CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution 1 of the
Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas
corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that:
a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition
is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the
Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted
to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with
her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with
her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways.
On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without
notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this
was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then
went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did
not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls
from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a
writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA
7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an
act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural
expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in
relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the
jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is
concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the
word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue
said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence,
then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent – and such an
interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas
corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of
habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional
Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction
is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it
cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court – or any
court for that matter – to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the
exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the
remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May
15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas
corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,4Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
1

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by
giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to
be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive"
apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they
passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared
towards addressing three major issues regarding children’s welfare cases, as expressed
by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving
Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further
clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of
the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the
children party to the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that
RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in
one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is
paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in
disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the
appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature:
the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to
another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining
Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the
regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports
petitioner’s submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not
connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus
cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were
selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is
concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its
territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the
enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can
issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any
member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any
member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the
court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court
of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable
before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular
courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and
giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling
is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures
man’s survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law
killeth; its spirit giveth life."
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution,
as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power
of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and
the implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one
sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice or contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will
result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children"8 under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing
the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
2
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The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute SO ORDERED.
must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to
have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."9

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where
the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-
04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any
of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court
within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing
the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10

That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not
represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more
different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest,
since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.

3

G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN
When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the
minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such
is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally charged.
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7,
1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994;
Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born
on December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their
three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent
sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to
no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too
proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the
Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay
and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s
care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and
to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed
that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had
a change of heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit to
take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at
night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected
her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent
who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where
he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila
Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369
(otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was
driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug
addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to
commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal
problems.4
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6 asserting its authority to take
cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was
entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in
a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence,
this recourse.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He
invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of
minors.
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions
for habeas corpuswhere the custody of minors is at issue.8 (emphases supplied)
4
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
11
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The
writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of
minors is involved.9 (emphases supplied)1avvphi1

We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:

[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result
in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining
custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking
for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred
from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas
corpuscase will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].10

Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to
the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to
avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial
instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court
5

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for
herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million
Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of
Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies
just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to
curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission
on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female
violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27,
2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e,
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders
from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC;
and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers,
prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local
government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262.
She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation
of custody of her children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former
was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17
years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted;
Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He
forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When
she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office,
petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was
often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one
point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner
admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even
boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager.
Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of
their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on
both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another
time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat
Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to
leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's
sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father
because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of
despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her
wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house
instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven
(7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on
6

her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and
is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends
to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing
the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was
leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in
the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since
he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he
would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had
previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a
single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells.
He is the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are
both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations,
private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation
only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less
than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use of credit
cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16After private respondent
confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby
depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the
petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a
TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or
family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and
if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal
dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the
name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or
anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove
things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the
family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26
March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter
the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified
TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit
and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm
licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his
possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental
of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he
received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006,
which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must
submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all
7

these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to
the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of
Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite,
and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if
the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered
to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION
PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an
amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following
additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the
Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they
go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two
sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental
expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of
support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice
of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used
by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00
to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the
conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8)
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner
Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and
make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the
conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental
and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise
be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the
Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their
children, private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of
which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering
the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of
replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with
long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
8

back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-
Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-
Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610,
also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids
working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against
private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went
to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside
a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case
for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads
as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees
or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J.
Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo,
driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard
Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of
1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three
children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the
children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their
tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through
the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508
and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to
deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another
vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia
only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal
home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered
by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall
be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered
not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of
petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the
Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be
forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud
her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO
for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon
petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated
October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an
Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated
August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended
for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after
9

each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered
by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it
would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an
invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition
for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial
court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly,
the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY
THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT
R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262
AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of
the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will
not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction
that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
10

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level
as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of
1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the
Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at
least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony with
the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed
of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46 The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co.,
Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as
follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262
could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the
same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an
opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim
for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's
claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality
of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-
claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo
because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of
R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.
11

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows
the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further
hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will
be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in
the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done
in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing
when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said
order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP.
No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor
in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus
or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day
TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not
stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30)
days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme
Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect
to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is
immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To
issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We
have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues,
and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the
instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to
rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and
child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife,
gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under
the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A.
9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized
measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence
Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing
12

protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving
special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it
was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We
quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's
groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to
include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the
household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts
to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really
are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to
place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves
"WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe
so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law
wives, and those related with the family.65
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this
to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding
that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I
remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation
period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get
me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in
the domestic environment.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men,
assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not
equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I
am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether
we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man
would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this
bill because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the
other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence.
While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men
also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to
men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women.
However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards
in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and
whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the
family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold
inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family
members, particularly children.
13

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family
members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with
various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda
would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the
rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am
not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept
this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung
may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake,
puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove
the children from this particular measure.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter
of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old
children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by
their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will
update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only
women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in
the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency
of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A.
9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By
the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation
of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
14

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is
instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination
as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based
on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As
Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence
of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise
known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think
men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles
in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power
comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression
of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over
and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement
of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by
which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-
based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks
delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last
October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The
patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under
his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior
both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave,
concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as
property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife
if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of
society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent
Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one
and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s,
English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
15

common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives
with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or
inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the
English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate
court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair,
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities,
is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same
protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The
temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and
picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's
agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then,
the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the
public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern.
No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the
victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that
nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates,"
because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well,
and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true
incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million
severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be
physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male
partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating
takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most
visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic
isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they
perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in
shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of
income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by
their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The
United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the
equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been
regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established
a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the
State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence
against women and children show that –
16
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and
55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and,
2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United
of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had
cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their
their husbands and live-in partners.73 spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and
much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with emotional abuse.76
violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,74 thus: While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against
men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-
Reported 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or
Cases discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas,
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832 parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal
Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23 protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201 animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the
Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625 same streets.
Lasciviousness
Physical 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588 The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may
Injuries be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must
Sexual 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63 be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-
Harassment drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community."77The mere
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021 fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213 right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15 produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62 C. Gender bias and prejudices
Abduction 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29 From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155 against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948 was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President,
chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights
remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has
institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence,
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
17

subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of
the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No.
2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter
and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the
case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later
be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and
prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic
violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in
reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her
as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an
"illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of
being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested
property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender
sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination
through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is
an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As
a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he
paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police,
the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which
is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of
which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified
on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified
by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties
shall accord to women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is,
thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security
of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
18

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child
as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity
by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental
or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein
the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined
in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the
use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are
attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs
is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct
is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet,
petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,"
"marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they
make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or
father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the
use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-
Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were
held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they
and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the
husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
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A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary
reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of
their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to
the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the
victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence,
and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor
children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103 among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice,
copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present
his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April
24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the
TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated
September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment
arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and
that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was
denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC
case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is
virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination
suggest that this is so. It states:
20

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include
any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the
respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's
residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are
violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it
for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging
mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to
"protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a
proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue
at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In
addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic
because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against
whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay
officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection
1âw phi 1
order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is
issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2)
threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in
the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
21
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of
a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence
and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and
that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials
and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and
to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of,
or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must
be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case,
however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner
to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed
laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight
against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a
hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118Accordingly,
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.

22

G.R. No. 149578 April 10, 2003
EVELYN TOLOSA vs. NLRC QWANA KAIUN (through its resident-agent, FUMIO
NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. INC., PEDRO GARATE and MARIO
ASIS
As a rule, labor arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission have no power or
authority to grant reliefs from claims that do not arise from employer-employee relations.
They have no jurisdiction over torts that have no reasonable causal connection to any of
the claims provided for in the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining
agreements.
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the April 18, 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 57660, as well as the April 17, 2001 CA
Resolution2 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of
the challenged Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DENIED and accordingly DISMISSED, without prejudice to the right of herein
petitioner to file a suit before the proper court, if she so desires. No
pronouncement as to costs."3
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts of the case in this manner:
"Evelyn Tolosa (hereafter EVELYN), was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa
(hereafter CAPT. TOLOSA) who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning
agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils. Inc., (ASIA BULK for brevity), to be the master
of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. CAPT. TOLOSA had a monthly
compensation of US$1700, plus US$400.00 monthly overtime allowance. His
contract officially began on November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract of
employment when he assumed command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan.
The vessel departed for Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle
of the voyage. At the time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown
to be in good health.
"During 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from Yokohama
sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater.
The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever and in the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his death
on November 18, 1992.
"According to Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the Vessel, in his statement submitted
to the U.S. Coast Guard on November 23, 1992 upon arrival in Long Beach,
California CAPT. TOLOSA experienced high fever between November 11-15,
1992 and suffered from loose bowel movement (LBM) beginning November 9,
1992. By November 11, 1992, his temperature was 39.5 although his LBM had
'slightly' stopped. The next day, his temperature rose to 39.8 and had lost his
appetite. In the evening of that day, November 13, 1992, he slipped in the toilet
and suffered scratches at the back of his waist. First aid was applied and CAPT.
TOLOSA was henceforth confined to his quarters with an able seaman to watch
him 24 hours a day until November 15, 1992, when his conditioned worsened.
"On the same day, November 15, 1992, the Chief Engineer initiated the move
and contacted ASIA BULK which left CAPT. TOLOSA's fate in the hands of
Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, Second Mate of the same vessel who was in-
charge of the primary medical care of its officers and crew. Contact with the U.S.
Coast Guard in Honolulu, Hawaii (USCGHH) was likewise initiated to seek
medical advice.
"On November 17, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was 'losing resistance' and his
'condition was getting serious.' At 2215 GMT, a telex was sent to ASIA BULK
requesting for the immediate evacuation of CAPT. TOLOSA and thereafter an
airlift was set on November 19, 1992. However, on November 18, 1992, at 0753
GMT, CAPT. TOLOSA was officially recorded as having breathed his last.
"Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner, filed
a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA (POEA Case No. 93-06-1080)
against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its resident-agent, Mr. Fumio Nakagawa, ASIA BULK,
Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, as respondents.
"After initial hearings and submissions of pleadings, the case was however
transferred to the Department of Labor and Employment, National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), when the amendatory legislation expanding its
jurisdiction, and removing overseas employment related claims from the ambit of
POEA jurisdiction. The case was then raffled to Labor Arbiter, Vladimir Sampang.
"After considering the pleadings and evidences, on July 8, 1997, the Labor
Arbiter Vladimir P. L. Sampang, in conformity with petitioner's plea to hold
respondents solidarily liable, granted all the damages, (plus legal interest), as
prayed for by the petitioner. The dispositive portion of his Decision reads:
23

'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondents are hereby
ordered to jointly and solidarily pay complainants the following:
1. US$176,400.00 (US$2,100.00 x 12 months x 7 years) or
P4,586,400.00 (at P26.00 per US$1.00) by way of lost income;
2. interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum or
P1,238,328.00 (from November 1992 to May 1997 or 4 ½ years);
3. moral damages of P200,000.00;
4. exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
5. 10% of the total award, or P612,472.80, as attorney's fees.'
"On appeal, private respondents raised before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) the following grounds:
(a) the action before the Arbiter, as he himself concedes, is a complaint
based on torts due to negligence. It is the regular courts of law which
have jurisdiction over the action;
(b) Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relationship (Art. 217, Section (a) (3));
(c) In this case, gross negligence is imputed to respondents Garate and
Asis, who have no employer-employee relationship with the late Capt.
Virgilio Tolosa;
(d) The labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over the controversy;
"Despite other peripheral issues raised by the parties in their respective
pleadings, the NLRC on September 10, 1998, vacated the appealed decision
dated July 8, 1997 of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner's case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pursuant to the provisions of the
Labor Code, as amended."4 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her cause did not arise from an employer-
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
employee relation, but from a quasi delict or tort. Further, there is no reasonable causal
connection between her suit for damages and her claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the
Labor Code, which allows an award of damages incident to an employer-employee
relation.
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I
"Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
"II
"Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by the labor
arbiter."6
After reviewing petitioner's Memorandum, we find that we are specifically being asked to
determine 1) whether the labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioner's
action, and 2) whether the monetary award granted by the labor arbiter has already
reached finality.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction over the Action
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort, but
on the failure of private respondents -- as employers of her husband (Captain Tolosa) --
to provide him with timely, adequate and competent medical services under Article 161
of the Labor Code:
"ART 161. Assistance of employer. -- It shall be the duty of any employer to
provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate
medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in
case of emergency."
24

Likewise, she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code vests labor arbiters
7 change in course, which the other officers would have concurred in had they
and the NLRC with jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from
employer-employee relations.
Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal connection" rule should be applied in
her favor. Citing San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban,8 she insists that a reasonable
causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relation
confers jurisdiction upon labor tribunals. She adds that she has satisfied the required
conditions: 1) the dispute arose from an employer-employee relation, considering that
the claim was for damages based on the failure of private respondents to comply with
their obligation under Article 161 of the Labor Code; and 2) the dispute can be resolved
by reference to the Labor Code, because the material issue is whether private
respondents complied with their legal obligation to provide timely, adequate and
competent medical services to guarantee Captain Tolosa's occupational safety.9
We disagree. We affirm the CA's ruling that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages, because that ruling was based on a
quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.10
Time and time again, we have held that the allegations in the complaint determine the
nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts.11 After carefully
examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are convinced that the
allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on a quasi delict or tort. It is
evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence.
Petitioner's complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the negligent
acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-employee relation with Captain
Tolosa. Specifically, the paper alleges the following tortious acts:
"x x x [R]espondent Asis was the medical officer of the Vessel, who failed to
regularly monitor Capt. Tolosa's condition, and who needed the USCG to prod
him to take the latter's vital signs. In fact, he failed to keep a medical record, like
a patient's card or folder, of Capt. Tolosa's illness."12
"Respondents, however, failed Capt. Tolosa because Garate never initiated
actions to save him. x x x In fact, Garate rarely checked personally on Capt.
Tolosa's condition, to wit:"13
"x x x Noticeably, the History (Annex "D") fails to mention any instance when
Garate consulted the other officers, much less Capt. Tolosa, regarding the
possibility of deviation. To save Capt. Tolosa's life was surely a just cause for the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
been consulted by respondent Garate – which he grossly neglected to do.
"Garate's poor judgement, since he was the officer effectively in command of the
vessel, prevented him from undertaking these emergency measures, the neglect
of which resulted in Capt. Tolosa's untimely demise."14
The labor arbiter himself classified petitioner's case as "a complaint for damages,
blacklisting and watchlisting (pending inquiry) for gross negligence resulting in the death
of complainant's husband, Capt. Virgilio Tolosa."15
We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the
recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited
to disputes arising from employer-employee relations, as we ruled in Georg Grotjahn
GMBH & Co. v. Isnani:16
"Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that
only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under
Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement."17
The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the relief sought by
petitioner. From her paper, it is evident that the primary reliefs she seeks are as follows: (a)
loss of earning capacity denominated therein as "actual damages" or "lost income" and (b)
blacklisting. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings of the deceased, but to
his earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years. This amount is recoverable if the
action is based on a quasi delict as provided for in Article 2206 of the Civil Code, 18 but not in
the Labor Code.
While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs
provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code,19 these reliefs must
still he based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.20
The central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in the complaint. In San
Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,21 this Court held:
"It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this
connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a
collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the
25
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as Court.27
Petitioner's allegation cannot be accepted by this Court on its face; to do so would be
an incident to such claim."22 tantamount to a denial of respondents' right to due process.28

The labor arbiter found private respondents to be grossly negligent. He ruled that Captain
Tolosa, who died at age 58, could expect to live up to 65 years and to have an earning
capacity of US$176,400.
It must be noted that a worker's loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be
equated with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor benefits that
are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or claim
resulting from a quasi delict or a similar cause within the realm of civil law.
Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is a question of fact that
cannot be entertained in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general,
the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a
review of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a quo.29
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

"Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable by the
labor arbiter. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim for
damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations."23 In the present case,
petitioner's claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor
statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does
not grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under
Book IV of the same Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor
secretary.24 Thus, claims for an employer's violation thereof are beyond the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner cannot enforce the labor standard provided for in
Article 161 by suing for damages before the labor arbiter.

It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in
which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action
proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. 25 Since petitioner's claim for
damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with
any of the claims provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining
agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular courts 26 -- not with the NLRC or
the labor arbiters.

Second Issue:
Finality of the Monetary Award

Petitioner contends that the labor arbiter's monetary award has already reached finality, since
private respondents were not able to file a timely appeal before the NLRC.

