G.R. No.

193459 February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL
OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-
CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the
Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section
15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and
spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint 1 against petitioner, upon the
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.2
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House
of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. 3 who, by
Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. 4
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia,
Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint 5 against petitioner with a
resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano,
Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.6 On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally
adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date, 7 the
Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, 8
also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, 9 instructed
Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the
Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, 10 which was complied with by their
inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to public respondent.11
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which
complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent.
Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice
for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of
public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in substance. The determination of the
sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations,
hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on
September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.13
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the
present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc
RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order14 and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10
days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file in 10 days its Comment on the petition
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public
respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of
October 5, 2010.
Under an Advisory15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by
petitioner’s filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given
15-day period.
The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not
exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it
was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, 16 and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a
preliminary investigation.17
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. 18 The argument that impeachment
proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that
while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power
but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power
of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the
principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing
full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This
shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
xxxx
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.
Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In
Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality
of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. 19
(citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction20 of this Court
reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."21
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari
and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives
that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the
supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.22
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that
the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the
present petition23 on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance
of the two complaints.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of ripeness. 24 The question of ripeness is especially
relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. 25 In the present petition, there is no
doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish
as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to
invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a
period of one year.
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her
claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par.
5) of the Constitution.
Due process of law
Petitioner alleges that public respondent’s chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an
investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office
against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and
vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof.
Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.26
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell
Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the
commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of
the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in
behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. 28
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings
when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.29
Even petitioner’s counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep.
Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed.
In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality,
in fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be
deprived of due process of law?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the element
of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him.
JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in this case there were
objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez to
the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.
JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the
committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with that background as the
material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the
effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator. 30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in
form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive
thereat.lawphi1
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v.
Department of Justice31 holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an
injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration
of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each
case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five
state prosecutors.32 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was
indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioner’s counsel, the
participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file
her answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination
that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be
asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is
(interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level,
particularly Section 534 which denotes that petitioner’s initial participation in the impeachment proceedings – the
opportunity to file an Answer – starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance.
That the Committee refused to accept petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the
impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints
on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.35
The claim fails.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to
public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the
Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining
the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," 36 and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee." 37
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as
Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing." 38 In the discharge of its constitutional
duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to
effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
This the Court cannot do.
Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls
upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.]" 39 Worse,
petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the
facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in
the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally
adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment
Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation. 40
Citing Tañada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was
published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She
likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information,
not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."42
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations 43 which held that the
Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains
that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art.
XI of Constitution.
Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule
of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory. 44
(emphasis supplied)
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. 45 A number of those instances involves the promulgation of
various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in
point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as
promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for
filing and publication."46
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to "promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates" in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its
canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, 47 it did not require the publication thereof for its
effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on different meanings as they are part
of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case, 48 the publication of implementing rules occurs after
their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make known. Generalia verba
sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the
general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. 49
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood to
have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means
to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the
dictates of the Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its
rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which
to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation
of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity
to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. 50 (italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in
the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal
term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the
1987 Constitution’s directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera.51 Tañada naturally
could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as
expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for instance, under Section
3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting
a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that
this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could
very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS
RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other
procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.52 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in
any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains
in designing even its details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity
of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution.
Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period
of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution
for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at " effectively
carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House
deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such
situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions.
In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the
procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending
actions. "It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." 54 In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment
of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved,
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender. 55
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety.
Rather,
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain
provisions57 of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed
the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.
The one-year bar rule
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22,
2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22,
2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts
with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture
to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the
transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that
under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco58 states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it.59 The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified impeachment may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action" 60 which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment
complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the
act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third 61 of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period.62 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress’ Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings ─ Sections 1663 and 1764 of Rule V thereof ─ "clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve
the term ‘initiate’ a meaning different from filing and referral."65
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission,
particularly Commissioner Maambong’s statements66 that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.
Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that
the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the House’s action on the committee report/resolution is not
part of that initiation phase.
Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical about this," 67 for certain exchanges in the Constitutional
Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of
one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of the House is
required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee,
we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the National
Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment
proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint
rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period
for the Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of
the questions we would like to be discussed.
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-
half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to a refiling
which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x68 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to
file the case before the Senate.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles
of Impeachment. That is my understanding.69 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two
occasions:
[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of
the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to
the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the words because
we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S.
Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.70 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration
will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17
to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after
the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the
word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the
Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of
the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of
the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.71 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained
that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that
sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. 72 (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in
Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had
already been done,"73 apparently citing Bernas’ discussion.
The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House’s action on the committee report initiates the
impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done.
Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House –
steps done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment
"proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint" 74 to denote the limit prescribed by the
Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.75
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles
the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick.
Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the
candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous
referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time . What is important
is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent
matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner’s stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint
exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government
resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly
desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line.
It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress
the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a
laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process
is precisely intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt
birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal
witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be
brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign,
endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the
Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually
anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints.
Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not
readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the
body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’
disquisition76 in Francisco, a proceeding which "takes place not in the Senate but in the House"77 precedes the bringing of
an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the
sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives. 78 Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking
charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame
and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any
private individual, should own up to its processes.
The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise
be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper
committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of
Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own
chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second
impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any
debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. 79 Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion
to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of
the referral.80 With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent
impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment
complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year
period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment
proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the
Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The
Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter."
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly "belated" referral of the first
impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet
then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date
the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the
Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period. 81
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the
people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the
limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been
betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer
through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents’ alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment
proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice
report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of
at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House. 82 To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. 83 To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justice’s
recommendation to the House plenary.84
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed
provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against
the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the
impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to
accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence
to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty
and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial
Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a
group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same
judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would
be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the
exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts. 85
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already
a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of
steps that follow."86
Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of
successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the
Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the
affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding 87 of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent),
or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), 88 or the Committee on Justice
concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each
of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the
floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner
concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.89 Justice Azcuna stated
that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the
legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation," with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that
reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of
the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking.
Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take
place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.90 (underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be
precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment
proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in
Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment
complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first
impeachment complaint to the date of referral.
As pointed out during the oral arguments 91 by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers
of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding,
verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance – all these
must be met before bothering a respondent to answer – already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the
11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to
nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse
petitioner’s fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.
To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough
oppression.
Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to
the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom
from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on
the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does
not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the
Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer
when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the
Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just
once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for
one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.
Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own
Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that "the Rules of Criminal
Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."
Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress may
consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.
First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner
invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or
information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." To
petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its discretion
when it disregarded its own rules.
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to
the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain
rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from
completing its report within the deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only
one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure
since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination
of the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as
non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal
prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner,
unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions92 outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the
issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioner’s case falls
under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment – removal from office and disqualification to hold
any public office – even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not
keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.
Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the
relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the
practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by
the House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular rule of
Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment
offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the
Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that
"[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on
after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will
decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate." 95 Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially
describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated."96
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture
to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory. 97
Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,98
her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory obviously springs from her "proceeding =
complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of
public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status
Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173918 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 173918 : April 8, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), Petitioner, v.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 4 August 2006
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of
the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85
dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the
Administrative Code of 1987,3 which requires the publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration
Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances. Thus, surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be
imposed upon respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the business of
refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities.4
The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the
President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all
plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization,
distribution and conservation.
On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the
purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in world market
prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.5
Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil
companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to fluctuation in foreign exchange
rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at reasonable prices.6
Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory
Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of crude oil and
petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost, increasing or decreasing this price component as
necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the OPSF.7
On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the sources and
utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at reasonable levels. 8
On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that respondent's
contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient.
OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the
underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to
MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,9 which provides that:
2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be
made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment for
the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case of locally produced crude. Payment
after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount, if paid within
thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid after thirty days. 10 (Emphasis
supplied.)
On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its additional underpayment to the
OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period April 1991 to October 1991. In
addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.
In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the transactions in
question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and MOE Circular No. 85-05-
82 dated 16 May 1985.12
On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment, totaling P24,554,387.31, but
not the surcharges.13
In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF a total amount of
P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the period December 1989 to
October 1991.
In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges due. Otherwise, the
DOE warned that it would proceed against the respondent's Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid
surcharges.
On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President
affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996. While it admitted that
the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted that
respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such requirements. The aforementioned Decision reads: 16
Given the foregoing, the DOE's implementation of MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on Pilipinas
Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE is bound to presume the validity of that administrative
regulation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Department of Energy, contained in its letters dated
15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President, which
was denied on 28 November 2003.17
Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9 February 2004 18 and 11
February 200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85 respectively, have not
been filed before said office.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and ruled that MOF
Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. It decreed that
even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda, Jr. long before the Administrative
Code of 1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed within three months from the date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such
rules cannot thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. 20 According to the dispositive of the
appellate court's Decision:21
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and the
Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office of the President, are hereby REVERSED.

ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon petitioner is hereby declared without legal basis.

On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following issues were
raised:22
I

THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN
AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT,
MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT
ENACTMENT OF A LAW REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE
 OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL REGISTER

II

ASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED
ITS OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT
REQUIRED BY PETITIONER.

This petition is without merit.

As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis
provided.)

Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof specifically
providing that:
Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party
or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this
section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
(Emphasis provided.)

