G.R. No.
L-40779 November 28, 1975 their reason: They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of
EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, herein represented by FR.
ANTONIO B. LAMBINO, respondent.
Epicharis T Garcia in her own behalf.
Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola
School of Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue
studying therein is whether she is deemed possessed of such a right that has to be respected. That is denied not
only on general principle, but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution involved. It is a
seminary. It would appear therefore that at most she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent
school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to such an obvious conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by the
Constitution in this explicit language: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." 1 The petition
must therefore fail.
Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in
Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-
76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-
admission in their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal
ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative
of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose
of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits
of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the
school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were
better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in
said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was
informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements
for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology — which would entail about four to five
years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused
readmission, it would entail only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering that time was of the essence
in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work,
enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any
academic units for the subject she would take; 9. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her
school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of
Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration; ... " 2 She
prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester. She made it more
specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would be allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the
June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and that whatever units may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties be likewise recognized by respondent. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father Lambino which
started on a happy note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but ended in a manner
far from satisfactory for her, as shown by this portion thereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter
which is not too pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the summer session and several members are strongly
opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as
slowing down the progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted
more effort to understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and problems. The way things
are, I would say that the advisability of your completing a program (with all the course work and thesis writing) with
us is very questionable. That you have the requisite intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be
in your best interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with your orientation. I regret to have to make this
report, but I am only thinking of your welfare." 3
This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975, required comment on the part of respondent Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology. 4 As submitted on behalf of Father Lambino, it set forth the following:
"Respondent is the Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a
religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the
Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School
of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University
and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School
of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate
School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program;
Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but said admission
was not an admission to a degree program because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate
School can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo
de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed
to take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Furthermore, petitioner was not charged a single centavo
by the Loyola School of Theology and/or the Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the courses she took in
the summer of 1975, as she was allowed to take it free of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J.,
and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether
to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school any particular student, considering not only academic or
intellectual standards but also other considerations such as personality traits and character orientation in relation
with other students as well as considering the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The Petition
for Mandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to admit
the petitioner therein in the current year to take up further courses in the Loyola School of Theology." 5It was likewise
alleged in the aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter of May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitioner to
take up further courses in said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on reasonable grounds, ... ." 6 Then reference
was made to the availability of non-judicial remedies which petitioner could have pursued. 7 The prayer was for the
dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner sought permission to reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she
had a detailed recital of why under the circumstances she is entitled to relief from the courts. In a resolution of August
8, 1975, this Court considered the comment of respondent as answer and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda. That they did, and the petition was deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at the outset,
we do not see merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.
1. In respondent's memorandum, it was made clear why a petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy. Thus:
"Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola School of
Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary
for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and
a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no
duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down
even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and
component considerations." 8 No authorities were cited, respondent apparently being of the view that the law has not
1
reached the stage where the matter of admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled
discretion of the applicant. There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion
appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses
is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus
proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of T` `heology. In a rather
comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately did not have counsel, an a ttempt was made to dispute
the contention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive.
It is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a practitioner that was evident. While she pressed
her points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify
the grant of this writ.
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning
enjoying academic freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution
would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be,
whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed
by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution." 9 As for the educator and philosopher
Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified
persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to
no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are
sought and established in these disciplines." 10
3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized
by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients
of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a gradging fashion.
That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the
Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom
to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." 11 He cited
the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of
rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: " "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes
tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no
means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not
even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore,
between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher."
" 12 Also: "To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he
says: "The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher — recognized and effectively
guaranteed by society — to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in
his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in
considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they
disseminate their learning."' 13 He likewise quoted from the President of the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir Eric
Ashby: "'The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto
control of the following functions: (i) the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study;
(iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the different
categories of expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universities had to rely on the literal
interpretation of their constitutions in order to acquire for their academic members control of these four functions, for
in one constitution or another most of these functions are laid on the shoulders of the law governing body .'" 14 Justice
Frankfurter, with his extensive background in legal education as a former Professor of the Harvard Law School,
referred to what he called the business of a university and the four essential freedoms in the following language: "It
is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university — to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study." 15 Thus is reinforced the conclusion reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this case.
4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeable in the field, to whom cannot be
imputed lack of awareness of the need to respect freedom of thought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover,
it could amount to minimizing the full respect that must be accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by the
Constitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that
colleges and universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or
reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category.
5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the persistence of petitioner to continue her studies in the
Loyola School of Theology is the result solely of a legal appraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to be
construed as in any way reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent due
acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was
deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well as of the other students and her own welfare, that she
continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed
relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other
institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the
controversy was touched upon in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO
RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE
and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng
dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint
Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner
James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the controversy
before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the
following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition
2
for certiorariagainst respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2)
Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration; 3 (3) Order dated January 7,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate
writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private
respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents on March 29,
1995 involving private respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James
Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing
and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house,
he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished
eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang's and
confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of
the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the
Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. "Kailanganng apology" in the words of
respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus.
Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were looking for a person whose description
matched James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr.
Yap, one of them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate
to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back.
Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung
punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands – "parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee
were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching
him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of
attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio,
Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired
guy also running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the Engineering Gate. Mr.
Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his
fraternity brods at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang
gagalaw. Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in Miguel Building.
However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of
Dagonoy Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives
somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first
saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them and just keep on walking. However, the group got
out of the restaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng
gulo." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and
respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were
chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest.
He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his
head with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual did not
see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto and
Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto.
Respondent Valdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time.
Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to
a friend's house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening before they returned to the campus
to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were three cars roaming the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis
Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants,
private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members
of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against
Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College
of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes,
Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio
(AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and
Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed
their respective answers.9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB
Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent
notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the
charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C.
Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon
Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a
lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of
your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement
of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the
principal act complained of.
For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common
defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:
3
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances when he was picked-up
by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But
on this particular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the car and thus, his
dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived at La Salle at 4:56
p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Parañaque
(on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his
house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports
Authority is located at the South Harbor.14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29,
1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat
irritation. He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4
minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette Aquino, attempted
to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He
said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the construction workers who were doing some works
in the apartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would wait for
him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers get paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly attesting to the fact
that he paid the workers at the date and time in question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with
some of the officers that we were preparing."17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They
were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of
the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105),
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE
(AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal
Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorariand
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36.
The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the
June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents,
representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment
of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct an allegation in
paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made
in the amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-
3-25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
(MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-
intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders
to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On June
20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order 32 denying petitioners' (respondents there) motion to
dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons acting for and in its behalf
is/are restrained and enjoined from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and
the petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming
the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent De La Salle
University and to immediately allow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents, representatives, or any and all
persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent (De La
Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete their
respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive
bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention will pay to respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court will
finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit. Respondents are directed to file their
Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to
enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court.34Aguilar also prayed
that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September
20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of
which reads:
4
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until further orders,
you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any
other person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated
May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution
dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment
of petitioner and intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree
courses until their graduation from said school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995
Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty
of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private
respondents were to be excluded.38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR
THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS,
DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or
attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal
of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to
petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes
pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco
refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to
comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to
reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy
available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further
prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed
to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for
Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private
respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner
DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to
dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private
respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in character, the pendency of a Motion
for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over
expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the
DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the
automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ
of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar's
urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted,
and respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the respondents at petitioners'
expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the
continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case
No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4,
1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long completed his course
at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as
indicated in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic
requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning
that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the
expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However,
because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different
5
directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete
their degree courses until their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the
substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling
reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.54 This
is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong
pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those involving students in
secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite
Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the
"Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review
over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes
no reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its
students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation,
recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher
learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review
powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of institutions of higher
education is limited to the powers and functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the
CHED has replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student
disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on
Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. – In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the
Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
and attached to the office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and
private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to
carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement
of growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'
power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as
institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision over all public and private
institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,
public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary
level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private."
That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs.
Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to
affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be
accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting
its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and
research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level
professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases
involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and
exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED
replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other government entities
having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be read in
conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered
state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to
the Commission [On Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being
transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans,
programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only
concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer
to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or
rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized
society as conceived by our entire history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.65
6
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal
minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain
of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 69So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact,
submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they
attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence
on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all
the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine
the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National University73where this Court
held that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may
be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes
determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang
akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
interest calls for some restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how
it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." 76 Indeed, while it is categorically
stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well
exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial
evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng
ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi
may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of
the crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been
established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose
testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi,
being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused. 82Alibi
is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an
alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of
truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime and were the
victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other,
the former must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it
is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable
doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Reverente.1awphi1They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29,
1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive
identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been
investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to
do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the
1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable institution
as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as
those who come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or
flowering if you will, of the total man.89
7
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame
in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the
certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at
about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp
Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine
Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our permission to
leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro
D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City),
and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when
it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an
accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays
lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent
with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible defense for what
could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of
justice in his favor.93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang
pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and
that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival."94 This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not
commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and
the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question.95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate
to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two
mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures
especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They
attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges
and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action
should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such,
pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private
respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and
dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997
are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On
the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.
from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168766 May 22, 2008
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
HENRY A. SOJOR, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?
Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate academic freedom?
The twin questions, among others, are posed in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which annulled two (2) CSC Resolutions2 against respondent Henry A. Sojor.
The Facts
The uncontroverted facts that led to the controversy, as found by the CSC and the CA, are as follows:
On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the Central
Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, or the "Higher
Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted. This law mandated that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed
to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed respondent as president, with a four-
year term beginning September 1998 up to September 2002.3 Upon the expiration of his first term of office in 2002,
he was appointed president of the institution for a second four-year term, expiring on September 24, 2006.4
On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU). 5 A Board of Regents
(BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members before
the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:
1. ADMC DC No. 02-20(A) – Complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service filed on June 26, 2002 by Jose Rene A. Cepe and Narciso P. Ragay. It was alleged that respondent
approved the release of salary differentials despite the absence of the required Plantilla and Salary Adjustment Form
and valid appointments.6
2. ADM DC No. 02-20 – Complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documents filed on July 10,
2002 by Jocelyn Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos. The complaint averred that respondent maliciously allowed the
antedating and falsification of the reclassification differential payroll, to the prejudice of instructors and professors
who have pending request for adjustment of their academic ranks.7
3. ADM DC No. 02-21 – Complaint for nepotism filed on August 15, 2002 by Rose Marie Palomar, a former part-time
instructor of CVPC. It was alleged that respondent appointed his half-sister, Estrellas Sojor-Managuilas, as casual
clerk, in violation of the provisions against nepotism under the Administrative Code.8
Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, bar by prior judgment and forum shopping.
He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of the non-competitive
or unclassified service of the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the
President (OP). He argued that CSC had no authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges against him; that
the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation, discipline, and removal of presidential appointees.
8
He also pointed out that the subject matter of the complaints had already been resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman.9
Finding no sufficient basis to sustain respondent’s arguments, the CSC-RO denied his motion to dismiss in its
Resolution dated September 4, 2002.10 His motion for reconsideration11 was likewise denied. Thus, respondent was
formally charged with three administrative cases, namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official
Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3)
Nepotism.12
Respondent appealed the actions of the regional office to the Commission proper (CSC), raising the same arguments
in his motion to dismiss.13 He argued that since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher Education
Chairperson who was under the OP, the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was appointed
by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted to
CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 80714 enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that this was
superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292,15 a later law which granted to the BOT the power to remove university
officials.
CSC Disposition
In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004,16 the CSC dismissed respondent’s appeal and authorized its regional office
to proceed with the investigation. He was also preventively suspended for 90 days. The fallo of the said resolution
states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Henry A. Sojor, President of Central Visayas Polytechnic College, is hereby
DISMISSED. The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, is authorized to proceed with the
formal investigation of the cases against Sojor and submit the investigation reports to the Commission within one
hundred five (105) days from receipt hereof. Finally, Sojor is preventively suspended for ninety (90) days. 17
In decreeing that it had jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against respondent, the CSC opined that his claim that
he was a presidential appointee had no basis in fact or in law. CSC maintained that it had concurrent jurisdiction with
the BOT of the CVPC. We quote:
His appointment dated September 23, 2002 was signed by then Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chairman
Ester A. Garcia. Moreover, the said appointment expressly stated that it was approved and adopted by the Central
Visayas Polytechnic College Board of Trustees on August 13, 2002 in accordance with Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8292 (Higher education Modernization Act of 1997), which explicitly provides that, "He (the president of a state
college) shall be appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees, upon recommendation of a duly constituted search
committee." Since the President of a state college is appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees of the
college concerned, it is crystal clear that he is not a presidential appointee. Therefore, it is without doubt
that Sojor, being the President of a state college (Central Visayas Polytechnic College), is within the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission.
The allegation of appellant Sojor that the Commission is bereft of disciplinary jurisdiction over him since the same is
exclusively lodged in the CVPC Board of Trustees, being the appointing authority, cannot be considered. The
Commission and the CVPC Board of Trustees have concurrent jurisdiction over cases against officials and
employees of the said agency. Since the three (3) complaints against Sojor were filed with the Commission and
not with the CVPC, then the former already acquired disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant to the exclusion of
the latter agency.18 (Emphasis supplied)
The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official, as defined under its rules, who are under the jurisdiction of
the Commission proper. Nevertheless, it adopted the formal charges issued by its regional office and ordered it to
proceed with the investigation:
Pursuant to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sojor, being a third level official, is within
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission Proper. Thus, strictly speaking, the Commission has the sole
jurisdiction to issue the formal charge against Sojor. x x x However, since the CSC RO No. VII already issued the
formal charges against him and found merit in the said formal charges, the same is adopted. The CSC RO No. VII
is authorized to proceed with the formal investigation of the case against Sojor in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the aforestated Uniform Rules.19 (Emphasis supplied)
No merit was found by the CSC in respondent’s motion for reconsideration and, accordingly, denied it with finality on
July 6, 2004.20
Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the
CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and
that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC was exclusively lodged in the BOT of
CVPC.
CA Disposition
On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the CSC to cease and desist from
enforcing its Resolution dated March 30, 2004 and Resolution dated July 6, 2004.21 Thus, the formal investigation of
the administrative charges against Sojor before the CSC-RO was suspended.
On June 27, 2005, after giving both parties an opportunity to air their sides, the CA resolved in favor of respondent.
It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the
administrative investigation. The dispositive part of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding that the respondent Civil Service Commission acted without
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution Nos. 040321 and 040766 dated March 20, 2004 and July 6, 2004,
respectively, the same are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on
September 29, 2004 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.22
The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. It declared that the
enactment of R.A. No. 929923 in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power to
discipline and remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed as
president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.24 The power
of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative officials as expressly
provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No.
9299. The said provision reads:
Power and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties
in addition to its general powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of
a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines:
xxxx
to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees x x x; and to remove them
for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis added)
The CA added that Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,25 which grants disciplinary jurisdiction to the CSC over all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, is a general law. According to the appellate court, E.O. No. 292 does
not prevail over R.A. No. 9299,26 a special law.
Issues
Petitioner CSC comes to Us, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA on the ground that THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
RESOLUTION NO. 040321 DATED MARCH 30, 2004 AND RESOLUTION NO. 04766 DATED JULY 6, 2004. 27
9
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I. Jurisdiction of the CSC
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service.28 As defined, the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or
controlled corporation.29 It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. Career service positions
are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity
for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. These include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic
staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
the President;
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as
the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.30
Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the first two levels is determined through
competitive examinations, while entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board. 31 The
positions covered by each level are:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve non-professional
or subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate
studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional,
technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work
up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.32
On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by: (1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit and
fitness; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made.33 The law states:
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential
staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the
specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency;
and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.34
It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil
service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of general jurisdiction, the
CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.35 We find that the specific
jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from the general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The
jurisdiction of the Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office (Commission Proper) is specified in
the CSC rules as:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. – The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil
service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees.
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. – The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have
jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing
penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary brought before it on
appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by the agencies and
such other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the foregoing enumerations.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought before it;
2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for executive clemency;
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving third level officials; and
4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation with the foregoing enumerations.
Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. – The Civil Service Commission Regional Offices shall have
jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices provided that
the alleged acts or omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil
Service examination anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of agencies,
local or national, within said geographical areas;
2. Complaints involving Civil Service Commission Regional Office personnel who are appointees of said office; and
3. Petitions to place respondent under Preventive Suspension.
B. Non-Disciplinary
10
1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on appeal;
2. Protests against the appointments of first and second level employees brought before it directly or on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of
the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing
board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the
CSC.
II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent
jurisdiction over a president of a state university.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, under which law respondent was
appointed during the time material to the present case, provides that the school’s governing board shall have the
general powers of administration granted to a corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the
power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and employees for cause:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the following specific
powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers
granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known
as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the provisions
of the revised compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing
hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves
of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not
withstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the succeeding law that converted CVPC into
NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the
administration of the university and exercise of corporate powers of the board of the school shall be exclusive:
Sec. 4. Administration. – The University shall have the general powers of a corporation set forth in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 68, as amended, otherwise known as "The Corporation Code of the Philippines." The administration of the
University and the exercise of its corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Regents and
the president of the University insofar as authorized by the Board.
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that administrative power over the school exclusively
belongs to its BOR. But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power to remove its erring employees
and officials?
In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondent’s argument that the BOR has exclusive power to remove
its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members,
employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of administration."
This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292, demonstrating that the
intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. For clarity, the text of the said section
is reproduced below:
Sec. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board of Regents. – The Board shall have the following specific powers and
duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the Board
of Directors of a corporation under existing laws:
xxxx
i. To fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees, subject to the provisions
of the Revised Compensation and Position Classification System and other pertinent budget and compensation laws
governing hours of service and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its
discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provision of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process
of law.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not exclusive
in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials,
there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.37
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-
career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service
official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.
This is not a case of first impression.
In University of the Philippines v. Regino,38 this Court struck down the claim of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP BOR
to discipline its employees. The Court held then:
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary
cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the power to
"hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought
to it on appeal." And Section 37(a) provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office."
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their
creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution, only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1),
which states:
"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973
Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a
component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the
discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.39 (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria,40 this Court lent credence to the concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC
when it affirmed that a case against a university official may be filed either with the university’s BOR or directly with
the CSC. We quote:
Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP
Board of Regents, was contrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he cites no specific provision of the Civil Service
Law which was violated by the respondents in forming the investigating committee. The Civil Service Rules embodied
in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the Secretary and the university, through its governing board, to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Of
11
course under EO 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed either with the university’s
Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC may delegate the
investigation of a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department, agency, official or group of
officials to conduct such investigation.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed before the regional office, concerning
violations of civil service rules against respondent.
III. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged violations of civil service laws and rules.
Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of action under the principle of academic
freedom. Academic freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.42 Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that
institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and
objectives, free from outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires. 43 They have the
independence to determine who to accept to study in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to
enroll a student.44
That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters traditionally held
to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve
violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are classified as grave offenses under
civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.45
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory basis.46 For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service,
may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under
the principle of academic freedom.
Lastly, We do not agree with respondent’s contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU,
despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts
imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.47 and Aguinaldo v. Santos48 are
inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike
respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people.49 Under
the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign
will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
YOLANDA M. MERCADO, G.R. No. 183572
CHARITO S. DE LEON, DIANA R. LACHICA,
MARGARITO M. ALBA, JR., and FELIX A. TONOG, Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ, and
*MENDOZA, JJ.
AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-PARAAQUE CITY,
INC. , Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 13, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petitioners Yolanda M. Mercado (Mercado), Charito S. De Leon (De Leon), Diana R. Lachica (Lachica), Margarito
M. Alba, Jr. (Alba, Jr.,), and Felix A. Tonog (Tonog), all former faculty members of AMA Computer College-Paraaque
City, Inc. (AMACC) assail in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of November
29,
2007[2] and its resolution of June 20, 2008[3] that set aside the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC)
resolution dated July 18, 2005.[4]
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts are not disputed and are summarized below.
AMACC is an educational institution engaged in computer-based education in the country. One of AMACCs biggest
schools in the country is its branch at Paraaque City. The petitioners were faculty members who started teaching at
AMACC on May 25, 1998. The petitioner Mercado was engaged as a Professor 3, while petitioner Tonog was
engaged as an Assistant Professor 2. On the other hand, petitioners De Leon, Lachica and Alba, Jr., were all
engaged as Instructor 1.[5] The petitioners executed individual Teachers Contracts for each of the trimesters that they
were engaged to teach, with the following common stipulation:[6]
1. POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in the College of xxx
effective xxx to xxx or for the duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given a teaching loadbased on the
assignment duly approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO. [Emphasis supplied]
For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth in its Guidelines on
the Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla.[7] Under the new screening guidelines, teachers were to be hired or
maintained based on extensive teaching experience, capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research
background. The performance standards under the new screening guidelines were also used to determine the
present faculty members entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based
on the performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase. [8]
Because of AMACCs action on the salary increases, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation,
13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices.[9]
12
On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a memorandum from AMACC, through Human
Resources Supervisor Mary Grace Beronia, informing them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their
contract would no longer be renewed.[10] The memorandum[11] entitled Notice of Non-Renewal of Contract states in
full:
In view of the expiration of your contract to teach with AMACC-Paranaque, We wish to inform you that your contract
shall no longer be renewed effective Thirty (30) days upon receipt of this notice. We therefore would like to thank you
for your service and wish you good luck as you pursue your career.
You are hereby instructed to report to the HRD for further instruction. Please bear in mind that as per company policy,
you are required to accomplish your clearance and turn-over all documents and accountabilities to your immediate
superior.
For your information and guidance
The petitioners amended their labor arbitration complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal against AMACC. In
their Position Paper, the petitioners claimed that their dismissal was illegal because it was made in retaliation for their
complaint for monetary benefits and discriminatory practices against AMACC. The petitioners also contended that
AMACC failed to give them adequate notice; hence, their dismissal was ineffectual. [12]
AMACC contended in response that the petitioners worked under a contracted term under a non-tenured appointment
and were still within the three-year probationary period for teachers. Their contracts were not renewed for the
following term because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST) while others
failed to comply with the other requirements for regularization, promotion, or increase in salary. This move, according
to AMACC, was justified since the school has to maintain its high academic standards. [13]
The Labor Arbiter Ruling
On March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter (LA) Florentino R. Darlucio declared in his decision[14] that the petitioners had been
illegally dismissed, and ordered AMACC to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and
to pay them full backwages, attorneys fees and 13th month pay. The LA ruled that Article 281 of the Labor Code on
probationary employment applied to the case; that AMACC allowed the petitioners to teach for the first semester of
school year 2000-200; that AMACC did not specify who among the petitioners failed to pass the PAST and who
among them did not comply with the other requirements of regularization, promotions or increase in salary; and that
the petitioners dismissal could not be sustained on the basis of AMACCs vague and general allegations without
substantial factual basis.[15] Significantly, the LA found no discrimination in the adjustments for the salary rate of the
faculty members based on the performance and other qualification which is an exercise of management
prerogative.[16] On this basis, the LA paid no heed to the claims for salary increases.
The NLRC Ruling
On appeal, the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 18, 2005 [17] denied AMACCs appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in toto the LAs ruling. The NLRC, however, observed that the applicable law is Section 92 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools (which mandates a probationary period of nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory
service for academic personnel in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis),
not Article 281 of the Labor Code (which prescribes a probationary period of six months) as the LA ruled. Despite
this observation, the NLRC affirmed the LAs finding of illegal dismissal since the petitioners were terminated on the
basis of standards that were only introduced near the end of their probationary period.
The NLRC ruled that the new screening guidelines for the school year 2000-20001 cannot be imposed on the
petitioners and their employment contracts since the new guidelines were not imposed when the petitioners were
first employed in 1998. According to the NLRC, the imposition of the new guidelines violates Section 6(d) of Rule I,
Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which provides that in all cases of probationary employment,
the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at
the time of his engagement. Citing our ruling in Orient Express Placement Philippines v. NLRC,[18] the NLRC stressed
that the rudiments of due process demand that employees should be informed beforehand of the conditions of their
employment as well as the basis for their advancement.
AMACC elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It charged that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) ruling that the petitioners were illegally dismissed; (2) refusing
to recognize and give effect to the petitioners valid term of employment; (3) ruling that AMACC cannot apply the
performance standards generally applicable to all faculty members; and (4) ordering the petitioners reinstatement
and awarding them backwages and attorneys fees.
The CA Ruling
In a decision issued on November 29, 2007,[19] the CA granted AMACCs petition for certiorari and dismissed the
petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal.
The CA ruled that under the Manual for Regulations for Private Schools, a teaching personnel in a private educational
institution (1) must be a full time teacher; (2) must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such
service must be satisfactory before he or she can acquire permanent status.
The CA noted that the petitioners had not completed three (3) consecutive years of service (i.e. six regular semesters
or nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service) and were still within their probationary period; their teaching
stints only covered a period of two (2) years and three (3) months when AMACC decided not to renew their contracts
on September 7, 2000.
The CA effectively found reasonable basis for AMACC not to renew the petitioners contracts. To the CA, the
petitioners were not actually dismissed; their respective contracts merely expired and were no longer renewed by
AMACC because they failed to satisfy the schools standards for the school year 2000-2001 that measured their
fitness and aptitude to teach as regular faculty members. The CA emphasized that in the absence of any evidence
of bad faith on AMACCs part, the court would not disturb or nullify its discretion to set standards and to select for
regularization only the teachers who qualify, based on reasonable and non-discriminatory guidelines.
The CA disagreed with the NLRCs ruling that the new guidelines for the school year 2000-20001 could not be
imposed on the petitioners and their employment contracts. The appellate court opined that AMACC has the inherent
right to upgrade the quality of computer education it offers to the public; part of this pursuit is the implementation of
continuing evaluation and screening of its faculty members for academic excellence. The CA noted that the nature
13
of education AMACC offers demands that the school constantly adopt progressive performance standards for its
faculty to ensure that they keep pace with the rapid developments in the field of information technology.
Finally, the CA found that the petitioners were hired on a non-tenured basis and for a fixed and predetermined term
based on the Teaching Contract exemplified by the contract between the petitioner Lachica and AMACC. The CA
ruled that the non-renewal of the petitioners teaching contracts is sanctioned by the doctrine laid down in Brent
School, Inc. v. Zamora[20] where the Court recognized the validity of contracts providing for fixed-period employment.
THE PETITION
The petitioners cite the following errors in the CA decision:[21]
1) The CA gravely erred in reversing the LA and NLRC illegal dismissal rulings; and
2) The CA gravely erred in not ordering their reinstatement with full, backwages.
The petitioners submit that the CA should not have disturbed the findings of the LA and the NLRC that they were
illegally dismissed; instead, the CA should have accorded great respect, if not finality, to the findings of these
specialized bodies as these findings were supported by evidence on record. Citing our ruling in Soriano v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[22] the petitioners contend that in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the CA does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
based their conclusions. They submit that the CA erred when it substituted its judgment for that of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC who were the triers of facts who had the opportunity to review the evidence extensively.
On the merits, the petitioners argue that the applicable law on probationary employment, as explained by the LA, is
Article 281 of the Labor Code which mandates a period of six (6) months as the maximum duration of the probationary
period unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; that the CA should not have disturbed the LAs conclusion that
the AMACC failed to support its allegation that they did not qualify under the new guidelines adopted for the school
year 2000-2001; and that they were illegally dismissed; their employment was terminated based on standards that
were not made known to them at the time of their engagement. On the whole, the petitioners argue that the LA and
the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion that the CA can validly cite.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
In their Comment,[23] AMACC notes that the petitioners raised no substantial argument in support of their petition and
that the CA correctly found that the petitioners were hired on a non-tenured basis and for a fixed or predetermined
term. AMACC stresses that the CA was correct in concluding that no actual dismissal transpired; it simply did not
renew the petitioners respective employment contracts because of their poor performance and failure to satisfy the
schools standards.
AMACC also asserts that the petitioners knew very well that the applicable standards would be revised and updated
from time to time given the nature of the teaching profession. The petitioners also knew at the time of their
engagement that they must comply with the schools regularization policies as stated in the Faculty
Manual. Specifically, they must obtain a passing rating on the Performance Appraisal for Teachers (PAST)
the primary instrument to measure the performance of faculty members.
Since the petitioners were not actually dismissed, AMACC submits that the CA correctly ruled that they are not
entitled to reinstatement, full backwages and attorneys fees.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The CAs Review of Factual Findings under Rule 65
We agree with the petitioners that, as a rule in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA
does not assess and weigh each piece of evidence introduced in the case. The CA only examines the factual findings
of the NLRC to determine whether or not the conclusions are supported by substantial evidence whose absence
points to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [24] In the recent case of Protacio v.
Laya Mananghaya & Co.,[25] we emphasized that:
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess
and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query
in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate
court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by
substantial evidence. The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate courts reversals of the decisions of
labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence. [Emphasis supplied]
As discussed below, our review of the records and of the CA decision shows that the CA erred in recognizing that
grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRCs conclusion that the petitioners were illegally dismissed. Consistent
with this conclusion, the evidence on record show that AMACC failed to discharge its burden of proving by substantial
evidence the just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners contracts.
In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,[26] we laid down our basic approach in the review of Rule 65 decisions
of the CA in labor cases, as follows:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for
jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of
law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the
same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in
the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal,
of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA
ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
14
Following this approach, our task is to determine whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that the petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Legal Environment in the Employment of Teachers
a. Rule on Employment on Probationary Status
A reality we have to face in the consideration of employment on probationary status of teaching personnel is that
they are not governed purely by the Labor Code. The Labor Code is supplemented with respect to the period of
probation by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.[27] On the matter of probationary
period, Section 92 of these regulations provides:
Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school
requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years
of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of
satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for
those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. [Emphasis supplied]
The CA pointed this out in its decision (as the NLRC also did), and we confirm the correctness of this
conclusion. Other than on the period, the following quoted portion of Article 281 of the Labor Code still fully applies:
x x x The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just
cause when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by
the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. [Emphasis supplied]
b. Fixed-period Employment
The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers probationary period is likewise an accepted practice in
the teaching profession. We mentioned this in passing in Magis Young Achievers Learning Center v. Adelaida P.
Manalo,[28] albeit a case that involved elementary, not tertiary, education, and hence spoke of a school year rather
than a semester or a trimester. We noted in this case:
The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a contract, effective for one school
year. At the end of the school year, the employer has the option not to renew the contract, particularly considering
the teachers performance. If the contract is not renewed, the employment relationship terminates. If the contract is
renewed, usually for another school year, the probationary employment continues. Again, at the end of that period,
the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If renewed, this second renewal of the contract for another
school year would then be the last year since it would be the third school year of probationary employment. At the
end of this third year, the employer may now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the
employee, primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable standards of competence and
efficiency set by the employer. For the entire duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under
probation. Upon the expiration of his contract of employment, being simply on probation, he cannot
automatically claim security of tenure and compel the employer to renew his employment contract. It is when
the yearly contract is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes operative, and the teacher
then is entitled to regular or permanent employment status.
It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term of its effectivity. The failure to
stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year probationary
period.
We have long settled the validity of a fixed-term contract in the case Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora[29] that AMACC
cited. Significantly, Brent happened in a school setting. Care should be taken, however, in reading Brent in the
context of this case as Brent did not involve any probationary employment issue; it dealt purely and simply with the
validity of a fixed-term employment under the terms of the Labor Code, then newly issued and which does not
expressly contain a provision on fixed-term employment.
c. Academic and Management Prerogative
Last but not the least factor in the academic world, is that a school enjoys academic freedom a guarantee that enjoys
protection from the Constitution no less. Section 5(2) Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom.[30]
The institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide and adopt its aims and
objectives, and to determine how these objections can best be attained, free from outside coercion or interference,
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the
term academic freedom encompass the freedom of the school or college to determine for itself: (1) who may teach;
(2) who may be taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.[31]
AMACCs right to academic freedom is particularly important in the present case, because of the new screening
guidelines for AMACC faculty put in place for the school year 2000-2001. We agree with the CA that AMACC has
the inherent right to establish high standards of competency and efficiency for its faculty members in order to achieve
and maintain academic excellence. The schools prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and to determine
whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom that gives the educational
institution the right to choose who should teach.[32] In Pea v. National Labor Relations Commission,[33] we
emphasized:
It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a
mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty
to set them aside. Schools cannot be required to adopt standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government
recognition.
The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions for hiring
its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code. Academic freedom, too, is not the
only legal basis for AMACCs issuance of screening guidelines. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected
by its management prerogative the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the
freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of
employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers.[34] Thus, AMACC
has every right to determine for itself that it shall use fixed-term employment contracts as its medium for hiring its
15
teachers. It also acted within the terms of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools when it recognized the
petitioners to be merely on probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters.
The Conflict: Probationary Status
and Fixed-term Employment
The existence of the term-to-term contracts covering the petitioners employment is not disputed, nor is it disputed
that they were on probationary status not permanent or regular status from the time they were employed on May 25,
1998 and until the expiration of their Teaching Contracts on September 7, 2000. As the CA correctly found, their
teaching stints only covered a period of at least seven (7) consecutive trimesters or two (2) years and three (3)
months of service. This case, however, brings to the fore the essential question of which, between the two
factors affecting employment, should prevail given AMACCs position that the teachers contracts expired
and it had the right not to renew them. In other words, should the teachers probationary status be disregarded
simply because the contracts were fixed-term?
The provision on employment on probationary status under the Labor Code [35] is a primary example of the fine
balancing of interests between labor and management that the Code has institutionalized pursuant to the underlying
intent of the Constitution.[36]
On the one hand, employment on probationary status affords management the chance to fully scrutinize the true
worth of hired personnel before the full force of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution comes into
play.[37] Based on the standards set at the start of the probationary period, management is given the widest
opportunity during the probationary period to reject hirees who fail to meet its own adopted but reasonable
standards.[38] These standards, together with the just[39] and authorized causes[40] for termination of employment the
Labor Code expressly provides, are the grounds available to terminate the employment of a teacher on probationary
status. For example, the school may impose reasonably stricter attendance or report compliance records on teachers
on probation, and reject a probationary teacher for failing in this regard, although the same attendance or compliance
record may not be required for a teacher already on permanent status. At the same time, the same just and authorizes
causes for dismissal under the Labor Code apply to probationary teachers, so that they may be the first to be laid-off
if the school does not have enough students for a given semester or trimester. Termination of employment on this
basis is an authorized cause under the Labor Code.[41]
Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of knowing the company standards the new
hires have to meet during the probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards, aside from the
usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code,
these standards should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their probationary
period, or at the very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester
during which the probationary standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet the
probationary standards, is that the school should show as a matter of due process how these standards have been
applied. This is effectively the second notice in a dismissal situation that the law requires as a due process guarantee
supporting the security of tenure provision,[42] and is in furtherance, too, of the basic rule in employee dismissal that
the employer carries the burden of justifying a dismissal. [43] These rules ensure compliance with the limited security
of tenure guarantee the law extends to probationary employees.[44]
When fixed-term employment is brought into play under the above probationary period rules, the situation as in the
present case may at first blush look muddled as fixed-term employment is in itself a valid employment mode under
Philippine law and jurisprudence.[45] The conflict, however, is more apparent than real when the respective nature of
fixed-term employment and of employment on probationary status are closely examined.
The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the period agreed upon between the employer and the
employee; employment exists only for the duration of the term and ends on its own when the term expires. In a sense,
employment on probationary status also refers to a period because of the technical meaning probation carries in
Philippine labor law a maximum period of six months, or in the academe, a period of three years for those engaged
in teaching jobs. Their similarity ends there, however, because of the overriding meaning that being on
probation connotes, i.e., a process of testing and observing the character or abilities of a person who is new to a role
or job.[46]
Understood in the above sense, the essentially protective character of probationary status for management can
readily be appreciated. But this same protective character gives rise to the countervailing but equally protective rule
that the probationary period can only last for a specific maximum period and under reasonable, well-laid and properly
communicated standards. Otherwise stated, within the period of the probation, any employer move based on the
probationary standards and affecting the continuity of the employment must strictly conform to the probationary rules.
Under the given facts where the school year is divided into trimesters, the school apparently utilizes its fixed-term
contracts as a convenient arrangement dictated by the trimestral system and not because the workplace parties
really intended to limit the period of their relationship to any fixed term and to finish this relationship at the end of that
term. If we pierce the veil, so to speak, of the parties so-called fixed-term employment contracts, what undeniably
comes out at the core is a fixed-term contract conveniently used by the school to define and regulate its relations
with its teachers during their probationary period.
To be sure, nothing is illegitimate in defining the school-teacher relationship in this manner. The school, however,
cannot forget that its system of fixed-term contract is a system that operates during the probationary period and for
this reason is subject to the terms of Article 281 of the Labor Code. Unless this reconciliation is made, the
requirements of this Article on probationary status would be fully negated as the school may freely choose
not to renew contracts simply because their terms have expired. The inevitable effect of course is to wreck
the scheme that the Constitution and the Labor Code established to balance relationships between labor
and management.
Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude that in a situation where the probationary
status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume
primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way. This conclusion is immeasurably strengthened
by the petitioners and the AMACCs hardly concealed expectation that the employment on probation could lead to
permanent status, and that the contracts are renewable unless the petitioners fail to pass the schools standards.
To highlight what we mean by a fixed-term contract specifically used for the fixed term it offers, a replacement
teacher, for example, may be contracted for a period of one year to temporarily take the place of a permanent teacher
on a one-year study leave. The expiration of the replacement teachers contracted term, under the circumstances,
leads to no probationary status implications as she was never employed on probationary basis; her employment is
16
for a specific purpose with particular focus on the term and with every intent to end her teaching relationship with the
school upon expiration of this term.
If the school were to apply the probationary standards (as in fact it says it did in the present case), these standards
must not only be reasonable but must have also been communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary
period, or at the very least, at the start of the period when they were to be applied. These terms, in addition to those
expressly provided by the Labor Code, would serve as the just cause for the termination of the probationary
contract. As explained above, the details of this finding of just cause must be communicated to the affected teachers
as a matter of due process.
AMACC, by its submissions, admits that it did not renew the petitioners contracts because they failed to pass the
Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST) and other requirements for regularization that the school
undertakes to maintain its high academic standards.[47] The evidence is unclear on the exact terms of the standards,
although the school also admits that these were standards under the Guidelines on the Implementation of AMACC
Faculty Plantilla put in place at the start of school year 2000-2001.
While we can grant that the standards were duly communicated to the petitioners and could be applied beginning the
1st trimester of the school year 2000-2001, glaring and very basic gaps in the schools evidence still exist. The exact
terms of the standards were never introduced as evidence; neither does the evidence show how these standards
were applied to the petitioners.[48] Without these pieces of evidence (effectively, the finding of just cause for the non-
renewal of the petitioners contracts), we have nothing to consider and pass upon as valid or invalid for each of the
petitioners.Inevitably, the non-renewal (or effectively, the termination of employment of employees on probationary
status) lacks the supporting finding of just cause that the law requires and, hence, is illegal.
In this light, the CA decision should be reversed. Thus, the LAs decision, affirmed as to the results by the NLRC,
should stand as the decision to be enforced, appropriately re-computed to consider the period of appeal and review
of the case up to our level.
Given the period that has lapsed and the inevitable change of circumstances that must have taken place in the interim
in the academic world and at AMACC, which changes inevitably affect current school operations, we hold that - in
lieu of reinstatement - the petitioners should be paid separation pay computed on a trimestral basis from the time of
separation from service up to the end of the complete trimester preceding the finality of this Decision.[49] The
separation pay shall be in addition to the other awards, properly recomputed, that the LA originally decreed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and, consequently, REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated June 20, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 96599. The Labor Arbiters decision of March 15, 2002, subsequently affirmed as to the results by
the National Labor Relations Commission, stands and should be enforced with appropriate re-computation to take
into account the date of the finality of this Decision.
In lieu of reinstatement, AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc. is hereby DIRECTED to pay separation pay
computed on a trimestral basis from the time of separation from service up to the end of the complete trimester
preceding the finality of this Decision. For greater certainty, the petitioners are entitled to:
(a) backwages and 13th month pay computed from September 7, 2000 (the date AMA Computer
College-Paraaque City, Inc. illegally dismissed the petitioners) up to the finality of this Decision;
(b) monthly honoraria (if applicable) computed from September 7, 2000 (the time of separation from
service) up to the finality of this Decision; and
(c) separation pay on a trimestral basis from September 7, 2000 (the time of separation from service) up to the end
of the complete trimester preceding the finality of this Decision.
The labor arbiter is hereby ORDERED to make another re-computation according to the above directives. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207412 August 7, 2013
FLORD NICSON CALAWAG, PETITIONER,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS AND DEAN CARLOS C. BAYLON, RESPONDENTS.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207542
MICAH P. ESPIA, JOSE MARIE F. NASALGA AND CHE CHE B. SALCEPUEDES, PETITIONERS,
vs.
DR. CARLOS C. BA YLON, DR. MINDA J. FORMACI ON AND DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN (TO BE SUBSTITUTED
BY ALFREDO E. PASCUAL, BEING THE NEW UP PRESIDENT), UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD
OF REGENTS, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
This case involves the consolidated petitions of petitioner Flord Nicson Calawag in G.R. No. 207412 and petitioners
Micah P. Espia, Jose Marie F. Nasalga and Che Che B. Salcepuedes in G.R. No. 207542 (hereinafter collectively
known as petitioners), both assailing the decision1 dated August 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 05079. The CA annulled the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67,
granting a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent Dean Carlos Baylon of the University of the
Philippines Visayas (UP Visayas).
The petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship from the
Department of Science and Technology-Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development. They
finished their first year of study with good grades, and thus were eligible to start their thesis in the first semester of
their second year. The petitioners then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis titles, and obtained
the consent of Dr. Rex Baleña to be their thesis adviser, as well as the other faculty members’ consent to constitute
their respective thesis committees. These details were enclosed in the letters the petitioners sent to Dean Baylon,
asking him to approve the composition of their thesis committees. The letter contained the thesis committee members
and the thesis adviser’s approval of their titles, as well as the approval of Professor Roman Sanares, the director of
the Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanology.
Upon receipt of the petitioners’ letters, Dean Baylon wrote a series of memos addressed to Professor Sanares,
questioning the propriety of the thesis topics with the college’s graduate degree program. He subsequently
disapproved the composition of the petitioners’ thesis committees and their tentative thesis topics. According to Dean
Baylon, the petitioners’ thesis titles connote a historical and social dimension study which is not appropriate for the
petitioners’ chosen master’s degrees. Dean Baylon thereafter ordered the petitioners to submit a two-page proposal
containing an outline of their tentative thesis titles, and informed them that he is forming an ad hoc committee that
would take over the role of the adviser and of the thesis committees.
The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC, asking it to order Dean Baylon to
approve and constitute the petitioners’ thesis committees and approve their thesis titles. They also asked that the
17
RTC issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean Baylon, and order him to perform such acts while
the suit was pending.
The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylon allegedly refused to follow. UP
Visayas eventually assailed this order before the CA through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO).
The CA’s Ruling
The CA issued a TRO against the implementation of the RTC’s order, holding that the petitioners had no clear right
to compel Dean Baylon to approve the composition of their thesis committees as a matter of course. As the college
dean, Dean Baylon exercises supervisory authority in all academic matters affecting the college. According to the
CA, the petitioners’ reliance on Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas is misplaced. Article 51
provides:
Art. 51. The composition of the thesis committee shall be approved by the dean of the college/school upon the
recommendation of the chairperson of the major department/division/institute. The GPO shall be informed of the
composition of the thesis committee and/or any change thereof.3
Despite the mandatory language provided for composing the thesis committee under Article 51 of the Graduate
Program Manual of UP Visayas, the CA construed it to mean that the Dean’s approval is necessary prior to the
composition of a thesis committee.
Lastly, the CA held that the case presents issues that are purely academic in character, which are outside the court’s
jurisdiction. It also noted that Dean Baylon has been accommodating of the petitioners, and that the requirements he
imposed were meant to assist them to formulate a proper thesis title and graduate on time.
The Petitions for Review on Certiorari
In G.R. No. 207412, Calawag argues that the CA’s decision should be set aside for the following reasons:
First, Calawag was entitled to the injunction prayed for, as he has clear rights under the law which were violated by
Dean Baylon’s actions. These are the right to education, the right to due process, and the right to equal protection
under the law. According to Calawag, Dean Baylon violated his right to due process when he added to and changed
the requirements for the constitution of his thesis committee, without prior publication of the change in rules.
Calawag’s right to equal protection of the law, on the other hand, was allegedly violated because only students like
him, who chose Dr. Baleña for their thesis adviser, were subjected to the additional requirements imposed by the
dean, while the other students’ thesis committees were formed without these impositions. Hence, Calawag and the
three other petitioners in G.R. No. 207542 were unduly discriminated against.
Second, a reading of Executive Order No. 628, s. 1980,4 and Republic Act No. 95005 shows that the college dean’s
functions are merely administrative, and, hence, the CA erred in its construction of Article 51 of the Graduate Program
Manual of UP Visayas, as well as its proclamation that the college dean has supervisory authority over academic
matters in the college.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 207542, petitioners Espia, Nasalga and Salcepuedes argue that the CA’s decision
should be set aside for the following reasons:
First, the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas and the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program
are clear in providing that Dean Baylon has a formal duty to approve the composition of the petitioners’ thesis
committees upon the latter’s compliance with several requirements. Thus, when the petitioners complied with these
requirements and Dean Baylon still refused to approve the composition of their thesis committees, the petitioners
had a right to have him compelled to perform his duty.
Second, Dean Baylon cannot arbitrarily change and alter the manual and the guidelines, and cannot use academic
freedom as subterfuge for not performing his duties.
Third, the thesis adviser and the thesis committees, in consultations with the students, have the right to choose the
thesis topics, and not the dean.
The Court’s Ruling
Having reviewed the arguments presented by the petitioners and the records they have attached to the petitions, we
find that the CA did not commit an error in judgment in setting aside the preliminary mandatory injunction that the
RTC issued against Dean Baylon. Thus, there could be no basis for the Court’s exercise of its discretionary power
to review the CA’s decision.
"To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Since a
preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is
thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction [presents a fourth requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute.
When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is improper."6
The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the protection
of a preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CA’s conclusion that the dean has the discretion to approve
or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, the petitioners had no right for an automatic
approval and composition of their thesis committees.
Calawag’s citation of Executive Order No. 628, s. 1980 and Republic Act No. 9500 to show that the dean of a college
exercises only administrative functions and, hence, has no ascendancy over the college’s academic matters, has no
legal ground to stand on. Neither law provides or supports such conclusion, as neither specifies the role and
responsibilities of a college dean. The functions and duties of a college dean are outlined in the university’s Faculty
Manual, which details the rules and regulations governing the university’s administration. Section 11.8.2, paragraph
b of the Faculty Manual enumerates the powers and responsibilities of a college dean, which include the power to
approve the composition of a thesis committee, to wit:
11.8.2 Administration
xxxx
b. Dean/Director of UP System or UP Diliman-based Programs * The Dean/Director shall be responsible for the
planning and
implementation of the graduate programs. In particular, the Dean/Director shall exercise the following powers and
responsibilities based on the recommendations forwarded to him/her, through channels:
xxxx
Approve the composition of the Thesis, Dissertation or Special Project** Committees and Master’s or doctoral
examination/oral defense panel for each student[.]7 (emphases and italics ours)
By necessary implication,8 the dean’s power to approve includes the power to disapprove the composition of a thesis
committee. Thus, under the UP System’s faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in approving or
disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual
of UP Visayas, and the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the CA’s
interpretation that the thesis committee’s composition needs the approval of the dean after the students have
complied with the requisites provided in Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual and Section IX of the Guidelines
for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program.9
Anent the petitioners’ argument that Dean Baylon acted arbitrarily in imposing additional requirements for the
composition of the thesis committee, which according to Calawag violated their right to due process, we hold that the
dean’s authority to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee includes this discretion. We also
note the CA’s finding that these additional requirements were meant to assist the petitioners in formulating a thesis
18
title that is in line with the college’s master of fisheries program. Absent any finding of grave abuse of discretion, we
cannot interfere with the exercise of the dean’s prerogative without encroaching on the college’s academic freedom.
Verily, the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves
their aims and objectives and how best to attain them.10 They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who
can and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates.11
This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis,
and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students. The courts may not interfere with their exercise
of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment.12
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego,13 we held that the right to education is not
absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a profession
or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements." The thesis
requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements
a person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply with.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY giving due course to the petitions in G.R. No. 207412 and G.R. No.
207542.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the
eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on
18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block
of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995);
and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match
the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed
in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that since
51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent
GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the
tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares
of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x
x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business
may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial
sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
19
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the
events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of
the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen
since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet
taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly,
the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do
not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined
as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into
by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution
is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar
to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of
a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view
is, as it has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they
quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the
wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified
Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against
aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over
aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing
laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example,
qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied
by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further
laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or
place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and
add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for
a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power
on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument
is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State
still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
20
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not
by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in
one part and non-self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles
and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to
legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of
the youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of education.[25] Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights[27] and on
education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity
of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and
development.[33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission [34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.Therefore,
we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty
of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During
World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as
the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was
the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine
Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino
First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at
least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist
in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY
SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose
it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned
by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent
Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not
to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual
Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that
I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
21
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that
Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still
further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo[43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as
the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate
the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified
foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as
one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that
the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the
hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-
executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional
provision - by the government itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty
to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need
implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply
afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts,
it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the
executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is
confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that
the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent
Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale
of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages
in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is
evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and
third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS,
is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of
the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3)
branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among
others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from
the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding
rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance
that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award
yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents
are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to
all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. [47] Certainly, the constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding
its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning
to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which
investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since
petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the
sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In
the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
22
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally
made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes
or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to
be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the
majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court
to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages
and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been
spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in connection
with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian
Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind
referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure
that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and
ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses,
regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond
judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely
for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are
talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines
as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation
of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila
Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark
- this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the
Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable
alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be
equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is
sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in
the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements
and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as
taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and
as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE
PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA,
JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their
respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President
of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN,
23
in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance;
ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast
majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has
irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization,
deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business
by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national
economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented
global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-thy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient
domestic producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru,
Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity.
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment
of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations -- were discussed at
Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to
foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge,
even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United
States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no
institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round
and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the World Trade Organization --
with the signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated
by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector x x
x, (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more investments
into the country. Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is
of special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial
adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate
Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at
frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries
were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional
powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement
for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated
and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through
the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of
government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This
concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco,
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities,
with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President
of the Philippines,[3] stating among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083,
a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. [5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved,
that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.[6] The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of
Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred
to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
24
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed[7] the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having
seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements
and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are
integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and
every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper
and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are
integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral
annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8] the Solicitor General describes these
two latter documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters,
such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and
qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and
definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents comment and
petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties
thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as
Bautista Paper,[9] for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of
proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine
adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume
WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a
Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various
bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners,
on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the
concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of
Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair
Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution
is vested in the Congress of the Philippines;
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of
judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the several issues raised by
petitioners into the following:[10]
1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements
and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by
petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and
12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power
by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court
in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has
effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable;
(2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped
from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court
resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very
jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon
as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively
waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents favor, will
25
not cause the petitions dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the
defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an
integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of
petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave
constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved
here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the
merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE
PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19,
ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY
THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT
AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS
AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld.[12] Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.[13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters[14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution,[15] as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political
law.[16] As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,[17] the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,[18] it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before
it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the
vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the
decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the governments
economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade
barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and
its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic nationalism are
violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in various parts not only of the
WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII,
of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods,
and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted
in their memorandum:[19]
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative
restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this
Agreement.(Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments,
p.22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
26
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article
III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether
specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume
or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value
of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in
paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to
foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products,
or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p.22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14
September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).
b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis
supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the
supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other
Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services
and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the
conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service
suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round
Legal Instruments, p.22610 emphasis supplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,in contravention of
the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed
on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements.[20]Petitioners further argue that these provisions
contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-
executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by
petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly
Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4)
that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution[21] is called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco.[22] These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts.[23] They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by
the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to
implement them, thus:
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth)
of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are
basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and
the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language
of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced
from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social
and economic policy making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran,
Jr.,[26] explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be violated
by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly
render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply
saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
27
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court
should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the
legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may
well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions
to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged
or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and executive
departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards,
and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development
of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the
national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth;
a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian
reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as
follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony[27] and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by
mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive;[28] and (3) by requiring the State to develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.[29] In similar language, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity;[30] and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al.,[31] this Court
held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions
rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair.[32] In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of any other.There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security
Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver
of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in
general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any
member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of
withdrawals.[33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-
one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push
their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. These basic principles are found in the
preamble[34] of the WTO Agreement as follows:
28
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal
use of the worlds resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially
the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs
of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, x
x x. (underscoring supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO
Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection
from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to
developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be
spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected
within a period of six (6) years while developing countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to effect an
average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural
products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10)
years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary
outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6)
years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed
countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including
anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges.Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any
basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos
will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the
Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the
respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state
into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic
policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and
disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining
whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy[35] does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy
in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on
external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means
avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control
of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public
utilities.[36]
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside
from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity,[37] the fundamental law encourages industries that
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity
to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez
faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain
any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to
the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable
prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at
large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it will -- as promised by its promoters -
- expand the countrys exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the
Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That
does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated
the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when
the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have
contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby
effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the
Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary
events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters
29
that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing
winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist[38] explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and framework
only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate
of our delegates, but slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time develop its sinews and
gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess
Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant
Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing
from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing,
living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.[39] Petitioners maintain that
this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which
under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault
on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be
good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which
not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of investments and money x x x as well as to a whole
slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x.[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress.[41] And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to specified limits
and x x x such limitations and restrictions as Congress may provide,[42] as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this
issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type
isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." [43] By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws.[44] One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda --
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations
is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus,
treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct
of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down
of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. [46] The sovereignty of a
state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1)
limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient
nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.[47]
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its
sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, (a)ll
members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter,
and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action. Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative
expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of
July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the
Middle East and in the Congo were expenses of the United Nations under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN
Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine
Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such
peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own
territory. Another example: although sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction of all members are set forth as
underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final
example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the
present charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the sovereign power to
make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both bilateral and
multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his
Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among
others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the
United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the
United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to
its citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are
exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to
taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties,
inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise
taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment,
stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
30
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges
as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli
nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59
days.
(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor
visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in
the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty,
any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
international obligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation,
eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the
reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or
trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in
international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal
obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure
relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce
the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations
to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade
liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new
trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller countrys market. [48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)[49] intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, [51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in
paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities
shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different
from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any
identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent
has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged
infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing
and business secrets shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the absence of proof
to the contrary) presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process
shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product
obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process
used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should actually be
understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly
understood, actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical
(or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the presumption
provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged
identical product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of
newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the
patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject,
Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of
infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized
copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the
making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial
identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying. (underscoring supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1)
the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product
was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the
process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of legislative
power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion,
if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights,
the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.[52]
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final
Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the other
documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They
31
submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final
Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority
of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate [53] which enumerated what
constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings
of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations
and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference.[54] It is not the treaty itself. It
is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several
years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is
contained in just one page[55] in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing
said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities
with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved
by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet to
give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the
Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments
on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry
of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment,
clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business.[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its
integral parts,[58] as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members
in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to as
Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as Plurilateral Trade
Agreements) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members that have not
accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as GATT
1994) is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the
Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as
GATT 1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members deliberation
on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,[59]the senators of the
Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this
Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not
the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the
same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a
point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative
solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the
nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making a new submission which
improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his
intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised
this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate
for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization
as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali
Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft
of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The
Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being
submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance
with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance
as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if
that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been
adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays session and I dont see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of
question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to
make.
Epilogue
32
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Courts
constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No.
97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.[62] Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the
dismissal of the petition.[63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign
houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent
and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its
favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in
the Senates processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates
exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution.[64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while serving as judicial and
legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the
promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance
of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is
balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We
find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is
not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is
more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in
the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the
worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine
in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the
political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance[65] where the
East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century. He
refers to the free market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present
about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the
WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only
viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The
alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership,
keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a
vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity
and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free
choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999]
JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA,
JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondents.
LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998[1] of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter
DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in
the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998[2] of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs motion
for reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed.
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. [3]
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson
and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private
respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much
less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations,
private respondents presented the following evidence:
1. Annex A the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of the Lone District of the
Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998,
where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the
constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item 10, that he is registered voter
of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
2. Annex B Voters Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating respondents registration
at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;
3. Annex C Respondents Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15, 1997;
4. Annex D Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial & Municipal Treasurer of Alabel,
Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr. Conrado G. Butil, which reads:
In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy of the triplicate copy
of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to Carlito Engcong on
September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and
serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.
33
5. Annex E The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino dated
September 5, 1997;
6. Annex F Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998 addressed to Mr. Herson
D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:
For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of Community Tax Certificate
containing Nos. 11132201C-11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under Official Receipt No.
7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.
7. Annex G Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3rd District of Quezon City
for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the Regional Election Director, National Capital Region, on March 17,
1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his residence in the
constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election as 3 years and 5months; and, in item 9,
that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex H a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF
RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel,
Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating among others, that [T]he undersigneds previous residence is at 24
Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter and that for
business and residence purposes, the undersigned has transferred and conducts his business and reside at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this application;
9. Annex I Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR CANCELLATION OF VOTERS [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS
REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at
Alabel, Sarangani.[4]
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has
been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the
COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:
1. Annex 1 - Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and Administrator of the properties
of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997,
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex 2 - Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale executed by and between
the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and
the respondent on November 4, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;
3. Annex 3 - True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725 captioned as In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion
from the List of voters of Precinct No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino,
Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents. The dispositive portion of which reads:
1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III
Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani
where they have been residing since December 1996;
2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in good faith due to an honest mistake
caused by circumstances beyond their control and without any fault of petitioners;
3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara,
Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and
4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the election/voters registration records of the
petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of
Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously qualified to exercise their respective rights of suffrage.
4. Annex 4 - Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence addressed to
Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997.
5. Annex 5 - Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of applications for registration
approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20, 1997, showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon
Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112 both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as
transferees without VRR numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and September 30, 1997, respectively.
6. Annex 6 - same as Annex 5
7. Annex 6-a - Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voters Previous Registration (Annex I, Petition);
8. Annex 7 - Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504 dated October 20, 1997
as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
9. Annex 7-a - Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer IV, District III,
Quezon City, which reads:
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered voters of District III,
Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession of the Election Officer
of Alabel, Sarangani.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
10. Annex 8 - Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the circumstances and incidents
detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent.
11. Annexes 8-a, 8-b, 8-c and 8-d - Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes,
Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on
April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged personal knowledge of respondents residency in Alabel, Sarangani;
12. Annex 8-e - A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio,
containing a listing of the names of fifty-five(55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath
that they personally know the respondent as a permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to
present;
13. Annexes 9, 9-a and 9-b- Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2,
respectively, of respondent; and,
14. Annex 10 - The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and circumstances leading to his
relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani, appending Annexes A, B, C, D, D-1, E, F, G with sub-markings
G-1 and G-2 and H his CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes 1, 2, 4, 5,
6-a, 3, 7, 9 with sub-markings 9-a and 9-b except Annex H.[5]
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate
for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:
What militates against respondents claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position sought is his
own Voters Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex B, Petition] and his address indicated as
24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence, standing alone, negates all his
protestations that he established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It
is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same position in the 3rd Legislative
District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office
sought.
34
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and
until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement
provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
All told, petitioners evidence conspire to attest to respondents lack of residence in the constituency where he seeks
election and while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189,
he lacks the qualification to run for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani. [6]
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046,
ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the
Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.[7]
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers,[8] shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of
Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied
by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINOs Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed the
parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition.[9]
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second
highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene.[10]
INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in Intervention[11] is asking the Court to
uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of
Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission
on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of
petitioner.[12]
The first issue.
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive
upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny
due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of
the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of
candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of
DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does not
preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of
compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the
factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the
right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court
in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including
the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion
from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise
of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the
particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion
proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.[13] In this sense, it does not
operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding.[14]Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voters political status,
nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election. [15]
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar[16] we ruled that:
xxx It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become final, the same
does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an
important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in such a summary and
peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City
Court had granted appellants petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino
citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still have been left open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it
declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voters
registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion,
Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited
only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not
qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification. The trial
court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the
function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. [17] The only effect of the
decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board,
upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voters registration record from the corresponding book of voters,
enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file. [18]
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action
are indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor
INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINO himself and
his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the Voters List on the ground of erroneous registration while
the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against
DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the
dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity
of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action.[19] In the present case, the aforesaid essential
requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al.,[20] the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue
ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the case of
the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Gurays name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent
the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of a summary
character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of
35
the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom
said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the municipality
of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as
a registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by
Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against
Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two
cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which
said persons litigate. ( Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p.
756, par. 1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the exclusion of
Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto
proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he
has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months legal
residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of quo warranto,
the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one years legal residence required for eligibility to the office
of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c)
identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in
the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or
causes of action, there is no res judicata.
The Second Issue.
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998
election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.
It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. [21] Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return.[22] Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules
must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.[23]
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur[24] and that sometime in 1991, he acquired
a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is
now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of
choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.[25] To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.[26] In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.[27]
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was
sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their
locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. While residence simply requires bodily presence in a given place, domicile
requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed
and permanent place of abode, ones home.[28]
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt
it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these
elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition
of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.[29]
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The
lease contract may be indicative of DOMINOs intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile.[30] Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15
January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement.
Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give
rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former
barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is
said to have decided preponderance is a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his
residence.[31] The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine
the status of his domicile.[32]
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he had no control
cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was scheduled for
two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22.[33]
While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house
he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22
October 1997,[34] and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change
of residence on 30 August 1997,[35] DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the
Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to
represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.[36] Dominos failure to do so rendered
him ineligible and his election to office null and void.[37]
The Third Issue.
DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over
a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if
for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes[38] and provided further that the winning
candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.[39]
36
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as
provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives.[40]
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate.[41] A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the
election ordering the suspension of DOMINOs proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This
resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO
as candidate for the position.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC
and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.[42]
Issue raised by INTERVENOR.
After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province of Sarangani,
may INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning
candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.[43]
In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be
given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast
in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.[44]
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of
a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.[45] To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.[46]
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.[47]
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred[48] from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then
as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who haS obtained a plurality of votes [49] and
does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the
electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.[50] To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate
to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any
fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect officials
of their choice.[51]
INTERVENORs plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be
sustained. INTERVENORs reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case[52] to wit: if the electorate, fully aware
in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity
and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected, is misplaced.
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible
candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however,
the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be
counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are
presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply
their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.[53]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division
and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under
the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-
five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain
maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly
amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all
the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries,
and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of
Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable
guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his
program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
37
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public
office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to
seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause
of action before the courts.4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory.
The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public
office and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth
an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the
word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access
to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create
as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of
broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the
government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet
offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden." 7 (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the
framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition
of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It
is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of
the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights
may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the
instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be
accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral
exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that
erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support
before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot – the interest, if no other, in
avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17
January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the
COMELEC’s Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because
the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to
run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the
Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in automated counting
and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION
PESOS (P450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign
enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in
the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in
every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral contributions.15Moreover,
there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a
given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is
not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would
be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance
of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates
and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract
and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion
of free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fidecandidates for public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fide candidates is
governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
38
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner
cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the
COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance
candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which
the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials
as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to
their respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It
deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.
As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly
complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a certificate of
candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum
qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC
for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with
deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, G.R. No. 168081
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent. October 17, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to
adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress
his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence
to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated
against
because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay,
however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so
because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He
stands five feet and eight inches (58) with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual[1] of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation
leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet
the companys weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he
was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his
ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the
company physician should he wish to do so.He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.[2]
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing,
weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status
was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on
the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous
weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment[3] to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group
Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