This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not raised in the
tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. Thus, points of law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention
of the Court of Appeals need not -- and ordinarily will not -- be considered by this
26

G.R. No. 152121 July 29, 2003
EDUARDO G. EVIOTA vs. CA and STANDARD CHARTERED BANK
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60141 denying the
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner praying the nullification of the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136.2
Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank and petitioner
Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under which the petitioner was
employed by the respondent bank as Compensation and Benefits Manager, VP (M21).
However, the petitioner abruptly resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after
his employment and rejoined his former employer.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
purchased a desktop IBM computer for Eviota’s use; (d) arranged the takeout of
Eviota’s loans with Eviota’s former employer; (e) released Eviota’s signing bonus
in the net amount of P300,000.00; (f) booked Eviota’s participation in a
Singapore conference on Y2K project scheduled on March 10 and 11, 1998; and
(g) introduced Eviota to the local and regional staff and officers of the Bank via
personal introductions and electronic mail.
6. The various expenses incurred by the Bank in carrying out the above acts are
itemized below, as follows:
a. Signing Bonus P 300,000.00
b. 1 Honda CR-V 800,000.00

On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank filed a complaint against the petitioner with the c. IBM Desktop Computer 89,995.00
RTC of Makati City. The respondent bank alleged inter alia in its complaint that:
d. Office Reconfiguration 29,815.00
1. It is a foreign banking institution authorized to do business in the Philippines,
with principal offices at the 5th Floor, Bankmer Bldg., 6756 Ayala Avenue, Makati e. 2-Drawer Lateral File
City. Cabinet 13,200.00

2. Defendant Eduardo Eviota ("Eviota") is a former employee of the Bank, and f. 1 Officer’s Chair 31,539.00
may be served with summons and other court processes at 8 Maple Street,
Cottonwoods, Antipolo, Metro Manila.
g. 1 Guest Chair 2,200.00
3. On December 22, 1997, Eviota began negotiating with the Bank on his
h. 1 Hanging Shelf 2,012.00
possible employment with the latter. Taken up during these negotiations were not
only his compensation and benefit package, but also the nature and demands of
his prospective position. The Bank made sure that Eviota was fully aware of all i. Staff Loan Processing
the terms and conditions of his possible job with the Bank.
Title Verification 375.00
4. On January 26, 1998, Eviota indicated his conformity with the Bank’s Offer of
Employment by signing a written copy of such offer dated January 22, 1998 (the Cost of Appraisal –
"Employment Contract"). A copy of the Employment Contract between Eviota
and the Bank is hereto attached as Annex "A." Housing Loan 3,500.00

5. Acting on the Employment Contract and on Eviota’s uninhibited display of TOTAL P1,272,636.00
interest in assuming his position, the Bank promptly proceeded to carry out the
terms of the Employment Contract as well as to facilitate his integration into the An itemized schedule of the above expenses incurred by the Bank is hereto
workforce. Among others, the Bank: (a) renovated and refurbished the room attached as Annex "B."
which was to serve as Eviota’s office; (b) purchased a 1998 Honda CR-V (Motor
No. PEWED7P101101; Chassis No. PADRD 1830WV00108) for Eviota’s use; (c)

27

7. On February 25, 1998, Eviota assumed his position as Compensation and
Benefits Manager with the Bank and began to discharge his duties. At one
Human Resources ("HR") Committee meeting held on March 3, 1998, Eviota
energetically presented to senior management his projects for the year, thus
raising the latter’s expectations. The same day, Eviota instructed the Bank’s HR
Administrator to book him a flight for Singapore, where he was scheduled to
participate in a Y2K project on March 10 and 11, 1998. Confident of Eviota’s
professed commitment to the Bank, the latter made the aforementioned airline
booking for him. In addition, the Bank allowed Eviota access to certain sensitive
and confidential information and documents concerning the Bank’s operations.
8. After leading the Bank to believe that he had come to stay, Eviota suddenly
resigned his employment with immediate effect to re-join his previous employer.
His resignation, which did not comply with the 30-day prior notice rule under the
law and under the Employment Contract, was so unexpected that it disrupted
plans already in the pipeline (e.g., the development of a salary/matrix grid and
salary structure, and the processing of merit promotion recommendations),
aborted meetings previously scheduled among Bank officers, and forced the
Bank to hire the services of a third party to perform the job he was hired to do.
For the services of this third party, the Bank had to pay a total of P208,807.50. A
copy of a receipt for the above expenses is hereto attached as Annex "C" (See
also, Annex "B").
9. Aside from causing no small degree of chaos within the Bank by reason of his
sudden resignation, Eviota made off with a computer diskette and other papers
and documents containing confidential information on employee compensation
and other Bank matters, such as the salary schedule of all Corporate and
Institutional Banking officers and photocopies of schedules of benefits provided
expatriates being employed by the Bank.
10. With the benefit of hindsight, the Bank realizes that it was simply used by
Eviota as a mere leverage for his selfish efforts at negotiating better terms of
employment with his previous employer. Worse, there is evidence to show that in
his attempts to justify his hasty departure from the Bank and conceal the real
reason for his move, Eviota has resorted to falsehoods derogatory to the
reputation of the Bank. In particular, he has been maliciously purveying the
canard that he had hurriedly left the Bank because it had failed to provide him
support. His untruthful remarks have falsely depicted the Bank as a contract
violator and an undesirable employer, thus damaging the Bank’s reputation and
business standing in the highly competitive banking community, and undermining
its ability to recruit and retain the best personnel in the labor market.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
11. On March 16, 1998, the Bank made a written demand on Eviota to return the
aforementioned computer diskette and other confidential documents and papers,
reimburse the Bank for the various expenses incurred on his account as a result
of his resignation (with legal interest), and pay damages in the amount of at least
P500,000.00 for the inconvenience and work/program disruptions suffered by the
Bank.
A copy of the Bank’s demand letter dated March 16, 1998 is hereto attached as Annex
"D."
12. In partial compliance with said demand, Eviota made arrangements with his
previous employer to reimburse the Bank for the expenses incurred in connection
with the Bank’s purchase of the Honda CR-V for his use. The Bank informed
Eviota that in addition to the Honda CR-V’s purchase price of P848,000.00 (of
which Eviota initially shouldered P48,000.00), incidental costs in the form of
Processing Fees (P1,000.00), FPD/MCAR/98-155684 (P1,232.53) and Fund
Transfer Price (P18,646.84) were incurred, bringing the total cost of the Honda
CR-V to P868,881.38. On April 29, 1998, the Bank received two manager’s
checks in the aggregate amount of P868,881.38, representing costs incurred in
connection with the purchase of the Honda CR-V, inclusive of processing fees
and other incidental costs. Previously, Eviota had returned his P300,000.00
signing bonus, less the P48,000.00 he had advanced for the Honda CR-V’s
purchase price.
13. Eviota never complied with the Bank’s demand that he reimburse the latter
for the other expenses incurred on his account, amounting to P360,562.12 (see,
Annex "B").3
The respondent bank alleged, by way of its causes of action against the petitioner, the
following:
First Cause of Action
14. Eviota’s actions constitute a clear violation of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
Republic Act No. 386, as amended (the "Civil Code"). Assuming arguendo that
Eviota had the right to terminate his employment with the Bank for no reason, the
manner in and circumstances under which he exercised the same are clearly
abusive and contrary to the rules governing human relations.
14.1. By his actions and representations, Eviota had induced the Bank to
believe that he was committed to fulfilling his obligations under the
Employment Contract. As a result, the Bank incurred expenses in
28

carrying out its part of the contract (see Annexes "B" and "C"). Less
reimbursements received from Eviota, the Bank is entitled to actual
damages of P360,562.12. (See, Annex "C").
Second Cause of Action
15. Under Article 285 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (the Labor
Code), an employee may terminate without just cause the employer-employee
relationship by serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in
advance. In addition, Section 13 of the Employment Contract specifically
provides that: "Your [i.e., Eviota’s] employment may be terminated by either party
giving notice of at least one month." (Annex "A," p. 5.)
15.1. Eviota’s failure to comply with the above requirement threw a
monkey wrench into the Bank’s operations – Eviota’s sudden resignation
aborted meetings previously scheduled among Bank officers and
disrupted plans for a salary/merit review program and development of a
salary structure and merit grid already in the pipeline.
Hence, Eviota is liable to the Bank for damages in the amount of at least
P100,000.00.
Third Cause of Action
16. Eviota’s false and derogatory statements that the Bank had failed to deliver
what it had purportedly promised have besmirched the Bank’s reputation and
depicted it as a contract violator and one which does not treat its employees
properly. These derogatory statements have injured the Bank’s business
standing in the banking community, and have undermined the Bank’s ability to
recruit and retain the best personnel. Hence, plaintiff is entitled to moral damages
of at least P2,000,000.00.
17. By way of example or correction for the public good, and to deter other
parties from committing similar acts in the future, defendant should be held liable
for exemplary damages of at least P1,000,000.00
18. Eviota’s actions have compelled plaintiff to obtain the services of undersigned
counsel for a fee, in order to protect its interests. Hence, plaintiff is entitled to
attorney’s fees of at least P200,000.00.4
The respondent bank prayed, that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in its
favor as follows:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff:
1. As actual damages, the amount of P360,562.12, representing expenses
referred to in items c to i of par. 6 and the cost of the third-party services
mentioned in par. 8;
2. For violating the 30-day notice requirement under the Labor Code and order
(sic) the Employment Contract, damages in the amount of at least P100,000.00;
3. As moral damages, the amount of P2,000,000.00;
4. As exemplary damages, the amount of P1,000,000.00;
5. As attorney’s fees, the amount of P200,000.00; and
6. Costs of the suit.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.5
The respondent bank appended to its complaint a copy of the petitioner’s employment
contract.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for
damages of the respondent bank was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
under paragraph 4, Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. The
petitioner averred that the respondent bank’s claim for damages arose out of or were in
connection with his employer-employee relationship with the respondent bank or some
aspect or incident of such relationship. The respondent bank opposed the motion,
claiming that its action for damages was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court.
Although its claims for damages incidentally involved an employer-employee
relationship, the said claims are actually predicated on the petitioner’s acts and
omissions which are separately, specifically and distinctly governed by the New Civil
Code.
On November 29, 1999, the trial court issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss, ratiocinating that the primary relief prayed for by the respondent bank was
grounded on the tortious manner by which the petitioner terminated his employment with
the latter, and as such is governed by the New Civil Code:
The Court holds that here, since the primary relief prayed for by the plaintiff is for
damages, grounded on the tortious manner by which the defendant terminated his
29

employment with the company, the same are recoverable under the applicable provision
of the Civil Code, the present controversy is removed from the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter and brings in within the purview of the regular courts.6
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order, but the court issued an
order denying the same. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals for the nullification of the orders of the trial court, alleging that the court a quo
committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the said orders. The petitioner further asserted that contrary to the ruling of the
court, the respondent bank claimed damages in its complaint against the petitioner
based on his employment contract, and not on tortious acts.
On November 15, 2001, the CA promulgated a decision dismissing the petition, holding
that the trial court and not the Labor Arbiter had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of
the respondent bank. It held that the latter’s claims for damages were grounded on the
petitioner’s sudden and unceremonious severance of his employment with the
respondent bank barely a month after assuming office.
With his motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the CA, the
petitioner filed his petition with this Court contending that:
Suffice to state immediately that on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, it is the
Labor Arbiter, not the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-1397, the principal cause of action being the alleged
omission of petitioner in giving notice to the respondent Bank employer of termination of
their relationship; whereas the claims for other actual/moral/exemplary damages are well
within the competence of the Labor Arbiter.7
The petition is barren of merit.
Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715
which took effect on March 21, 1989 reads:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.—(a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations.
Case law has it that the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as
which court has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of
the complaint and the reliefs prayed for in relation to the law involved.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-
versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim by a worker
against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and
employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the
regular courts of justice.8
Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is
merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.9 In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v.
Isnani,10 we held that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor
Code, as amended, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship
which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code of the Philippines, other labor
laws or their collective bargaining agreements. In Singapore Airlines Limited v.
Paño,11 the complaint of the employer against the employee for damages for wanton
justice and refusal without just cause to report for duty, and for having maliciously and
with bad faith violated the terms and conditions of their agreement for a course of
conversion training at the expense of the employer, we ruled that jurisdiction over the
action belongs to the civil court:
On appeal to this court, we held that jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the civil
courts. We stated that the action was for breach of a contractual obligation, which is
intrinsically a civil dispute. We further stated that while seemingly the cause of action
arose from employer-employee relations, the employer’s claim for damages is grounded
on "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause to report to duty coupled with the
averment that the employee "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and
conditions of the contract to the damage of the employer. Such averments removed the
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and brought it within
the purview of the Civil Law.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article
217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection
30

with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with
the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-
employee relations.12
The claims were the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation,
intrinsically civil in nature.
In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome,13 we held that a complaint of an employee for damages
against the employer for slanderous remarks made against him was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice because the cause of action of the plaintiff was
for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the employer. The fact that there
was between the parties an employer-employee relationship does not negate the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
In Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Paño,14 we held that:
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits
under the Labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of
1âwphi1
a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by
workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages,
overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural
consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
In Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, Jr.,15 the petitioner sued
its employee Adonis Limjuco for breach of contract which reads:
That for a period of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER,
EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or employed, be a consultant
and/or be an informative body directly or indirectly, with any business firm, entity or
undertaking engaged in a business similar to or in competition with that of the
EMPLOYER."16
The petitioner alleged in its complaint with the trial court that:
Petitioner claimed that private respondent became an employee of Angel Sound
Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line of business as that of
petitioner, within two years from January 30, 1992, the date of private respondent’s
resignation from petitioner’s employ. Petitioner further alleged that private respondent is
holding the position of Head of the Material Management Control Department, the same
position he held while in the employ of petitioner.17
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because
the cause of action for damages arose out of the parties’ employer-employee
relationship. We reversed the order of the trial court and held, thus:
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to
recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent’s breach
of his contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice" (Rollo, p. 57). Such cause of
action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to
the regular courts. More so when we consider that the stipulation refers to the post-
employment relations of the parties.18
In this case, the private respondent’s first cause of action for damages is anchored on
the petitioner’s employment of deceit and of making the private respondent believe that
he would fulfill his obligation under the employment contract with assiduousness and
earnestness. The petitioner volte face when, without the requisite thirty-day notice under
the contract and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, he abandoned his
office and rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the private respondent to hire a
replacement. The private respondent was left in a lurch, and its corporate plans and
program in jeopardy and disarray. Moreover, the petitioner took off with the private
respondent’s computer diskette, papers and documents containing confidential
information on employee compensation and other bank matters. On its second cause of
action, the petitioner simply walked away from his employment with the private
respondent sans any written notice, to the prejudice of the private respondent, its
banking operations and the conduct of its business. Anent its third cause of action, the
petitioner made false and derogatory statements that the private respondent reneged on
its obligations under their contract of employment; thus, depicting the private respondent
as unworthy of trust.
It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner do
not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines and other labor laws but
the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil. There is no
causal relationship between the causes of action of the private respondent’s causes of
action against the petitioner and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the
private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an existing
employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment is merely incidental. In
fact, the petitioner had already been replaced by the private respondent before the action
was filed against the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the petition of the petitioner is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
31

G.R. No. 154830 June 8, 2007
PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES, INC., PIONEER PHILIPPINES HOLDINGS, and
PHILIP J. KLEPZIG vs. ANTONIO D. TODARO
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54155
and its Resolution2 of August 21, 2002 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On January 16, 1998, herein respondent Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages
with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer
Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G.
McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).3
In his complaint, Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and
concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold
the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established
by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and
quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the
Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and
PCPI; Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc.
(Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate
production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted
Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention
to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines;
Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and
Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of
the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be employed as
the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest
in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it
refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.4
Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the
jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.5
In its Order dated January 4, 1999, the RTC of Makati, Branch 147, denied herein
petitioners' respective motions to dismiss.6 Herein petitioners, as defendants, filed an
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
Urgent Omnibus Motion for the reconsideration of the trial court's Order of January 4,
7
1999 but the trial court denied it via its Order8 dated June 3, 1999.
On August 3, 1999, herein petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.9 On
October 31, 2000, the CA rendered its presently assailed Decision denying herein
petitioners' Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 21, 2002.
Hence, herein Petition for Review on Certiorari based on the following assignment of
errors:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL
BASIS. THE ANNEXES TO THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY BELIE THE
ALLEGATION OF EXISTENCE OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND PETITIONERS.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT INDUBITABLY
SHOWS THAT IT IS AN ACTION FOR AN ALLEGED BREACH OF
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, AND HENCE, FALLS WITHIN THE EXLCUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
C
THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF "FORUM NON CONVENIENS" AS A VALID GROUND FOR
DISMISSING A COMPLAINT.10
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that there was no perfected employment
contract between PIL and herein respondent. Petitioners assert that the annexes to
respondent's complaint show that PIL's offer was for respondent to be employed as the
manager only of its pre-mixed concrete operations and not as the company's managing
director or CEO. Petitioners argue that when respondent reiterated his intention to
become the manager of PIL's overall business venture in the Philippines, he, in effect did
not accept PIL's offer of employment and instead made a counter-offer, which, however,
32

was not accepted by PIL. Petitioners also contend that under Article 1318 of the Civil
Code, one of the requisites for a contract to be perfected is the consent of the contracting
parties; that under Article 1319 of the same Code, consent is manifested by the meeting
of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract; that the offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute; that a qualified
acceptance constitutes a counter-offer. Petitioners assert that since PIL did not accept
respondent's counter-offer, there never was any employment contract that was perfected
between them.
Petitioners further argue that respondent's claim for damages based on the provisions of
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code is baseless because it was shown that there was no
perfected employment contract.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that PIL may be held liable for breach of
employment contract, petitioners contend that PCPI and PPHI, may not also be held
liable because they are juridical entities with personalities which are separate and distinct
from PIL, even if they are subsidiary corporations of the latter. Petitioners also aver that
the annexes to respondent's complaint show that the negotiations on the alleged
employment contract took place between respondent and PIL through its office in
Hongkong. In other words, PCPI and PPHI were not privy to the negotiations between
PIL and respondent for the possible employment of the latter; and under Article 1311 of
the Civil Code, a contract is not binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who
was not a party to it even if he be aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof.
Petitioners further assert that petitioner Klepzig may not be held liable because he is
simply acting in his capacity as president of PCPI and PPHI and settled is the rule that
an officer of a corporation is not personally liable for acts done in the performance of his
duties and within the bounds of the authority conferred on him. Furthermore, petitioners
argue that even if PCPI and PPHI are held liable, respondent still has no cause of action
against Klepzig because PCPI and PPHI have personalities which are separate and
distinct from those acting in their behalf, such as Klepzig.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that since herein respondent's
claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages are solely premised on the alleged
breach of employment contract, the present case should be considered as falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.
With respect to the third assigned error, petitioners assert that the principle of forum non
conveniens dictates that even where exercise of jurisidiction is authorized by law, courts
may refuse to entertain a case involving a foreign element where the matter can be
better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case
transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
and the plaintiff sought the forum merely to secure procedural advantage or to annoy or
harass the defendant. Petitioners also argue that one of the factors in determining the
most convenient forum for conflicts problem is the power of the court to enforce its
decision. Petitioners contend that since the majority of the defendants in the present
case are not residents of the Philippines, they are not subject to compulsory processes
of the Philippine court handling the case for purposes of requiring their attendance during
trial. Even assuming that they can be summoned, their appearance would entail
excessive costs. Petitioners further assert that there is no allegation in the complaint
from which one can conclude that the evidence to be presented during the trial can be
better obtained in the Philippines. Moreover, the events which led to the present
controversy occurred outside the Philippines. Petitioners conclude that based on the
foregoing factual circumstances, the case should be dismissed under the principle
of forum non conveniens.
In his Comment, respondent extensively quoted the assailed CA Decision maintaining
that the factual allegations in the complaint determine whether or not the complaint
states a cause of action.
As to the question of jurisdiction, respondent contends that the complaint he filed was not
based on a contract of employment. Rather, it was based on petitioners' unwarranted
breach of their contractual obligation to employ respondent. This breach, respondent
argues, gave rise to an action for damages which is cognizable by the regular courts.
Even assuming that there was an employment contract, respondent asserts that for the
NLRC to acquire jurisdiction, the claim for damages must have a reasonable causal
connection with the employer-employee relationship of petitioners and respondent.
Respondent further argues that there is a perfected contract between him and petitioners
as they both agreed that the latter shall employ him to manage and operate their ready-
mix concrete operations in the Philippines. Even assuming that there was no perfected
contract, respondent contends that his complaint alleges an alternative cause of action
which is based on the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
As to the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, respondent avers that the
question of whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the particular case
and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to
determine whether special circumstances require that the court desist from assuming
jurisdiction over the suit.
The petition lacks merit.
33

