Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Kristin Davidse
University of Leuven
Department of Linguistics
Blijde-Inkomststraat 21
B-3000 Leuven
Belgium
e-mail: Kristin.Davidse@arts.kuleuven.ac.be
tel: +32 16 32 48 11
fax: +32 16 32 47 67
Abstract
In this article I will argue that clefts differ in more than simply their information structure from
their non-cleft counterparts. Clefts are constructions in their own right, whose grammatical
features convey specific representational semantics. I will focus on the two main coded
relations in cleft constructions: the one expressed by the matrix clause and the anaphoric
relation between the Complement of the matrix clause and the relative clause. I will indicate in
which ways these have not been described satisfactorily in the literature so far, and propose an
alternative description. The different matrix clauses of clefts are specific subtypes of
identifying, existential and possessive clauses, which all impose a specific ‘quantificational’
cardinal quantification of instances. The relative clause takes this specifying, enumerating or
In this way, I will argue, the different types of clefts, viz. it-clefts, there-clefts and possessive
Introduction*
2
In this article I will revisit the grammar and semantics of the sentence types traditionally
referred to as clefts. I will be concerned with it-clefts, the neglected category of there-clefts,
In section 1 I will criticize the traditional approach to ‘clefts’, which has tended to assume that
they do not have any representational semantics independent of their non-cleft counterparts.
Focusing on Huddleston’s (1984) articulation of this position,1 I will point out in section 1 what
seem to me the two main descriptive cop-outs in this approach, viz. the failure to give a
positive characterization to the relative clause in clefts, and the claim that the matrix clauses of
two main ‘component’ structures have not been dealt with satisfactorily, the ‘composite’
structure formed by the cleft has not been described adequately either.
The general approach advocated to clefts here is ‘constructional’ in the long functional
tradition represented by, amongst others, Haas (1954: 74), Halliday (1985: 32), Langacker
(1987: 316; 1991: 5) and McGregor (1997: 39). According to Halliday’s (1985: 32) succinct
‘top-down’ in the sense that the functions are defined by the higher-level unit in which they play
a role, viz. the construction. It is also ‘semiotic’ in the sense that both the composite structure
and its component structures are viewed as symbolic form-meaning couplings, with the form
An exhaustive description of all the constructional features of clefts is far beyond the
scope of one article. Therefore, I will focus on the two main coded relations in clefts, which, as
indicated above, have not been described with sufficient precision so far.
3
In section 2, I will focus on the relative clause and its antecedent in clefts and point out
fundamental differences with both restrictive relative clauses and non-restrictive relative
clauses. This will also lead to a revision of certain traditional descriptions of restrictive relative
clauses.
In section 3, I will home in on the matrix clauses found in clefts and argue that they are
specific subtypes of identifying, existential and possessive constructions, which all impose a
‘cardinal’ and ‘enumerative’ existentials as set out in Davidse (1999) will be used to further
In section 4, I will integrate these findings into a description of the main constructional
features of clefts, which will also lead to an integrated description of the semantic differences
As pointed out by Huddleston (1984: 461), the most distinctive grammatical feature of the it-
cleft is the fact that the postverbal NP and the relative clause following it do not form one
grammatical unit. In this respect the it-cleft can be contrasted with an ‘ordinary’ identifying
clause whose Complement contains a restrictive relative clause (henceforth RRC). Consider,
(4) Who was that on the phone? -- It was the boy who/that caused all the trouble.
(5) Who caused all the trouble? -- It was the boy (who/that) caused all the trouble.
Identifying clause (4) specifies that the person on the phone is the boy who caused all the
trouble: in this clause the Complement is formed by the whole NP with its RRC postmodifier.
The it-cleft (5) specifies that the person causing all the trouble was the boy. In (5) it is only the
4
boy that functions as postverbal Complement. The wh-/th-clause is not part of this
Complement-NP. This is clearly shown if we replace the boy by a proper name (Huddleston
1984: 460) as in
The distinction between it-clefts, on the one hand, and identifying clauses with
Complements postmodified by a RRC, on the other, is also signalled by the distinct intonation
patterns that tend to be associated with them. Halliday (1967a: 237) has pointed out that it-
clefts are typically spoken on a compound fall-rise tone. This allows the speaker to place the
marked or contrastive information focus on the postverbal NP, while also having a tonal
nucleus on the final lexical item of the tone unit (Quirk et al 1972: 1046).
In contrast, the identifying clause with Complement postmodified by a RRC (4) would
As noted by Halliday (1985: 205), RRCs can be recognized intonationally by the fact that they
Now, the same sorts of contrasts as exist between identifying clauses with RRC and it-
clefts can be observed between existential clauses with RRC like example (7) on the one hand
and constructions such as those illustrated by example (8) on the other. Consider:
5
(7) What can you see on the table? -- Well, there’s one thing that has a funny shape.
(8) Could it be anything else? -- No, there’s only one thing that’s that shape.
The existential in (7) basically informs the hearer that there is ‘one’ instance of a ‘funny-shaped
thing’ on the table. That has a funny shape is a RRC which modifies the head thing.3 (Note that
it is intonationally integrated into the matrix clause, which is uttered with one simple tone
contour.)
In contrast, the there-sentence in (8) asserts that ‘only one thing’ exists which
corresponds to the specific shape speaker and hearer have in mind. The Complement of the
existential predicator is just the NP one thing here. The th-clause that is that shape is not a
Postmodifier of thing. This is signalled formally by the intonation associated with (8): the
relative clause is not - as it is in (7) - integrated into the tone contour with which the sentence is
spoken. Rather, example (8) takes the compound ‘fall-rise’ tone, which was also characteristic
Moreover, the postverbal NP in (8) can be replaced by a proper name (as in 9), which also
Clearly, sentences like (8) instantiate another construction than an ordinary existential with
RRC. Because of the many similarities with it-clefts, I will, following Halliday and
Huddleston, refer to examples like (8) as there-clefts. The descriptive justification of this
categorization will be given later in this article. Meanwhile, it can be noted that the category of
there-clefts does not have common currency in the mainstream. To my knowledge, relatively
6
few authors (Halliday 1967a, Huddleston 1984, Hannay 1985, Collins 1992, Davidse 1999b)
constructional features which they share into sharper relief, and also reveals that these features
have not yet received an adequate explanation. The formal status and semantic value of the
th-/wh- clause in it- and there-clefts is a case in point. This question has traditionally been
skirted by describing sentences like (5) - (8) as ‘cleft’ transforms of ‘non-cleft’ originals. In the
Huddleston (1984) is an interesting example of the traditional approach to clefts, which, though
not transformational in the strict sense, holds that ‘cleft’ constructions can only be described
“indirectly, in terms of the non-cleft counterpart in conjunction with the cleaving operation”
(462). For examples (5) and (8), the non-cleft counterparts are:
These single clauses, so the traditional explanation runs, are divided into two distinct parts
assigned to different clauses, viz. a matrix clause, it was the boy, there ‘s only one thing, and a
‘secondary’ clause, (who/that) caused all the trouble; (that) ‘s that shape.