Dear Sir:
REYES, R.T., J.:
39
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31
Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal weight is
achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for my weight
check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui[4]
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time
that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight
checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight
requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his
grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards. [5]
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for processing at
the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt
with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates.[6] Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did
not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight
checks.[7]
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal
weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter
part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds onNovember 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his
answer and submit controverting evidence.[8]
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.[9] Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he
claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PALsince no action has been taken by
the company regarding his case since 1988. He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because the
company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated.
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight
reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.[10]
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and
considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his
services were considered terminated effective immediately.[11]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,[12] petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The
dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainants dismissal illegal,
and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for purposes
of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at P651,000.00;
b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.[15] However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did
not hamper the performance of his duties.[16] Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to other positions
where his weight would not be a negative factor.[17]Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui,
and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.[18]
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[19]
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner without loss
of seniority rights and other benefits.[20]
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied[21] the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution[22] of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.[23]
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment[24] in the following tenor:
40
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our
findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainants
entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainants entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal
until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the
reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the
same shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall
accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.[25]
According to the NLRC, obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food
intake, is a disease in itself.[26] As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by
petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.[27]
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as
unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have
limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of
the weight standards of PAL.[28]
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.[29] Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[30]
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL
and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it looked at wrong and
irrelevant considerations[33] in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight
standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees position.[34] The failure to adhere to the
weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in
relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest.[35] Said the CA, the element
of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the
dismissal is legally proper.[36] In other words, the relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of
reasonableness of the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this
standard.[37]
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable.[38] Thus,
petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards.[39] It is obvious
that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for
being overweight.[40]
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [41] Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA
held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation, justifies
an employees separation from the service.[42]
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY
CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION
(BFOQ) DEFENSE;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN
ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONERS
CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING
MOOTAND ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) [44] of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing
qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is
unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the employer; they were the prescribed weights
that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other
41
words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employees position. In this sense, the
failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of
willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employers qualifying standards is in fact a
ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the
other causes analogous to the foregoing.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They
apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be
hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order
to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed
pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer qualifies for
his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x xx[45]
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a physical abnormality and/or
illness.[46] Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,[47] he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in
subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadurasillness
occasional attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial
court said, illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination.
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law
are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Naduras illness could be considered as analogous
to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through
his own voluntary act.[48]
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case at
bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No.
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third,
in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner
was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the
issue in Nadura is whether or not thedismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue
centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth,
in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was
given more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he was
able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner
himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes.
I can do it now.[49]
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him a lot of expenses.[50] However, petitioner has only himself
to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.[51] He chose
to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without
offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals,[52] decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to
1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being
operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that
her performance met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time,
she stood 52 tall and weighed over 320 pounds. Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised
her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in
direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,[53] which incorporates the remedies contained in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a
handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff
could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that
respondent discriminated against Cook based on perceived disability. The evidence included expert testimony that
morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological
appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal,
respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that mutability is relevant only in determining the
substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given impairment, thus mutability only precludes those conditions that
an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration.
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of
her height. According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed over 320 pounds in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case
here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an
analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may
not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that the
just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or
omission.Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element
of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).[54]
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the
employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
42
qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).[55] In the United States, there are a few federal
and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise
unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of
a business or enterprise.[56]
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it.[57] Further,
there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.[58]
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution,[59] the Labor Code,[60] and RA No. 7277[61] or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons[62] contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government
and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU),[63] the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called Meiorin Test in
determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted
the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;[64] (2) the employer must establish that
the standard is reasonably necessary[65] to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer
must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,[66] this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the
employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.[67]
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. [68] BFOQ is
valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.[69]
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[70] the Court did not hesitate to
pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company.
It was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the
company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor
Arbiter,[71] NLRC,[72] and CA[73] are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common
carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers it transports.[74] It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances.[75]
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that
the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue
of being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order
to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on
board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its
employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It
cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence
on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline
companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially
the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations
safely and soundly.A lesser performance is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of
the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the
evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin
attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the
agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case of
emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of
respondent that [w]hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of
transporting passengers to their destination; and that the weight standards has nothing to do with airworthiness of
respondents airlines, must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell[76] relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved
there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and
a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60
retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and
being overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped
cabin space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would
certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant
occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without
introduction of evidence.[77] It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to
widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating
the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the
passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency
situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into
three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow
aisles. These possibilities are not remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to him prior
to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. [78] In
fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona
43
fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be
done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame for both
male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants
sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any
possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.[79] We
are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that [t]he element of discrimination came into play
in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that
being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal,
including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondents failure to comply.[80] It is a basic
rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.[81]
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his
allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are
allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated
and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed
to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and
other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words
of the CA, PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet.[82]
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are
accorded respect, even finality.[83] The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their
specific and specialized jurisdiction.[84] But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of
facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies
grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts
must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.[85]
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty [86] of the
Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked.[87] Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals.[88] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,[89] which is the
source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that
the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.[90] Private actions,
no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.[91]
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is
entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time that the
NLRC was reversed by the CA.[92]
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at
the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of
execution,[93] the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does
not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL did everything under the sun to frustrate his immediate return to his
previous position,[94] there is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position
in accordance with the order of the Labor
Arbiter.[95] In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his
signature.[96]
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case [97] that [t]he unjustified refusal of the
employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution[98] and even if the order of reinstatement
of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages
of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.[99] He failed to prove that he complied
with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from
the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render
the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled
that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible.[100]
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
44
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and
Article 279 of the Labor Code that [a]n employee who is unjustly dismissedfrom work shall be entitled to reinstatement ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines, October 18, 2011
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other Respondents.
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time x----------------------------------------------x
of his actual reinstatement. Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule. BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
Petitioner,
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act social justice, [101] or based on
equity.[102] In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not
reflect on the moral character of the employee.[103] - versus -

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service.[104] It
should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving. [105]We are not blind to the fact that he was SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his G.R. No. 196305
that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade. capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity
Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent toone-half (1/2) months pay for every as Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his
year of service, which should include his regular allowances. capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

SO ORDERED. REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,

___________________________________________ Petitioner,

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, G.R. No. 196271

in his personal capacity, and in representation of - versus -
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS Present:
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J.
USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN CORONA, C.J., PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive
TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. CARPIO, Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH VELASCO, JR., Respondents.
SAUPI, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, x----------------------------------------------x
Petitioners, BRION,
PERALTA, ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU
BERSAMIN, CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO
- versus - DEL CASTILLO, PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), G.R. No. 197221
ABAD, Petitioners,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its PEREZ,
President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF MENDOZA, - versus -
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO SERENO,
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its REYES, and
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Promulgated: in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
45
B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the G.R. No. 197392
Department of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines,
Respondents. G.R. No. 197280
x----------------------------------------------x

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE G.R. No. 197454

PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,

Petitioner, DECISION
BRION, J.:

- versus -
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The
Respondents. G.R. No. 197282 law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional
x----------------------------------------------x Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
JACINTO V. PARAS, and assumed office.
Petitioner,
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity;
- versus - House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and Factual Antecedents

the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous
x--------------------------------------------x regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
Respondents-Intervenor. provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
46
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions
to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from
a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act
(RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A
plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully
establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of
the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the
basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140 [1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular
elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA
No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to
join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333
was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC
had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional
offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013,
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement
of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6,
2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative
concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No.
196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA
No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari
Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4]also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The
law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of
Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo
against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives
against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections
scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketed
as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity
Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention
dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the
consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA
No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit
their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.
47
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No.
10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054
and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-
reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations
of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative
character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to
the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials
elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power
of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments
of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of
RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and
Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section
18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in
support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday
of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments
to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the
shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.[12] This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.[13]
48
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a constitutional
mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[14] we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to
end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure
on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three
years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized
as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyers document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular
limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision. [17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions
of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments,
as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government.Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous
region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordillerasas
hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as
this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and
again for its complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in
the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act
No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14,
1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no
public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should
elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]
49
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to
the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial
review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence, while
the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches
of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three
readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested
in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1)
to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress
through the enactment process.[23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed
measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on
the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the
Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority
of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than
ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will
show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections,
which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any
provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date
of the subsequent regular elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA
No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA
No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No. 8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of
the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not
amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections
would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140[30] to reset the
date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not
among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9333,[31]which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a
plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with
this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied
in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054
the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of
majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served
to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts
pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind
the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as
they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body,
and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under
delusions of omniscience.
50
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within
its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication
by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself
or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed;
and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature
to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect
of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34](Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution
requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section
18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite
requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we
find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be
excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous
regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions.
While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order
to become effective,[35] questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because
of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to
be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional
government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated
Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the
Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress
must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact
already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the
synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides
is an old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where
the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given
that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem.
These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant
to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint
OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. The first is
the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of
elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses
plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. [41] Except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest.[42]
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally
provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections
1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are
found in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the
enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law.[43]
51
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute
express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure
of government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which
must be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national government, too, must not encroach on
the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17,
Article X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in
dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt
on what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to legislate on a
wide array of social, economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-
quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they
now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized
and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs
at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No.
10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening
period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one
(21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution
and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures,
to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions
themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction
of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of
synchronization first transpired under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough
or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus,
the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In the creation
of Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim
governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are essentially
elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been
elected and qualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-
province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches
were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of
wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our
discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the
ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding
of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA
No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally
be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed through
RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed
by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term
and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to
continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term
of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the
Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where
the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated
should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable
constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the
constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only pass legislation
52
filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-
executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called
for.[54]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for
any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation
from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the
elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in
a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.[56] Hence, holdover whichever
way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and
given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with
contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v. Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v.
Comelec,[59] where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the
ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms
fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section
7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where
such contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule
that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court
cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,[62] except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately
conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the
following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be
held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority
to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it
shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other
elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to
declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have
done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we
cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of
Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections
unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC
53
with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised
within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a
date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension
of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on
the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already
been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under
the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous
causes are further defined by the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do
not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section
5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and
is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the
imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or
Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure,
cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.[66]Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and
this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal
basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the
power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution
shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is
that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and
certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In
sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead
of acting on their term (where the term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress
nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an
unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the
President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this
law as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order
to be recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces
54
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [74]
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials
that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No.
10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective
and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-
observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact
only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different
from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality
is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should
be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. [75] Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt,
given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it.In more concrete terms and based on
the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability
of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the
choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as
allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for
Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would
extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic and
republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to
be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally
breach the elective and representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the
period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA
No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for
the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community,
the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and
as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local
government units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too, are
used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional
interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of
the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure
taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment
of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be
supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising
from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment
of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative
of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the
circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in
the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
55
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress,
not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the
synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA
No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be
transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections
and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the
COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration
of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2
years intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM
elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history past and current teach us, many
developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in
the way they transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM
Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with
even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President
is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence
of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no
cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present
case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit.
As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the
board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated
or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there
will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-
Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic
services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to
critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to
impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that
there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such
that it is necessary to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat
quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be given
importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.[82] We refer to the Courts
declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a
manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this
Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure
to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be
respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any
way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by
the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local
elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of
the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national
government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination.
As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather an efficient
working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective
partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.
56
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the
nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution,
and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be
unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and
for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually
to be exercised by the national government[.][85] Of note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis
ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns.
Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the
regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with
a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local
elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[87] As
judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend
it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping
the exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special
elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation,
which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic government the separation of
powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting
RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of
choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive
duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse
of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every
statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the
party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt
about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must
support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153
for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we
issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, G.R. No. 196271
in his personal capacity, and in representation of
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA
J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN,
ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH
AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and
BASSAM ALUH SAUPI,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
57
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines,
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO Respondents.
OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XATTY. ROMULO B.
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of MACALINTAL,
Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Petitioner,
Philippines, - versus -
Respondents.
X----------------------X COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF G.R. No. 197280
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Petitioner, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
- versus - Respondents.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XLOUIS BAROK C.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of BIRAOGO,
the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. Petitioner,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of - versus -
Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of Respondents.
the House of Representatives, X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XJACINTO V. PARAS,
Respondents. Petitioner,
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XREP. EDCEL C. G.R. No. 196305
LAGMAN,
Petitioner,
- versus -
- versus -
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XALMARIM CENTI
TILLAH, DATU
CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., G.R. No. 197282
DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP- and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
LABAN), Respondents.
Petitioners, x-----------------------------------------x
- versus - MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his G.R. No. 197221
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget

58
 reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed
G.R. No. 197392 by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in
G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280;
and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still
existing and effective.

These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act
(RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional
elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-
in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
The Motions for Reconsideration
G.R. No. 197454
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their motion:
Present:
CORONA, C.J., I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL
CARPIO, ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS
VELASCO, JR., SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE
DEL CASTILLO,* LAWS.
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE
PEREZ, CONSTITUTION.
MENDOZA,
SERENO,** V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.][1]
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
Promulgated:
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE
February 28, 2012 CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE LOCAL
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON SUCH
PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND AUTONOMY,
AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.
RESOLUTION
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND
BRION, J.: REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY
PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT
MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.
(b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante
ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for
59
III. THE PRESIDENTS APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT
EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH SUPERVISORY
POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs
OCCUPYING ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS
PENDING THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS.
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF
OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC ACTS.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC
ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT
OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT
MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM,
AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS
CAUSE WARRANTING COMELECS HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS.[2] (italics supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE
QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992
ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED INTENT OF THE FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME TO
ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE FOREMOST
RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
xxxx
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS
COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY
TO AMEND RA 9054.
xxxx
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3
VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A
PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.
xxxx
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF
ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT
OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.[3] (italics and underscoring supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
A.
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL
OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE
ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED
BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN
INTERIM MEASURE.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR
THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
C.
THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND
BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST
POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY
60
CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7,
ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054. (e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of
ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
D.
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the Presidents supervisory powers over
WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST autonomous regions?
IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE
UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.[4]
The Courts Ruling

We deny the motions for lack of merit.

Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that: Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM elections; The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local
elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections,
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, by constitutional mandate, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
guides the governance of the Republic; Constitution, which state:

c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday
the House of Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite; of May, 1987.

d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even after their terms are over The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
and non-elective individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
the better choice; councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions, which does not include the Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this
power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national and local elections as this Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
will make it easier for the authorities to implement election laws. six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxxx

In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions: Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local
elections? The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements? To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the discussions of the Constitutional
Commission:
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM? Section 14. It reads: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL
61
OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF
JUNE 1992.
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by the
Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: THE SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER
THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent
President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members
of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said
officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization
of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should
not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their
term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993
for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be
elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in
1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials
and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three
years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the
President and another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and
12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the
first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the
Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in
order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved the first national and local officials to
be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That
means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue
beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992,
the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12
shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall
have an election every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every
three years which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and Vice-President
in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials
with the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision of
the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the
municipal officials.[5] (emphases and underscoring ours)
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election
in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even
willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the
importance of this constitutional mandate.
We came to the same conclusion in Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[6] where we unequivocally stated that the
Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local elections."[7]Despite the length and verbosity of their
motions, the petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners contention that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-
quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional
mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially
organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is
not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as
62
it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what
actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite
future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption,
a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive
and not static.[8]
To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled Local Government, clearly shows the intention of the Constitution
to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which
provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local
Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of
local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local governments, and does not make a
distinction between the local government and the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units,
still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments,
it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, the
ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. [9] Applying this
principle to determine the scope of local elections, we refer to the meaning of the word local, as understood in its
ordinary sense. As defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, local refers to something that
primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision. Obviously,
the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within
this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not
enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. [10]
RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA No.
9054.
We cannot agree with their position.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections;[11] it does not
provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections,
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any
provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and
RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA
No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM
elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments
to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections
would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the
date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not
among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a
plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with
this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied
in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.[12] (emphases supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the date of
the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054 that the
succeeding elections are to be held three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission
at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion.[13] Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply
what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.[14] Providing for
lapses within the law falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning,
have no authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space.
63

Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153
to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the
supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [15] is unconstitutional for violating
the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature,
by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for
interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:[16]
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within
its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication
by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself
or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed;
and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature
to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect
of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided
there is quorum.[17] In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than
the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which
we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands
of, future legislatures.[18]
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated:
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively
and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers. One Congress cannot
limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what
the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote
threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution.[19]
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad
Similarly, we struck down the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement[20] applies to all amendments of
RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.] We interpreted
this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation
of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide
for in the Organic Act[21] require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the plebiscite requirement is to
recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people.
While we agree with the petitioners underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we
disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No.
9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all
amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this would
lead to impractical and illogical results hampering the ARMMs progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws
that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the
costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the President the power to appoint
OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of
the government, and thus requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.
Again, we disagree.
The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.
We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the ARMM regional government.
On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it
recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these
offices to perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.
Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the
regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM
regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is
no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a
holdover capacity.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
64

On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years,
which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon
of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall continue
in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have
already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no
authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended
by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant
difference between the present case and these past cases [22] is that while these past cases all refer to
elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor,
and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[23]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress
the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly
acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom
of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and
the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise
from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently
empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. [24] Although the
legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the
power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided
for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a
date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension
of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on
the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and
underscoring ours]
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances
where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous
circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no
authority to set a different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can compel the
COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to
synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the
COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years.
Presidents authority to appoint OICs
65
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the Presidents power to appoint pertains only to appointive positions
and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature.[25] Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935
Constitution provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is
the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are
enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is
empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing
for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of
presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following
exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after captain and x x x delete and all and substitute
it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear
that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.[26]
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. [27] The second
sentence acts as the catch-all provision for the Presidents appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the
power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. [28]The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further
demonstrated by the recognition of the Presidents power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even
provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide
the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the Presidents appointment power should be strictly construed
and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.[29] Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs
in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by
the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on
clear constitutional basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective
positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,[30] which merely grants the President the power of
supervision over autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the Presidents appointment power. There is no incompatibility between
the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the
President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law.[31] This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter
or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.[32]
The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief
that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners
foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and
not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are
replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President
has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more
apparent than real.
66

RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within the context it was
enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to
synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone
the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with
governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the
assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13,
2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the problem
created by synchronization (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a
holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next
ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his
appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the
vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established
the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that synchronization
requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the
challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In other
words, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the
Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to
make?[33]
We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well
as the communitys choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure is a matter
of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure is comparable to the interim measures
traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective offices upon the creation of
new local government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code)
to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang
Pampook).[34]
Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated December 21, 2011, question the
propriety of the appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting Vice
Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and given
the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in recognition of the principle of judicial
courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our decision until we have ruled with finality on this case.
We find the petitioners reasoning specious.
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to lower courts in
instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper
for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. [35] In other words, the principle
of judicial courtesy applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of
origin.[36] Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of
government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole
system of government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect
of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is
concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case,[37] a
decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be
respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the voting, the
probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted.[38]
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that
since motions for reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in
the present case, the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective. He
further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of
the motions for reconsideration borders on disrespect if not outright insolence[39] to this Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC,[40] where the Court held that while it had already
issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can also be the subject of
a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance,[41] where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO
previously issued.[42]
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of a motion for reconsideration
filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after we have issued a
final and executory decision, especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18,
2011 decision, which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153
for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order
we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.[43] (emphases ours)
In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present case. While it may be true
that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws were
67
dismissed by the Court, an examination of the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court
did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we expressly lifted the TRO issued on
September 13, 2011. There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the President from exercising his authority
to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.
Conclusion
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion,
that our Decision has virtually given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that
the elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances which led to the enactment
of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to
grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent
ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the
terms of elective local officials for less than three years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials from continuing
in a holdover capacity should some exigency require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang
Kabataan elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners motions for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR.,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the
respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly
opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading,
petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives
from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos.
111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3,
2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately
executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from
notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion
of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing
members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the
government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935
Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable
practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the
members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the
appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive
and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and
partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in
this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1)
representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.
68
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member was added
to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives
one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the
following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity
considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a
shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not
subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the
Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly
correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and
second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds,
carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are
established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their
safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one
suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon which government and society
were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly
says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional
construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative
of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the
JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be
read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with
the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election
shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20Another is
Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the
Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral
nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would
be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision
to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain
oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the
provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to
legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The
need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs
precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses
consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-
legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of
war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of
each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these
instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen
consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and
balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of
judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4)
regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio
Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department),
and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In
so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao,
submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance
with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to
mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle
of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single representation of
Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief
Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the
influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will
compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers.
Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for
Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of
even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming
from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single
69
individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond
dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only
"xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to
eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC
consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the
Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-
officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of government while the
regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the
JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice
of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation
to the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the
matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires
the Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’
role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the
other two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same weight to
considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have
any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa
is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives,
is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it
is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives
of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the
essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally
done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a
constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution
envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with
him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply
because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still
safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because it
was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the
rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain
acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the
Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed
at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To
reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to
a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the
Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in
the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its
express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction
the Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under
its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or
because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against
usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself.
Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical
logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest
intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion
of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court
cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or
reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the
Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169364
70
Petitioner, 2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about
Present: the country or the streets without visible means of support;
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario, 3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate
Velasco, Jr., with prostitutes;
Peralta, and
Bersamin*, JJ. 4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y Promulgated:
MEFANIA, 5. Prostitutes.
Respondents. September 18, 2009
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

DECISION Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven
composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and
Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order[1] of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial
Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2
of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The
Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro
and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.[2]
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash[3] on the
ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
In an Order[4] dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file
their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted
pursuant to the States police power and justified by the Latin maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex, which calls for
the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on police power, Professor
Freund describes laconically police power as the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. (Citations omitted). In fact the persons acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the police
power of the state. The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex (the god of the people
is the Supreme Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.In
the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex A lucidly shows that there
was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where
the two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male
customer. Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the interest of
substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the prosecution proof of the crime,
and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in the indictment cant be categorized as a
crime.[5]

Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants: The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated
that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the
apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.