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the act
or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and, (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.11
In Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan,12 this Court held:
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise,
may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry
is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained,
it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by
the defendants.13
Moreover, the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence
of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case.14 To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.15
Hence, in resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case states a cause of
action, the trial court correctly limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations
in the Complaint as well as the annexes thereto. It is proscribed from inquiring into the
truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents
referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by
the respondent.
This Court has reviewed respondent’s allegations in its Complaint. In a nutshell,
respondent alleged that herein petitioners reneged on their contractual obligation to
employ him on a permanent basis. This allegation is sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for damages.
The issue as to whether or not there was a perfected contract between petitioners and
respondent is a matter which is not ripe for determination in the present case; rather, this
issue must be taken up during trial, considering that its resolution would necessarily
entail an examination of the veracity of the allegations not only of herein respondent as
plaintiff but also of petitioners as defendants.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
The Court does not agree with petitioners' contention that they were not privy to the
negotiations for respondent's possible employment. It is evident from paragraphs 24 to
28 of the Complaint16 that, on various occasions, Klepzig conducted negotiations with
respondent regarding the latter's possible employment. In fact, Annex "H"17 of the
complaint shows that it was Klepzig who informed respondent that his company was no
longer interested in employing respondent. Hence, based on the allegations in the
Complaint and the annexes attached thereto, respondent has a cause of action against
herein petitioners.
As to the question of jurisdiction, this Court has consistently held that where no
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved
which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any
collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction.18 In
the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and
respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under
the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged
breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action
for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute.19 In the alternative,
respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and
jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.20
With respect to the applicability of the principle of forum non conveniens in the present
case, this Court's ruling in Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals21 is instructive,
to wit:
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally meaning ‘the forum is
inconvenient’, emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global
forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum
or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure
procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a
court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it
is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. In the case of Communication Materials and
Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to
34
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."

Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of

Appeals, that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a
ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled
that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts
are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court’s desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination,
hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.22 (emphasis
supplied)

In the present case, the factual circumstances cited by petitioners which would allegedly
justify the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens are matters of defense, the
merits of which should properly be threshed out during trial.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

35
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
MATLING INDUSTRIAL G.R. No. 157802 Commission (NLRC) to the effect that the LA had jurisdiction because the respondent was
AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, not a corporate officer of petitioner Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation (Matling).
RICHARD K. SPENCER, Present:

CATHERINE SPENCER, Antecedents

AND ALEX MANCILLA, CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

Petitioners, BRION,

BERSAMIN,
After his dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and Administration, the
VILLARAMA, JR., and respondent filed on August 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal
-versus - SERENO, JJ. against Matling and some of its corporate officers (petitioners) in the NLRC, Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City.[3]

Promulgated:

RICARDO R. COROS, October 13, 2010

Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
This case reprises the jurisdictional conundrum of whether a complaint for illegal
dismissal is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter (LA) or by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
determination of whether the dismissed officer was a regular employee or a corporate officer
unravels the conundrum. In the case of the regular employee, the LA has jurisdiction;
otherwise, the RTC exercises the legal authority to adjudicate.
In this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners challenge
the decision dated September 13, 2002[1] and the resolution dated April 2,
promulgated in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65714 entitled Matling Industrial and Commercial
Corporation, et al. v. Ricardo R. Coros and National Labor Relations Commission, whereby
by the Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the ruling of the National Labor Relations
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint,[4] raising the ground, among others,
that the complaint pertained to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) due to the controversy being intra-corporate inasmuch as the respondent was a
member of Matlings Board of Directors aside from being its Vice-President for Finance and
Administration prior to his termination.
The respondent opposed the petitioners motion to dismiss,[5] insisting that his status as a
member of Matlings Board of Directors was doubtful, considering that he had not been
formally elected as such; that he did not own a single share of stock in Matling, considering
that he had been made to sign in blank an undated indorsement of the certificate of stock he
had been given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and retained the certificate of stock in its
custody; and that even assuming that he had been a Director of Matling, he had been
2003,[2] both removed as the Vice President for Finance and Administration, not as a Director, a fact that
the notice of his termination dated April 10, 2000 showed.

36

On October 16, 2000, the LA granted the petitioners motion to dismiss,[6] ruling that
the respondent was a corporate officer because he was occupying the position of Vice
President for Finance and Administration and at the same time was a Member of the Board of
Directors of Matling; and that, consequently, his removal was a corporate act of Matling and
the controversy resulting from such removal was under the jurisdiction of the SEC, pursuant
to Section 5, paragraph (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902.
Ruling of the NLRC
The respondent appealed to the NLRC,[7] urging that:
I
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION GRANTING APPELLEES MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT
GIVING THE APPELLANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE HIS OPPOSITION
THERETO THEREBY VIOLATING THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF DUE
PROCESS.
II
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
DISMISSING THE CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
On March 13, 2001, the NLRC set aside the dismissal, concluding that the
respondents complaint for illegal dismissal was properly cognizable by the LA, not by the
SEC, because he was not a corporate officer by virtue of his position in Matling, albeit high
ranking and managerial, not being among the positions listed in Matlings Constitution and By-
Laws.[8] The NLRC disposed thuswise:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is SET ASIDE. A new one is
entered declaring and holding that the case at bench does not involve any
intracorporate matter. Hence, jurisdiction to hear and act on said case is
vested with the Labor Arbiter, not the SEC, considering that the position of
Vice-President for Finance and Administration being held by complainant-
appellant is not listed as among respondent's corporate officers.
Accordingly, let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Arbitration
Branch of origin in order that the Labor Arbiter below could act on the case at
bench, hear both parties, receive their respective evidence and position
papers fully observing the requirements of due process, and resolve the
same with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners sought reconsideration,[9] reiterating that the respondent, being a member of
the Board of Directors, was a corporate officer whose removal was not within the LAs
jurisdiction.
The petitioners later submitted to the NLRC in support of the motion for
reconsideration the certified machine copies of Matlings Amended Articles of Incorporation
and By Laws to prove that the President of Matling was thereby granted full power to create
new offices and appoint the officers thereto, and the minutes of special meeting held on June
7, 1999 by Matlings Board of Directors to prove that the respondent was, indeed, a Member
of the Board of Directors.[10]
Nonetheless, on April 30, 2001, the NLRC denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[11]
37

Ruling of the CA
The petitioners elevated the issue to the CA by petition for certiorari, docketed as C.A.-G.R.
No. SP 65714, contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in reversing the correct decision of the LA.
In its assailed decision promulgated on September 13, 2002,[12] the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari, explaining:
For a position to be considered as a corporate office, or, for that matter, for
one to be considered as a corporate officer, the position must, if not listed in
the by-laws, have been created by the corporation's board of directors, and
the occupant thereof appointed or elected by the same board of directors or
stockholders. This is the implication of the ruling in Tabang v. National Labor
Relations Commission, which reads:
The president, vice president, secretary and treasurer are
commonly regarded as the principal or executive officers of a
corporation, and modern corporation statutes usually designate
them as the officers of the corporation. However, other offices are
sometimes created by the charter or by-laws of a corporation, or
the board of directors may be empowered under the by-laws of a
corporation to create additional offices as may be necessary.
It has been held that an 'office' is created by the charter of the
corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or
stockholders. On the other hand, an 'employee' usually occupies
no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who
also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Ongkingco v.
National Labor Relations Commission and De Rossi v. National Labor
Relations Commission.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
The position of vice-president for administration and finance, which
Coros used to hold in the corporation, was not created by the corporations
board of directors but only by its president or executive vice-president
pursuant to the by-laws of the corporation. Moreover, Coros appointment to
said position was not made through any act of the board of directors
or stockholders of the corporation. Consequently, the position to which Coros
was appointed and later on removed from, is not a corporate office despite
its nomenclature, but an ordinary office in the corporation.
Coros alleged illegal dismissal therefrom is, therefore, within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 2, 2003.[13]
Issue
Thus, the petitioners are now before the Court for a review on certiorari, positing that the
respondent was a stockholder/member of the Matlings Board of Directors as well as its Vice
President for Finance and Administration; and that the CA consequently erred in holding that
the LA had jurisdiction.
The decisive issue is whether the respondent was a corporate officer of Matling or not. The
resolution of the issue determines whether the LA or the RTC had jurisdiction over
his complaint for illegal dismissal.
Ruling
The appeal fails.
I
The Law on Jurisdiction in Dismissal Cases
38

As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private employer is
properly cognizable by the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides as follows:
Article 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. -
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-
employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (As amended by Section
9, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer, however, the
controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
because the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and
among stockholders, members, or associates, or between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the
State insofar as the controversy concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity; or because the controversy involves the election or appointment of a director, trustee,
officer, or manager of such corporation, partnership, or association.[14] Such controversy,
among others, is known as an intra-corporate dispute.
Effective on August 8, 2000, upon the passage of Republic Act No.
8799,[15] otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code, the SECs jurisdiction over all
intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the RTC, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799,
to wit:
39

5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the
Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction
over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending
cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution
which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this
Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
Considering that the respondents complaint for illegal dismissal was commenced on
August 10, 2000, it might come under the coverage of Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799, supra,
should it turn out that the respondent was a corporate, not a regular, officer of Matling.
II
Was the Respondents Position of Vice President
for Administration and Finance a Corporate Office?
We must first resolve whether or not the respondents position as Vice President for Finance
and Administration was a corporate office. If it was, his dismissal by the Board of Directors
rendered the matter an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the RTC pursuant to RA No.
8799.
The petitioners contend that the position of Vice President for Finance and Administration
was a corporate office, having been created by Matlings President pursuant to By-Law No. V,
as amended,[16] to wit:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
BY LAW NO. V
Officers
The President shall be the executive head of the corporation; shall preside
over the meetings of the stockholders and directors; shall countersign all
certificates, contracts and other instruments of the corporation as authorized
by the Board of Directors; shall have full power to hire and discharge any or
all employees of the corporation; shall have full power to create new
offices and to appoint the officers thereto as he may deem proper and
necessary in the operations of the corporation and as the progress of
the business and welfare of the corporation may demand; shall make
reports to the directors and stockholders and perform all such other duties
and functions as are incident to his office or are properly required of him by
the Board of Directors. In case of the absence or disability of the President,
the Executive Vice President shall have the power to exercise his functions.
The petitioners argue that the power to create corporate offices and to appoint the
individuals to assume the offices was delegated by Matlings Board of Directors to its
President through By-Law No. V, as amended; and that any office the President created, like
the position of the respondent, was as valid and effective a creation as that made by the
Board of Directors, making the office a corporate office. In justification, they cite Tabang v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[17] which held that other offices are sometimes created
by the charter or by-laws of a corporation, or the board of directors may be empowered under
the by-laws of a corporation to create additional officers as may be necessary.
The respondent counters that Matlings By-Laws did not list his position as Vice President for
Finance and Administration as one of the corporate offices; that Matlings By-Law No. III listed
only four corporate officers, namely: President, Executive Vice President, Secretary, and
40
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2

Treasurer; [18] that the corporate offices contemplated in the phrase and such other officers as
may be provided for in the by-laws found in Section 25 of the Corporation Code should be Directors or trustees cannot attend or vote by proxy at board meetings.

clearly and expressly stated in the By-Laws; that the fact that Matlings By-Law No. III dealt
with Directors & Officers while its By-Law No. V dealt with Officers proved that there was a
differentiation between the officers mentioned in the two provisions, with those classified
under By-Law No. V being ordinary or non-corporate officers; and that the officer, to be
considered as a corporate officer, must be elected by the Board of Directors or the
stockholders, for the President could only appoint an employee to a position pursuant to By-
Law No. V.
We agree with respondent.
Conformably with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws
in order to be considered as a corporate office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or
under a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make a position a corporate
office. Guerrea v. Lezama,[19] the first ruling on the matter, held that the only officers of a
corporation were those given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the By-
Laws; the rest of the corporate officers could be considered only as employees or
subordinate officials. Thus, it was held in Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. v. King:[20]

Section 25 of the Corporation Code provides: An office is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected
by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee occupies
no office and generally is employed not by the action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also
Section 25. Corporate officers, quorum.--Immediately after their determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
election, the directors of a corporation must formally organize by the election
of a president, who shall be a director, a treasurer who may or may not be a
director, a secretary who shall be a resident and citizen of
In this case, respondent was appointed vice president for nationwide
the Philippines, and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-
expansion by Malonzo, petitioner's general manager, not by the board of
laws. Any two (2) or more positions may be held concurrently by the same
directors of petitioner. It was also Malonzo who determined the
person, except that no one shall act as president and secretary or as
compensation package of respondent. Thus, respondent was an employee,
president and treasurer at the same time.
not a corporate officer. The CA was therefore correct in ruling that jurisdiction
The directors or trustees and officers to be elected shall perform the over the case was properly with the NLRC, not the SEC (now the RTC).
duties enjoined on them by law and the by-laws of the corporation. Unless
the articles of incorporation or the by-laws provide for a greater majority, a
majority of the number of directors or trustees as fixed in the articles of
incorporation shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of corporate This interpretation is the correct application of Section 25 of the Corporation Code,
business, and every decision of at least a majority of the directors or trustees
which plainly states that the corporate officers are the President, Secretary,
present at a meeting at which there is a quorum shall be valid as a corporate
act, except for the election of officers which shall require the vote of a Treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the By-Laws. Accordingly, the
majority of all the members of the board.

41

corporate officers in the context of PD No. 902-A are exclusively those who are given that
character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations By-Laws.
A different interpretation can easily leave the way open for the Board of Directors to
circumvent the constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure of the employee by the
expedient inclusion in the By-Laws of an enabling clause on the creation of just any corporate
officer position.
It is relevant to state in this connection that the SEC, the primary agency
administering the Corporation Code, adopted a similar interpretation of Section 25 of
the Corporation Code in its Opinion dated November 25, 1993,[21] to wit:
Thus, pursuant to the above provision (Section 25 of the Corporation
Code), whoever are the corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws
are the exclusive Officers of the corporation and the Board has no
power to create other Offices without amending first the corporate By-
laws. However, the Board may create appointive positions other than
the positions of corporate Officers, but the persons occupying such
positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning
of Section 25 of the Corporation Code and are not empowered to
exercise the functions of the corporate Officers, except those functions
lawfully delegated to them. Their functions and duties are to be
determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.
Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to
create a corporate office to the President, in light of Section 25 of the Corporation
Code requiring the Board of Directors itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, the power to
elect the corporate officers was a discretionary power that the law exclusively vested in the
Board of Directors, and could not be delegated to subordinate officers or agents. [22] The office
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
of Vice President for Finance and Administration created by Matlings President pursuant to
By Law No. V was an ordinary, not a corporate, office.
To emphasize, the power to create new offices and the power to appoint the officers to
occupy them vested by By-Law No. V merely allowed Matlings President to create non-
corporate offices to be occupied by ordinary employees of Matling. Such powers were
incidental to the Presidents duties as the executive head of Matling to assist him in the daily
operations of the business.
The petitioners reliance on Tabang, supra, is misplaced. The statement in Tabang, to the
effect that offices not expressly mentioned in the By-Laws but were created pursuant to a By-
Law enabling provision were also considered corporate offices, was plainly obiter dictum due
to the position subject of the controversy being mentioned in the By-Laws. Thus, the Court
held therein that the position was a corporate office, and that the determination of the rights
and liabilities arising from the ouster from the position was an intra-corporate controversy
within the SECs jurisdiction.
In Nacpil v. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation,[23] which may be the more appropriate
ruling, the position subject of the controversy was not expressly mentioned in the By-Laws,
but was created pursuant to a By-Law enabling provision authorizing the Board of Directors
to create other offices that the Board of Directors might see fit to create. The Court held there
that the position was a corporate office, relying on the obiter dictum in Tabang.
Considering that the observations earlier made herein show that the soundness of
their dicta is not unassailable, Tabang and Nacpil should no longer be controlling.
III
42