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should
be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular
should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
- filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center - for rules that are already in force at the time the
Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards
against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on
matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.
In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 2004 25 and 9 February 200426 issued by ONAR prove that MOF
Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said office. Moreover,
petitioner was unable to controvert respondent's allegation that neither of the aforementioned circulars were published in the
Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication
and filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.
In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,27 this Court emphasized that
both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory
for the effectivity of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it specified several instances wherein this Court declared
administrative issuances, which failed to observe the proper requirements, to have no force and effect:
Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAM Implementing Rules was published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both the
GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that they "shall take effect immediately." These
 clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations were not likewise filed with the
said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having no force
and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of
Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals,
medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension of payments due
and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; (3) Memorandum Circulars
issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers
to Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International
Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People's Republic of China; (5)
Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management
discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees;
and (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which provided for the schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders.

In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they
were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other hand, in Republic v.
Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the National
Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite the fact that it was filed with the National
Administrative Register because the same had not been published at the time. The Court emphasized therein
that "publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non
before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect."

Petitioner's argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, when it paid
in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious. MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended
imposes surcharges, while respondents' underpayment is based on MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.
Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary
since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary to
jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties
were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. Hence, also in National Association of Electricity
Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court pronounced:
In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was never published or
filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with the publication
requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that parties, particularly the
distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public consultation on the ERC's
proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public consultation and even submitted
their comments thereon.

However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective
comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any
administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of publication of implementing
rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was
public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments.28 (Emphasis provided.)

Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of
Executive Order No. 137, which reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to implement the executive order. Such contention is irrelevant in the present case since the power of the
Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the
ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR.
And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of
publication and filing cannot be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF
Circular No. 1-85, as amended from the aforementioned requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 100776. October 28, 1993.]

ALBINO S. CO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel — and in payment of his share of the expenses of
the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a
check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983, in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT." chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co’s conviction of the crime charged, and his being
sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of
P361,528.00.chanrobles law library

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by
this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September
1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery
of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official
pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently
provided as follows:chanrobles law library

"2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-
existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981,
Virginia Montano v. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon v. Lydia Calingo, October 23,
1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido v. Miguel A. Mateo, Et Al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida
Lazaro v. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981)."cralaw virtua1aw library

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) —
almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said
Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a
misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e., that the
intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," decreed as
follows: 4

"Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its
administration interpretation of a statute, but that its new interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank
v. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check
in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation or to facilitate collection will no longer be considered as a valid defense."cralaw virtua1aw library

Co’s theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil.
561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration
under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter
complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co’s theory on
appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply
dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties’ arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of
justice, to reinstate Albino Co’s appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.

"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . ." 5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v.
PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank
of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before
effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, Et Al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as amended by RA
3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in
the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections. 9 and 10 of Executive Order
No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; Peo. v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding
that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before
publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D.
No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of
tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo
v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the
ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v.
CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive
effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also
Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broasting
Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that
Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no
retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s.
1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary
appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
‘Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .’"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential
Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine,
came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine in Mapa? . . .

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, ‘Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system . . .’ The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law
as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of the legal maxim ‘legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet’ — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society."cralaw virtua1aw library

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 97973) and
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:
8

"We sustain the petitioners’ position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It
was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on
September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge
and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant
to Article 8 of the Civil Code ‘judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.’ But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of
the Civil Code which provides that ‘laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.’ This is expressed
in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested
or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus,
we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] ‘. . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative
necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating
acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, in this Court’s decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared "that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect," and as regards which
declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision
might have no acts done in reliance on the validity of those presidential decrees . . ." — the Court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not
a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."cralaw virtua1aw library
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342,
the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmeña, suspending the
enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been
"explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 ‘unreasonable, and oppressive, and should not
be prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11

". . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or
a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it
justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to
all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme
and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does
not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in
force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act
was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official’ (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been
quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v.
Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in
Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v Military Commission No 34, 12 — declaring
invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction
and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future
cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the
promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases
where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should
the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the
judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

