G.R. Nos.

90191-96 January 28, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANACLETO FURUGGANAN

Facts,

On December 9, 1986, Joseph Ferrer, with 5 companions, decided to go to the ricefield

situated at Sitanga, Dodan, Aparri, Cagayan. They arrived at the place of Froilan Clemente
at around one o'clock in the afternoon. Upon arrival, they cast their fishing line. After a while,
they rested in a nipa hut . They fell asleep and while in a deep slumber, the prosecution
witness Joseph Ferrer heard a firing of a gun and was thereafter shot. Ferrer, while
pretending to be dead, observed that the three malefactors, namely, Eleazer Payongan,
Basilio Gomer and Anacleto Furungganan were making sure that their victims were already
dead. Ferrer, the lone survivor, went home despite the fact that he sustained wounds in his
leg which, according to an expert, would have caused his death if not for timely medical
attention.

Furungganan, on the other hand, stated that he, a member of the CHDF, and Barangay
Captain Eleazer Payongan, Basilio Gomer, Jr. and Diomedes Palattao, also a member of the
CHDF, dropped by his house. after a drinking session, they hiked to the hut of Froilan
Clemente. Upon arrival at the hut of Froilan Clemente, Basilio Gomer and Eleazer Payongan
went to the door of the hut and started firing their guns. Furungganan narrates and alleges
that he was threatened by Payongan to go up the hut or else he himself would be shot.
Overwhelmed by said threat, the former claims he had no other recourse but to follow. Anent
the allegation of conspiracy, he contends that there is not even a hint of the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement to commit the crimes charged, appellant having been
invited only by his co-accused to a drinking session. Appellant was found guilty as charged
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the five (5) cases
for murder and one case of frustrated murder

Issue:

W/N there exists conspiracy in the case at bar.

Held:

The evidence which consisted primarily of the testimony of the lone survivor, Joseph Ferrer, is
replete with irreconcilable inconsistencies which are neither trifling nor unimportant as to be of little
consequence. He twice categorically declared in open court that they were all fast asleep when he
heard a sudden burst of gunshots.11 One can only wonder how Ferrer could have witnessed the firing
from outside when he was, as he stated, in deep slumber.Accused rebuts the imputation of guilt
against him by maintaining that he had no inkling of the murderous design of his co-accused — he
having been invited only for a drink — and that he went up the hut only because he was threatened
at gunpoint to do so or else he himself would be shot.

Any amount of reliance on such probability, however, would be purely speculative. albeit no formal
agreement is necessary to prove conspiracy, it must be established by the same quantum of
evidence as any other ingredient of the offense. The same degree of proof necessary to establish
the crime is required to establish a finding of criminal conspiracy, that is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In the case at bar, the fact that appellant was with the other accused when the crime was
committed is not sufficient proof of the existence of conspiracy. Mere companionship does not
establish conspiracy.21 Neither can conspiracy be inferred from the mere fact that they had
been drinking together prior to the shooting.22 It was held that the evidence against Anacleto
Furugganan is not sufficient to establish his participation or culpability in the alleged criminal
conspiracy. Certainly, to stress the obvious, any doubt as to the guilt of the accused should be
resolved in favor of the presumption of his innocence.

YONGCO AND LANOJAN v. PEOPLE G.R. Nos. 209373 and 209414 / JULY 30, 2014 / VELASCO, JR., J. / QUALIFIED
THEFT / JSGMANAO NATURE Petitions for review on certiorari PETITIONERS G.R. No. 209373: Joel Yongo and
Julieto Lañojan G.R. No. 209414: Anecito Tangian, Jr. RESPONDENT People of the Philippines

FACTS.

 Tangian was a garbage truck driver for the city government of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. Yongco and Lañojan
were security guards assigned to guard the City Engineer’s Office (CEO).

 On April 15, 2005, after the shift of Lañojan, he gave 4 gate passes to Yongco, allegedly covering waste materials
withdrawn during the earlier shift. These gate passes were required as standard procedure in taking out materials
from the CEO premises.

 On April 16, 2005, around 1:30 a.m., at the request of Tangian, Pablo Salodsod, a garbage collector for the city
government, accompanied him to the CEO.