As to the matrix clauses of it- and there-clefts, Huddleston (1984: 462, 470) holds that
both it + be and there + be are “fully grammaticalized features of the construction whose
contribution to the meaning is not directly predictable from their use in other kinds of clause”.
The main semantic function he ascribes to clefts is a textual one4. It-clefts ‘highlight’ an
element, viz. the postverbal NP, and associate, due to the use of definite it, a component of
uniqueness with this element (Huddleston 1984: 466-467) e.g. in (5) it is Tom, and no one else,
7
who caused the trouble. Informationally, the postverbal NP often provides ‘new’ information,
with the relative clause containing the ‘given’ information (as in (5) and (6)). However, as
pointed out by Huddleston (1984: 465), the information in the relative clause can also be new,
in which case the highlighted element is often anaphoric or otherwise given, as in the following
(10) Far from humbling himself before the king of England, the burgher was leaving the city
to descend toward the camp. It is this that gives the group the feeling of march, of
movement.
(from: R. Butler (1993) Rodin. The Shape of Genius. New Haven & London:
Huddleston (1984: 469) does not attribute a ‘highlighting’ function to there-clefts, but holds
that they recast the non-cleft clause into a “thematic variant”, which presents the description of
the actual event in postverbal position (One man kept interrupting – There was one man kept
interrupting). In other words, despite the many structural similarities between it- and there-
clefts, he does not recognize analogies between their semantic values. I will argue that this is
unsatisfactory and propose an alternative analysis that does bring out certain semantic parallels
Turning to the th/wh-clause, then, Huddleston views it as displaying some, but not all,
of the characteristics of a defining relative clause. Firstly, antecedents of relative clauses in it-
clefts, have a wider range than those of ordinary RRCs: they can not only be NPs with common
noun heads, but also pronouns and proper names (Declerck 1988: 52) as well as prepositional
(13) It was because he was ill that/zero we decided to return. (Quirk et al 1972: 953)
8
Note that the Complements in there-clefts can be pronouns or proper names too.
Prepositional phrases and, marginally, clauses also seem possible as Complements of there-
clefts.
(15) There’s on the table that you may have left it.
(16) There’s when you were away that it might have happened.
Further, both in it and there-clefts, that and zero are more common than wh-forms. With some
types of antecedents, wh-forms are even ungrammatical (Quirk et al 1972: 953; Huddleston
Moreover, zero-realization of the Subject in the relative clause, which is restricted to informal
registers in ordinary RRCs, occurs unproblematically in it- and there-clefts (Quirk et al 1972:
Huddleston (1984: 462) concludes that the relative clause in it-clefts is of a kind that is “sui
We thus see how this approach to clefts posits that they cannot be described as
constructions in their own right, but only ‘indirectly’ as transforms of their non-cleft
existential clause, despite its apparent similarities to these clause types. In fact, in the
Huddleston approach, the matrix clause is denied any representational import. Similarly, no
attempt is made to describe the special properties of the relative clause in clefts beyond the
Opposed to this, I will argue that the two main component structures of clefts – matrix
and relative clause – can be given positive functional characterizations, which, together, lead to
The first main point to be tackled in a constructional approach to clefts is the special status of
its relative clauses. The traditional observations about the relative clause in clefts stop short of
the real issues, particularly the extent and the structural status of the antecedent. In this
respect, I will show that Huddleston’s analysis of the relative clause in clefts
1) does not go far enough in developing the differences with restrictive relative clauses;
2) does not account for the differences from non-restrictive relative clauses;
3) does not recognize that this sort of relative clause is found in other constructions besides it-
clefts.
2.1. Differences between relative clauses in clefts and restrictive relative clauses
As we saw above, Huddleston makes the observation that relative clauses in it-clefts allow for
a wider range of antecedents than RRCs, viz. proper names, pronouns, adverbials and clauses.
In this section I will argue that there are more fundamental differences between RRCs and
10
relative clauses in clefts. In fact, focusing on the contrast between RRCs and clefts will bring
The traditional approach to RRCs tends to hedge on the question whether it is the
whole NP or only the nominal head that functions as antecedent5. If mostly the assumption is
withheld that RRCs have the whole NP as antecedent (e.g. Huddleston 1984: 394) this may be
because the semantic function of the RRC is traditionally explained as giving information
necessary to identify the referent of that antecedent. And ‘picking out a referent’ presupposes a
full NP with determiner. For instance, in (20) who stood in the corner is said to provide the
(20) The girl who stood in the corner is Mary Smith. (Quirk et al 1972: 858)
Non-restrictive relative clauses (henceforth NRRCs) are then said to add merely information
which is not essential to identification, because the antecedent has already been uniquely
identified. For instance, in (21) the antecedent is the proper name Mary Smith, which is as such
uniquely identifiable.
(21) Mary Smith, who is in the corner, wants to meet you. (Quirk et al 1972: 858)
The traditional description is not very explicit either about the head-modifier relations in NPs
with RRCs and mostly leaves it at noting that, for instance in (20), the determiner the is
premodifier, girl head, and who stood in the doorway postmodifier, without specifying any
A further problem with the traditional explanation of RRCs versus NRRCs is that it
applies only to definite NPs, but does not clarify what sort of distinction is involved when the
(22) She was wearing a dress that I’d never seen before. (Huddleston 1984: 398)
11
(23) She was wearing an exclusive dress, which I’d never seen before.