71
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City,[6] directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of
vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since
the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They
likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it
discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Courts ruling in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan,[7] the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal
statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed
to overcome this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated
April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the
subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it violated the equal
protection clause. It held that the void for vagueness doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal
statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,[9] where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial court ruled:
The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are equally applicable
to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being found loitering about public or semi-public buildings
or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support offers too wide
a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of recession when there
are many who are without visible means of support not by reason of choice but by force of circumstance as borne
out by the high unemployment rate in the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the fact that he cannot
find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.[10]
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the trial court
declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of the equal
protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those covered by the law and
those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one
individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code offers
no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force
of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy
legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.[11]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE [12]
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[13] the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special
application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that
respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the
standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare
in the exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process
and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech
vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the
presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid
and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged.[14] However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the
citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule
of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid.[15] This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-
vagueness doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law.[16]
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,[17] the Court recognized the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to
criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
72
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the
purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An
appropriate as applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections
10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination
of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial
review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
and not conjectural or anticipatory.[18]
The first statute punishing vagrancy Act No. 519 was modeled after American vagrancy statutes and passed by the
Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to December
31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy.[19] While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime
prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised
Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to
apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate
with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any
inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in
its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering
about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without
visible means of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which
defined vagrant as every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or
straying through the country without visible means of support. The second clause was essentially retained with the
modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms public
or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S.
Supreme Courts opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville[20] case, which in essence declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that [all persons] are entitled to be informed
as to what the State commands or forbids. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending conduct.
See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445;
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities,
where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,
342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted to the regulatory
schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they
read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent
to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,
supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally innocent.
Nightwalking is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State,
202 So.2d at 855, only the habitual wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, common night walkers. We know,
however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation
will result.
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that loafing was a national virtue in his
Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons wandering or strolling from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The
qualification without any lawful purpose or object may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons neglecting all lawful
business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served
would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be casing
a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police.
Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not
mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for
giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have
dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness.
They have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
73
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted may be
punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:
The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-
type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and the existence
of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other
immediate solution. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice given a potential
offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote,
an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering punishment by analogy. Such crimes,
though long common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system.
xxxx
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who
are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for
a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the
bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of
course, they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and
justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that
even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as
majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.[21]
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; and 2) it encourages or
promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to
give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.[22] This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted
it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional
rule that admits of exceptions.[23]
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific provisions thereof,
which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code 257) provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons who use juggling
or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in
stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers,
disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses
of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in
the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or
habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual
loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon
the earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But
these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) any person found
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be persons wandering or strolling around
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object. But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is
qualified by without visible means of support while the Jacksonvilleordinance prohibits wandering or strolling without
any lawful purpose or object, which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a trap for innocent acts.
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[24] Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement
of probable causeprovides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in
relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents,
echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is
therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof,
but more than suspicion or possibility.[25]
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for,
absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest.[26]
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and
effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other
forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives
of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.[27]
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance
operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under
our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been
a source of police abuse in their case.
74
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of
Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous
and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing watch-your-car boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers,
gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The
streets and parks have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred
criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled,
harassed or mauled if not killed by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing
hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus
exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by
are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and
harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks
for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the
prowl; beggars endlessly pester and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-
abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or
night.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or else we can never
say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity,
and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted
to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. These laws may be traced
all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve the
citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.[28] Civilly, they are covered by the abuse of rights
doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part,
that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.[29] This provision is, together with the
succeeding articles on human relations, intended to embody certain basic principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.[30]
In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of
the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to
force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims.[31] Any private person may abate a public
nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes
the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.[32]
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public indecencies and immoralities, to public
nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to societys basic
sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society. For example, the issuance or
making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be abated.[33] As a
matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to
return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. [34] Thus, public
nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property by members of a community.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but
for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to
engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which
punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under
such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members
of the community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on their
effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districts abound,
gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains
stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our
streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by
the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around
dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and
establishments for their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a mans house is his
castle,[35] outside on the streets, the king is fair game.
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and
constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with
grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[36] The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory
is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. [37]
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its
scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare.[38] As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional
light.
75
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 1 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En
Banc directed the Law Department to file the appropriate Information with the proper court against petitioners Carlos
S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.5 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
thereon was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 with the
COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section
261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;
and Section 1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop,
Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S.
Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer
of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their
sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of Section 10 11 of Republic Act
Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in
fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon
City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A,
as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well
said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of
time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and consummated
election offenses in violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for
knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any data or information required in the application for
registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (5), committed by any person who, being a registered
voter, registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus
Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of
registration records due to change of residence to another city or municipality."12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if
the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that
they did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration. They avowed that they
intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen,
Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen,
Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing
therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official
residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a
Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of
the appropriate Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file
the necessary information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for violation of
Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of the Law
Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic
report after every hearing of the case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the recommendatory Resolution of 28
November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to file the appropriate information with
the proper court against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of
Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June
2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration
are merely a rehash of the arguments advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum received by the Law
Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already considered by the Investigating Officer and was discussed in
her recommendation which eventually was made as the basis for the En Banc’s resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting
Registration Record does not automatically cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of
application for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election
Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City
was still valid and subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen,
Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g),
in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and
Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following arguments:
I
76
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD
JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.22
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite
for Indirect Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC
by the COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC
filed with the RTC, two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez,
charging her with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter,
docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private respondent are entirely different
from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private
respondent’s complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voter’s Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En Banc directed
in the assailed Resolutions, that they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
the Voter’s Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law.
Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges which COMELEC ordered
to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act is vague as it
does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense; hence, it
runs contrary to Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which
embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct
of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall
personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before
the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled
prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto,
to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the
qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished
application contains all the data therein required and that the applicant’s specimen signatures, fingerprints, and
photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voter’s application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC,
support the charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere
perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically
mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the
following allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in
violation of the requirements of Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose
[S]treet, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa
[S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong
Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex
"D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their
applications (Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have resided in Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are residents and registered voters of Quezon
City, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively; photocopies of which
are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B.
Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000,
together with a certified copy of the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1" )
containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES
ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct
Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they
were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application for registration will be
disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of double registration, but also for another
election offense of knowingly making any false or untruthful statement relative to any data or information required in
the application for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or
her own handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:
77
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and correct; that I possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints, specimen signatures and photographs
appearing herein are mine; and that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged against
them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC,
as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained
in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private
respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC
against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally
alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28Citing
Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, in Lacson, this court
resolved the issue of whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and
intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in
Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.30
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have
said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the
COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant
to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to
refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were
afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit
with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the
said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree
with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and
description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted
whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given
the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively
participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police officer therein designated
the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-
sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On
a claim that there was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that
the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor
to assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to support the charge of acts of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense
of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same facts
and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which
only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that
it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2),
Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite
provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which
a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial
invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no
uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established
rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned
in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection
clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute.
Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of
legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose
cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in
these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in
a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly
strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality
of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
78
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the
purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An
appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections
10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189—the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination
of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for
judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest
in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such
summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the
outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from
pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only
as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules
governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations
not before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed
to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and
pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners
did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid
if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section
45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is
an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other
interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty
that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not
understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for
statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the
argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do
we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form
of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible
to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the
omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating.
The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon
which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set
79
forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and updated list
of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth in the application.
The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a
requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a
precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the requirement in
Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple
voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such
facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voter’s application form for registration is directly
relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.
It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a
similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates
any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the provision constitutional. The
Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof
which was the pertinent portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the
terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very
fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to
punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be
observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a
number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.48We hold that
petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in the
absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and
is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in
finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a misapprehension of facts, and
committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of Informations against them with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory expression under Section 265 49of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the COMELEC whenever
any election offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a
determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating
officer makes a determination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's
sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and
malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may
otherwise be provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that there was sufficient cause
for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom. Without question, on
May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners’ registration records as registered voters of Precinct No.
4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which
affirmed the Resolution55 of 28 November 2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to
be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude that there exists probable cause to
hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez filed their respective applications
for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001,
respectively, they stated under oath that they are not registered voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and
07902941). However, contrary to their statements, records show they are still registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-
A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In
other words, respondents’ registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City for cancellation
of their voter’s registration record as voter’s (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same will be favorably acted
upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in cases of transfer of residence to another city/municipality
which must be complied with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. – Any registered voter who has transferred
residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of
his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the approval
of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the application for transfer, and
after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of their former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall
transmit by registered mail the voter’s registration record to the Election Officer of the voter’s new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for transfer of registration records by
reason of transferred new residence to another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one Eufemia S.
Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant Election Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the letter of
respondents was due to improper procedure because respondents should have filed the required request for transfer
with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge, however, they proceeded to register as new
voters of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act 8189, respondents
admitted that they erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which they now desire to correct. (underscoring ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of election law, is mala prohibita. Proof
of criminal intent is not necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point. Commission of the act
is sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is probable cause to hold respondents
Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of
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Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
consciously, freely and voluntarily.56 LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to prosecute cases or violations DECISION
of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides: NACHURA, J.:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President
investigate and where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election laws, including acts or omissions of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be prosecuted, and the corollary right administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred
to decide whom not to prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the right to determine under to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the
As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.58 Its rationale subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. 1
cannot be doubted. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered
the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
of the defense.60 Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director
the Information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The records show that Informations supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on
charging petitioners with violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2
been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be allowed to take its due course. On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
Injunction before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January persons.3
2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal course Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
of trial is expected to have continued in the proceedings a quo. Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other
COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records
SO ORDERED. of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008 the House proceedings.5
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
vs. After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an
and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents. inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping
x----------------------x activities.
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008 On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners, National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to
vs. regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents. In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his
x----------------------x concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body were to conduct a legislative
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech,
x----------------------x articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication
of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
81
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged
illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,
filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes
on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment 16 on
the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned
by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. 18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first
is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports,
and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at
length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member
of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts
of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed
the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments
to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the
Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person
alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees
as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by
the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the
petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens,
taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes
will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be
defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights,
and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in
aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the
conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge
asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners
Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the
questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that
in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for,
as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal profession–which were also
supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench
and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the
more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution
of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory
opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 36 Neither
will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot
when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a
moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive
writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in
82
their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings.
But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also
the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to
the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition
has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing
of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15
days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of
its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We
quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition
of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted
by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has
twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of
twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next
Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum
to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not
a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is
that the Rules of Proceduremust be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same
case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election
or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not
in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of
the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part.
If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be
deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term
of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended
or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of
their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules.
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are
amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed
that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may
easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
83
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next
Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the
clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more,
that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published
rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or
revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed
by the Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate,
is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules
of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792
considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being
the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use
its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact,
the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar
as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken
by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED.
Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees
from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180888 September 18, 2009
ROLANDO PLACIDO and EDGARDO CARAGAY, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
INCORPORATED, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Rolando Placido (Placido) and Edgardo Caragay (Caragay) had been employed since January 22, 1981
and June 1, 1983, respectively, both as cable splicers by respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
Incorporated (PLDT).
It appears that since August 2000, PLDT had been receiving reports of theft and destruction of its cables.1 On March
13, 2001, PLDT Duty Inspector Ricardo Mojica (Mojica) and PLDT Security Guard/Driver Mark Anthony Cruto (Cruto),
responding to a report that cables were being stripped and burned in one of the residences along Alley 2 Street,
Project 6, Quezon City, proceeded to the said area where they saw petitioners’ service vehicle parked infront of the
house at No. 162. They likewise saw petitioners stripping and burning cables inside the compound of the house
which turned out to belong to Caragay’s mother. With the assistance of police and barangay officials, PLDT recovered
the cables bearing the "PLDT" marking.
The incident spawned the filing, on complaint of PLDT, of an Information for Qualified Theft against petitioners before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 99467.
In a related move, PLDT required petitioners to explain within 72 hours why no severe disciplinary action should be
taken against them for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty.2 After several requests for extension to submit their
explanations, petitioners submitted a joint explanation3 on June 11, 2001 denying the charges against them. By their
claim, they were on their way back from the house of one Jabenz Quezada (Quezada) from whom they were inquiring
about a vehicle when they were detained by Mojica.
On petitioners’ request, a formal hearing was scheduled. Their request for a copy of the Security Investigation was
denied, however, on the ground that they are only entitled to "be informed of the charges, and they cannot demand
for the report as it is still on the confidential stage."
During the June 25, 2001 formal hearing scheduled by PLDT, representatives from petitioners’ union Manggagawa
ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) were present. As petitioners’ counsel could not attend the hearing due to a
previously scheduled hearing at the RTC Makati, petitioners requested for another setting 4 but it was denied.
Petitioners were, however, given a non-extendible period of three days to submit their evidence.5
Mojica testified during the hearing that when petitioners saw him as they were stripping and burning the cables, they
fled but surfaced thirty minutes later from Alley 6 Street wearing different clothes; and that according to Rodolfo R.
Anor, PLDT Work Order Supervisor, the cables could be dead cables that were not recovered by contractors. 6
Petitioners’ counsel later reiterated the request for a setting of a hearing and an audiotape of the June 25, 2001
hearing, but the same was denied. A third time request for another hearing was likewise denied.7
On May 17, 2002, PLDT sent notices of termination8 to petitioners, prompting them to file on May 24, 2002 a
complaint9 for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
By Decision of January 12, 2004, Labor Arbiter Catalino R. Laderas held that petitioners were illegally dismissed,
there being no provision in PLDT’s rules and regulations that stripping and burning of PLDT cables and wires
constitute Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty; that PLDT’s seeming lack of urgency in taking any disciplinary action
against petitioners negates the charges;10 and that dismissal is too harsh, given petitioners’ years of service and lack
of previous derogatory record.
On appeal,11 the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Decision dated February 28, 2005, reversed the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision and dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack of merit,12 it holding that they were validly
dismissed for just cause ─ "theft of company property."13
In brushing aside petitioners’ disclaimer of the acts attributed to them, the NLRC noted that, inter alia, they failed to
present any affidavit of Quezada to prove that they were indeed at his house inquiring about a vehicle.
84
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime or on February 15, 2007, Branch 104 of the Quezon City RTC acquitted petitioners in Criminal Case
No. 99467 on the ground of reasonable doubt, it holding that the prosecution failed to prove that the cables were in
fact stolen from PLDT.14
By Decision of September 28, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Decision,15 it holding that since the cables
bore the "PLDT" marking, they were presumed to be owned by PLDT, hence, the burden of evidence shifted on
petitioners to prove that they were no longer owned by PLDT, but they failed.
Ruling out petitioners’ claim that they were denied due process, the appellate court held that they were given ample
opportunity to defend themselves during the administrative hearing during which they were furnished with written
invitations for their appearance before the investigating unit on several dates, but they refused to submit themselves
to the investigation. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution16 of December 17,
2007, the present petition was filed.17
Petitioners insist that the presence of the "PLDT" marking on the cables does not prove that PLDT owned them at
the time. They aver that PLDT disposes of used and unserviceable materials, including cables and telephone wires
which had been declared junked and classified as scrap --- a substantial amount of which remains insulated ---, and
once disposed of, these cables, although still bearing the "PLDT" marking, are no longer its property .
In fine, petitioners contend that PLDT’s ownership of cables or wires bearing the "PLDT" marking on the insulation
cannot be presumed, hence, a person’s possession thereof does not give rise to the presumption that he obtained
or stole them from PLDT.18
Additionally, petitioners aver that they were denied due process when PLDT refused to furnish them a copy of the
Investigation Report and grant them a formal hearing in which they could be represented by counsel of their choice.
The petition is bereft of merit.
As did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,19 the Court finds that as the cables bore the "PLDT" marking, the
presumption is that PLDT owned them. The burden of evidence thus lay on petitioners to prove that they acquired
the cables lawfully. This they failed to discharge.
And as also did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, the Court finds that petitioners were not denied due process.
Article 277 of the Labor Code provides:
xxxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just or authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code,
the employer shall furnish the workers whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to the guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing
a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. (Emphasis supplied)
And the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code require a hearing and conference during which the employee
concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, and present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him. Thus Rule I, Section 2(d), provides:
Section 2. Security of Tenure. —
xxxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so
desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him.1avvphi1
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The abovequoted provision of Section 2(d) should not be taken to mean, however, that holding an actual hearing or
conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in case of termination of
employment. For the test for the fair procedure guaranteed under the above-quoted Article 277(b) of the Labor Code
is not whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The
"ample opportunity to be heard" standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the
employee’s right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right.20
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due
process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.21
In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given several written invitations to submit themselves to
PLDT’s Investigation Unit to explain their side, but they failed to heed them. A hearing, which petitioners attended
along with their union MKP representatives, was conducted on June 25, 2001 during which the principal witnesses
to the incident were presented. Petitioners were thus afforded the opportunity to confront those witnesses and present
evidence in their behalf, but they failed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
85
 JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 188308 The petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the Province of Bulacan in the May 14,
Petitioner, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the office of Governor.
Present:
The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was raffled to the Second Division
*PUNO, C.J., and docketed as EPC No. 2007-44. Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts in
**QUISUMBING, Angat, Bocaue, Calumpit, Doa Remedios Trinidad, Guiginto, Malolos, Meycauayan, Norzagaray, Pandi, Paombong,
CARPIO, Plaridel, Pulilan, San Rafael and San Jose del Monte soon followed. The revision was conducted at the COMELECs
CORONA, office in Intramuros. After revision, the parties presented their other evidence, leading to the parties formal offer of
CARPIO MORALES, their respective evidence.
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
***VELASCO, JR., The COMELEC approved the parties formal offer of evidence and then required the parties to submit their respective
NACHURA, memoranda. The parties complied with the COMELECs order. The case was thereafter submitted for resolution.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, On March 2, 2009 the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the provincial
PERALTA, election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with the protest filed by Aquilino Pimentel III
BERSAMIN, against Juan Miguel Zubiri. In light of this development, the petitioner moved to suspend further proceedings. .
****DEL CASTILLO, and

ABAD, JJ. The COMELECs Second Division denied the petitioners motion in its Order of April 29, 2009, ruling that the
COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROBERTO M. concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination with the SET. The petitioner moved to
PAGDANGANAN, Promulgated: reconsider this Order, but the COMELECs Second Division denied the motion in its Order of May 26, 2009. These
Respondents. inter-related Resolutions led to the COMELECs continued action specifically, the appreciation of ballots on the
October 15, 2009 provincial election contest at the SET offices.

Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within the SET premises
without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel wrote the SET Secretary, Atty. Irene
Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported conduct of proceedings.[2] The SET
Secretary responded on June 17, 2009 as follows:

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The present case involves a clash between the power under the Philippine Constitution of the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the handling of a provincial election contest, and the claimed due process
rights of a party to the contest. The petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza (the petitioner) essentially asserts in his petition
for certiorari[1] that the COMELEC conducted proceedings in the election contest for the gubernatorial position of the
Province of Bulacan, between him and the respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan (the respondent), without due
regard to his fundamental due process rights. The COMELEC, on the other hand, claims that its decision-making
deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require notice to and the participation of the contending parties.
THE ANTECEDENTS
x x x please be informed that the conduct of proceedings in COMELEC EPC No. 2007-44 (Pagdanganan vs.
Mendoza) within the Tribunal Premises was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle.
Basis of such grant is Section 3, Comelec Resolution No. 2812 dated 17 October 1995, stating that (t)he Tribunals,
the Commission and the Courts shall coordinate and make arrangement with each other so as not to delay or interrupt
the revision of ballots being conducted. The synchronization of revision of ballots shall be such that the expeditious
disposition of the respective protest case shall be the primary concern. While the said provision speaks only of
revision, it has been the practice of the Tribunal to allow the conduct of other proceedings in local election protest
cases within its premises as may be requested. [emphasis supplied][3]
THE PETITION
The SET Secretarys response triggered the filing of the present petition raising the following ISSUES
86
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS
WITHOUT GIVING DUE NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO AN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING BALLOTS WHICH ARE NOT IN ITS OFFICIAL CUSTODY AND
ARE OUTSIDE ITS OWN PREMISES, AUTHORITY AND CONTROL.
The petitioner argues that the election protest involves his election as Governor; thus, its subject matter involves him
and the people of the Province of Bulacan who elected him. On this basis, he claims entitlement to notice and
participation in all matters that involve or are related to the election protest. He further asserts that he had the
legitimate expectation that no further proceedings would be held or conducted in the case after its submission for
decision.
Citing the commentaries of Father Joaquin Bernas,[4] the petitioner argues that the proceedings before the
COMELEC in election protests are judicial in nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process
specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful hearing apply. Notices in
judicial dispute, he claims, are not really just a matter of courtesy; they are elementary fundamental element of due
process, they are part and parcel of a right of a party to be heard. He further cites Justice Isagani A. Cruz,[5] who
wrote:
x x x Every litigant is entitled to his day in court. He has a right to be notified of every incident of the proceeding and
to be present at every stage thereof so that he may be heard by himself and counsel for the protection of his interest.
The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element of the right to have
judgment only after lawful hearing is absent. There is no way, he claims, that a judicial proceeding held without notice
to the parties could be described as a lawful hearing, especially a proceeding which has as its subject matter the
sovereign will of an entire province.
He was therefore denied his day in court, he claims, when the COMELEC conducted the examination and
appreciation of ballots. The proceedings should be stopped and declared null and void; its future results, too, should
be nullified, as nothing derived from the anomalous and unconstitutional clandestine and unilateral proceedings
should ever be part of any decision that the COMELEC may subsequently render. The poisonous fruits (derived from
the proceedings) should have no part and should not be admitted for any purpose and/or in any judicial proceeding.
Other than his due process concern, the petitioner takes issue with the COMELECs appreciation of ballots even
when the ballots and other election materials were no longer in its official custody and were outside its premises,
authority and control. He asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should have
jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings. In this case, the COMELEC has transferred
possession, custody and jurisdiction over the ballots to the SET, a tribunal separate and independent from the
COMELEC and over which the COMELEC exercises no authority or jurisdiction. For the COMELEC to still conduct
proceedings on property, materials and evidence no longer in its custody violates the principle of separation of
powers.
The petitioner also points out that the COMELECs unilateral appreciation of the ballots in the SET premises deviates
from the Commissions usual and time honored practice and procedure of conducting proceedings within its premises
and while it has custody over the ballots. There is no precedent, according to the petitioner, for this deviation, nor is
there any compelling reason to make the present case an exception. Citing Cabagnot v. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. 124383, August 9, 1996) which involves a transfer or change of venue of the revision of ballots,
the petitioner alleges that this Court has been very emphatic in denouncing the COMELEC for its departure from its
own rules and usual practice; while Cabagnot involves the issue of change of venue, the petitioner finds parallel
applicability in the present case which also involves a deviation from COMELEC rules and usual practice. The
petitioner adds that the act of the Second Division is effectively an arrogation of the authority to promulgate rules of
procedure a power that solely belongs to the COMELEC en banc.
After a preliminary finding of a genuine due process issue, we issued a Status Quo Order on July 14, 2009.
THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS
In his Comment to the Petition with Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift/Dissolve Status Quo Ante Order, the private
respondent asserts that the petition contains deliberate falsehoods and misleading allegations that led the Court to
grant the injunctive relief the petitioner had asked. He asserts that the proceeding the petitioner stated in his petition
was actually the COMELECs decision-making process, i.e., the appreciation of ballots, which is a procedure internal
to the Members of the Second Division of the COMELEC and their staff members; no revision of ballots took place
as revision had long been finished. What was therefore undertaken within the SETs premises was unilateral
COMELEC action that is exclusive to the COMELEC and an internal matter that is confidential in nature. In this light,
no due process violation ever arose.
The private respondent also asserts that the petitioner cannot claim that he was not notified of and denied
participation in the revision proceedings, as the petitioner himself is fully aware that the revision of the ballots was
completed as early as July 28, 2008 and the petitioner was present and actively participated in the entire proceedings,
all the way to the filing of the required memoranda. Thus, the petitioners right to due process was duly satisfied.
The private respondent implores us to commence contempt proceedings against the petitioner who, the respondent
claims, has not been forthright in his submissions and was not guided by the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in his conduct as a party and in his relations with the opposing party, the other counsel and the
Court.
Lastly, the private respondent posits that the present petition was filed out of time i.e., beyond the reglementary
period provided under Rule 64. All these reasons, the private respondent argues, constitute sufficient basis
for the lifting of the status quo order and the dismissal of the petition.
Public respondent COMELEC, for its part, claims that the petition is without basis in fact and in law and ought to be
dismissed outright. Given the possibility of simultaneous election contests involving national and local officials, it has
institutionalized an order of preference in the custody and revision of ballots in contested ballot boxes. The
established order of preference is not without exception, as the expeditious disposition of protest cases is a primary
concern. Additionally, the order of preference does not prevent the COMELEC from proceeding with pending protest
cases, particularly those already submitted for decision. It claims that it has wide latitude to employ means to
effectively perform its duty in safeguarding the sanctity of the elections and the integrity of the ballot.
The COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it can conduct appreciation of
ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down to one of discretion the authority of the
87
COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a pending election protest. Under Section 4 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC may use all auxiliary writs, processes and other means to carry into
effect its powers or jurisdiction; if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not
specifically provided for by law or the Rules of Procedure, any suitable process or proceeding not prohibited by law
or by its rules may be adopted.
The COMELEC lastly submits that while due process requires giving the parties an opportunity to intervene in all
stages of the proceedings, the COMELEC in the present case is not actually conducting further proceedings requiring
notice to the parties; there is no revision or correction of the ballots, as the election protest had already been
submitted for resolution. When the COMELEC coordinated with the SET, it was simply for purposes of resolving the
submitted provincial election contest before it; the parties do not take part in this aspect of the case which necessarily
requires utmost secrecy. On the whole, the petitioner was afforded every opportunity to present his case. To now
hold the election protest hostage until the conclusion of the protest pending before the SET defeats the COMELECs
mandate of ensuring free, orderly and honest election.
THE COURTS RULING
We review the present petition on the basis of the combined application of Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of
Court. While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of subsequent
COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a term that defies exact definition, but
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[6] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be
grave to merit our positive action.[7]
After due consideration, we find the petition devoid of merit.
The petition is anchored on the alleged conduct of proceedings in the election protest following the completed revision
of ballots at the SET premises without notice to and without the participation of the petitioner. Significantly, the
conduct of proceedings is confirmed by the SET Secretary in the letter we quoted above.[8] As the issues raised show
the petitioners focus is not really on the COMELEC Orders denying the suspension of proceedings when the ballot
boxes and other election materials pertinent to the election contest were transferred to the SET; the focus is on what
the COMELEC did after to the issuance of the Resolutions. We read the petition in this context as these COMELEC
Orders are now unassailable as the period to challenge them has long passed.[9]
The substantive issue we are primarily called upon to resolve is whether there were proceedings within the SET
premises, entitling the petitioner to notice and participation, which were denied to him; in other words, the issue is
whether the petitioners right to due process has been violated. A finding of due process violation, because of the
inherent arbitrariness it carries, necessarily amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the petitioner has claimed that COMELEC exercises judicial power in its action
over provincial election contests and has argued its due process position from this view. We take this opportunity to
clarify that judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.[10] This exclusive grant of authority to the Judiciary is reinforced under the second paragraph of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which further states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.. ., thus
constitutionally locating the situs of the exercise of judicial power in the courts.
In contrast with the above definitions, Section 2, Article IX(C) of the Constitution lists the COMELECs powers and
functions, among others, as follows:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay officials shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and
its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), [11] quasi-judicial (to
exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction
over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting
elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been increased from the
1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the countrys awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and
protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935 Constitution, the powers and functions of
the COMELEC were defined as follows:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law.
It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the
Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest election. The decisions,
orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. [emphasis supplied]
These evolved into the following powers and functions under the 1973 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
88
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
the registration of voters.
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the 1987 Constitution, but retained all the while the
character of an administrative agency.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with
authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise
discretion of a judicial nature;[12] it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law
and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders
judgment.[13] Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to
election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising
judicial power in the constitutional sense;[14] hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of
administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
As will be seen on close examination, the 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the COMELEC shall be
the sole judge of all contests, thus giving the appearance that judicial power had been conferred. This phraseology,
however, was changed in the 1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction over all contests, thus
removing any vestige of exercising its adjudicatory power as a court and correctly aligning it with what it is a quasi-
judicial body.[15] Consistent with the characterization of its adjudicatory power as quasi-judicial, the judicial review of
COMELEC en banc decisions (together with the review of Civil Service Commission decisions) is via the prerogative
writ of certiorari, not through an appeal, as the traditional mode of review of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative
tribunals in the exercise the Courts supervisory authority. This means that the Court will not supplant the decision of
the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body except where a grave abuse of discretion or any other jurisdictional error
exists.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal,
are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[16] quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support
it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The
essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.[17] A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the
case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a
hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the
evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the
case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the
totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted
by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on
substantial evidence.[18]
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further
complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional
requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. [19] As a
component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the duty to give reason to enable the affected
person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public
scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the hearing and deliberative
stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated. We discuss all these allegations below.
The Right to Notice and to be Heard.
a. At the Hearing and Revision of Ballots.
Based on the pleadings filed, we see no factual and legal basis for the petitioner to complain of denial of his hearing
stage rights. In the first place, he does not dispute that he fully participated in the proceedings of the election protest
until the case was deemed submitted for resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots, duly
89
presented his evidence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. These various phases of the proceedings
constitute the hearing proper of the election contest and the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to
be heard that the Ang Tibay hearing stage rights require. In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head
with the respondent in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make
their presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of
procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can
complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
b. At the Proceedings at the SET.
A critical question to be answered in passing upon due process questions at this stage of the election contest is the
nature of the so-called proceedings after the ballots and other materials pertinent to the provincial election contest
were transferred to the SET.
In the petition, the petitioner alleged that there were strange proceedings [20] which were unilateral, clandestine and
surreptitious within the premises of the SET, on documents, ballots and election materials whose possession and
custody have been transferred to the SET, and the petitioner was NEVER OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED of the strange
on-goings at the SET.[21] Attached to the petition was the letter of the Secretary of the SET confirming the conduct of
proceedings in the provincial election contest, and citing as basis the authority of Acting SET Chairman, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, upon the formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, and citing Section 3,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2812 dated 17 October 1995 on the coordination envisioned among the COMELEC, the
SET and the courts so as not to delay or interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted. While the SET letter
made the reservation that While the said provision speaks only of revision, it has been the practice of the Tribunal to
allow the conduct of other proceedings in local election protest cases within its premises as may be requested, no
mention whatsoever was made of the kind of proceedings taking place.
It was at this point that this Court intervened, in response to the petitioners prayer for the issuance of temporary
injunctive relief, through the issuance of a Status Quo Order with a non-extendible directive for the respondents to
file their comments on the petition; for indeed, any further revision of ballots or other adversarial proceedings after
the case has been submitted for resolution, would not only be strange and unusual but would indicate a gross violation
of due process rights.
After consideration of the respondents Comments and the petitioners petition and Reply, we hold that the contested
proceedings at the SET (contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the election contest
that would require notice of hearing and the participation of the parties. As the COMELEC stated in its Comment and
without any contrary or disputing claim in the petitioners Reply:[22]
However, contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in the appreciation of the contested ballots in EPC
No. 2007-44 simultaneously with the SET in SET Case No. 001-07 is not conducting further proceedings requiring
notice to the parties. There is no revision or correction of the ballots because EPC No. 2007-04 was already submitted
for resolution. Public respondent, in coordinating with the SET, is simply resolving the submitted protest case before
it. The parties necessarily take no part in said deliberation, which require utmost secrecy. Needless to state, the
actual decision-making process is supposed to be conducted only by the designated members of the Second Division
of the public respondent in strict confidentiality.
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body,
in the course of appreciating the evidence presented and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits. These
deliberations are no different from judicial deliberations which are considered confidential and privileged.[23] We find
it significant that the private respondents Comment fully supported the COMELECs position and disavowed any
participation in the contested proceeding the petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other hand, has not
shown that the private respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the provincial election
contest.
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in the COMELECs handling of the
Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of the ballot boxes to the SET; no proceedings at the instance
of one party or of COMELEC has been conducted at the SET that would require notice and hearing because of the
possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps
it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our standard
of review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed
by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation
entailed.
Alleged Violations of
Deliberation Stage Rights.
On the basis of the above conclusion, we see no point in discussing any alleged violation of the deliberative stage
rights. First, no illegal proceeding ever took place that would bear the poisonous fruits that the petitioner
fears. Secondly, in the absence of the results of the COMELEC deliberations through its decision on the election
protest, no basis exists to apply the Ang Tibay deliberative stage rights; there is nothing for us to test under the
standards of the due process deliberative stages rights before the COMELEC renders its decision. Expressed in
terms of our standard of review, we have as yet no basis to determine the existence of any grave abuse of discretion.
Conduct of COMELEC
Deliberations at the SET Premises
We turn to the issue of the propriety of the COMELECs consideration of the provincial election contest (specifically
its appreciation of the contested ballots) at the SET premises and while the same ballots are also under consideration
by the SET for another election contest legitimately within the SETs own jurisdiction.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest, as the petitioner
seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The
Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving provincial officials. The
COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest,
as well as over the parties. After its jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction cannot be ousted by subsequent events
such as the temporary transfer of evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its
own jurisdiction over another election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of
jurisdiction.[24]
90

Thus, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over provincial election contest exists side by side with the jurisdiction of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, with each tribunal being supreme in their respective areas of concern (the Senate election
contests for the SET, and the regional, provincial and city election contests for the COMELEC), and with neither one
being higher than the other in terms of precedence so that the jurisdiction of one must yield to the other.
But while no precedence in jurisdiction exists, the COMELEC, vowing to the reality that only a single ballot exists in
an election for national and local officials, saw it fit to lay down the rule on the order of preference in the custody and
revision of ballots and other documents contained in the ballot boxes. The order, in terms of the adjudicatory tribunal
and as provided in COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, runs:
1. Presidential Electoral Tribunal;
2. Senate Electoral Tribunal;
3. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
4. Commission on Elections; and
5. Regional Trial Courts.
This order of preference dictated that the ballot boxes and other election materials in Bulacans provincial election
contest, had to be transferred to the SET when the latter needed these materials for its revision of ballots. The transfer
to the SET, however, did not mean that the Bulacan provincial election contest at that time already submitted for
decision had to be suspended as the COMELEC held in its Orders of 29 April 2009 and 26 May 2009 in EPC No.
2007-44.[25] This is particularly true in Bulacans case as no revision had to be undertaken, the revision having been
already terminated.
With the COMELEC retaining its jurisdiction over the Bulacan provincial election contest, the legal effect of the
physical transfer of the ballots and other election materials to the SET for purposes of its own revision becomes a
non-issue, given the arrangement between the COMELEC and the SET, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
2812, to coordinate and make arrangements with each other so as not to delay or interrupt the revision of ballots
being conducted, all for the purpose of the expeditious disposition of their respective protest cases. The SET itself
honored this arrangement as shown by the letter of the SET Secretary that the COMELEC could conduct proceedings
within the Tribunal premises as authorized by the Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio.[26] This
arrangement recognized the COMELECs effective authority over the Bulacan ballots and other election materials,
although these were temporarily located at the SET premises. This arrangement, too, together with the side by side
and non-conflicting existence of the COMELEC and SET jurisdictions, negate the validity of the petitioners argument
that the COMELEC transgressed the rule on separation of powers when it acted on the Bulacan provincial election
contest while the ballot boxes were at the SET premises. Rather than negate, this arrangement reinforced the
separate but co-existing nature of these tribunals respective jurisdictions.
As the petitioner argues and the COMELEC candidly admits, there is no specific rule which allows the COMELEC to
conduct an appreciation of ballots outside its premises and of those which are outside its own custody.[27] But while
this is true, there is likewise nothing to prohibit the COMELEC from undertaking the appreciation of ballot side by
side with the SETs own revision of ballots for the senatorial votes, in light especially of the COMELECs general
authority to adopt means to effect its powers and jurisdiction under its Rules of Procedure. Section 4 of these Rules
states:
Sec. 4. Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect its
powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules, any suitable process or proceeding
may be adopted.
This rule is by no means unusual and unique to the COMELEC as the courts have the benefit of this same type of
rule under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. The courts own rule provides:
Means to Carry Jurisdiction into Effect. When by law jurisdiction is conferred o n a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer;
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these
rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said
law or rules.
Incidentally, the COMELEC authority to promulgate the above rule enjoys constitutional moorings; in the grant to the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction, the Constitution provided it with the accompanying authority to promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, provided that these rules shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.[28] The Constitution additionally requires that the rules of procedure that the
COMELEC will promulgate must expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies.[29] This constitutional standard is authority, no less, that the COMELEC can cite in defending its action.
For ultimately, the appreciation of the Bulacan ballots that the COMELEC undertook side by side with the SETs own
revision of ballots, constitutes an exercise of discretion made under the authority of the above-cited COMELEC rule
of procedure.
On the basis of the standards set by Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and of the Constitution
itself in the handling of election cases, we rule that the COMELEC action is a valid exercise of discretion as
it is a suitable and reasonable process within the exercise of its jurisdiction over provincial election contests,
aimed at expediting the disposition of this case, and with no adverse, prejudicial or discriminatory effects
on the parties to the contest that would render the rule unreasonable.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding into the COMELEC en banc rule-making prerogative
when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side with the SET
revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule
that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.
In light of these conclusions, we need not discuss the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. We
accordingly LIFT the STATUS QUO ORDER we issued, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183626 October 4, 2010
91
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO), Petitioner,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision dated April 17,
20082 and the Resolution dated June 25, 20083 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99781.
The antecedent facts and proceedings follow—
Petitioner Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) is a rural electric cooperative organized and
existing by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269.
On February 8, 1996, the Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and
of the other 33 rural electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition before the then Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) for the approval of the formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832. 4 The case was docketed as ERB
Case No. 96-49, and later consolidated with identical petitions of other associations of electric cooperatives in the
Philippines.
The relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7832 for compliance are Sections 10 and 14, which provide—
Sec. 10. Rationalization of System Losses by Phasing Out Pilferage Losses as a Component Thereof. – There is
hereby established a cap on the recoverable rate of system losses as follows:
xxxx
(b) For rural electric cooperatives:
(i) Twenty-two percent (22%) at the end of the first year following the effectivity of this Act;
(ii) Twenty percent (20%) at the end of the second year following the effectivity of this Act;
(iii) Eighteen percent (18%) at the end of the third year following the effectivity of this Act;
(iv) Sixteen percent (16%) at the end of the fourth year following the effectivity of this Act; and
(v) Fourteen percent (14%) at the end of the fifth year following the effectivity of this Act.
Provided, that the ERB is hereby authorized to determine at the end of the fifth year following the effectivity of this
Act, and as often as is necessary, taking into account the viability of rural electric cooperatives and the interest of
consumers, whether the caps herein or theretofore established shall be reduced further which shall, in no case, be
lower than nine percent (9%) and accordingly fix the date of the effectivity of the new caps.
xxxx
Sec. 14. Rules and Regulations. – The ERB shall, within thirty (30) working days after the conduct of hearings which
must commence within thirty (30) working days upon the effectivity of this Act, issue the rules and regulation as may
be necessary to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the provisions of this Act, to include but not
limited to, the development of methodologies for computing the amount of electricity illegally used and the amount of
payment or deposit contemplated in Section 7 hereof as a result of the presence of the prima facie evidence
discovered.
Corollary thereto, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7832
provide—
Section 4. Caps on System Loss allowed to Rural Electric Cooperatives. – The maximum rate of system loss that the
cooperative can pass on to its customers shall be as follows:
a. Twenty-two percent (22%) effective on February 1996 billing.
b. Twenty percent (20%) effective on February 1997 billing.
c. Eighteen percent (18%) effective on February 1998 billing.
d. Sixteen percent (16%) effective on February 1999 billing.
e. Fourteen percent (14%) effective on February 2000 billing.
Section 5. Automatic Cost Adjustment Formula. – Each and every cooperative shall file with the ERB, on or before
September 30, 1995, an application for approval of an amended Purchased Power Adjustment Clause that would
reflect the new system loss cap to be included in its schedule of rates.
The automatic cost adjustment of every electric cooperative shall be guided by the following formula:
Purchased Power Adjustment Clause
A
(PPA) =
B – (C + D)
Where:
A = Cost of electricity purchased and generated for the previous month
B = Total Kwh purchased and generated for the previous month
C = The actual system loss but not to exceed the maximum recoverable rate of system loss in Kwh plus actual
company use in kwhrs but not to exceed 1% of total kwhrs purchased and generated
D = kwh consumed by subsidized consumers
E = Applicable base cost of power equal to the amount incorporated into their basic rate per kwh.
In an Order5 dated February 19, 1997, the ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional
authority to use and implement the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) formula pursuant to the mandatory
provisions of R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR, with a directive to submit relevant and pertinent documents for the Board’s
review, verification, and confirmation.
In the meantime, the passage of R.A. No. 91366 led to the creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
replacing and succeeding the ERB. All pending cases before the ERB were transferred to the ERC. ERB Case No.
96-49 was re-docketed as ERC Case No. 2001-343.
In the Order dated June 17, 2003, the ERC clarified ERB’s earlier policy regarding the PPA formula to be used by
the electric cooperatives, viz.—
After a careful evaluation of the records, the Commission noted that the PPA formula which was approved by the
ERB was silent on whether the calculation of the cost of electricity purchased and generated in the formula should
be "gross" or "net" of the discounts.
Let it be noted that the power cost is said to be at "gross" if the discounts are not passed-on to the end-users whereas
it is said to be at "net" if the said discounts are passed-on to the end-users.
To attain uniformity in the implementation of the PPA formula, the Commission has resolved that:
1. In the confirmation of past PPAs, the power cost shall still be based on "gross," and
2. In the confirmation of future PPAs, the power cost shall be based on "net."
The electric cooperatives filed their respective motions for clarification and/or reconsideration. Hence, the ERC issued
an Order7 dated January 14, 2005, stating that the PPA was a cost-recovery mechanism, not a revenue-generating
scheme, so that the distribution utilities or the electric cooperatives must recover from their customers only the actual
cost of purchased power. The ERC thus adopted a new PPA policy, to wit—
A. The computation and confirmation of the PPA prior to the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based
on the approved PPA Formula;
B. The computation and confirmation of the PPA after the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based
on the power cost "net" of discount; and
C. If the approved PPA Formula is silent on the terms of discount, the computation and confirmation of the PPA shall
be based on the power cost at "gross," subject to the submission of proofs that said discounts are being extended to
the end-users.8
92
Thereafter, the ERC continued its review, verification, and confirmation of the electric cooperatives’ implementation
of the PPA formula based on the available data and information submitted by the latter.
On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order,9 mandating that the discounts earned by SURNECO from its
power supplier should be deducted from the computation of the power cost, disposing in this wise ¾
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby confirms the Purchased Power
Adjustment (PPA) of Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) for the period February 1996 to July
2004 which resulted to an over-recovery amounting to EIGHTEEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FOUR PESOS (PhP18,188,794.00) equivalent to PhP0.0500/kwh. In this
connection, SURNECO is hereby directed to refund the amount of PhP0.0500/kwh to its Main Island consumers
starting the next billing cycle from receipt of this Order until such time that the full amount shall have been refunded.
The Commission likewise confirms the PPA of SURNECO for its Hikdop Island consumers for the period February
1996 to July 2004 which resulted to an under-recovery amounting to TWO MILLION FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FORTY FIVE PESOS (PhP2,478,045.00). SURNECO is hereby authorized to collect from its
Hikdop Island consumers the amount of PhP0.0100/kwh starting the next billing cycle from receipt of this Order until
such time that the full amount shall have been collected.
Accordingly, SURNECO is directed to:
a) Reflect the PPA refund/collection as a separate item in the bill using the phrase "Previous Years’ Adjustment on
Power Cost";
b) Submit, within ten (10) days from its initial implementation of the refund/collection, a sworn statement indicating
its compliance with the aforecited directive; and
c) Accomplish and submit a report in accordance with the attached prescribed format, on or before the 30th day of
January of the succeeding year and every year thereafter until the amount shall have been fully refunded/collected.
SO ORDERED.10
SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the ERC in its Order11 dated May 29, 2007 on the
ground that the motion did not raise any new matter which was not already passed upon by the ERC.
Aggrieved, SURNECO went to the CA via a petition for review,12 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, seeking the annulment of the ERC Orders dated March 19, 2007 and
May 29, 2007.
In its Decision dated April 17, 2008, the CA denied SURNECO’s petition and affirmed the assailed Orders of the
ERC.
On June 25, 2008, upon motion for reconsideration13 of SURNECO, the CA issued its Resolution denying the same.
Hence, this petition, with SURNECO ascribing error to the CA and the ERC in: (1) disallowing its use of the multiplier
scheme to compute its system’s loss; (2) ordering it to deduct from the power cost or refund to its consumers the
discounts extended to it by its power supplier, NPC; and (3) ordering it to refund alleged over-recoveries arrived at
by the ERC without giving SURNECO the opportunity to be heard.
The petition should be denied.
First. SURNECO points out that the National Electrification Administration (NEA), which used to be the government
authority charged by law with the power to fix rates of rural electric cooperatives, entered into a loan agreement with
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The proceeds of the loan were intended for use by qualified rural electric
cooperatives, SURNECO included, in their rehabilitation and expansion projects. The loan agreement imposed a
15% system loss cap, but provided a Power Cost Adjustment Clause authorizing cooperatives to charge and show
"system losses in excess of 15%" as a separate item in their consumer’s bill. Thus, the cooperatives charged their
consumer-members "System Loss Levy" for system losses in excess of the 15% cap.
SURNECO states that, in January 1984, it was authorized by the NEA that all increases in the NPC power cost (in
case of NPC-connected cooperatives) shall be uniformly passed on to the member-consumers using the 1.4
multiplier, which is divided into 1.3 as allowance for 23% system loss and 0.1 as provision for the corresponding
increase in operating expenses to partly offset the effects of inflation.14 Subsequently, the NEA, through NEA
Memorandum No. 1-A dated March 30, 1992, revised the aforesaid issuance as follows—
Pursuant to NEA Board Resolution No. 98, Series of 1991, x x x, the revised cooperatives’ multiplier will be as follows:
1.2 – Rural Electric Cooperatives (RECs) with system loss of 15% and below;
1.3 – RECs with system loss ranging from 16% to 22%;
1.4 – RECs with system loss of 23% and above.
SURNECO posits that, per NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, the NEA had authorized it to adopt a multiplier scheme as
the method to recover system loss. It claims that this cannot be abrogated, revoked, or superseded by any order,
resolution, or issuance by the ERC prescribing a certain formula to implement the caps of recoverable rate of system
loss under R.A. No. 7832 without violating the non-impairment clause15 of the Constitution.
We disagree. SURNECO cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the system loss
caps under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7832. The law took effect on January 17, 1995. Perusing Section 10, and also
Section 11,16 providing for the application of the caps as of the date of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7832, readily shows
that the imposition of the caps was self-executory and did not require the issuance of any enabling set of rules or any
action by the then ERB, now ERC. Thus, the caps should have been applied as of January 17, 1995 when R.A. No.
7832 took effect.
Indeed, under NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of system losses
even beyond the caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out pilferage losses as a
component of the recoverable system losses by the distributing utilities such as SURNECO. However, it is totally
repugnant to and incompatible with the system loss caps established in R.A. No. 7832, and is repealed by Section
1617 of the law. As between NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere administrative issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a
legislative enactment, the latter must prevail.18
Second. The ERC was merely implementing the system loss caps in R.A. No. 7832 when it reviewed and confirmed
SURNECO’S PPA charges, and ordered the refund of the amount collected in excess of the allowable system loss
caps through its continued use of the multiplier scheme. As the ERC held in its March 19, 2007 Order—
On January 14, 2005, the Commission issued an Order adopting a new PPA policy as follows: (a) the computation
and confirmation of the PPA prior to the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on the approved
PPA Formula; (b) the computation and confirmation of the PPA after the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003
shall be based on the power cost "net" of discount; and (c) if the approved PPA Formula is silent in terms of discount,
the computation and confirmation of the PPA shall be based on the power cost at "gross" reduced by the amount of
discounts extended to customers, subject to the submission of proofs that said discounts are indeed being extended
to customers.
However, the Commission deemed it appropriate to clarify its PPA confirmation process particularly on the treatment
of the Prompt Payment Discount (PPD) granted to distribution utilities (DUs) by their power suppliers, to wit:
I. The over-or-under recovery will be determined by comparing the allowable power cost with the actual revenue
billed to end-users.
II. Calculation of the DU’s allowable power cost as prescribed in the PPA formula:
a. If the PPA formula explicitly provides the manner by which discounts availed from the power supplier/s shall be
treated, the allowable power cost will be computed based on the specific provision of the formula, which may either
be at "net" or "gross"; and
b. If the PPA formula is silent in terms of discounts, the allowable power cost will be computed at "net" of discounts
availed from the power supplier/s, if there be any.
III. Calculation of DU’s actual revenues/actual amount billed to end-users.
a. On actual PPA computed at net of discounts availed from power supplier/s:
93
a.1. If a DU bills at net of discounts availed from the power supplier/s (i.e., gross power cost minus discounts from The over-recoveries were due to the following:
power supplier/s) and the DU is not extending discounts to end-users, the actual revenue should be equal to the 1. For the period February 1996 to December 1998, SURNECO’s PPA computation included the power cost and the
allowable power cost; and corresponding kWh purchased from Hikdop end-users. The Commission excluded those months which SURNECO
a.2. If a DU bills at net of discounts availed from the power supplier/s (i.e., gross power cost minus discounts from did not impose variable charges to Hikdop end-user which resulted to a total net over-recovery of PhP21,245,034.00;
power supplier/s) and the DU is extending discounts to end-users, the discount extended to end-users shall be added and
back to the actual revenue. 2. SURNECO’s basic charge for Hikdop end-users were beyond the approved basic charge for the period February
b. On actual PPA computed at gross: 1996 to September 1998 resulting to a net over-recovery of PhP128,489.00.
b.1. If a DU bills at gross (i.e., gross power cost not reduced by discounts from power supplier/s) and the DU is SURNECO’s under recoveries for the period January 1999 to June 2004 were due to the following:
extending discounts to end-users, the actual revenue shall be calculated as: gross power revenue less discounts 1. For the period August 2001 to June 2004, SURNECO erroneously deducted the Power Act Reduction Adjustments
extended to end-users. The result shall then be compared to the allowable power cost; and (PARA) in the total purchased power cost of its PPA computation resulting to an under-recovery of PhP1,377,763.00;
b.2. If a DU bills at gross (i.e., gross power cost not reduced by discounts from power supplier/s) and the DU is not 2. SURNECO’s power cost and kWh computation includes Dummy Load resulting to an under recovery amounting
extending discounts to end-users, the actual revenue shall be taken as is which shall be compared to the allowable to PhP226,196.00; and
power cost. 3. The new grossed-up factor scheme adopted by the Commission which provided a true-up mechanism to allow the
IV. In the calculation of the DU’s actual revenues, the amount of discounts extended to end-users shall, in no case, DUs to recover the actual costs of purchased power.19
be higher than the discounts availed by the DU from its power supplier/s. In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA
The foregoing clarification was intended to ensure that only the actual costs of purchased power are recovered by mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric
the DUs. cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric
In the meantime, SURNECO submitted reports on its monthly implementation of the PPA covering the period January cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in
1998 to July 2004 and attended the conferences conducted by the Commission on December 11, 2003 and May 4, those rates.
2005 relative thereto. It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility
The Commission evaluated SURNECO’s monthly PPA implementation covering the period February 1996 to July such as SURNECO. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company20—
2004, which disclosed the following: The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes
Schedule 1, Main Island prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is
Period Covered Over Over used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject
(Under) (Under) Recoveries to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the
Recoveries (In kWh) owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
(In PhP) Likewise, SURNECO cannot validly assert that the caps set by R.A. No. 7832 are arbitrary, or that they violate the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution for allegedly traversing the loan agreement between NEA and ADB.
February 1996 to 20,737,074 0.2077 Striking down a legislative enactment, or any of its provisions, can be done only by way of a direct action, not through
December 1998 a collateral attack, and more so, not for the first time on appeal in order to avoid compliance. The challenge to the
law’s constitutionality should also be raised at the earliest opportunity.21
January 1999 to (2,548,280) (0.0097) Even assuming, merely for argument’s sake, that the ERC issuances violated the NEA and ADB covenant, the
July 2004 contract had to yield to the greater authority of the State’s exercise of police power. It has long been settled that
TOTAL 18,188,794 0.0500 police power legislation, adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety,
and general welfare of the people prevail not only over future contracts but even over those already in existence, for
Schedule 2, Municipality of Hikdop all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.22
February 1996 to 70,235 0.3190 SURNECO also avers that the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) removed the alleged arbitrary
December 1998 caps in R.A. No. 7832. We differ. The EPIRA allows the caps to remain until replaced by the caps to be determined
PPA Plus Basic by the ERC, pursuant to its delegated authority under Section 4323 of R.A. No. 9136 to prescribe new system loss
Cha[r]ge caps, based on technical parameters such as load density, sales mix, cost of service, delivery voltage, and other
technical considerations it may promulgate.
January 1999 to (2,548,280) (0.0097) Third. We also disagree with SURNECO in its insistence that the PPA confirmation policies constituted an
July 2004 amendment to the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 and must, therefore, comply with the publication requirement for the
TOTAL (2,478,045) (0.0100) effectivity of administrative issuances.