 At the garage of the CEO, Salodsod and his fellow garbage collectors were ordered by Tangian and Yongco, the
guard on duty at that time, to load car parts, which were allegedly waste items, on the truck driven by Tangian. 
After loading the car parts, Tangian and Salodsod went to the Delfin Junk Store to unload them. Tangian did not
give the gate pass required to take out something from the CEO premises. Yongco did not demand for the same
on the pretext that there was another guard on duty in the guard house to get the gate pass.
 The items were then unloaded in front of the junk store. Before the truck left the junk store, Lañojan, who was
at the junk store, gave a thumbs-up to Tangian. Lañojan then covered up the unloaded items with a sack.

 The following morning, the brother-in-law of Lañojan, a worker at the junk store, took the items inside the store.


RTC: Guilty of qualified theft; ruled that the 4 gate passes were used as coverup for the actual withdrawal of the
stolen items.

Defense: No conspiracy  Yongco: He extended his assistance to Tangian in good faith, upon the assumption of the
lawful order of Lañojan.  Lañojan: He was not present at the time of the taking; the mere giving of a thumbs-up
does not amount to conspiracy.  Tangian: He merely innocently obeyed the orders of Lañojan since the latter was
his superior and was authorized to get rid of the scrap materials in the CEO premises even without the required
gate pass.

CA: Affirmed RTC.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON Yongco, Lañojan, and Tangian are guilty of qualified theft. – YES. Synthesizing Articles 308 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, the elements of qualified theft committed with grave abuse of discretion are as follows: 1.
Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with
intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and 6. That it be done with grave abuse of
confidence. As for the first element, the items were taken away from the CEO and were already under complete
and effective control of the persons taking the same, since they were loaded onto the garbage truck driven by
Tangian and brought to the Delfin Junk Store. As for the second element, the items stolen belong to the CEO of
Iligan City. Although they were considered "heap of scrap," they have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste
by the proper authority or office, nor have they been marked for proper disposal. As for the third element, intent
to gain is presumed from the unlawful taking. Since these items were brought to the junk store, intent to gain
becomes obvious. As for the fourth element, the taking was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan City because
there was no gate pass issued to that effect. Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate pass on the pretext that there
was another guard on duty at the gate. As for the sixth element, the taking of these items was done with grave
abuse of confidence. Yongco, Lañojan, and Tangian were guards and drivers with access to the entrance and exit
of the CEO premises.
2. WON there was conspiracy among Yongco, Lañojan, and Tangian. – YES. Yongco knew of the office procedure
that a gate pass is required every time something is taken out of the CEO premises. The fact that 4 gate passes
were given to him that morning by Lañojan should have reminded him of his duty to demand a gate pass for
property leaving the CEO premises. Tangian also knew of this procedure from his 16 years of service as truck driver
for the city government. He should also know better than to assume that Lañojan can authorize the withdrawal of
items without the requisite gate pass since Lañojan’s duty, as security guard, is precisely to prevent the same.
Lañojan gave Tangian the "thumbs-up" sign, meaning everything is okay – clear proof of meeting of minds between
Tangian and Lañojan, and their collusion to steal the items under the pretext of disposing unserviceable waste
materials

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

 Facts:

1. Background:

a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was
then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary
Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.m On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019. There was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

3. Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

a. On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary
of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to
his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded
to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as
the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under
Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms
are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.

b. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

4. SB order:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.

9. SB resolution:

a. grants respondent’s Motion to Quash.

b. appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information
filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.

10. Hence, the instant petition

Issue:

Whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the
filing of the Information.

Held:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3
of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a
case involving herein private respondent.

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means
that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one
of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this
Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends
upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be
convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases
of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
People vs Peralta, et al.

People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.

G.R. No. L-19069
October 29, 1968

Facts:

On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs
inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.

In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by
virtue of final judgments.

They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation
and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined
in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

Issues

(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?

(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime?
Held:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. is Generally, conspiracy not a crime unless when the law specifically
provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of
a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express
or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in
order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them
to executing the conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.

Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission
of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that
there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all
the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really
prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going
from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.
DIVISION

[ GR No. 191723, Jul 23, 2014 ]

PEOPLE v. ROLANDO LAS PIÑAS +

DECISION

In an Information dated July 25, 2001 docketed as Criminal Case No. 2001-5445, the public prosecutor
charged Renato, Rolando, Armando, Gilberto, Merwin, Freddie, Salvador, all surnamed Las Piñas, and
Jimmy Delizo with frustrated murder committed as follows:

That on or about 2:00 x x x in the morning of May 2, 2001 at the fishpen in the Municipality of Castilla,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines

which injuries could have caused the death of said Roger Aringo.
In three other Informations all dated July 25, 2001, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-
5447 and 2001-5448, the public prosecutor charged the same persons above-enumerated with three
counts of murder, to wit:

Specifically, Roger narrated that he saw accused Armando and Rolando shoot Edgardo and Benjamin,
while he witnessed Jimmy, Merwin and Freddie shoot Carlito. He likewise witnessed Armando slash the
throat of Edgardo after the latter was incapacitated, and throw his (Edgardo) body into the sea. As for
himself, Roger testified that his assailants were accused Renato, Salvador and Gilberto; and that he
sustained gunshot wounds on his right cheek, left chest, and left buttock. The carnage finally ended
when the accused thought that the three Aringo brothers and Carlito were all dead; and then they
boarded their boat and left towards Sorsogon. Roger recognized all the accused because they used to be
neighbors at Sitio Dulungan, Brgy. Libtong, Castilla, Sorsogon.[17]

Of the four, only Roger remained alive by daybreak and was eventually rescued by a passing
fisherman. He was brought to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital for treatment
the RTC did not believe the accused-appellants' defense of alibi because it was not established with
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the fishpen when the
offense was committed especially so that the coastal Barangay Bitan-o was along the same coastline as
Barangay Poblacion and Bagalaya of Castilla; and the fishpen involved in the incident was off-shore of
these barangays. In fact, it was established that from Barangay Bitan-o to the two other barangays, one
can travel by boat in one hour or less.[34]

the RTC held that the defense of alibi becomes unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the
accused himself and his relatives and not by credible persons. Here, accused-appellants Rolando and
Merwin's alibis were supported by each other and their friends, while accused-appellant Jimmy's alibi
was supported by his wife and his drinking buddy.[35]

The RTC also concluded that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime

ISSUE:

accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder despite the insufficiency
of evidence for the prosecution;
The appeal fails.

After a review of the records, the Court sustains the conviction of the accused-appellants for Frustrated
Murder and three counts of Murder.

The two trial courts and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly of Roger who was an eyewitness to the crime and was himself a
victim of the shooting.

Roger's testimony does not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly
detract from his credibility. The accused-appellants were directly identified by Roger as three of the
eight perpetrators of the crimes charged. Roger saw the shooting of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, and
was categorical and frank in his testimony.

To emphasize, the victims, Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, were caught off guard when the
accused, including the accused-appellants, in the dead of night, arrived at the fishpen and climbed the
same, and without warning, opened fire at the sleeping/resting victims to disable them. the stealth,
swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the four victims no chance at
all to evade the bullets and defend themselves from the unexpected onslaught. Thus, there is no
denying that the collective acts of the accused and the accused-appellants reek of treachery.

Conspiracy

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code states that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."[54]
That there was conspiracy among the accused and accused-appellants is a matter not in issue. Both trial
courts and the Court of Appeals deduced the conspiracy among the accused/accused-appellants from
the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. Proof of the actual agreement to commit
the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their conduct before,
during, and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and
concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy. In this case, all the accused/accused-appellants were
convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed
victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the
fishpen located offshore on board the same boat, but also from their joint attack commenced
simultaneously, firing successive shots at the four victims and immediately followed by clambering up
the platform and resuming their shooting of Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito.

It was also significant that they fled together on board the boat that they arrived in as soon as they had
achieved their common purpose. Their conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime
indicated a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Hence, conspiracy
attended the commission of the crimes.