According to the received analysis the antecedent in (22) is a dress. Since this nominal is
indefinite, the function of the RRC cannot be that of ‘aiding identification’. In example (23) the
antecedent (an exclusive dress) is also indefinite, so the NRRC cannot be said to add non-
Against this traditional description, Langacker (1991: 430f) explicitly says that the
antecedent of the RRC is the nominal head minus determiners. Moreover, he specifies that the
RRC modifies the nominal head only, and that this complex is grounded by the determiner. The
<Figure 1 here>
correlates the various structural elements found in it with its four basic semantic functions, viz.
type specification, instantiation, quantification, and grounding. NPs with common noun heads
display the unmarked correlations between forms and basic functions. Since common nouns
designate classes or types, e.g. dog, the common noun head expresses the ‘general type’ of the
e.g. golden dog, dog that is faithful. Head and non-determining modifiers thus constitute the
full ‘type specification’. To tie the type specification to specific instances, it has to be modified
by a determiner, e.g. a golden dog, the dog that is faithful. The grounding, or ‘identification’, of
relative quantifiers, e.g. a dog (one instance, not presumed known), your dogs (more than one
instance, identified in terms of possession), either dog (one instance not presumed identifiable
from a reference set of two). NPs consisting of proper names or pronouns present the marked
option in that they do not have distinct structural elements to realize the four semantic
12
functions of the NP. For instance, Mrs Widmerpool implies a ‘type specification’ (e.g. ‘female’,
Within this overall descriptive framework, Langacker analyzes the RRC as an element
of the type specification: a RRC “restricts the head noun’s type specification” (Langacker
1991: 432). The internal assembly of the type specification precedes the grounding of the
instance by the determiner. Thus, in Langacker’s description, the antecedent of the RRC is the
nominal head designating the type (e.g. dress), not the full NP designating the instance (a/the
dress).
In what follows I will argue that Langacker’s analysis receives further support from an
394-5) himself has made a convincing case that the relative pronoun does not have an
anaphoric relation with the full NP, but only with the head minus determiners. This is
particularly clear when the determiner is a quantifier such as no, every, any, each, etc.
Consider
(24) No one who knows her would consider her a threat. (cf Huddleston 1984: 394)
Here, the relative pronoun clearly does not point to no one, for this would entail that ‘no one
knows her’ and that is not part of the intended meaning of (24). Likewise,
(25) Every vehicle which they had tested had some defect. (Huddleston 1984: 394)
does not entail that they had tested every vehicle. Huddleston (1984: 395) further points out
quite rightly that even in the seemingly straightforward cases with definite article, as in
there is no pragmatic equivalence between who spoke first and the guy spoke first. In the latter
expression, the description guy is sufficient to pick out the intended referent, whereas in (26)
the whole description guy who spoke first is judged pragmatically necessary by the speaker for
With these observations, Huddleston seems to come close to the sort of position
advocated by Langacker (1991), but rather than going the whole way, he ultimately reverts to
the traditional position in which the antecedent of the RRC is considered to be the full NP. He
then posits an alleged ‘lack of equivalence’ between relative anaphor and antecedent, which
goes against the logical assumption that the antecedent is the meaning anaphorically pointed
to7.
relative pronoun is an anaphor which requires the disentangling of ‘type specification’ and
‘grounded, quantified instance’ as grammatical categories. Who in (26) has got the ‘type’ guy
as antecedent. Once one recognizes that it is the ‘type description’ which functions as
related to the traditional philosophical conception of ‘reference’, which considers only the
relation established between the full NP and the ‘instance’ referred to (be it conceptualized as
an instance in the real world or in the universe of discourse). In fact, the reference act is more
complex: the speaker can bring the hearer into mental contact with the instance (Langacker
1991: 91) only if the hearer can also successfully process the ‘type description’ which, should
be sufficiently informative in view of the information accumulated in the text up to that point.
‘Defining’ modifiers such as RRCs play an important role in the reference act precisely by
It is clear enough that the determiners in (24)-(26) are not part of the antecedent, but to
arrive at a coherent picture of the role of determiners in NPs with RRC, we have to look into
this matter more systematically. More specifically, we have to investigate how the main types
14
Interestingly, it is by systematically comparing RRCs with clefts that light can be shed on this
matter.
Let us begin with identifiers, which, as is well-known, indicate whether the instances
designated by the NP are ‘presumed known to the hearer’ (definite reference) or ‘not presumed
Let us first (re-)consider examples with definite identifier and attempt to bring a
In the it-cleft, the Complement slot can take NPs with definite determiner as well as proper
nouns. By contrast definite NP the man in (27) cannot be replaced by a proper name: *I didn’t
like John who spoke first. This distributional fact is well-known but little reflection has been
devoted to why this is so. Following the lead of Langacker’s analysis, I propose that a proper
name cannot function as antecedent of a RRC because it does not symbolize the ‘type
description’ as a separate element that the relative pronoun can refer back to. This line of
reasoning is confirmed by the fact that a RRC is possible after determiner + proper noun in the
(29) I‘ve just met the John you used to go out with.
15
which could be used in a context containing at least two people with the name John. As pointed
out by Langacker (1991: 59), John is used as a common noun in such examples: its lexical
predication is not an individual but the category delineation ‘person with name John’, and it
requires a determiner to be tied to a specific instance. The RRC in (29) thus has the general
type ‘person with name John’ as its antecedent. In contrast, in clefts NPs with definite
determiner + common noun head do alternate with proper names (example 28). Clearly, the
relative pronoun is not anaphoric with the ‘type’ here but with the ‘grounded instance’
How does the RRC function then in the referential act performed with a definite NP
containing a RRC? As pointed out above, the more elaborate ‘type specification’ construed by
nominal head + RRC, such as man who spoke first in (27), is judged necessary by the speaker
in that specific context to allow the hearer to pick out the instance in question. But in order to
understand the contribution made by the RRC fully, we have to look more deeply into the
mechanisms involved in definite identification. I (1999) have proposed that, with definitely
identified NPs, the type description defines a reference mass8 of ‘all the instances
corresponding to that type in the discourse context’. For instance, in both examples (30)-(31),
the contextually relevant reference mass is ‘all exams that still need correcting’. The definite
article in (30) refers to all of those, while the possessive determiner in (31) refers to only some
(31) If you take care of your exams that still need correcting, I’ll take care of mine.