94
The PPA formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 was only a model to be used as a guide by the electric
cooperatives in proposing their own PPA formula for approval by the then ERB. Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX of the IRR
directed the electric cooperatives to apply for approval of such formula with the ERB so that the system loss caps
under the law would be incorporated in their computation of power cost adjustments. The IRR did not provide for a
specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the IRR that was amended or could have been amended relative to
the PPA formula. The IRR left to the ERB, now the ERC, the authority to approve and oversee the implementation
of the electric cooperatives’ PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making power over them.1avvphi1
We likewise differ from SURNECO’s stance that it was denied due process when the ERC issued its questioned
Orders. Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.24 It means being given the opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this
purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is not even essential. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to present evidence in support thereof. 25
Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the electric cooperatives’ monthly documentary submissions
to substantiate their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for other required supporting
documents and were allowed to submit them accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC
conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives’ representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss
preliminary figures and to double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition, after the
issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives were allowed to file their respective motions for
reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that SURNECO was not denied due process.
Finally, the core of the issues raised is factual in character. It needs only to be reiterated that factual findings of
administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even
finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant,26 more so if affirmed
by the CA. Absent any grave abuse of discretion on the part of ERC, we must sustain its findings. Hence, its assailed
Orders, following the rule of non-interference on matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming their special technical knowledge and training, must be upheld.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 17, 2008 and the Resolution dated June 25, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99781 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, acting through its owner, G.R. No. 178296
GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
- versus - CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, NACHURA,
RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), ABAD, and
Respondent. MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 12, 2011
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 30,
2005 and Resolution dated June 4, 2007. The assailed Decision affirmed the dismissal of a petition for cancellation
of union registration filed by petitioner, Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation, owner of Heritage Hotel Manila, against
respondent, National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila
Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), a labor organization of the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel
Manila.
The case stemmed from the following antecedents:
On October 11, 1995, respondent filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region
(DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election.[2] The Med-Arbiter granted the petition on February 14, 1996 and
ordered the holding of a certification election.[3] On appeal, the DOLE Secretary, in a Resolution dated August 15,
1996, affirmed the Med-Arbiters order and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a preelection
conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on September 23,
1996.
The preelection conference was not held as initially scheduled; it was held a year later, or on February 20, 1998.
Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent. The
latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice. The preelection conference resumed on January 29, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its
annual financial report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995.
Consequently, on May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the
ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner prayed that respondents Certificate of Creation of
Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further requested
the suspension of the certification election proceedings.[4]
On June 1, 2000, petitioner reiterated its request by filing a Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the [Certification Election]
Proceedings,[5] arguing that the dismissal or suspension of the proceedings is warranted, considering that the
legitimacy of respondent is seriously being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration. Petitioner
maintained that the resolution of the issue of whether respondent is a legitimate labor organization is crucial to the
issue of whether it may exercise rights of a legitimate labor organization, which include the right to be certified as the
bargaining agent of the covered employees.
Nevertheless, the certification election pushed through on June 23, 2000. Respondent emerged as the winner. [6]
On June 28, 2000, petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner,[7] stating
that the certification election held on June 23, 2000 was an exercise in futility because, once respondents registration
is cancelled, it would no longer be entitled to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory
employees. Petitioner also claimed that some of respondents members were not qualified to join the union because
they were either confidential employees or managerial employees. It then prayed that the certification of the election
results and winner be deferred until the petition for cancellation shall have been resolved, and that respondents
members who held confidential or managerial positions be excluded from the supervisors bargaining unit.
95
Meanwhile, respondent filed its Answer[8] to the petition for the cancellation of its registration. It averred that the
petition was filed primarily to delay the conduct of the certification election, the respondents certification as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the supervisory employees, and the commencement of bargaining
negotiations. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons: (a) petitioner is estopped
from questioning respondents status as a legitimate labor organization as it had already recognized respondent as
such during the preelection conferences; (b) petitioner is not the party-in-interest, as the union members are the ones
who would be disadvantaged by the non-submission of financial reports; (c) it has already complied with the
reportorial requirements, having submitted its financial statements for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, its updated list
of officers, and its list of members for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999; (d) the petition is already moot
and academic, considering that the certification election had already been held, and the members had manifested
their will to be represented by respondent.
Citing National Union of Bank Employees v. Minister of Labor, et al.[9] and Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific
Plastic v. Hon. Laguesma,[10] the Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of registration is
not a bar to the holding of a certification election. Thus, in an Order [11] dated January 26, 2001, the Med-Arbiter
dismissed petitioners protest, and certified respondent as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all supervisory
employees.
Petitioner subsequently appealed the said Order to the DOLE Secretary.[12] The appeal was later dismissed by DOLE
Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas) in the Resolution of August 21, 2002. [13] Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. [14]
In the meantime, Regional Director Alex E. Maraan (Regional Director Maraan) of DOLE-NCR finally resolved the
petition for cancellation of registration. While finding that respondent had indeed failed to file financial reports and the
list of its members for several years, he, nonetheless, denied the petition, ratiocinating that freedom of association
and the employees right to self-organization are more substantive considerations. He took into account the fact that
respondent won the certification election and that it had already been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of
the supervisory employees. In view of the foregoing, Regional Director Maraanwhile emphasizing that the non-
compliance with the law is not viewed with favorconsidered the belated submission of the annual financial reports
and the list of members as sufficient compliance thereof and considered them as having been submitted on time.
The dispositive portion of the decision[15] dated December 29, 2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition to delist the National Union of Workers in the Hotel,
Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter from the roll of legitimate labor
organizations is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision to the BLR.[17] BLR Director Hans Leo Cacdac inhibited himself from the
case because he had been a former counsel of respondent.
In view of Director Cacdacs inhibition, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas took cognizance of the appeal. In a
resolution[18] dated February 21, 2003, she dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of association and right of workers to self-organization outweighed respondents noncompliance with the
statutory requirements to maintain its status as a legitimate labor organization.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] but the motion was likewise denied in a resolution[20] dated May 30,
2003. DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas admitted that it was the BLR which had jurisdiction over the appeal, but she
pointed out that the BLR Director had voluntarily inhibited himself from the case because he used to appear as
counsel for respondent. In order to maintain the integrity of the decision and of the BLR, she therefore accepted the
motion to inhibit and took cognizance of the appeal.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, raising the issue of whether the DOLE Secretary acted with grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal and affirming the dismissal of its petition for cancellation of
respondents registration.
In a Decision dated May 30, 2005, the CA denied the petition. The CA opined that the DOLE Secretary may legally
assume jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the Regional Director in the event that the Director of the
BLR inhibits himself from the case. According to the CA, in the absence of the BLR Director, there is no person more
competent to resolve the appeal than the DOLE Secretary. The CA brushed aside the allegation of bias and partiality
on the part of the DOLE Secretary, considering that such allegation was not supported by any evidence.
The CA also found that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the dismissal
of the petition for cancellation of respondents registration as a labor organization. Echoing the DOLE Secretary, the
CA held that the requirements of registration of labor organizations are an exercise of the overriding police power of
the State, designed for the protection of workers against potential abuse by the union that recruits them. These
requirements, the CA opined, should not be exploited to work against the workers constitutionally protected right to
self-organization.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking this Courts ruling in Abbott Labs. Phils., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.
Employees Union,[21] which categorically declared that the DOLE Secretary has no authority to review the decision
of the Regional Director in a petition for cancellation of union registration, and Section 4, [22] Rule VIII, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
In its Resolution[23] dated June 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion, stating that the BLR Directors inhibition
from the case was a peculiarity not present in the Abbott case, and that such inhibition justified the assumption of
jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary.
In this petition, petitioner argues that:
I.
The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ruling that the Labor Secretary properly assumed jurisdiction over Petitioners
appeal of the Regional Directors Decision in the Cancellation Petition x x x.
A. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The Labor Secretary had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Regional Director in a petition for cancellation. Such jurisdiction is conferred by law to the BLR.
B. The unilateral inhibition by the BLR Director cannot justify the Labor Secretarys exercise of jurisdiction
over the Appeal.
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C. The Labor Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction over the Appeal without notice violated Petitioners right
to due process.
II.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of the Cancellation Petition despite the mandatory and
unequivocal provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.[24]
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with the BLR. This is clearly provided in the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code and enunciated by the Court in Abbott. But as pointed out by the CA, the
present case involves a peculiar circumstance that was not present or covered by the ruling in Abbott. In this case,
the BLR Director inhibited himself from the case because he was a former counsel of respondent. Who, then, shall
resolve the case in his place?
In Abbott, the appeal from the Regional Directors decision was directly filed with the Office of the DOLE Secretary,
and we ruled that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appeal was filed by petitioner with
the BLR, which, undisputedly, acquired jurisdiction over the case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains
with it until the full termination of the case.[25]
Thus, jurisdiction remained with the BLR despite the BLR Directors inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved
the appeal, she merely stepped into the shoes of the BLR Director and performed a function that the latter could not
himself perform. She did so pursuant to her power of supervision and control over the BLR.[26]
Expounding on the extent of the power of control, the Court, in Araneta, et al. v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et
al.,[27] pronounced that, if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department Secretary, then such
power or authority may be exercised directly by the President, who exercises supervision and control over the
departments. This principle was incorporated in the Administrative Code of 1987, which defines supervision and
control as including the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate.[28] Applying the foregoing to the present case, it is clear that the DOLE Secretary, as the person
exercising the power of supervision and control over the BLR, has the authority to directly exercise the quasi-judicial
function entrusted by law to the BLR Director.
It is true that the power of control and supervision does not give the Department Secretary unbridled authority to take
over the functions of his or her subordinate. Such authority is subject to certain guidelines which are stated in Book
IV, Chapter 8, Section 39(1)(a) of the Administrative Code of 1987. [29] However, in the present case, the DOLE
Secretarys act of taking over the function of the BLR Director was warranted and necessitated by the latters inhibition
from the case and the objective to maintain the integrity of the decision, as well as the Bureau itself.[30]
Petitioner insists that the BLR Directors subordinates should have resolved the appeal, citing the provision under the
Administrative Code of 1987 which states, in case of the absence or disability of the head of a bureau or office, his
duties shall be performed by the assistant head. [31] The provision clearly does not apply considering that the BLR
Director was neither absent nor suffering from any disability; he remained as head of the BLR. Thus, to dispel any
suspicion of bias, the DOLE Secretary opted to resolve the appeal herself.
Petitioner was not denied the right to due process when it was not notified in advance of the BLR Directors inhibition
and the DOLE Secretarys assumption of the case. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [32] Petitioner had the opportunity to
question the BLR Directors inhibition and the DOLE Secretarys taking cognizance of the case when it filed a motion
for reconsideration of the latters decision. It would be well to state that a critical component of due process is a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, for all the elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.[33] It was precisely to
ensure a fair trial that moved the BLR Director to inhibit himself from the case and the DOLE Secretary to take over
his function.
Petitioner also insists that respondents registration as a legitimate labor union should be cancelled. Petitioner posits
that once it is determined that a ground enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code is present, cancellation of
registration should follow; it becomes the ministerial duty of the Regional Director to cancel the registration of the
labor organization, hence, the use of the word shall.Petitioner points out that the Regional Director has admitted in
its decision that respondent failed to submit the required documents for a number of years; therefore, cancellation of
its registration should have followed as a matter of course.
We are not persuaded.
Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code read:
ART. 238. CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION; APPEAL
The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local, shall be canceled by the
Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets one or more
of the requirements herein prescribed.[34]
ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION.
The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
xxxx
(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the closing of every fiscal
year and misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself;
xxxx
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever required by the Bureau. [35]
These provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with a petition for cancellation of a unions
registration, particularly, determining whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient
to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the law. After all, the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report and list
of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an organization so as to protect the
employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required documents by
respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.
97
We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for
cancellation of respondents registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the
union officers who were responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR.
Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation of union registration,
lest they be accused of interfering with union activities. In resolving the petition, consideration must be taken of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear
in mind that registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the concomitant right and privileges granted
by law to a legitimate labor organization, particularly the right to participate in or ask for certification election in a
bargaining unit.[36] Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a
labor organization. For without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights under the Labor Code.[37]
It is worth mentioning that the Labor Codes provisions on cancellation of union registration and on reportorial
requirements have been recently amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481, An Act Strengthening the Workers
Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective
on June 14, 2007. The amendment sought to strengthen the workers right to self-organization and enhance
the Philippines compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labour Organization
(ILO) Convention No. 87,[38] pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers organizations by administrative
authority.[39] Thus, R.A. No. 9481 amended Article 239 to read:
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of
union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and
by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of
officers, and the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which provides:
ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.The following are documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by the
legitimate labor organization concerned:
(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took
part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;
(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of voters within thirty (30) days from election;
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year; and
(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.
Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration
but shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any
appropriate penalty.
ILO Convention No. 87, which we have ratified in 1953, provides that workers and employers organizations shall not
be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority. The ILO has expressed the opinion that the
cancellation of union registration by the registrar of labor unions, which in our case is the BLR, is tantamount to
dissolution of the organization by administrative authority when such measure would give rise to the loss of legal
personality of the union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry out its activities, which is true in our jurisdiction.
Although the ILO has allowed such measure to be taken, provided that judicial safeguards are in place, i.e., the right
to appeal to a judicial body, it has nonetheless reminded its members that dissolution of a union, and cancellation of
registration for that matter, involve serious consequences for occupational representation. It has, therefore, deemed
it preferable if such actions were to be taken only as a last resort and after exhausting other possibilities with less
serious effects on the organization.[40]
The aforesaid amendments and the ILOs opinion on this matter serve to fortify our ruling in this case. We therefore
quote with approval the DOLE Secretarys rationale for denying the petition, thus:
It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in accordance
with Article 239 of the Labor Code. However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to the
cancellation of union registration. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance
with reporting requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union activities and
requiring periodic documentation thereof.
The more substantive considerations involve the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of
workers to self-organization. Also involved is the public policy to promote free trade unionism and collective
bargaining as instruments of industrial peace and democracy. An overly stringent interpretation of the statute
governing cancellation of union registration without regard to surrounding circumstances cannot be allowed.
Otherwise, it would lead to an unconstitutional application of the statute and emasculation of public policy objectives.
Worse, it can render nugatory the protection to labor and social justice clauses that pervades the Constitution and
the Labor Code.
Moreover, submission of the required documents is the duty of the officers of the union. It would be unreasonable for
this Office to order the cancellation of the union and penalize the entire union membership on the basis of the
negligence of its officers. In National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, L-53406, 14 December 1981,
110 SCRA 296, the Supreme Court ruled:
As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: The rights of workers to self-organization
finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. x x x Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken
much less nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or
members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself.
98
At any rate, we note that on 19 May 2000, appellee had submitted its financial statement for the years 1996-1999.
With this submission, appellee has substantially complied with its duty to submit its financial report for the said period.
To rule differently would be to preclude the union, after having failed to meet its periodic obligations promptly, from
taking appropriate measures to correct its omissions. For the record, we do not view with favor appellees late
submission. Punctuality on the part of the union and its officers could have prevented this petition.[41]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 30, 2005 and Resolution dated June
4, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President
(BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON
L. MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335,2 otherwise known as the Attrition Act
of 2005, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations3 (IRR) unconstitutional, and the implementation thereof be
enjoined permanently.
The Facts
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on
February 11, 2005.
In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima4 (Abakada), we said of R.A. No. 9335:
RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the
targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the
Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a
system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and
(6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue
the implementing rules and regulations of RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created for such purpose.5
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR
was published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard,
and became effective fifteen (15) days later.6
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in
violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA),
an association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President,
Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents
Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L.
Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In its petition, BOCEA made the following averments:
Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in
order to comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance
Contracts7 (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file employees to sign. The
Performance Contract pertinently provided:
xxxx
WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition
Act of 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and
Employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties unto this Agreement hereby agree
and so agreed to perform the following:
xxxx
2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target and further accepts/commits to
meet the said target under the following conditions:
a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby undertakes and binds himself/herself
that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the target with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act and its IRR, he/she will
voluntarily submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and
b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section
the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct them to accept
their individual target. The Performance Contract executed by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall
be submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before March 31, 2008.
x x x x8
BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Government’s own policies on reduced
tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic
factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The
majority of them, however, did not sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the
Performance Contracts but they also refused. To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent
letters, and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them.
99
In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of
Formal Entry Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners of the BOC during command
conferences to make them sign their Performance Contracts. Likewise, BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali
(Deputy Commissioner Umali) individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said contracts. Said
personnel were threatened that if they do not sign their respective Performance Contracts, they would face possible
reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed on floating status. Thus, all the District Collectors, except a certain
Atty. Carlos So of the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance
Contracts.
BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan
approached Deputy Commissioner Umali to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of harassment, but the latter
merely said that he would look into the matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through counsel wrote the Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist from implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring
rank-and-file employees of the BOC and BIR to sign Performance Contracts.9 In his letter-reply10 dated February 12,
2008, Deputy Commissioner Umali denied having coerced any BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract. He
also defended the BOC, invoking its mandate of merely implementing the law. Finally, Pagulayan and BOCEA’s
counsel, on separate occasions, requested for a certified true copy of the Performance Contract from Deputy
Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish them a copy.11
This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality
of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees,
direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are
in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation
of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.
In their Comment,12 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The
OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee
which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may
only be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added
that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
In its Reply,13 BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are unreasonable to achieve its stated
objectives; that the law is unduly oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the extreme burden upon their
shoulders when the Government itself has adopted measures that make collection difficult such as reduced tariff
rates to almost zero percent and tax exemption of big businesses; and that the law is discriminatory of BIR and BOC
employees. BOCEA manifested that only the high-ranking officials of the BOC benefited largely from the reward
system under R.A. No. 9335 despite the fact that they were not the ones directly toiling to collect revenue. Moreover,
despite the BOCEA’s numerous requests,14 BOC continually refused to provide BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on
how such reward was distributed.
Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, BOCEA
filed a Motion to Consolidate15 the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008. However, pending action on said
motion, the Court rendered its decision in Abakada on August 14, 2008. Thus, the consolidation of this case with
Abakada was rendered no longer possible.16
In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, declared Section 1217 of
R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and
violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A.
No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 1318 of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown,
the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.19
Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our Resolution20 dated February 10, 2009,
requiring them to submit their respective Memoranda.
The Issues
BOCEA raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE
COVERED BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS[;]
III.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS
ENSHRINED UNDER SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]
V.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,] UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A PARTICULAR GROUP OR
CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL.21
BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its petition, events unfolded showing the
patent unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335. It narrated that during the first year of the implementation of R.A. No.
9335, BOC employees exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue target of P196 billion which they
surpassed by as much as P2 billion for that year alone. However, this was attained only because oil companies made
advance tax payments to BOC. Moreover, BOC employees were given their "reward" for surpassing said target only
in 2008, the distribution of which they described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials
of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the employees, who did the hard task of collecting, received a mere pittance
of around P8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds Division of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated target
but the higher management gave out to the employees a measly sum of P8,500.00 while the top level officials partook
of millions of the excess collections. BOCEA relies on a piece of information revealed by a newspaper showing the
list of BOC officials who apparently earned huge amounts of money by way of reward. 22 It claims that the recipients
thereof included lawyers, support personnel and other employees, including a dentist, who performed no collection
functions at all. These alleged anomalous selection, distribution and allocation of rewards was due to the failure of
R.A. No. 9335 to set out clear guidelines.23
In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition for the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting
five BOC officials from the Port of Manila to attrition despite the fact that the Port of Manila substantially complied
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of these officials for attrition without proper
investigation was nothing less than arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments’ promulgation of
100
issuances and the Government’s accession to regional trade agreements have caused a significant diminution of the
tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all collection. These unrealistic settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR and
BOC employees tasked with the burden of collection, and worse, subjected them to attrition.24
BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the following grounds:
1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process because the termination of
employees who had not attained their revenue targets for the year is peremptory and done without any form of
hearing to allow said employees to ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not comply with the
requirements under CSC rules and regulations as the dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such
immediately executory nature of the Board’s decision negates the remedies available to an employee as provided
under the CSC rules.
2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to equal protection of the law because R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of other
revenue generating government agencies like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, Department of
Transportation and Communication, the Air Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office, and the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are not subject to attrition.
3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to security of tenure because R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure afforded to
government employees. The law likewise created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-attainment of revenue
collection target, which is not provided under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and therefore
arbitrary and unreasonable.
4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress granted to the Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, the manner of allocating
targets, the distribution of rewards and the determination of relevant factors affecting the targets of collection, which
is tantamount to undue delegation of legislative power.
5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and
employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of
hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the presumption of regularity
in the performance of the official functions of a public officer.25
On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR are constitutional, as per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG argues that the classification of
BIR and BOC employees as public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and substantial distinction since
the revenue generated by the BIR and BOC is essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the State,
while the revenue produced by other agencies is merely incidental or secondary to their governmental functions; that
in view of their mandate, and for purposes of tax collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No. 9335
complies with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests for the permissive delegation of legislative power to
the Board; that the Board exercises its delegated power consistent with the policy laid down in the law, that is, to
optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters were set in order
that the Board may identify the officials and employees subject to attrition, and the proper procedure for their removal
in case they fail to meet the targets set in the Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR and
BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly accorded by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise
maintains that there was no encroachment of judicial power in the enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of
attainder since R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and provided for the penalty that may be
imposed. Finally, the OSG reiterates that the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC employee under R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR shall be done only upon due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection,
subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and in compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
The OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from violating the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process,
actually serves as a notice of the revenue target they have to meet and the possible consequences of failing to meet
the same. More, there is nothing in the law which prevents the aggrieved party from appealing the unfavorable
decision of dismissal.26
In essence, the issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;
2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process; and
3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC,
are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA’s members have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR.27
However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.
It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are being challenged.
The Court already settled the majority of the same issues raised by BOCEA in our decision in Abakada, which
attained finality on September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy of reiteration in this case.
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. 28 Necessarily
imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.29However,
this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions,30 one of which is the delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v. Department of
Energy,31 to wit:
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in
today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly
to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked
to execute laws in their specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is
that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.32
Thus, in Abakada, we held,
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
101
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets."
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to the President to fix revenue
targets:
"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is
hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue
targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection [Over] the Revenue Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to
Targets Accrue to the Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue
collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given
fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to
Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as
allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx xxx x x x"
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress.
Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of
the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil
service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the
following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no
historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under
consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of
revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs
officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure
or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and
proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such
decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of an
official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on
accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers
and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx x x x"
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest", "justice and equity",
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.33
We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No.
9335, as evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 5 34 of R.A. No. 9335 also
provides for the incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5
provides that "[t]he allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules
and regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a) 35 of R.A. No. 9335 clearly
mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court
finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the
Board.
Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.361awphil
Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they
have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject
to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
102
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx x x x"
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management
and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary [of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of
entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx x x x"
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.37
As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues on the security of tenure of affected BIR
and BOC officials and employees and their entitlement to due process were also settled in Abakada:
Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA
[No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by
at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous
to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.38
In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.39 BOCEA’s apprehension of deprivation of due
process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.40 The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee
is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors41 that may affect the level of collection. In the same manner,
exemptions42 were set, contravening BOCEA’s claim that its members may be removed for unattained target
collection even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an employee’s right to be heard is not at all
prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of him.43 In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case
cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his constitutional right to due process. No less
than R.A. No. 9335 in accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.
We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court proceeds to resolve the last, but new
issue raised by BOCEA, that is, whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, 44 Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are
a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and
the lack of judicial trial.451avvphi1
In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,46 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces the
roots of a Bill of Attainder, to wit:
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament would at times
enact bills or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable
quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially
a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the
deprivation of life or liberty or property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While
cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other
than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified person or group of persons (and not
upon the general community) without a prior charge or demand, without notice and hearing, without an opportunity
to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it (People v. Ferrer,
48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90
L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder
wielded as a means of legislative oppression. x x x47
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a
judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee
and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights
of the concerned employee are amply protected.
A final note.
We find that BOCEA’s petition is replete with allegations of defects and anomalies in allocation, distribution and
receipt of rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it intends to curb graft and corruption in the BOC in particular and in
the government in general which is nothing but noble, these intentions do not actually pertain to the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, but rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not tolerate
these pernicious acts of graft and corruption.48 As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of,
and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the
enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The
Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
thereof.49 Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative.50 We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR are constitutional.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
103
GEMMA P. CABALIT, G.R. No. 180236 MENDOZA,
Petitioner, SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
- versus -
HON. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his official capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas, EDGARDO G. CANTON, in his Promulgated:
capacity as Graft Investigator Officer, ATTY. ROY L.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT-REGION VII, URSAL, in his capacity as Regional Cluster Director, January 17, 2012
Respondent. Commission on Audit, Cebu City,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
FILADELFO S. APIT, G.R. No. 180341 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Three employees from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Jagna, Bohol were found by the Ombudsman to have
perpetrated a scheme to defraud the government of proper motor vehicle registration fees. They now seek in the
- versus - present consolidated petitions a judgment from this Court annulling the January 18, 2006 Decision 1 and September
21, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas dismissing them from government service.
The facts follow:
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) Legal and Adjudication, On September 4, 2001, the Philippine Star News, a local newspaper in Cebu City, reported that employees of the
Region VII, LTO in Jagna, Bohol, are shortchanging the government by tampering with their income reports. 4 Accordingly,
Respondent. Regional Director Ildefonso T. Deloria of the Commission on Audit (COA) directed State
Auditors Teodocio D. Cabalit and Emmanuel L. Coloma of the Provincial Revenue Audit Group to conduct a fact-
finding investigation. A widespread tampering of official receipts of Motor Vehicle Registration during the years 1998,
x----------------------------------------------x 1999, 2000 and 2001 was then discovered by the investigators.
According to the investigators, a total of 106 receipts were tampered. The scheme was done by detaching the Plate
LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR, in his capacity as Transportation G.R. No. 180342 Release and Owners copy from the set of official receipts then typing thereon the correct details corresponding to
Regulation Officer and Officer-In-Charge of Land the vehicle registered, the owners name and address, and the correct amount of registration fees. The other copies,
Transportation Office, Jagna, Province of Bohol, Present: consisting of the copies for the Collector, EDP, Record, Auditor, and Regional Office, meanwhile, were typed on to
Petitioner, make it appear that the receipts were issued mostly for the registration of motorcycles with much lower registration
CORONA, C.J., charges. Incorrect names and/or addresses were also used on said file copies. The difference between the amounts
CARPIO, paid by the vehicle owners and the amounts appearing on the file copies were then pocketed by the perpetrators,
VELASCO, JR., and only the lower amounts appearing on the retained duplicate file copies were reported in the Report of
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Collections.5 According to State Auditors Cabalit and Coloma in their Joint-Affidavit, the scheme was perpetrated by
BRION,* LTO employees Leonardo G. Olaivar, Gemma P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and Samuel T. Alabat, and resulted in an
PERALTA, unreported income totaling P169,642.50.6
BERSAMIN, On August 8, 2002, COA Regional Cluster Director Atty. Roy L. Ursal reported the tampering of official receipts to
DEL CASTILLO, Deputy Ombudsman Primo C. Miro.7 According to Atty. Ursal, the irregularity is penalized under Article 217, in
ABAD, relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;8 Section 3(e)9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
VILLARAMA, JR., likewise violates Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.10
PEREZ, In a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R. Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago found grounds to
conduct a preliminary investigation.11 Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty was filed
104
against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties were required
to submit their counter-affidavits.
In compliance, Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted separate counter-affidavits, all essentially denying
knowledge and responsibility for the anomalies. As to Olaivar, he maintained that the receipts were typed outside his
office by regular and casual employees. He claimed that the receipts were presented to him only for signature and
he does not receive the payment when he signs the receipts.12 Cabalit, for her part, claimed that her duty as cashier
was to receive collections turned over to her and to deposit them in the Land Bank of the Philippines
in Tagbilaran City. She claimed that she was not even aware of any anomaly in the collection of fees prior to the
investigation.13 As to Apit, he admitted that he countersigned the official receipts, but he too denied being aware of
any illegal activity in their office. He claimed that upon being informed of the charge, he verified the photocopies of
the tampered receipts and was surprised to find that the signatures above his name were falsified. 14 Alabat,
meanwhile, claimed he did not tamper, alter or falsify any public document in the performance of his duties. He
insisted that the initial above his name on Official Receipt No. 64056082 was Apits, while the initial on Official Receipt
No. 64056813 was that of Olaivar.15
During the hearing before Graft Investigator Pio R. Dargantes, State Auditor Cabalit testified on the investigation he
conducted in the LTO in Jagna, Bohol. He testified that he was furnished with the owners and duplicate copies of the
tampered receipts. Upon comparison of the Owners copy with the Collector or Records copy, he noticed that the
amounts shown in the original copies were much bigger than those appearing in the file copies. State
Auditor Cabalit also declared that the basis for implicating Olaivar is the fact that his signature appears in all the 106
tampered official receipts and he signed as verified correct the Report of Collections, which included the tampered
receipts. As to Apit and Cabalit, they are the other signatories of the official receipts.16 In some official receipts, the
Owners copy is signed by F.S. Apit as Computer Evaluator, G.P. Cabalit as Cashier, and Leonardo Olaivar as District
Head, but their signatures do not appear on the file copies.17
On February 12, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas directed18 the parties to submit their position papers
pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, dated September 7, 2003, amending the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman.19 No cross-examination of State Auditor Cabalit was therefore conducted.
Complying with the above Order, the COA submitted its position paper on March 18, 2004. Olaivar, Cabalit and Apit,
for their part, respectively submitted their position papers on April 29, 2004, March 18, 2004 and March 15, 2004.
In its position paper,20 the COA pointed out that the signatures of Cabalit, Apit and Olaivar were indispensable to the
issuance of the receipts. As to Olaivar, the original receipts bear his signature, thereby showing that he approved of
the amounts collected for the registration charges. However, when the receipts were reported in the Report of
Collections, the data therein were already tampered reflecting a much lesser amount. By affixing his signature on the
Report of Collections and thereby attesting that the entries therein were verified by him as correct, he allowed the
scheme to be perpetrated. As to Cabalit, the COA pointed out that as cashier, Cabalits signature on the receipts
signified that she received the registration fees. The correct amounts should have therefore appeared in the Report
of Collections, but as already stated, lesser amounts appeared on the Report of Collections, which she prepares. In
the same manner, Apit, as computer evaluator, also signed the subject receipts allowing the irregularities to be
perpetuated.
In his position paper,21 Olaivar meanwhile insisted that he had no participation in the anomalies. He stressed that his
only role in the issuance of the official receipts was to review and approve the applications, and that he was the last
one to sign the official receipts. He argued that based on the standard procedure for the processing of applications
for registration of motor vehicles, it could be deduced that there was a concerted effort or conspiracy among the
evaluator, typist and cashier, while he was kept blind of their modus operandi.
Cabalit, for her part, questioned the findings of the investigators. She stressed in her position paper22 that had there
been a thorough investigation of the questioned official receipts, the auditors would have discovered that the
signatures appearing above her name were actually that of Olaivar. She outlined the standard paper flow of a regular
transaction at the LTO. It begins when the registrant goes to the computer evaluator for the computation of applicable
fees and proceeds to the cashier for payment. After paying, the typist will prepare the official receipts consisting of
seven (7) copies, which will be routed to the computer evaluator, to the district head, and to the cashier for signature.
The cashier retains the copies for the EDP, Regional Office, Collector and Auditor, while the remaining copies
(Owner, Plate Release and Records copy) will be forwarded to the Releasing Section for distribution and release.
Cabalit insisted that on several occasions Olaivar disregarded the standard procedure and directly accommodated
some registrants who were either his friends or referred to him by friends. For such transactions, Olaivar assumes
the functions of computer evaluator, typist and cashier, as he is the one who computes the fees, receives the payment
and prepares the official receipts. Olaivar would then remit the payment to her. As the cashier, she has to accept the
payment as a matter of ministerial duty.
Apit, meanwhile, stressed in his position paper23 that the strokes of the signatures appearing above his typewritten
name on the official receipts are different, indicating that the same are falsified. He also explained that considering
that the LTO in Jagna issues around 20 to 25 receipts a day, he signed the receipts relying on the faith that his co-
employees had properly accomplished the forms. He also pointed out that Engr. Dano admitted signing accomplished
official receipts when the regular computer encoder is out, which just shows that other personnel could have signed
above the name of F.S. Apit.
On May 3, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered judgment finding petitioners liable for dishonesty
for tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected.
The OMB-Visayas ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby resolved that the following respondents be found guilty of the
administrative infraction of DISHONESTY and accordingly be meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service:
1. Leonardo G. Olaivar -Transportation Regulation Officer II/ Office[r]-In-Charge
LTO Jagna District Office
Jagna, Bohol;
2. Gemma P. Cabalit - Cashier II, LTO Jagna District Office Jagna, Bohol;
3. Filadelpo S. Apit - Clerk II, LTO Jagna District Office Jagna, Bohol;
The complaint against respondent Samuel T. Alabat, presently the Head of Apprehension Unit of the Tagbilaran City
LTO, is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
The complaint regarding the LTO official receipts/MVRRs issued by the LTO Jagna District Office, which are not
covered by original copies are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate charges upon the
recovery of the original copies thereof.
SO DECIDED.24
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision, but their motions were denied by the Ombudsman. 25 Thus, they
separately sought recourse from the CA.
On January 18, 2006, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 86256, 86394 and 00047. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by US DISMISSING the instant consolidated
petitions. The assailed decision of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas dated May 3, 2004 in OMB-V-A-02-0415-
H is hereby AFFIRMED with a modification that petitioner Olaivar be held administratively liable for gross neglect of
duty which carries the same penalty as provided for dishonesty. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
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According to the CA, it was unbelievable that from 1998 to 2001, Cabalit and Apit performed vital functions by
routinely signing LTO official receipts but did not have any knowledge of the irregularity in their office. With regard
to Olaivar, the CA believed that the tampering of the receipts could have been avoided had he exercised the required
diligence in the performance of his duties. Thus, the CA held him liable merely for gross neglect of duty.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions.27 Hence, they filed the instant
petitions before the Court.
In her petition, petitioner Cabalit argues that
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE OMBUDSMAN'S DECISION
WHICH GAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 17 IN THE PROCEEDINGS
BELOW THAT WAS ALREADY ON TRIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL TYPE
HEARING UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07 DID NOT PUSH THRU, PETITIONER WAS STILL
ACCORDED HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 17.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN DESPITE HAVING FAILED TO MAKE A CATEGORICAL RULING
ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE QUESTIONED AND/OR FORGED SIGNATURES BELONG TO PETITIONER
GEMMA CABALIT.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE
ON THE DOCTRINAL VALUE AND/OR APPLICABILITY OF THE TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
(G.R. [129124], MARCH 15, 2002) RULING HERE IN THE INSTANT CASE.28
Meanwhile, Apit interposes the following arguments in his petition:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD ONLY.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE DEFENSE OF PETITIONER APIT AS MERE
DENIAL.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO RECONSIDER THE EVIDENCE THAT CLEARLY
PROVED THAT THE SIGNATURES ABOVE THE NAME OF PETITIONER APIT IN THE QUESTIONED RECEIPTS
ARE ALL FORGED AND FALSIFIED.29
As for Olaivar, he assails the CA Decision raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER LEONARDO G.
OLAIVAR IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR GROSS NEGLIGENCE.
II. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER LEONARDO
G. OLAIVAR WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VISAYAS FOUND
HIM GUILTY FOR DISHONESTY AND METED OUT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE. 30
On January 15, 2008, said petitions were consolidated.31
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether there was a violation of the right to due process when the
hearing officer at the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas adopted the procedure under A.O. No. 17 notwithstanding
the fact that the said amendatory order took effect after the hearings had started; and (2)
whether Cabalit, Apit and Olaivar are administratively liable.
As regards the first issue, petitioners claim that they were denied due process of law when the investigating lawyer
proceeded to resolve the case based only on the affidavits and other evidence on record without conducting a formal
hearing. They lament that the case was submitted for decision without giving them opportunity to present witnesses
and cross-examine the witnesses against them. Petitioner Cabalit also argues that the Office of the Ombudsman
erred in applying the amendments under A.O. No. 17 to the trial of the case, which was already in progress under
the old procedures under A.O. No. 07. She stressed that under A.O. No. 07, she had the right to choose whether to
avail of a formal investigation or to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Here, she
was not given such option and was merely required to submit her position paper.
Petitioners arguments deserve scant consideration.
Suffice to say, petitioners were not denied due process of law when the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve
the case based on the affidavits and other evidence on record. Section 5(b)(1) 32 Rule 3, of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, plainly provides that the hearing officer may issue an
order directing the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified position papers on
the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer may consider the case submitted for
decision. It is only when the hearing officer determines that based on the evidence, there is a need to
conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further
proceedings will be conducted. But the determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound
discretion of the hearing officer. As the petitioners have utterly failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing
officers determination should be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by this Court. We likewise find
no merit in their contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case was already
undergoing trial before the hearing officer, should not have been applied.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,33 the Court elucidated:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural
statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as
a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has
no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. (Emphasis supplied.)
While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights,
petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them. Indeed, in this
case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to
submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have
been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied
due process of law. Well to remember, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present
their charges and defenses.34 But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due
course, said party is not denied due process.35
Neither is there merit to Cabalits assertion that she should have been investigated under the old rules of procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, and not under the new rules. In Marohomsalic v. Cole,36 we clarified that the Office
of the Ombudsman has only one set of rules of procedure and that is A.O. No. 07, series of 1990, as amended. There
have been various amendments made thereto but it has remained, to date, the only set of rules of procedure
governing cases filed in the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the phrase as amended is correctly appended to A.O.
No. 7 every time it is invoked. A.O. No. 17 is just one example of these amendments.
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But did the CA correctly rule that petitioners Cabalit and Apit are liable for dishonesty while petitioner Olaivar is liable
for gross neglect of duty?
Cabalit argues that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Ombudsman finding her liable for dishonesty. She
asserts that it was not established by substantial evidence that the forged signatures belong to her.
Meanwhile, Apit contends that the CA erred in not considering evidence which proves that the signatures appearing
above his name are falsified. However, we note that both Cabalit and Apit raise essentially factual issues which are
not proper in petitions filed under Rule 45. Settled jurisprudence dictates that subject to a few exceptions, only
questions of law may be brought before the Court via a petition for review on certiorari. In Diokno v. Cacdac,37 the
Court held:
x x x [T]he scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only to errors
of law, and questions of fact are not entertained. We elucidated on our fidelity to this rule, and we said:
Thus, only questions of law may be brought by the parties and passed upon by this Court in the exercise of
its power to review. Also, judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency
of the evidence upon which the proper x x x tribunal has based its determination. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. The Supreme
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. 38
Here, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas which are supported by substantial
evidence such as affidavits of witnesses and copies of the tampered official receipts.39The CA found that a perusal
of the questioned receipts would easily reveal the discrepancies between the date, name and vehicle in the Owner's
or Plate Release copies and the File, Auditor, and Regional Office copies. It upheld the factual findings of the
Ombudsman that petitioners Cabalit and Apit tampered with the duplicates of the official receipts to make it appear
that they collected a lesser amount. Their participation was found to have been indispensable as the irregularities
could not have been committed without their participation. They also concealed the misappropriation of public funds
by falsifying the receipts.
Now, superior courts are not triers of facts. When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial
evidence, it should be considered as conclusive.40 This Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the
Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion. 41 Hence, being
supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman which are
affirmed by the CA.
As for Olaivar, he insists that the CA erred in holding him administratively liable for gross negligence when he relied
to a reasonable extent and in good faith on the actions of his subordinates in the preparation of the applications for
registration. He questions the appellate courts finding that he failed to exercise the required diligence in the
performance of his duties.
While as stated above, the general rule is that factual findings of the CA are not reviewable by this Court, we find
that Olaivars case falls in one of the recognized exceptions laid down in jurisprudence since the CAs findings
regarding his liability are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on
record.42
The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found Olaivar administratively liable for dishonesty while the CA ruled that he
may not be held liable for dishonesty supposedly for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA ruled that there was no
substantial evidence to show that Olaivar participated in the scheme, but the tampering of the official receipts could
have been avoided had he exercised the required diligence in the performance of his duties as officer-in-charge of
the Jagna District Office. Thus, the CA found him liable only for gross neglect of duty. This, however, is clear error
on the part of the CA.
For one, there is clear evidence that Olaivar was involved in the anomalies. Witness Joselito Taladua categorically
declared in his affidavit43 that he personally paid Olaivar the sum of P2,675 for the renewal of registration of a jeep
for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 47699853. Much to his dismay, Taladua later found out that his payment
was not reflected correctly in the Report of Collections, and that the vehicle was deemed unregistered for the year
2000.
More, Cabalit pointed to Olaivar as the person behind the anomaly in the LTO-Jagna District Office. She narrated in
her position paper that on several times, Olaivar directly accommodated some registrants and assumed the functions
of computer evaluator, typist and cashier, and computed the fees, received payment and prepared the official receipts
for those transactions. She also revealed that Olaivar would ask her for unused official receipts and would later return
the duplicate copies to her with the cash collections. Later, he would verify the Report of Collections as correct.44
Likewise, Motor Vehicle Inspector Engr. Lowell A. Dano confirmed that in several instances, he
witnessed Olaivar type the data himself in the official receipts even if they have a typist in the office to do the job.
Engr. Dano added that after typing, Olaivar personally brought the accomplished official receipts for him
(Engr. Dano) to sign.45
Moreover, Jacinto Jalop, the records officer of the LTO in Jagna, Bohol, illustrated how the official receipts were
tampered. He disclosed that the correct charges were typed in the Owners copy and the Plate Release copy of the
official receipts, but a much lower charge and an incorrect address were indicated in the other copies. He asserted
that Olaivar was responsible for tampering the official receipts.46
Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either
carelessness or indifference.47 However, the facts of this case show more than a failure to mind ones task. Rather,
they manifest that Olaivar committed acts of dishonesty, which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in
a matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle.48 Hence, the CA should have found Olaivar liable for dishonesty.
But be that as it may, still, the CA correctly imposed the proper penalty upon Olaivar. Under Section 52, Rule IV of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, like gross neglect of duty, is classified as
a grave offense punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time. 49 Under Section 58,50 such penalty
likewise carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits
and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
One final note. Cabalit contends that pursuant to the obiter in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,51 the Office of
the Ombudsman can only recommend administrative sanctions and not directly impose them.However, in Office of
the Ombudsman v. Masing,52 this Court has already settled the issue when we ruled that the power of the
Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.
We held,
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be
coursed through the proper officer. Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we also held
While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to recommend x x x removal, suspension,
demotion x x x of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in
the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of RA 6770.
(emphasis supplied.)53
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Subsequently, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,54 and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,55 the Court
upheld the Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary
authority. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we held that the exercise of such power is well founded
in the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, thus:
The Court further explained in Ledesma that the mandatory character of the Ombudsmans order imposing a sanction
should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that
the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the
proper officer.
Consequently in Ledesma, the Court affirmed the appellate courts decision which had, in turn, affirmed an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of suspension on the erring public official.56
The duty and privilege of the Ombudsman to act as protector of the people against the illegal and unjust acts of those
who are in the public service emanate from no less than the 1987 Constitution. Section 12 of Article XI thereof states:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
In addition, Section 15 (3) of R.A. No. 6770, provides:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects
to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman
to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
xxxx
Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or
omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited
merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold
hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place respondents under preventive
suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a
public officer or employee.57
The provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office
of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative
adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under
preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty
imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said
penalty.58 Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions.
We find it worthy to state at this point that public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public
servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their
duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate
the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; and must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.59
WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 18, 2006 and
Resolution dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 86256, 86394 and 00047
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Leonardo G. Olaivar is held administratively liable
for DISHONESTY and meted the penalty of dismissal from the service as well as the accessory penalties inherent to
said penalty.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint1 tiled by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant) against Atty. Glenn
Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into
signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his
relatives.
After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court referred the complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, evaluation and
recommendation.
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa
City. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation
proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former
registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan
and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902. The RTC already fixed the price and
issued an order for the City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the property.2
The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case as intervenors
for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to
sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer
and for the amount of consideration. The respondent further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the
City Government when the RTC issues the order to transfer the titles. 3 The respondent then fraudulently – without
their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding – converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a
108
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001,4 selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So
for P200,000.00.5
The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the P200,000.00 purchase price or that they would sell
the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at least P6,000,000.00 as just compensation.6
The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 even
though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his uncle and his aunt, respectively.7
The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.8
The respondent argued that the complainant’s greed to get the just Compensation9 caused her to file this "baseless,
unfounded and malicious" disbarment case.10 He claimed that the sale was their voluntary transaction and that he
"simply ratified the document."11 He also claimed that Reynold and Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the
properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000; that they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino
subsequently sold his share to Reynold under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.12
The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute any "preparatory deed
of sale" in favor of the City Government.13 He also denied that the Deed of Absolute Sale contained blanks when
they signed it.14 That he filed for the spouses Ylaya and Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC
fixed proved that there was no agreement to use the document for the expropriation case. 15 He also argued that it
was clear from the document that the intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical person, because there
were spaces for the buyer’s legal age, marital status, and citizenship,16 and he was even constrained to file a
subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs to
the subject properties after borrowing them from his office.17 Lastly, he denied violating the Rules on Notarial
Practice.18
On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006 praying
for the early resolution of the complaint.19
On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss
the Case dated November 14, 2006.20
On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit21 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness
and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000; 22 the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) dated April 19, 2000;23 and the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.24 The respondent submitted this
Affidavit to the IBP as an attachment to his Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.25
The IBP’s Findings
In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya
found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).26 She recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.27
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP
Commissioner’s finding, but increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years suspension and a warning:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner [in] the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Rule IV, Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice),
Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years with a Warning that
commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. [emphases supplied]
On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008, attaching, among others, a
copy of the complainant’s Affidavit dated February 27, 2008, admitting the existence, genuineness and due execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Cirilo and Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the Deed
of Absolute Sale between Laurentino and Reynold; and the Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the
complainant dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case.29
On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court, requesting that the IBP be
directed to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration.30
By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,31 the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial matter or any cogent reason to warrant a reversal
or even a modification of its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302.32
On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP’s findings, as follows:33
a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and fraudulently notarized without
requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal hearing thus, violated the respondent’s right to due process as he
was not able to cross-examine her. This is not to mention that the complainant failed to offer corroborative proof to
prove her bare allegations;
b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents (MOA and 2 other DOAS) duly
executed by the parties therein and notarized by the respondent;
c) In totally ignoring the complainant’s Affidavit admitting the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in issue;
d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe Ylaya of the subject lots despite the
existence of a notarized MOA clearly showing the co-ownership of Ylaya and So; and
e) In finding the respondent/appellant’s act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to the notarial rules.
The Issues
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondent’s right to due process; and
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is administratively liable for violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP Board of Governors
finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for being
remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties. We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating
the rule on conflict of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
a. Due process violation
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity
to be heard or to have one’s day in court. As a rule, no denial of due process takes place where a party has been
given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case;35 what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard.
The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not given the "amplest
opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness complainant, to object to the admissibility of documents
or present controverting evidence"36 when the IBP rendered its conclusion without requiring the complainant to
adduce evidence in a formal hearing and despite the absence of corroborative proof. He insists that these defects
rendered the complainant’s allegations as hearsay, and the IBP’s report, recommendation or resolution null and void.
109
Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant when she failed to appear
at the required mandatory conference on October 6, 2005,37 the records reveal that the respondent fully participated
during the entire proceedings and submitted numerous pleadings, including evidence, before the IBP. He was even
allowed to file a motion for reconsideration supported by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered
and ruled upon in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.38
In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma,39 we held that due process, as applied to
administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain one’s side. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,40 due process in
an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due
process takes place. The requirements of due process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President,41 we held that "due process, as a constitutional precept,
does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met
in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude[, provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore,
not legally objectionable for being violative of due process, for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties."42
In this case, the respondent’s failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient ground to support the claim
that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent was heard through his pleadings, his submission of
alleged controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These
pleadings, evidence and testimony were received and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her
findings and recommendation, and were the bases for the IBP Board’s Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
A denia of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly in this case, the requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent." 43
We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006, submitted his
case to the IBP for its resolution without any further hearings. The motion, filed almost one year after the mandatory
conference on October 6, 2005, significantly did not contain any statement regarding a denial of due process. In
effect, the respondent himself waived his cross-examination of the complainant when he asked the IBP Board of
Governors to resolve the case based on the pleadings and the evidence on record. To quote his own submission:
1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;
2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its attachments denying all the allegations in the
complaint;
3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006, the respondent also filed his
supplemental position paper. By contrast, up to this date, the complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position
paper thus, waived her right to file the same;
4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the defenses and counter-arguments are
supported by documentary evidence, it is most respectfully prayed that the instant case be resolved on its merits or
be ordered dismissed for lack of merit without further hearing;
5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan in Civil
Case No. 2902 for Expropriation involving the same property, and such fact was deliberately omitted by the
complainant in her Verified Complaint as shown in the certification of non-forum shopping, the outright dismissal of
this case is warranted, hence, this motion; and
6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.44 (underscore ours; italics supplied)
Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:
No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator’s Report shall be considered as
substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or
may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the
Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire
proceedings.
In this case, the IBP Commissioner’s findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors – the first review
resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30245 dated December 14, 2007, affirming the IBP Commissioner’s findings,
but modifying the penalty; the second review resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8,
2010,46 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP Board of Governors found
no defect or miscarriage of justice warranting a remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.
We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor
purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, 47 not the trial of an
action or a suit.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases deleted]
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.48 Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which
the complainant must adduce evidence.
From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary proceedings and her failure
to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is
important is whether, upon due investigation, the IBP
Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondent’s misconduct to warrant the exercise of its disciplinary
powers.
b. Merits of the Complaint
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the
complainant has the burden to discharge."49 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief compared to the presented contrary evidence.
Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether preponderance of evidence exists, the court
may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, and the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number
of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. 50 By law, a
lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proven, and
that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. 51
The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:
110
The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, finds that the charges of the
complainant against the respondent are worthy of belief based on the following:
First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of spouses Ylanas (sic) in the properties
subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic) is hard to believe despite the
presentation of the Memorandum of Agreement.
It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document are put in issue, the best evidence
would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the
subject properties is only Laurentino L. Ylaya married to Fe A. Ylaya. The document does not state that Reynold So
was likewise a buyer together with Laurentino Ylaya, or that the former paid half of the purchase price.
Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer at that and who allegedly paid
half of the purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion of his name in the Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer
Certificate of Title subsequently issued.
The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So produced by the respondent cannot
overturn the belief of this Commission considering that the Memorandum of Agreement was executed more than a
month AFTER the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact
that the complainant denied ever having executed the Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the
signatories in the said Memorandum of Agreement would reveal that indeed, the alleged signatures of the
complainant and her husband are not the same with their signatures in other documents.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid, thereby making Laurentino Ylaya
and co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the subject properties (Please see Annex "B" of respondent’s Comment),
this Commission finds it hard to believe Laurentino Ylaya would sell it to Reynold So for P200,000 x x x when his
minimum expenses for the purchase thereof is already P225,000.00 and he was expecting to receive P7,000,000.00,
more or less. That would mean that if Reynold So and the complainant were co-owners, the P7,000,000.00 would
then be equally divided among them at P3,500,000.00 each, far above the P200,000.00 selling price reflected in the
pre-signed Deed of Sale.
As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error in notarizing the Deed
of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV,
Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal
within the fourth civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule becausehis uncle Reynold
So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of
the respondent’s Supplemental Position Paper) is misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant
case are considered principals in the contract entered into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a principal so as to apply
the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated the Rules when he notarized the subject
Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and
Reynold So were principal parties in the said Memorandum of Agreement.52
The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioner’s findings are contrary to the presented evidence, specifically to
the MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold acknowledging the existence of a co-ownership;53 to the complainant’s
Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 where she
stated that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the disbarment
complaint arose from a misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts; 54 to her Affidavit
dated February 27, 200855 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000;56 and to the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.57
In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this administrative complaint against him
is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Peneyra, the complainant’s counsel in this administrative
case, as the hand behind the complaint.58 According to the respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and
his family after his father filed several administrative cases against Atty. Peneyra, one of which resulted in the
imposition of a warning and a reprimand on Atty. Peneyra.59
Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-ownership between him and
Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to Reynold because he (Laurentino) had been
sickly and in dire need of money to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino agreed to the price of P200,000.00 as
this was almost the same value of his investment when he and Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the
sale to Reynold was with the agreement and consent of the complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale. 60
After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the evidence insufficient to
prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c),
Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the evidence against the respondent fails to show the alleged
fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory
deed of sale" and the conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no
prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested is the notary’s relative
within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the respondent notarized the documents.
In her Report and Recommendation,61 the IBP Commissioner concluded that the respondent is liable for deceit and
fraud because he failed to prove the existence of a co-ownership between Laurentino and Reynold; in her opinion,
the signatures of the complainant and of her husband on the MOA "are not the same with their signatures in other
documents."62
We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some questions regarding the respondent’s
legal practice, we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear evidence of the respondent’s specific acts of fraud
and deceit. His failure to prove the existence of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and that the respondent was responsible for creating
these spurious documents. We are further persuaded, after noting that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP
Commissioner failed to specify what differences she observed in the spouses Ylaya’s signatures in the MOA and
what documents were used in comparison.
Apart from her allegations, the complainant’s pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos. 162632 and 162633; 63 her
Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated May 17, 2000; 64 the RTC order in Civil Case No. 2902
dated November 6, 2000 fixing the price of just compensation;65 the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001;66 the
spouses Ylaya’s Verified Manifestation dated September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in Civil Case No. 2902, assailing
the Motion to Deposit Just Compensation filed by the respondent on behalf of Reynold and manifesting the sale
between Laurentino and Reynold;67 the Provincial Prosecutor’s Subpoena to the complainant in connection with the
respondent’s complaint for libel;68 the respondent’s complaint for libel against the complainant dated August 27,
2003;69 the complainant’s Counter Affidavit dated March 26, 2004 against the charge of libel;70 and the respondent’s
letter to the Provincial Attorney of Palawan dated April 5, 2004, requesting for "official information regarding the actual
attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE seminar.71
We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts constituting deceit or fraud on the
respondent’s part. The documents by themselves are neutral and, at the most, show the breakdown of the attorney-
client relationship between the respondent and the complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and
it is another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting these allegations.72
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We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the Court exercises its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence.73Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has a greater weight than that of the other party. When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or
when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the
party carrying the burden of proof.74
In this case, we find that the complainant’s evidence and the records of the case do not show the respondent’s
deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon
1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with Reynold, whom the
complainant alleges to be the respondent’s uncle because Reynold is married to the respondent’s maternal
aunt.75 However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held liable for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 200176 and the MOA dated April 19,
200077 were notarized by the respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial
law in force in the years 2000 - 2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code of 1917)
which did not contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties are related to the notary
public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for violation
of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing
conflicting interests without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for
being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a
legal matter entrusted to him.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. [emphasis ours]
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid
representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to decline professional employment, no matter how attractive the
fee offered may be, if its acceptance involves a violation of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the
rules of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after he has given
professional advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment from another in a matter
adversely affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to decline employment in any of these and similar
circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests. 78
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other, or that there would be no occasion to use
the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated."79 The sole exception is provided in Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – if
there is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this case show that the respondent retained clients who had
close dealings with each other. The respondent admits to acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses
Ylaya and Reynold at one point during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only
Reynold in the same proceedings,81 asserting Reynold’s ownership over the property against all other claims,
including that of the spouses Ylaya.82
We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give the respondent the
benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this case that the respondent retained Reynold
as his client and actively opposed the interests of his former client, the complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioner’s finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The respondent admits to losing
certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by Reynold.83 According to the respondent, the complainant
"maliciously retained" the TCTs over the properties sold by Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them from his
office.84 Reynold confirms that the TCTs were taken by the complainant from the respondent’s law office. 85
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties owned by another – an
act that could result in damage – should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff
who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present
when the complainant borrowed the TCTs,86 we nevertheless hold the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted
to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his client’s properties that were in his custody.
We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to
him. Despite the respondent’s admission that he represented the complainant and her late husband in Civil Case No.
2902 and that he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in their behalf, the records show that he never filed
such a motion for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant herself states that she and her late husband were forced to
file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on their own behalf. The records of the case, which include the Motion for Leave
to Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this conclusion.87
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge
of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure
of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.88
In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in this case in his duty to his
client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses
Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we find that there was want of diligence; without sufficient justification, this is
sufficient to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
d. The Complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case and her Affidavit
We are aware of the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case
dated November 14, 200690 and her Affidavit91 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000.92 The complainant explains that the parties have
entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because
of a "misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts";93 she erroneously accused the
respondent of ill motives and bad intentions, but after being enlightened, she is convinced that he has no personal
or pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No. 2902; that such misunderstanding was due to her
unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late husband during his lifetime. 94 The complainant now pleads for the
respondent’s forgiveness, stating that he has been her and her late husband’s lawyer for over a decade and affirms
her trust and confidence in him.95 We take note that under their Compromise Agreement dated November 14, 2006
for the expropriation case,96 the complainant and Reynold equally share the just compensation, which have since
increased to P10,000,000.00.
While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case and the Affidavit
appear to exonerate the respondent, complete exoneration is not the necessary legal effect as the submitted motion
and affidavit are immaterial for purposes of the present proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
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states that, "No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."
In Angalan v. Delante,97 despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the respondent therein for taking advantage
of his clients and for transferring the title of their property to his name. In Bautista v. Bernabe, 98 we revoked the
lawyer’s notarial commission, disqualified him from reappointment as a notary public for two years, and suspended
him from the practice of law for one year for notarizing a document without requiring the affiant to personally appear
before him. In this cited case, we said:
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the
administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.99
In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainant’s desistance or withdrawal does not terminate
the proceedings. This is particularly true in the present case where pecuniary consideration has been given to the
complainant as a consideration for her desistance. We note in this regard that she would receive P5,000,000.00, or
half of the just compensation under the Compromise Agreement,100 and thus agreed to withdraw all charges against
the respondent.101 From this perspective, we consider the complainant’s desistance to be suspect; it is not grounded
on the fact that the respondent did not commit any actual misconduct; rather, because of the consideration, the
complainant is now amenable to the position of the respondent and/or Reynold.
e. Procedural aspect
We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely recommendatory and do not attain
finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12, Rule 139-B is clear on this point that:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
xxxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.1âwphi1
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. 102 It exercises such disciplinary
functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are
exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBP’s recommendations imposing the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Court’s review and approval.
The Penalty
In Solidon v. Macalalad,103 we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months from the practice of law on the
respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In Josefina M. Aniñon v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.,104 we suspended the respondent therein from
the practice of law for one (1) year, for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under the circumstances, we find a one (1) year suspension to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against the
respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated December 14, 2007 and
Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP Board of Governors, and find respondent Atty. Glenn
Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted
anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension
between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels
and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated
city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
"wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred
constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present
petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled,
"An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. 4 The Ordinance is
reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest,
health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted
terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than
twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be
concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same
meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of
113
[a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable:
Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party
shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or
any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented
by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time
basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of
the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to
withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14,
1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January
22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement
of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the
Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the
case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance
null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and
void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded
by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and
the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation
that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying
for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where
the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-
province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition
for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the
Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense. 23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom
of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.24First, it
held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach
of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective
of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25 In their petition and Memorandum,
petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments
offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners
also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter
is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal
protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from
the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing
is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the
judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. 27The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as
well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and
redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
114
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer
suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance. 31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have
suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which
appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such
special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be
construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or
invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by
state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held
that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a
statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of
the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in
effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39 In this
case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We
can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our
1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40Ermita-
Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such
as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging
house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals.
A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was
sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities
covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate
the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out
a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The
awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit
of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection
questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they
exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another
form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate
many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third
political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious
and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous
and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as
a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on
government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the
procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due
process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into
the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
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If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive
legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as
it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of
constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a
liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the
due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine
the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed
with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of
the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a
discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been
articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process
cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.57 Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 60 Strict scrutiny
is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access63 and
interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners
at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the
injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential
standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well
the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-
up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn
of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel
the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial"
yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally
incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may
or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big
Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them
as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[ 65] In accordance
with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a
free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery
and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’"68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-
scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting
single adults which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our
holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon
the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of
that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the
will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any
real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish
to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any
116
person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other
than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power
whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is
a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged
in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification
of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the
unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home,76 and it is
skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah
for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept
that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and
vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived
decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by
offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a
new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply
by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing
laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. 77 The notion that the promotion of
public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of
philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular
behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be
functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different
interests.79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as
a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts
to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws,
for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right
and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction,
but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and
immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected
by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as
the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office,
and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative
is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be
left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. 177056
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS VELASCO, JR.,
LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA NACHURA, and
CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., PERALTA, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
September 18, 2009
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x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by
petitioner Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision [2] dated 25
January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision[3] dated 29
May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210;
and (2) the Resolution[4] dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the same case which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of the OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons
Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime)
could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls in various locations in
Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out commercial buildings and other structures,
among which, are SM City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue, Quezon City; and
SM Southmall, Las Pias.
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles,
either by way of parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely
devoted for use as parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the construction
of their own parking facilities. Respondent Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities, consisting of land and building
specifically used as parking spaces, which were constructed for the lessors account.
Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective parking facilities. They provide
security personnel to protect the vehicles parked in their parking facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn,
they collect the following parking fees from the persons making use of their parking facilities, regardless of whether
said persons are mall patrons or not:
Respondent Parking Fees
Ayala Land On weekdays, P25.00 for the first four hours and P10.00 for every
succeeding hour; on weekends, flat rate of P25.00 per day
Robinsons P20.00 for the first three hours and P10.00 for every succeeding
hour
Shangri-la Flat rate of P30.00 per day
SM Prime P10.00 to P20.00 (depending on whether the parking space is
outdoors or indoors) for the first three hours and 59 minutes,
and P10.00 for every succeeding hour or fraction thereof
The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the stipulation that respondents shall
not be responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in respondents parking facilities.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint
investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping malls of
charging parking fees; (2) assuming arguendo that the collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to find out
the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to determine the legality of
the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of theft, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause
at the back of the parking tickets. Said Senate Committees invited the top executives of respondents, who operate
the major malls in the country; the officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and other local government officials;
and the Philippine Motorists Association (PMA) as representative of the consumers group.
After three public hearings held on 30 September, 3 November, and 1 December 1999, the afore-mentioned Senate
Committees jointly issued Senate Committee Report No. 225[5] on 2 May 2000, in which they concluded:
In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the
National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code merely requires malls to provide
parking spaces, without specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the reasonable and logical
interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for free. This interpretation is not only reasonable and logical
but finds support in the actual practice in other countries like the United States of America where parking spaces
owned and operated by mall owners are free of charge.
Figuratively speaking, the Code has expropriated the land for parking something similar to the subdivision law which
require developers to devote so much of the land area for parks.
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) provides that it is the policy of the State to
protect the interest of the consumers, promote the general welfare and establish standards of conduct for business
and industry. Obviously, a contrary interpretation (i.e., justifying the collection of parking fees) would be going against
the declared policy of R.A. 7394.
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the
provisions of the Code, including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of
Public Works. This set up, however, is not being carried out in reality.
In the position paper submitted by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C.
Binay, accurately pointed out that the Secretary of the DPWH is responsible for the implementation/enforcement of
the National Building Code. After the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government units
(LGUs) were tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of the DPWH.Hence, in the local level, the Building Officials
enforce all rules/ regulations formulated by the DPWH relative to all building plans, specifications and designs
including parking space requirements. There is, however, no single national department or agency directly tasked to
118
supervise the enforcement of the provisions of the Code on parking, notwithstanding the national character of the
law.[6]
Senate Committee Report No. 225, thus, contained the following recommendations:
In light of the foregoing, the Committees on Trade and Commerce and Justice and Human Rights hereby recommend
the following:
1. The Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as
well as to enforce the penal sanction provisions of the National Building Code. The Office of the Solicitor General
should likewise study how refund can be exacted from mall owners who continue to collect parking fees.
2. The Department of Trade and Industry pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the
Consumer Act of the Philippines should enforce the provisions of the Code relative to parking. Towards this end, the
DTI should formulate the necessary implementing rules and regulations on parking in shopping malls, with prior
consultations with the local government units where these are located. Furthermore, the DTI, in coordination with the
DPWH, should be empowered to regulate and supervise the construction and maintenance of parking
establishments.
3. Finally, Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to expressly prohibit shopping malls from
collecting parking fees by at the same time, prohibit them from invoking the waiver of liability.[7]
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 225, the
DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias intended to institute, through
the OSG, an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to
impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the
National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR). With the threatened action against it, respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October 2000, a Petition for Declaratory
Relief[8] under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, against the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of
Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias. Said Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1208 and assigned to the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 138, presided over by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (Judge Marella). In its Petition, respondent SM
Prime prayed for judgment:
a) Declaring Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National Building Code as ultra vires, hence,
unconstitutional and void;
b) Declaring [herein respondent SM Prime]s clear legal right to lease parking spaces appurtenant to its department
stores, malls, shopping centers and other commercial establishments; and
c) Declaring the National Building Code of the Philippines Implementing Rules and Regulations as ineffective, not
having been published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, as
prescribed by Section 211 of Presidential Decree No. 1096.
[Respondent SM Prime] further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the
premises.[9]
The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)[10] against respondents. This Petition was docketed
as Civil Case No. 00-1210 and raffled to the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, presided over by Judge Francisco B. Ibay
(Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed that the RTC:
1. After summary hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
respondents from collecting parking fees from their customers; and
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring that the practice of respondents in charging parking fees is violative
of the National Building Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations and is therefore invalid, and making
permanent any injunctive writ issued in this case.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.[11]
On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, issued an Order consolidating Civil Case
No. 00-1210 with Civil Case No. 00-1208 pending before Judge Marella of RTC of Makati, Branch 138.
As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning of 8 August 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order[12] of
even date which limited the issues to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 to the following:
1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present proceedings and relative thereto
whether the controversy in the collection of parking fees by mall owners is a matter of public welfare.
2. Whether declaratory relief is proper.
3. Whether respondent Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime are obligated to provide
parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge.
4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award of damages.[13]
On 29 May 2002, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210.
The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG can initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under
Presidential Decree No. 478 and the Administrative Code of 1987.[14] It also found that all the requisites for an action
for declaratory relief were present, to wit:
The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy is
between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (d) the issue involved is ripe for judicial determination.
119
SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic] is a mall operator who stands to be affected directly by the position
taken by the government officials sued namely the Secretary of Public Highways and the Building Officials of the
local government units where it operates shopping malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a matter of public
interest and has taken a position adverse to that of the mall owners whom it sued. The construction of new and bigger
malls has been announced, a matter which the Court can take judicial notice and the unsettled issue of whether mall
operators should provide parking facilities, free of charge needs to be resolved.[15]
As to the third and most contentious issue, the RTC pronounced that:
The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing Rules and Regulations do not impose that parking
spaces shall be provided by the mall owners free of charge. Absent such directive[,] AyalaLand, Robinsons, Shangri-
la and SM [Prime] are under no obligation to provide them for free. Article 1158 of the Civil Code is clear:
Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book (1090).[]
xxxx
The provision on ratios of parking slots to several variables, like shopping floor area or customer area found in Rule
XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot be construed as a directive to provide free parking spaces,
because the enabling law, the Building Code does not so provide. x x x.
To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM [Prime] to provide parking spaces for free can be considered
as an unlawful taking of property right without just compensation.
Parking spaces in shopping malls are privately owned and for their use, the mall operators collect fees. The legal
relationship could be either lease or deposit. In either case[,] the mall owners have the right to collect money which
translates into income. Should parking spaces be made free, this right of mall owners shall be gone. This, without
just compensation. Further, loss of effective control over their property will ensue which is frowned upon by law.
The presence of parking spaces can be viewed in another light. They can be looked at as necessary facilities to
entice the public to increase patronage of their malls because without parking spaces, going to their malls will be
inconvenient. These are[,] however[,] business considerations which mall operators will have to decide for
themselves. They are not sufficient to justify a legal conclusion, as the OSG would like the Court to adopt that it is
the obligation of the mall owners to provide parking spaces for free.[16]
The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for damages.
The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 that:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-la
Plaza Corporation and SM Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the
use of their patrons or public in general, free of charge.
All counterclaims in Civil Case No. 00-1210 are dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.[17]
CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 involved the separate appeals of the OSG[18] and respondent SM Prime[19] filed with the Court
of Appeals. The sole assignment of error of the OSG in its Appellants Brief was:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE DID NOT INTEND MALL
PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF CHARGE[;][20]
while the four errors assigned by respondent SM Prime in its Appellants Brief were:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AS HAVING
BEEN ENACTED ULTRA VIRES, HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE IMPLEMENTING RULES INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT
HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSGS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND
INJUNCTION FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE OSG HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE
AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.[21]
Respondent Robinsons filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the OSG on the ground that the lone issue raised therein
involved a pure question of law, not reviewable by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 on 25 January 2007. The appellate court
agreed with respondent Robinsons that the appeal of the OSG should suffer the fate of dismissal, since the issue on
whether or not the National Building Code and its implementing rules require shopping mall operators to provide
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parking facilities to the public for free was evidently a question of law. Even so, since CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 also
included the appeal of respondent SM Prime, which raised issues worthy of consideration, and in order to satisfy the
demands of substantial justice, the Court of Appeals proceeded to rule on the merits of the case.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the capacity of the OSG to initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 before the
RTC as the legal representative of the government,[22] and as the one deputized by the Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines through Senate Committee Report No. 225.
The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of respondent SM Prime that the OSG failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. The appellate court explained that an administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.
The Court of Appeals likewise refused to rule on the validity of the IRR of the National Building Code, as such issue
was not among those the parties had agreed to be resolved by the RTC during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases
No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210. Issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the appellate court
found that the controversy could be settled on other grounds, without touching on the issue of the validity of the
IRR. It referred to the settled rule that courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law or
implementing rules, because of the principle that bars judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, unless the
resolution thereof is indispensable to the determination of the case.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR were
clear and needed no further construction. Said provisions were only intended to control the occupancy or congestion
of areas and structures. In the absence of any express and clear provision of law, respondents could not be obliged
and expected to provide parking slots free of charge.
The fallo of the 25 January 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED. Accordingly, appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[23]
In its Resolution issued on 14 March 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG,
finding that the grounds relied upon by the latter had already been carefully considered, evaluated, and passed upon
by the appellate court, and there was no strong and cogent reason to modify much less reverse the assailed
judgment.
The OSG now comes before this Court, via the instant Petition for Review, with a single assignment of error:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT OBLIGED TO PROVIDE FREE PARKING SPACES TO THEIR CUSTOMERS OR THE
PUBLIC.[24]
The OSG argues that respondents are mandated to provide free parking by Section 803 of the National Building
Code and Rule XIX of the IRR.
According to Section 803 of the National Building Code:
SECTION 803. Percentage of Site Occupancy
(a) Maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the
use, area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local zoning requirements and in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
In connection therewith, Rule XIX of the old IRR,[25] provides:
RULE XIX PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site occupancy, the following
provisions on parking and loading space requirements shall be observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for specific uses/occupancies for
buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by 5.00 meters for perpendicular
or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be
computed at a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the total
number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether or not parking accommodations, are attendant-
managed. (See Section 2 for computation of parking requirements).
xxxx
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be read together with Section 102 of the National Building
Code, which declares:
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent
with the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this
Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate
and control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the aim of safeguarding life, health,
property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and
control. Adequate parking spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when complemented by
quick and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking. Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use,
121
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to
control -- partially or, as in this case, absolutely -- the imposition of such fees.
The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain reading thereof,
is that respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading
spaces, in accordance with the minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term parking
fees cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code and its IRR.
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempt at interpretation.[26] Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do
not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the same. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in
special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to
what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. (Emphasis ours.)
Hence, in order to bring the matter of parking fees within the ambit of the National Building Code and its IRR, the
OSG had to resort to specious and feeble argumentation, in which the Court cannot concur.
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of the
same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the
first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State to safeguard life, health,
property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; but
totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads, and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and
control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance. While the
first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that
explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code.Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-
encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health,
property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the
minimum standards and requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are
complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for parking spaces for
buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of
charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing
rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved
in favor of the basic law.[27]
From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG repeatedly referred to Republic v. Gonzales[28] and City of Ozamis
v. Lumapas[29] to support its position that the State has the power to regulate parking spaces to promote the health,
safety, and welfare of the public; and it is by virtue of said power that respondents may be required to provide free
parking facilities. The OSG, though, failed to consider the substantial differences in the factual and legal backgrounds
of these two cases from those of the Petition at bar.
In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the occupants of two parcels of land of the public domain to
give way to a road-widening project. It was in this context that the Court pronounced:
Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course,
caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use
the streets. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience of the people and it
can only be substantially relieved by widening streets and providing adequate parking areas.
The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had been clothed with full power to control and regulate its streets
for the purpose of promoting public health, safety and welfare. The City can regulate the time, place, and manner of
parking in the streets and public places; and charge minimal fees for the street parking to cover the expenses for
supervision, inspection and control, to ensure the smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public market, and for
the safety and convenience of the public.
Republic and City of Ozamis involved parking in the local streets; in contrast, the present case deals with privately
owned parking facilities available for use by the general public. In Republic and City of Ozamis, the concerned local
governments regulated parking pursuant to their power to control and regulate their streets; in the instant case, the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials regulate parking pursuant to their authority to ensure compliance with
the minimum standards and requirements under the National Building Code and its IRR. With the difference in subject
matters and the bases for the regulatory powers being invoked, Republic and City of Ozamis do not constitute
precedents for this case.
Indeed, Republic and City of Ozamis both contain pronouncements that weaken the position of the OSG in the case
at bar. In Republic, the Court, instead of placing the burden on private persons to provide parking facilities to the
general public, mentioned the trend in other jurisdictions wherein the municipal governments themselves took the
initiative to make more parking spaces available so as to alleviate the traffic problems, thus:
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is
allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where
traffic is at least as voluminous as here, the provision by municipal governments of parking space is not limited to
parking along public streets or highways. There has been a marked trend to build off-street parking facilities with the
view to removing parked cars from the streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks has been
commonly undertaken by private enterprise, municipal governments have been constrained to put up carparks in
response to public necessity where private enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public demand. American
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courts have upheld the right of municipal governments to construct off-street parking facilities as clearly redounding
to the public benefit.[30]
In City of Ozamis, the Court authorized the collection by the City of minimal fees for the parking of vehicles along the
streets: so why then should the Court now preclude respondents from collecting from the public a fee for the use of
the mall parking facilities? Undoubtedly, respondents also incur expenses in the maintenance and operation of the
mall parking facilities, such as electric consumption, compensation for parking attendants and security, and upkeep
of the physical structures.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance
of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this
case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose
are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental
competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It
looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as
between private parties and the political society.[31] True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the
present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees
upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking
facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory
powers over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit
such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action
of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the
measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.[32]
Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness and propriety of measures or means, the Court notes
that Section 803 of the National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on Light and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code
deems it necessary to regulate site occupancy to ensure that there is proper lighting and ventilation in every
building. Pursuant thereto, Rule XIX of the IRR requires that a building, depending on its specific use and/or floor
area, should provide a minimum number of parking spaces. The Court, however, fails to see the connection between
regulating site occupancy to ensure proper light and ventilation in every building vis--vis regulating the collection by
building owners of fees for the use of their parking spaces. Contrary to the averment of the OSG, the former does
not necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally escapes this Court how lighting and ventilation conditions at the
malls could be affected by the fact that parking facilities thereat are free or paid for.
The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by arguing that:
Under Section 803 of the National Building Code, complimentary parking spaces are required to enhance light and
ventilation, that is, to avoid traffic congestion in areas surrounding the building, which certainly affects the ventilation
within the building itself, which otherwise, the annexed parking spaces would have served. Free-of-charge parking
avoids traffic congestion by ensuring quick and easy access of legitimate shoppers to off-street parking spaces
annexed to the malls, and thereby removing the vehicles of these legitimate shoppers off the busy streets near the
commercial establishments.[33]
The Court is unconvinced. The National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum specifications
and requirements for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic congestion in areas surrounding the building. It
is already a stretch to say that the National Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the problem of traffic
congestion around the buildings so as to ensure that the said buildings shall have adequate lighting and
ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the OSG has apparently done, that the traffic congestion
in areas around the malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their parking facilities, thus, forcing vehicle
owners to just park in the streets. The Court notes that despite the fees charged by respondents, vehicle owners still
use the mall parking facilities, which are even fully occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be parking in the
streets only because there are not enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are deterred by the
parking fees charged by respondents. Free parking spaces at the malls may even have the opposite effect from what
the OSG envisioned: more people may be encouraged by the free parking to bring their own vehicles, instead of
taking public transport, to the malls; as a result, the parking facilities would become full sooner, leaving more vehicles
without parking spaces in the malls and parked in the streets instead, causing even more traffic congestion.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State,
through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection
by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however,
that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking
facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The
power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include
the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms. [34]
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising police
power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.[35]
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.[36] It is a settled rule that neither
acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with
the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated
or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property
constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the
regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to
use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover
therefor.[37]
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount
123
to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the
latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they
being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting
from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
The ruling of this Court in City Government of Quezon City v. Judge Ericta[38] is edifying. Therein, the City
Government of Quezon City passed an ordinance obliging private cemeteries within its jurisdiction to set aside at
least six percent of their total area for charity, that is, for burial grounds of deceased paupers. According to the Court,
the ordinance in question was null and void, for it authorized the taking of private property without just compensation:
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of' health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of' building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
'The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic
Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within
the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general
law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides
in Section 177(q) that a sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy
or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law, and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance
is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development
of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made
to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the
mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property
without payment of just compensation.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the issue persistently raised by respondent SM Prime
concerning the unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the IRR. In addition, the said issue was not among those that the
parties, during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to submit for resolution of
the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an ordinance or an act will not be
resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds. [39]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007
and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint
Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and
No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184778 October 2, 2009
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD and CHUCHI FONACIER, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, in her capacity as Regional Trial Court Judge of Manila, Branch 28;
RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.; RURAL BANK OF SAN JOSE (BATANGAS), INC.; RURAL BANK OF
CARMEN (CEBU), INC.; PILIPINO RURAL BANK, INC.; PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, INC.;
RURAL BANK OF CALATAGAN (BATANGAS), INC. (now DYNAMIC RURAL BANK); RURAL BANK OF
DARBCI, INC.; RURAL BANK OF KANANGA (LEYTE), INC. (now FIRST INTERSTATE RURAL BANK); RURAL
BANK OF BISAYAS MINGLANILLA (now BANK OF EAST ASIA); and SAN PABLO CITY DEVELOPMENT
BANK, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)/Writ of Preliminary Injunction, questioning the Decision dated September 30, 2008 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103935. The CA Decision upheld the Order2 dated June 4, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 28 in Manila, issuing writs of preliminary injunction in Civil Case Nos. 08-119243, 08-119244, 08-
119245, 08-119246, 08-119247, 08-119248, 08-119249, 08-119250, 08-119251, and 08-119273, and the Order
dated May 21, 2008 that consolidated the civil cases.
The Facts
In September of 2007, the Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
conducted examinations of the books of the following banks: Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. (RBPI), Rural Bank of
San Jose (Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc., Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc., Philippine Countryside Rural
Bank, Inc., Rural Bank of Calatagan (Batangas), Inc. (now Dynamic Rural Bank), Rural Bank of Darbci, Inc., Rural
Bank of Kananga (Leyte), Inc. (now First Interstate Rural Bank), Rural Bank de Bisayas Minglanilla (now Bank of
East Asia), and San Pablo City Development Bank, Inc.
After the examinations, exit conferences were held with the officers or representatives of the banks wherein the SED
examiners provided them with copies of Lists of Findings/Exceptions containing the deficiencies discovered during
the examinations. These banks were then required to comment and to undertake the remedial measures stated in
these lists within 30 days from their receipt of the lists, which remedial measures included the infusion of additional
capital. Though the banks claimed that they made the additional capital infusions, petitioner Chuchi Fonacier, officer-
in-charge of the SED, sent separate letters to the Board of Directors of each bank, informing them that the SED found
that the banks failed to carry out the required remedial measures. In response, the banks requested that they be
given time to obtain BSP approval to amend their Articles of Incorporation, that they have an opportunity to seek
investors. They requested as well that the basis for the capital infusion figures be disclosed, and noted that none of
them had received the Report of Examination (ROE) which finalizes the audit findings. They also requested meetings
with the BSP audit teams to reconcile audit figures. In response, Fonacier reiterated the banks’ failure to comply with
the directive for additional capital infusions.
On May 12, 2008, the RBPI filed a complaint for nullification of the BSP ROE with application for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. 08-119243 against Fonacier, the BSP, Amado M.
Tetangco, Jr., Romulo L. Neri, Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr., Raul A. Boncan, Juanita D. Amatong, Alfredo C. Antonio,
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and Nelly F. Villafuerte. RBPI prayed that Fonacier, her subordinates, agents, or any other person acting in her behalf
be enjoined from submitting the ROE or any similar report to the Monetary Board (MB), or if the ROE had already
been submitted, the MB be enjoined from acting on the basis of said ROE, on the allegation that the failure to furnish
the bank with a copy of the ROE violated its right to due process.
The Rural Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc., Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc., Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank, Inc., Rural Bank of Calatagan (Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Darbci, Inc., Rural Bank of
Kananga (Leyte), Inc., and Rural Bank de Bisayas Minglanilla followed suit, filing complaints with the RTC
substantially similar to that of RBPI, including the reliefs prayed for, which were raffled to different branches and
docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 08-119244, 08-119245, 08-119246, 08-119247, 08-119248, 08-119249, 08-119250,
and 08-119251, respectively.
On May 13, 2008, the RTC denied the prayer for a TRO of Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc. The bank filed a motion for
reconsideration the next day.
On May 14, 2008, Fonacier and the BSP filed their opposition to the application for a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 08-119243 with the RTC. Respondent Judge Nina Antonio-Valenzuela of Branch 28
granted RBPI’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
The other banks separately filed motions for consolidation of their cases in Branch 28, which motions were granted.
Judge Valenzuela set the complaint of Rural Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc. for hearing on May 15, 2008.
Petitioners assailed the validity of the consolidation of the nine cases before the RTC, alleging that the court had
already prejudged the case by the earlier issuance of a TRO in Civil Case No. 08-119243, and moved for the inhibition
of respondent judge. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the consolidation of the subject cases.
On May 16, 2008, San Pablo City Development Bank, Inc. filed a similar complaint against the same defendants with
the RTC, and this was docketed as Civil Case No. 08-119273 that was later on consolidated with Civil Case No. 08-
119243. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Dissolve the TRO and an Opposition to the earlier motion for
reconsideration of Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc.
On May 19, 2008, Judge Valenzuela issued an Order granting the prayer for the issuance of TROs for the other
seven cases consolidated with Civil Case No. 08-119243. On May 21, 2008, Judge Valenzuela issued an Order
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration regarding the consolidation of cases in Branch 28. On May 22, 2008,
Judge Valenzuela granted the urgent motion for reconsideration of Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc. and issued a TRO similar
to the ones earlier issued.
On May 26, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss against all the complaints (except that of the San Pablo City
Development Bank, Inc.), on the grounds that the complaints stated no cause of action and that a condition precedent
for filing the cases had not been complied with. On May 29, 2008, a hearing was conducted on the application for a
TRO and for a writ of preliminary injunction of San Pablo City Development Bank, Inc.
The Ruling of the RTC
After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the RTC, on June 4, 2008, ruled that the banks were entitled to
the writs of preliminary injunction prayed for. It held that it had been the practice of the SED to provide the ROEs to
the banks before submission to the MB. It further held that as the banks are the subjects of examinations, they are
entitled to copies of the ROEs. The denial by petitioners of the banks’ requests for copies of the ROEs was held to
be a denial of the banks’ right to due process.
The dispositive portion of the RTC’s order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:
1) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119243. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Rural
Bank of Paranaque Inc. is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of P500,000.00 to the
effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if
the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond and approval thereof,
let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from submitting the Report of
Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff, to the
Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar report prepared in connection with
the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary Board, the latter and its members (i.e.
defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained
from acting on the basis of said report.
2) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119244. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Rural
Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc. is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of
P500,000.00 to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason
of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond
and approval thereof, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from
submitting the Report of Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination
conducted on the plaintiff, to the Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar
report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary
Board, the latter and its members (i.e. defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and
Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained from acting on the basis of said report.
3) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119245. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Rural
Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc. is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of P500,000.00 to
the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction
if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond and approval
thereof, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from submitting the Report
of Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff, to
the Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar report prepared in connection
with the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary Board, the latter and its members
(i.e. defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained
from acting on the basis of said report.
4) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119246. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Pilipino
Rural Bank Inc. is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of P500,000.00 to the effect
that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court
should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond and approval thereof, let a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from submitting the Report of
Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff, to the
Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar report prepared in connection with
the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary Board, the latter and its members (i.e.
defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained
from acting on the basis of said report.
5) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119247. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank Inc. is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of P500,000.00 to
the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction
if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond and approval
thereof, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from submitting the Report
of Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff, to
the Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar report prepared in connection
with the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary Board, the latter and its members
125
(i.e. defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained
from acting on the basis of said report.
6) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119248. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Dynamic
Bank Inc. (Rural Bank of Calatagan) is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of
P500,000.00 to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason
of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond
and approval thereof, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from
submitting the Report of Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination
conducted on the plaintiff, to the Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar
report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary
Board, the latter and its members (i.e. defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and
Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained from acting on the basis of said report.
7) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119249. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Rural
Bank of DARBCI, Inc. is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of P500,000.00 to the
effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if
the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond and approval thereof,
let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from submitting the Report of
Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff, to the
Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar report prepared in connection with
the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary Board, the latter and its members (i.e.
defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained
from acting on the basis of said report.
8) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119250. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Rural
Bank of Kananga Inc. (First Intestate Bank), is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of
P500,000.00 to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason
of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond
and approval thereof, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from
submitting the Report of Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination
conducted on the plaintiff, to the Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar
report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary
Board, the latter and its members (i.e. defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and
Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained from acting on the basis of said report.
9) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119251. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff Banco
Rural De Bisayas Minglanilla (Cebu) Inc. (Bank of East Asia) is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants,
in the amount of P500,000.00 to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may
sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After
posting of the bond and approval thereof, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the
defendants from submitting the Report of Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the
examination conducted on the plaintiff, to the Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any
other similar report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the
Monetary Board, the latter and its members (i.e. defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio,
and Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained from acting on the basis of said report.
10) Re: Civil Case No. 08-119273. Pursuant to Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff San
Pablo City Development Bank, Inc. is directed to post a bond executed to the defendants, in the amount of
P500,000.00 to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason
of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. After posting of the bond
and approval thereof, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin and restrain the defendants from
submitting the Report of Examination or any other similar report prepared in connection with the examination
conducted on the plaintiff, to the Monetary Board. In case such a Report on Examination [sic] or any other similar
report prepared in connection with the examination conducted on the plaintiff has been submitted to the Monetary
Board, the latter and its members (i.e. defendants Tetangco, Neri, Valdepenas, Boncan, Amatong, Antonio, and
Villafuerte) are enjoined and restrained from acting on the basis of said report.3
The Ruling of the CA
Petitioners then brought the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 claiming grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Valenzuela when she issued the orders dated May 21, 2008 and June 4, 2008.
The CA ruled that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and when it ordered the consolidation of the 10 cases.
It held that petitioners should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed orders, and failed to justify
why they resorted to a special civil action of certiorari instead.
The CA also found that aside from the technical aspect, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC, and if there was a mistake in the assessment of evidence by the trial court, that should be characterized as an
error of judgment, and should be correctable via appeal.
The CA held that the principles of fairness and transparency dictate that the respondent banks are entitled to copies
of the ROE.
Regarding the consolidation of the 10 cases, the CA found that there was a similarity of facts, reliefs sought, issues
raised, defendants, and that plaintiffs and defendants were represented by the same sets of counsels. It found that
the joint trial of these cases would prejudice any substantial right of petitioners.
Finding that no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the orders by the RTC, the CA denied the petition.
On November 24, 2008, a TRO was issued by this Court, restraining the CA, RTC, and respondents from
implementing and enforcing the CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 103935.4
By reason of the TRO issued by this Court, the SED was able to submit their ROEs to the MB. The MB then prohibited
the respondent banks from transacting business and placed them under receivership under Section 53 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 87915 and Sec. 30 of RA
76536 through MB Resolution No. 1616 dated December 9, 2008; Resolution Nos. 1637 and 1638 dated December
11, 2008; Resolution Nos. 1647, 1648, and 1649 dated December 12, 2008; Resolution Nos. 1652 and 1653 dated
December 16, 2008; and Resolution Nos. 1692 and 1695 dated December 19, 2008, with the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation as the appointed receiver.
Now we resolve the main petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INJUNCTION
ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT VIOLATED SECTION 25 OF THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT AND
EFFECTIVELY HANDCUFFED THE BANGKO SENTRAL FROM DISCHARGING ITS FUNCTIONS TO THE GREAT
AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE OF THE COUNTRY’S BANKING SYSTEM;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO BE FURNISHED COPIES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ROEs BEFORE THE SAME IS SUBMITTED TO
THE MONETARY BOARD IN VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS AND TRANSPARENCY DESPITE LACK
OF EXPRESS PROVISION IN THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT REQUIRING BSP TO DO THE SAME
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DEPARTING FROM WELL-ESTABLISHED
PRECEPTS OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
126
A. THE EXCEPTIONS CITED BY PETITIONER JUSTIFIED RESORT TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 INSTEAD OF FIRST FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
B. RESPONDENT BANKS’ ACT OF RESORTING IMMEDIATELY TO THE COURT WAS PREMATURE SINCE IT
WAS MADE IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
C. THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WAS NOT
ONLY IMPROPER BUT AMOUNTED TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION7
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Lim v. Court of Appeals it was stated:
The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence
of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and
the violation against that right must be shown.8
These requirements are absent in the present case.
In granting the writs of preliminary injunction, the trial court held that the submission of the ROEs to the MB before
the respondent banks would violate the right to due process of said banks.
This is erroneous.
The respondent banks have failed to show that they are entitled to copies of the ROEs. They can point to no provision
of law, no section in the procedures of the BSP that shows that the BSP is required to give them copies of the ROEs.
Sec. 28 of RA 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, which governs examinations of banking institutions, provides that
the ROE shall be submitted to the MB; the bank examined is not mentioned as a recipient of the ROE.
The respondent banks cannot claim a violation of their right to due process if they are not provided with copies of the
ROEs. The same ROEs are based on the lists of findings/exceptions containing the deficiencies found by the SED
examiners when they examined the books of the respondent banks. As found by the RTC, these lists of
findings/exceptions were furnished to the officers or representatives of the respondent banks, and the respondent
banks were required to comment and to undertake remedial measures stated in said lists. Despite these instructions,
respondent banks failed to comply with the SED’s directive.
Respondent banks are already aware of what is required of them by the BSP, and cannot claim violation of their right
to due process simply because they are not furnished with copies of the ROEs. Respondent banks were held by the
CA to be entitled to copies of the ROEs prior to or simultaneously with their submission to the MB, on the principles
of fairness and transparency. Further, the CA held that if the contents of the ROEs are essentially the same as those
of the lists of findings/exceptions provided to said banks, there is no reason not to give copies of the ROEs to the
banks. This is a flawed conclusion, since if the banks are already aware of the contents of the ROEs, they cannot
say that fairness and transparency are not present. If sanctions are to be imposed upon the respondent banks, they
are already well aware of the reasons for the sanctions, having been informed via the lists of findings/exceptions,
demolishing that particular argument. The ROEs would then be superfluities to the respondent banks, and should
not be the basis for a writ of preliminary injunction. Also, the reliance of the RTC on Banco Filipino v. Monetary
Board9 is misplaced. The petitioner in that case was held to be entitled to annexes of the Supervision and
Examination Sector’s reports, as it already had a copy of the reports themselves. It was not the subject of the case
whether or not the petitioner was entitled to a copy of the reports. And the ruling was made after the petitioner bank
was ordered closed, and it was allowed to be supplied with annexes of the reports in order to better prepare its
defense. In this instance, at the time the respondent banks requested copies of the ROEs, no action had yet been
taken by the MB with regard to imposing sanctions upon said banks.
The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an unwarranted interference with the powers of the MB.
Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 765310 refer to the appointment of a conservator or a receiver for a bank, which is a power of
the MB for which they need the ROEs done by the supervising or examining department. The writs of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court hinder the MB from fulfilling its function under the law. The actions of the MB under
Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 "may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction." The writs of preliminary injunction order are precisely what cannot be done under the law
by preventing the MB from taking action under either Sec. 29 or Sec. 30 of RA 7653.
As to the third requirement, the respondent banks have shown no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent serious damage. The serious damage contemplated by the trial court was the possibility of the imposition of
sanctions upon respondent banks, even the sanction of closure. Under the law, the sanction of closure could be
imposed upon a bank by the BSP even without notice and hearing. The apparent lack of procedural due process
would not result in the invalidity of action by the MB. This was the ruling in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals.11 This "close now, hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent
unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors,
creditors, stockholders, and the general public. The writ of preliminary injunction cannot, thus, prevent the MB from
taking action, by preventing the submission of the ROEs and worse, by preventing the MB from acting on such ROEs.
The trial court required the MB to respect the respondent banks’ right to due process by allowing the respondent
banks to view the ROEs and act upon them to forestall any sanctions the MB might impose. Such procedure has no
basis in law and does in fact violate the "close now, hear later" doctrine. We held in Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc.
v. Monetary Board, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas:
It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. The action of the MB
on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise may nonetheless be subject to judicial inquiry and can be set
aside if found to be in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.12
The respondent banks cannot—through seeking a writ of preliminary injunction by appealing to lack of due process,
in a roundabout manner— prevent their closure by the MB. Their remedy, as stated, is a subsequent one, which will
determine whether the closure of the bank was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Judicial review enters the
picture only after the MB has taken action; it cannot prevent such action by the MB. The threat of the imposition of
sanctions, even that of closure, does not violate their right to due process, and cannot be the basis for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest.
Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and
determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the
banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses
suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.13
The respondent banks have failed to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. It must be emphasized
that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader. 14 The respondent banks cannot rely
on a simple appeal to procedural due process to prove entitlement. The requirements for the issuance of the writ
have not been proved. No invasion of the rights of respondent banks has been shown, nor is their right to copies of
the ROEs clear and unmistakable. There is also no necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indeed the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction tramples upon the powers of the MB and prevents it from fulfilling its
functions. There is no right that the writ of preliminary injunction would protect in this particular case. In the absence
127
of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 15 In the absence of KATIPUNAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA HACIENDA December 4, 2009
proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ROXAS, INC. (KAMAHARI), rep. by its President
will be nullified.16 CARLITO CAISIP, and DAMAYAN NG
Courts are hereby reminded to take greater care in issuing injunctive relief to litigants, that it would not violate any MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS- G.R. No. 167540
law. The grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS
should be made with great caution.17 Thus, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction must have basis in and (DAMBA-NFSW), represnted by LAURO MARTIN,
be in accordance with law. All told, while the grant or denial of an injunction generally rests on the sound discretion Petitioners,
of the lower court, this Court may and should intervene in a clear case of abuse.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 103935 is hereby REVERSED. The assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction of respondent Judge
Valenzuela in Civil Case Nos. 08-119243, 08-119244, 08-119245, 08-119246, 08-119247, 08-119248, 08-119249, - versus -
08-119250, 08-119251, and 08-119273 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 149548 SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
Petitioner, ROXAS & Co., INC.,
Respondents.