x x x

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year
period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of
his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the
unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long
before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic.
Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the
nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished." 13
It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court’s decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the
prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice
that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. V. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar
doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry
being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the
former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other Government officer construing the special law
violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under
legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case, on the other hand, the defense is that
reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney
of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which
reliance may be placed by private individuals as reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in his
office as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos v. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court
of Appeals is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated
the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor
of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should
override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as hereinabove set out and discussed, negativing criminal
liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside,
and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:
Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the
6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended information dated October 11, 1985
charged:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused, conspiring, confederating and
cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still unknown and who are still at large, armed with
bladed weapons by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better
realize their purpose, and in the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300,00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal property: one (1)
adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants, one (1) travelling bag
and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10,00) pesos, with a total value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, owned by the victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of
cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without
the consent of the above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated
amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2) accused did then and
there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting wounds which required medical
attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to the other victims Corazon
Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance for several
number of days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp, 92-93, II Record.)
In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-
appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with the crime of robbery
with multiple rape, thusly:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with deliberate intent, and
without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working together with Richard Doe, Philip
Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby
performing [sic] themselves into a band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with
intent to gain and with violence against, and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring
worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos,
and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand
Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or consent of the owner; that on the occasion
thereof, the above-named three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their companions who
are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and
Josephine Belesario, against their will and consent.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 90-91, II Record.)
Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to both crimes charged (p. 103,
II Record).
After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:
Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the accused in
 these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against them, they are hereby
sentenced as follows:
a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex
Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years, and One (1)
day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal,
as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of P700.00 representing the value of her property
robbed from her and also to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the
expenses he incurred for his medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.
b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alex
Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members of the Carcillar
family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from them.
In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 80, Rollo.)
The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:
Criminal Case No. 18376
The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex
Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified companions, based on the positive identification made by complaining witness
Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).
Criminal Case No. 18305
Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an unidentified companion, acted in
concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively identified by the following witnesses.
Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia
Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally
knew him as former barangay-mate for a long time, as well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The identification
of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene
for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their memory the countenance or visage of accused-
appellants. Said positive and clear identification by the complaining witnesses, who were not shown to have ill motive to
falsify the truth and to implicate accused-appellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and
dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. 78-79, Rollo).
The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The trial court erred in
finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-
appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding
that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes charged, the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of
death as the same was suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).
The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo
Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and
Perpetua Carcillar, is summarized in the Solicitor General's consolidated Brief, as follows:
At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister Josephine
Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their house at Barangay
Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside
the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let
him and the other persons with him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).
Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8,
ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with his companions, one of whom
is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant
Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex
Mijaque hacked Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest
(pp. 14-16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed the hacking
incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of
the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario
inside their house, covered their mouth and told them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex
Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is
beside their house. The other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill
Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred
pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1)
screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos
(P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos
(P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sister's house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July
21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988).
Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just twenty (20)
meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside the house of her
aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's name and ask that the door be opened for her.
While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately
went in, boxed the aunt of Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up.
The other companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were
armed with knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine Belisario's cousins, namely
Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar, (pp. 11-15, TSN, June 30,
1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced
to lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1998; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant
Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of her cousins),
kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: "Money, money". "It is money we want." Appellant Alfonso
Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp.
7-8, February 15, 1990.). Then, appellants and their companions seized the following personalities of the
Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of lady's
rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings, and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9,
TSN, February 15, 1990).
Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a
butcher's knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she did as she was told
(pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear and
placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife
at the former's neck and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter,
appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again
(pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun took
her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This man, at the
point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her
life, was left with no choice but to obey the man's orders. There, she was raped for the second time by this
gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped, appellant Alfonso Patalin
was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).
Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with his knife,
tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered appellant Alex Mijaque and
he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon not to do so by one of his
companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).
Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her over to one
of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a gun. This man threatened
her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he undressed her. He inserted his finger on her
sex organ and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this
companion of appellant Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look
for money. When she told him that they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course
thereof, he found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her outside
the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She
was then brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor again. While at this
position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside the house. She refused to obey
appellant Alex Mijaque's order to lie down on the ground so he pushed her downwards. Her strength gave
out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN,
June 29, 1989).
Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant Alex
Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to undress her. He fondled
her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She was
then left inside the room. Two companions of appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her
cousins Rogelia and Perpetua Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another
room. The man demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money. The man was also
carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he was forcing her to lie down on the
bed but her strength finally gave out . He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After
raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of the bed and brought her back to the room
where she was first raped. Her aunt and cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30,
1988).
Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living room, she was
pulled by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she stood up, she realized
that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, armed with a double-bladed knife, brought
her outside the house, ordered her to undress and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was
then only thirteen (13) years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her
vagina but did not succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a
member of their group who was only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a
double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie down. He fondled her
breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, appellant Nestor
Ras brought her back inside the house. When she was returned inside the house, the intruders were still
demanding for money from her mother and were taking turns in beating the latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July
12, 1990).
Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated earlier after
threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all of them (p.19,
TSN, February 15, 1990).
Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first aid. He was
then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-20, TSN, December 16,
1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the
following injuries: (1) hackwound, mid forearm, area ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack
wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for
almost three (3) months and he spent more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and
other expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986).
Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was raped. A
hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of Josephine Belisario which
could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits
two (2) fingers". Further, hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions
and fresh lacerations was also noted at nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are indications that
a foreign object, which could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of
the hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).1âwphi1.nêt
Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by Dr. Leticia
Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).
A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid). Her vagina
admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one centimeter in length (pp.
18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her hymen at
eight, eleven and three o'clock positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified
that a foreign object was inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3,
TSN, November 10, 1986).
Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of the face, upper
right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of the head and left side of the
mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm. lacerated wound on the left side of the lower
lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger
 and right thumb, (4) 4 inches incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back
including the portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the
hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four o'clock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum which was also
swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration at six o'clock position and
a hematoma also at six o'clock position were noted on her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).
(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)
Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan,
Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with other arguments, are summarized as
follows:
Alfonso Patalin
Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang, whom he described as the land
lord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and
rape. Verily, he declared on the stand that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine Belisario
and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).
In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution witness Josephine Belisario
was asked on the stand if she recognized "the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo," said witness responded that she
did not know the person who called her brother, and that she only recognized the caller's voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp.
30-31). Further, accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant.
Alex Mijaque
Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record), there is no
mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes charged. Moreover, during the
preliminary examination in the lower court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the malefactors. He
likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first report mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No
rape was reported. In the second report, it was blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no
rape was reported. Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely
narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.
According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred to in the record as
"Mandurriao") received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen previous to the incidents herein
involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police
Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo).
Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the
Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save themselves from charges of arbitrary
detention, immediately referred him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently, three days
after his confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed
against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.
Nestor Pas
The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, and that
Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also states that the witnesses'
declarations as regards his identification are confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).
Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor about what happened to his
sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that "Nothing happened to them" (p. 210, id). And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other
female prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were
raped.
As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented their respective alibis. Accused-
appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13,
1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge
of the plantation where he was working, who testified that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from
August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).
For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where he was working
which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was arrested for theft of a television set
and detained in the Lambunao jail for investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front of his
detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the policemen pointed to him and said, "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you.
If you will not include him, he will file a case against you." Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29,
1993, pp. 10-13). Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latter's alibi
that on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock midnight, and accused-
appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the
following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).
Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on
August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who
testified that on August 11, 1984, she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao,
Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4,
1994, p. 4).
We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm.
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93
[1997]). We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but
only with the cold pages of a written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).
A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility, particularly the ravished victims,
who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their
own homes.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was not able to prove any motive
on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two