NPs with definite article and singular count noun can be used without ambiguity if there is just
one ‘contextually relevant instance’ corresponding to that type, which also happens to be the
one actually referred to, as is the case in (28). The context of the Garden of Eden evoked by
this example contains only one instance of the type ‘man’. Of course, many other contexts will
contain more than one instance of the type ‘man’. By adding a RRC to the general type, the
16
‘reference mass’ may be narrowed down so that only one instance in the discourse context
corresponds to it. For instance, in (27), there were presumably several ‘men’ at the meeting, but
by using the description man who spoke first, the set of potentially relevant instances is
restricted to just one. Hence, the definite NP the man who spoke first can be used
unambiguously to refer to the person in question. (This is the use which is so often cited as the
Let us now turn to RRCs with indefinite determiner, which contrast with relative
clauses in there-clefts.
(32) A tie is always an appropriate present for a man who is rather conservative.
In (32), the RRC contributes to the ‘type specification’: speaker and hearer are thinking of an
instance of the category ‘man who is rather conservative’. By contrast, it is clear that the there-
cleft in (33) is not correctly paraphrased as ‘There’s not an instance of the category ‘white man
dances as well as black men’. The point of this there-cleft is that there is not a white man of
whom it can be predicated that he ‘dances as well as black men’. The zero relative pronoun
clearly points back to the full NP not a white man so that the predication made in the relative
As for the RRC in (32), Langacker’s point holds again that the RRC is first assembled
with the nominal head and only then is this elaborate type specification integrated with the
indefinite article, which presents the instance as ‘not identifiable’. ‘Not identifiable’ can mean
basically two things. The instance may be known to the speaker, but may be ‘being introduced’
into the discourse for the hearer’s benefit. In this case, the type of identification is ‘indefinite’,
but ‘specific’. It is also possible that no specific ‘instance’ corresponds to the indefinite NP for
either speaker or hearer, in which case we have ‘non-specific’ indefinite reference as in (32). In
either case, the ‘type specification’ which contains the RRC has a purely classificational
function: it does not define a reference mass. An indefinite NP merely designates ‘some’
17
instantiation of a type, without indicating whether there are - or aren’t - other instances of the
The next issue to be looked at is the role of quantifiers in RRCs and clefts. Following
Milsark (1974/1977) and Langacker (1991: Ch.2), I (1999) hold that the two main types of
quantifying elements found in the NP are cardinal and relative quantifiers. Cardinal, or
‘absolute’ (Langacker 1991: 82f), quantifiers express the intrinsic magnitude of the designated
mass without giving any information about how this amount “stacks up in relation to”
(Langacker 1991: 82) all the instances of that type in the context. For instance, if you are
you give information about how many mice are dead, but not about how many mice are still
alive in the shed. In contrast, a relatively quantified NP compares the actually designated mass
with the reference mass of all contextually relevant instances and indicates whether the former
conveys that ‘most’ mice of the total mice population in the shed are still alive.
(36) For one man who’s just, I’ll save the city.
We can note again that the cleft indirectly predicates ‘is that shape’ of only one thing: the
antecedent of that is the full Complement NP only one thing. On the other hand, the RRC has
only the noun man as antecedent and thus constructs the more elaborate type man who’s just.
18
Cardinal quantifiers such as one ‘man who’s just’, or five/some ‘men who are just’ indicate the
intrinsic size of the instantiation. Hence, the type specification containing the RRC does not
contribute to the definition of a reference mass but has a purely ‘categorizing’ function.
(39) It was all the passengers who had committed the murder.
In (38) the relative pronoun does not point back to all students; this clause does not state that
‘all students attended’. Rather, it conveys that all instances of the category ‘students who
attended’ will receive a bonus point. Note that with a relatively quantified NP such as all
students who attended, the type specification evokes a reference mass of all contextually
relevant instances, over which all quantifies universally. By contrast, the relative clause in (39)
is linked to all the passengers by the relative pronoun who: hence had committed the murder is
indirectly predicated of all the passengers. In other words, the antecedent of the RRC excludes
relative quantifiers, whereas that of the relative clause in clefts, which is the full NP, obviously
includes them.
In conclusion, against the traditional assumption that the antecedent of RRCs is a full
NP, we have seen that the antecedent of RRCs systematically excludes identifiers and
quantifiers. In contrast, the relative clauses in clefts have the full Complement NP as
antecedent. We can also note that it is precisely the inclusion of identification and quantification
in the antecedent of clefts that sanctions the well-known systematic alternation with non-cleft
In the cleft (39), the relative clause predicates information about a specific situation indirectly
- via the intermediary of the anaphoric relative relation - of the antecedent NP. In the
corresponding non-cleft (40), the same clause is integrated directly with that NP. Note however
that the semantics of the cleft differ from those of the non-cleft because the matrix clause
frames the anaphoric relation between antecedent and relative clause in a specific way (see
2.2. Differences between relative clauses in clefts and non-restrictive relative clauses
In terms of their antecedent, non-restrictive relative clauses differ, in turn, from the relative
clauses in clefts. The antecedent of a NRRC can be a noun phrase (41), an adjective (42), an
adverb or prepositional phrase (43), a part of the matrix clause (44), or the whole matrix
(42) They’re going to paint their house purple, which I would never paint my house.
(43) They talked about it yesterday/on Monday, when they vetted all the applications.
(44) The members of the board changed the order, which we have never done.
(45) They always looked down on him, which they should not have.
relative clauses in clefts might appear not to be very different from that in NRRCs. In it-clefts,
for instance, we also find, besides NPs (46), adjectives (47), adverbs and prepositional phrases
(50) It’s while you were away that it might have happened.
NRRCs and those of relative clauses in clefts, as far as the ‘non-NP’ fillers are concerned, i.e.
adjectives, adverbs, prepositional phrases and clausal antecedents. The latter are rankshifted
into the nominal Complement-slot of clefts, whereas the antecedents of NRRCs display the
structural assembly congruent with their rank. The concept of ‘rankshift’ has evolved within the
Hallidayan tradition (Halliday 1965, Huddleston 1984, Matthiessen & Thompson 1989,
Hopper & Closs-Traugot 1993, McGregor 1997). McGregor’s recent (1997: 127) definition
brings out best both the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ consequences of rankshift: rankshifting
refers to the process whereby a unit of a given rank is “reclassified” as a unit of a different
rank, “as a result of which it takes on certain grammatical and semantic properties inherent to
that rank”. In other words, not only does the rankshifted unit function in a foreign structural
Thus, when functioning at their own rank, adjectives and prepositional phrases express
‘relational’ concepts (Langacker 1991: Ch.1) such as ‘quality’ or ‘location’. Likewise, the
type of situation and the full clause a specific instance of a situation (Langacker 1991: 33). The
antecedents of NRRCs that are not NPs all have the semantic value congruent with their rank,
such as ‘attributable quality’ in (42), temporal location in (43), type of situation in (44) and
instance of situation in (45). However, the ‘non-NP’ units functioning as Complement in clefts
are rankshifted into the nominal Complement-slot, and are in this sense ‘nominalized’ (Halliday
1985: 219). They function in a strictly ‘nominal’ slot, such as that of the identifying
Complement in it-clefts9. That is, they fulfil the role of a NP-type element of structure, which
also requires them to discharge basic NP functions such as ‘identification’ and ‘quantification’.