Did Respondents Status as Director and
Stockholder Automatically Convert his Dismissal
into an Intra-Corporate Dispute?
Yet, the petitioners insist that because the respondent was a Director/stockholder of Matling,
and relying on Paguio v. National Labor Relations Commission[24] and Ongkingko v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[25] the NLRC had no jurisdiction over his complaint, considering
that any case for illegal dismissal brought by a stockholder/officer against the corporation was
an intra-corporate matter that must fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC conformably with the
context of PD No. 902-A.
The petitioners insistence is bereft of basis.
To begin with, the reliance on Paguio and Ongkingko is misplaced. In both rulings, the
complainants were undeniably corporate officers due to their positions being expressly
mentioned in the By-Laws, aside from the fact that both of them had been duly elected by the
respective Boards of Directors. But the herein respondents position of Vice President for
Finance and Administration was not expressly mentioned in the By-Laws; neither was the
position of Vice President for Finance and Administration created by Matlings Board of
Directors. Lastly, the President, not the Board of Directors, appointed him.
True it is that the Court pronounced in Tabang as follows:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
Also, an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a
stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction, qualification or any
exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of
controversies between stockholders and corporations.[26]
However, the Tabang pronouncement is not controlling because it is too sweeping and does
not accord with reason, justice, and fair play. In order to determine whether a dispute
constitutes an intra-corporate controversy or not, the Court considers two elements instead,
namely: (a) the status or relationship of the parties; and (b) the nature of the question that is
the subject of their controversy. This was our thrust in Viray v. Court of Appeals:[27]
The establishment of any of the relationships mentioned above will not
necessarily always confer jurisdiction over the dispute on the SEC to the
exclusion of regular courts. The statement made in one case that the rule
admits of no exceptions or distinctions is not that absolute. The better policy
in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider
not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy.
Not every conflict between a corporation and its stockholders involves
corporate matters that only the SEC can resolve in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. If, for example, a person leases an
apartment owned by a corporation of which he is a stockholder, there should
be no question that a complaint for his ejectment for non-payment of rentals
would still come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not of the
SEC. By the same token, if one person injures another in a vehicular
accident, the complaint for damages filed by the victim will not come under
the jurisdiction of the SEC simply because of the happenstance that both
parties are stockholders of the same corporation. A contrary interpretation
would dissipate the powers of the regular courts and distort the meaning and
intent of PD No. 902-A.
43

In another case, Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla,[28] the Court reiterated
these determinants thuswise:
In order that the SEC (now the regular courts) can take cognizance of a
case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships:
a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the
public;
b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or officers;
c) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State
as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned;
and
d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.
The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all
stockholders or that the parties involved are the stockholders and the
corporation does not necessarily place the dispute within the ambit of the
jurisdiction of SEC. The better policy to be followed in determining jurisdiction
over a case should be to consider concurrent factors such as the status or
relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is the subject of
their controversy. In the absence of any one of these factors, the SEC will not
have jurisdiction. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that every
conflict between the corporation and its stockholders would involve such
corporate matters as only the SEC can resolve in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.[29]
The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers who may be ousted from
office at will, on one hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be terminated for
just cause, on the other hand, do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on
the manner of creation of the office. In the respondents case, he was supposedly at once an
employee, a stockholder, and a Director of Matling. The circumstances surrounding his
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
appointment to office must be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal constituted
an intra-corporate controversy or a labor termination dispute. We must also consider whether
his status as Director and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and
subsequent dismissal as Vice President for Finance and Administration.
Obviously enough, the respondent was not appointed as Vice President for Finance and
Administration because of his being a stockholder or Director of Matling. He had started
working for Matling on September 8, 1966, and had been employed continuously for 33 years
until his termination on April 17, 2000, first as a bookkeeper, and his climb in 1987 to his last
position as Vice President for Finance and Administration had been gradual but steady, as
the following sequence indicates:
1966 Bookkeeper
1968 Senior Accountant
1969 Chief Accountant
1972 Office Supervisor
1973 Assistant Treasurer
1978 Special Assistant for Finance
1980 Assistant Comptroller
1983 Finance and Administrative Manager
1985 Asst. Vice President for Finance and Administration
1987 to April 17, 2000 Vice President for Finance and Administration
Even though he might have become a stockholder of Matling in 1992, his promotion
to the position of Vice President for Finance and Administration in 1987 was by virtue of the
length of quality service he had rendered as an employee of Matling. His subsequent
44
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2

acquisition of the status of Director/stockholder had no relation to his promotion. Besides, his WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision of the
status of Director/stockholder was unaffected by his dismissal from employment as Vice Court of Appeals
President for Finance and Administration.

In Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes,[30] a case involving a lady bank
manager who had risen from the ranks but was dismissed, the Court held that her complaint
for illegal dismissal was correctly brought to the NLRC, because she was deemed a regular
employee of the bank. The Court observed thus:

It appears that private respondent was appointed Accounting Clerk by

the Bank on July 14, 1963. From that position she rose to become
supervisor. Then in 1982, she was appointed Assistant Vice-President which
she occupied until her illegal dismissal on July 19, 1991. The banks
contention that she merely holds an elective position and that in effect
she is not a regular employee is belied by the nature of her work and
her length of service with the Bank. As earlier stated, she rose from the
ranks and has been employed with the Bank since 1963 until the termination
of her employment in 1991. As Assistant Vice President of the Foreign
Department of the Bank, she is tasked, among others, to collect checks
drawn against overseas banks payable in foreign currency and to ensure the
collection of foreign bills or checks purchased, including the signing of
transmittal letters covering the same. It has been stated that the primary
standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the
usual trade or business of the employer. Additionally, an employee is regular
because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the
mode or even the reason for hiring them. As Assistant Vice-President of the
Foreign Department of the Bank she performs tasks integral to the operations
of the bank and her length of service with the bank totaling 28 years speaks
volumes of her status as a regular employee of the bank. In fine, as a
regular employee, she is entitled to security of tenure; that is, her services
may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. This being in truth a
case of illegal dismissal, it is no wonder then that the Bank endeavored to the
very end to establish loss of trust and confidence and serious misconduct on
the part of private respondent but, as will be discussed later, to no avail.

45

G.R. No. 185567 October 20, 2010
ARSENIO Z. LOCSIN vs. NISSAN LEASE PHILS. INC. and LUIS BANSON
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Arsenio Z. Locsin (Locsin) seeks
the reversal of the Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 28, 2008,3 in
"Arsenio Z. Locsin v. Nissan Car Lease Phils., Inc. and Luis Banson," docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 103720 and the Resolution dated December 9, 2008,4 denying Locsin’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed ruling of the CA reversed and set aside the
Decision5 of the Hon. Labor Arbiter Thelma Concepcion (Labor Arbiter Concepcion)
which denied Nissan Lease Phils. Inc.’s (NCLPI) and Luis T. Banson’s (Banson) Motion
to Dismiss.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer
(EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and responsibilities included:
(1) the management of the finances of the company; (2) carrying out the directions of the
President and/or the Board of Directors regarding financial management; and (3) the
preparation of financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial
condition of NCLPI.6 Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been re-elected every
year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was nominated and elected Chairman
of NCLPI’s Board of Directors.7
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as Chairman of the
Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the Manila Polo Club. One of the
items of the agenda was the election of a new set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was
neither re-elected Chairman nor reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.8
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorney’s fees before the Labor
Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who was then President of NCLPI.9
The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson filed a Motion
to Dismiss,10 on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case
since the issue of Locsin’s removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate
dispute.
On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to dismiss,
maintaining his position that he is an employee of NCLPI.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss, holding that her office acquired "jurisdiction to arbitrate and/or decide the instant
complaint finding extant in the case an employer-employee relationship."11
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.12 NCLPI raised the issue on whether the Labor
Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion by denying the Motion to Dismiss and
holding that her office had jurisdiction over the dispute.
The CA Decision - Locsin was a corporate officer; the issue of his removal as
EVP/Treasurer is an intra-corporate dispute under the RTC’s jurisdiction.
On August 28, 2008,13 the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Order denying
the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate officer.
Citing PD 902-A, the CA defined "corporate officers as those officers of a corporation
who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations’ by-
laws." In this regard, the CA held:
Scrutinizing the records, We hold that petitioners successfully discharged their onus of
establishing that private respondent was a corporate officer who held the position of
Executive Vice-President/Treasurer as provided in the by-laws of petitioner corporation
and that he held such position by virtue of election by the Board of Directors.
That private respondent is a corporate officer cannot be disputed. The position of
Executive Vice-President/Treasurer is specifically included in the roster of officers
provided for by the (Amended) By-Laws of petitioner corporation, his duties and
responsibilities, as well as compensation as such officer are likewise set forth therein.14
Article 280 of the Labor Code, the receipt of salaries by Locsin, SSS deductions on that
salary, and the element of control in the performance of work duties – indicia used by the
Labor Arbiter to conclude that Locsin was a regular employee – were held inapplicable
by the CA.15 The CA noted the Labor Arbiter’s failure to address the fact that the position
of EVP/Treasurer is specifically enumerated as an "office" in the corporation’s by-laws.16
Further, the CA pointed out Locsin’s failure to "state any circumstance by which NCLPI
engaged his services as a corporate officer that would make him an employee." The CA
found, in this regard, that Locsin’s assumption and retention as EVP/Treasurer was
based on his election and subsequent re-elections from 1992 until 2005. Further, he
performed only those functions that were "specifically set forth in the By-Laws or required
of him by the Board of Directors.17"
46

With respect to the suit Locsin filed with the Labor Arbiter, the CA held that:
Private respondent, in belatedly filing this suit before the Labor Arbiter, questioned the
legality of his "dismissal" but in essence, he raises the issue of whether or not the Board
of Directors had the authority to remove him from the corporate office to which he was
elected pursuant to the By-Laws of the petitioner corporation. Indeed, had private
respondent been an ordinary employee, an election conducted by the Board of Directors
would not have been necessary to remove him as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer.
However, in an obvious attempt to preclude the application of settled jurisprudence that
corporate officers whose position is provided in the by-laws, their election, removal or
dismissal is subject to Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A (now R.A. No. 8799), private
respondent would even claim in his Position Paper, that since his responsibilities were
akin to that of the company’s Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, he was "hired under
the pretext that he was being ‘elected’ into said post.18 [Emphasis supplied.]
As a consequence, the CA concluded that Locsin does not have any recourse with the
Labor Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a corporate officer, whether elected or
appointed, is an intra-corporate controversy over which the NLRC has no
jurisdiction.19 Instead, according to the CA, Locsin’s complaint for "illegal dismissal"
should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), pursuant to Rule 6 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies.20
Finally, the CA addressed Locsin’s invocation of Article 4 of the Labor Code. Dismissing
the application of the provision, the CA cited Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo
School of Law, as follows:
x x x the non-coverage of corporate officers from the security of tenure clause under the
Constitution is now well-established principle by numerous decisions upholding such
doctrine under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution in the face of contemporary decisions
of the same Supreme Court likewise confirming that security of tenure covers all
employees or workers including managerial employees.21
THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the CA’s decision, Locsin filed the present petition
on January 28, 2009, raising the following procedural and substantive issues:
(1) Whether the CA has original jurisdiction to review decision of the Labor
Arbiter under Rule 65?
(2) Whether he is a regular employee of NCLPI under the definition of Article 280
of the Labor Code? and
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
(3) Whether Locsin’s position as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer makes him
a corporate officer thereby excluding him from the coverage of the Labor Code?
Procedurally, Locsin essentially submits that NCLPI wrongfully filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, as the latter’s remedy is to proceed with the arbitration, and to
appeal to the NLRC after the Labor Arbiter shall have ruled on the merits of the case.
Locsin cites, in this regard, Rule V, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC Rules), which provides that a denial of a motion to dismiss
by the Labor Arbiter is not subject to an appeal. Locsin also argues that even if the Labor
Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the NCLPI motion, a special civil
action for certiorari, filed with the CA was not the appropriate remedy, since this was a
breach of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Substantively, Locsin submits that he is a regular employee of NCLPI since - as he
argued before the Labor Arbiter and the CA - his relationship with the company meets
the "four-fold test."
First, Locsin contends that NCLPI had the power to engage his services as
EVP/Treasurer. Second, he received regular wages from NCLPI, from which his SSS
and Philhealth contributions, as well as his withholding taxes were deducted. Third,
NCLPI had the power to terminate his employment.22 Lastly, Nissan had control over the
manner of the performance of his functions as EVP/Treasurer, as shown by the 13 years
of faithful execution of his job, which he carried out in accordance with the standards and
expectations set by NCLPI.23 Further, Locsin maintains that even after his election as
Chairman, he essentially performed the functions of EVP/Treasurer – handling the
financial and administrative operations of the Corporation – thus making him a regular
employee.24
Under these claimed facts, Locsin concludes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC – not
the RTC (as NCLPI posits) – has jurisdiction to decide the controversy. Parenthetically,
Locsin clarifies that he does not dispute the validity of his election as Chairman of the
Board on January 1, 2005. Instead, he theorizes that he never lost his position as
EVP/Treasurer having continuously performed the functions appurtenant thereto.25 Thus,
he questions his "unceremonious removal" as EVP/Treasurer during the August 5, 2005
special Board meeting.
THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
It its April 17, 2009 Comment,26 Nissan prays for the denial of the petition for lack of
merit. Nissan submits that the CA correctly ruled that the Labor Arbiter does not have
jurisdiction over Locsin’s complaint for illegal dismissal. In support, Nissan maintains that
Locsin is a corporate officer and not an employee. In addressing the procedural defect
Locsin raised, Nissan brushes the issue aside, stating that (1) this issue was belatedly
47

raised in the Motion for Reconsideration, and that (2) in any case, Rule VI, Section 2(1)
of the NLRC does not apply since only appealable decisions, resolutions and orders are
covered under the rule.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
At the outset, we stress that there are two (2) important considerations in the final
determination of this case. On the one hand, Locsin raises a procedural issue that, if
proven correct, will require the Court to dismiss the instant petition for using an improper
remedy. On the other hand, there is the substantive issue that will be disregarded if a
strict implementation of the rules of procedure is upheld.
Prefatorily, we agree with Locsin’s submission that the NCLPI incorrectly elevated the
Labor Arbiter’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss to the CA. Locsin is correct in positing that
the denial of a motion to dismiss is unappealable. As a general rule, an aggrieved party’s
proper recourse to the denial is to file his position paper, interpose the grounds relied
upon in the motion to dismiss before the labor arbiter, and actively participate in the
proceedings. Thereafter, the labor arbiter’s decision can be appealed to the NLRC, not to
the CA.
As a rule, we strictly adhere to the rules of procedure and do everything we can, to the
point of penalizing violators, to encourage respect for these rules. We take exception to
this general rule, however, when a strict implementation of these rules would cause
substantial injustice to the parties.
We see it appropriate to apply the exception to this case for the reasons discussed
below; hence, we are compelled to go beyond procedure and rule on the merits of the
case. In the context of this case, we see sufficient justification to rule on the employer-
employee relationship issue raised by NCLPI, even though the Labor Arbiter’s
interlocutory order was incorrectly brought to the CA under Rule 65.
The NLRC Rules are clear: the denial by the labor arbiter of the motion to dismiss is not
appealable because the denial is merely an interlocutory order.
In Metro Drug v. Metro Drug Employees,27 we definitively stated that the denial of a
motion to dismiss by a labor arbiter is not immediately appealable.28
We similarly ruled in Texon Manufacturing v. Millena, in Sime Darby Employees
29
Association v. National Labor Relations Commission30 and in Westmont Pharmaceuticals
v. Samaniego.31 In Texon, we specifically said:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
The Order of the Labor Arbiter denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss is interlocutory. It is
well-settled that a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and
hence, cannot be appealed, until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.
[Emphasis supplied.]32
and indicated the appropriate recourse in Metro Drug, as follows:33
x x x The NLRC rule proscribing appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss is similar to
the general rule observed in civil procedure that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and, hence, not appealable until final judgment or order is rendered [1 Feria
and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 453 (2001 ed.)]. The remedy of the aggrieved
party in case of denial of the motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose, as a
defense or defenses, the ground or grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss,
proceed to trial and, in case of adverse judgment, to elevate the entire case by appeal in
due course [Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81909, September 5, 1991, 201
SCRA 343]. In order to avail of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, it is incumbent upon
petitioner to establish that the denial of the motion to dismiss was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. [Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 602]
In so citing Feria and Noche, the Court was referring to Sec. 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, which specifically enumerates interlocutory orders as one of the court actions
that cannot be appealed. In the same rule, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, the
aggrieved party is allowed to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The
latter rule, however, also contains limitations for its application, clearly outlined in its
Section 1 which provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
In the labor law setting, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy is still open to the
aggrieved party when a labor arbiter denies a motion to dismiss. This is Article 223 of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (Labor Code), 34which states:
48