of the rape victims, Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant
Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they
really suffered the fate they narrated.
Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. As discussed above in their
individual defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn
statement; that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents
at the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter
stated that the alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillar's
report did not mention that she was raped.
Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such
delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn
statement (p. 3, I Record) shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his
failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaque's name, he explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name
of the person who attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-
39). It was only later that he found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact
that he mentioned "unknown persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive identification of
accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home.
Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter to the police,
otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were overcome by fear and shame
(ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date
of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82
[1996]) where we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her
honor, does not detract from the veracity of her charge.
The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses, as follows: (1) Juliana
Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was
extinguished as a result of it being knocked down, thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua
Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light in the house coming from the lamp, yet she could still see
because the light of the moon still illuminated their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution
witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as
well as the date when Ras was arrested.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such
witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant
(Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve
to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the
conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).
With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification,
where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is
supported by the testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA
254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995];
People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26
[1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242
SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs.
Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).
Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland travel time from
the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that
he was in Barangay Pandan, which is merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he
was in Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is approximately two hours away therefrom via overland
transportation. The defense tried to corroborate these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened
ten years prior to the date their testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.
Mutatis mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places where accused-appellants alleged
they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at
the crime scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly and damning yet is the
positive identification of their presence thereat by the victims.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case No. 18376
considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows that accused-appellants took
advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling
is clear from the abuse of confidence which the victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the
violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims' homes. He who goes to another's house to slander him, hurt him, or do
him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code — Criminal Law, Vol. I,
1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol.
II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial court's finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band
considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was
later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by
Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p.10,
June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery with
multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the victims thereof who stated that five
persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered their dwelling that
unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15, 1990, p. 5).
With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were arrested without warrants, suffice it to say
that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs.
CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was
ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p. 324, Rollo).
It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In
the first criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque, together with unidentified
companions, committed the crime charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and
inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants
(together with unidentified companions), who were positively identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had the
common criminal design of robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the occasion of
the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and the other culprits followed suit.
Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they were staging a hold-up. After robbing the
household, they proceeded in ravishing the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after
the other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting
the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-appellants adduced at the trial
—
. . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the
assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must
be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate
that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting
among them to concert means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147
SCRA 146; People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486). . .
( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).
Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward testimony of the victims
themselves.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the time the crimes charged were
committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was
abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:
Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion, "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at
some future time (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).
Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took
effect on January 1, 1994.
Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect,
being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover
them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty
Law had already taken effect.
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior
to its commission. At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by the trial court, robbery with rape, if
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
(Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No. 767]).
True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had
as yet then been imposed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases
pending without any penalty of death having been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
any death penalty already imposed is automatically — without need for any executive action — commuted (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).
The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to
herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no
longer cover them? An affirmative answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his life (or lose it), or
the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs.
Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 [1919]). Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused
in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for
the offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in
our type of government. Every official act must be based on and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which
the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is insufficient.
There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accused-appellants.
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be
imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal
prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the
service has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review,
1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).
In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-
appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution
themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have
prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508,
citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-
748).
There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or
repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied
retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [1946]). Courts have thus
given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere
with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued
or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested (Benzonan vs. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).
By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the old law cannot be
taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to apply this principle since the very
taking of life is involved and is at issue.
As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376, correctly awarded P700.00 to
Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo
Aliman representing expenses incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial
court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R.
No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we said:
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative
response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at
bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.
accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape (considering that Juliana
Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the
cash and articles that were taken from the victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July
30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise
awarded. Lastly, so that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the amount of
P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).
Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally liable for the
amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable for the amounts
awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that the aggravating
circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime, accused-appellants Patalin and
Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts awarded by the trial court
in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of the cash and articles taken from
Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family representing the value of
the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity
for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as
exemplary damages, for which amounts all the three accused-appellant are jointly and severally liable.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 139882 August 16, 2000
ORIENTAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The retroactive application, of procedural rules to pending cases is well settled. Hence, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the notice of appeal, applies to the present case.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the March 8, 19991 and the June 4, 19992
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA). The first Resolution reads as follows:
"The Court considers the appeal of Leonila Cui and Oriental Assurance Corporation ABANDONED and DISMISSED for
their failure to pay the required docket fees (Section 1 [c], Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.)"
(emphasis in the original)
The second Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Oriental Assurance Corporation issued Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D, insuring the stock of finished
and/or unfinished products including raw materials, machinery and equipment belonging to Wear Me Garments
Manufacturing, Inc. (Wear Me). The policy insured against loss and/or damage by fire from March 20, 1991 to March 20,
1992. The policy was subsequently renewed for another year from March 20, 1992 to March 20, 1993 under Renewal
Receipt No. 40948. A Memorandum stating that the policy was "[m]ade further subject to MORTGAGEE CLAUSE in favor
of SOLIDBANK CORPORATION"' was typewritten on the face of the receipt.
On April 27, 1993, petitioner issued another Fire Insurance Policy (No. F-93-40690-D) insuring the same items of Wear Me
from March 20, 1993 to March 20, 1994.
On July 12, 1993, a fire broke out at the factory of Wear Me, destroying a major portion of the insured properties. Wear Me
submitted to petitioner and its co-insurers3 a Notice of Loss for the value of the damaged properties. The claims were
denied.
As holder of trust receipts over the burned goods, Solidbank Corporation sent an undated telegram to petitioner, asking the
latter to pay the proceeds of Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D. Petitioner refused to comply, because the Policy did
not contain a mortgagee clause in favor of Solidbank.
Before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC),4 respondent then instituted Civil Case No. 94-70505 against petitioner
and Wear Me; as well as Angelita Amparo Go and Arnold A. Go, Leonila Cui, and Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc.
Acting favorably on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment,5 the RTC rendered a Decision,6 the dispositive part of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as
follows:
1.1 Holding that the plaintiff is entitled to be paid under the loan of P1.2 Million and under the five trust receipts
the sum of P4,797, 294.83, plus interests and other charges form December 29, 1992, until fully paid;
1.2 Holding defendant WEAR ME, Angelita Amparo Go and spouse, Arnold A. Go, jointly and severally liable to
pay the plaintiff the above amounts;
1.3 Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., and Oriental Assurance Corporation, are held jointly and severally
liable to pay the plaintiff, together with defendants WEAR ME, Angelita Amparo Go and her spouse, Arnold A.
Go, the above amounts but limited to the extent of the insurance coverage representing the insurance coverage
assigned to Solidbank Corporation under the two (2) fire insurance policies;
1.4 Leonila Cui is held jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff, together with all the other defendants, but only
with respect to the loan of P1.2 million and the accrued interest and penalties.
2. Ordering all the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff a sum equal to 10% of the amounts above payable
plus the costs of the suit."7
On August 18, 1995, respondent filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal. It was opposed by petitioner, which filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision.
Subsequently, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting the Motion for Execution and denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.1âwphi1 On October 23, 1995, petitioner appealed. the RTC Decision and Omnibus Order to the Court of
Appeals. It should be added that before elevating the records of the case to the appellate court, the RTC granted respondent's
Motion to Stay Execution Pending Appeal Based on Supersedeas Bond.
As earlier mentioned, the CA denied petitioner's appeal and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to
this Court.8
The Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits for the consideration of this Court this lone issue:
"xxx [W]hether or not the Court of Appeals x x x committed reversible error in giving retroactive effect to Section 1 (c) of
Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [dismissing] petitioner's appeal for failure of the petitioner to pay the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees."9
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue: Retroactive Effect of Rules of Procedure
According to both parties, the sole controversy is the retroactive application of Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, which provides:
"SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. -- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion
or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 4010 and section 4 of
Rule 41;"
Section 4 of Rule 41 in turn reads:
"SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. -- Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to
the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal."
Petitioner contends that these Rules cannot be given retroactive effect because such action would impair its "vested" rights
under the old Rules.11 The latter required an appellant to pay the docket fees within fifteen days from the receipt of notice
from the CA clerk of court that the record on appeal has been received.
The retroactive application of procedural rules to pending cases is undoubtedly well settled.12 Petitioner even admits this in
its efforts to reason out its case.13 For this reason alone, the present Petition should be dismissed.
Even assuming that it is entitled to the aforecited right, the CA's dismissal of the appeal still stands.
Counsel's Negligence
In Arambulo v. CA,14 a case in which the required notice invoked by herein petitioner was sent to the wrong counsel, we
held:
"Both the Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Jimenez and the Appearance of Atty. Pineda are undeniably found in the
original record of Civil Case No. 5301 and are explicitly referred to in the Summary Index in the record of CA-G.R. CV No.
32348. And since the withdrawal of Atty. Jimenez had taken effect upon its filing before the trial court on 12 February 1991,
the notice to pay the docket and other fees sent to him by the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals on 4 March
1991 was thus void or otherwise ineffective. Receipt thereof by him did not operate as notice to the Arambulos. It is a fact
on record that no notice to pay the docket fee was sent to and received by Atty. Pineda, therefore, the 15-day period to pay
the required docket fee did not even commence to run." (emphasis ours)
Even if we assume that petitioner is entitled to the notice mentioned in the old Rules, the appeal may be dismissed
nonetheless, due to petitioner and its counsel's negligence in inquiring on the status of the appeal. Again, Arambulo is
illuminating, as shown below:
"Nevertheless, the appeal can be dismissed, not on the basis of the respondent Court of Appeals' error but on a different
ground for which Atty. Pineda must answer. As the new counsel for petitioners, it was incumbent upon him, consistent with
his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, to inquire either from the trial court or the appellate court about
the status of the appeal since he had not received any notice to pay the docketing and other fees despite the lapse of several
months from the time he entered his appearance. While he had every reason to expect that the office of the Clerk of Court of
the Court of Appeals would faithfully comply with Sections 2(3) and 3, Rule 4 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals on the issuance of notice to the parties to pay the docketing and other fees, his failure to receive the notice for so
long a time should have alarmed him to the possibility that something must have gone awry somewhere." (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, it is the duty15 of petitioner's counsel to check the status of a pending appeal.16 This duty is even more compelling
in this case because the appeal had been pending for over three years,17 and counsel had not received any notice to pay the
required docket and other lawful fees. These circumstances should have compelled to action petitioner's counsel, whose
reason for the delay was flimsy and unacceptable. Erroneous and irrelevant is the allegation that "[t]he long pendency of
petitioner's appeal was due to the filing by Prudential of the petition for certiorari and the filing by the respondent of the
motion to dismiss the appeal."18 We stress that the relevant matter is the failure of petitioner to check the status of its
appeal. Under the circumstances, it is bound by the negligence of its counsel.19
In view of the foregoing conclusion, the parties' lengthy discussions of the merits of the appealed case need not be ruled
upon.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Office for petitioner.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:
The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philippines
[hereafter referred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the Philippine Islands (hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed
COMTRUST through a corporate merger, and was substituted as party to the case.