They fulfil these functions in a way similar to how proper names realize identification and
quantification (cf Langacker 1991: 148), viz. without separate symbolization by determiners.
21
The rankshifted units are ‘cited’ in their entirety like a proper name, and they designate single
and uniquely identified entities, which may be individuals (e.g. then, they have always looked
in clefts which explains their resistance to relative adverbs such as when, where, etc.
(53) It’s before you get married *when/that you should travel.
phrase or clause, then its semantic profile is that of a - reified - entity. Hence, these
‘rankshifted’ units are systematically referred to by relative pronoun that, and occasionally
which, whose general categorial features are those of ‘inanimate/abstract entity’. These
antecedents cannot be referred to by relative adverbs such as when, where and why, because
It should be noted that enumerative there-clefts can also take rankshifted prepositional
phrases and clauses. Enumerative there-clefts, which will be discussed in more detail in section
(56) There’s when you were away that it might have happened.
The mechanism of rankshifting found here is fully parallel to that in it-clefts. Prepositional
phrases and clauses are rankshifted into the nominal Complement-slot and are re-classified as
definite NPs. Like proper names, they are ‘cited’ in their entirety and given definite
identification, but without separate coding of their definite status. As we shall see in the next
22
section, the more ‘enumerative’ feel associated with the Complement stems from the distinct
Note also that the enumerating Complement in there-clefts accepts fewer types of
rankshifted units than the identifying Complement in it-clefts. For instance, rankshifted
adjectives, and prepositional phrases expressing Receivers and Beneficiaries, are possible in it-
clefts but seem virtually excluded in there-clefts (p.c. K. Van den Eynde).
Acceptability judgements will vary here and one can always try to make the enumerative
(63) For whom am I doing all this? -- Well, there’s for your mother and father that you
But there can be no doubt that it-clefts allow for a greater variety of rankshifted units than
there-clefts. Perhaps this is due to the fact that ‘ordinary’ identifying clauses readily accept
(65) The moment to do it is when the plants have shed their leaves.
23
‘Ordinary’ enumerative existentials do not, of course, predicate any equation and do not
normally contain rankshifted units. They seem to need the ‘secondary’ relation expressed by the
antecedent and the relative clause in clefts to sanction the use of rankshifted units.
Let us, in conclusion to this section, summarize the main differences between NRRCs
and relative clauses in clefts. The antecedents of NRRCs may belong to various grammatical
classes such as NP, PrepP, PredP and clause. There is no necessary match between the class of
the antecedent and the function of the relative pronoun in the relative clause. Compare
(66) If I did fall off, which there is no chance of. :: *There is no chance of I did fall off.
(67) He had to do it by hand, which was time consuming. :: *Do it by hand was time
consuming.
For instance, in (67) the antecedent is the predicate do it by hand, but the function of the
relative pronoun is Subject -- which cannot be realized by a bare infinitive (*Do it by hand was
time consuming).
In contrast, the antecedents of the relative clauses in clefts are either NPs or
phrases, infinitives, gerunds, clauses). In the latter case, we have rankshifted units which
‘quote’ the form of the original class, but superimpose the functions of a definitely identified
NP on them. In clefts, there is a general match between the function of the relative anaphor and
the original, quoted, class of the antecedent. In that form, the antecedent can generally simply
(68) It’s his falling off that there is no chance of. :: There is no chance of his falling off.
(69) It’s by hand that you should do it. :: You should do it by hand.
This is in fact the second factor, besides the inclusion of quantifiers and determiners in the
antecedent, which enables the systematic alternation between cleft and non-cleft counterpart.
24
The rankshifted antecedent of the RC in clefts still displays the class which matches up with the
function of the relative pronoun. Therefore, the relative clause can be re-integrated with its
antecedent.
Thus, careful comparison of the relative clauses in clefts with RRCs and NRRCs has
revealed the two most distinctive features of the antecedents of the former. Firstly, the
antecedent of the relative clause in clefts is the full NP, including the identifiers and quantifiers.
Secondly, the antecedent of the relative clause in clefts is always a NP, either as such or as the
result of a re-classification of non-nominal units. As we have seen, it is these two factors which
motivate the well-known systematic alternation between cleft and non-cleft. As a result, this
famous alternation loses something of its mystique. Definitely, it provides no justification for
regarding the cleft construction as a ‘transform’ unanalyzable in its own right. The special
characteristics of the antecedent in clefts can be given a positive description and provide part of
2.3. The sort of relative clause found in it-clefts is also found in other constructions
In this section, the point will be made (against Huddleston 1984: 462) that relative clauses of
the sort found in it- and there-clefts are not restricted to these environments. They are also
(70) Who could be considered for this job? Well, we have/you’ve got Mick and Di that
could be considered.
With possessive clauses we find a contrast which is very similar to that between identifying
clause with RRC versus it-cleft, and between existential clause with RRC versus there-cleft.
Consider
(71) I have one daughter who plays the guitar and two daughters who play the piano.
25
(72) So, you’re all on your own then? -- No, I have a daughter/my daughter/Elizabeth
Example (71) is a clause expressing possession. Its Complement is formed by two coordinated
NPs with postmodifying RRC: one daughter who plays the guitar and two daughters who play
the piano. Who plays the guitar defines a subclass of ‘daughter’, which contrasts with the
subclass ‘daughters who play the piano’ (Huddleston 1984: 400). In contrast, (72) turns out, on
closer examination, to have the sort of relative clause whose antecedent is a full NP. Who/that
helps me makes a predication about definite instances (a daughter, my daughter, Elizabeth), not
about a type of which it delineates a finer subtype. Note that the antecedent of the relative
(73) RRC: (What are your daughters like?) I have a daughter that helps me and two that
don’t.
