Title: MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp. G.R. No.

201001

Doctrine: Best Evidence Rule: The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document
whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. Except those exceptions as provided under Section 3 of Rule of the Rules of
Court. Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for
its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

Facts

MCMP leased heavy equipment from Monark for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract .
Thus, Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP, the delivery evidenced by invoices
as well as Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667 and 5706, received and signed by representatives of MCMP.

Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices, MCMP failed to pay the rental fees. As of April 30,
2002, MCMP owed Monark the amount of Ph₱1,282,481.83,

During trial, Monark presented asone of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account Manager.
Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies ofthe Contract, one retained by Monark, while the other was given
to MCMP. He further testified that Monark’s copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved futile.
Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to
search for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial
court to produce the same.

RTC -rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay

CA- affirmed in totothe Decision and Order of the RTC. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
existence of the Contract?

Ruling: No. Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.

The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever its contents are the
subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court which provides:

"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis
supplied)"

Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to
prove the contents of a lost document:
"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost ordestroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is inthe custody or
under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory
proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss."

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the
following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to
the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were
exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this
Court, "findings offacts and assessment ofcredibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court."12 Hence, the Court
will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.

MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it has failed
to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request ofthe trial court for it to produce its copy of the Contract.13
Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s
failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence
in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, butit also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to
MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced."

Evidently, the instant petition must be dismissed.

EDSA SHANGRILA HOTEL & RESORT, INC. vs. BF Corp.

Doctrine:

”The original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents
is not admissible except where the original cannot be had.”

“When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.”

Facts:

A construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel
Project4 that ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other
things, the contract stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in
the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then
re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's progress billing

In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit: (1)
submission of the progress billing to ESHRI's Engineering Department; (2) following-up of the preparation of the Progress
Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment
with one Evelyn San Pascual. BF adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the period from May 1, 1991 to
June 30, 1992, submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work Summary, the monthly progress billings, including an
evaluation of the work in accordance with the Project Manager's Instructions (PMIs) and the detailed valuations contained in
the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for final re-measurement under the PMIs. BF said that the values of the WVOs were
contained in the progress billings under the section "Change Orders."

From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the procedure agreed upon. Based
on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05.7
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the work done, did not prepare the
Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having
been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment
Certificates already being processed.

After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of
money and damages.
In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with
damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and turning
up with inferior work accomplishment.

Issue:

Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of law raised by petitioners in their
appeal [particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a
general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot
be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (Emphasis added.)

Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. - If the document is in the custody or under control
of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other than the original
instrument or document itself.18 A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance,
however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.

In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in question as secondary
evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to
19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed.

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the
conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary
evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of
the cause of the original document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith. 19 While perhaps not on all fours
because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt, thus:

“To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse
party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to
produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.”

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does not
warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best
evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the
original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence
may be admitted.

Airfrance vs carrascosso

n March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was
issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of
Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when
things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the
plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take
the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in
the plane’s journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso
was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the
said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court is admissible in
evidence.

HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first
class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not
an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous
act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air
France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry,
but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

G.R. No. 179470 April 20, 2010

NISSAN NORTH EDSA operating under the name MOTOR CARRIAGE, INC., Petitioner, vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE
SCOUT VETERANS DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY, Respondent.

Doctrine:

The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence to prove a disputed fact. 29 However, the
same applies only when the contents of a document are the subject of the inquiry.

Facts:

United Philippine Scout Veterans Detective and Protective Agency (United) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of providing security services. It entered into a contract for security services with petitioner 5 Nissan North Edsa (Nissan), and
was able to post 18 security guards within Nissan’s compound located in EDSA Balintawak, Quezon City.6

On 3 November 1995, United’s night supervisor and night security guard did not report for duty. Then, on 16 January 1996,
at noontime, the security supervisor assigned at Nissan’s premises abandoned his post
In the morning of 31 January 1996, Nissan informed United, through the latter’s General Manager, Mr. Ricarte Galope
(Galope), that its services were being terminated beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day. Galope personally pleaded with the
personnel manager of Nissan to reconsider its decision.8 When Nissan failed to act on this verbal request, Galope wrote a
Letter to Nissan’s general manager, formally seeking a reconsideration of its action. As this was likewise ignored, United’s
President and Chairman of the Board wrote a Letter addressed to Nissan’s President and General Manager, demanding
payment of the amount equivalent to thirty (30) days of service in view of Nissan’s act of terminating United’s services
without observing the required 30-day prior written notice as stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service contract.

As a result of Nissan’s continued failure to comply with United’s demands, the latter filed a case for Sum of Money with
damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas City.

In its Answer, Nissan maintained that the above-mentioned paragraph 17 of the service contract expressly confers upon
either party the power to terminate the contract, without the necessity of a prior written notice, in cases of violations of the
provisions thereof.11 Nissan alleged that United violated the terms of their contract, thereby allowing Nissan to unilaterally
terminate the services of United without prior notice.12

Nissan claimed that its premises had been exposed to threats in security, which allegedly constitutes a clear violation of the
provisions of the service contract.17

MeTC:
- ruled in favor of herein respondent United.
- pronounced that Nissan has not adduced any evidence to substantiate its claim that the terms of their contract were
violated by United; and that absent any showing that violations were committed, the 30-day prior written notice should
have been observed.

RTC:
- It denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

CA:
- affirmed the Decision of the RTC, with the modification that the award for exemplary damages was deleted.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolution of this case calls for the application of the best evidence rule.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit. We thus sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Nissan’s reliance on the best evidence rule is misplaced. The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade
of evidence to prove a disputed fact.29 However, the same applies only when the contents of a document are the subject of
the inquiry.30 In this case, the contents of the service contract between Nissan and United have not been put in issue.
Neither United nor Nissan disputes the contents of the service contract; as in fact, both parties quoted and relied on the
same provision of the contract (paragraph 17) to support their respective claims and defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule
finds no application here.