- versus - x------------------------------------------x

DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM, FORMERLY

DAMBA-NFSW and the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR),
REFORM,* Petitioner,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------x
DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA G.R. No. 167505 - versus -
ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW), Present:
Petitioner, ROXAS & CO, INC., G.R. No. 167543
PUNO, C.J., Respondent.
- versus - CARPIO, x------------------------------------x
CORONA, ROXAS & CO., INC.,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, CARPIO MORALES, Petitioner,
ROXAS & Co., INC. AND/OR ATTY. MARIANO AMPIL, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondents. VELASCO, JR., - versus -
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, DAMBA-NFSW,
x-----------------------------------x PERALTA, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, x------------------------------------x
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and DAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V.
VILLARAMA, JJ. MARTIN, G.R. No. 167845
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
ROXAS & CO., INC.,
128
 Respondent.
x------------------------------------x
DAMBA-NFSW,
Petitioner, G.R. No. 169163
- versus -
ROXAS & CO., INC.,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 179650
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.
The main subject of the seven consolidated petitions is the application of petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc. (Roxas & Co.)
for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use of its three haciendaslocated in Nasugbu, Batangas containing
a total area of almost 3,000 hectares. The facts are not new, the Court having earlier resolved intimately-related
issues dealing with these haciendas. Thus, in the 1999 case of Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[1] the Court
presented the facts as follows:
. . . Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024
hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered
under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571
hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.
xxxx
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
[VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL.
xxxx
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the
Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-
agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
x x x x[2] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543 nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP)
1520 which was issued on November 28, 1975 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.The PP reads:
DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND
THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite
Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes
for the foreign and domestic market; and
WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to segregate specific geographic areas for
concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite
Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.
The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value, wherein
optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited
resources of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange
as well as other tourist receipts.
Any duly established military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded from this proclamation.
All proclamation, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified
accordingly. (emphasis and underscoring supplied).
129
The incidents which spawned the filing of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, 167845,
169163 and 179650 are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, the original draft of which
was made the basis of the Courts deliberations.
Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from argricultural to non-agricultural
on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified
them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the
three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the
subject of G.R. No. 167505.
The application for conversion of Roxas & Co. was the subject of the above-stated Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals which the Court remanded to the DAR for the observance of proper acquisition proceedings. As reflected in
the above-quoted statement of facts in said case, during the pendency before the DAR of its application for
conversion following its remand to the DAR or on May 16, 2000, Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for
exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP
1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994[3] which states that all lands already classified as
commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the
DAR.
It bears mentioning at this juncture that on April 18, 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu enacted Municipal
Zoning Ordinance No. 4 (Nasugbu MZO No. 4) which was approved on May 4, 1983 by the Human Settlements
Regulation Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
The records show that Sangguniang Bayan and Association of Barangay Captains of Nasugbu filed before this Court
petitions for intervention which were, however, denied by Resolution of June 5, 2006 for lack of standing.[4]
After the seven present petitions were consolidated and referred to the Court en banc,[5] oral arguments were
conducted on July 7, 2009.
The core issues are:
1. Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-
agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;
2. Whether Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982 exempted certain lots in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage;
and
3. Whether the partial and complete cancellations by the DAR of CLOA No. 6654 subject of G.R. No. 167505 is
valid.
The Court shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I. PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREE
MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING NASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified
all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.
To determine the chief intent of PP 1520, reference to the whereas clauses is in order. By and large, a reference to
the congressional deliberation records would provide guidance in dissecting the intent of legislation. But since PP
1520 emanated from the legislative powers of then President Marcos during martial rule, reference to the whereas
clauses cannot be dispensed with.[6]
The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities
that] have potential tourism value and mandated the conduct of necessary studies and the segregation of specific
geographic areas to achieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to
identify what those potential tourism areas are.If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to
non-agricultural use, there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those specific
geographic areas are.
The Court had in fact passed upon a similar matter before. Thus in DAR v. Franco,[7] it pronounced:
Thus, the DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine Tourism Authority, has to determine
precisely which areas are for tourism development and excluded from the Operation Land Transfer and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. And suffice it to state here that the Court has repeatedly ruled that lands
already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 do not need any
conversion clearance.[8] (emphasis and underscoring supplied).
While the above pronouncement in Franco is an obiter, it should not be ignored in the resolution of the present
petitions since it reflects a more rational and just interpretation of PP 1520. There is no prohibition in embracing the
rationale of an obiter dictum in settling controversies, or in considering related proclamations establishing tourism
zones.
In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,[9] the Court made it clear that the power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the
[Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court.[10] The
DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October 22, 2001, the application for CARP
exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the specific
geographic areas for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas. Further,
report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were
planted with sugar cane and other crops.[11]
Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,[12] came up with clarificatory guidelines and
therein decreed that
A. x x x x.
130
B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas
as tourist zones that merely:
(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or
peninsulas to be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to
identify/delineate specific geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate said areas
development; or
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x
x x) and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas development;
could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area declared as
tourist zone. This is so because reclassification of lands denotes their allocation into some specific use and
providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the act of
specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. (Joint HLURB, DAR, DA, DILG Memo. Circular Prescribing
Guidelines for MC 54, S. 1995, Sec.2)
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area
declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone
for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within
the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural.
Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces,
municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping
exemption from CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use
reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government.
C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect
before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein
from CARP coverage x x x x.
D. x x x x. (underscoring in the original; emphasis and italics supplied)
The DARs reading into these general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially
in the present petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the
potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the
areas to non-agricultural use.
Apart from PP 1520, there are similarly worded proclamations declaring the whole of Ilocos Norte
and Bataan Provinces, Camiguin, Puerto Prinsesa, Siquijor, Panglao Island, parts of Cebu Cityand Municipalities of
Argao and Dalaguete in Cebu Province as tourism zones.[13]
Indubitably, these proclamations, particularly those pertaining to the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Bataan, did not
intend to reclassify all agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands in one fell swoop. The Court takes notice of how
the agrarian reform program wasand still isimplemented in these provinces since there are lands that do not have
any tourism potential and are more appropriate for agricultural utilization.
Relatedly, a reference to the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995[14] provides a parallel orientation on the issue. Under
said Act, several towns and cities encompassing the whole Philippines were readily identified as economic
zones.[15] To uphold Roxas & Co.s reading of PP 1520 would see a total reclassification of practically all the
agricultural lands in the country to non-agricultural use.Propitiously, the legislature had the foresight to include a
bailout provision in Section 31 of said Act for land conversion.[16] The same cannot be said of PP 1520, despite the
existence of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 or the Tenant Emancipation Decree,[17] which is the precursor of the
CARP.
Interestingly, then President Marcos also issued on September 26, 1972 PD No. 2 which declared
the entire Philippines as land reform area.[18] Such declaration did not intend to reclassify all lands in the entire
country to agricultural lands. President Marcos, about a month later or on October 21, 1972, issued PD 27 which
decreed that all private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn were deemed awarded to their tenant-
farmers.
Given these martial law-era decrees and considering the socio-political backdrop at the time PP 1520 was issued in
1975, it is inconceivable that PP 1520, as well as other similarly worded proclamations which are completely silent
on the aspect of reclassification of the lands in those tourism zones, would nullify the gains already then achieved
by PD 27.
Even so, Roxas & Co. turns to Natalia Realty v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde to support its position. These cases are not
even closely similar to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543. The only time that these cases may find
application to said petitions is when the PTA actually identifies well-defined geographic areas within the zone with
potential tourism value.
In remotely tying these two immediately-cited cases that involve specific and defined townsite reservations for the
housing program of the National Housing Authority to the present petitions, Roxas & Co. cites Letter of Instructions
No. 352 issued on December 22, 1975 which states that the survey and technical description of the tourism zones
shall be considered an integral part of PP 1520.There were, however, at the time no surveys and technical
delineations yet of the intended tourism areas.
On hindsight, Natalia and Allarde find application in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 179650 & 167505, which petitions are
anchored on the extenuating effects of Nasugbu MZO No. 4, but not in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 & 167543
bearing on PP 1520, as will later be discussed.
Of significance also in the present petitions is the issuance on August 3, 2007 of Executive Order No. 647[19] by
President Arroyo which proclaimed the areas in the Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan as Special Tourism
Zone. Pursuant to said Executive Order, the PTA completed its validation of 21 out of 42 barangays as tourism priority
areas, hence, it is only after such completion that these identified lands may be subjected to reclassification
proceedings.
It bears emphasis that a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to
change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.[20]
131
Tourism Act, and not to PP 1520, for possible exemption.
II. ROXAS & CO.S APPLICATION IN DAR ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-142-97 FOR CARP EXEMPTION
IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 179650 CANNOT BE GRANTED IN VIEW OF DISCREPANCIES
IN THE LOCATION AND IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND.
Since PP 1520 did not automatically convert Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad and Palico into non-agricultural estates,
can Roxas & Co. invoke in the alternative Nasugbu MZO No. 4, which reclassified in 1982 the haciendas to non-
agricultural use to exclude six parcels of land in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage?
By Roxas & Co.s contention, the affected six parcels of land which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-142-97 and nine parcels of land which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98
involved in G.R. No. 167505, all in Hacienda Palico, have been reclassified to non-agricultural uses via Nasugbu
MZO No. 4 which was approved by the forerunner of HLURB.
Roxas & Co.s contention fails.
To be sure, the Court had on several occasions decreed that a local government unit has the power to classify and
convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL.[23] In Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Association v. Nicolas,[24] it reiterated that
. . . the facts obtaining in this case are similar to those in Natalia Realty. Both subject lands form part of an area
designated for non-agricultural purposes. Both were classified as non-agricultural lands prior to June 15, 1988, the
date of effectivity of CARL.
xxxx
In the case under review, the subject parcels of lands were reclassified within an urban zone as per approved Official
Comprehensive Zoning Map of the City of Davao. The reclassification was embodied in City Ordinance No. 363,
Series of 1982. As such, the subject parcels of land are considered non-agricultural and may be utilized for
residential, commercial, and industrial purposes. The reclassification was later approved by the
HLURB.[25] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The DAR Secretary[26] denied the application for exemption of Roxas & Co., however, in this wise:
Initially, CLUPPI-2 based [its] evaluation on the lot nos. as appearing in CLOA No. 6654. However, for purposes of
clarity and to ensure that the area applied for exemption is indeed part of TCT No. T-60034, CLUPPI-2 sought to
clarify with [Roxas & Co.] the origin of TCT No. T-60034. In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [Roxas & Co.] explains that
portions of TCT No. T-985, the mother title, was subdivided into 125 lots pursuant to PD 27. A total of 947.8417 was
retained by the landowners and was subsequently registered under TCT No. 49946. [[Roxas & Co.] further explains
that TCT No. 49946 was further subdivided into several lots (Lot 125-A to Lot 125-P) with Lot No. 125-N registered
under TCT No. 60034. [A] review of the titles, however, shows that the origin of T-49946 is T-783 and not T-
985. On the other hand, the origin of T-60034 is listed as 59946, and not T-49946. The discrepancies were
attributed by [Roxas & Co.] to typographical errors which were acknowledged and initialled [sic] by the
ROD. Per verification, the discrepancies . . . cannot be ascertained.[27] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In denying Roxas & Co.s motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary held:
The landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11,
1998 of the [HLURB] , the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, and the Certifications dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National
Irrigation Authority. The certifications were issued for Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34. Thus, it was not even
possible to issue exemption clearance over the lots covered by TCT Nos. 60019 to 60023.
Furthermore, we also note the discrepancies between the certifications issued by the HLURB and the
Municipal Planning Development Coordinator as to the area of the specific lots.[28](emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In affirming the DAR Secretarys denial of Roxas & Co.s application for exemption, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63146 subject of G.R. No. 179650, observed:
In the instant case, a perusal of the documents before us shows that there is no indication that the said TCTs refer
to the same properties applied for exemption by [Roxas & Co.] It is true that the certifications refer, among others, to
DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34But these certifications contain nothing to show that these lots are the
same as Lots 125-A, 125-B, 125-C, 125-D and 125-E covered by TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021, 60022 and
60023, respetively. While [Roxas & Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24 and 31 correspond to the
aforementioned TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was presented to substantiate such allegation.
Moreover, [Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 which it claims covers DAR Lot Nos. 28, 32 and 24.(TSN,
April 24, 2001, pp. 43-44)
xxxx
[Roxas & Co.] also claims that subject properties are located at Barangay Cogunan and Lumbangan and that these
properties are part of the zone classified as Industrial under Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982 of
the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. .a scrutiny of the said Ordinance shows that only Barangays Talangan
and Lumbangan of the said municipality were classified as Industrial ZonesBarangay Cogunan was not
included. x x x x. In fact, the TCTs submitted by [Roxas & Co.] show that the properties covered by said titles are all
located at Barrio Lumbangan.[29] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Its foregoing findings notwithstanding, the appellate court still allowed Roxas & Co. to adduce additional evidence to
support its application for exemption under Nasugbu MZO No. 4.
Meanwhile, Roxas & Co. appealed the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 63146 affirming the DAR
Secretarys denial of its application for CARP exemption in Hacienda Palico(now the subject of G.R. No. 149548).
132
When Roxas & Co. sought the re-opening of the proceedings in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97
(subject of G.R. No. 179650), and offered additional evidence in support of its application for CARP exemption, the
DAR Secretary, this time, granted its application for the six lots including Lot No. 36 since the additional documents
offered by Roxas & Co. mentioned the said lot.
In granting the application, the DAR Secretary[30] examined anew the evidence submitted by Roxas & Co. which
consisted mainly of certifications from various local and national government agencies. [31] Petitioner in G.R. Nos.
167505, 167540, 169163 and 179650, Damayan Ng Mga Manggagawang Bukid Sa Asyenda Roxas-National
Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW), the organization of the farmer-beneficiaries, moved to have the grant
of the application reconsidered but the same was denied by the DAR by Order of December 12, 2003, hence, it filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82225, on grounds of forum-
shopping and grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court, by Decision of October 31, 2006, ruled that DAMBA-
NFSW availed of the wrong mode of appeal. At all events, it dismissed its petition as it upheld the DAR Secretarys
ruling that Roxas & Co. did not commit forum-shopping, hence, the petition of DAMBA-NGSW in G.R. No. 179650.
While ordinarily findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded great weight and even finality by
the Court if supported by substantial evidence in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their
consideration,[32] this legal precept cannot be made to apply in G.R. No. 179650.
Even as the existence and validity of Nasugbu MZO No. 4 had already been established, there remains in dispute
the issue of whether the parcels of land involved in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 subject of G.R. No.
179650 are actually within the said zoning ordinance.
The Court finds that the DAR Secretary indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when he ignored the glaring
inconsistencies in the certifications submitted early on by Roxas & Co. in support of its application vis--vis the
certifications it later submitted when the DAR Secretary reopened DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97.
Notably, then DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, on one hand, observed that the landholdings covered by the aforesaid
titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB], the Certification dated
September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications
dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority. On the other hand, then Secretary
Hernani Braganza relied on a different set of certifications which were issued later or on September 19, 1996.
In this regard, the Court finds in order the observation of DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas & Co. should have submitted
the comprehensive land use plan and pointed therein the exact locations of the properties to prove that indeed they
are within the area of coverage of Nasugbu MZO No. 4.
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 179650 & 149548 must be distinguished from Junio v. Garilao[33] wherein the certifications
submitted in support of the application for exemption of the therein subject lot were mainly considered on the
presumption of regularity in their issuance, there being no doubt on the location and identity of the subject lot.[34] In
G.R. No. 179650, there exist uncertainties on the location and identities of the properties being applied for exemption.
G.R. No. 179650 & G.R. No. 149548 must accordingly be denied for lack of merit.
III. ROXAS & CO.S APPLICATION FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN DAR ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-008-
98 FOR THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 167505 SHOULD
BE GRANTED.
The Court, however, takes a different stance with respect to Roxas & Co.s application for CARP exemption in DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 over nine parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49,
48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico, subject of G.R. No.
167505.
In its application, Roxas & Co. submitted the following documents:
1. Letter-application dated 29 September 1997 signed by Elino SJ. Napigkit, for and on behalf of Roxas &
Company, Inc., seeking exemption from CARP coverage of subject landholdings;
2. Secretarys Certificate dated September 2002 executed by Mariano M. Ampil III, Corporate Secretary of Roxas
& Company, Inc., indicating a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent the corporation in its application for
exemption with the DAR. The same Board Resolution revoked the authorization previously granted to the Sierra
Management & Resources Corporation;
3. Photocopy of TCT No. 985 and its corresponding Tax Declaration No. 0401;
4. Location and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;
5. Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of land
are within the Urban Core Zone as specified in Zone A. VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of
1982, approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), under Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;
6. Two (2) Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II, Director, HLURB, Region IV,
stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within the Residential cluster Area as specified in Zone
VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of
1983, dated 4 May 1983;[35]
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR Secretary granted the application for exemption but issued the following
conditions:
1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and
cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a final determination has been made on the amount of disturbance
compensation due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas;
133
2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the appropriate disturbance
compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants who are determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof
of payment of disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment;
and
3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject of a separate proceeding
before the PARAD of Batangas.[36]
DAMBA-NSFW moved for reconsideration but the DAR Secretary denied the same and explained further why CLOA
holders need not be informed of the pending application for exemption in this wise:
As regards the first ground raised by [DAMBA-NSFW], it should be remembered that an application for CARP-
exemption pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, as implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
series of 1994, is non-adversarial or non-litigious in nature. Hence, applicant is correct in saying that nowhere in the
rules is it required that occupants of a landholding should be notified of an initiated or pending exemption application.
xxxx
With regard [to] the allegation that oppositors-movants are already CLOA holders of subject propert[ies] and deserve
to be notified, as owners, of the initiated questioned exemption application, is of no moment. The Supreme Court in
the case of Roxas [&] Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106, held:
We stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. x x x
x. Anyhow, the farmer[-]beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.
Since subject landholding has been validly determined to be CARP-exempt, therefore, the previous issuance of the
CLOA of oppositors-movants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the situation of the above-quoted Supreme Court
Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the property in trust for the rightful owners of the land and are not the owners
of subject landholding who should be notified of the exemption application of applicant Roxas & Company,
Incorporated.
Finally, this Office finds no substantial basis to reverse the assailed Orders since there is substantial compliance by
the applicant with the requirements for the issuance of exemption clearance under DAR AO 6 (1994).[37]
On DAMBA-NSFWs petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, noting that the petition was belatedly filed, sustained,
by Decision of December 20, 1994 and Resolution of May 7, 2007,[38] the DAR Secretarys finding that Roxas & Co.
had substantially complied with the prerequisites of DAR AO 6, Series of 1994. Hence, DAMBA-NFSWs petition in
G.R. No. 167505.
The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals assailed issuances, the orders of the DAR Secretary which
it sustained being amply supported by evidence.
IV. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-008-98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No.
179650 TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES INVOLVING THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO
MUST BE CANCELLED.
Turning now to the validity of the issuance of CLOAs in Hacienda Palico vis--vis the present dispositions: It bears
recalling that in DAR Administrative Case Nos. A-9999-008-98 and A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 179650), the Court
ruled for Roxas & Co.s grant of exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 but denied the grant of
exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 for reasons already discussed. It follows that the CLOAs
issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 must be cancelled.
But first, the Court digresses. The assertion of DAMBA-NSFW that the petitions for partial and complete cancellations
of the CLOAs subject of DARAB Case Nos. R-401-003-2001 to R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001 violated the
earlier order in Roxas v. Court of Appeals does not lie. Nowhere did the Court therein pronounce that the CLOAs
issued cannot and should not be cancelled, what was involved therein being the legality of the acquisition
proceedings. The Court merely reiterated that it is the DAR which has primary jurisdiction to rule on the validity of
CLOAs.Thus it held:
. . . [t]he failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does
not give this Court the power to nullify the [CLOAs] already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. To assume the power
is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given
the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries
hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.[39]
On the procedural question raised by Roxas & Co. on the appellate courts relaxation of the rules by giving due course
to DAMBA-NFSWs appeal in CA G.R. SP No. 72198, the subject of G.R. No. 167845:
Indeed, the perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the assailed
decision final and executory.[40] A relaxation of the rules may, however, for meritorious reasons, be allowed in the
interest of justice.[41] The Court finds that in giving due course to DAMBA-NSFWs appeal, the appellate court
committed no reversible error. Consider its ratiocination:
x x x x. To deny [DAMBA-NSFW]s appeal with the PARAD will not only affect their right over the parcel of land subject
of this petition with an area of 103.1436 hectares, but also that of the whole area covered by CLOA No. 6654 since
the PARAD rendered a Joint Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [DAMBA-NSFW] with regard
to [Roxas & Co.]s application for partial and total cancellation of the CLOA in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to
R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001. There is a pressing need for an extensive discussion of the issues as raised
by both parties as the matter of canceling CLOA No. 6654 is of utmost importance, involving as it does the probable
displacement of hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries and their families. x x x x (underscoring supplied)
134
Unlike courts of justice, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body, is not bound to strictly observe rules of procedure and
evidence. To strictly enforce rules on appeals in this case would render to naught the Courts dispositions on the other
issues in these consolidated petitions.
In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs issued for the nine parcels of land identified as
Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares
in Hacienda Palico (or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). As for the rest of the CLOAs,
they should be respected since Roxas & Co., as shown in the discussion in G.R. Nos. 167540, 167543 and 167505,
failed to prove that the other lots in Hacienda Palico and the other two haciendas, aside from the above-mentioned
nine lots, are CARP-exempt.
Conformably, Republic Act No. 3844 (R.A. No. 3844), as amended,[42] mandates that disturbance compensation be
given to tenants of parcels of land upon finding that (t)he landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes.[43] In addition, DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994 directs the payment of disturbance compensation
before the application for exemption may be completely granted.
Roxas & Co. is thus mandated to first satisfy the disturbance compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries in the
areas covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR AO No. A-9999-008-98 before the CLOAs covering them can be
cancelled. And it is enjoined to strictly follow the instructions of R.A. No. 3844.
5) In G.R. No. 167505, the Court DENIES the petition for review of DAMBA-NSFW and AFFIRMS the December 20,
2004 Decision and March 7, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226;
6) In G.R. No. 167845, the Court DENIES Roxas & Co.s petition for review for lack of merit
and AFFIRMS the September 10, 2004 Decision and April 14, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals;
7) In G.R. No. 169163, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decisions of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in
DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 ordering the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 and DARAB Cases Nos. R-401-003-
2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 granting the partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654. The CLOAs issued for Lots No. 21
No. 24, No. 26, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34 or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97) remain;
and
8) Roxas & Co. is ORDERED to pay the disturbance compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries in the areas
covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 before the CLOAs therein can
be cancelled, and is ENJOINED to strictly follow the mandate of R.A. No. 3844.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly CALTEX G.R. No. 173863
PHILIPPINES, INC.),
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Finally then, and in view of the Courts dispositions in G.R. Nos. 179650 and 167505, the May 27, 2001 Decision of Chairperson,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)[44] in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 ordering the total - versus - PERALTA,*
cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, subject of G.R. No. 169163, is SET ASIDE except with respect to the CLOAs issued BERSAMIN,
for Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares VILLARAMA, JR., and
in Hacienda Palico (or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). It goes without saying that SERENO, JJ.
themotion for reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW is granted to thus vacate the Courts October 19, 2005 Resolution
dismissing DAMBA-NFSWs petition for review of the appellate courts Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952;[45]

WHEREFORE,
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Promulgated:
1) In G.R. No. 167540, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the November 24, 2003 Decision[46] and March 18,
and CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 which declared that Presidential Proclamation
Respondents. September 15, 2010
No. 1520 reclassified the lands in the municipalities of Nasugbu in Batangas and Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
to non-agricultural use;
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
2) The Court accordingly GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration of the Department of Agrarian Reform in G.R. No.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated November 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
167543 and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE its Resolution of July 20, 2005;
CA-G.R. SP No. 87117, which affirmed the Resolution[2] dated August 2, 2004 and the Order[3] dated September 30,
3) In G.R. No. 149548, the Court DENIES the petition for review of Roxas & Co. for lack of merit;
2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 04-D-170.
The facts follow.
4) In G.R. No. 179650, the Court GRANTS the petition for review of DAMBA-NSFW and REVERSES and SETS
On June 28, 2002, the Board of Directors of respondent Clark Development Corporation (CDC) issued and approved
ASIDE the October 31, 2006 Decision and August 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) [4] which
82225;
provided, among others, for the following fees and charges:

135
1. Accreditation Fee
xxxx
2. Annual Inspection Fee
xxxx
3. Royalty Fees
Suppliers delivering fuel from outside sources shall be assessed the following royalty fees:
- Php0.50 per liter those delivering Coastal petroleum fuel to CSEZ locators not sanctioned by CDC
- Php1.00 per liter those bringing-in petroleum fuel (except Jet A-1) from outside sources
xxxx
4. Gate Pass Fee
x x x x[5]
The above policy guidelines were implemented effective July 27, 2002. On October 1, 2002, CDC sent a letter[6] to
herein petitioner Chevron Philippines, Inc. (formerly Caltex Philippines, Inc.), a domestic corporation which has been
supplying fuel to Nanox Philippines, a locator inside the CSEZ since 2001, informing the petitioner that a royalty fee
of P0.50 per liter shall be assessed on its deliveries to Nanox Philippines effective August 1, 2002. Thereafter,
on October 21, 2002 a Statement of Account[7] was sent by CDC billing the petitioner for royalty fees in the amount
of P115,000.00 for its fuel sales from Coastal depot to Nanox Philippines from August 1-31 to September 3-21, 2002.
Claiming that nothing in the law authorizes CDC to impose royalty fees or any fees based on a per unit measurement
of any commodity sold within the special economic zone, petitioner sent a letter [8] dated October 30, 2002 to the
President and Chief Executive Officer of CDC, Mr. Emmanuel Y. Angeles, to protest the assessment for royalty
fees. Petitioner nevertheless paid the said fees under protest on November 4, 2002.
On August 18, 2003, CDC again wrote a letter[9] to petitioner regarding the latters unsettled royalty fees covering the
period of December 2002 to July 2003. Petitioner responded through a letter[10] dated September 8, 2003 reiterating
its continuing objection over the assessed royalty fees and requested a refund of the amount paid under protest
on November 4, 2002. The letter also asked CDC to revoke the imposition of such royalty fees. The request was
denied by CDC in a letter[11] dated September 29, 2003.
Petitioner elevated its protest before respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) arguing that the
royalty fees imposed had no reasonable relation to the probable expenses of regulation and that the imposition on a
per unit measurement of fuel sales was for a revenue generating purpose, thus, akin to a tax. The protest was
however denied by BCDA in a letter[12] dated March 3, 2004.
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President which dismissed [13] the appeal for lack of merit on August 2,
2004 and denied[14] petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof on September 30, 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA which likewise dismissed[15] the appeal for lack of merit
on November 30, 2005 and denied[16] the motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2006.
The CA held that in imposing the challenged royalty fees, respondent CDC was exercising its right to regulate the
flow of fuel into CSEZ, which is bolstered by the fact that it possesses exclusive right to distribute fuel within CSEZ
pursuant to its Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)[17] with Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Coastal Subic
Bay Terminal, Inc. (CSBTI) dated April 11, 1996. The appellate court also found that royalty fees were assessed on
fuel delivered, not on the sale, by petitioner and that the basis of such imposition was petitioners delivery receipts to
Nanox Philippines. The fact that revenue is incidentally also obtained does not make the imposition a tax as long as
the primary purpose of such imposition is regulation.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution [19] dated July 26, 2006.
Hence, this petition raising the following grounds:
I. THE ISSUE RAISED BEFORE THE COURT A QUO IS A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE
DETERMINED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
II. THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE CDC HAS THE POWER TO IMPOSE THE
QUESTIONED ROYALTY FEES IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND A CLEAR MISUNDERSTANDING OF FACTS WHEN IT RULED CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE THAT: (i) THE QUESTIONED ROYALTY FEE IS PRIMARILY FOR REGULATION; AND (ii) ANY
REVENUE EARNED THEREFROM IS MERELY INCIDENTAL TO THE PURPOSE OF REGULATION.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO GIVE DUE WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY CPI SUCH AS THE LETTERS COMING FROM RESPONDENT CDC ITSELF PROVING THAT
THE QUESTIONED ROYALTY FEES ARE IMPOSED ON THE BASIS OF FUEL SALES (NOT DELIVERY OF FUEL)
AND NOT FOR REGULATION BUT PURELY FOR INCOME GENERATION, I.E. AS PRICE OR CONSIDERATION
FOR THE RIGHT TO MARKET AND DISTRIBUTE FUEL INSIDE THE CSEZ.[20]
Petitioner argues that CDC does not have any power to impose royalty fees on sale of fuel inside the CSEZ on the basis
of purely income generating functions and its exclusive right to market and distribute goods inside the CSEZ. Such
imposition of royalty fees for revenue generating purposes would amount to a tax, which the respondents have no power
to impose. Petitioner stresses that the royalty fee imposed by CDC is not regulatory in nature but a revenue generating
measure to increase its profits and to further enhance its exclusive right to market and distribute fuel in CSEZ.[21]
Petitioner would also like this Court to note that the fees imposed, assuming arguendo they are regulatory in nature,
are unreasonable and are grossly in excess of regulation costs. It adds that the amount of the fees should be
presumed to be unreasonable and that the burden of proving that the fees are not unreasonable lies with the
respondents.[22]
On the part of the respondents, they argue that the purpose of the royalty fees is to regulate the flow of fuel to and
from the CSEZ. Such being its main purpose, and revenue (if any) just an incidental product, the imposition cannot
be considered a tax. It is their position that the regulation is a valid exercise of police power since it is aimed at
promoting the general welfare of the public. They claim that being the administrator of the CSEZ, CDC is responsible
for the safe distribution of fuel products inside the CSEZ.[23]
The petition has no merit.
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the
implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the
measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is
deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated.
Thus, in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,[24] the Court stated:
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two (2) powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is
made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but
if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
In the case at bar, we hold that the subject royalty fee was imposed primarily for regulatory purposes, and not for the
generation of income or profits as petitioner claims. The Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to
and from the Clark Special Economic Zone[25] provides:
DECLARATION OF POLICY
136
It is hereby declared the policy of CDC to develop and maintain the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) as a
highly secured zone free from threats of any kind, which could possibly endanger the lives and properties of
locators, would-be investors, visitors, and employees.
It is also declared the policy of CDC to operate and manage the CSEZ as a separate customs territory ensuring free
flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the CSEZ.[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the Policy Guidelines was issued, first and foremost, to ensure the safety,
security, and good condition of the petroleum fuel industry within the CSEZ. The questioned royalty fees form part of
the regulatory framework to ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to and from the CSEZ. The fact that
respondents have the exclusive right to distribute and market petroleum products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA
with SBMA and CSBTI does not diminish the regulatory purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied by
petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.
As pointed out by the respondents in their Comment, from the time the JVA took effect up to the time CDC
implemented its Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and from the CSEZ, suppliers/distributors
were allowed to bring in petroleum products inside CSEZ without any charge at all. But this arrangement clearly
negates CDCs mandate under the JVA as exclusive distributor of CSBTIs fuel products within CSEZ and respondents
ownership of the Subic-Clark Pipeline.[27] On this score, respondents were justified in charging royalty fees on fuel
delivered by outside suppliers.
However, it was erroneous for petitioner to argue that such exclusive right of respondent CDC to market and distribute
fuel inside CSEZ is the sole basis of the royalty fees imposed under the Policy Guidelines. Being the administrator
of CSEZ, the responsibility of ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel products within the Zone falls
on CDC. Addressing specific concerns demanded by the nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in
the range of services which respondent CDC is expected to provide under the law, in pursuance of its general power
of supervision and control over the movement of all supplies and equipment into the CSEZ.
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 80[28] provides:
SEC. 2. Powers and Functions of the Clark Development Corporation. The BCDA, as the incorporator and holding
company of its Clark subsidiary, shall determine the powers and functions of the CDC. Pursuant to Section 15 of RA
7227, the CDC shall have the specific powers of the Export Processing Zone Authority as provided for in Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 66 (1972) as amended.
Among those specific powers granted to CDC under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 66 are:
(a) To operate, administer and manage the export processing zone established in the Port of Mariveles, Bataan, and
such other export processing zones as may be established under this Decree; to construct, acquire, own, lease,
operate and maintain infrastructure facilities, factory building, warehouses, dams, reservoir, water distribution, electric
light and power system, telecommunications and transportation, or such other facilities and services necessary or
useful in the conduct of commerce or in the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Decree;
xxxx
(g) To fix, assess and collect storage charges and fees, including rentals for the lease, use or occupancy of lands,
buildings, structure, warehouses, facilities and other properties owned and administered by the Authority; and to fix
and collect the fees and charges for the issuance of permits, licenses and the rendering of services not
enumerated herein, the provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding;
(h) For the due and effective exercise of the powers conferred by law and to the extend (sic) [extent] requisite therefor,
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and sole police authority over all areas owned or administered by the Authority. For
this purpose, the Authority shall have supervision and control over the bringing in or taking out of the Zone,
including the movement therein, of all cargoes, wares, articles, machineries, equipment, supplies or
merchandise of every type and description;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
In relation to the regulatory purpose of the imposed fees, this Court in Progressive Development Corporation v.
Quezon City,[29] stated that x x x the imposition questioned must relate to an occupation or activity that so engages
the public interest in health, morals, safety and development as to require regulation for the protection and promotion
of such public interest; the imposition must also bear a reasonable relation to the probable expenses of regulation,
taking into account not only the costs of direct regulation but also its incidental consequences as well.
In the case at bar, there can be no doubt that the oil industry is greatly imbued with public interest as it vitally affects
the general welfare.[30] In addition, fuel is a highly combustible product which, if left unchecked, poses a serious threat
to life and property. Also, the reasonable relation between the royalty fees imposed on a per liter basis and the
regulation sought to be attained is that the higher the volume of fuel entering CSEZ, the greater the extent and
frequency of supervision and inspection required to ensure safety, security, and order within the Zone.
Respondents submit that increased administrative costs were triggered by security risks that have recently emerged,
such as terrorist strikes in airlines and military/government facilities. Explaining the regulatory feature of the charges
imposed under the Policy Guidelines, then BCDA President Rufo Colayco in his letter dated March 3,
2004 addressed to petitioners Chief Corporate Counsel, stressed:
The need for regulation is more evident in the light of the 9/11 tragedy considering that what is being moved from
one location to another are highly combustible fuel products that could cause loss of lives and damage to properties,
hence, a set of guidelines was promulgated on 28 June 2002. It must be emphasized also that greater security
measure must be observed in the CSEZ because of the presence of the airport which is a vital public infrastructure.
We are therefore constrained to sustain the imposition of the royalty fees on deliveries of CPIs fuel products to
Nanox Philippines.[31]
As to the issue of reasonableness of the amount of the fees, we hold that no evidence was adduced by the petitioner
to show that the fees imposed are unreasonable.
Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law.[32] They benefit from the same presumption of validity and
constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two precepts place a heavy burden upon any party assailing
governmental regulations.[33] Petitioners plain allegations are simply not enough to overcome the presumption of
validity and reasonableness of the subject imposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87117 is hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. G.R. No. 143855
ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES,
PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN BAUTISTA,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
- versus - BRION,*
PERALTA,
137
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines,
VILLARAMA, JR., to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,* and On October 11, 2000 petitioners Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T. Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S.
SERENO,** JJ. Lim, Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Sergio Apostol, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M.
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive Secretary), HON. MAR ROXAS (Secretary of Trade and Industry), Gonzales, Jaime Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero Pichay, Juan
HON. FELIPE MEDALLA (Secretary of National Economic and Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL Miguel Zubiri and Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing
BUENAVENTURA (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman, Securities and the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
Exchange Commission),
Respondents. Promulgated: First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the
national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization
September 21, 2010 and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with
alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
ABAD, J.:
Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-
employment, and bring about more unemployment.
This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and determine the constitutionality of the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. government as a condition for the release of certain loans.