The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the positive
identification made by one of their victims, Roger.

accused-appellants Rolando Las Piñas, Jimmy Delizo and Merwin Las Piñas GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of Murder and Frustrated Murder
People vs. Sinoc [GR 113511-12, 1 July 1997]
Third Division, Narvasa (CJ): 4 concur
Facts: On 20 September 1991, at about 6:00 a.m., Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito
Mining
Corporation, was motoring from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del
Norte) to Surigao
City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero (DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio
Guijapon. As
Viacrusis and Guijapon were approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they were stopped by
several armed
men. The latter, identifying themselves as members of the New People's Army (NPA), boarded
the Pajero and
ordered Guijapon to proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men
ordered Viacrusis
and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands bound behind their back to a coconut grove some
6 meters from
the road, and after making them lie face down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis
miraculously
survived. The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the spot. At about 7 a.m. the
following day, a
secret informant (known as a "civilian asset") named Boyet reported to the police Station at
Monkayo, Davao
del Norte that the stolen ("carnapped") "Pajero" was parked behind the apartment of a certain
Paulino Overa
at the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the Station Commander,
a police team
went to the place. They saw the "Pajero" and, their initial inquiries having yielded the information
that the
man who had brought it there would return that morning, posted themselves in such a manner
as to keep it in
view. Some 3 hours later, at about 10:30 a.m., they saw a man approach the "Pajero" who, on
seeing them,
tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc of
Surigao del
Norte, had the key of the "Pajero," and was acting under instructions of certain companions who
were waiting
for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the recovered "Pajero," the
police officers
brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer there.
Only Sinoc and Vicente Salon were arraigned, on
14 July 1992, the other accused being then at large. Assisted by their respective counsel, both
Sinoc and Salon
entered pleas of not guilty and were thereafter jointly tried. On 7 October 1993, the Regional
Trial Court of
Surigao City, Branch 30, found Sinoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two cases jointly tried:
one, of the
special complex crime of kidnapping with murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 2
and 48 3 of
the Revised Penal Code) — in Criminal Case 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of
kidnapping with
frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6 4 and 48 of the same Code) — in Criminal Case
3565. In each
case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on him. Salon, on the other hand was
acquitted inasmuch
as conspiracy was not proven. Sinoc appealed.

Issue:WON conspiracy exists in this case

Held:
The crimes do not come within the operation of Article 48 of the Criminal Code which, speaking
of complex crimes, provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Actually in this case, the two
crimes of carnapping and frustrated murder did not result from a single act. Nor was either offense a
necessary means for committing the other. The shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the
carnapping; indeed, at the time the victim was shot, the carnapping had already been
consummated. And, of course, the cannapping which, according to the evidence, was the conspirators
principal objective, was not necessary to perpetrate the shooting.

It follows then that the malefactors felonious acts in Criminal Case No. 3565 cannot be regarded as
juridically fused into a complex crime under Article 48. They should be considered separate offenses,
separately punishable.

Now, Sinoc admittedly entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused; but he insists that as far as he was
concerned, the conspiracy was to carnap the Pajero, and did not include any killing or assault against
persons. Sinoc says himself never had that intention. Indeed, he says he had no inkling that the shooting
would take place

Sinocs disclaimers notwithstanding, it is this Courts view that the crime that may properly be ascribed to
him in Case No. 3564 is robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The most
that can be conceded is to credit him with the mitigating circumstance of having no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed.[27]

Sinoc may not be held liable in Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of frustrated murder as regards
Viacrusis, for the reasons already mentioned; in this particular case, the evidence shows that he agreed
only to the plan to carnap the Pajero, but not to any assault or killing.[28] Nor is it logical to convict him
twice of robbery of the same property under the same circumstances. Hence, he may not be
pronounced responsible for the separate offense of robbery of the same Pajero, in addition to being
declared guilty of robbery (of that same Pajero) with homicide under Article 294.

The penalty imposable on Sinoc is that provided in Article 294 of the Penal Code, which is reclusion
perpetua to death. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that done, the penalty that should be applied to him is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3564, appellant Danilo Sinoc, being guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of robbery with homicide defined and punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Criminal Case No. 3565 is DISMISSED as to him.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 114263-64. March 29, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO, accused-
appellants.

DECISION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Accused appellants were found guilty of murder and frustrated murder.

on the night of June 20, 1990, (sic) accused John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo proceeded to the
Aroma Beer House where the victim Rosendo Mortel was tabled (sic) and wherein some
misunderstanding happened and Ronnie Mortel went out and was shot at close range by either Porras
or Emelo as seen by a waitress, Maribel Herman who pointed to Porras as the assailant and who after
seeing Rosendo Mortel sprawled on the ground and bloodied

During the chase given by Catalino Bermas he was shot by Emelo along the way after having told
them.