(74) Cleft: (So, you’re all on your own then?) No, I have a daughter that helps me.
The functional parallels between this type of construction and there-clefts are obvious
and have also been pointed out by Hannay (1985: 92), who has drawn attention to the existence
of these ‘possessive’ clefts. In the next section, the parallels between possessive and existential
In the traditional approach to clefts, the ‘representational’ semantics of the matrix clauses have
generally been neglected or even denied. Thus, both there + be (Collins 1992: 432) and it + be
have been claimed to be “fully grammaticalized features of the construction whose contribution
26
to the meaning is not directly predictable from their use in other kinds of clauses” (Huddleston
1984: 462).
Against this position, I will make the case that the matrix clauses of it-, there- and
have/got-clefts do have the semantic import of identifying, existential and possessive clauses,
respectively. I will argue that, if one does not bring in the distinct semantics of the matrix
clauses, one cannot explain the distinct semantics of the corresponding clefts. Consider the
As pointed out by Halliday (1967a: 238), (75) specifies that it is only Jim who makes the
coffee, while (76) enumerates Jim as one, ‘possibly amongst others’, who makes the coffee.
The very existence of the there-cleft, besides the it-cleft, shows that the latter’s meaning of
‘exhaustive’ identification is not simply due to the definite Complement NP in (75). The
Complement-NP in (76) is similarly definite, but (76) does not express ‘exhaustive’
identification. I will argue below that the semantic contrast between (75)-(76) stems from the
In this section, I will show that the matrix clauses of clefts are very specific subtypes
of identifying, existential and possessive clauses, which all have a common denominator, viz.
the fact that they impose a specific quantificational value on their Complement. In subsection
3.1, I will discuss the subtypes of identifying, existential and possessive clauses with specifying
or enumerating Complements that function as the matrices of clefts. In 3.2., I will look at the
rather distinct subtype of the ‘cardinal’ there-cleft, in which the obligatory cardinal
The identifying, existential and possessive matrix clauses found in clefts correspond exactly to
In what follows I will briefly characterize the constructional semantics of each, focusing on the
question what sort of quantitative effect is associated with the Complements of these
constructions.
Example (77) is an identifying clause with Subject it. Identifying constructions have
been defined by Halliday (1967a: 224) as providing a definite value, the Identifier, for an
element to be identified, the Identified. The Identified can be likened to the unknown ‘x’ in a
mathematical equation and the Identifier to its actual value in that equation. In (77) the
Example (78) is an enumerative existential (Lumsden 1988: 150f, Davidse 1999). This
construction type enumerates instances - in the limiting case just one instance - of a
contextually given type, such as ‘things that can be eaten for supper’. It is generally accepted
that (77) specifies exhaustively ‘what’s for supper’, while (78) merely lists - potentially non-
Constructionally, this semantic contrast is triggered by the distinct Subjects of the two
clause types. Halliday & Hasan (1976: 101) have proposed that the general clitic pronouns it
and there stand in a systemic relation to each other: the first is definite and the second
indefinite. Following their lead, I (1999) have argued that definite it conveys quantificational
exhaustiveness, while there designates an - unspecific - amount of the numerical scale. This
proportionality is brought out nicely by the following alternation between clefts and pseudo-
clefts:
28
(80) It’s Jules and Jim that got away with it.
(81) The ones that got away with it are Jules and Jim.
(82) There’s Jules and Jim that got away with it.
(83) Ones that got away with it are Jules and Jim.
It points to all the instantiation in the relevant discourse context of the category in question. In
this sense, its semantics involve comparison with a reference mass. It is the relative general
pronoun, which quantifies exhaustively over the whole reference mass. Note that in the
corresponding pseudo-cleft (81), the also encompasses all the instances in the discourse space
of the general type expressed by ones that got away with it. On the other hand, there in (82)
designates an unspecific amount of the numerical scale. In the indefinite pseudo-cleft (83), the
form of quantification: it designates - in an unspecific way - the intrinsic size of the predicated
mass ones that got away with it. There is no reference mass involved here. We can thus
is used here (as in Declerck 1988) in the strict sense of specifying the exact value
corresponding to the unknown factor in the equation. Thus, spaghetti exhaustively specifies the
entities corresponding to the contextual type ‘things to be eaten for supper’. We can, therefore,
In contrast, the cardinally quantifying Subject there in (78) points to its Complement
(84) First there was the Commonwealth and then also the European to go for.
29
the ordinal scheme of the enumeration is made explicit by the adverbs first and then also. As
argued in Davidse (1999), the ordinal scheme found in enumerative existentials is an extension
of the ‘cardinal’ meaning of ordinary existentials. The extension from cardinality to ordinality
is clearly illustrated in existentials which combine the cardinal and the enumerative aspect, as
in:
(84)’ There were two important competitions: first, the Commonwealth Games and, then, the
European Championships.
The limiting case of enumeration is to enumerate just one instance. Thus, example (78) lists
only spaghetti as an instance corresponding to the contextual type ‘things to be eaten for
supper’.
Lists are mostly felt to be ‘possibly incomplete’ as in (85), but Rando & Napoli (1978)
have rightly pointed out that, with falling intonation, lists can also be presented as ‘complete’
as in (86).
(85) I don’t have any friends. Oh, don’t be silly! There’s John and me and Susan and Peggy
(86) What’s worth visisting here? There’s the park, a very nice restaurant, and the library.
That’s all as far as I’m concerned. (Rando & Napoli 1978: 300-301)
Ultimately, the difference between specificational identifying clauses and enumerative there-
clauses lies in the distinct quantificational mechanisms imposed on the Complement. Like its
comparison with a reference set or mass, with which the actually predicated mass coincides
completely. If in answer to the question Who murdered Caesar? I say: It was Brutus and the
senate, I specify the full set of ‘murderers of Julius Caesar’. In contrast, the enumerating
Complement is, like its Subject there, concerned only with a part of the numerical scale: it
30
merely pegs the enumerated instances to a numerical scale, as in: There was Brutus and the
senate. The default implication is that the list may not be exhaustive. It requires special
Finally, possessive clauses such as (79) have also been characterized as ‘enumerative’
(Quirk at al 1972: 961). The possessive verbs convey general meanings such as ‘have at one’s
specificational meaning: the Complement is not a specificational one, but one with enumerative
features similar to those in enumerative there-clauses, which can list items. For instance,
(87) Who could apply for that job? Well, we have Charles and Harry.