The real issue in this case is whether or not Nissan committed a breach of contract, thereby entitling United to damages in
the amount equivalent to 30 days’ service.

We rule in the affirmative.

At the heart of the controversy is paragraph 17 of the service contract, which reads:

However, violations committed by either party on the provisions of this Contract shall be sufficient ground for the termination
of this contract, without the necessity of prior notice, otherwise a thirty (30) days prior written notice shall be observed.31
Nissan argues that the failure of United’s security guards to report for duty on two occasions, without justifiable cause,
constitutes a violation of the provisions of the service contract, sufficient to entitle Nissan to terminate the same without the
necessity of a 30-day prior notice.

We hold otherwise.

As the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas City stated in its decision, Nissan did not adduce any evidence to substantiate its
claim that the terms of the contract were violated by United.

What Nissan failed to do is to point out or indicate the specific provisions of the service contract which were violated by
United as a result of the latter’s lapses in security. In so failing, Nissan’s act of unilaterally terminating the contract
constitutes a breach thereof, entitling United to collect actual damages.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.

[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990. CRUZ, J.:]

Doctrine: Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the
need of accounting for the original.
Facts:
- Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2) pieces of
dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are prohibited drug, for and in
consideration of P20.00.
- The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:
- The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of
the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
- The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
- One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan
said yes. The exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00
bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
- The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.
- The accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court
of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
- The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:
o This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money which,
according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
o Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary document falling under
Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence
except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:
- The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry.
Issue:
Whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Held:
1. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
2. Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the
accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the
police officers.
3. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to
produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
4. We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt.
 5. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge of drug addiction
upon our people.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
accused-appellant.:

Title: Marquez vs. Espejo GR. No. 168387 August 25, 2010

Doctrine: The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence
is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a
general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.

Facts:

Respondents in the case owned 2 parcels of land, the Lantap property and Murong property. The respondents in the case
are the tenatns of such properties. The respondents mortaged both the properties to RBBI. Upon failure to pay, the
properties were transferred to RBBI. But later on, the respondent bought back one of the properties. When the prperties
were transferred to RBBI both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any
reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong. Late on, respondents both back one ofthe properties but the deed
of sale did not mention the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-
62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property.

Meanwhile, the RBBI pursuanat to RA 6657 executed a separate VLT in favor of the petitioners, the tenants of Murong
property. More than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and almost seven years after the execution
of VLTs in favor of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint before the RARAD for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs,
the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer
by RBBI in favor of respondent. The complaint was based on respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the
petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based
their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts.

Ruling:

NO, the CA erred in deciding the case. Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of
Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since
the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property then the
property repurchased by the respondents was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between
petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap property then the property transferred to petitioners
was the Lantap property.

The SC held, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence
(such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it
reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document. In the instant case, there is no room for the application of
the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties
that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.

PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 142641 July 17, 2006
Facts:
Pacifico Arceo obtained a loan from Josefino Cenizal totaling to 150,000.00. Arceo issued a BPI check for payment. It was
dishonored by the bank due to insufficient funds. Cenizal filed a BP 22 case against Arceo however during trial the check in
question and the return slip were however lost by as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence. Cenizal executed an
Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip. RTC ruled in favor of Ceniza which was also
affirmed by CA, hence petition reached the Supreme Court.
Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule
Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is
wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence
rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the
execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact
of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Although the check and the return slip
were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution,
existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the
case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admitted that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented for payment
to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

63.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NEIL B. COLORADO

Facts:

Accused-appellant Colorado was charged with the crime of rape in an Information. Colorado pleaded "not guilty" upon
arraignment. During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: (1) the existence of the Medico Legal Certi:cate and
the Birth Certi:cate of AAA; (2) that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA; and (3) that Colorado and AAA lived under the
same roof. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

AAA testified that sometime in December 2002, her parents attended a wedding celebration somewhere in Hermosa, Dasol,
Pangasinan, leaving behind AAA, Colorado and their two other brothers in the house. When their parents had not yet arrived
in the evening, Colorado committed the dastardly act against AAA. She was twelve (12) years old at that time, while
Colorado was already twenty-four (24) years old. He approached AAA, held her two hands, even threatened her with a knife
and covered her mouth with a handkerchief. He then removed AAA's shorts and panty, inserted his penis into the young
girl's vagina, then made a push and pull movement. AAA tried to resist her brother's sexual aggression, but miserably failed
despite her efforts because of her brother's greater strength. Colorado later left AAA, who put back her shorts and
underwear, but remained awake because of fear and trauma with what she had gone through.

On that same night, Colorado raped AAA twice more, unmindful of the presence of their two other brothers who were then
sleeping inside the room where Colorado ravished AAA. In both instances, Colorado still threatened AAA with a knife,
removed her shorts and panty, inserted his penis into his sister's vagina, then performed the push and pull movement.
Colorado warned AAA that he would stab her should she report to anyone what he had done. AAA then did not dare reveal
these incidents to anybody, until she had the courage to report them to their mother.

Also in her testimony before the trial court, AAA disclosed that she had been raped by Colorado when she was just nine (9)
years old. She also revealed having been ravished on different dates by another brother, DDD, and a brother-in-law.

Colorado testi:ed for his defense. He denied having raped AAA, arguing that he was not living with AAA in their parents'
house in December 2002. Allegedly, he was at that time staying with an older sister in Osmeña, Dasol. Colorado claimed that
on the night of the alleged incident, he was fishing with his brother-in-law, and that they returned to Osmeña, Dasol in the
morning of the following day.

The RTC rendered its decision finding Colorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape.The CA
affirmed Colorado's conviction.Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of AAA admissible.