Sgt. Amorico Alvarez who was then following up unsolved cases in the Station was apprised of the
shooting and went to the place and was informed about the identity (sic) of the tricycle which they
traced to the house of Real he was able to apprehend the three, namely: Porras, Emelo and Real. [4]

Now, to dispose of the issues raised:

Appellants claim that some of the trial courts factual findings[5] are product of imagination and gross
misrepresentation allegedly due to lack of evidentiary support. SPO3 Rolando Villegas, one of the
prosecutions witnesses, indeed, positively identified the appellants as the persons who showed up at
the Cavite City police station at around 9:00 oclock in the evening of June 19, 1990, looking for Pfc.
Roldan Emelo - persons who, the record reveals, were responsible for the dastardly crimes. A closer
scrutiny of Maribel Germans testimony reveals that she merely saw an assailant shot the victim
(Mortel) while sprawled on the ground, but nowhere in her testimony did she state that there is only
one assailant. In fact, Maribel German never testified witnessing the crime from its inception which
Jose Malumay witnessed to have been authored by two assailants.

At any rate, the alleged inconsistency just discussed, which was shown to be otherwise, is neither
substantial nor of such nature to cast a serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Discrepancies on minor details, which do not destroy the substance of the witness
testimony show that the witness was not rehearsed.[11]
Appellants defense of alibi must likewise fail. Against their positive identification, alibi cannot
prevail.[12]

With respect to Criminal Case No. 246-91, we find that the trial court properly discarded the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and correctly ruled that the crime committed is Frustrated Homicide and
not Frustrated Murder as alleged in the information. The shooting of Sgt. Catalino Bermas who was
fully aware of the risks in pursuing appellants was, at best, done in a spur of the moment, an act
which can hardly be characterized as treacherous for it was nowhere proved that the same was
deliberately adopted to deny Sgt. Bermas the opportunity to defend himself.

The actual participation of the appellants in the killing of Rosendo Mortel having been established by
the prosecution, they are therefore equally liable pursuant to the rule on conspiracy that the act of
one is the act of all.[39] Conspiracy was duly proven by the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses pointing to acts done in concert by the appellants to carry out their unlawful design, but
only with respect to the killing of Rosendo Mortel. When an act done is beyond the contemplation of
the co-conspirators and is not a necessary or logical consequence of the intended crime then only the
actual perpetrators are to be held liable.[40] And in this case, the conspiracy proved concerns solely the
killing of Mortel and not the shooting of Sgt. Catalino Bermas. Thus, appellant Sergio Emelo alone
should be held liable for the crime of Frustrated Homicide in Criminal Case No. 246-91.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65017 November 13, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
STALIN GUEVARRA y PAPASIN accused-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro A. Venida for accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Stalin Guevarra was convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Oriental Mindoro.

The facts are as follows:

On November 29, 1980, Joselito de los Reyes, twenty-three years of age, assistant chief security guard
at "Baklad" Naujan Oriental Mindoro, together with Teofilo Martinez, a thirty-two year-old fisherman
of attended a dance sponsored by the San Agustin Barangay High School. Teofilo saw Eduardo Romero
(still at large) and Stalin Guevarra together at the dance hall At about midnight, Joselito and Teofilo
went home. Together with them were 3 girl students. Along the way, Teofilo held a flashlight to
illuminate path. Suddenly, Stalin, out of nowhere, went immediately behind Joselito, and embraced
him with both hands. Facing Joselito, Eduardo struck Joselito with a balisong. then they fled. Teofilo
together with the girls identified Stalin and Eduardo.
As a consequence, Pfcs Bautista and Aceremo accompanied by Rosabel and Babylyn, went to the
house of the appellant where he was found drunk. As to Eduardo, he vanished from the barrio
without a trace.

The appellant vehemently denies having conspired to the killing of Joselito de los Reyes.