ART. 223. APPEAL
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter; x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to this Article, we held in Metro Drug (citing Air Services Cooperative, et al. v.
Court of Appeals35) that the NLRC is clothed with sufficient authority to correct any
claimed "erroneous assumption of jurisdiction" by labor arbiters:
In Air Services Cooperative, et al. v. The Court of Appeals, et al., a case where the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was put in issue and was assailed through a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and annulment of judgment before a regional trial court, this
Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature of appeal as embodied in Article 223
of the Labor Code, thus:
x x x Also, while the title of the Article 223 seems to provide only for the remedy of
appeal as that term is understood in procedural law and as distinguished from the office
of certiorari, nonetheless, a closer reading thereof reveals that it is not as limited as
understood by the petitioners x x x.
Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant of review
thereof to the NLRC indicates the lawmakers’ intention to broaden the meaning of appeal
as that term is used in the Code. For this reason, petitioners cannot argue now that the
NLRC is devoid of any corrective power to rectify a supposed erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the Labor Arbiter x x x. [Air Services Cooperative, et al. v. The Court of
Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 118693, 23 July 1998, 293 SCRA 101]
Since the legislature had clothed the NLRC with the appellate authority to correct a
claimed "erroneous assumption of jurisdiction" on the part of the labor arbiter – a case of
grave abuse of discretion - the remedy availed of by petitioner in this case is patently
erroneous as recourse in this case is lodged, under the law, with the NLRC.
In Metro Drug, as in the present case, the defect imputed through the NLCPI Motion to
Dismiss is the labor arbiter’s lack of jurisdiction since Locsin is alleged to be a corporate
officer, not an employee. Parallelisms between the two cases is undeniable, as they are
similar on the following points: (1) in Metro Drug, as in this case, the Labor Arbiter issued
an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss by one of the parties; (2) the basis of the Motion
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
to Dismiss is also the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Labor Arbiter to settle the dispute;
and (3) dissatisfied with the Order of the Labor Arbiter, the aggrieved party likewise
elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65.
The similarities end there, however. Unlike in the present case, the CA denied the
petition for certiorari and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration in Metro Drug; the
CA correctly found that the proper appellate mechanism was an appeal to the NLRC and
not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the present case, the CA took a different
position despite our clear ruling in Metro Drug, and allowed, not only the use of Rule 65,
but also ruled on the merits.
From this perspective, the CA clearly erred in the application of the procedural rules by
disregarding the relevant provisions of the NLRC Rules, as well as the requirements for a
petition for certiorari under the Rules of Court. To reiterate, the proper action of an
aggrieved party faced with the labor arbiter’s denial of his motion to dismiss is to submit
his position paper and raise therein the supposed lack of jurisdiction. The aggrieved
party cannot immediately appeal the denial since it is an interlocutory order; the
appropriate remedial recourse is the procedure outlined in Article 223 of the Labor Code,
not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A strict implementation of the NLRC Rules and the Rules of Court would cause injustice
to the parties because the Labor Arbiter clearly has no jurisdiction over the present intra-
corporate dispute.
Our ruling in Mejillano v. Lucillo36 stands for the proposition that we should strictly apply
the rules of procedure. We said:
Time and again, we have ruled that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of
the litigants. Rules of Procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the
guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules were
established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial
system. [Emphasis supplied.]
An exception to this rule is our ruling in Lazaro v. Court of Appeals37 where we held that
the strict enforcement of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in exceptionally
meritorious cases:
x x x Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules,
they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. The Court
49

reiterates that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. x x x
The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would
be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice x x x.
Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of
judicial functions." Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may
be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases. [Emphasis supplied.]
Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious circumstance can be tested under
the guidelines we established in Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,38 as follows:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension
of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be
considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby. [Emphasis supplied.]
Under these standards, we hold that exceptional circumstances exist in the present case
to merit the relaxation of the applicable rules of procedure.
Due to existing exceptional circumstances, the ruling on the merits that Locsin is an
officer and not an employee of Nissan must take precedence over procedural
considerations.
We arrived at the conclusion that we should go beyond the procedural rules and
immediately take a look at the intrinsic merits of the case based on several
considerations.
First, the parties have sufficiently ventilated their positions on the disputed employer-
employee relationship and have, in fact, submitted the matter for the CA’s consideration.
Second, the CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists between
Locsin and Nissan.
Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions by
the Nissan board pursuant to its By-laws.39 As such, he was a corporate officer, not an
employee. The CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on
Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers as "those officers of a
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the
corporation’s by-laws." Likewise, Section 25 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, or the
Corporation Code of the Philippines (Corporation Code) provides that corporate officers
are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in
the by-laws.
Third. Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin already acted as a corporate
officer because the position of Executive Vice-President/Treasurer is provided for in
Nissan’s By-Laws. Article IV, Section 4 of these By-Laws specifically provides for this
position, as follows:
ARTICLE IV
Officers
Section 1. Election and Appointment – The Board of Directors at their first meeting,
annually thereafter, shall elect as officers of the Corporation a Chairman of the Board, a
President, an Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, a Vice-President/General Manager
and a Corporate Secretary. The other Senior Operating Officers of the Corporation shall
be appointed by the Board upon the recommendation of the President.
xxxx
Section 4. Executive Vice-President/Treasurer – The Executive Vice-President/Treasurer
shall have such powers and perform such duties as are prescribed by these By-Laws,
and as may be required of him by the Board of Directors. As the concurrent Treasurer of
the Corporation, he shall have the charge of the funds, securities, receipts, and
disbursements of the Corporation. He shall deposit, or cause to be deposited, the credit
of the Corporation in such banks or trust companies, or with such banks of other
depositories, as the Board of Directors may from time to time designate. He shall tender
to the President or to the Board of Directors whenever required an account of the
financial condition of the corporation and of all his transactions as Treasurer. As soon as
practicable after the close of each fiscal year, he shall make and submit to the Board of
Directors a like report of such fiscal year. He shall keep correct books of account of all
the business and transactions of the Corporation.
In Okol v. Slimmers World International,40 citing Tabang v. National Labor Relations
Commission,41 we held that –
x x x an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected
by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" usually occupies
no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by
50

the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid
to such employee. [Emphasis supplied.]
In this case, Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the Amended
By-Laws of the corporation. The following factual determination by the CA is elucidating:
More important, private respondent failed to state any such "circumstance" by which the
petitioner corporation "engaged his services" as corporate officer that would make him
an employee. In the first place, the Vice-President/Treasurer was elected on an annual
basis as provided in the By-Laws, and no duties and responsibilities were stated by
private respondent which he discharged while occupying said position other than those
specifically set forth in the By-Laws or required of him by the Board of Directors. The
unrebutted fact remains that private respondent held the position of Executive Vice-
President/Treasurer of petitioner corporation, a position provided for in the latter’s by-
laws, by virtue of election by the Board of Directors, and has functioned as such
Executive Vice-President/Treasurer pursuant to the provisions of the said By-Laws.
Private respondent knew very well that he was simply not re-elected to the said position
during the August 5, 2005 board meeting, but he had objected to the election of a new
set of officers held at the time upon the advice of his lawyer that he cannot be
"terminated" or replaced as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer as he had attained
tenurial security.42
We fully agree with this factual determination which we find to be sufficiently supported
by evidence. We likewise rule, based on law and established jurisprudence, that Locsin,
at the time of his severance from NCLPI, was the latter’s corporate officer.
a. The Question of Jurisdiction
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC,
has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. As
we also held in Okol, a corporate officer’s dismissal from service is an intra-corporate
dispute:
In a number of cases [Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
106722, 4 October 1996, 262 SCRA 709; Lozon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 310 Phil. 1 (1995); Espino v. National Labor Relations Commission, 310
Phil. 61 (1995); Fortune Cement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 79762, 24 January 1991, 193 SCRA 258], we have held that a corporate
officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which
arises between a stockholder and a corporation.43 [Emphasis supplied.]
so that the RTC should exercise jurisdiction based on the following legal reasoning:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (PD 902-A)
provided that intra-corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC):
Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations
registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
xxxx
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or
managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8799, which took effect on 8 August 2000,
transferred to regional trial courts the SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases listed in Section 5
of PD 902-A:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction
or the appropriate Regional Trial Court. [Emphasis supplied.]
b. Precedence of Substantive Merits;
Primacy of Element of Jurisdiction
Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to remand the case
to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to dismiss the petition outright due
to the wrongful use of Rule 65.44 We cannot close our eyes, however, to the factual and
legal reality, established by evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer
whose termination of relationship is outside a labor arbiter’s jurisdiction to rule upon.
Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the case, and
primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule on a case
and is the threshold element that must exist before any quasi-judicial officer can act. In
the context of the present case, the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the
termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on the
case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and the
law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial delay and
inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of injustice, to the parties.
This conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits of termination of relationship and
is without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute on this point before the
appropriate RTC.
51
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 103720, promulgated on August
28, 2008, as well as its Resolution of December 9, 2008, which reversed and set aside
the March 10, 2008 Order of Labor Arbiter Concepcion in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-
06165-07. This Decision is without prejudice to petitioner Locsin’s available recourse for
relief through the appropriate remedy in the proper forum. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.

52

G.R. No. 147874 July 17, 2006
DOLORES GAYOSO, DANNY GAYOSO, ELIZABETH G. DONDRIANO, VICTORIANO
GAYOSO, CHRISTOPHER GAYOSO, REMEDIOS GAYOSO and THE HEIRS OF
VICTORIANO GAYOSO vs. TWENTY-TWO REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48001.
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Ejectment filed by Twenty-Two Realty
Development Corporation (TTRDC), respondent, on December 12, 1996 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City against the above-named
petitioners. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 15340, alleges that on October
11, 1954, Victoriano Gayoso (now deceased) sold to Prospero Almeda a lot located on
Mariveles corner Calbayog Streets, Mandaluyong City. After the sale, Almeda allowed
Gayoso and his children, herein petitioners, to stay on the property as lessees,
paying P20.00 a month. Later, Almeda's heirs sold the lot to respondent TTRDC. Thus,
on February 19, 1996, the title to the property was transferred in the name of respondent
corporation.
However, petitioners have stopped paying rentals. Respondent then sent letters dated
September 12 and October 17, 1996 to petitioners demanding that they vacate the
premises, but they refused to do so. This prompted respondent to file with the MeTC a
complaint for illegal detainer against them.
In their answer, petitioners denied specifically TTRDC's allegations in its complaint. They
claimed that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case since in their answer they are
raising an issue of ownership. They alleged that their father, the late Victoriano Gayoso,
sold the lot (a conjugal property) to Almeda without the consent of their mother. The sale,
being void, Almeda could not have transferred ownership of the lot to respondent
corporation.
On July 21, 1997, the MeTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
A. Ordering the defendants
1. and all other persons claiming rights under them to vacate the
premises located at Mariveles corner Calbayog Streets, Mandaluyong
City, and to surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiff;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
2. to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,000.00 representing their unpaid
rentals beginning February 1981 to December 1996 and the amount
of P20.00 per month every month thereafter until the premises shall have
been vacated;
3. to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees; and
4. to pay the costs of suit.
B. dismissing the counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.
The MeTC ruled that since petitioners failed to pay rentals for more than three months,
then respondent has the right to evict them from the premises.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City, affirmed the
MeTC Decision, holding that the refusal of petitioners to vacate the property and pay the
rents make out a clear case of unlawful detainer over which the MeTC has jurisdiction.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
In its Decision dated April 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners contend that since the issue of ownership of the property in dispute is
inextricably linked with the issue of possession, the MeTC has no jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 15340.
For its part, respondent maintains that the real issue is who between the parties is
entitled to possession. Hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
53

We find for the respondent.
It is basic that a court's jurisdiction is provided by law. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended, provides in part:
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land
or building, neither shall it bar an action between the same parties respecting title
to the land or building nor be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
Likewise, in Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank,3 this Court ruled:

xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the issue
of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession; (Emphasis supplied)
All ejectment cases are covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and are
within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts regardless of whether they involve
questions of ownership. The courts in ejectment cases may determine questions
of ownership whenever necessary to decide the question of possession.
Verily, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the MeTC of
Mandaluyong City has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 15340,
notwithstanding the issue of ownership raised by petitioners in their answer.

Moreover, Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, states WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
that: 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48001 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession, not conclusive in actions
involving title or ownership. – The judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession
only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building.

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.

In Barba vs. Court of Appeals,2 this Court held:

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that municipal trial courts, metropolitan
trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts now retain jurisdiction over ejectment
cases if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the
issue of ownership. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, inferior
courts, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the
54

G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO and MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO.,
INC. (CEBU BRANCH)
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of
P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the
whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment
was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved
upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter,
the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against
the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written
opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2)
Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the
judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion
for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve
the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54)
The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been
made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary
demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs
filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set for the
hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a
period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer,
the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of
Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for
reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones
covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2,
1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary
hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in
Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution
against the herein bonding company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ
of execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its
subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside
the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11,
1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year.
Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date
Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already
become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the
demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of
First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these
premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the
appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May
20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to
Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for
collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But
55

about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17,
1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance
of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is
not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important
one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on
July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years,
and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of
jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be
worthy of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al.
vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956;
Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591,
September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable
Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants submitting
their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue"
(See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to
certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme Court. 1äw phï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in
accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about
a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and
as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts
and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of
the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on
January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the
Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when
it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of
origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed
specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12
and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs.
Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not
only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond
upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the
court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the
Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition,
the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the
56

court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed.
715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as
well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men
Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of
money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval,
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit
for collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against
defendants' properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed
by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied,
plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution
against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond.
But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there
was "no showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding
company for payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on
Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of
the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again
filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against
the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957,
the surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's
counsel asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so
an order was issued in open court, as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6,
1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this
incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City,
Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp.
64-65, emphasis ours)
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period
given him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs'
57
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
motion for execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for
corresponding writ of execution was issued. execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration.
In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called,
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days
on the ground that the same was "issued without the requirements of Section 17, within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with," more specifically, that an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was
the same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This motion was deprived of its day in court.
denied by order of February 10, 1958.
It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above- simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion
stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is
1958. obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will
show that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 — that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in
denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the
reconsideration, respectively — the surety has interposed the appeal on hand. four-day period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was
issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash
the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing
required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads; It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is
no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment
against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15).
"Sec. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond.
Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12
— If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety
of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may
or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to
recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence,
secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on
after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is
such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount
"returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond
due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such
automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against
surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action."
the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the
(Emphasis ours)
surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in
preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What
is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given
an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after
which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and
as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the
discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the
nature of the incident up for consideration.

58

G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI vs. HON. PEDRO A.
RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS
The dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180 filed by the herein petitioners in the respondent
Court against the private respondent is sought to be annulled and set aside by this
Petition For Review On Certiorari.
The antecedent material facts are not disputed. Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum
of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain
Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. After said
judgment became final, a writ of execution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of
Levy made on September 21, 1961 on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 9138 registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim",
specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and
participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this
title. " The Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan on
October 17, 1961 in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated that the
sale referred only to the rights and interest of Manuel Magali over the land described in
TCT No. 9138. Manuel Magali is one of the several children of Domingo Magali who had
died in 1940 and herein petitioner Modesta Calimlim.
However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was
erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described
in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of
Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated
at the back of said title.
On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the
respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT
No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of
the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his
possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to
surrender the said title. On June 20, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed
an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its
name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and in its Order dated July
13, 1967, it directed the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the
Independent Mercantile Corporation and the cancellation of TCT No. 9138. By virtue of
said Order, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the
corporation, Identified as TCT No. 68568.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo
Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled,
filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by
Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dated June 3, 1968 dismissing the
petition. (Rollo, pp. 31-38.)
The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC
Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971,
they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the
conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by
TCT No. 9138 previously registered in the name of Domingo Magali, married to Modesta
Calimlim. Named as defendant in said civil case was herein private respondent
Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile
Corporation on July 25, 1967. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to
obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim
annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180
on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations
(Rollo. pp. 42-45). Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated
April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of estoppel by prior
judgment. (Ibid., pp, 10-13.) A Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was
denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of September 2, 1971. (Ibid., pp. 13-15.) A
second Motion For Reconsideration was similarly denied in the Order dated September
29, 197 1. (Rollo, pp. 16-17.) Hence, this Petition.
We find merit in this appeal.
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC
Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment
against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the defense of res
judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have
been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order
cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. (2 Moran Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 364.) This essential element of the defense of bar by prior
judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case presently considered.
The petition filed by the herein petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent
invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court,
59

Although the said petition did not so state, that reliance was apparently placed on
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been settled by consistent rulings of this
Court that a court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited
and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of
issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or
title to real property. (Bareng vs. Shintoist Shrine and Japanese Charity Bureau, 83
SCRA 418; Manalo vs. Mariano, 69 SCRA 80; In re: Nicanor T Santos, 102 SCRA
747; Santos vs. Aquino, 101 SCRA 377.) In Hu chon Sunpongco vs. Heirs of Nicolas
Ronquillo, L- 27040, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 395, we have held that:
Section 112 of Act 496 confers authority upon the land registration court
to order the cancellation, alteration or amendment of a certificate of title
but withdraws from the Court the power to pass upon any question
concerning ownership of the registered property, or any incident where
the issues involved have become controversial.
It may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the petitioners in their petition to
cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or title over the property covered thereby.
The said petition presented before the respondent Court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction as a cadastral court, the question of who should be considered the true and
lawful owner of the parcel of land embraced in said title. The petitioners alleged therein
that they are the true owners of the property, and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought
to cancel was issued as a result of the errors which were not of their own making. In
short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial
competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.
It may neither be claimed that the parties have mutually agreed to submit the aforesaid
issues for the determination by the court, it being a fact that herein private respondent
was not a party in the petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Incidentally, although the said
petition was filed by the herein petitioners on November 21, 1967, the Opposition filed by
Independent Mercantile Corporation to the said petition made no mention of the alleged
sale of the property in question in favor of private respondent Francisco Ramos on July
5, 1967. This circumstance places in grave doubt the sincerity of said sale and the claim
that the private respondent was an innocent purchaser for value of the property in
question.
In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29, 1971 denying the second
motion for reconsideration, he cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to
uphold the view that the petitioners are deemed estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the respondent Court in having taken cognizance of the petition for
cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they being the ones who invoked the jurisdiction of the
said Court to grant the affirmative relief prayed for therein. We are of the opinion that the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop
nor the philosophy of the doctrine therein expounded fits the case at bar.
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is
a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoywhich
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld
that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack
of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost
fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no
longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned
that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled
and registered in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same,
they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said
remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral
court, instead of its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the
title in the name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by
the respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given for
such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and the petition
was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear
of record. It is even a possibility that such dismissal was in view of the realization of the
respondent Court that, sitting as a cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the
petition involving as it does a highly controversial issue. Upon such petition being
dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only
two and one-half years after the dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492.
Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to
60

claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to
have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time
or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself
is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No.
39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Motion To Dismiss filed by the private respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-180 shall be
deemed denied and the respondent Court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in
the case. With costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED.

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was
taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the
attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel
by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the
representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to
whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA
623.) The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to
entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling
which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or
proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be
prejudicial to the one who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable
judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter.
It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the
land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply
is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of
divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a
party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which
shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their
remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action "whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter."
(Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction,
such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,
Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)

The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their property in
Civil Case No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that
the property in question admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the
name of the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial
Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the execution proceeding. The justness of the relief
sought by herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered futile by reason of a doctrine
which is of highly doubtful applicability herein.