Rizaldy Zshornack initiated proceedings on June 28,1976 by filing in the Court of First Instance of Rizal — Caloocan City a
complaint against COMTRUST alleging four causes of action. Except for the third cause of action, the CFI ruled in favor of
Zshornack. The bank appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified the CFI decision absolving the bank
from liability on the fourth cause of action. The pertinent portions of the judgment, as modified, read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant COMTRUST to restore to the dollar savings account of plaintiff (No. 25-4109)
the amount of U.S $1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn interest together with the remaining balance
of the said account at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar deposits under Central Bank Circular 343;
2. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to return to the plaintiff the amount of U.S. $3,000.00 immediately
upon the finality of this decision, without interest for the reason that the said amount was merely held in
custody for safekeeping, but was not actually deposited with the defendant COMTRUST because being
cash currency, it cannot by law be deposited with plaintiffs dollar account and defendant's only obligation
is to return the same to plaintiff upon demand;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to pay plaintiff in the amount of P8,000.00 as damages in the concept
of litigation expenses and attorney's fees suffered by plaintiff as a result of the failure of the defendant
bank to restore to his (plaintiffs) account the amount of U.S. $1,000.00 and to return to him (plaintiff) the
U.S. $3,000.00 cash left for safekeeping.
Costs against defendant COMTRUST.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 47-48.]
Undaunted, the bank comes to this Court praying that it be totally absolved from any liability to Zshornack. The latter not
having appealed the Court of Appeals decision, the issues facing this Court are limited to the bank's liability with regard to
the first and second causes of action and its liability for damages.
1. We first consider the first cause of action, On the dates material to this case, Rizaldy Zshornack and his wife, Shirley
Gorospe, maintained in COMTRUST, Quezon City Branch, a dollar savings account and a peso current account.
On October 27, 1975, an application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia, Assistant Branch Manager of
COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain Leovigilda D. Dizon in the amount of $1,000.00. In the application, Garcia
indicated that the amount was to be charged to Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-4109, the savings account of the Zshornacks;
the charges for commission, documentary stamp tax and others totalling P17.46 were to be charged to Current Acct. No.
210465-29, again, the current account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar
draft.
On the same date, October 27,1975, COMTRUST, under the signature of Virgilio V. Garcia, issued a check payable to the
order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US $1,000 drawn on the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, with an indication
that it was to be charged to Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-4109.
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from his account, he demanded an explanation from the bank. In
answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother of
Rizaldy, on October 27, 1975 when he (Ernesto) encashed with COMTRUST a cashier's check for P8,450.00 issued by the
Manila Banking Corporation payable to Ernesto.
Upon consideration of the foregoing facts, this Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of both the trial court and the
Appellate Court on the first cause of action. Petitioner must be held liable for the unauthorized withdrawal of US$1,000.00
from private respondent's dollar account.
In its desperate attempt to justify its act of withdrawing from its depositor's savings account, the bank has adopted
inconsistent theories. First, it still maintains that the peso value of the amount withdrawn was given to Atty. Ernesto
Zshornack, Jr. when the latter encashed the Manilabank Cashier's Check. At the same time, the bank claims that the
withdrawal was made pursuant to an agreement where Zshornack allegedly authorized the bank to withdraw from his dollar
savings account such amount which, when converted to pesos, would be needed to fund his peso current account. If indeed
the peso equivalent of the amount withdrawn from the dollar account was credited to the peso current account, why did the
bank still have to pay Ernesto?
At any rate, both explanations are unavailing. With regard to the first explanation, petitioner bank has not shown how the
transaction involving the cashier's check is related to the transaction involving the dollar draft in favor of Dizon financed by
the withdrawal from Rizaldy's dollar account. The two transactions appear entirely independent of each other. Moreover,
Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., possesses a personality distinct and separate from Rizaldy Zshornack. Payment made to Ernesto
cannot be considered payment to Rizaldy.
As to the second explanation, even if we assume that there was such an agreement, the evidence do not show that the
withdrawal was made pursuant to it. Instead, the record reveals that the amount withdrawn was used to finance a dollar draft
in favor of Leovigilda D. Dizon, and not to fund the current account of the Zshornacks. There is no proof whatsoever that
peso Current Account No. 210-465-29 was ever credited with the peso equivalent of the US$1,000.00 withdrawn on
October 27, 1975 from Dollar Savings Account No. 25-4109.
2. As for the second cause of action, the complaint filed with the trial court alleged that on December 8, 1975, Zshornack
entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US $3,000.00 cash (popularly known as greenbacks) for safekeeping, and that the
agreement was embodied in a document, a copy of which was attached to and made part of the complaint. The document
reads:
Makati Cable Address:
Philippines "COMTRUST"
COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
of the Philippines
Quezon City Branch
December 8, 1975
MR. RIZALDY T. ZSHORNACK
&/OR MRS SHIRLEY E. ZSHORNACK
Sir/Madam:
We acknowledged (sic) having received from you today the sum of US DOLLARS:
THREE THOUSAND ONLY (US$3,000.00) for safekeeping.
Received by:
(Sgd.) VIRGILIO V. GARCIA
It was also alleged in the complaint that despite demands, the bank refused to return the money.
In its answer, COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was credited to Zshornack's peso current account at prevailing
conversion rates.
It must be emphasized that COMTRUST did not deny specifically under oath the authenticity and due execution of the
above instrument.
During trial, it was established that on December 8, 1975 Zshornack indeed delivered to the bank US $3,000 for
safekeeping. When he requested the return of the money on May 10, 1976, COMTRUST explained that the sum was
disposed of in this manner: US$2,000.00 was sold on December 29, 1975 and the peso proceeds amounting to P14,920.00
were deposited to Zshornack's current account per deposit slip accomplished by Garcia; the remaining US$1,000.00 was
sold on February 3, 1976 and the peso proceeds amounting to P8,350.00 were deposited to his current account per deposit
slip also accomplished by Garcia.
Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly credited to Zshornack's current account at prevailing conversion
rates, BPI now posits another ground to defeat private respondent's claim. It now argues that the contract embodied in the
document is the contract of depositum (as defined in Article 1962, New Civil Code), which banks do not enter into. The
bank alleges that Garcia exceeded his powers when he entered into the transaction. Hence, it is claimed, the bank cannot be
liable under the contract, and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia.
Before we go into the nature of the contract entered into, an important point which arises on the pleadings, must be
considered.
The second cause of action is based on a document purporting to be signed by COMTRUST, a copy of which document was
attached to the complaint. In short, the second cause of action was based on an actionable document. It was therefore
incumbent upon the bank to specifically deny under oath the due execution of the document, as prescribed under Rule 8,
Section 8, if it desired: (1) to question the authority of Garcia to bind the corporation; and (2) to deny its capacity to enter
into such contract. [See, E.B. Merchant v. International Banking Corporation, 6 Phil. 314 (1906).] No sworn answer denying
the due execution of the document in question, or questioning the authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or denying the bank's
capacity to enter into the contract, was ever filed. Hence, the bank is deemed to have admitted not only Garcia's authority,
but also the bank's power, to enter into the contract in question.
In the past, this Court had occasion to explain the reason behind this procedural requirement.
The reason for the rule enunciated in the foregoing authorities will, we think, be readily appreciated. In
dealing with corporations the public at large is bound to rely to a large extent upon outward appearances.
If a man is found acting for a corporation with the external indicia of authority, any person, not having
notice of want of authority, may usually rely upon those appearances; and if it be found that the directors
had permitted the agent to exercise that authority and thereby held him out as a person competent to bind
the corporation, or had acquiesced in a contract and retained the benefit supposed to have been conferred
by it, the corporation will be bound, notwithstanding the actual authority may never have been granted
... Whether a particular officer actually possesses the authority which he assumes to exercise is frequently
known to very few, and the proof of it usually is not readily accessible to the stranger who deals with the
corporation on the faith of the ostensible authority exercised by some of the corporate officers. It is
therefore reasonable, in a case where an officer of a corporation has made a contract in its name, that the
corporation should be required, if it denies his authority, to state such defense in its answer. By this means
the plaintiff is apprised of the fact that the agent's authority is contested; and he is given an opportunity to
adduce evidence showing either that the authority existed or that the contract was ratified and approved.
[Ramirez v. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez, 38 Phil. 634, 645- 646 (1918).]
Petitioner's argument must also be rejected for another reason. The practical effect of absolving a corporation from liability
every time an officer enters into a contract which is beyond corporate powers, even without the proper allegation or proof
that the corporation has not authorized nor ratified the officer's act, is to cast corporations in so perfect a mold that
transgressions and wrongs by such artificial beings become impossible [Bissell v. Michigan Southern and N.I.R. Cos 22
N.Y 258 (1860).] "To say that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts is only to put forth a very plain truism but
to say that such bodies have no power or capacity to err is to impute to them an excellence which does not belong to any
created existence with which we are acquainted. The distinction between power and right is no more to be lost sight of in
respect to artificial than in respect to natural persons." [Ibid.]
Having determined that Garcia's act of entering into the contract binds the corporation, we now determine the correct nature
of the contract, and its legal consequences, including its enforceability.
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping. The
subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to
return it to Zshornack at a later time, Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five
months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with
the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is
not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign exchange. Hence, the transaction was
covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions, promulgated on
December 9, 1949, which was in force at the time the parties entered into the transaction involved in this case. The circular
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Transactions in the assets described below and all dealings in them of whatever nature, including,
where applicable their exportation and importation, shall NOT be effected, except with respect to deposit
accounts included in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, when such deposit accounts are owned
by and in the name of, banks.
(a) Any and all assets, provided they are held through, in, or with banks or banking
institutions located in the Philippines, including money, checks, drafts, bullions bank
drafts, deposit accounts (demand, time and savings), all debts, indebtedness or
obligations, financial brokers and investment houses, notes, debentures, stocks, bonds,
coupons, bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of
security, expressed in foreign currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the
currency in which they are expressed, and belonging to any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation
residing or located within the Philippines;
(b) Any and all assets of the kinds included and/or described in subparagraph (a) above,
whether or not held through, in, or with banks or banking institutions, and existent
within the Philippines, which belong to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation not residing or
located within the Philippines;
(c) Any and all assets existent within the Philippines including money, checks, drafts,
bullions, bank drafts, all debts, indebtedness or obligations, financial securities
commonly dealt in by bankers, brokers and investment houses, notes, debentures, stock,
bonds, coupons, bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature
of security expressed in foreign currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the
currency in which they are expressed, and belonging to any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation
residing or located within the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
4. (a) All receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to the Central Bank by those authorized to deal in
foreign exchange. All receipts of foreign exchange by any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation shall be sold to the authorized agents
of the Central Bank by the recipients within one business day following the receipt of such foreign
exchange. Any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other
unincorporated body or corporation, residing or located within the Philippines, who acquires on and after
the date of this Circular foreign exchange shall not, unless licensed by the Central Bank, dispose of such
foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value, nor delay taking ownership
thereof except as such delay is customary; Provided, further, That within one day upon taking ownership,
or receiving payment, of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such foreign
exchange to designated agents of the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
8. Strict observance of the provisions of this Circular is enjoined; and any person, firm or corporation,
foreign or domestic, who being bound to the observance thereof, or of such other rules, regulations or
directives as may hereafter be issued in implementation of this Circular, shall fail or refuse to comply
with, or abide by, or shall violate the same, shall be subject to the penal sanctions provided in the Central
Bank Act.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central Bank Circular No. 281, Regulations on Foreign Exchange,
promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its coverage to Philippine residents only. Section 6 provides:
SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident person, firm, company or corporation shall be
 sold to authorized agents of the Central Bank by the recipients within one business day following the
receipt of such foreign exchange. Any resident person, firm, company or corporation residing or located
within the Philippines, who acquires foreign exchange shall not, unless authorized by the Central Bank,
dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value, nor delay taking
ownership thereof except as such delay is customary; Provided, That, within one business day upon taking
ownership or receiving payment of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall sell
such foreign exchange to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.
As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended the bank to safekeep the
foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The parties
did not intended to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of
depositum would never have been entered into at all.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one business day from
receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be considered as one which falls under the
general class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed
against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action
against the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes
a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411,
New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.
We thus rule that Zshornack cannot recover under the second cause of action.
3. Lastly, we find the P8,000.00 awarded by the courts a quo as damages in the concept of litigation expenses and attorney's
fees to be reasonable. The award is sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is ordered to restore to the dollar savings
account of private respondent the amount of US$1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn interest at the rate fixed by the
bank for dollar savings deposits. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent the amount of P8,000.00 as
damages. The other causes of action of private respondent are ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139479 December 27, 2002
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS, INC., FILM ADVERTISING MEDIA EXHIBITIONS, INC. (FAME),
LUIS NEPOMUCENO, AMPARO NEPOMUCENO, and JESUS NEPOMUCENO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47500 1 affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 155) in Civil Case No. 28809 which set aside the foreclosure
proceedings and auction sale of respondent’s properties and ordered petitioner to pay attorney’s fees.
The relevant facts of the case are undisputed.
On November 28, 1973, petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted respondents a 4 Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00)
credit line to finance the filming of the movie "Pacific Connection." 2 The loan was secured by mortgages on respondents’
real and personal properties, to wit: (1) a 7,623 square meters parcel of land located in Malugay Street, Makati (referred to
as the Malugay property); (2) a 3,000 square meters parcel of land located in North Forbes Park, Makati (referred to as the
Forbes property);3 and (3) several motion picture equipments. 4 The credit line was later increased to 6 Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00) on January 14, 1974,5 and finally to 7.5 Million Pesos (P7,500,000.00) on September 8, 1974.6
Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties with the Sheriff’s
Office of Pasig, Rizal. Initially scheduled on August 12, 1976, the auction sale was re-scheduled several times without need
of republication of the notice of sale, as stipulated in the Agreement to Postpone Sale, 7 until finally, the auction sale
proceeded on December 20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest bidder in the amount of P10,432,776.97.8
Aggrieved, respondents filed Civil Case No. 28809 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 155), an action for
annulment of foreclosure sale and damages with injunction. 9 Respondents contended that the foreclosure sale is null and
void because: (1) the obligation is yet to mature as there were negotiations for an additional loan amount of P5,000,000.00;
(2) lack of publication; (3) the purchase price was grossly inadequate and unconscionable; and (4) the foreclosure
proceedings were initiated by petitioner in bad faith.10
In its Decision dated September 16, 1992, the court a quo ordered the annulment and setting aside of the foreclosure
proceedings and auction sale held on December 20, 1976 on the ground that there was lack of publication of the notice of
sale.11 The court a quo also ordered petitioner to pay P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.12
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
During completion stage of the appeal, the appellate court issued a Resolution on January 31, 1996 dismissing petitioner’s
appeal with regard to the Forbes Park property as the same was already the subject of a Deed of Reconveyance executed by
petitioner in favor of respondents on November 22, 1994, as well as a Compromise Agreement dated September 13, 1994
between the same parties.13 Said Resolution having become final and executory on February 26, 1996, entry of judgment
was made on March 27, 1996. 14 Hence, resolution of the appeal in the Court of Appeals pertained only to the Malugay
property.
On December 11, 1998, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision, which affirmed in toto the decision of the court a
quo.15
Hence, herein petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner maintains that:
"I