Depending on the intonation (low rise versus fall respectively), these lists may be interpreted as
In clefts such as There’s only one thing that’s that shape the matrix clause is an unmarked, not
an enumerative (see 3.1), existential. In the mainstream, the unmarked existential has always
been interpreted locatively: it is alleged to prediacte an explicit or implicit location to the entity
designated by the central NP. However, many decades ago Strawson (1959: 241) had already
suggested that existential be should not be interpreted in terms of predication, but as ‘be
by the central NP. I have given extensive linguistic argumentation elsewhere11 for the same
interpretative claim, while, however, also incorporating Milsark’s cardinality restriction in it.
As pointed out by Milsark (1976: 116f), the focal NPs in unmarked existentials are subject to a
‘cardinality restriction’: the quantifying elements found in the unmarked existential all express
calls them, designate the intrinsic magnitude of the designated mass, either by pegging it to a
In what way does the cardinal measure obligatorily expressed by the NP in these
existentials contribute to its semantics? I have argued that it applies to the ‘instantiation’ of the
such as There were ten little Indians cardinally measures the actual instantiation within that
clause’s spatio-temporal domain of the general category ‘little Indian’. Or to put it very simply,
it counts the instances of ‘little Indians’ to be found within the spatio-temporal coordinates set
out by that clause. In this context, we can also return to the existential example (7) discussed
(90) There’s only one thing that has a funny shape on the table.
Sentence (90) specifies that in the spatio-temporal domain ‘present time, on the table’, only one
instance of the category ‘thing that has a funny shape’ can be found.
It is because of this central concern with the cardinal quantification of instances that I
In this final section, the findings of sections 2 and 3 will be brought together and a general
description of the semantics of clefts will be offered. The position assumed here is that so-
called clefts can and should be analyzed as constructions in their own right. Their semantics are
the result of the two basic relations coded by the construction. Firstly, there is the relation
expressed by the matrix clause, which, as we have seen, can be either identifying, cardinal
existential, enumerative existential, or possessive. The distinct semantics of the various matrix
clauses are responsible for the differences in meaning between the various types of cleft, such
as that between the identifying and the enumerating cleft discussed above (examples 75-76).
Secondly, there is the anaphoric relation between Complement and relative clause, which is
common to all clefts. As we have seen, the transformation-type approach has tended to
confound these two component structures, but in sections 2 and 3, I have attempted to put their
What is striking about all the matrix clauses that occur in clefts is that they all
construe ‘quantificational’ information of some sort for their Complement. As we have seen, we
Complements that constitute the common denominator of the clause types that can function as
Complement-NPs as antecedents. The antecedent in (80) is not just the coordinated NPs Jules
and Jim, but the specificational Complement, i.e. the element of structure on which the
antecedent is ‘Jules and Jim as exhaustively specified set’. Likewise, the antecedent in (82) is
not just the coordinated NPs Jules and Jim. (As pointed out under 3, we cannot account for the
difference in meaning between (80) and (82) if we bring only the grammatical class features of
the Complement NP, such as definite NP, into the picture.) The antecedent in (82) is the
33
enumerating Complement, which pegs instances to a numerical scale; its meaning is ‘Jules and
What, then, are the semantics of the antecedent - relative clause relation itself in clefts?
Unlike with RRCs, they do not constitute a Head - Modifier relation, in which the ‘general
type’ is narrowed down to a more specific ‘type specification’. Rather, as proposed by Declerck
(1984 1988) and Hannay (1985: 120), antecedent and relative clause in clefts construe a Value-
Variable relation. The instances, as framed by the various quantificational mechanisms of the
matrix clauses, constitute the specific Value. The situation designated by the relative clause
constitutes the more general Variable. Value and Variable are used in a general sense here,
which covers all the quantificational mechanisms found in the various cleft types12.
The constructional semantics of the various types of cleft can then be described as
follows. It-clefts have an identifying matrix, which equates universally quantifying it with the
antecedent of the relative clause. It specifies the total set of instances corresponding to the
(93) The facts are: it’s President Chirac who is going to carry the political can. (CB)
specifies that the only politician who is going to be blamed is President Chirac.
scheme, as corresponding to the Variable expressed by the relative clause. Often, we find the
limiting case of enumeration, which is to list just one instance. Typically, the implication is that
this list is potentially incomplete, as in (94), but intonation and added expressions such as only
(94) I’ve really just got to fill them in on lexicographers’ needs just because we’ve been
doing a lot of it but if there’s other people that you think are doing kind of creative
corpus lexicography. – Well, there’s McCarthy who’s just building a new one. (CB)
(95) Put something up? -- There’s only the council can do that. (CB)
This sort of enumerative Complement is also found in the more marginal ‘cleft’ constructions
In (96), a general concept of possession is used to frame the list of Values corresponding to the
to the cardinality restriction: its Complement has always got absolute quantification. Therefore,
it indicates the cardinal measure of the instance corresponding as Value to the Variable. As
discussed above, the Complement NP in clefts is typically focal. In cardinal there-clefts, the
information focus may be on the nominal head or on the cardinal quantifier of the Value. In the
former case, illustrated by one possible reading of (97), the most salient information in the cleft
is the type of thing or person (‘boy’) instantiating the Variable. In the latter case, for instance
(97) There’s no boy in that school has more or better clothes than you. (CB)
(98) Look at the shape of it. There’s only one thing that’s that shape. (CB)
We should note here that possessive clefts with indefinite Complement also impose cardinal
I submit that these semantic characterizations do justice to the two main coded
relations in clefts: the one expressed by the matrix clause and the one expressed by the
anaphoric relation between antecedent and relative clause. Earlier descriptions have tended to
reduce one to the other. For instance, in Halliday’s (1967a) and Bolinger’s (1972) analysis of
it-clefts, Subject it and the relative clause are said to form one discontinuous constituent, which
is analyzed as the Identified. In this way, the it-cleft is reduced to a simple identifying clause13.