RULING:
Both the RTC and the CA correctly ruled on the concurrence of the following elements of quali:ed rape, as de:ned in the
aforequoted provisions of the RPC: (1) that the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (2) that the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian or relative by consanguinity or af:nity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (3) that the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either
through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.

The age of the victim at the time of the crime's commission is undisputed. During the pretrial, the parties agreed on the
existence of AAA's Certificate of Live Birth.As to the second element, there is no dispute that Colorado is a full-blood brother
of AAA, as this was also among the parties' stipulated facts during the case's pre-trial.

The grounds now being raised by Colorado to justify his exoneration delve mainly on the alleged absence of the crime's third
element. He denies AAA's claim that he had ravished her, raising the defense of alibi and the alleged doubt and suspicion
that should be ascribed to AAA's accusations. On this matter, settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of a witness deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial
evidence. We have repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process
of unearthing the truth. The rule finds even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA. Thus,
except for compelling reasons, we are doctrinally bound by the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
The Court finds no cogent reasons to overturn RTC and CA’s findings. Indeed, it was established that Colorado succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of the victim, employing force, threat and intimidation that allowed him to consummate his bestial
act. AAA had positively identified Colorado as her rapist. Such identification of Colorado could not have been difficult for AAA
considering that Colorado was a brother who lived with her in their parents' house. Even the failure of AAA to identify the
exact date of the crime's commission is inconsequential to Colorado's conviction. In rape cases, the date of commission is
not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence, 16 a fact that was sufficiently established given
AAA's and her testimony's credibility. Contrary to Colorado's contention, AAA's claim that two other siblings were sleeping in
the same room where she was raped did not render her statements incredible. Time and again, we have taken into
consideration how rapists are not deterred by the presence of people nearby, such as the members of their own family inside
the same room, with the likelihood of being discovered, since lust respects no time, locale or circumstance. As against AAA's
credible testimony, Colorado's defenses lack persuasion. While Colorado denied in his testimony that he lived with AAA, such
fact was already admitted by the parties during the pre-trial. His defense that he was in Osmeña, Dasol at the time of the
crime's commission was even uncorroborated by any other witness. By jurisprudence, denial is an intrinsically weak defense
which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence
to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant and his
involvement in the crime attributed to him. 18 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur. First,
the appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was committed; and second, it was physically impossible for him
to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. The defense failed to establish these requisites. On the contrary,
Colorado testified that from Osmeña, where he claimed to have lived with an older sister, he could normally reach his
parents' house by a three hour walk. There were also other means of transportation in these two places, which then could
have allowed Colorado to travel the distance over a shorter period of time.

Colorado also questions the weight of Dr. Sanchez's medico-legal certificate, arguing that AAA's hymenal lacerations could
have resulted from the sexual aggressions allegedly committed against her by DDD and their brother-in-law. Such contention,
however, deserves no consideration, given that results of an offended party's medical examination are merely corroborative
in character. As explained by the Court in People v. Balonzo, a medical certi:cate is not necessary to prove the commission of
rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. An accused can still be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole
testimony of the private complainant. Furthermore, laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and
irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In
the context that is used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Thus, even granting that AAA's lacerations
were not caused by Colorado, the latter could still be declared guilty of rape, after it was established that he succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of the victim.

G.R. No. 195640 December 4, 2012

SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, represented by its Administrator, Petitioner,
vs.
ENCARNACION B. TORMON, EDGARDO B. ALISAJE, LOURDES M. DOBLE, TERESITA Q. LIM, EDMUNDO R.
JORNADAL, JIMMY C. VILLANUEVA , DEANNA M. JANCE, HENRY G. DOBLE, REYNALDO D. LUZANA, MEDELYN P.
TOQUILLO, SEVERINO A. ORLIDO, RHODERICK V. ALIPOON, JONATHAN CORDERO, DANILO B. BISCOCHO,
BELLO C. LUCASAN, LUBERT V. TIVE, and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is Decision No. 2010-
1461 dated December 30,2010 of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private respondents, namely: Encarnacion B. Tormon, Edgardo B. Alisaje, Lourdes M. Doble, Teresita Q. Lim, Edmundo R.
Jornadal, Jimmy C. Villanueva , Deanna M. Jance, Henry G. Doble, Reynaldo D. Luzana, Medelyn P. Toquillo, Severino A.
Orlido, Rhoderick V. Alipoon, Jonathan Cordero, Danilo B. Biscocho, Bello C. Lucasan, Lubert V. Tive, were former employees
of Philippine Sugar Institute (PHILSUGIN) and the Sugar Quota Administration (SQA). On February 2, 1974, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 388 was issued creating the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM). Under the said decree,
PHILSUGIN and SQA shall be abolished upon the organization of PHILSUCOM and all the former's assets, liabilities and
records shall be transferred to the latter and the personnel of the abolished agencies who may not be retained shall be
entitled to retirement/gratuity and incentive benefits.

In September 1977, PHILSUGIN and SQA were abolished and private respondents were separated from the service; thus,
they were paid their retirement/gratuity and incentive benefits. In the same year, private respondents were reinstated by
PHILSUCOM subject to the condition that the former would refund in full the retirement/gratuity and incentive benefits they
received from PHILSUGIN or SQA. PHILSUCOM Consultant, Eduardo F. Gamboa, wrote:

We have received orders from the Main Office to require you to refund in full the unexpired portion of the money value of
the retirement or lay-off gratuity you received as called for in Office Memorandum No. 4, series of 1977, dated December 5,
1977, in view of your reinstatement in the service.

xxxx

In connection herewith, you are therefore directed to make the necessary refund of the above-mentioned amount to our
Local Accounting Department and to inform the Personnel Department, when refund is made. Failure on your part to make
the necessary refund will constrain us to recommend corrective measures.2

On May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 18, series of 1986 was issued wherein the Sugar Regulatory Administration
(petitioner SRA) replaced PHILSUCOM. PHILSUCOM's assets and records were all transferred to petitioner SRA which also
retained some of the former's personnel which included the private respondents.