61

G.R. No. 151821 April 14, 2004
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as Successor-in-Interest of BPI Investment
Corporation vs. ALS MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great respect, but may be reviewed if
they do not conform to law and to the evidence on record. In the case at bar, a
meticulous review of the facts compels us to modify the award granted by the Court of
Appeals.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the November 24, 2000 Decision2 and the January 9, 2002 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 25781. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the instant appeal DISMISSED."4
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the appellate court as follows:
"On July 29, 1985, [petitioner] BPI Investment Corporation filed a complaint for a
Sum of Money against ALS Management and Development Corporation,
alleging inter alia that on July 22, 1983, [petitioner] and [respondent] executed at
Makati, Metro Manila a Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of
the Twin Towers Condominium located at Ayala Avenue, corner Apartment
Ridge Street, Makati, Metro Manila designated as Unit E-4A comprising of 271
squares [sic] meters more or less, together with parking stalls identified as G022
and G-63. The Condominium Certificate of Title No. 4800 of the Registry of
Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila was issued after the execution of the said Deed
of Sale. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in
causing the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title.
Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated that the
VENDEE [respondent] shall pay all the expenses for the preparation and
registration of this Deed of Sale and such other documents as may be necessary
for the issuance of the corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title. After the
[petitioner] complied with its obligations under the said Deed of Sale,
[respondent], notwithstanding demands made by [petitioner], failed and refused
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
to pay [petitioner] its legitimate advances for the expenses mentioned above
without any valid, legal or justifiable reason.
"In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, [respondent] averred among
others that it has just and valid reasons for refusing to pay [petitioner’s] legal
claims. In clear and direct contravention of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No.
957 which provides that ‘No fee except those required for the registration of the
deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance of such
title’, the [petitioner] has jacked-up or increased the amount of its alleged
advances for the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of
Title in the name of the [respondent], by including therein charges which should
not be collected from buyers of condominium units. [Petitioner] made and
disseminated brochures and other sales propaganda in and before May 1980,
which made warranties as to the facilities, improvements, infrastructures or other
forms of development of the condominium units (known as ‘The Twin Towers’) it
was offering for sale to the public, which included the following:
‘The Twin Towers is destined to reflect condominium living at its very
best.’
‘While the twin tower design and its unusual height will make the project
the only one of its kind in the Philippines, the human scale and proportion
[are] carefully maintained.’
‘To be sure, modern conveniences are available as in the installation of
an intercom system and a closed-circuit TV monitor through which
residents from their apartments can see their guests down at the lobby
call station.’
‘Some of the features of each typical apartment unit are: x x x A bar x x x
Three toilets with baths x x x.’
‘The penthouse units are privileged with the provision of an all-around
balcony. x x x’
"[Respondent] further averred that [petitioner] represented to the [respondent]
that the condominium unit will be delivered completed and ready for occupancy
not later than December 31, 1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon the
descriptions and warranties contained in the aforementioned brochures and other
sales propaganda materials when [respondent] agreed to buy Unit E-4A of the
Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00 considering that the Twin
Towers was then yet to be built. In contravention of [petitioner’s] warranties and
62

of good engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased by [respondent]
suffered from the following defects and/or deficiencies:
‘1. The clearance in the walkway at the balcony is not sufficient for
passage;
‘2. The anodized aluminum used in the door and windows were
damaged;
‘3. The kitchen counter tops/splashboard suffered from cracks and were
mis-cut and misaligned;
‘4. The partition between living and master’s bedroom was unpainted and
it had no access for maintenance due to aluminum fixed glass cover;
‘5. The varifold divider, including the bar and counter top cabinet were not
installed;
‘6. The toilets had no tiles;
‘7. No closed circuit TV was installed;
‘8. Rainwater leaks inside or into the condominium unit.’" 5
Respondent’s Answer prayed that "judgment be rendered ordering [petitioner] to correct
such defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit,"6 and that the following reliefs be
granted:
"1. The sum of P40,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from the date of extra-
judicial demand, representing the amount spent by the defendant for the
completion works it had undertaken on the premises.
"2. The sum of U.S.$6,678.65 (or its equivalent in the Philippine currency)
representing the unearned rental of the premises which the defendant did not
realize by reason of the late delivery to him of the condominium unit;
"3. Twenty-four percent (24%) interest per annum on the agreed one (1) year
advance rental and one (1) month deposit (totaling U.S.$15,785.00)
corresponding to the period January 1, 1982 to June 17, 1982, which [petitioner]
would have earned had he deposited the said amount in a bank;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
"4. The sum of U.S.$1,214.30 per month, commencing from May 1, 1985, which
the [respondent] no longer earns as rental on the premises because the lessee
vacated the same by reason of defects and/or deficiencies;
"5. The sum of P50,000.00 plus appearance fees of P300.00 per court hearing,
as attorney’s fees;
"6. Litigation expenses and costs of suit."7
On February 6, 1990, the trial court issued this judgment:
"1. Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sum of P26,300.45, with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint up to full payment thereof, representing
the amount spent for the registration of the title to the condominium unit in
[respondent’s] name;
"2. Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at [petitioner’s] exclusive
expense/cost or appoint a licensed qualified contractor to do the same on its
behalf, the following defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit owned by the
[respondent]:
a) KITCHEN
i) The sides of the kitchen sink covered with sealants as well as
miscut marble installed as filler at the right side of the sink;
ii) Miscut marble installed on both sides of the side wall above the
gas range;
b) FOYERS
Water marks at the parquet flooring, near the main water supply room;
c) MAIDS ROOM
Ceiling cut off about one (1) square foot in size and left unfinished
d) DINING ROOM
i) Water damaged parquet up to about one (1) meter from the wall
underneath the open shelves and directly behind the plant box;
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ii) Plant box directly behind the dining room;
iii) The water damaged parquet flooring near the door of the
dining room to the passage way
e) MASTER’S BEDROOM
i) Falling off paint layers at the bathroom wall behind the
bathtub/faucet along the passageway of the master’s bedroom;
ii) Falling off water-damaged plywood ceiling in the master’s
bedroom bathroom;
iii) Grinders mark damage at the bathtub;
f) BALCONY WALKWAY
i) PVC pipes installed two (2) inches above floor level causing
water to accumulate;
ii) Cracks on level of wash out flooring;
iii) 14-inches passageway going to the open terrace not sufficient
as passageway;
iv) PVC pipe installed on the plant box water drained directly on
the balcony floor;
g) BALCONY (OPEN) TERRACE
i) Two (2) concrete cement measuring about 6 x 4 inches with
protruding live wires, purportedly lamp posts which were not
installed;
h) BOYS BEDROOM
i) Water mark on the parquet flooring due to water seepage;
ii) Asphalt plastered at the exterior wall/floor joints to prevent
water seepage;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
i) ANALOC FINISH of the aluminum frames of doors and windows all
around the condominium were painted with dark gray paint to cover dents
and scratches;
j) LIVING ROOM
Intercom equipment installed without the TV monitor;
k) STORAGE FACILITIES at the ground floor
"3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following:
a) The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement for expenses
incurred for the materials/labor in installing walls/floor titles in 2
bathrooms and bar counter cabinet.
b) The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned income for the five-
month period that the defendant had to suspend a lease contract over the
premises.
c) The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-one (21)
months (from May 1985 to January 1987), representing unearned income
when defendant’s lessee had to vacate the premises and condominium
unit remained vacant, all with legal interest from the filing of the
counterclaim until the same are fully paid."8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, after "a thorough review and examination of the evidence on record,"9 the CA
found "no basis for disbelieving what the trial court found and arrived at."10
The appellate court sustained the trial court’s finding that "while [petitioner] succeeded in
proving its claim against the [respondent] for expenses incurred in the registration of [the
latter’s] title to the condominium unit purchased, x x x for its part [respondent] in turn
succeeded in establishing an even bigger claim under its counterclaim."11
Hence, this Petition.12
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
64

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the respondent’s counterclaims.
"II. Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts and/or manifestly mistaken warranting a review by this
Honorable Court of the factual findings therein.
"III. Whether or not the award of damages by the Honorable Court of Appeals is
conjectural warranting a review by this Honorable Court of the factual findings
therein."13
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Contending that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) -- not the
RTC -- that had jurisdiction over respondent’s counterclaim, petitioner seeks to nullify the
award of the trial court.
Promulgated on July 12, 1976, PD No. 957 -- otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree" -- provides that the National Housing Authority
(NHA) shall have "exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and
business."14 Promulgated later on April 2, 1978, was PD No. 1344 entitled "Empowering
the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its
Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957." It expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA
as follows:
"SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner, developer, broker or salesman." (Italics ours.)
On February 7, 1981, by virtue of Executive Order No. 648, the regulatory functions of
the NHA were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC).
Section 8 thereof provides:
"SECTION 8. Transfer of Functions. - The regulatory functions of the National
Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and
other related laws are hereby transferred to the Commission (Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission). x x x. Among these regulatory functions
are: 1) Regulation of the real estate trade and business; x x x 11) Hear and
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund
filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and
cases of specific performance."
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the functions of the
HSRC were transferred to the HLURB.
As mandated by PD No. 957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is encompassing. Hence, we
said in Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Sarte:15
"x x x. While PD 957 was designed to meet the need basically to protect lot
buyers from the fraudulent manipulations of unscrupulous subdivision owners,
sellers and operators, the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ vested in the NHA is broad and
general -‘to regulate the real estate trade and business’ in accordance with the
provisions of said law."
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD
No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a
complaint of specific performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a
subdivision lot;16 for claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or
not;17 and for determining whether there is a perfected contract of sale.18
In Solid Homes v. Payawal,19 we declared that the NHA had the competence to award
damages as part of the exclusive power conferred upon it -- the power to hear and
decide "claims involving refund and any other claimsfiled by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman."20
65

Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim -- being one for specific performance (correction
of defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) and damages -- falls under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by Section 1 of PD No. 1344.
The Applicability of Estoppel
The general rule is that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.21 Indeed, the question
of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, provided that such action would not result in the
mockery of the tenets of fair play.22 As an exception to the rule, the issue may not be
raised if the party is barred by estoppel.23
In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a judgment
unfavorable to it did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may no longer deny the trial
court’s jurisdiction, for estoppel bars it from doing so. This Court cannot countenance the
inconsistent postures petitioner has adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular
court to which it has voluntarily submitted.24
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for decision,
and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if
it is not.25
We also find petitioner guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the question of
jurisdiction earlier. From the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on November 8,
1985, the former could have raised such issue, but failed or neglected to do so. It was
only upon filing its appellant’s brief26 with the CA on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised
the issue of jurisdiction for the first time.
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,27 we declared that the failure to raise the question of jurisdiction
at an earlier stage barred the party from questioning it later. Applying the rule on
estoppel by laches, we explained as follows:
"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppe[l] by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches.
"Laches, in general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
"The doctrine of laches or of ‘stale demands’ is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to
be enforced or asserted."28
Thus, we struck down the defense of lack of jurisdiction, since the appellant therein failed
to raise the question at an earlier stage. It did so only after an adverse decision had been
rendered.
We further declared that if we were to sanction the said appellant’s conduct, "we would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced x x x and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting."29
Applicable herein is our ruling in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,30 in which we said:
"Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing
by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking
inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice
and good faith. There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never raised the
issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead,
they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said
court. It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were
invoking all along."31
Second and Third Issues:
Appreciation of Facts
It is readily apparent that petitioner is raising issues of fact that have been ruled upon by
the RTC and sustained by the CA. The factual findings of lower courts are generally
binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal, especially when both sets of
findings are the same.32 Nevertheless, this rule has certain exceptions,33 as when those
findings are not supported by the evidence on record.
We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found reason to modify the
award to conform to law and the evidence. We thus address the arguments of
petitioner seriatim.
Warranties and Representations in the Brochure
66

The brochure that was disseminated indicated features that would be provided each
condominium unit; and that, under Section 19 of PD No. 957, would form part of the
sales warranties of petitioner.34 Respondent relied on the brochure in its decision to
purchase a unit.35 Since the former failed to deliver certain items stated therein, then
there was a clear violation of its warranties and representations.
The brochure says that "[t]he particulars stated x x x as well as the details and visuals
shown x x x are intended to give a general idea of the project to be undertaken, and as
such, are not to be relied [upon] as statements or representations of fact."36 This general
disclaimer should apply only to the general concept of the project that petitioner aptly
characterizes thus:
"’x x x [D]estined to reflect condominium living at its very best’ and ‘its design x x
x will make the project the only one of its kind in the Philippines.’"37
This disclaimer, however, should not apply to the features and the amenities that the
brochure promised to provide each condominium unit. Petitioner was thus in breach
when it failed to deliver a "closed-circuit TV monitor through which residents from their
apartments can see their guests x x x."38
Storage Facilities
The trial court erred, though, in requiring petitioner to provide storage facilities on the
ground floor, as the non-delivery had not been alleged in respondent’s Answer with
Counterclaim.39
It is elementary that a judgment must conform to and be supported by both the pleadings
and the evidence, and that it be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the
pleadings were framed and the case was tried.40Indeed, issues in each case are limited
to those presented in the pleadings.41
We are aware that issues not alleged in the pleadings may still be decided upon, if tried
with the parties’ express or implied consent.42 Trial courts are not precluded from
granting reliefs not specifically claimed in the pleadings -- notwithstanding the absence of
their amendment -- upon the condition that evidence has been presented properly, with
full opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support their respective contentions
and to refute each other’s evidence.43 This exception is not present in the case at bar.
Moreover, a cursory reading of the brochure shows that there is no promise to provide
individual storage facilities on the ground floor for each condominium unit. The brochure
reads: "Storage facilities in the apartment units and the ground floor."44 Apparent from the
letter of petitioner dated June 18, 1982,45 was its compliance with its promise of storage
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
facilities on the ground floor. In that letter, respondent was also informed that it may
course a reservation of those facilities through the building superintendent.
Damages for Delay in Delivery
It is undisputed that petitioner sent respondent a "Contract to Sell"46 declaring that the
construction would be finished on or before December 31, 1981.47 The former delivered
the condominium unit only in June 1982;48 thus, the latter claims that there was a delay in
the delivery.
Because of this delay, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay damages of P136,608.75
representing unearned income for the period that respondent had to suspend a lease
contract. We find a dearth of evidence to support such award.
To recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but
also be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.49 The lone evidence for this award
was the self-serving testimony of respondent’s witness that a lease contract had indeed
been intended to commence in January 1982, instead of the actual implementation on
June 18, 1982.50 Without any other evidence, we fail to see how the amount of loss was
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Condominium Defects
The rule is that a party’s case must be established through a "preponderance of
evidence."51 By such term of evidence is meant simply evidence that is of greater weight,
or is more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.52 Respondent was
able to establish through its witness’ testimony that the condominium unit suffered from
defects.53 This testimony was confirmed by an inspection report54 noted and signed by
petitioner’s representative, as well as by a commissioner’s report55 prepared after an
ocular inspection by the clerk of court acting as a commissioner. Furthermore, this
conclusion is supported by the circumstances that occurred during the lease period, as
evidenced by the complaint and the update letters56 of respondent’s lessee.
Petitioner’s contention that the claim arising from the alleged defects has already
prescribed must fail for being raised for the first time only on appeal.57 Well-settled is the
rule that issues not raised below cannot be resolved on review in higher courts.58
We agree, however, that the lower courts erred in finding that there was a defect in a
portion of the balcony, which respondent alleges to be a "walkway x x x [that] is not
sufficient for passage."59 Petitioner was able to prove, however, that the specifications
thereof conformed to the building plan.
67

Respondent contends that this portion should have been 65 to 80 centimeters wide, so
that it would be sufficient as a passageway.60 The building plan61 had not specified the
width, however. Architect Leo Ramos of W.V. Coscolluela & Associates, the architectural
firm that prepared the building plan, testified thus:
"Q I am directing your attention xxx to a certain portion in this condominium unit x
x x it appears x x x [that] there is no measurement indicated therein, do you know
why the measurement of said portion was not indicated in the building plan?
A Normally, it is variable.
Q What do you mean by variable?
A It depends on the actual measurement of the building construction.
Q Could you please tell the Court, what x x x the purpose of the said portion of
the condominium unit [is]?
A It is used for watering the plants and the servicing of some area[s].
Q How much measurement is made to affix the portion of watering the plants?
A Approximately .50 [m]."62
Respondent maintains that this portion should have been .80 meters (or 80 centimeters),
similar to another area in the building plan that it offered as Exhibit "2-A."63 But an
analysis of this plan reveals that the latter area has a different width from that of the
former.
It is readily apparent from the foregoing facts that the portion in controversy was not
intended to be a walkway. Thus, there was no deviation from the building plan. Because
it has not been shown that this section was insufficient to serve the purpose for which it
was intended, the lower courts erred in considering it as defective.
Reimbursement of P40,000 for Completion Work
The lower courts did not err in ordering petitioner to correct the defects in the
condominium unit, but in requiring it to reimburse respondent in the amount of P40,000
for completion work done.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
Petitioner argues that the trial court’s Decision encompassed the areas beyond those
alleged in respondent’s Answer.64 This contention is not convincing, because the
allegations in the latter were broad enough to cover all the defects in the condominium
unit. In fact, respondent prayed that "judgment be rendered ordering [petitioner] to
correct such defects x x x in the condominium unit as may be prove[d] during the trial."65
Petitioner further challenges the award of P40,000 as reimbursement for completion
work done by respondent, on the ground that this claim was not proven during the trial.
The latter’s evidence partook of a witness’ testimony66and of a demand letter67 sent to
petitioner requesting reimbursement for completion work done. Petitioner argues that
respondent should have presented receipts to support the expenses.68
We agree with petitioner. While respondent may have suffered pecuniary losses for
completion work done, it failed to establish with reasonable certainty the actual amount
spent. The award of actual damages cannot be based on the allegation of a witness
without any tangible document, such as receipts or other documentary proofs to support
such claim.69 In determining actual damages, courts cannot rely on mere assertions,
speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the
best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of loss.70
Unearned Lease Income
Respondent entered into a lease contract with Advanced Micro Device on May 18, 1982,
for the period June 18, 1982 to June 17, 1983, with option to renew.71 The lease -- which
was for an agreed monthly rental of P17,000 -- was renewed for a period ending May 1,
1985, when Advanced Micro Device vacated the unit.72 On the basis of these facts, the
trial court ordered petitioner to pay damages by way of unrealized income for twenty-one
months or from May 1, 1985, until January 1987 -- when respondent decided to move
into the condominium unit, which was unoccupied by then.
Despite the defects of the condominium unit, a lessee stayed there for almost three
years.73 The damages claimed by respondent is based on the rent that it might have
earned, had Advanced Micro Device chosen to stay and renew the lease. Such claim is
highly speculative, considering that respondent failed to adduce evidence that the unit
had been offered for lease to others, but that there were no takers because of the
defects therein. Speculative damages are too remote to be included in an accurate
estimate thereof.74 Absent any credible proof of the amount of actual damage sustained,
the Court cannot rely on speculations as to its existence and amount.75
We recognize, however, that respondent suffered damages when its lessee vacated the
condominium unit on May 1, 1985, because of the defects therein. Respondents are thus
entitled to temperate damages.76 Under the circumstances, the amount equivalent to
three monthly rentals of P17,000 -- or a total of P51,000 -- would be reasonable.
68
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED, as follows:

Hereby DELETED is the requirement on the part of petitioner to (1) deliver

storage facilities on the ground floor; (2) pay P136,608.75 for unearned income
for the five-month period that the lease contract was allegedly suspended; (3)
correct the alleged passageway in the balcony; (4) pay P40,000.00 as
reimbursement for completion work done by respondent; (5) pay P27,321.75 per
month for a period of twenty-one months for the alleged unearned income during
the period when the condominium unit remained vacant. Petitioner, however,
is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as temperate damages for the termination of the
lease contract because of the defects in the condominium unit. All other awards
are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

69

G.R. No. 154295. July 29, 2005
METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA GOKONGWIE-PE vs.
JOHNNY PASTORIN
At issue in this Petition for Review1 on certiorari under Rule 45 is whether or not lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, heard and decided by the labor arbiter,
may be raised for the first time before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
by a litigant who had actively participated in the proceedings, which it belatedly
questioned.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times Corporation
(Petitioner) on 10 December 1990 as a Field Representative/Collector. His task entailed
the periodic collection of receivables from dealers of petitioner's newspapers. Prior to the
subject incident, respondent claimed to have received a termination letter dated 7 May
1998 from management terminating his services for tardiness effective 16 June 1988.
Respondent, member of Metro Media Times Employees Union, was not dismissed due
to the intervention of the labor union, the collective bargaining agent in the company.
In May 1998, he obtained a loan from one of the dealers whom he dealt with, Gloria A.
de Manuel (De Manuel), amounting to Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00). After paying
One Thousand One Hundred Twenty-five Pesos (P1,125.00), respondent reneged on the
balance of his loan. De Manuel wrote a letter dated 6 July 1998 to petitioner, and seeking
assistance for collection on the remainder of the loan. She claimed that when respondent
became remissed on his personal obligation, he stopped collecting periodically the
outstanding dues of De Manuel2
On 9 July 1998, petitioner sent a letter addressed to respondent, requiring an
explanation for the transaction with De Manuel, as well as for his failure to pay back the
loan according to the conditions agreed upon. In his reply letter3 dated 13 July 1998,
respondent admitted having incurred the loan, but offered no definitive explanation for his
failure to repay the same.
Petitioner, through a Memorandum4 dated 24 August 1998, imposed the penalty of
suspension on respondent for 4 days, from 27 August to 1 September 1998, for violating
Company Policy No. 2.175 and ordered his transfer to the Administration Department.
On 2 September 1998, respondent wrote a letter6 to petitioner, stating that he wanted to
sign a transfer memo before assuming his new position.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
On September 7, 1998, he was handed the Payroll Change Advice7 (PCA), indicating his
new assignment to the Traffic and Order Department of Metromedia. Nonetheless,
respondent stopped reporting for work. On 16 September 1998, he sent a letter8 to
petitioner communicating his refusal to accept the transfer.
Respondent duly filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages
and other money claims with the labor arbiter, a copy of which petitioner received on 28
September 1998. The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. In
a Decision9 dated 28 May 1999, Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion concluded that
respondent did not commit insubordination or disobedience so as to warrant his transfer,
and that petitioner was not aggrieved by respondent’s failure to settle his obligation with
De Manuel. The dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant to his
former position, with full backwages from the time his salary was withheld until he is
actually reinstated. As of this date, the complainant’s backwages has reached the sum
of P97,324.17. The respondents are further directed to pay the complainant his 13th
month pay for 1998 in the sum of P3,611.89. The claims for allowance and unpaid
commission are dismissed for lack of sufficient basis to make an award.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner lodged an appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter over respondent’s complaint. Significally, this issue was not raised by
petitioner in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. In its Decision11 dated 16 March
2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on the ground that thee latter had no
jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the voluntary
arbitrator. The decretal portion of the NLRC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one entered, DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.12
The motion for reconsideration having been denied on 18 May 2001, respondent
elevated the case before the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition
for certiorari13 under Rule 65.
The CA Fifteenth Division reversed the Decision of NLRC, and reinstated the earlier
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Adopting the doctrines by this Court in the cases of Alfredo
Marquez v. Sec. of Labor14 and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,15 the CA ruled that the active participation of the
70

party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the
jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount
to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction. The
appellate court then disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition having merit, in fact and in
law, is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the challenged resolution/decision
and orders of public respondent NLRC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 28, 1999 REINSTATED with a slight
modification, that the 13th month pay be in the amount of P7,430.50. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner sought reconsideration17 of the above Decision18 but the CA denied the motion
in the assailed Resolution19 dated 27 June 2002. Hence, its recourse to this Court,
elevating the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT METROMEDIA IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE FOR THE FIRST TIME ONLY IN THEIR APPEAL BEFORE THE NLRC.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF 13TH MONTH PAY BY THE LABOR ARBITER
MAY BE MODIFIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER ASSIGNED
AS AN ERROR.
Anent the first assignment of error, there are divergent jurisprudential doctrines touching
on this issue. On the one hand are the cases of Martinez v. Merced,20 Marquez v.
Secretary of Labor,21 Ducat v. Court of Appeals,22Bayoca v. Nogales,23 Jimenez v.
Patricia,24 Centeno v. Centeno,25 and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employee Union Members
v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,26 all adhering to the doctrine that a party’s active
participation in the actual proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop him
from assailing such lack of jurisdiction. Respondent heavily relies on this doctrinal
jurisprudence.
On the other hand, the cases of Dy v. NLRC,27 La Naval Drug v. CA,28 De Rossi vs.
CA29 and Union Motors Corporation v. NLRC30 buttress the position of petitioner that
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time
even on appeal.
The Court of Appeals adopted the principles in the cases of Martinez, Marquez and ABS-
CBN in resolving the jurisdictional issue presented for its resolution, to wit:
Indeed, we agree with petitioner that private respondent was estopped from raising the
question of jurisdiction before public respondent NLRC and the latter gravely abused its
discretion in addressing said question in private respondents’ favor. As early as Martinez
vs. De la Merced, 174 SCRA 182, the Supreme Court has clearly ruled thus: "For it has
been consistently held by this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a party’s active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction
will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction."
....
The same principle was adopted by the Highest Tribunal in the case of Alfredo Marquez
vs. Sec. of Labor, 171 SCRA 337 and quoted in the latter case of ABS-CBN Supervisors
Employees Union Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 304 SCRA 497,
where it was ruled that: "The active participation of the party against whom the action
was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-
judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party
from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction."31
We rule differently. A cursory glance at these cases will lead one to the conclusion that a
party who does not raise the jurisdictional question at the outset will be estopped to raise
it on appeal. However, a more circumspect analysis would reveal that the cases cited by
respondent do not fall squarely within the issue and factual circumstances of the instant
case. We proceed to demonstrate.
The notion that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel on the party
invoking the same most prominently emerged in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.32 Indeed,
the Marquez case relied upon by the CA is in turn grounded on Tijam, where We held
that:
. . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
71

adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated—obviously for
reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court . . . And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court
said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.33
However, Tijam represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking lack of
jurisdiction did so only after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage when the proceedings had
already been elevated to the Court of Appeals. Even Marquez recognizes
that Tijam stands as an exception, rather than a general rule.34 The CA perhaps though
felt comfortable citing Marquez owing to the pronouncement therein that the Court would
not hesitate to apply Tijameven absent the extraordinary circumstances therein:
". . . where the entertainment of the jurisdictional issue at a belated stage of the
proceedings will result in a failure of justice and render nugatory the constitutional
imperative of protection to labor."35
In this case, jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was questioned as early as during appeal
before the NLRC, whereas in Marquez, the question of jurisdiction was raised for the first
time only before this Court. The viability of Marquez as controlling doctrine in this case is
diminished owing to the radically different circumstances in these two cases. A similar
observation can be made as to the Bayoca and Jimenez cases.36
Neither do the other like-minded cases squarely settle the issue in favor of the
respondent. In the case of Martinez, the issue is not jurisdiction by estoppel but waiver of
preliminary conference. In that case, we said:
As pointed out by petitioners, private respondents had at least three opportunities to
raise the question of lack of preliminary conference first, when private respondents filed a
motion for extension of time to file their position paper; second, at the time when they
actually filed their position paper in which they sought affirmative relief from the
Metropolitan Trial Court; and third; when they filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of the Metropolitan Trial Court expunging from the records the position paper of
private respondents, in which motion private respondents even urged the court to sustain
their position paper. And yet, in none of these instances was the issue of lack of
preliminary conference raised or even hinted at by private respondents. In fine, these are
acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings. For it has been
consistently held by this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction
will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.37
The case of Ducat was categorical in saying that if the parties acquiesced in submitting
an issue for determination by the trial court, they are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the same court to pass upon the issue. But this should be taken in the
context of the "agreement" of the parties. We quote from said case:
Petitioner’s filing of a Manifestion and Urgent Motion to Set Parameters of Computation
is indicative of its conformity with the questioned order of the trial court referring the
matter of computation of the excess to SGV and simultaneously thereafter, the issuance
of a writ of possession. If petitioner thought that subject order was wrong, it could have
taken recourse to the Court of Appeals but petitioner did not. Instead he manifested his
acquiescence in the said order by seeking parameters before the trial court. It is now too
late for petitioner to question subject order of the trial court. Petitioner cannot be allowed
to make a mockery of judicial processes, by changing his position from one of the
agreement to disagreement, to suit his needs. If the parties acquiesced in submitting an
issue for determination by the trial court, they are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the same court to pass upon the issue. Petitioner is consequently estopped
from questioning subject order of the trial court.38
Centeno involved the question of jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Arbitration Board (DARAB). The Court did rule therein that "participation by certain
parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them
from any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them."39Still,
the Court did recognize therein that the movants questioning jurisdiction had actually
sought and litigated for affirmative reliefs before the DARAB in support of a submitted
counterclaim. No similar circumstance obtains in this case concerning the petitioner.
Evidently, none of these cited precedents squarely operates as stare decisis on this
case, involving as they did different circumstances. The question now lies as to whether
the precedents cited by petitioner are more aproposto this case.
Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that the instant case falls squarely within the
purview of this Court’s ruling in the case of Dy. Admittedly, a different factual mileu was
present insofar as the questioned jurisdiction was alleged to have been properly lodged
in the SEC instead of NLRC. Yet the rationale employed by the Court therein warrants
serious consideration. The aforementioned case was ruled in this wise:
. . . .More importantly, estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this Court from taking up
the question of jurisdiction, which has been apparent on the face of the pleadings since
the start of litigation before the Labor Arbiter. It is well settled that the decision of a
72

tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs.
Ramirez, this Court held:
"A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is
a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld
that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
....
"It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was
taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the
attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel
by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the
representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to
whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA
623). The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to
entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling
which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may
not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been te result of an
honest mistake or of divergent interpretation of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to
be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on
the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they
pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to
dismiss an action `whenever it appears that court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.' (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec.
30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same (Art. 1144, par. 3,
Civil Code)."40
The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was assailed in the cases of De Rossi v. NLRC 41 and
Union Motors Corporation v. NLRC42 during appeal to the NLRC. Since the same
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
circumstance obtains in this case, the rulings therein, favorable as they are to the
petitioner, are germane.
In De Rossi, this Court elucidated:
Petitioner maintains that MICC can not question now the issue of jurisdiction of the
NLRC, considering that MICC did not raise this matter until after the case had been
brought on appeal to the NLRC. However, it has long been established as a rule, that
jurisdiction of a tribunal, agency, or office, is conferred by law, and its lack of jurisdiction
may be questioned at any time even on appeal. In La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78, 90, this Court said:
"Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be
dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final
judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not
within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set
aside."43
We held in the Union Motors Case:
The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law.
[Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggaggawa v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 536 (1993); Atlas Developer &
Steel Industries, Inc. v. Sarmiento Enterprises, Inc., 184 SCRA 153 (1990); Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 30 (1968)]. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Where it appears that the court or tribunal
has no jurisdiction, then the defense may be interposed at any time, even on appeal or
even after final judgment. Moreover, the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to
prevent this court from taking up the question of jurisdiction.44
The rulings in Lozon v. NLRC45 addresses the issue at hand. This Court came up with a
clear rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be
dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any
time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment
(Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this
kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-
94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
73

"The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction,
for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent
of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—
that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule
that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has
no bearing thereon.46 (Emphasis supplied)
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
contention that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat
in light of our pronouncement, and more so considering the NLRC’s correct observation
that jurisdiction over grievance issues, such as the propriety of the reassignment of a
union member falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.
Since jurisdiction does not lie with the Labor Arbiter, it is futile to discuss about the
computation of the 13th month pay.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the NLRC in dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Verily, Lozon, Union Motors, Dy and De Rossi aptly resolve the jurisdictional issue
obtaining in this case. Applying the guidelines in Lozon, the labor arbiter assumed
jurisdiction when he should not. In fact, the NLRC correctly reversed the labor arbiter’s
decision and ratiocinated:

What appears at first blush to be an issue which pertains to the propriety of

complainant’s reassignment to another job on account of his having contracted a private
loan, is one which may be considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, since the complainant is a union member, he should be
bound by the covenants provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.47

....

Based on the foregoing considerations, it appears that the issue of validity of

complainant’s reassignment stemmed from the exercise of a management prerogative
which is a matter apt for resolution by a Grievance Committee, the parties having opted
to consider such as a grievable issue. Further, a review of the records would show that
the matter of reassignment is one not directly related to the charge of complainant’s
having committed an act which is inimical to respondents’ interest, since the latter had
already been addressed to by complainant’s service of a suspension order. The transfer,
in effect, is one which properly falls under Section 1, Article IV of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and, as such, questions as to the enforcement thereof is one
which falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter."48

In line with the cases cited above and applying the general rule that estoppel does not
confer jurisdiction, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.

Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioner’s claim of lack of jurisdiction

on the part of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground in support of his
74