The distinct semantics of the matrix clauses explain the semantic differences between
the various types of clefts. In particular, they show how the Complement is set up as antecedent
of the relative clause with different quantificational values. As we have seen, the distinct matrix
clauses may express exhaustive specification of a set, enumeration and cardinal quantification
of instances. What the relative clause does is add a Value-Variable dimension as part of the
construction. The nature of the anaphoric relation created by the relative pronoun is the same in
all types of cleft: it relates the antecedent as a Value to the Variable expressed by the relative
clause. Thus, it becomes clear that clefts do not simply express specification, enumeration or
As continually stressed throughout this article, these two relations expressed by matrix
clause and relative anaphora are part of the constructional semantics. They form the
grammatical substratum for the many ‘textual’, or ‘pragmatic’, patterns that have received so
much attention in more recent studies of clefts (Geluyckens 1988, Collins 1991 1992). As we
saw in 1.1, the relative clause in clefts may recap ‘given’ information and encapsulate this in a
‘contextually given’ Variable (as in example 5), or it may present ‘new’ information in the
Varibale (as in example 10). Either informational schema is compatible with the grammatico-
Conclusion
36
In this article, I have developed a grammatical analysis of clefts as constructions in their own
right, whose semantic properties can be correlated directly with their grammatical features.
clefts established in the literature, such as its intonation and the fact that its relative clause does
not modify the nominal head. I have then identified the two main aspects of clefts that had not
yet been dealt with satisfactorily, viz. the constructional value of the matrix clause and the
In section 2, I have investigated the special status of the antecedent of the relative
clause in clefts. Unlike restrictive relative clauses, its antecedents include identifiers and
quantifiers, and unlike non-restrictive relative clauses, its ‘non-NP’ antecedents are rankshifted
In section 3, I have set out descriptions of the identifying, existential and possessive
interpretation of cardinal and enumerative existentials. I have pointed out that the Complements
of clefts, which already have ‘marked’ properties as antecedent of the relative clause, are
further foregrounded in clefts by the distinct quantificational values the matrix clauses impose
In section 4, finally, I have shown that the two relations construed by clefts - by the
matrix clause and by relative anaphora - can be integrated with each other, without reducing
them to each other, as has happened in earlier descriptions. Put very simply, clefts specify,
In view of all this, I have to add as a postscript that the term ‘cleft’ can be retained
only as a conventional, mnemonic label, and should certainly be cleared of any implications
Data Source
All the examples marked with (CB) were extracted from the COBUILD corpus by remote log-
in. They are reproduced here with the kind permission of HarperCollins.
37
References
Bolinger, Dwight (1972). A look at equations and cleft sentences. In Studies for Einar Haugen,
Presented by Friends and Colleagues, Evelyn Scherabon Firchow et al (eds.), 96-114. The
---- (1977). Meaning and form. London & New York: Longman.
Collins, Peter (1991). Cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions in English. London: Routledge.
Crystal, David (1991). A Dictionary of Phonetics and Linguistics. Third edition. London:
Longman.
--- (1999b). Are there sentences that can be analyzed as there-clefts? In Thinking English
grammar. To honour Xavier Dekeyser, Professor Emeritus, Tops, Guy, Devriendt, Betty,
Declerck, Renaat (1984). The pragmatics of it-clefts and WH-clefts. Lingua 64, 433-471.
--- (1988). Studies on Copular Sentences, Clefts and Pseudo-clefts. Leuven: Leuven University
Geluyckens, Ronald (1988). Five types of clefting in English discourse. Linguistics 26, 823-
841.
Gundel, Jeannette, Hedberg, Nancy & Zacharski, Ron. (1993). Cognitive status and the form
Haas, William (1954). On defining linguistic units. Transactions of the Philological Society
1954, 54-84.
38
Halliday, Michael (1965). Types of structure. Mimeo. University College, London. Reprinted
in Readings in Systemic Linguistics, Halliday, Michael & Martin, James (eds.), 29-41.
London: Batsford.
--- (1967a). Notes on transitivity and theme in English 2. Journal of Linguistics 3 (2), 199-244.
--- (1967b). Intonation and Grammar in British English. The Hague: Mouton.
Halliday, Michael & Hasan, Ruqaiya (1976) Cohesion in English. London: Longman.
University Press.
--- (1991). Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume II. Descriptive Application. Stanford:
Lumsden, Michael (1988). Existential sentences. Their structure and meaning. London: Croom
Helm.
Matthiessen, Christian & Thompson, Sandra (1989). The structure of discourse and
‘subordination’. In Clause combining in grammar and discourse, Haiman, John & Thompson,
Linguistics Club.
Quirk, Randolph; Greenbaum, Sidney; Leech, Geoffrey; and Svartvik, Jan (1972). A Grammar
Rando, Emily & Napoli, Donna (1987). Definites in there-sentnces. Language. 54, 300-313.
gratitude to him for his sharing of ideas, his sharp descriptive and methodological observations and his general
support. I also thank the anonymous referee of Linguistics for his generous comments.
1
This article takes Huddleston’s ‘transformational’ approach to clefts as a starting point because his is a very clear
articulation of this position. Moreover, it contains many interesting observations, as well as unresolved questions,
which, as acknowledged in several places in this article, have served as a springboard for the alternative approach
developed here.
2
It is precisely in its emphasis on the natural coding relation between form and meaning that this form of
grammatical class of the head noun: a singular count noun such as bullet designates a ‘type of discrete entity’, a mass
noun such as buckshot designates a ‘type of homogeneous’ mass, while a plural count noun such as bullets designates
which another unit in the SENTENCE refers (ANAPHORIC REFERENCE), typically a later unit” (1991: 17).
8
The concept of the ‘reference mass’ has been developed by Langacker (1991: 82f), who introduces this concept as
part of his definition of relative quantifiers (see below). However, unlike Milsark (1977), Langacker does not extend
the notion of relative quantification to definite determiners such as the definite article, and possessive and
demonstrative determiners.
9
The constructional characteristics of the Complements in the various types of cleft will be discussed in the next
section.
10
With verbal Complements, this integration has to pass via the intermediary of the verb do. This use of do is not the
‘operator’ use, which combines with the lexical verb, but the one that substitutes for the lexical verb (Halliday &
Verbal complements in clefts contain the predicate, not the finite, component of the VP, which is quoted in either the
infinitival or gerundival form. To integrate the antecedent with the relative clause, the substitute do has to be replaced
corresponding to the Variable expressed by the th/wh-clause. In his approach, the concepts of Value and Variable are
restricted to it-clefts.
13
The analysis of, for instance, it … who am to blame as one discontinuous constituent of It is I who am to blame also
involves grammatical problems. As pointed out by Huddleston (1984: 461), the first person marking of the finite verb