On July 29, 2004, E.O. No. 339 was issued, otherwise known as Mandating the Rationalization of the Operations and
Organization of the SRA, for the purpose of strengthening its vital services and refocusing its resources to priority programs
and activities, and reducing its personnel with the payment of retirement gratuity and incentives for those who opted to
retire from the service. Among those separated from the service were private respondents. Under the SRA Rationalization
Program, petitioner computed its employees' incentives and terminal leave benefits based on their creditable years of service
contained in their respective service records on file with petitioner and validated by the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS). The computation was then submitted to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for approval and
request of funds. The DBM approved the same and released the disbursement vouchers for processing of the incentive
benefits.

However, in the course of the implementation of its rationalization plan, petitioner found out that there was no showing that
private respondents had refunded their gratuity benefits received from PHILSUGIN or SQA. Hence, petitioner considered
private respondents' length of service as having been interrupted which commenced only at the time they were re-employed
by PHILSUCOM in 1977. Petitioner then recomputed private respondents' retirement and incentive benefits and paid only the
75% equivalent of the originally computed benefits and withheld the remaining 25% in view of the latter's inability to prove
the refund.

Private respondents requested petitioner to compute their incentive benefits based on their length of service to include their
years of service with PHILSUGIN or SQA taking into consideration their refund of gratuity benefits to PHILSUCOM at the time
of their re-employment in 1977. On January 4, 2007, then petitioner's Administrator, James C. Ledesma, issued a
memorandum3 declaring the services of its employees affected by the Rationalization Program, which included private
respondents, terminated effective on January 15, 2007. Under Board Resolution No. 2007-0554 dated June 14, 2007,
petitioner denied private respondents' requests for the latter's failure to submit proofs of refund of gratuity received from
PHILSUGIN or SQA.

On September 6, 2007, private respondents wrote a letter5 addressed to then Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman,
Guillermo N. Carague, asking the COA to order petitioner to pay the balance representing the 25% of their retirement and
incentive benefits withheld by petitioner. They claimed that they had already refunded the full amount of the incentive
benefits through salary deductions and since petitioner could no longer find the PHILSUCOM payrolls reflecting those
deductions, private respondents submitted the affidavits of Messrs. Hilario T. Cordova6 and Nicolas L. Meneses
Jr.,7 petitioner's Chief, Administrative Division, and Manager, Administrative and Finance Department, respectively, both
executed in March 2007, attesting to the fact of refund.

Petitioner filed its Answer8 thereto contending among others that since private respondents alleged payment, they were
duty-bound to present evidence substantiating the said refund; that no records of payments existed to clearly establish their
claim, thus, their resort to secondary evidence which were the sworn affidavits of petitioner's former officials were
insufficient to prove the fact of the alleged payment.

On October 14, 2009, the COA rendered Decision No. 2009 -100,9 with the following dispositive portion, to wit:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Commission rules that the affidavits presented by claimants are
insufficient proofs that they have refunded to PHILSUCOM the gratuity/incentive benefits they received from
PHILSUGIN/SQA.

Evidence other than the affidavits must be presented to substantially prove their claims. Also, all the benefits, gratuity,
incentive and retirement they received upon their separation from PHILSUGIN or SQA must be accounted for and refunded
to SRA before the requested incentive benefit is computed based on their length of government service reckoned from the
time they were employed with PHILSUGIN or SQA.10

In so ruling, the COA found that since private respondents alleged payment, they had the burden of proving the same by
clear and positive evidence; that the affidavits of Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr. stating that private respondents had
refunded to PHILSUCOM the benefits they received from PHILSUGIN/SQA were not the best evidence of such refunds; that
an affidavit was made without notice to the adverse party or opportunity to cross examine; and that the contents of these
affidavits were too general and did not state private respondents’ respective final payments.

Private respondents filed their motion for reconsideration which was opposed by petitioner.

On December 30, 2010, the COA rendered Decision No. 2010-146 granting private respondents' motion for reconsideration,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, COA Decision
No. 2009-100 is hereby REVERSED and [SET] ASIDE. The SRA is directed to release to movants the amount representing the
25% balance of their incentive and terminal leave benefits.11

In its decision, the COA observed that private respondents had filed a separate but related complaint with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). It found that while their complaint with the CSC was denominated as illegal termination/backwages and
entitlements, the main thrust of their complaint was to compel the payment of the 25% balance of their total incentives and
terminal leave benefits withheld by petitioner, which was the same demand made in their letter to Chairman Carague whose
decision is the subject of the motion for reconsideration, thus, forum shopping existed. The COA also noted that in their
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration/Manifestation filed on November 24, 2009, private respondents mentioned the
ruling of the CSC12 in their favor and they now disputed the COA’s jurisdiction to rule on their demand contending that it is
the CSC which has jurisdiction over cases involving government reorganization; and that the CSC had issued a Resolution
granting private respondents' motion for execution of the CSC resolution. Notwithstanding, however, the COA found that it
did not lose jurisdiction over the present case and went on to decide the claim on the merits and disregarded the CSC
Resolution.

The COA ruled that the affidavits submitted were not secondary evidence within the context of Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, hence, admissible in evidence, since technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in
administrative proceedings. The COA found in the records certain significant circumstances which, when taken together with
the affidavits, established that indeed private respondents had refunded the incentives in question. Since private
respondents had discharged their burden of proof, it was incumbent on petitioner to discharge the burden of evidence that
respondents had not paid the said incentives; that it was the PHILSUCOM, then petitioner, being the successor of
PHILSUGIN and SQA, that had been tasked with the official custody of all the records and books of their predecessors, as
mandated under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 388; that if petitioner's Accounting Division cannot issue a certification
because it has no records, it is never an excuse to shift the burden to the employees.

Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues, to wit:

1. Whether or not respondent Commission erred and gravely abused its discretion when it gave credence to the
affidavits of Mr. Hilario T. Cordova, then Chief, Administrative Division, SRA, and Mr. Nicolas L. Meneses, Jr., then
Manager, Administrative and Finance Department plainly alleging that the gratuity/incentives have been refunded
by the private respondents.

2. Whether or not public respondent Commission on Audit erred and gravely abused its discretion in making
assumptions or suppositions out of certain circumstances which were not even alleged by private respondents and
in arriving at a conclusion out of the same in favor of private respondents.

3. Whether or not public respondent Commission on Audit erred and gravely abused its discretion in finding
substantial evidence that private respondents refunded the gratuity incentives in question.13

The issue for resolution is whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in directing
petitioner to pay the 25% balance of private respondents' incentive and terminal leave benefits withheld from the submitted
computation of petitioner and duly funded by the DBM.

We find no merit in the petition.

Petitioner withheld 25% of private respondents' incentive and terminal leave benefits because of their failure to present
evidence of refund of the amounts of retirement and incentive benefits earlier received from PHILSUGIN/SQA. On the other
hand, private respondents claim that they had already refunded these benefits through salary deduction, therefore, they are
entitled to the payment of the amounts withheld by petitioner. The burden of proof is on private respondents to prove such
refund. One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.14 Even where the creditor alleges non-payment, the general
rule is that the onus rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment.15 The debtor
has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.16

Well settled also is the rule that a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of payment.17 In Monfort v.
Aguinaldo,18 the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were deemed to be the best evidence. Private respondents,
however, could not present any receipt since they alleged that their payments were made through salary deductions and the
payrolls which supposedly contained such deductions were in petitioner's possession which had not been produced. In order
to prove their allegations of refund, private respondents submitted the affidavits of Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr., which
we successively quote in part, to wit:

Mr. Cordova states:

That I was the Administrative Officer II of the defunct Philippine Sugar Institute when it was abolished in 1977; that I hold
the same position when the Philippine Sugar Commission took over the functions of PHILSUGIN from that year up to 1986;

That I continued to be the head of Personnel Division when Sugar Regulatory Administration replaced PHILSUCOM in 1986
and retired as Division Chief II of the Administrative Division on July 31, 2003;

That during my incumbency in said positions, I have personal knowledge of the paymen/refund of ex-PHILSUGIN employees
separated from service but reinstated in PHILSUCOM by way of salary deduction through payroll;

That Ms. Encarnacion Tormon, et al., upon return to service with PHILSUCOM, refunded the amount of the gratuities they
received from PHILSUGIN in the months following/succeeding upon their appointment as reinstated employees of
PHILSUCOM;
That their status as reinstated employees are officially marked in their individual service records duly authenticated by myself
as Chief of Personnel Division and validated by the Government Service Insurance System as proven by GSIS computation of
their creditable years.19

On the other hand, Mr. Meneses Jr., states:

That I was the Chief Internal Auditor of the defunct Philippine Sugar Institute when it was abolished in 1977; that I hold a
key position in the Budget and Accounting Division when the Philippine Sugar Commission took over the functions of
PHILSUGIN from that year up to 1986;

That I later became Division Chief I of [the] Budget Division in the Sugar Regulatory Administration in 1988 and retired as
Manager of the Administrative and Finance Department on July 31, 2003;

That during my incumbency in said positions, I have personal knowledge of the payment/refund of ex-PHILSUGIN employees
separated from service and reinstated in PHILSUCOM;

That Ms. Encarnacion Tormon et al., upon return to service with PHILSUCOM, refunded the amount of the gratuities they
received from PHILSUGIN;

That their status as reinstated employees are officially marked in their individual service records duly authenticated by the
Chief of Personnel Division and validated by GSIS.20

Messrs. Cordova, being petitioner's head of the Personnel Department, and Meneses, Jr., as petitioner's Chief of Budget
Division, and later Manager of the Administrative and Finance Department, were in the best positions to attest to the fact of
private respondents' refund through salary deductions of the amounts of retirement and incentive benefits previously
received, especially since these officials were in those departments since PHILSUCOM took over in 1977 and later with
petitioner until their retirement in 2003. There was nothing on record to show that Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr. were
actuated with any ill motive in the execution of their affidavits attesting to the fact of refund.

The general rule is that administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of evidence. It can accept documents
which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the Rules of Court are strictly observed. It can choose to give
weight or disregard such evidence, depending on its trustworthiness.21 Here, we find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the COA when it admitted the affidavits of Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr. and gave weight to them in the
light of the other circumstances established by the records which will be shown later in the decision.

Petitioner claims that the affiants attested on a matter which happened 30 years ago; thus, how could they recall that each
of the 16 employees had actually refunded the gratuity/incentives way back in 1977; that each of the private respondents
held different positions with salaries different from each other and the dates when they respectively re-assumed service in
the government differed from each other; that it may not even be entirely correct that all 16 respondents refunded the
gratuity incentives in question by salary deduction.

We are not persuaded.