"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PNB’S FORECLOSURE SALE OF

RESPONDENTS’ PROPERTIES NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF REPUBLICATION DESPITE THE
PARTIES AGREEMENT TO WAIVE THE REPUBLICATION AND RESPOSTING OF SHERIFF’S SALE

"II
 "THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE RESPONDENTS IN ESTOPPEL TO
ASSAIL THE VALIDITY OF THE FORECLOSURE SALE AFTER THEY INDUCED PNB TO EXECUTE
THE AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE SALE WAIVING THE REPUBLICATION AND REPOSTING OF
THE SHERIFF’S NOTICE OF SALE

"III

"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT THIRD
PERSONS IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW"16

The focal issue in this case is whether the parties to the mortgage can validly waive the posting and publication
requirements mandated by Act No. 3135.
We answer in the negative.
Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on real property is specific with regard to the
posting and publication requirements of the notice of sale, to wit:
"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice
shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city."
On this score, it is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places;
and, (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. 17 Failure to publish the notice of sale constitutes
a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.18
Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with since the parties agreed in
writing that the auction sale may proceed without need of re-publication and re-posting of the notice of sale. 19
We are not convinced. Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication
requirements of Act No. 3135.
In People v. Donato,20 the Court expounded on what rights and privileges may be waived, viz.:
"x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable
right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege
is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or role made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment
to the community at large x x x.
"Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a
waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights
of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
"While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of
the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver." 21
While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that such waiver is subject
to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.22
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the
public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices
are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. 23 Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and
publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. 24 As such, it is imbued with
public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.
Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with
and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at the very least voidable. 25
"Where required by the statute or by the terms of the foreclosure decree, public notice of the place and time of the mortgage
foreclosure sale must be given, a statute requiring it being held applicable to subsequent sales as well as to the first
"advertised sale of the property. It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with
statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a
notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and vitiate the sale."26
Thus, in the recent case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Aguirre,27 the foreclosure sale held more than two (2)
months after the published date of sale was considered void for lack of republication. 28 Similarly, in the instant case, the
lack of republication of the notice of the December 20, 1976 foreclosure sale renders it void.
The right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor’s failure to pay his obligation must be exercised according
to its clear mandate, and every requirement of the law must be complied with, lest the valid exercise of the right would
end.29 The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice
of others.30
We also cannot accept petitioner’s argument that respondents should be held in estoppel for inducing the former to re-
schedule the sale without need of republication and reposting of the notice of sale.
Records show that respondents, indeed, requested for the postponement of the foreclosure sale. 31 That, however, is all that
respondents sought. Nowhere in the records was it shown that respondents purposely sought re-scheduling of the sale
without need of republication and reposting of the notice of sale. To request postponement of the sale is one thing; to request
it without need of compliance with the statutory requirements is another. Respondents, therefore, did not commit any act
that would have estopped them from questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale for non-compliance with Act No. 3135.
In addition, the "Agreement to Postpone Sale" signed by respondents was obviously prepared solely by petitioner. 32 A
scrutiny of the agreement discloses that it is in a ready-made form and the only participation of respondents is to affix or
"adhere" their signature thereto. It therefore partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion, i.e., one in which one of the
contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party may accept or reject, but cannot modify. 33
One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion"
thereto, giving no room for negotiation, and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. 34 As such,
their terms are construed strictly against the party who drafted it.35
Finally, while we rule that the appellate court did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the court a quo, we find
the award of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees to be excessive. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows the award of such fees
when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect its just and valid claim. In view
of petitioner's foreclosure of the property without complying with the statutory requirements, 36 the award of attorney's fees
of P25,000.00 is just, fair, and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47500 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification that the award of attorney’s fees is reduced to P25,000.00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social
Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the
vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation
Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on
John, which led to his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 5
addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of
JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La
Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits
sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the
records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February
4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary
beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries
and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided
for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the
appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the
adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the
right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC. 10 Hence, the instant
petition.
 The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a
lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioner’s
otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is
John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated
by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which
would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit
being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the
Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12
However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death
certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than
three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC
to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-
related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing
the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued
the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of
employee’s death.
 (b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until
he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental
defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are
no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit;
provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be
counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent,
as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and
petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167
(j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent
that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in
order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with
the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent
parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben
Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one.
Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and
intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin
a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all
the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense —
which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did.
The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by
nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent
parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate
parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in
question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection
clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under
Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the
above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test
of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government
concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the
rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death -
will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course
of action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)
(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an
opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental
authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could
have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental
authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was
made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code
provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21
who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section
20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The
manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of
vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in
favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at
such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be
told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the
instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the
best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is
rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind,
in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a
parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties
between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they
shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall
apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing
provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who
was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of
the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot
leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was
snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being
adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of
John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be established from the
documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a
housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to
"give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth
in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan,
Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed in
Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John. 26
Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision.27 Similarly, this same address was used by
petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and
that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282,
otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or
injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626,
John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his
dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration
ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate
petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more,
does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under
the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release
the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 153063-70. August 19, 2005
AMELIA D. DE MESA, ARACELI ADATO, RODRIGO ALVARAN, AIDA CASTRO, BALTAZAR ESTRELLES,
ANTONIO A. FERRER, DANILO GARCIA, JULIO M. GONZALES, MARRIETA A. JOSE, PEPITA JUNTADO,
EDUARDO U. LAGO, NESTOR RODA, JAIME SANCHEZ and JUANITA SANCHEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC. and PEPSICO INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Order,1 dated April 18, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142 in
Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421. In the said Order, the RTC granted herein respondents’ motion to dismiss the
complaints filed by petitioners herein based on the principle of stare decisis.
The instant case arose from the same set of facts as (1) Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
153183 promulgated on July 24, 20022 affirming the Court of Appeals Decision, dated April 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. CV No.
53860;3 and (2) Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and Pepsico, Inc., G.R. No. 149411, dated October 1, 2001,
which also affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision of May 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62837.4
The facts are culled from the aforesaid Decisions of the Court of Appeals as affirmed by this Court.
Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps bearing the number "349," allegedly a winning combination in a contest
sponsored by respondents Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (PCPPI) and PEPSICO, Inc. (PI).
Respondent PCPPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, bottling, and distribution of carbonated drinks,
while respondent PI is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines and is the major stockholder of
PCPPI.
D.G. Consultores, a Mexican consulting firm that handled similar promotions in other countries, was tasked to randomly
pre-select the winning numbers and send to respondents a list of the 60 winning numbers with their corresponding security
codes. The process of selecting the winning numbers was implemented with the approval of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI).
During the initial promotion period, from February 17 to May 8, 1992, respondents seeded 1000 numbers, 60 of which were
winning numbers, 510 non-winning numbers, while the remaining 430 were unused. To ensure that the winning numbers
would not be tampered, the DTI required respondents to submit the list of winning numbers including their security codes
which was then deposited in a safety deposit box in a bank.5
Owing to the promotional campaign’s success, respondents extended the "Number Fever" by five more weeks, from May 10
to June 12, 1992. Pepsi again tapped D.G. Consultores to predetermine the 25 additional winning numbers from the list of
unused numbers.
On May 25, 1992, respondents announced "349" as the winning number for the May 26 draw. Later the same night, Quintin
Gomez, Jr., then PCPPI’s Marketing Services Manager called DTI Director Madarang informing her that due to some
security code problems a mistake had been made in the announcement of number "349" as the winning number.6
Numerous holders of the supposedly winning "349" crowns were not honored and paid by respondents, which led these
rejected crown holders to file separate complaints for specific performance and damages.
Civil Case No. 93-68351 was originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, but the plaintiffs in the
said case withdrew their complaint, leaving Gerson Mendoza as the sole plaintiff in Gerson M. Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola
Products Phils., Inc. and Pepsico, Inc.7 The other plaintiffs re-filed their complaints before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 50, entitled Romulo Rodrigo, et al. v. Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc., et al., docketed as Civil Case
No. 94-71403.8
For their part, petitioners herein filed their separate complaints, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421, before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142.
In the Mendoza case, the RTC dismissed the complaint filed against herein respondents for specific performance and
damages in connection with the Number Fever fiasco.9 Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
53860, which was dismissed for lack of merit.10 Unfazed, Mendoza filed with this Court a petition for review, which was
denied for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.11
In the Rodrigo case, the RTC likewise dismissed the complaint against herein respondents for specific performance and
damages arising from the said promotion.12 On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 62837, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC decision.13 A petition for review was subsequently filed with this Court, which was denied for failure to show that
a reversible error was committed by the appellate court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied with finality 14 and
entry of judgment was made.15
However, prior to the resolution of the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, herein petitioners filed with the RTC, on December 11,
2000, a motion for leave16 to (1) adopt the previous testimonial and documentary evidence in the Mendoza and Rodrigo
cases; or (2) archive the case until final resolution of the said two cases, which were then pending with the Court of
Appeals. The RTC granted the said motion on January 8, 2001 and the case was accordingly archived.17
Meantime, the Rodrigo case became final and executory on February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of therein petitioners’
petition for review on certiorari and motion for reconsideration.
Hence, on February 20, 2002, herein respondents filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss18 the complaints filed by
petitioners herein invoking the principle of stare decisis. The RTC, in its assailed Order,19 granted the motion to dismiss
ratiocinating as follows:
The Court finds the instant motion meritorious under the principle of stare decisis. The said doctrine embodies the legal
maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be
followed in other cases involving similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the
law and does not require identity or privy of parties. This is explicitly ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides
that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions
"assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of
those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto" (Kilosbayan, Inc. et al. vs. Manuel Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17,
1995).
In the instant cases as well as in Civil Case No. 93-68351 (the Mendoza case), not only are the legal rights and relations of
the parties substantially the same as those passed upon in Civil Case No. 94-71403 (the Rodrigo case), but the facts, the
applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a
ruling in one case, i.e. the Rodrigo case in Civil Case No. 94-71403, under the rule of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issue.20
Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review claiming that (1) the principle of res judicata does not apply; and (2)
the dismissal of the complaint was premature as petitioners’ motion to archive the case and the grant thereof was based on
the condition that there be a final resolution in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.21
Simply put, the sole issue is whether the present case is barred by this Court’s ruling in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.
Petitioners contend that res judicata does not apply as there is no identity of parties to begin with. Moreover, they argue that
stare decisis is not a hard and fast rule. They insist another review should be taken on the cause of action in this case
because the Court of Appeals, in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, erred in ruling that the security code determines the real
winning crowns. They claim that the trial court’s dismissal of their complaint was premature. Lastly, petitioners posit that
there was a breached contract between the parties; therefore, respondents should be made to perform their contractual
obligation.
For their part, respondents counter that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Respondents contend that, like the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, the civil cases filed by petitioners arose from the conduct of
respondents’ "Number Fever" promotion. Petitioners’ causes of action, testimonial and documentary evidence, are the same
as those in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases. Lastly, respondents point out that the findings of fact in the said two cases are
also the same, i.e.: (i) Respondents did not breach any contract since the "349" crowns with security code "L-2560-FQ" are
not winning crowns; and (ii) Respondents were not negligent in the conduct of their promotion and they exerted efforts to
ensure the integrity and smooth conduct of the same.
The instant petition must be denied.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere22 is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of
the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument.23
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues,
and the evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left
to be argued. The issue has been settled and this Court’s final decision in the said cases must be respected. This Court’s
hands are now tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 142, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134241 August 11, 2003
DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella), petitioner,
vs.
JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, INC., respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated 12 May 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
46224. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated 6 March 1997, 3 July 1997 and
3 October 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque, Branch 2602 ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 95-032.
The Facts
On 23 March 1995, petitioner David Reyes ("Reyes") filed before the trial court a complaint for annulment of contract and
damages against respondents Jose Lim ("Lim"), Chuy Cheng Keng ("Keng") and Harrison Lumber, Inc. ("Harrison
Lumber").
The complaint3 alleged that on 7 November 1994, Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell ("Contract
to Sell") a parcel of land ("Property") located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. Harrison Lumber occupied the
Property as lessee with a monthly rental of P35,000. The Contract to Sell provided for the following terms and conditions:
1. The total consideration for the purchase of the aforedescribed parcel of land together with the perimeter walls
found therein is TWENTY EIGHT MILLION (P28,000,000.00) PESOS payable as follows:
(a) TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS upon signing of this Contract to Sell;
(b) The balance of EIGHTEEN MILLION (P18,000,000.00) PESOS shall be paid on or before March 8, 1995 at
9:30 A.M. at a bank to be designated by the Buyer but upon the complete vacation of all the tenants or occupants of
the property and execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, if the tenants or occupants have vacated the
premises earlier than March 8, 1995, the VENDOR shall give the VENDEE at least one week advance notice for
the payment of the balance and execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
2. That in the event, the tenants or occupants of the premises subject of this sale shall not vacate the premises on
March 8, 1995 as stated above, the VENDEE shall withhold the payment of the balance of P18,000,000.00 and the
VENDOR agrees to pay a penalty of Four percent (4%) per month to the herein VENDEE based on the amount of
the downpayment of TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS until the complete vacation of the premises by the
tenants therein.4
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of January 1995.
Reyes also informed Keng5 and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable
for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. The complaint further alleged that Lim connived
with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled
the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
On 3 May 1995, Keng and Harrison Lumber filed their Answer 6 denying they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes. Keng
and Harrison Lumber alleged that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their
difficulty in finding a new location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that as of March 1995, it had already started
transferring some of its merchandise to its new business location in Malabon.7
On 31 May 1995, Lim filed his Answer 8 stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price on or
before 8 March 1995. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. On 9 March 1995, Reyes offered to
return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property.
Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had
already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation ("Line One") on 1 March 1995 for P16,782,840. After the
registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Register of Deeds issued to Line One TCT No. 134767 covering the Property.
Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.
On 2 November 1995, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These included
the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of
sale and title plus damages before another trial court. 9 The trial court granted the motion in an Order dated 23 November
1995.
In his Amended Answer dated 18 January 1996, 10 Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment in an Order dated 7 October 1996.
On 6 March 1997, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with the
cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.
On 25 March 1997, Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order dated 6 March 1997 on the ground the Order practically
granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. 11 The trial court denied Reyes’ motion in an Order 12 dated 3
July 1997. Citing Article 1385 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that an action for rescission could prosper only if the
party demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore should the court grant the rescission.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Order 13 dated 3 October 1997. In the same order, the trial
court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October 1997.
On 8 December 1997, Reyes14 filed a Petition for Certiorari 15 with the Court of Appeals. Reyes prayed that the Orders of
the trial court dated 6 March 1997, 3 July 1997 and 3 October 1997 be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 12 May 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled the trial court could validly issue the assailed orders in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. The
court may grant equitable reliefs to breathe life and force to substantive law such as Article 1385 16 of the Civil Code since
the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court do not apply to this case.
The Court of Appeals held the assailed orders merely directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million to the custody of the trial
court to protect the interest of Lim who paid the amount to Reyes as down payment. This did not mean the money would be
returned automatically to Lim.
The Issues
Reyes raises the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court could issue the questioned Orders dated March 6,
1997, July 3, 1997 and October 3, 1997, requiring petitioner David Reyes to deposit the amount of Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) during the pendency of the action, when deposit is not among the provisional remedies
enumerated in Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial court could issue the questioned Orders on grounds of
equity when there is an applicable law on the matter, that is, Rules 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. 17
The Court’s Ruling
Reyes’ contentions are without merit.
Reyes points out that deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Reyes
stresses the enumeration in the Rules is exclusive. Not one of the provisional remedies in Rules 57 to 61 18 applies to this
case. Reyes argues that a court cannot apply equity and require deposit if the law already prescribes the specific provisional
remedies which do not include deposit. Reyes invokes the principle that equity is "applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or x x x judicial rules of procedure." 19 Reyes adds the fact that the provisional remedies do not
include deposit is a matter of dura lex sed lex.20
The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If left alone, the
hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution, which is a
precondition to the rescission of the Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks. This is not a case of equity overruling a
positive provision of law or judicial rule for there is none that governs this particular case. This is a case of silence or
insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the courts to
make a ruling despite the "silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." 21 This calls for the application of equity, 22 which
"fills the open spaces in the law."23
Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit of the P10 million down payment
in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to
the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. 24 Equity is the principle
by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate.25
Reyes is seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. In his amended answer, Lim is also seeking cancellation of the Contract
to Sell. The trial court then ordered Reyes to deposit in court the P10 million down payment that Lim made under the
Contract to Sell. Reyes admits receipt of the P10 million down payment but opposes the order to deposit the amount in
court. Reyes contends that prior to a judgment annulling the Contract to Sell, he has the "right to use, possess and enjoy" 26
the P10 million as its "owner"27 unless the court orders its preliminary attachment.28
To subscribe to Reyes’ contention will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of Lim. Reyes sold to Line One the Property
even before the balance of P18 million under the Contract to Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On 1 March
1995, Reyes signed a Deed of Absolute Sale 29 in favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the Register of Deeds issued TCT
No. 13476730 in the name of Line One. 31 Reyes cannot claim ownership of the P10 million down payment because Reyes
had already sold to another buyer the Property for which Lim made the down payment. In fact, in his Comment 32 dated 20
March 1996, Reyes reiterated his offer to return to Lim the P10 million down payment.
On balance, it is unreasonable and unjust for Reyes to object to the deposit of the P10 million down payment. The
application of equity always involves a balancing of the equities in a particular case, a matter addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Here, we find the equities weigh heavily in favor of Lim, who paid the P10 million down payment in
good faith only to discover later that Reyes had subsequently sold the Property to another buyer.
In Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. IAC,33 this Court held the plaintiff could not continue to benefit from the
property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whomever the court might ultimately
adjudge as the lawful owner. The Court declared:
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted among others in its complaint in
Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts
due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. x x x
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner’s objections to the deposit of the amounts in
litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of
aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the
Land Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).
There is also no plausible or justifiable reason for Reyes to object to the deposit of the P10 million down payment in court.
The Contract to Sell can no longer be enforced because Reyes himself subsequently sold the Property to Line One. Both
Reyes and Lim are now seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. Under Article 1385 of the Civil Code, rescission creates
the obligation to return the things that are the object of the contract. Rescission is possible only when the person demanding
rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is
restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante. 34
Thus, since Reyes is demanding to rescind the Contract to Sell, he cannot refuse to deposit the P10 million down payment in
court.35 Such deposit will ensure restitution of the P10 million to its rightful owner. Lim, on the other hand, has nothing to
refund, as he has not received anything under the Contract to Sell.36
In Government of the Philippine Islands v. Wagner and Cleland Wagner,37 the Court ruled the refund of amounts
received under a contract is a precondition to the rescission of the contract. The Court declared:
The Government, having asked for rescission, must restore to the defendants whatever it has received under the
contract. It will only be just if, as a condition to rescission, the Government be required to refund to the defendants
an amount equal to the purchase price, plus the sums expended by them in improving the land. (Civil Code, art.
1295.)
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in Article 22 38 of the Civil
Code. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this
principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other
provision of law.39 Courts can extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the
pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the Rules of Court.
Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of
the sale because he has subsequently sold the same property to another buyer. 40 By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily
offers to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a seller may not take back his offer if the court deems it
equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution, to put the money in judicial deposit.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 41 In this case, it was just,
equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment to prevent unjust enrichment
by Reyes at the expense of Lim.42
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known
as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato.
On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an
investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and
other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in
the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City
requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take
his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some
personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he
was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However,
Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt
of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register
in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told
to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to
the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of
which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez."4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same
office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar
Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter
to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of
court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different
from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local
civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non
for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No.
6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as
minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by
law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an
indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated
C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias,
according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims
that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express
consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was
different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute
should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the
surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related
statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No.
6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one
with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name
as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and
one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like
those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had
for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of
which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such
authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now
reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes
and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any
name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or
with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the
bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who
have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in
the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure
such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name,
if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and
the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any
name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper
local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in
Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce
and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on
14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.8 The pertinent provisions of Act No.
3883 as amended follow —
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt
for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or
printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business
other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his
business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name
or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the
Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common
interest with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142
thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and
recorded in the civil register.9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an
alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real
name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of
the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner
admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he
is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain
difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two
names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using
and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a
petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of
his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further
using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in
ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after
he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he
can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can,
abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper
and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of
Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually
in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute
name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and
these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name
of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did
so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent.
There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had
used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez"
was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For,
even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the
complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of
public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept
of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-
alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from
those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor
of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed,
our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the
act done by him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184823 October 6, 2010
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his
favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases,
a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-
observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would result in the
denial of his claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the July 30, 2008 Decision 1
and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing, and processing of steel and its by-products. 3 It is registered
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity 4 and its products, "close impression die steel
forgings" and "tool and dies," are registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer status. 5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002 in the total amount of ₱3,891,123.82 with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the
Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review 7 with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The case
was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, it generated and
recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of ₱131,791,399.00,8 which was paid pursuant to Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and
(3) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid input VAT
amounting to ₱3,912,088.14 from purchases and importation attributable to its zero-rated sales; 10 and that in its application
for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center, it only claimed
the amount of ₱3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated under Sections 106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1)
of the Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2) year period prescribed in Section 229 of the Tax
Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to
sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of the nature of exemption
from taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting
respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a
tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to
the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in sales
which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-registered; (3) the claim must be filed within two
years after the close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be
attributable to such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against the
output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-262,"
"JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in sales which are zero-rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499 (Exhibit
"C") with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on September 30, 2004 (Exhibit
"N") and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004, both within the two (2) year prescriptive period from the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, which is from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some documents and claims of petitioner that are baseless
and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate representing
unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its zero-
rated sales for the same period, but in the reduced amount of ₱3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82
Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37

Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45

Less:
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent
is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced
amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100
PESOS (₱3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the months of July to September 2002.
SO ORDERED.14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 15 insisting that the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under
Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax
refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. 16 He cited as
basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, 17 which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In
addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections
112 and 229 of the NIRC.18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a "condition precedent" 19
before a judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power of
judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in favor
of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for counting the two-year period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed beyond the period allowed by law and hence, the
honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner further contends that respondent's filing of the
administrative and judicial [claims] effectively eliminates the authority of the honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over
the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the
amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for
each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25) days from the close of each taxable quarter within
which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved
was for the period of July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, respondent has until
October 25, 2002 within which to file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied when it filed
its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start from the
payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of
2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus, respondent's administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on September 30, 2004
were filed on time because AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the 1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an
administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be the case as the law does not prohibit the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims for refund. What is controlling is that both claims for refund
must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the findings and conclusion spelled out in the assailed
January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division. What the instant petition seeks is for
the Court En Banc to view and appreciate the evidence in their own perspective of things, which unfortunately had already
been considered and passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No.
7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc. petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent" are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of whether respondent’s judicial and administrative claims
for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
the NIRC.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit were filed in violation of
Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code, 26 since the year 2004 was a
leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which
expired on September 29, 2004.27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in determining the start of the
two-year period as the said provision pertains to the compliance requirements in the payment of VAT. 28 He asserts that it is
Section 112, paragraph (A), of the same Code that should apply because it specifically provides for the period within which
a claim for tax refund/ credit should be made.29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial claim with the CTA were
filed on the same day. 30 He opines that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes
Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an administrative claim. 31 He insists that such procedural
requirement is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an appellate body
exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because it has substantially complied with all the requirements provided by law. 33
Respondent likewise defends the CTA En Banc in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the prescriptive
period for the claim for tax refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must be read together with
Section 114(A) of the same Code.34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial claims, respondent contends that it first filed an
administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF before it filed
a judicial claim with the CTA.35 To prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet No. 49702 36 and
BIR Form No. 1914 for the third quarter of 2002, 37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as Annexes "M" and "N,"
respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the CTA. 38 Respondent further contends that the non-observance of the
120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is
important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. 39 In support thereof, respondent cites
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. 40 where it was ruled that "[i]f, however, the [CIR] takes
time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the [CTA]
before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the [CIR]." 41 Lastly, respondent argues that even if
the period had already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity considering that it is not a jurisdictional
requirement.42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the Second Division of
the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a
tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to
the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales
under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange
proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in
taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be
directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume
of sales. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC, which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the
amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for
each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with Section 236, shall file a return and pay the tax due
thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of registration: Provided, That only one consolidated
return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his principal place of business or head office and all branches.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. –
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged
to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or
credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax,
penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax
or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner
may, even without written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was
made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period for filing a claim for refund/credit of unutilized
input VAT should start from the date of payment of tax and not from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been resolved
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 44 where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is
the applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT,
and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous
payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes."45 We explained that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT
payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT
regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec.
112 (A), "[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made and not from the
time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued." Thus, when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays
its input VAT a year after the pertinent transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the
unutilized creditable input VAT. The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or
transaction was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last creditable input
VAT due for the period covering the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996 ending on September
30, 1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after
September 30, 1996 or, to be precise, on September 30, 1998. Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on
December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose of
refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C)
and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The Commissioner may –
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of
internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change
unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of
taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund
within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an overpayment
shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for
the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively
or in any manner wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or
proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax
or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner
may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment
was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of payment of the tax or penalty,
for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous
payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed on to the
buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or
transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not,
standing alone, deprive the taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous,
illegal, or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive period
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales or transactions were made pertaining to the
creditable input VAT, applies to the instant case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of
taxes.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in
computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. To be clear, Section 112 of
the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be reckoned from
the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was timely filed.
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code, 47 which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and taking into account the
fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit for
the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 49 we said that as between the Civil Code, which
provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of
12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. 50 Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
same subject matter – the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be
a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period
(reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months,
computed as follows:
 Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month
from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period. 51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we
are constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section 112(D) of the
NIRC, which provides that:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner shall
grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)
hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act
on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of
the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the
unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete
documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or
partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the
decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the
remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously,
respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we find the filing of
the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as
both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period 52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that
"any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. This is
apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which states that the CIR has "120 days from the
submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within
which to decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already
provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second
paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse
of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has 30
days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing an appeal with
the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we find the
same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And as already
discussed, Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal
inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008 Resolution
of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is
DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065 for having been prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed
as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the
time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in
Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her
reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY
TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent.16
Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of
Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime
charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and
ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child
under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies
to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating
its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our
national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established
that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase
exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was
directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the
Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals]
on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions
of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation
to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling
by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the
hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with
petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to
support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31
respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as
her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that
Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family
Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente
v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the
divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance
with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said
foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in
any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children
is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force
or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of violence
against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here
in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling
under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started
in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same
court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar
v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10
of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a
specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such
was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in
Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.

NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing from New York to
Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court categorically
ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach was
"characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract on
respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline
tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6,
1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare
ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight.
On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m.
but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the
seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed
as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to
board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being
ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the
wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane;
while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was
only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was
also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines
at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of
petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the following
amounts:
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets bought
by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New
York City;
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Suthira Zalamea's
ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50, Philippine Currency,
representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral damages for all the
plaintiffs'
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a
breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights
is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked and that even a
person with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such
omission or negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-eight (48) other
passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over discounted tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals3 dated October 25, 1991 states as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED in that the
award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of Suthira
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of Cesar Zalamea's
ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and alleged the following
errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT
FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS.5
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for
Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking
has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.6 Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition
dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside
from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance
with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be
applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline.8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be
Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an
award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals,9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused
carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular
flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that
flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an
airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them
would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute,
said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not allowed to board the plane
because her seat had already been given to another passenger even before the allowable period for passengers to check in
had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline
acted in bad faith in violating private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the
injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to bad faith. In Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had the necessary ticket,
baggage claim and clearance from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the
passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the
lower court's finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. So ruled this
Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended
with public duty — a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-
interest or enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because
there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller planes,
thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention
and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an
award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its
passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was
overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly
inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice
to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written the name of the passenger
and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any
rate, said exhibit was not offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that
Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to
discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them
was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given
priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding priorities are reasonable
policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of
said policies but whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage.
Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to
show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding
priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA,
thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The
failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to
them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the
rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA
liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge
respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea's ticket because the ticket
was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act
of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate act.
Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that
both petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines tickets purchased and used by
petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to take the American
Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because
respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase
of the American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable
breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA
should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its
obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a passenger
is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply
being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from
New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of
the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled
petitioners to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code which allows recovery
when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest. However,
the award for moral damages and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira
and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00 exemplary
damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in the following
amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets bought by Suthira and
Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.