Issue:

WON there accused conspired with Eduardo in killing the victim

Held:

Conspiracy, it is true, is "always predominantly 'mental in composition' because it consists primarily of

a meeting of minds and an intent." 24 Hence, direct proof is not essential to establish it. By its nature,
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. 25

Although here there is no well founded evidence that the appellant and Romero had conferred and
agreed to kill Joselito, their complicity can be justified by circumstantial evidence, that is, their
community of purpose and their unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous
performance of the act of assaulting the deceased. 26

The appellant cooperated with Romero in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. Therefore, the appellant is guilty as a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The requisites for
criminal liability under this provision are: 1) participation in the criminal resolution, i.e., there is either
anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before or simultaneously
with the commission of the crime charged; and 2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. 27

There can be no question that the appellant's act in holding the victim from behind immediately
before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and an overt act towards the
realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. 28 The
act was impulsively done on the spur of the moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby
uniting with the criminal design of the slayer immediately before the commission of the offense. That
is termed as implied conspiracy. 29 The appellant's voluntary and indispensable cooperation was a
concurrence of the criminal act to be executed. Consequently, he is a co-conspirator by indispensable
cooperation, although the common desire or purpose was never bottled up by a previous
undertaking.

his act of immobilizing Joselito's arms establishes the indispensable cooperation required by law to
make him equally guilty with Romero who alone stabbed and wounded the former.
G.R. No. L-62359 November 14, 1991 (DIgest)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RODOLFO BRAGAES, NESTOR NUMERON and GEMINA FESTIN, defendant-appellants.

FERNAN, C.J.:p

Facts: The information for murder filed with the lower court on January 26, 1981 states that in the
poblacion of the municipality of Calatrava, province of Romblon, Bragaes alias Dupong, Numeron alias
Mindanao Boy and Gemina Festin all conspired to kill Gabriel Fetalino and at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of February 24, 1980, with treachery and evident premeditation they assaulted him with a
knife locally known as a "balisong" thereby inflicting on him a mortal wound which directly and
immediately caused his untimely death.

the prosecution established that Bragaes was employed in Numeron's operation of a "peryahan"
gambling called "pula-puti" or "indian target." He lived in the house Numeron shared with his
common-law wife Gemina in Calatrava.

Fetalino, 59 years old, postmaster and community leader, was brought to the Romblon Provincial
Hospital where he expired at around 12:30 in the early hour of February 25, 1980. His death certificate
shows that he died of massive hemorrhage resulting from a stab wound at the right side of his back.
21

Issue: whether or not germina festin conspired with Numeron and Bragaes in the killing of Fetalino.

Held: After trial, the court rendered the aforementioned decision convicting the three accused for the
crime of murder.Citing People vs. Lanza it ruled out the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation in view of the incident preceding the stabbing and the absence of persistence of
criminal intent. However, the trial court found that treachery was proven beyond reasonable doubt
because Fetalino, who was unarmed, was suddenly and unexpectedly attacked from behind with a
deadly weapon.
Although the trial court ruled that there was conspiracy among the three accused, on the strength of
the ruling in People vs. Nierra, it considered Gemina as only an accomplice ruling that her role in the
perpetration of the crime was "of a minor character."

Treachery was correctly considered by the trial court as a circumstance which attended the killing. As
Fetalino was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from his back and having no weapon to
resist it, the stabbing cannot but be considered as treacherous. 56 The presence of treachery qualified
the killing of Fetalino to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

There is no proof that Gemina handed Bragaes the death weapon before the commission of the crime.
The uncorroborated testimony of Cecilia Servañez that as Bragaes gave Gemina the knife, he said "Ito
na ang ibinigay mo sa akin kanina, itago mo" may not be considered as proof beyond reasonable
doubt that Gemina in fact gave Bragaes the knife to be used in stabbing Fetalino.

We are not blind to the fact that it was Gemina's boisterous quarrel with Fetalino which triggered the
chain of events leading to Fetalino's murder. However, the evidence at hand are simply not adequate
to overcome the presumption that Gemina was innocent of the crime charged.

Insofar as Rodolfo Bragaes is concerned the decision of the lower court imposing the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that he shall indemnify the heirs
of Gabriel Fetalino in the amount of P50,000 instead of P12,000. For lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt that she conspired with Rodolfo Bragaes and Nestor Numeron in the murder of Gabriel
Fetalino, Gemina Faner-Festin is hereby ACQUITTED. No costs.