Significantly, Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr. were petitioner's former officials who held key positions in the two divisions,
namely, Personnel and Accounting Divisions, where private respondents were directed by then petitioner's Consultant
Gamboa to make the necessary refunds for their retirement and incentive pay. Thus, if no refunds were made, these officials
could have reported the same to Gamboa, who would have taken corrective measures as he threatened to do so if private
respondents failed to make the necessary refunds. Notably, there is no showing that corrective measures had been taken.
Moreover, as we said, while the COA admitted the affidavits, it did not rely solely on those affidavits to conclude that refunds
were already made by private respondents. The matter of refund was proven by several circumstances which the COA found
extant in the records of the case. We find apropos to quote the COA findings in this wise:

First, movants were reemployed by PHILSUCOM with the condition that they must return the benefits they had already
received. In his 16 March 1978 letter, Mr. Eduardo F. Gamboa, directed Ms. Tormon to refund the amount and to inform the
Personnel Department when the refund was made. He warned Ms. Tormon to make the refund or they will be constrained to
recommend corrective measures. The fact was that claimants were reinstated. That management did not take any corrective
measures to compel the refund – except perhaps, the enforced salary deduction which claimants said was the mode of
refund undertaken - is a point in favor of claimants. It would be unbelievable that in all these years, from 1977 to 2007, the
SRA management, indubitably having the higher authority, just slept on its right to enforce the refund and did nothing about
it. The natural and expected action that SRA ought to have taken was to enforce the refund through salary deduction, not
through voluntary direct payment since the latter option does not carry with it the mandatory character of an automatic
salary deduction.

Second, a certain Mr. Henry Doble, one of the movants, was promoted from Emergency Employee, a temporary status, to
senior machine cutting operator with permanent status. If Mr. Doble had not refunded his gratuity, it was more reasonable
to suppose that SRA would not have promoted him.

Third, COA Directors Rosemarie L. Lerio and Divina M. Alagon, CGS and SRA ATL22 Antonio M. Malit, to whom the case was
coursed through for comments, did not mention, even in passing, of any audit finding in the Annual Audit Reports (AARS)
regarding the unrefunded incentives received by claimants The silence of the AARs for 30 years would only lend credence
that theses refunds were made.

Fourth, under the SRA Rationalization program, the affected employees' incentive and terminal leave benefits were
computed based on their creditable years of services as contained in their respective service records with the agency as
validated by the GSIS. Accordingly, SRA computed movants' incentive and terminal leave benefits as of December 31, 2006
which was approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary Rolando Andaya. This only showed
that even the SRA was convinced that movants had no more financial accountability with the SRA at the time.1âwphi1

Fifth, then SRA Administrator James C. Ledesma informed movants that not one of the records of the payments they claimed
was available at the office; thus, the SRA could not be definite as to the actual payments made by them and the equivalent
periods corresponding thereto, Also, Ms. Amelita A. Papasin, Accountant IV, Accounting Unit, SRA, Bacolod, stated that they
could not find any record showing payments made as claimed by Ms. Tormon, et al., to refund the severance gratuities paid
to them during their termination on September 30, 1977. Indeed, the SRA could not comply with the request of Mr. Antonio
M. Malit, Audit Team leader (ATL), SRA, to produce copies of payroll or index of payments, or any accounting records
covering the 32-year period which would have shown whether movants paid or did not pay the required refund. These
payrolls and other records would have conclusively established the fact of payment or non-payment, But then all the SRA
could say was there is no record of such payment. Absence of record is different from saying there was no payment.23

Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts,
and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.24

Petitioner's claim that the COA made its own assumptions which were not even based on the allegations made by private
respondents in any of their pleadings is devoid of merit. In their Reply to petitioner's Supplemental Comment/Opposition to
private respondents' motion for reconsideration, private respondents had alleged some of these above- mentioned
circumstances to support their claim that refunds had already been made. We also find that the records of the case support
the above-quoted circumstances enumerated by the COA.

Considering that private respondents had introduced evidence that they had refunded their retirement and incentive benefits
through salary deduction, the burden of going forward with the evidence- as distinct from the general burden of proof- shifts
to the petitioner, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.25 However, the payroll to
establish whether or not deductions had been made from the salary of private respondents were in petitioner's custody, but
petitioner failed to present the same due to the considerable lapse of time.

All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COA in rendering
its assailed decision. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism,26 which is wanting in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Decision No. 2010-146 dated December 30, 2010 of the Commission on Audit is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Estrada v. Desierto cited in CITIBANK, N.A. and Investor’s Finance Corporation v. Modesta R. Sebeniano, G.R.
No. 156132, October 12, 2006

Doctrine: the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must
be produced. Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best
proved by the production of the document itself, to the exclusion of any secondary or
substitutionary evidence

Facts:
Modesta Sabeniano is a client of Citibank and FNCB Finance. On February 1978, Sabeniano obtained a loan of Php 200,000
from Citibank. This loan was followed with several other loans – some were paid, while some were not. Those that were not
paid upon maturity were rolled over, reflecting a total unpaid loan of Php 1,069,847.40 as of September 1979.
These loans were secured by Sabeniano’s money market placements with FNCB Finance through a Deed of Assignment plus
a Declaration of Pledge which states that all present and future fiduciary placements held in her personal and/or joint name
with Citibank Switzerland, will secure all claims that Citibank may have or, in the future, acquire against her.

The Deeds of Assignment were duly notarized, while the Declaration of Pledge was not notarized and Citibank’s copy was
undated, while that of Sabeniano bore the date, September 24, 1979.

Since Sabeniano failed to pay her obligations to Citibank, the latter sent demand letters to request payment. Her total unpaid
loan initially amounted to Php 2,123,843.20 (inclusive of interests).

Still failing to pay, Citibank executed the Deeds of Assignment and used the proceeds of Sabeniano’s money market
placement from FNCB Finance which totaled Php 1,022,916.66 and her deposits with Citibank which totaled Php 31,079.14
to set-off her loan. This reduced the unpaid balance to Php 1,069,847.40 as previously mentioned. Since the loan remains
unpaid, Citibank proceeded to execute the Declaration of Pledge and remitted a total of $149,632.99 from Sabeniano’s
Citibank-Geneva accounts to off-set the loan.

Sabeniano then filed a complaint against Citibank for damages and specific performance (for proper accounting and return of
the remitted proceeds from her personal accounts). She also contended that the proceeds of 2 promissory notes (PN) from
her money market placements with Citibank were rolled over or reinvested into the petitioner bank, and these should also be
returned to her.