G.R. No. 167702 March 20, 2009
LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL vs. CA and RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 dismissing Civil
Case No. 99-297 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as narrated by the CA, are simple.
[Petitioner Lourdes] Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (or
"village"), Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 208586. On the
other hand, [respondent Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the
former president and chairman of the board of governors (or "board"), construction
committee chairman and village manager of [Urdaneta Village Association Inc.] UVAI,
respectively. UVAI is an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.
[Eristingcol’s] action [against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] is founded on the
allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and after UVAI’s approval
of her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and architect’s fee,
Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lot with "concrete canopy directly above
the main door and highway"; that for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and
Regulations (or "CRR") on "Set Back Line" vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI
imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from
entering the village and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on "Set Back
Line," is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.
On February 9, 1999, or a day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a
temporary settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an
undertaking which allowed Eristingcol’s workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and
enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.
On February 26, 1999, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is
the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (or "HIGC")2which has jurisdiction over intra-
corporate disputes involving homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 535,
Series of 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986.
Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and
Vilvestre did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
[RTC] after they voluntarily appeared therein "and embraced its authority by agreeing to
sign an Undertaking."
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
On May 20, 1999, Eristingcol filed an amended complaint by (i) impleading Manuel
Carmona (or "Carmona") and Rene Cristobal (or "Cristobal"), UVAI’s newly-elected
president and chairman of the board and newly-designated construction committee
chairman, respectively, as additional defendants and (ii) increasing her claim for moral
damages against each petitioner from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.
On May 25, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion for production and inspection of documents,
which UVAI, Limjoco, Tan, Vilvestre, Carmona and Cristobal opposed. The motion
sought to compel [UVAI and its officers] to produce the documents used by UVAI as
basis for the imposition of the P400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol as well as letters and
documents showing that UVAI had informed the other homeowners of their violations of
the CRR.
On May 26, 1999, the [RTC] issued an order which pertinently reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, for lack of merit, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
Denied, and plaintiff’s motion to declare defendants in default and for contempt are also
Denied."
The [RTC] ratiocinated that [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] may not assail its
jurisdiction "after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein, and
embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist from prohibiting
(Eristingcol’s) workers from entering the village." In so ruling, it applied the doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
On June 7, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion reiterating her earlier motion for production
and inspection of documents.
On June 8, 1999, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] moved for partial reconsideration of
the order dated May 26, 1999. Eristingcol opposed the motion.
On March 24, 2001, the [RTC] issued an order granting Eristingcol’s motion for
production and inspection of documents, while on March 26, 2001, it issued an order
denying [UVAI’s, Limjoco’s, Tan’s and Vilvestre’s] motion for partial reconsideration.
On May 10, 2001, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] elevated the dispute before [the
CA] via [a] petition for certiorari alleging that the [RTC] acted without jurisdiction in
issuing the orders of May 26, 1999 and March 24 and 26, 2001.3
The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order4 and dismissing
Eristingcol’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
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Hence, this appeal positing a sole issue for our resolution:
Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcol’s complaint.
Before anything else, we note that the instant petition impleads only Limjoco as private
respondent. The rest of the defendants sued by Eristingcol before the RTC, who then
collectively filed the petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC’s Order, were,
curiously, not included as private respondents in this particular petition.
Eristingcol explains that only respondent Limjoco was retained in the instant petition as
her discussions with UVAI and the other defendants revealed their lack of participation in
the work-stoppage order which was supposedly single-handedly thought of and
implemented by Limjoco.
The foregoing clarification notwithstanding, the rest of the defendants should have been
impleaded as respondents in this petition considering that the complaint before the RTC,
where the petition before the CA and the instant petition originated, has yet to be
amended. Furthermore, the present petition maintains that it was serious error for the CA
to have ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over a complaint for declaration of
nullity of UVAI’s Construction Rules. Clearly, UVAI and the rest of the defendants should
have been impleaded herein as respondents.
Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, requires that the petition shall "state the full
name of the appealing party as petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents." As
the losing party in defendants’ petition for certiorari before the CA, Eristingcol should
have impleaded all petitioners, the winning and adverse parties therein.
On this score alone, the present petition could have been dismissed outright.5 However,
to settle the issue of jurisdiction, we have opted to dispose of this case on the merits.
Despite her having dropped UVAI, Lorenzo Tan (Tan) and June Vilvestre (Vilvestre) from
this suit, Eristingcol insists that her complaint against UVAI and the defendants was
properly filed before the RTC as it prays for the declaration of nullity of UVAI’s
Construction Rules and asks that damages be paid by Limjoco and the other UVAI
officers who had inflicted injury upon her. Eristingcol asseverates that since the case
before the RTC is one for declaration of nullity, the nature of the question that is the
subject of controversy, not just the status or relationship of the parties, should determine
which body has jurisdiction. In any event, Eristingcol submits that the RTC’s jurisdiction
over the case was foreclosed by the prayer of UVAI and its officers, including Limjoco,
for affirmative relief from that court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which body has jurisdiction
over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also
the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.6 To determine the
nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of
the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.7 Thus, we examine the
pertinent allegations in Eristingcol’s complaint, specifically her amended complaint, to
wit:
Allegations Common to All Causes of Action
3. In 1958 and upon its incorporation, [UVAI] adopted a set of By-laws and Rules and
Regulations, x x x. Item 5 of [UVAI’s] Construction Rules pertinently provides:
"Set back line: All Buildings, including garage servants’ quarters, or parts thereof
(covered terraces, portes cocheres) must be constructed at a distance of not less than
three (3) meters from the boundary fronting a street and not less than four (4) meters
fronting the drainage creek or underground culvert and two (2) meters from other
boundaries of a lot. Distance will be measured from the vertical projection of the roof
nearest the property line. Completely open and unroofed terraces are not included in
these restrictions."
Suffice it to state that there is nothing in the same By-laws which deals explicitly with
canopies or marquees which extend outward from the main building.
4. [Eristingcol] has been a resident of Urdaneta Village for eleven (11) years. In February
1997, she purchased a parcel of land in the Village, located at the corner of Urdaneta Avenue
and Cerrada Street. x x x.
5. In considering the design for the house (the "Cerrada property") which she intended to
construct on Cerrada Street, [Eristingcol] referred to the National Building Code of the
Philippines. After assuring herself that the said law does not expressly provide any
restrictions in respect thereof, and after noting that other houses owned by prominent families
had similar structures without being cited by the Village’s Construction Committee,
[Eristingcol] decided that the Cerrada property would have a concrete canopy directly above
the main door and driveway.
6. In compliance with [UVAI’s] rules, [Eristingcol] submitted to [UVAI] copies of her building
plans in respect of the Cerrada property and the building plans were duly approved by
[UVAI]. x x x.
7. [Eristingcol] submitted and/or paid the "cash bond/construction bond deposit and
architect’s inspection fee" of P200,000.00 and the architect’s inspection fee of P500.00 as
required under Construction Rules x x x.
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8. In the latter part of 1997, and while the construction of the Cerrada property was ongoing,
[Eristingcol] received a notice from [UVAI], charging her with alleged violations of the
Construction Rules, i.e., those on the height restriction of eleven (11.0) meters, and the
canopy extension into the easement. On 22nd January 1998, [Eristingcol] (through her
representatives) met with, among others, defendant Limjoco. In said meeting, and after
deliberation on the definition of the phrase "original ground elevation" as a reference point,
[Eristingcol’s] representatives agreed to revise the building plan by removing what was
intended to be a parapet or roof railing, and thereby reduce the height of the structure by 40
centimeters, which proposal was accepted by the Board through defendant Limjoco, Gov.
Catalino Macaraig Jr. ([UVAI’s] Construction Committee chairman), and the Village’s
Architect. However, the issue of the alleged violation in respect of the canopy/extension
remained unresolved.
9. In compliance with the agreement reached at the 22nd January 1998 meeting, [Eristingcol]
caused the revision of her building plans such that, as it now stands, the Cerrada property
has a vertical height of 10.96 meters and, thus, was within the Village’s allowed maximum
height of 11 meters.
10. Sometime in June 1998, [Eristingcol] was surprised to receive another letter from [UVAI],
this time from the Construction Committee chairman (defendant Tan), again calling her
attention to alleged violations of the Construction Rules. On 15th June 1998, [UVAI] barred
[Eristingcol’s] construction workers from entering the Village. Thus, [Eristingcol’s]
Construction Manager (Mr. Jaime M. Hidalgo) wrote defendant Tan to explain her position,
and attached photographs of similar "violations" by other property owners which have not
merited the same scrutiny and sanction from [UVAI].
11. On 26th October 1998, and for reasons known only to him, defendant Vilvestre sent a
letter to Mr. Geronimo delos Reyes, demanding for an "idea of how [Mr. delos Reyes] can
demonstrate in concrete terms [his] good faith as a quid pro quo for compromise to" [UVAI’s]
continued insistence that [Eristingcol] had violated [UVAI’s] Construction Rules. x x x.
12. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo sent a letter dated 24th November 1998 to defendant
Tan, copies of which were furnished defendants Limjoco, Vilvestre and the Board, reiterating
that, among others: (i) the alleged height restriction violation is untrue, since the Cerrada
property now has a height within the limits imposed by [UVAI]; and (ii) the demand to reduce
the canopy by ninety (90) centimeters is without basis, in light of the existence of thirty-five
(35) similar "violations" of the same nature by other homeowners. [Eristingcol] through Mr.
Hidalgo further mentioned that she had done nothing to deserve the crude and coercive
Village letters and the Board’s threats of work stoppage, and she cited instances when she
dealt with [UVAI] and her fellow homeowners in good faith and goodwill such as in 1997,
when she very discreetly spent substantial amounts to landscape the entire Village Park,
concrete the Park track oval which was being used as a jogging path, and donate to the
Association molave benches used as Park benches.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
13. On the same date (24th November 1998), defendant Vilvestre sent another letter
addressed to [Eristingcol’s] construction manager Hidalgo, again threatening to enjoin all
construction activity on the Cerrada property as well as ban entry of all workers and
construction deliveries effective 1st December 1998 unless Mr. delos Reyes met with
defendants. x x x.
14. On 2nd December 1998, [Eristingcol’s] representatives met with defendants Limjoco,
Tan, and Vilvestre. During that meeting, defendants were shown copies of the architectural
plans for the Cerrada property. [Eristingcol’s] representatives agreed to allow [UVAI’s]
Construction Committee’s architect to validate the measurements given. However, on the
issue of the canopy extension, the defendants informed [Eristingcol’s] representatives that
the Board would impose a penalty of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) for
violation of [UVAI’s] "set back" or easement rule. Defendants cited the Board’s imposition of
similar fines to previous homeowners who had violated the same rule, and they undertook to
furnish [Eristingcol] with a list of past penalties imposed and paid by homeowners found by
the Board to have violated the Village’s "set back" provision.
15. On 22nd December 1998, defendant Vilvestre sent [Eristingcol] a letter dated 18th
December 1998 formally imposing a penalty of P400,000.00 for the "canopy easement
violation." x x x.
16. On 29th December 1998, x x x, Vilvestre sent a letter to [Eristingcol], stating that "as far
as [his] administration is concerned, there has been no past penalties executed by [UVAI],
similar to the one we are presently demanding on your on going construction. x x x
17. On 4th January 1999, [Eristingcol’s] representative sent a letter to the Board, asking for a
reconsideration of the imposition of the P400,000.00 penalty on the ground that the same is
unwarranted and excessive. On 6th January 1999, [Eristingcol] herself sent a letter to the
Board, expounding on the reasons for opposing the Board’s action. On 18th January 1999,
[Eristingcol] sent another letter in compliance with defendants’ request for a breakdown of her
expenditures in respect of her donations relative to the Village park.
18. On 3rd February 1999, [Eristingcol] through her lawyers sent defendants a letter,
requesting that her letters of 4th and 6th January 1999 be acted upon.
19. On 4th February 1999, x x x, defendant Limjoco gave a verbal order to [UVAI’s] guards to
bar the entry of workers working on the Cerrada property.
20. In the morning of 5th February 1999, defendants physically barred [Eristingcol’s] workers
and contractors from entering the Village and working at the Cerrada property. 8
Eristingcol then lists the following causes of action:
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1. Item 5 of UVAI’s Construction Rules constitutes an illegal and unwarranted
intrusion upon Eristingcol’s proprietary rights as it imposes a set-back or horizontal
easement of 3.0 meters from the property line greater than the specification in
Section 1005(b) of the Building Code that "the horizontal clearance between the
outermost edge of the marquee and the curb line shall be not less than 300
millimeters." As such, Eristingcol prays for the declaration of nullity of this provision in
UVAI’s Construction Rules insofar as she is concerned.
2. UVAI’s imposition of a P400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol has no factual basis, is
arbitrary, whimsical and capricious as rampant violations of the set-back rule by other
homeowners in the Village were not penalized by UVAI. Eristingcol prays to put a
stop to defendants’ arbitrary exercise of power pursuant to UVAI’s by-laws.
3. Absent any factual or legal bases for the imposition of a P400,000.00 penalty,
defendants and all persons working under their control should be permanently barred
or restrained from imposing and/or enforcing any penalty upon Eristingcol for an
alleged violation of UVAI’s Construction Rules, specifically the provision on set-back.
4. Defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code,
demonstrated bias against Eristingcol by zeroing in on her alone and her supposed
violation, while other homeowners, who had likewise violated UVAI’s Construction
Rules, were not cited or penalized therefor. Defendants’ actuations were in clear
violation of their duty to give all homeowners, including Eristingcol, their due.
5. Defendants’ actuations have seriously affected Eristingcol’s mental disposition and
have caused her to suffer sleepless nights, mental anguish and serious anxiety.
Eristingcol’s reputation has likewise been besmirched by UVAI’s and defendants’
arbitrary charge that she had violated UVAI’s Construction Rules. In this regard,
individual defendants should each pay Eristingcol moral damages in the amount
of P1,000,000.00.
6. Lastly, defendants should pay Eristingcol P1,000.000.00 for litigation expenses
she incurred in instituting this suit and for attorney’s fees.
At the outset, we note that the relationship between the parties is not in dispute and is, in fact,
admitted by Eristingcol in her complaint. Nonetheless, Eristingcol is adamant that the subject
matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular courts and need not be filed
before a specialized body or commission.
Eristingcol’s contention is wrong.
Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls within the
regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we have, on more than one occasion, held that the
caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action.9
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the
question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s
Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application
of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the
parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the
application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction Rules. Significantly,
Eristingcol does not assail the height restriction of UVAI’s Construction Rules, as she has
readily complied therewith.
Distinctly in point is China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 10 which upheld the jurisdiction
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the suit and recognized its special
competence to interpret and apply Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc.’s (VGCCI’s) by-laws.
We ruled, thus:
Applying the foregoing principles in the case at bar, to ascertain which tribunal has
jurisdiction we have to determine therefore whether or not petitioner is a stockholder of
VGCCI and whether or not the nature of the controversy between petitioner and private
respondent corporation is intra-corporate.
As to the first query, there is no question that the purchase of the subject share or
membership certificate at public auction by petitioner (and the issuance to it of the
corresponding Certificate of Sale) transferred ownership of the same to the latter and thus
entitled petitioner to have the said share registered in its name as a member of VGCCI. x x x.
By virtue of the aforementioned sale, petitioner became a bona fide stockholder of VGCCI
and, therefore, the conflict that arose between petitioner and VGCCI aptly exemplifies an
intra-corporate controversy between a corporation and its stockholder under Sec. 5(b) of P.D.
902-A.
An important consideration, moreover, is the nature of the controversy between petitioner and
private respondent corporation. VGCCI claims a prior right over the subject share anchored
mainly on Sec. 3, Art. VIII of its by-laws which provides that "after a member shall have been
posted as delinquent, the Board may order his/her/its share sold to satisfy the claims of the
Club…" It is pursuant to this provision that VGCCI also sold the subject share at public
auction, of which it was the highest bidder. VGCCI caps its argument by asserting that its
corporate by-laws should prevail. The bone of contention, thus, is the proper interpretation
and application of VGCCI’s aforequoted by-laws, a subject which irrefutably calls for the
special competence of the SEC.
We reiterate herein the sound policy enunciated by the Court in Abejo v. De la Cruz:
6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative
commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in
corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the
78

Industrial Court’s intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies likely to
cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so
expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious
doctrine of primary jurisdiction … the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of
the regulatory statute administered.
In this case, the need for the SEC’s technical expertise cannot be over-emphasized involving
as it does the meticulous analysis and correct interpretation of a corporation’s by-laws as well
as the applicable provisions of the Corporation Code in order to determine the validity of
VGCCI’s claims. The SEC, therefore, took proper cognizance of the instant case. 11
Likewise in point is our illuminating ruling in Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association v. Sps.
Gaston,12 although it ultimately held that the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the
complaint of respondent- spouses Gaston for declaration of nullity of a board resolution
issued by Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association (SCHA) was vested in the regular courts. In
Sta. Clara, the main issue raised by SCHA reads: "Whether [the CA] erred in upholding the
jurisdiction of the [RTC], ‘to declare as null and void the resolution of the Board of SCHA,
decreeing that only members [in] good standing of the said association were to be issued
stickers for use in their vehicles.’" In holding that the regular courts had jurisdiction over
respondent-spouses Gaston’s complaint for declaration of nullity, we stressed the absence of
relationship and the consequent lack of privity of contract between the parties, thus:
Are [Respondent-Spouses Gaston] SCHA Members?
In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve
preliminarily—on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint—whether [respondent-spouses
Gaston] are members of the SCHA.
[SCHA] contend[s] that because the Complaint arose from intra-corporate relations between
the SCHA and its members, the HIGC therefore has jurisdiction over the dispute. To support
their contention that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the association, [SCHA]
cite[s] the SCHA’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws which provide that all landowners of
the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically members of the SCHA.
We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the
freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the
very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision
guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to
form or join one.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
More to the point, [respondent-spouses Gaston] cannot be compelled to become members of
the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-
laws without their express or implied consent. x x x. In the present case, however, other than
the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that [respondent-spouses
Gaston] have agreed to be SCHA members.
No privity of Contract
Clearly then, no privity of contract exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston].
As a general rule, a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons. The Civil Code
upholds the spirit over the form; thus, it deems an agreement to exist, provided the essential
requisites are present. x x x. From the moment there is a meeting of minds between the
parties, it is perfected.
As already adverted to, there are cases in which a party who enters into a contract of sale is
also bound by a lien annotated on the certificate of title. We recognized this in Bel Air Village
Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, in which we ruled:
There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject parcel of
land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot
owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide
by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation,
security and the general welfare of the community. It is likewise not disputed that the
provision on automatic membership was expressly annotated on the petitioner’s Transfer
Certificate of Title and on the title of his predecessor-in-interest.
The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by such
annotation.
Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in
good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate
x x x. (Italics supplied)
The above ruling, however, does not apply to the case at bar. When [respondent-spouses
Gaston] purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara
Subdivision, there was no annotation showing their automatic membership in the SCHA.
Thus, no privity of contract arising from the title certificate exists between [SCHA] and
[respondent-spouses Gaston].
79

Further, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that private respondents
intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the implementation of the aforesaid
Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not members of the association were
issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles. This fact has not been disputed by
[SCHA]. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were subdivision landowners who were not
members thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Complaint
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in
the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant
in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
The Complaint does not allege that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA.
In point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no jurisdiction over the
dispute.13
In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is well-established.
Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract between UVAI and Eristingcol is
palpable, despite the latter’s deft phraseology of its primary cause of action as a declaration
of nullity of UVAI’s Construction Rules. In short, the crux of Eristingcol’s complaint is UVAI’s
supposed arbitrary implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, a member
thereof.
Moreover, as in Sta. Clara (had respondent-spouses Gaston been members of SCHA), the
controversy which arose between the parties in this case partook of the nature of an intra-
corporate dispute. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 535,14 which amended Republic Act No. 580
creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over
homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides
in pertinent part:
2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the
Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers:
(a) x x x; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested
on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home owners
association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary
notwithstanding;
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners
association registered in accordance therewith.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – SESSION 2
By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SEC’s original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership
relations.15 Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and
responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners’ associations, were
transferred to the HLURB.
As regards the defendants’ supposed embrace of the RTC’s jurisdiction by appearing thereat
and undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcol’s workers from entering the village,
suffice it to state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. 16 is
quite a long stretch.
The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in the case at bench are worlds apart. As found by
the CA, defendants’ appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in compliance with, a
subpoena issued by that court in connection with Eristingcol’s application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO). On defendants’ supposed agreement to sign the Undertaking
allowing Eristingcol’s workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this
temporary settlement cannot be equated with full acceptance of the RTC’s authority, as what
actually transpired in Tijam.1avvphi1.zw+
The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an objection
to the court’s jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the
lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case. 17 In that
case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time—fifteen years after the action was commenced in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well
as in the CA, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and
even submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred by
laches from invoking the CFI’s lack of jurisdiction.
To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was held on February 9,
1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On even date, the parties reached a temporary
settlement reflected in the Undertaking. Fifteen days thereafter, defendants, including
Limjoco, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events
cannot be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from questioning the RTC’s
jurisdiction.
In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint, it is the HLURB, not the
RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
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