Regarding the execution of the pledge, the RTC declared this illegal, null and void. Citibank was ordered to return the
$149,632.99 to Sabeniano’s Citibank-Geneva account with a legal interest of 12% per annum. The RTC also ordered
Sabeniano to pay her outstanding loan to Citibank without interests and penalty charges.

Both parties appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC’s decision, but further ruled entirely in favor of Sabeniano – holding
that Citibank failed to establish her indebtedness and that all the executed deeds should be returned to her account. The
case has now reached the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the court of appeals is correct in dismissing the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioners

Ruling:
This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals summarily
dismissing the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners based on its broad and
indiscriminate application of the best evidence rule

The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents was established through the testimonies of witnesses,
such as Mr. Tan, before whom most of the documents were personally executed by respondent. The original PNs also went
through the whole loan booking system of petitioner Citibank — from the account officer in its Marketing Department, to the
pre-processor, to the signature verifier, back to the preprocessor, then to the processor for booking. The original PNs were
seen by Ms. Dondoyano, the processor, who recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr. Pujeda personally saw the original
MCs, proving respondent's receipt of the proceeds of her loans from petitioner Citibank, when he helped Attys. Cleofe and
Fernandez, the bank's legal counsels, to reconstruct the records of respondent's loans. The original MCs were presented to
Atty. Cleofe who used the same during the preliminary investigation of the case, sometime in years 1986-1987. The original
MCs were subsequently turned over to the Control and Investigation Division of petitioner Citibank. It was only petitioner
FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original copies of the PNs when it moved to a new office. Citibank did not make
a similar contention; instead, it explained that the original copies of the PNs were returned to the borrower upon liquidation
of the loan, either through payment or roll-over. Petitioner Citibank proffered the excuse that they were still looking for the
documents in their storage or warehouse to explain the delay and difficulty in the retrieval thereof, but not their absence or
loss. The original documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and, thus, unavailable for
presentation before the RTC only on 7 October 1987, when a fire broke out on the 7th floor of the office building of
petitioner Citibank. There is no showing that the fire was intentionally set. The fire destroyed relevant documents, not just of
the present case, but also of other cases, since the 7th floor housed the Control and Investigation Division, in charge of
keeping the necessary documents for cases in which petitioner Citibank was involved. The foregoing would have been
sufficient to allow the presentation of photocopies or microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the petitioners as
secondary evidence to establish the existence of respondent's loans, as an exception to the best evidence rule.

In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that — It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only
copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not,
however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that: "Production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

Citibank, N.A. and Investor’s Finance Corp. vs. Sabeniano

Doctrine:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.”
“Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court -
SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated.”

Facts:
Respondent was a client of petitioners. She had several deposits and market placements with petitioners, among which were
her savings account with the local branch of petitioner Citibank (Manila); money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance; and dollar accounts with the Geneva branch of petitioner Citibank (Citibank-Geneva, Switzerland).
At the same time, respondent had outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank, incurred at Citibank-Manila amounting to P1.9M
which had become due and demandable by May 1979.
Despite repeated demands by petitioner Citibank, respondent failed to pay her outstanding loans.
Thus, petitioner Citibank used respondent's deposits and money market placements to off-set and liquidate her outstanding
obligations.
Respondents denied having any outstanding loans with petitioner and she likewise denied that she was informed of the off-
setting or compensation made by petitioner using her deposits and money market placements with petitioners. Hence, she
instituted a complaint for accounting, sum of money and damages against petitioners with RTC.
RTC declared, among others, illegal, null and void the setoff by Citibank of plaintiff’s dollar deposit with Citibank, Switzerland
and ordered Citibank to refund the said amount to the plaintiff with legal interest.
RTC also declared plaintiff indebted to Citibank in the amount of P1M+ and ordered plaintiff to pay.
CA affirmed RTC decision with modification. It declared illegal, null and void the setoff by Citibank of the dollar deposit with
Citibank, Switzerland and ordered defendant to refund. As Citibank failed to establish by competent evidence the alleged
indebtedness of plaintiff, the set off of P1M+ in the account of plaintiff is declared without legal basis.
After the resolution of CA of the MR is still in favor of the respondent, the petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the documentary evidence by petitioner based on its broad and indiscriminate application of
the best evidence rule.

Ruling:
This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals summarily dismissing the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioners based on its broad and indiscriminate application of the best evidence rule.

In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. Accordingly, for
documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself, to the
exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence.

The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3, which reads -
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of
the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus -
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is
the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need for accounting for the original.

Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real,
evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91
Phil 565). x x x [115]

In Estrada v. Desierto,[116] this Court had occasion to rule that -

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his
book on evidence, states that:

"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.24

"x x x x

"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily
no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its
essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it."
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm
copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of respondent's loans. The terms
or contents of these documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent's position that
the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding
PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of the
loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another
purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of
petitioner Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse
of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the former is
admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the
documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.

Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding
the existence of respondent's loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule
130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court -
SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated.
The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents was established through the testimonies of witnesses,
such as Mr. Tan, before whom most of the documents were personally executed by respondent. The original PNs also went
through the whole loan booking system of petitioner Citibank - from the account officer in its Marketing Department, to the
pre-processor, to the signature verifier, back to the pre-processor, then to the processor for booking.[117] The original PNs
were seen by Ms. Dondoyano, the processor, who recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr. Pujeda personally saw the
original MCs, proving respondent's receipt of the proceeds of her loans from petitioner Citibank, when he helped Attys.
Cleofe and Fernandez, the bank's legal counsels, to reconstruct the records of respondent's loans. The original MCs were
presented to Atty. Cleofe who used the same during the preliminary investigation of the case, sometime in years 1986-
1987. The original MCs were subsequently turned over to the Control and Investigation Division of petitioner Citibank. [118]

It was only petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original copies of the PNs when it moved to a new office.
Citibank did not make a similar contention; instead, it explained that the original copies of the PNs were returned to the
borrower upon liquidation of the loan, either through payment or roll-over. Petitioner Citibank proffered the excuse that they
were still looking for the documents in their storage or warehouse to explain the delay and difficulty in the retrieval thereof,
but not their absence or loss. The original documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and, thus,
unavailable for presentation before the RTC only on 7 October 1987, when a fire broke out on the 7th floor of the office
building of petitioner Citibank. There is no showing that the fire was intentionally set. The fire destroyed relevant
documents, not just of the present case, but also of other cases, since the 7th floor housed the Control and Investigation
Division, in charge of keeping the necessary documents for cases in which petitioner Citibank was involved.

The foregoing would have been sufficient to allow the presentation of photocopies or microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and
letters by the petitioners as secondary evidence to establish the existence of respondent's loans, as an exception to the best
evidence rule.

CHUA GAW V. CHUA (REMEDIAL)

If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondent's testimony as adverse witness
during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitutes a harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result
of the case.

In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is
that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's evidence.
Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of
the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all the facts and
circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.

A party who calls his adversary as a witness, therefore, is not bound by the latter's testimony only in the sense that he may
contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule that
provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony
may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or
from impeaching him. This, the petitioner failed to do.

All parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.
In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them
in evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party,
but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in
the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the
witness or contradict his testimony.

The BEST EVIDENCE RULE as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court applies only when the content of
such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or
exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the
original Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the
terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never
even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.
 [G.R. NO. 159687 : April 24, 2009]

GULF AIR, JASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ROBERTO J.C. REYES, Respondents.

FACTS:

Roberto J.C. Reyes (Reyes) had been employed with Gulf Air as Airport Manager for around ten years when he was
dismissed on October 10, 1992 for serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence4 arising from the following
incidents:

In an office memorandum dated June 29, 1992, Aquel Yousip Ishaq (Ishaq) of the Gulf Air Revenue Department instructed
Reyes to investigate the acceptance without prior authorization of an Astro Airline ticket on FOC [free of charge] basis for
travel from MNL-BAH on GF 155 on June 10, 1992, in violation of Gulf Air's Manual of Authority which provides that "no FOC
tickets of other airline (OAL) should be honored for travel on GF without obtaining proper authority." Astro Airline has no
interline agreement with Gulf Air.5

On October 1, 1992, Gulf Air Area Manager-Philippines, Jassim Hindri Abdulla (Abdulla) required Reyes to explain in writing
why he should not be dismissed for dishonesty, serious misconduct and willful breach of the trust and confidence reposed in
him by Gulf Air.

Pending submission of his explanation, Reyes was placed under preventive suspension. 10

Not satisfied with Reyes' explanation, Gulf Air terminated his employment.12

Reyes filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint against Gulf Air, Abdulla and Gulf Air Area Financial Controller Resty
Arevalo (hereinafter referred to as Gulf Air), alleging that he did not betray the trust and confidence of his employer when he
granted certain privileges to Queroz upon the request of Pascual; rather, he acted in the exercise of his public relations
duties as Airport Manager and in furtherance of Gulf Air's business interest.13 ςrαlαω

In a Decision dated August 7, 1998, the LA declared that Reyes was validly dismissed for he had no authority to extend
privileges to Queroz.

Reyes appealed21 to the NLRC which, in a Decision dated April 26, 1999, reversed the LA decision

Gulf Air filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same.25

Upon Petition for Review on Certiorari26

The CA denied Gulf Air's motion for partial reconsideration.28

In contrast to the findings of the LA, the concurrent view of the CA and the NLRC is that petitioners failed to prove the
existence of a company policy prohibiting respondent from directly granting to Queroz travel and accommodation privileges;
they instead found that the established company practice is that respondent may grant such privileges without need of prior
authorization.32 chanrobles virtual law library

It cannot be doubted that respondent's public relations duties include entertaining requests of officials of government
agencies for travel on board Gulf Air.

However, the authority of respondent to promote public relations by accommodating requests of officials of government
agencies for free or discounted passage on board petitioner Gulf Air is subject to limitations.

Gulf Air claims that when it comes to acceptance for passage of persons holding tickets issued by other airlines, the company
policy is provided in Gulf Air Finance Manual
Astro Airlines is not among the airlines with whom petitioner Gulf Air has an interline agreement; hence, under the foregoing
manual, acceptance of Astro Airlines tickets requires prior authorization from Gulf Air Marketing Department and notice to
the Revenue Department. Nothing in the Manual provides for exemption from this requirement.

Photocopy of the foregoing manual was presented by petitioner before the NLRC41 and the CA.42 Respondent objected to its
admissibility on the ground that it is a mere photocopy and the contents thereof were not testified to during the
proceedings.43 However, as cited by petitioners, respondent virtually acknowledged the existence of a company policy on
interline agreements in relation to the processing of requests by government officials for free passage

ISSUE:

WON the photocopy of the manual presented was admissible as evidence in the court?

HELD:

Yes.

A mere photocopy of the manual presented does not make said evidence any less significant. Labor proceedings are non-
litigious in nature; hence, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law do not strictly apply.
Rather, the hearing officer is given much leeway to ascertain for himself the facts of the case. 45

Without question, respondent did not comply with this requirement when he ordered the acceptance of the Astro Airlines
ticket of Queroz. However, there is no evidence that respondent violated any company policy when he issued a MATO to
Queroz.

there is no evidence that respondent acted with malice in committing the violation of his employer's policies.

Thus, the CA and the NLRC correctly observed that the worst that respondent committed was an inadvertent infraction. For
that, the extreme penalty of dismissal imposed on him by petitioners was grossly disproportionate.

SO ORDERED.