The Facts and the Case Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National
engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories: Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael
Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino citizens and
US$2,500,000.00 corporations wholly owned by Filipino First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since
citizens. R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of
Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but less than For the first two years of R.A. 8762s Congress since they made no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.
US$7,500,000.00 effectivity, foreign ownership is
allowed up to 60%. After the two-year Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as members of
period, 100% foreign equity shall be Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the petition does not allege that the
allowed. subject law violates the rights of those vendors.
Category C US$7,500,000.00 or more May be wholly owned by foreigners.
Foreign investments for establishing Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not
a store in Categories B and C shall specify how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
not be less than the equivalent in Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
Philippine Pesos of US$830,000.00.
Category D US$250,000.00 per store of foreign May be wholly owned by foreigners. Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to
enterprises specializing in high-end reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national
or luxury products interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such
138
reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries
not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
The Issues Presented
Simplified, the case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
The Courts Ruling
One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so. [1] Legal
standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More
particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury
as a result of the passage of that law.[2] To put it another way, he must show that he has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the law he complains of.[3]
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners
or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers[4] or as legislators.[5] Still the Court will resolve the question they
raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when as in this case the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6]
Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which read as follows:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
xxxx
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise,
and provides incentives to needed investments.
Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and
in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
xxxx
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
But, as the Court explained in Taada v. Angara,[7] the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations
of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to
a cause of action in the courts.
The Court further explained in Taada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by
requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.[8]
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of
the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the
Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.[9]
139
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While
it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. [10] The key, as
in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of
foreign investments and services.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact
laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this
case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of
reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of
the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him
without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that restricts
the retail business to Filipino citizens.In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the
foreigners right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise
of police power.[11] The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was
reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos
right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business
to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any
constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to
alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support
its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only
nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall
be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in
certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use
of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
activities.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161107 March 12, 2013
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City, JOSEPHINE C.
EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City Engineer, and ALFONSO
ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina City, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-MARIKINA, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside
the December 1, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75691.
The Facts
Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are
educational institutions organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and business
addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.2
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in
Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSA-
Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement
house for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years
ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.3
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,4 entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls
in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 2175 and 2006 were enacted to amend Sections
7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
ORDINANCE No. 192
Series of 1994
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES AND WALLS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MARIKINA
WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative body of the municipality to "x x x Prescribe reasonable
limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the municipality, x x x";
WHEREAS the effort of the municipality to accelerate its economic and physical development, coupled with
urbanization and modernization, makes imperative the adoption of an ordinance which shall embody up-to-date and
modern technical design in the construction of fences of residential, commercial and industrial buildings;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines, does
not adequately provide technical guidelines for the construction of fences, in terms of design, construction, and
criteria;
WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall provide more efficient and effective enforcement of laws
on public safety and security;
WHEREAS, it has occurred in not just a few occasions that high fences or walls did not actually discourage but, in
fact, even protected burglars, robbers, and other lawless elements from the view of outsiders once they have gained
ingress into these walls, hence, fences not necessarily providing security, but becomes itself a "security problem";
WHEREAS, to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts earlier enumerated,
and as guardian of the people of Marikina, the municipal government seeks to enact and implement rules and
ordinances to protect and promote the health, safety and morals of its constituents;
140
WHEREAS, consistent too, with the "Clean and Green Program" of the government, lowering of fences and walls
shall encourage people to plant more trees and ornamental plants in their yards, and when visible, such trees and
ornamental plants are expected to create an aura of a clean, green and beautiful environment for Marikeños;
WHEREAS, high fences are unsightly that, in the past, people planted on sidewalks to "beautify" the façade of their
residences but, however, become hazards and obstructions to pedestrians;
WHEREAS, high and solid walls as fences are considered "un-neighborly" preventing community members to easily
communicate and socialize and deemed to create "boxed-in" mentality among the populace;
WHEREAS, to gather as wide-range of opinions and comments on this proposal, and as a requirement of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), the Sangguniang Bayan of Marikina invited presidents or officers of
homeowners associations, and commercial and industrial establishments in Marikina to two public hearings held on
July 28, 1994 and August 25, 1994;
WHEREAS, the rationale and mechanics of the proposed ordinance were fully presented to the attendees and no
vehement objection was presented to the municipal government;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUINANG BAYAN OF MARIKINA IN SESSION DULY
ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the construction of all fences, walls and gates on lots classified or
used for residential, commercial, industrial, or special purposes.
Section 2. Definition of Terms:
a. Front Yard – refers to the area of the lot fronting a street, alley or public thoroughfare.
b. Back Yard – the part of the lot at the rear of the structure constructed therein.
c. Open fence – type of fence which allows a view of "thru-see" of the inner yard and the improvements therein.
(Examples: wrought iron, wooden lattice, cyclone wire)
d. Front gate – refers to the gate which serves as a passage of persons or vehicles fronting a street, alley, or public
thoroughfare.
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall
be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru; and
(2) Fences on the side and back yard – shall be in accordance with the provisions of P.D. 1096 otherwise known as
the National Building Code.
Section 4. No fence of any kind shall be allowed in areas specifically reserved or classified as parks.
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between
the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational and
religious institutions.7
Section 6. Exemption.
(1) The Ordinance does not cover perimeter walls of residential subdivisions.
(2) When public safety or public welfare requires, the Sangguniang Bayan may allow the construction and/or
maintenance of walls higher than as prescribed herein and shall issue a special permit or exemption.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose existing fences and walls do not conform to the
specifications herein are allowed adequate period of time from the passage of this Ordinance within which to conform,
as follows:
(1) Residential houses – eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments – five (5) years
(3) Industrial establishments – three (3) years
(4) Educational institutions – five (5) years8 (public and privately owned)
Section 8. Penalty. Walls found not conforming to the provisions of this Ordinance shall be demolished by the
municipal government at the expense of the owner of the lot or structure.
Section 9. The Municipal Engineering Office is tasked to strictly implement this ordinance, including the issuance of
the necessary implementing guidelines, issuance of building and fencing permits, and demolition of non-conforming
walls at the lapse of the grace period herein provided.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. All existing Ordinances and Resolutions, Rules and Regulations inconsistent with the
foregoing provisions are hereby repealed, amended or modified.
Section 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason or reasons, local executive orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof in conflict with this Ordinance are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.
Section 12. Effectivity. This ordinance takes effect after publication.
APPROVED: September 30, 1994
(Emphases supplied)
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish and
replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about
six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park.9 On April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an
extension of time to comply with the directive.10 In response, the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F.
Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC), docketed as SCA Case
No. 2000-381-MK.11
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192,
asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. That demolishing their fence and
constructing it six (6) meters back would result in the loss of at least 1,808.34 square meters, worth
about P9,041,700.00, along West Drive, and at least 1,954.02 square meters, worth roughly P9,770,100.00, along
East Drive. It would also result in the destruction of the garbage house, covered walk, electric house, storage house,
comfort rooms, guards’ room, guards’ post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students, Blessed Virgin Shrine,
P.E. area, and the multi-purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial use. The respondents, thus,
asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an appropriation of
property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their property through
eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did
not exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient protection for many years.12
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of
which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public
convenience and general prosperity.13
On June 30, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the
demolition of the fence at SSC’s Marikina property.14
Ruling of the RTC
On the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision,15 dated October 2, 2002, granting the petition and ordering the issuance
of a writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance
No. 192 on the respondents’ property.
The RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the petitioners to demolish the fence at the SSC property in
Marikina and to move it back six (6) meters would amount to an appropriation of property which could only be done
through the exercise of eminent domain. It held that the petitioners could not take the respondents’ property under
the guise of police power to evade the payment of just compensation.
141
It did not give weight to the petitioners’ contention that the parking space was for the benefit of the students and
patrons of SSA-Marikina, considering that the respondents were already providing for sufficient parking in compliance
with the standards under Rule XIX of the National Building Code.
It further found that the 80% see-thru fence requirement could run counter to the respondents’ right to privacy,
considering that the property also served as a residence of the Benedictine sisters, who were entitled to some sense
of privacy in their affairs. It also found that the respondents were able to prove that the danger to security had no
basis in their case. Moreover, it held that the purpose of beautification could not be used to justify the exercise of
police power.
It also observed that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, provided for retroactive application. It held,
however, that such retroactive effect should not impair the respondents’ vested substantive rights over the perimeter
walls, the six-meter strips of land along the walls, and the building, structures, facilities, and improvements, which
would be destroyed by the demolition of the walls and the seizure of the strips of land.
The RTC also found untenable the petitioners’ argument that Ordinance No. 192 was a remedial or curative statute
intended to correct the defects of buildings and structures, which were brought about by the absence or insufficiency
of laws. It ruled that the assailed ordinance was neither remedial nor curative in nature, considering that at the time
the respondents’ perimeter wall was built, the same was valid and legal, and the ordinance did not refer to any
previous legislation that it sought to correct.
The RTC noted that the petitioners could still take action to expropriate the subject property through eminent domain.
The RTC, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to
permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on petitioners’
property in question located at Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the CA
In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in Ordinance No. 192 did not justify the exercise of police power, as
it did not only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the respondents’ property without due process of law.
The respondents were bound to lose an unquantifiable sense of security, the beneficial use of their structures, and a
total of 3,762.36 square meters of property. It, thus, ruled that the assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as
it clearly invaded the personal and property rights of the respondents and "[f]or being unreasonable, and undue
restraint of trade."17
It noted that although the petitioners complied with procedural due process in enacting Ordinance No. 192, they failed
to comply with substantive due process. Hence, the failure of the respondents to attend the public hearings in order
to raise objections did not amount to a waiver of their right to question the validity of the ordinance.
The CA also shot down the argument that the five-meter setback provision for parking was a legal easement, the use
and ownership of which would remain with, and inure to, the benefit of the respondents for whom the easement was
primarily intended. It found that the real intent of the setback provision was to make the parking space free for use
by the public, considering that such would cease to be for the exclusive use of the school and its students as it would
be situated outside school premises and beyond the school administration’s control.
In affirming the RTC ruling that the ordinance was not a curative statute, the CA found that the petitioner failed to
point out any irregularity or invalidity in the provisions of the National Building Code that required correction or cure.
It noted that any correction in the Code should be properly undertaken by the Congress and not by the City Council
of Marikina through an ordinance.
The CA, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, all foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED.1âwphi1 The October 2, 2002
Decision and the January 13, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 273, granting
petitioners-appellees’ petition for Prohibition in SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18
Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, the petitioners are now before this Court presenting the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CITY
ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
AFOREMENTIONED ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE CITY OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CITY
VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994; AND
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.19
In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the assailed ordinance, pertaining to the five-meter setback
requirement is, as held by the lower courts, invalid.20 Nonetheless, the petitioners argue that such invalidity was
subsequently cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, series of 2000. They also contend that Section 3, relating to the
80% see-thru fence requirement, must be complied with, as it remains to be valid.
Ruling of the Court
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of
police power by the City Government of Marikina.
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." 21 The State, through the
legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State. This
delegation of police power is embodied in Section 1622 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
known as the General Welfare Clause,23 which has two branches. "The first, known as the general legislative power,
authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The
second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary
and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property."24
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,25 discusses the test of a valid ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.26
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police power. To
successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and
the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
142
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.27
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down
for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private
rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as discussed in Social Justice
Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:28
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.29
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.30
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall
be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between
the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational and
religious institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from requiring them to (1) demolish their existing concrete
wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters
back in order to provide a parking area.
Setback Requirement
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a
parking area. The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking area to be created would remain with
the respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its students and faculty, and that its use by the public on non-
school days would only be incidental. In their Reply, however, the petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in fact,
invalid for being repugnant to the Constitution.31
The Court agrees with the latter position.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free
for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also
be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent
domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property will continue to remain with
the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor the total destruction of value is essential to
taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking.32 The Court
is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of 3,762.36
square meters of the respondents’ private property for public use without just compensation, in contravention to the
Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious that
providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment
of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve
or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.33 The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5 was properly cured by Zoning Ordinance No.
303,34 Series of 2000, which classified the respondents’ property to be within an institutional zone, under which a
five-meter setback has been required.
The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, has no bearing to the case at hand.
The Court notes with displeasure that this argument was only raised for the first time on appeal in this Court in the
petitioners’ Reply. Considering that Ordinance No. 303 was enacted on December 20, 2000, the petitioners could
very well have raised it in their defense before the RTC in 2002. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party
cannot change the legal theory of this case under which the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court. It
should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is conducted. Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing
court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This will be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process.35
Furthermore, the two ordinances have completely different purposes and subjects. Ordinance No. 192 aims to
regulate the construction of fences, while Ordinance No. 303 is a zoning ordinance which classifies the city into
specific land uses. In fact, the five-meter setback required by Ordinance No. 303 does not even appear to be for the
purpose of providing a parking area.
By no stretch of the imagination, therefore, can Ordinance No. 303, "cure" Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192.
In any case, the clear subject of the petition for prohibition filed by the respondents is Ordinance No. 192 and, as
such, the precise issue to be determined is whether the petitioners can be prohibited from enforcing the said
ordinance, and no other, against the respondents.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the height of
fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru, should remain valid
and enforceable against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the reasonable relation between the
purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.36
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful
acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. The
means employed by the petitioners, however, is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose
and is unduly oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious
to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a
more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that such exposed premises
could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass and
143
breach. It also appears that the respondents’ concrete wall has served as more than sufficient protection over the
last 40 years. `
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may not, under the
guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic appearance of the community.
Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster "neighborliness" between members of a
community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their
property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their right to privacy,
considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property. The right to privacy has
long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone,37 as governmental powers should stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens.38 It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of
Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 39
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the respondents’ rights to
property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents.
No Retroactivity
Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192 by including the regulation of educational institutions
which was unintentionally omitted, and giving said educational institutions five (5) years from the passage of
Ordinance No. 192 (and not Ordinance No. 217) to conform to its provisions.40 The petitioners argued that the
amendment could be retroactively applied because the assailed ordinance is a curative statute which is retroactive
in nature.
Considering that Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 cannot be enforced against the respondents, it is no longer
necessary to rule on the issue of retroactivity. The Court shall, nevertheless, pass upon the issue for the sake of
clarity.
"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise
be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have
designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or
irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their
purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive."41
The petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 192 is a curative statute as it aims to correct or cure a defect in the National
Building Code, namely, its failure to provide for adequate guidelines for the construction of fences. They ultimately
seek to remedy an insufficiency in the law. In aiming to cure this insufficiency, the petitioners attempt to add lacking
provisions to the National Building Code. This is not what is contemplated by curative statutes, which intend to correct
irregularities or invalidity in the law. The petitioners fail to point out any irregular or invalid provision. As such, the
assailed ordinance cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature.
At any rate, there appears to be no insufficiency in the National Building Code with respect to parking provisions in
relation to the issue of the respondents. Paragraph 1.16.1, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations of the said code
requires an educational institution to provide one parking slot for every ten classrooms. As found by the lower courts,
the respondents provide a total of 76 parking slots for their 80 classrooms and, thus, had more than sufficiently
complied with the law.
Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is, therefore, not a curative statute which may be applied retroactively.
Separability
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution,
while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced."42 Thus, the other sections of the assailed ordinance remain valid and enforceable.
Conclusion
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess of their jurisdiction
in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in
issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the
assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 2, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in SCA Case No.
2000-381-MK is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to
permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as
amended, on the petitioners' property in question located in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159110 December 10, 2013
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO) SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN, Respondents.
x---------------x
G.R. No. 159692
BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., and BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE BRADBURY JABAN, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF CEBU, CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF CITY
OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEÑA, AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD and
CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO, and
LITO GILBUENA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs) is to ensure the enjoyment by each
of the territorial and political subdivisions of the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal,
the National Legislature has devolved the three great inherent powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political
subdivision is there by vested with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.
In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the LGUs to enact and adopt ordinances
to regulate vehicular traffic and to prohibit illegal parking within their jurisdictions. Now challenged before the Court
are the constitutionality and validity of one such ordinance on the ground that the ordinance constituted a
contravention of the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by authorizing the immobilization of offending
vehicles through the clamping of tires. The challenge originated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at the instance of
the petitioners – vehicle owners who had borne the brunt of the implementation of the ordinance –with the RTC
declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, but it has now reached the Court as a consolidated appeal taken in due
course by the petitioners after the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the RTC.
Antecedents
144
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No.
1664toauthorizethetraffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and
prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).1 The pertinent provisions of Ordinance No.
1664 read:
Section 1. POLICY–It is the policy of the government of the City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating
any provision of any City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801,
otherwise known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as amended, in order to have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in
all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times.
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES–Any vehicle found violating any provision of any existing ordinance of
the City of Cebu which prohibits, regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any
tire of the said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget designed
to immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or
Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to immobilize any violating vehicleas
hereinabove provided.
Section 3. PENALTIES–Any motor vehicle, owner or driver violating any ordinance on parking prohibitions,
regulations and/or restrictions, as may be providedunder Ordinance No. 801, as amended, or any other existing
ordinance, shall be penalized in accordance with the penalties imposed in the ordinance so violated, provided that
the vehicle immobilizer may not be removed or released without its owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer
of Cebu City through the Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated penalties for all prior traffic law violations
that remain unpaid or unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the
immobilization of the said vehicle, and receipts of such payments presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau
responsible for the release of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released by any of the following
officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belciña
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the denver
boot vehicle immobilizer or other such special gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or destruction and shall be
prosecuted for such loss or destruction under pain or penalty under the Revised Penal Code and any other existing
ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; Provided that any such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially.
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard
thereof shall be towed to the city government impounding area for safekeeping and may be released only after the
provision of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully complied with.
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment
of not less than one (1)month nor more than six (6) months or of a fine of not less than Two Thousand
Pesos(P2,000.00)nor more than Five Thousand Pesos(P5,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the
discretion of the court.2
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban
(Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its
City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of
Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and
damages.3 Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking
area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents fromhis office;4that upon his return after
less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car
to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp;5 that he had been infuriated by the immobilization
of his car because he had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day; that his car was
impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to payP4,200.00as a fine to
the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car;6that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and
without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had undergone a
similar incident of clamping of his car on the early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car was parked properly
in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating any traffic regulation or causing
any obstruction; that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00(itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00for the
violation) without any court hearing and final judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very
secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative Lito
Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the total sum of P1,400.00for the release of his car without a court
hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.7
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu,T.C. Sayson, Ricardo
Hapitan and John Does to demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu
City, and damages.8 He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the
sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anayexterminator who had
asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the front of the residence inasmuch as his daughter’s
car had been parked in the carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long;9 that while waiting
for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go
into the house to answer the call; that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown persons had
clamped the front wheel of his car;10 that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been
clamped by CITOM representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the
remover to criminal charges;11 and that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even
if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.12
In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants,13 the City Attorney of Cebu presented similar
defenses, essentially stating that the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the
plaintiffs;14 and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and validity.15
The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial, rendered on January 22, 1999 its
decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void upon the following ratiocination:
In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was expressed by Daniel Webster as a "law which hears
before it condemns". In another case[s], "procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It contemplate(s)notice and opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered affecting ones (sic) person or property." In both procedural and substantive due process,
a hearing is always a pre-requisite, hence, the taking or deprivation of one’s life, liberty or property must be done
upon and with observance of the "due process" clause of the Constitution and the non-observance or violation thereof
is, perforce, unconstitutional.
Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a prohibited, restrycted (sic) or regulated area in the street
or along the street, the vehicle is immobilized by clamping any tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget which immobilized the motor vehicle. The violating vehicle is
immobilized, thus, depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole determination of any traffic enforcer or regular
PNP personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle immobilizer cannot be removed or
released without the owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau
all the accumulated penalties of all unpaid or unsettled traffic law violations, plus the administrative penalty
of P500.00 and, further, the immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon presentation of the receipt of said
145
payments and upon release order by the Chairman, CITOM, or Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology,
or Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcina. It should be stressed that the owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have to
undergo all these ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is
the arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector. Otherwise stated, the owner of the immobilized motor vehicle
is deprived of his right to the use of his/her vehicle and penalized without a hearing by a person who is not legally or
duly vested with such rights, power or authority. The Ordinance in question is penal in nature, and it has been held;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance
No.1664unconstitutional and directing the defendant City of Cebu to pay the plaintiff Valentino Legaspi the sum
of P110,000.00 representing the value of his car, and to all the plaintiffs, Valentino L. Legaspi, Bienvenido P. Jaban
and Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban, the sum of P100,000.00 each or P300,000.00 all as nominal
damages and another P100,000.00 each orP300,000.00 all as temperate or moderate damages. With costs against
defendant City of Cebu.
SO ORDERED.16 (citations omitted)
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA, assigning the following errors to the RTC, namely: (a)
the RTC erred in declaring that Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional; (b) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No.
1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in holding that any violation prior to its declaration as being
unconstitutional was irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC
gravely erred in awarding damages to the plaintiffs; (d) granting, arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
damages, the damages awarded were excessive and contrary to law; and (e) the decision of the RTC was void,
because the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been notified of the proceedings.
On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,17overturning the RTCand declaring Ordinance No.
1664 valid, to wit:
The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of Ordinance 1664. Defendants-appellants contend that the
passage of Ordinance 1664is in accordance with the police powers exercised by the City of Cebu through the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A thematic
analysis of the law on municipal corporations confirms this view. As in previous legislation, the Local Government
Code delegates police powers to the local governments in two ways. Firstly, it enumerates the subjects on which the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may exercise these powers. Thus, with respect to the use of public streets, Section 458
of the Code states:
Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative branch of the city, x x x shall x x x
(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, park and other public places and approve
the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals
or regulate the use of the same by privately owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and the
operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the
putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and
sprinkling of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in
the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places.It
then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of the legislative authority of the local government is set
out in Section 16, to wit:
Section 16. General Welfare. –Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
This provision contains what is traditionally known as the general welfare clause. As expounded in United States vs.
Salaveria, 39 Phil 102, the general welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause is
much more independent of the specific functions of the council, and authorizes such ordinances as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for health, safety, prosperity and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants.
In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause complements the more specific powers granted a local
government. It serves as a catch-all provision that ensures that the local government will be equipped to meet any
local contingency that bears upon the welfare of its constituents but has not been actually anticipated. So varied and
protean are the activities that affect the legitimate interests of the local inhabitants that it is well-nigh impossible to
say beforehand what may or may not be done specifically through law. To ensure that a local government can react
positively to the people’s needs and expectations, the general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to
allow the local legislative council to enact such measures as the occasion requires.
Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 may be deemed a legitimate exercise of the police powers
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu. This local law authorizes traffic enforcers to immobilize and tow
for safekeeping vehicles on the streets that are illegally parked and to release them upon payment of the announced
penalties. As explained in the preamble, it has become necessary to resort to these measures because of the traffic
congestion caused by illegal parking and the inability of existing penalties to curb it. The ordinance is designed to
improve traffic conditions in the City of Cebu and thus shows a real and substantial relation to the welfare, comfort
and convenience of the people of Cebu. The only restrictions to an ordinance passed under the general welfare
clause, as declared in Salaveria, is that the regulation must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the corporation, consistent with national laws and policies, and not unreasonable or discriminatory. The
measure in question undoubtedly comes within these parameters.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi came to
the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.
Issues
Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues are decisive of the challenge, to wit:
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly the
limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes.
Ruling
The petitions for review have nomerit.
A.
Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,18 the Court restatesthe tests of a valid ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.19
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the
corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and
the substantive (i.e.,involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the
146
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).
B.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the formal requirements
Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu?
The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to the
enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the
LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police
power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific
parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view
of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.
In particular, police power is regarded as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’"20 It is unquestionably "the power vested in the legislature by the constitution,
to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subject of the same."21 According to Cooley: "[The police power] embraces the whole
system of internal regulation by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences
against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment
of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right enjoyment of rights by others." 22
In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police power. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc.,23 the Court cogently observed:
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this
power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic
rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.24Section 458of the LGC relevantly states: Section 458. Powers,
Duties, Functions and Composition. –(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section
22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as
provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:
xxxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve the
construction, improvement repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or
regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and operation of
conveyances for hire;designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of
signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of
streets and public places;(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon
and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal
constructions in public places;(emphasis supplied)The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave
to the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic congestions associated with development and
progress because they were directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs
would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their
communities. With the broad latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities ,their traffic regulations must be
held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards.
C.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the substantive requirements
The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process
of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.4
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the
Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to
every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has vividly written: 25
x x x. If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the protection of due
process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise
violated. Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute, its unjustified
withholding would also be a violation of due process. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms
of justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the
denial involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,26 the Court expounded on the aspects of the guaranty of due process of law as a
limitation on the acts of government, viz:
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due
process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient
justification for the government’s action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a
justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational
basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then
the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights
of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands
of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property.27
147
The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the confiscation and immobilization of the motor vehicles
to the traffic enforcers or the regular personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to officials exercising
judicial authority, was violative of the constitutional guaranty of due process; that such confiscation and immobilization
should only be after a hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the immobilization and the clamping of the cars
and motor vehicles by the police or traffic enforcers could be subject to abuse.
On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. 1664 violated the constitutional guaranty of due process
for being arbitrary and oppressive; and that its provisions conferring upon the traffic enforcers the absolute discretion
to be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and collectors all at the same time were vague and ambiguous.28 He reminds
that the grant of police powers for the general welfare under the LGC was not unlimited but subject to constitutional
limitations;29and that these consolidated cases should not be resolved differently from the resolution of a third case
assailing the validity of Ordinance No.1664 (Astillero case), in which the decision of the same RTC declaring
Ordinance No.1664 as unconstitutional had attained finality following the denial of due course to the appeal of the
City of Cebu and its co-defendants.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the petitioners
cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to include
illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which were precisely the
subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in a vowedly aiming to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in
the City of Cebu at all times" (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its Whereas Clauses, viz:
WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code (Ordinance No. 801) as amended, provided for Parking
Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in the streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of parking on certain streets of Cebu City, violations continued
unabated due, among others, to the very low penalties imposed under the Traffic Code of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to address the traffic congestions caused by illegal parkings
in the streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance No.1642 in order to fully address and solve the problem of
illegal parking and other violations of the Traffic Code of Cebu City;30 (emphasis supplied)
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic
centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the
general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose
of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the
streets of the City of Cebu.
Legaspi’s attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague and ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny.
As can be readily seen, its text was for thright and unambiguous in all respects. There could be no confusion on the
meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But should there be any vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions, which
the OSG does not concede,31 there was nothing that a proper application of the basic rules of statutory construction
could not justly rectify.
The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No. 1664 like themselves were
not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard
and to explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and
arbitrary for that reason.
The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was
immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance.
Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an administrative escape in the form of permitting the
release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the
Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña–officials
named in the ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the
stipulated fine. That none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the fairness
and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by
clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the
apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to
move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only
to prevent the transgress or from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of
the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized
vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The
owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.
In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the elements of fairness
and reasonableness.
Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process?
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under
our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due
process. Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a
crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer
for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies,
and the abatement of nuisance per se.32 Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto.33
The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of others similarly
situated) was of the same character as the aforecited established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As
already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the
transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due
process, forgiving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally
satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure
a compliance with the guaranty of due process.
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance
against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.
Finally, Legaspi’s position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in the Astillero case declaring Ordinance No.
1664 unconstitutional bound the City of Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals from being decided
differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends too much importance to an irrelevant decision
of the RTC–irrelevant, because the connection between that case to these cases was not at all shown. For another,
he ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals
in these cases being already pending in the CA. Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should have
anticipated that in the regular course of proceedings the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before
the CA would ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such anticipation should have
made it refrain from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its
position in the "interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation," should have exercised a
"becoming modesty" on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the Constitution required the
148
majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting en bane to determine.34 Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned
that any declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on the parties, but that a declaration
of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding on all. 35
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t10ns for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When a party challeges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests upon him.
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition2 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Manila Memorial Park,
Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial
services, against public respondents Secretaries of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and
the Department of Finance (DOF).
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432, 3 as amended by RA 9257,4 and
the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments
to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the following privileges:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services,
hotels and similar lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere
in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert
halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;
c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable income does not
exceed the property level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year;
d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;
e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in the country, subject to guidelines to
be issued by the Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System;
f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits and privileges given by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed
by those in actual service.
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) and 4
of RR No. 02-94 provide:
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. – For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax Credit – refers to the amount representing the 20%
discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by all establishments relative to their utilization of transportation services,
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters, cinema houses,
concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be
deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for
value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes. x x x x Sec. 4. RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING REQUIREMENTS
FOR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. – Private establishments, i.e., transport services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, recreation centers, drugstores, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture[,] leisure and amusement, giving 20% discounts to qualified senior
citizens are required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to senior citizens, which shall include
the name, identification number, gross sales/receipts, discounts, dates of transactions and invoice number for every
transaction. The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from the gross income for income tax purposes and from
gross sales of the business enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other percentage taxes.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,5 the Court declared Sections 2(i) and 4 of
RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because these contravene RA 7432,6 thus:
RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they grant. In turn,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide the procedures for its availment. To deny
such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the regulations carrying out that mandate, is indefensible. First,
the definition given by petitioner is erroneous. It refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20 percent
discount that "shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and
from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes." In ordinary business language, the tax
credit represents the amount of such discount. However, the manner by which the discount shall be credited against
taxes has not been clarified by the revenue regulations. By ordinary acceptation, a discount is an "abatement or
reduction made from the gross amount or value of anything." To be more precise, it is in business parlance "a
deduction or lowering of an amount of money;" or "a reduction from the full amount or value of something, especially
a price." In business there are many kinds of discount, the most common of which is that affecting the income
statement or financial report upon which the income tax is based.
xxxx
Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as the 20 percent discount deductible
from gross income for income tax purposes, or from gross sales for VAT or other percentage tax purposes. In effect,
the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount. This contrived definition is improper, considering
that the latter has to be deducted from gross sales in order to compute the gross income in the income statement
and cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax. When the law says that the cost of
the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount — when claimed — shall be treated as a
reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple. The option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the
existence of a tax liability, but to limit the benefit to a sales discount — which is not even identical to the discount
privilege that is granted by law — does not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The definition must, therefore,
be stricken down.
Laws Not Amended by Regulations
Second, the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates to create a rule out of
harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;" it cannot prevail. It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and should respect
the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it x x
x." In the scheme of judicial tax administration, the need for certainty and predictability in the implementation of tax
laws is crucial. Our tax authorities fill in the details that "Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide." The regulations these authorities issue are relied upon by taxpayers, who are certain that these will be
followed by the courts. Courts, however, will not uphold these authorities’ interpretations when clearly absurd,
erroneous or improper. In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of
RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. Their interpretation has muddled x x x the intent of
Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount. The administrative agency issuing these
regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional
requirements not contemplated by the legislature.
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In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A "regulation adopted pursuant to law is law." Conversely, a regulation or
any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law.7
On February 26, 2004, RA 92578 amended certain provisions of RA 7432, to wit:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the
death of senior citizens;
xxxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost
of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended.
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006, the pertinent provision
of which provides:
SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS AS DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME.
– Establishments enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales discounts to senior citizens on the sale
of goods and/or services specified thereunder are entitled to deduct the said discount from gross income subject to
the following conditions:
(1) Only that portion of the gross sales EXCLUSIVELY USED, CONSUMED OR ENJOYED BY THE SENIOR
CITIZEN shall be eligible for the deductible sales discount.
(2) The gross selling price and the sales discount MUST BE SEPARATELY INDICATED IN THE OFFICIAL RECEIPT
OR SALES INVOICE issued by the establishment for the sale of goods or services to the senior citizen.
(3) Only the actual amount of the discount granted or a sales discount not exceeding 20% of the gross selling price
can be deducted from the gross income, net of value added tax, if applicable, for income tax purposes, and from
gross sales or gross receipts of the business enterprise concerned, for VAT or other percentage tax purposes.
(4) The discount can only be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted.
(5) The business establishment giving sales discounts to qualified senior citizens is required to keep separate and
accurate record[s] of sales, which shall include the name of the senior citizen, TIN, OSCA ID, gross sales/receipts,
sales discount granted, [date] of [transaction] and invoice number for every sale transaction to senior citizen.
(6) Only the following business establishments which granted sales discount to senior citizens on their sale of goods
and/or services may claim the said discount granted as deduction from gross income, namely:
xxxx
(i) Funeral parlors and similar establishments – The beneficiary or any person who shall shoulder the funeral and
burial expenses of the deceased senior citizen shall claim the discount, such as casket, embalmment, cremation cost
and other related services for the senior citizen upon payment and presentation of [his] death certificate.
The DSWD likewise issued its own Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9257, to wit:
RULE VI DISCOUNTS AS TAX DEDUCTION OF ESTABLISHMENTS
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. – The establishment may claim the discounts granted under Rule V,
Section 4 – Discounts for Establishments, Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities and Sections
10 and 11 – Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered.
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year
that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance (DOF).
Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the present recourse, praying that Section 4 of RA
7432, as amended by RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF be
declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior
citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax
credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.
B.
WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR
CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.9
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing
the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.10
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides
that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."11
In support of their position, petitioners cite Central Luzon Drug Corporation,12 where it was ruled that the 20% discount
privilege constitutes taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just compensation,13 and
Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,14 where it was acknowledged that
the tax deduction scheme does not meet the definition of just compensation.15
Petitioners likewise seek a reversal of the ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 16 that the tax deduction scheme
adopted by the government is justified by police power.17
They assert that "[a]lthough both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their
object, there are still traditional distinctions between the two"18 and that "eminent domain cannot be made less
supreme than police power."19
Petitioners further claim that the legislature, in amending RA 7432, relied on an erroneous contemporaneous
construction that prior payment of taxes is required for tax credit.20
Petitioners also contend that the tax deduction scheme violates Article XV, Section 421 and Article XIII, Section 1122of
the Constitution because it shifts the State’s constitutional mandate or duty of improving the welfare of the elderly to
the private sector.23
Under the tax deduction scheme, the private sector shoulders 65% of the discount because only 35%24 of it is actually
returned by the government.25
Consequently, the implementation of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under Section 4 of RA 9257 affects the
businesses of petitioners.26
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Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy of transcendental importance which deserves judicious disposition
on the merits by the highest court of the land.27
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, question the filing of the instant Petition directly with the Supreme Court as this
disregards the hierarchy of courts.28
They likewise assert that there is no justiciable controversy as petitioners failed to prove that the tax deduction
treatment is not a "fair and full equivalent of the loss sustained" by them.29
As to the constitutionality of RA 9257 and its implementing rules and regulations, respondents contend that petitioners
failed to overturn its presumption of constitutionality.30
More important, respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police
power.31
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
There exists an actual case or controversy.
We shall first resolve the procedural issue. When the constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review may be
availed of only if the following requisites concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence
of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the [question of constitutionality]; (3) recourse to
judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the [question of constitutionality] is the lis mota of the
case."32
In this case, petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme provided in RA 9257 and
the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF. Respondents, however, oppose the
Petition on the ground that there is no actual case or controversy. We do not agree with respondents. An actual case
or controversy exists when there is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution."33
The Petition must therefore show that "the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it."34
In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot
be denied that there exists an actual case or controversy.
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as an exercise of
police power of the State, has already been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
Petitioners posit that the resolution of this case lies in the determination of whether the legally mandated 20% senior
citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent domain. If it is police power, no just compensation is
warranted. But if it is eminent domain, the tax deduction scheme is unconstitutional because it is not a peso for peso
reimbursement of the 20% discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it constitutes taking of private property without
payment of just compensation. At the outset, we note that this question has been settled in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation.35
In that case, we ruled:
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.
Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide
a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. Examining petitioners’ arguments, it is
apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a
reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the
afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege
accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is
subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is
allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is
due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a
fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income
of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the
gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total
revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation
is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet
the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the
health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to
maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority given to senior
citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides: SEC. 2. Republic Act
No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. — Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the
duty of the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social security for them.
In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides: "The State shall provide
social justice in all phases of national development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt
an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with these constitutional principles the
following are the declared policies of this Act:
………
(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to
actively seek their partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental
services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of
medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
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to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea
of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis
for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Given these, it is incorrect
for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been
able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. In treating
the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion,
for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as only P0.32
will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction. To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug
cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc
from the distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount
to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to
a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be
refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will be
reimbursed to the drugstores. Petitioners’ computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that
the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before
deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per
transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners' sales,
expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their
income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a
loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their
customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount
of the discount.
Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines
given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the
mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this
decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply
because they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition. The Court is not
oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the
exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property
rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for
the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of
contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as x x x reminder[s] that the right to property can be relinquished
upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens
program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This
being the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the
purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A.
No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to
petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.36 (Bold in the original; underline supplied)
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of
the State.
No compelling reason has been proffered to overturn, modify or abandon the ruling in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation.
Petitioners argue that we have previously ruled in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 37 that the 20% discount is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain, thus, requiring the payment of just compensation. They urge us to re-
examine our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation38 which allegedly reversed the ruling in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation.39
They also point out that Carlos Superdrug Corporation40 recognized that the tax deduction scheme under the assailed
law does not provide for sufficient just compensation. We agree with petitioners’ observation that there are statements
in Central Luzon Drug Corporation41 describing the 20% discount as an exercise of the power of eminent domain,
viz.:
[T]he privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private
establishments concerned. Accordingly, the tax credit benefit granted to these establishments can be deemed as
their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The concept of public use is no longer
confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
welfare, and public convenience. The discount privilege to which our senior citizens are entitled is actually a benefit
enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers
and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The permanent
reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. As a result of the 20 percent discount imposed by RA 7432, respondent becomes entitled to a just
compensation. This term refers not only to the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the correct amount of the
discounts given, but also to the promptness in its release. Equivalent to the payment of property taken by the State,
such issuance — when not done within a reasonable time from the grant of the discounts — cannot be considered
as just compensation. In effect, respondent is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of its
revenues while awaiting actual receipt, through the certificate, of the equivalent amount it needs to cope with the
reduction in its revenues. Besides, the taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. Tax measures are but "enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions" and "clearly
imposed for a public purpose." In recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most effective tool to realize
social justice, public welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth. While it is a declared commitment under Section
1 of RA 7432, social justice "cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution
and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take
away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto." For this reason, a just compensation
for income that is taken away from respondent becomes necessary. It is in the tax credit that our legislators find
support to realize social justice, and no administrative body can alter that fact. To put it differently, a private
establishment that merely breaks even — without the discounts yet — will surely start to incur losses because of
such discounts. The same effect is expected if its mark-up is less than 20 percent, and if all its sales come from retail
purchases by senior citizens. Aside from the observation we have already raised earlier, it will also be grossly unfair
to an establishment if the discounts will be treated merely as deductions from either its gross income or its gross
sales. Operating at a loss through no fault of its own, it will realize that the tax credit limitation under RR 2-94 is
inutile, if not improper. Worse, profit-generating businesses will be put in a better position if they avail themselves of
tax credits denied those that are losing, because no taxes are due from the latter. 42 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
The above was partly incorporated in our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation43 when we stated preliminarily that—
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.
Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide
152
a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. Examining petitioners’ arguments, it is
apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a
reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the
afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege
accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is
subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is
allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is
due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a
fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income
of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the
gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total
revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation
is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet
the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the
health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so.44
This, notwithstanding, we went on to rule in Carlos Superdrug Corporation45 that the 20% discount and tax deduction
scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The present case, thus, affords an opportunity for us to
clarify the above-quoted statements in Central Luzon Drug Corporation46 and Carlos Superdrug Corporation.47
First, we note that the above-quoted disquisition on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation48 is obiter
dicta and, thus, not binding precedent. As stated earlier, in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,49 we ruled that the BIR
acted ultra vires when it effectively treated the 20% discount as a tax deduction, under Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No.
2-94, despite the clear wording of the previous law that the same should be treated as a tax credit. We were, therefore,
not confronted in that case with the issue as to whether the 20% discount is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain. Second, although we adverted to Central Luzon Drug Corporation 50 in our ruling in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation,51 this referred only to preliminary matters. A fair reading of Carlos Superdrug Corporation52 would show
that we categorically ruled therein that the 20% discount is a valid exercise of police power. Thus, even if the current
law, through its tax deduction scheme (which abandoned the tax credit scheme under the previous law), does not
provide for a peso for peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given by private establishments, no constitutional
infirmity obtains because, being a valid exercise of police power, payment of just compensation is not warranted. We
have carefully reviewed the basis of our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation53 and we find no cogent reason to
overturn, modify or abandon it. We also note that petitioners’ arguments are a mere reiteration of those raised and
resolved in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.54 Thus, we sustain Carlos Superdrug Corporation.55
Nonetheless, we deem it proper, in what follows, to amplify our explanation in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 56 as to
why the 20% discount is a valid exercise of police power and why it may not, under the specific circumstances of this
case, be considered as an exercise of the power of eminent domain contrary to the obiter in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation.57
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property for public
welfare.58
The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.59
In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method
of accomplishing the goal.60
Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government."61
The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary."62
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property for
public use.63
The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the
payment of just compensation.64
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, a property
right is impaired by regulation,65 or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted66 to promote public
welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required.
Examples of these regulations are property condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a
building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in the
interest of public morals)67 as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the
health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory into residential and industrial areas).68
It has, thus, been observed that, in the exercise of police power (as distinguished from eminent domain), although
the regulation affects the right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated
for use by or for the benefit of the public.69
On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied
to some public purpose which necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and
possession of the property are transferred to the expropriating authority. Examples include the acquisition of lands
for the construction of public highways as well as agricultural lands acquired by the government under the agrarian
reform law for redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of title
or total destruction of the property is not essential for "taking" under the power of eminent domain to be present.70
Examples of these include establishment of easements such as where the land owner is perpetually deprived of his
proprietary rights because of the hazards posed by electric transmission lines constructed above his property 71 or
the compelled interconnection of the telephone system between the government and a private company.72
In these cases, although the private property owner is not divested of ownership or possession, payment of just
compensation is warranted because of the burden placed on the property for the use or benefit of the public.
The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.
It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain. The very nature of police power as elastic and responsive to various social conditions 73 as well as
the evolving meaning and scope of public use74 and just compensation75 in eminent domain evinces that these are
not static concepts. Because of the exigencies of rapidly changing times, Congress may be compelled to adopt or
experiment with different measures to promote the general welfare which may not fall squarely within the traditionally
recognized categories of police power and eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature
and effects of the challenged governmental act and decide, on the basis thereof, whether the act is the exercise of
police power or eminent domain. Thus, we now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if it
constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of
senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities,
and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount
serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral
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part of this law. As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which
the Constitution affords preferential concern.76
In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive from senior
citizens. In other words, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment. However, it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or
conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter,
but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross sales
that such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens. The subject regulation may be said to be similar
to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are
traditionally regarded as police power measures.77
These laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect
consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return
on investment of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they
provide to the general public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to
all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to
the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory
measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject
regulation is a police power measure. The obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 78 however, describes the 20%
discount as an exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous law, equivalent to the
amount of discount given as the just compensation therefor. The reason is that (1) the discount would have formed
part of the gross sales of the establishment were it not for the law prescribing the 20% discount, and (2) the permanent
reduction in total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit.
The flaw in this reasoning is in its premise. It presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing and,
hence, the profitability of a private establishment, automatically amounts to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. If this were so, then all price and rate of return on investment control laws would have to be invalidated
because they impact, at some level, the regulated establishment’s profits or income/gross sales, yet there is no
provision for payment of just compensation. It would also mean that overnment cannot set price or rate of return on
investment limits, which reduce the profits or income/gross sales of private establishments, if no just compensation
is paid even if the measure is not confiscatory. The obiter is, thus, at odds with the settled octrine that the State can
employ police power measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence, the profitability of business
establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the common good, provided that the regulation does
not go too far as to amount to "taking."79
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,80 we recognized that— x x x a taking also could be found if government regulation of
the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. No formula or rule can be devised to answer the
questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was
"a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as
well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering
the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public
action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should
remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.81
The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the one under consideration, must, thus, be determined on a case-to-
case basis. Whether that line between permissible regulation under police power and "taking" under eminent domain
has been crossed must, under the specific circumstances of this case, be subject to proof and the one assailing the
constitutionality of the regulation carries the heavy burden of proving that the measure is unreasonable, oppressive
or confiscatory. The time-honored rule is that the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a law rests upon the
one assailing it and "the burden becomes heavier when police power is at issue."82
The 20% senior citizen discount has not been shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.
In Alalayan v. National Power Corporation,83 petitioners, who were franchise holders of electric plants, challenged
the validity of a law limiting their allowable net profits to no more than 12% per annum of their investments plus two-
month operating expenses. In rejecting their plea, we ruled that, in an earlier case, it was found that 12% is a
reasonable rate of return and that petitioners failed to prove that the aforesaid rate is confiscatory in view of the
presumption of constitutionality.84
We adopted a similar line of reasoning in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 85 when we ruled that petitioners therein
failed to prove that the 20% discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a
financial report, to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was presented in
order to show that they would be operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or that the continued implementation
of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of petitioners. In the case at bar,
petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar to what the
petitioners in Carlos Superdrug Corporation86 did. Petitioners went directly to this Court without first establishing the
factual bases of their claims. Hence, the present recourse must, likewise, fail. Because all laws enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality, courts will uphold a law’s validity if any set of facts may be conceived to sustain it.87
On its face, we find that there are at least two conceivable bases to sustain the subject regulation’s validity absent
clear and convincing proof that it is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately
concluded that business establishments have the capacity to absorb a decrease in profits or income/gross sales due
to the 20% discount without substantially affecting the reasonable rate of return on their investments considering (1)
not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens and (2) the level of its profit margins on goods and
services offered to the general public. Concurrently, Congress may have, likewise, legitimately concluded that the
establishments, which will be required to extend the 20% discount, have the capacity to revise their pricing strategy
so that whatever reduction in profits or income/gross sales that they may sustain because of sales to senior citizens,
can be recouped through higher mark-ups or from other products not subject of discounts. As a result, the discounts
resulting from sales to senior citizens will not be confiscatory or unduly oppressive. In sum, we sustain our ruling in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation88 that the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises
of police power of the State absent a clear showing that it is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.
Conclusion
In closing, we note that petitioners hypothesize, consistent with our previous ratiocinations, that the discount will force
establishments to raise their prices in order to compensate for its impact on overall profits or income/gross sales.
The general public, or those not belonging to the senior citizen class, are, thus, made to effectively shoulder the
subsidy for senior citizens. This, in petitioners’ view, is unfair.
As already mentioned, Congress may be reasonably assumed to have foreseen this eventuality. But, more
importantly, this goes into the wisdom, efficacy and expediency of the subject law which is not proper for judicial
review. In a way, this law pursues its social equity objective in a non-traditional manner unlike past and existing direct
subsidy programs of the government for the poor and marginalized sectors of our society. Verily, Congress must be
given sufficient leeway in formulating welfare legislations given the enormous challenges that the government faces
relative to, among others, resource adequacy and administrative capability in implementing social reform measures
which aim to protect and uphold the interests of those most vulnerable in our society. In the process, the individual,
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who enjoys the rights, benefits and privileges of living in a democratic polity, must bear his share in supporting
measures intended for the common good. This is only fair. In fine, without the requisite showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, the validity of the assailed law must be sustained.
Refutation of the Dissent
The main points of Justice Carpio’s Dissent may be summarized as follows: (1) the discussion on eminent domain in
Central Luzon Drug Corporation89 is not obiter dicta ; (2) allowable taking, in police power, is limited to property that
is destroyed or placed outside the commerce of man for public welfare; (3) the amount of mandatory discount is
private property within the ambit of Article III, Section 990 of the Constitution; and (4) the permanent reduction in a
private establishment’s total revenue, arising from the mandatory discount, is a taking of private property for public
use or benefit, hence, an exercise of the power of eminent domain requiring the payment of just compensation. I We
maintain that the discussion on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 91 is obiter dicta. As previously
discussed, in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,92 the BIR, pursuant to Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94, treated the
senior citizen discount in the previous law, RA 7432, as a tax deduction instead of a tax credit despite the clear
provision in that law which stated –
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
a) The grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services,
hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere
in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit; (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court ruled that the subject revenue regulation violated the law, viz:
The 20 percent discount required by the law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not merely a tax deduction
from the gross income or gross sale of the establishment concerned. A tax credit is used by a private establishment
only after the tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before the tax is computed. RA 7432 unconditionally grants
a tax credit to all covered entities. Thus, the provisions of the revenue regulation that withdraw or modify such grant
are void. Basic is the rule that administrative regulations cannot amend or revoke the law. 93
As can be readily seen, the discussion on eminent domain was not necessary in order to arrive at this conclusion.
All that was needed was to point out that the revenue regulation contravened the law which it sought to implement.
And, precisely, this was done in Central Luzon Drug Corporation94 by comparing the wording of the previous law vis-
à-vis the revenue regulation; employing the rules of statutory construction; and applying the settled principle that a
regulation cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. A close reading of Central Luzon Drug Corporation 95 would
show that the Court went on to state that the tax credit "can be deemed" as just compensation only to explain why
the previous law provides for a tax credit instead of a tax deduction. The Court surmised that the tax credit was a
form of just compensation given to the establishments covered by the 20% discount. However, the reason why the
previous law provided for a tax credit and not a tax deduction was not necessary to resolve the issue as to whether
the revenue regulation contravenes the law. Hence, the discussion on eminent domain is obiter dicta.
A court, in resolving cases before it, may look into the possible purposes or reasons that impelled the enactment of
a particular statute or legal provision. However, statements made relative thereto are not always necessary in
resolving the actual controversies presented before it. This was the case in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 96resulting
in that unfortunate statement that the tax credit "can be deemed" as just compensation. This, in turn, led to the
erroneous conclusion, by deductive reasoning, that the 20% discount is an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The Dissent essentially adopts this theory and reasoning which, as will be shown below, is contrary to settled
principles in police power and eminent domain analysis. II The Dissent discusses at length the doctrine on "taking"
in police power which occurs when private property is destroyed or placed outside the commerce of man. Indeed,
there is a whole class of police power measures which justify the destruction of private property in order to preserve
public health, morals, safety or welfare. As earlier mentioned, these would include a building on the verge of collapse
or confiscated obscene materials as well as those mentioned by the Dissent with regard to property used in violating
a criminal statute or one which constitutes a nuisance. In such cases, no compensation is required. However, it is
equally true that there is another class of police power measures which do not involve the destruction of private
property but merely regulate its use. The minimum wage law, zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating
the operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the like would fall under this category.
The examples cited by the Dissent, likewise, fall under this category: Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections 19 and
18 of the Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. These laws merely regulate or, to use the
term of the Dissent, burden the conduct of the affairs of business establishments. In such cases, payment of just
compensation is not required because they fall within the sphere of permissible police power measures. The senior
citizen discount law falls under this latter category. III The Dissent proceeds from the theory that the permanent
reduction of profits or income/gross sales, due to the 20% discount, is a "taking" of private property for public purpose
without payment of just compensation. At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioners never presented any
evidence to establish that they were forced to suffer enormous losses or operate at a loss due to the effects of the
assailed law. They came directly to this Court and provided a hypothetical computation of the loss they would
allegedly suffer due to the operation of the assailed law. The central premise of the Dissent’s argument that the 20%
discount results in a permanent reduction in profits or income/gross sales, or forces a business establishment to
operate at a loss is, thus, wholly unsupported by competent evidence. To be sure, the Court can invalidate a law
which, on its face, is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.97
But this is not the case here.
In the case at bar, evidence is indispensable before a determination of a constitutional violation can be made because
of the following reasons. First, the assailed law, by imposing the senior citizen discount, does not take any of the
properties used by a business establishment like, say, the land on which a manufacturing plant is constructed or the
equipment being used to produce goods or services. Second, rather than taking specific properties of a business
establishment, the senior citizen discount law merely regulates the prices of the goods or services being sold to
senior citizens by mandating a 20% discount. Thus, if a product is sold at P10.00 to the general public, then it shall
be sold at P8.00 ( i.e., P10.00 less 20%) to senior citizens. Note that the law does not impose at what specific price
the product shall be sold, only that a 20% discount shall be given to senior citizens based on the price set by the
business establishment. A business establishment is, thus, free to adjust the prices of the goods or services it
provides to the general public. Accordingly, it can increase the price of the above product to P20.00 but is required
to sell it at P16.00 (i.e. , P20.00 less 20%) to senior citizens. Third, because the law impacts the prices of the goods
or services of a particular establishment relative to its sales to senior citizens, its profits or income/gross sales are
affected. The extent of the impact would, however, depend on the profit margin of the business establishment on a
particular good or service. If a product costs P5.00 to produce and is sold at P10.00, then the profit98 is P5.0099 or a
profit margin100 of 50%.101
Under the assailed law, the aforesaid product would have to be sold at P8.00 to senior citizens yet the business
would still earn P3.00102 or a 30%103 profit margin. On the other hand, if the product costs P9.00 to produce and is
required to be sold at P8.00 to senior citizens, then the business would experience a loss of P1.00.104
But note that since not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens, the business establishment
may continue to earn P1.00 from non-senior citizens which, in turn, can offset any loss arising from sales to senior
citizens.
Fourth, when the law imposes the 20% discount in favor of senior citizens, it does not prevent the business
establishment from revising its pricing strategy.
By revising its pricing strategy, a business establishment can recoup any reduction of profits or income/gross sales
which would otherwise arise from the giving of the 20% discount. To illustrate, suppose A has two customers: X, a
senior citizen, and Y, a non-senior citizen. Prior to the law, A sells his products at P10.00 a piece to X and Y resulting
in income/gross sales of P20.00 (P10.00 + P10.00). With the passage of the law, A must now sell his product to X
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at P8.00 (i.e., P10.00 less 20%) so that his income/gross sales would be P18.00 (P8.00 + P10.00) or lower by P2.00.
To prevent this from happening, A decides to increase the price of his products to P11.11 per piece. Thus, he sells
his product to X at P8.89 (i.e. , P11.11 less 20%) and to Y at P11.11. As a result, his income/gross sales would still
be P20.00105 (P8.89 + P11.11). The capacity, then, of business establishments to revise their pricing strategy makes
it possible for them not to suffer any reduction in profits or income/gross sales, or, in the alternative, mitigate the
reduction of their profits or income/gross sales even after the passage of the law. In other words, business
establishments have the capacity to adjust their prices so that they may remain profitable even under the operation
of the assailed law.
The Dissent, however, states that – The explanation by the majority that private establishments can always increase
their prices to recover the mandatory discount will only encourage private establishments to adjust their prices
upwards to the prejudice of customers who do not enjoy the 20% discount. It was likewise suggested that if a
company increases its prices, despite the application of the 20% discount, the establishment becomes more
profitable than it was before the implementation of R.A. 7432. Such an economic justification is self-defeating, for
more consumers will suffer from the price increase than will benefit from the 20% discount. Even then, such ability
to increase prices cannot legally validate a violation of the eminent domain clause.106
But, if it is possible that the business establishment, by adjusting its prices, will suffer no reduction in its profits or
income/gross sales (or suffer some reduction but continue to operate profitably) despite giving the discount, what
would be the basis to strike down the law? If it is possible that the business establishment, by adjusting its prices,
will not be unduly burdened, how can there be a finding that the assailed law is an unconstitutional exercise of police
power or eminent domain? That there may be a burden placed on business establishments or the consuming public
as a result of the operation of the assailed law is not, by itself, a ground to declare it unconstitutional for this goes
into the wisdom and expediency of the law.
The cost of most, if not all, regulatory measures of the government on business establishments is ultimately passed
on to the consumers but that, by itself, does not justify the wholesale nullification of these measures. It is a basic
postulate of our democratic system of government that the Constitution is a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.107
All persons may be burdened by regulatory measures intended for the common good or to serve some important
governmental interest, such as protecting or improving the welfare of a special class of people for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern. Indubitably, the one assailing the law has the heavy burden of proving that
the regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory, or has gone "too far" as to amount to a "taking." Yet, here,
the Dissent would have this Court nullify the law without any proof of such nature.
Further, this Court is not the proper forum to debate the economic theories or realities that impelled Congress to shift
from the tax credit to the tax deduction scheme. It is not within our power or competence to judge which scheme is
more or less burdensome to business establishments or the consuming public and, thereafter, to choose which
scheme the State should use or pursue. The shift from the tax credit to tax deduction scheme is a policy determination
by Congress and the Court will respect it for as long as there is no showing, as here, that the subject regulation has
transgressed constitutional limitations. Unavoidably, the lack of evidence constrains the Dissent to rely on speculative
and hypothetical argumentation when it states that the 20% discount is a significant amount and not a minimal loss
(which erroneously assumes that the discount automatically results in a loss when it is possible that the profit margin
is greater than 20% and/or the pricing strategy can be revised to prevent or mitigate any reduction in profits or
income/gross sales as illustrated above),108 and not all private establishments make a 20% profit margin (which
conversely implies that there are those who make more and, thus, would not be greatly affected by this regulation).109
In fine, because of the possible scenarios discussed above, we cannot assume that the 20% discount results in a
permanent reduction in profits or income/gross sales, much less that business establishments are forced to operate
at a loss under the assailed law. And, even if we gratuitously assume that the 20% discount results in some degree
of reduction in profits or income/gross sales, we cannot assume that such reduction is arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory. To repeat, there is no actual proof to back up this claim, and it could be that the loss suffered by a
business establishment was occasioned through its fault or negligence in not adapting to the effects of the assailed
law. The law uniformly applies to all business establishments covered thereunder. There is, therefore, no unjust
discrimination as the aforesaid business establishments are faced with the same constraints. The necessity of proof
is all the more pertinent in this case because, as similarly observed by Justice Velasco in his Concurring Opinion,
the law has been in operation for over nine years now. However, the grim picture painted by petitioners on the
unconscionable losses to be indiscriminately suffered by business establishments, which should have led to the
closure of numerous business establishments, has not come to pass. Verily, we cannot invalidate the assailed law
based on assumptions and conjectures. Without adequate proof, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail. IV
At this juncture, we note that the Dissent modified its original arguments by including a new paragraph, to wit:
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution speaks of private property without any distinction. It does not state that
there should be profit before the taking of property is subject to just compensation. The private property referred to
for purposes of taking could be inherited, donated, purchased, mortgaged, or as in this case, part of the gross sales
of private establishments. They are all private property and any taking should be attended by corresponding payment
of just compensation. The 20% discount granted to senior citizens belong to private establishments, whether these
establishments make a profit or suffer a loss. In fact, the 20% discount applies to non-profit establishments like
country, social, or golf clubs which are open to the public and not only for exclusive membership. The issue of profit
or loss to the establishments is immaterial.110
Two things may be said of this argument. First, it contradicts the rest of the arguments of the Dissent. After it states
that the issue of profit or loss is immaterial, the Dissent proceeds to argue that the 20% discount is not a minimal
loss111 and that the 20% discount forces business establishments to operate at a loss.112
Even the obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,113 which the Dissent essentially adopts and relies on, is premised
on the permanent reduction of total revenues and the loss that business establishments will be forced to suffer in
arguing that the 20% discount constitutes a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. Thus, when the Dissent
now argues that the issue of profit or loss is immaterial, it contradicts itself because it later argues, in order to justify
that there is a "taking" under the power of eminent domain in this case, that the 20% discount forces business
establishments to suffer a significant loss or to operate at a loss. Second, this argument suffers from the same flaw
as the Dissent's original arguments. It is an erroneous characterization of the 20% discount. According to the Dissent,
the 20% discount is part of the gross sales and, hence, private property belonging to business establishments.
However, as previously discussed, the 20% discount is not private property actually owned and/or used by the
business establishment. It should be distinguished from properties like lands or buildings actually used in the
operation of a business establishment which, if appropriated for public use, would amount to a "taking" under the
power of eminent domain. Instead, the 20% discount is a regulatory measure which impacts the pricing and, hence,
the profitability of business establishments. At the time the discount is imposed, no particular property of the business
establishment can be said to be "taken." That is, the State does not acquire or take anything from the business
establishment in the way that it takes a piece of private land to build a public road. While the 20% discount may form
part of the potential profits or income/gross sales114 of the business establishment, as similarly characterized by
Justice Bersamin in his Concurring Opinion, potential profits or income/gross sales are not private property,
specifically cash or money, already belonging to the business establishment. They are a mere expectancy because
they are potential fruits of the successful conduct of the business. Prior to the sale of goods or services, a business
establishment may be subject to State regulations, such as the 20% senior citizen discount, which may impact the
level or amount of profits or income/gross sales that can be generated by such establishment. For this reason, the
validity of the discount is to be determined based on its overall effects on the operations of the business
establishment.
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Again, as previously discussed, the 20% discount does not automatically result in a 20% reduction in profits, or, to
align it with the term used by the Dissent, the 20% discount does not mean that a 20% reduction in gross sales
necessarily results. Because (1) the profit margin of a product is not necessarily less than 20%, (2) not all customers
of a business establishment are senior citizens, and (3) the establishment may revise its pricing strategy, such
reduction in profits or income/gross sales may be prevented or, in the alternative, mitigated so that the business
establishment continues to operate profitably. Thus, even if we gratuitously assume that some degree of reduction
in profits or income/gross sales occurs because of the 20% discount, it does not follow that the regulation is
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory because the business establishment may make the necessary adjustments
to continue to operate profitably. No evidence was presented by petitioners to show otherwise. In fact, no evidence
was presented by petitioners at all. Justice Leonen, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, characterizes "profits"
(or income/gross sales) as an inchoate right. Another way to view it, as stated by Justice Velasco in his Concurring
Opinion, is that the business establishment merely has a right to profits. The Constitution adverts to it as the right of
an enterprise to a reasonable return on investment.115
Undeniably, this right, like any other right, may be regulated under the police power of the State to achieve important
governmental objectives like protecting the interests and improving the welfare of senior citizens. It should be noted
though that potential profits or income/gross sales are relevant in police power and eminent domain analyses
because they may, in appropriate cases, serve as an indicia when a regulation has gone "too far" as to amount to a
"taking" under the power of eminent domain. When the deprivation or reduction of profits or income/gross sales is
shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory, then the challenged governmental regulation may be nullified
for being a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. In such a case, it is not profits or income/gross sales which
are actually taken and appropriated for public use. Rather, when the regulation causes an establishment to incur
losses in an unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory manner, what is actually taken is capital and the right of the
business establishment to a reasonable return on investment. If the business losses are not halted because of the
continued operation of the regulation, this eventually leads to the destruction of the business and the total loss of the
capital invested therein. But, again, petitioners in this case failed to prove that the subject regulation is unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory.
V.
The Dissent further argues that we erroneously used price and rate of return on investment control laws to justify the
senior citizen discount law. According to the Dissent, only profits from industries imbued with public interest may be
regulated because this is a condition of their franchises. Profits of establishments without franchises cannot be
regulated permanently because there is no law regulating their profits. The Dissent concludes that the permanent
reduction of total revenues or gross sales of business establishments without franchises is a taking of private property
under the power of eminent domain. In making this argument, it is unfortunate that the Dissent quotes only a portion
of the ponencia – The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. These
laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect
consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return
on investment of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they
provide to the general public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to
all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. x x x116
The above paragraph, in full, states –
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of
return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. These laws generally
regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers from
exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on investment
of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the
general public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments
from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of
a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens.
Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as
belonging to the category of price regulatory measures which affects the profitability of establishments subjected
thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The point of this paragraph is to simply show that the State has, in the past, regulated prices and profits of business
establishments. In other words, this type of regulatory measures is traditionally recognized as police power measures
so that the senior citizen discount may be considered as a police power measure as well. What is more, the
substantial distinctions between price and rate of return on investment control laws vis-à-vis the senior citizen
discount law provide greater reason to uphold the validity of the senior citizen discount law. As previously discussed,
the ability to adjust prices allows the establishment subject to the senior citizen discount to prevent or mitigate any
reduction of profits or income/gross sales arising from the giving of the discount. In contrast, establishments subject
to price and rate of return on investment control laws cannot adjust prices accordingly. Certainly, there is no intention
to say that price and rate of return on investment control laws are the justification for the senior citizen discount law.
Not at all. The justification for the senior citizen discount law is the plenary powers of Congress. The legislative power
to regulate business establishments is broad and covers a wide array of areas and subjects. It is well within Congress’
legislative powers to regulate the profits or income/gross sales of industries and enterprises, even those without
franchises. For what are franchises but mere legislative enactments? There is nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits Congress from regulating the profits or income/gross sales of industries and enterprises without franchises.
On the contrary, the social justice provisions of the Constitution enjoin the State to regulate the "acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition" of property and its increments.117
This may cover the regulation of profits or income/gross sales of all businesses, without qualification, to attain the
objective of diffusing wealth in order to protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity.118
Thus, under the social justice policy of the Constitution, business establishments may be compelled to contribute to
uplifting the plight of vulnerable or marginalized groups in our society provided that the regulation is not arbitrary,
oppressive or confiscatory, or is not in breach of some specific constitutional limitation. When the Dissent, therefore,
states that the "profits of private establishments which are non-franchisees cannot be regulated permanently, and
there is no such law regulating their profits permanently,"119 it is assuming what it ought to prove. First, there are laws
which, in effect, permanently regulate profits or income/gross sales of establishments without franchises, and RA
9257 is one such law. And, second, Congress can regulate such profits or income/gross sales because, as previously
noted, there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent it from doing so. Here, again, it must be emphasized that
petitioners failed to present any proof to show that the effects of the assailed law on their operations has been
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. The permanent regulation of profits or income/gross sales of business
establishments, even those without franchises, is not as uncommon as the Dissent depicts it to be. For instance, the
minimum wage law allows the State to set the minimum wage of employees in a given region or geographical area.
Because of the added labor costs arising from the minimum wage, a permanent reduction of profits or income/gross
sales would result, assuming that the employer does not increase the prices of his goods or services. To illustrate,
suppose it costs a company P5.00 to produce a product and it sells the same at P10.00 with a 50% profit margin.
Later, the State increases the minimum wage. As a result, the company incurs greater labor costs so that it now
costs P7.00 to produce the same product. The profit per product of the company would be reduced to P3.00 with a
profit margin of 30%. The net effect would be the same as in the earlier example of granting a 20% senior citizen
discount. As can be seen, the minimum wage law could, likewise, lead to a permanent reduction of profits. Does this
157
mean that the minimum wage law should, likewise, be declared unconstitutional on the mere plea that it results in a and should not be summarily invalidated on a mere allegation that it reduces the profits or income/gross sales of
permanent reduction of profits? Taking it a step further, suppose the company decides to increase the price of its business establishments.
product in order to offset the effects of the increase in labor cost; does this mean that the minimum wage law, following WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the reasoning of the Dissent, is unconstitutional because the consuming public is effectively made to subsidize the SO ORDERED.
wage of a group of laborers, i.e., minimum wage earners? The same reasoning can be adopted relative to the APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO G.R. No. 164195
examples cited by the Dissent which, according to it, are valid police power regulations. Article 157 of the Labor PLANTATION, INC.,
Code, Sections 19 and 18 of the Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law would effectively Petitioners, Present:
increase the labor cost of a business establishment. This would, in turn, be integrated as part of the cost of its goods
or services. Again, if the establishment does not increase its prices, the net effect would be a permanent reduction CORONA, C.J.,
in its profits or income/gross sales. Following the reasoning of the Dissent that "any form of permanent taking of *CARPIO,
private property (including profits or income/gross sales)120 is an exercise of eminent domain that requires the State CARPIO MORALES,
to pay just compensation,"121 then these statutory provisions would, likewise, have to be declared unconstitutional. It VELASCO, JR.,
does not matter that these benefits are deemed part of the employees’ legislated wages because the net effect is the NACHURA,
same, that is, it leads to higher labor costs and a permanent reduction in the profits or income/gross sales of the - versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
business establishments.122 BRION,
The point then is this – most, if not all, regulatory measures imposed by the State on business establishments impact, * PERALTA,
at some level, the latter’s prices and/or profits or income/gross sales.123 BERSAMIN,
If the Court were to sustain the Dissent’s theory, then a wholesale nullification of such measures would inevitably DEL CASTILLO,
result. The police power of the State and the social justice provisions of the Constitution would, thus, be rendered * ABAD,
nugatory. There is nothing sacrosanct about profits or income/gross sales. This, we made clear in Carlos Superdrug VILLARAMA, JR.,
Corporation:124 PEREZ,
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MENDOZA, and
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the Respondent. SERENO, JJ.
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for Promulgated:
its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
xxxx October 12, 2010
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the business. While the Constitution protects property rights petitioners must the realities of business and the State, RESOLUTION
in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the percept for BRION, J.:
the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of
contracts and public utilities, continously serve as a reminder for the promotion of public good.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the We resolve the petitioners motion for reconsideration addressing our Resolution of December 4, 2009 whose
other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation dispositive portion directs:
of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without
sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the
would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain form quashing a legislative act.125 award of legal interest and attorneys fees), and reiterates the decision dated February 6, 2007 and the resolution
In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in determining whether the subject regulatory measure has amounted dated December 19, 2007 of the Third Division.
to a "taking" under the power of eminent domain is the one laid down in Alalayan v. National Power Corporation126 and
followed in Carlos Superdurg Corporation127 consistent with long standing principles in police power and eminent For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation of this Resolution, we hark back to the roots of this case.
domain analysis. Thus, the deprivation or reduction of profits or income. Gross sales must be clearly shown to be
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Under the specific circumstances of this case, such determination can Factual Antecedents
only be made upon the presentation of competent proof which petitioners failed to do. A law, which has been in
operation for many years and promotes the welfare of a group accorded special concern by the Constitution, cannot
158
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together also referred to as petitioners, were registered
owners of vast tracks of land; AFC owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308 hectares. On October 12,
1995, they voluntarily offered to sell these landholdings to the government via Voluntary Offer to Sell applications
filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation of their properties
from the DARs Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare,
AFCs land was valued at P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC
rejected these valuations for being very low.
In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in
AFCs bank account and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the petitioners then withdrew. The
titles over AFC and HPIs properties were thereafter cancelled, and new ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just compensation with the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB). When the DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more than three years, AFC and
HPI filed separate complaints for determination and payment of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tagum City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court. These complaints were subsequently consolidated.
On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing the just compensation for the petitioners
1,338.6027 hectares of land[1] at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at the prevailing market interest
rates, computed from the taking of the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus the amounts the
petitioners already received under the initial valuation. The RTC also awarded attorneys fees.
LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The RTC, in its order of December 5, 2001, modified its ruling
and fixed the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the complaint was filed until finality of the
decision. The Third Division of this Court, in its Decision of February 6, 2007, affirmed this RTC decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution of December 19, 2007, modifying its February
6, 2007 Decision by deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of the awarded just compensation. The Third
Division justified the deletion by the finding that the LBP did not delay the payment of just compensation as it had
deposited the pertinent amounts due to AFC and HPI within fourteen months after they filed their complaints for just
compensation with the RTC. The Court also considered that AFC had already collected approximately P149.6 million,
while HPI had already collected approximately P262 million from the LBP. The Third Division also deleted the award
of attorneys fees.
All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling. The Court uniformly denied all the motions in its April
30, 2008 Resolution. Entry of Judgment followed on May 16, 2008.
Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and HPI filed the following motions on May 28, 2008: (1) Motion for
Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration; (2) Second Motion for Reconsideration, with respect to
the denial of the award of legal interest and attorneys fees; and (3) Motion to Refer the Second Motion for
Reconsideration to the Honorable Court En Banc.
The Third Division found the motion to admit the Second Motion for Reconsideration and the motion to refer this
second motion to the Court En Banc meritorious, and accordingly referred the case to the Court En Banc. On
September 8, 2009, the Court En Banc accepted the referral.
The Court En Banc Resolution
On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a majority vote, denied the petitioners second motion for
reconsideration based on two considerations.
First, the grant of the second motion for reconsideration runs counter to the immutability of final decisions. Moreover,
the Court saw no reason to recognize the case as an exception to the immutability principle as the petitioners private
claim for the payment of interest does not qualify as either a substantial or transcendental matter or an issue of
paramount public interest.
Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover interest on the just compensation and attorneys fees
because they caused the delay in the payment of the just compensation due them; they erroneously filed their
complaints with the DARAB when they should have directly filed these with the RTC acting as an agrarian court.
Furthermore, the Court found it significant that the LBP deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners favor within
fourteen months after the petitions were filed with the RTC. Under these circumstances, the Court found no
unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the award of 12% interest.
The Chico-Nazario Dissent
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[2] the ponente of the original December 19, 2007 Resolution (deleting the 12%
interest), dissented from the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution.
On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice Chico-Nazario pointed out that under extraordinary circumstances,
this Court has recalled entries of judgment on the ground of substantial justice. Given the special circumstances
involved in the present case, the Court En Banc should have taken a second hard look at the petitioners positions in
their second motion for reconsideration, and acted to correct the clearly erroneous December 19, 2007 Resolution.
Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the obligation of the State, in the exercise of its inherent power of
eminent domain, to pay just compensation to the owner of the expropriated property. To be just, the compensation
must not only be the correct amount to be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time from the time the land
is taken from the owner. If not, the State must pay the landowner interest, by way of damages, from the time the
property was taken until just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a part of just compensation due, has
been established by prevailing jurisprudence to be 12% per annum.
On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the government deprived the petitioners of their property on
December 9, 1996, and paid the balance of the just compensation due them only on May 9, 2008. The delay of
almost twelve years earned the petitioners interest in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.
Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it fit to declare the computed interest to be totally due; she
found it unconscionable to apply the full force of the law on the LBP because of the magnitude of the amount due. She
thus reduced the awarded interest to P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of the computed interest.
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The Present Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion to reconsider the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution (the present Motion for
Reconsideration), the petitioners principally argue that: (a) the principle of immutability of judgment does not apply
since the Entry of Judgment was issued even before the lapse of fifteen days from the parties receipt of the April 30,
2008 Resolution and the petitioners timely filed their second motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from their
receipt of this resolution; (b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot be considered immutable considering the special
and compelling circumstances attendant to the present case which fall within the exceptions to the principle of
immutability of judgments; (c) the legal interest due is at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the taking of the
subject properties and this rate is not subject to reduction. The power of the courts to equitably reduce interest rates
applies solely to liquidated damages under a contract and not to interest set by the Honorable Court itself as due and
owing in just compensation cases; and (d) the Honorable Courts fears that the interest payments due to the
petitioners will produce more harm than good to the system of agrarian reform are misplaced and are based merely
on conjectures.
The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines
The LBP commented on the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 28, 2010. It maintained that: (a) the
doctrine of immutability of the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly applies to the present case; (b) the LBP is not
guilty of undue delay in the payment of just compensation as the petitioners were promptly paid once the Court had
determined the final value of the properties expropriated; (c) the Supreme Court rulings invoked by the petitioners
are inapplicable to the present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just compensation is not a forbearance of money,
interest should commence only after the amount due becomes ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest per
annum applies only to the liquidated amount, from the date of finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of 12% interest
on the balance of P971,409,831.68 is unwarranted because there was no unjustified refusal by LBP to pay just
compensation, and no contractual breach is involved; (f) the deletion of the attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the
amount finally awarded as just compensation is proper; (g) this case does not involve a violation of substantial justice
to justify the alteration of the immutable resolution dated December 19, 2007 that deleted the award of interest and
attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and accordingly GRANT the present motion for
reconsideration.
Just compensation a Basic Limitation on the States
Power of Eminent Domain
At the heart of the present controversy is the Third Divisions December 19, 2007 Resolution which held that the
petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest on the balance of the just compensation belatedly paid by the LBP. In the
presently assailed December 4, 2009 Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007 Resolutions findings that: (a)
the LBP deposited pertinent amounts in favor of the petitioners within fourteen months after they filed their complaint
for determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP had already paid the petitioners P411,769,168.32. We
concluded then that these circumstances refuted the petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay on the part of the
LBP.
A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and the parties arguments, viewed in light of the just compensation
requirement in the exercise of the States inherent power of eminent domain, compels us to re-examine our findings
and conclusions.
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use. [3] It is an inherent power of State as
it is a power necessary for the States existence; it is a power the State cannot do without. [4] As an inherent power, it
does not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting
what is otherwise an unlimited power. The limitation is found in the Bill of Rights[5] that part of the Constitution whose
provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of governmental powers.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads No private property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation.) provides two essential limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose
of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property.
It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be just as the safeguard is there to ensure a
balance property is not to be taken for public use at the expense of private interests; the public, through the State,
must balance the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for what is taken, value for value.
Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of the individual and strictly against the
government. The protection of the individual is the reason for the Bill of Rights being; to keep the exercise of the
powers of government within reasonable bounds is what it seeks.[6]
The concept of just compensation is not new to Philippine constitutional law,[7] but is not original to the Philippines; it
is a transplant from the American Constitution.[8] It found fertile application in this country particularly in the area of
agrarian reform where the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers has been equated to the public
use that the Constitution requires. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,[9] a valuation case under our agrarian
reform law, this Court had occasion to state:
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it
being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning
of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample.[10] [Emphasis supplied.]
In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the petitioners landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,[11] the
RTC, acting as a special agrarian court, determined the actual value of the petitioners landholdings to
be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a finding of fact, has subsequently been affirmed by this Court, and is now
beyond question. In eminent domain terms, this amount is the real, substantial, full and ample compensation the
government must pay to be just to the landowners.
160

Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed from the initial valuation made by the DAR; their values differ
by P1,131,799,897.00 in itself a very substantial sum that is roughly four times the original DAR valuation. We
mention these valuations as they indicate to us how undervalued the petitioners lands had been at the start,
particularly at the time the petitioners landholdings were taken. This reason apparently compelled the petitioners to
relentlessly pursue their valuation claims all they way up to the level of this Court.
While the LBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62 into the petitioners accounts (P26,409,549.86 for AFC
and P45,481,706.76 for HPI) at the time the landholdings were taken, these amounts were mere partial payments
that only amounted to 5% of the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the expropriated properties. We point this aspect
out to show that the initial payments made by the LBP when the petitioners landholdings were taken, although
promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by any means be considered a fair exchange of values at the time
of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual deposit could not be said to be substantial even from the original LBP valuation
of P251,379,103.90.
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate taking of the landholdings but cannot
be claimed as amounts that would excuse the LBP from the payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the
compensation due. As discussed at length below, they were not enough to compensate the petitioners for the
potential income the landholdings could have earned for them if no immediate taking had taken place. Under the
circumstances, the State acted oppressively and was far from just in their position to deny the petitioners of the
potential income that the immediate taking of their properties entailed.
Just Compensation from the
Prism of the Element of Taking.
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to
be just, must also be made without delay.[12] Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if
the property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its
fruits or income.
This is the principle at the core of the present case where the petitioners were made to wait for more than a
decade after the taking of their property before they actually received the full amount of the principal of the just
compensation due them.[13] What they have not received to date is the income of their
landholdings corresponding to what they would have received had no uncompensated taking of these lands
been immediately made. This income, in terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current
litigation.
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] the need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of
interest to compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this
case that:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell,
i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.[15] [Emphasis supplied.]
Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Courts previous ruling in National Power Corporation v.
Angas[16] which held that just compensation due for expropriated properties is not a loan or forbearance of money
but indemnity for damages for the delay in payment; since the interest involved is in the nature of damages rather
than earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated
property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping
Lines ruling,[17] the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property
was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the Courts own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to
be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in September
1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the
taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. [18] [Emphasis supplied.]
We subsequently upheld Republics 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the
following cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20] Republic v. Court
of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-
Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]
These were the established rulings that stood before this Court issued the currently assailed Resolution of December
4, 2009. These would be the rulings this Court shall reverse and de-establish if we maintain and affirm our
ruling deleting the 12% interest on the unpaid balance of compensation due for properties already taken.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we see no compelling reason to depart from the rule
that Republic firmly established. Let it be remembered that shorn of its eminent domain and social justice aspects,
what the agrarian land reform program involves is the purchase by the government, through the LBP, of agricultural
lands for sale and distribution to farmers. As a purchase, it involves an exchange of values the landholdings in
exchange for the LBPs payment. In determining the just compensation for this exchange, however, the
measure to be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss [25] since what is involved is the
takeover of private property under the States coercive power. As mentioned above, in the value-for-value
exchange in an eminent domain situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose property is taken is not
shortchanged and must hence carry the burden of showing that the just compensation requirement of the Bill of
Rights is satisfied.
The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is
taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the
potential income lost. The just compensation is made available to the property owner so that he may derive income
from this compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived income from his expropriated property. If
full compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for the shortfall in the earning potential
161
immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of replacement property from which income can be derived;
interest on the unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain
and as a basic measure of fairness.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners landholdings without the corresponding full payment, it
became liable to the petitioners for the income the landholdings would have earned had they not immediately been
taken from the petitioners. What is interesting in this interplay, under the developments of this case, is that the
LBP, by taking landholdings without full payment while holding on at the same time to the interest that it
should have paid, effectively used or retained funds that should go to the landowners and thereby took
advantage of these funds for its own account.
From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting the award of 12% interest is not only patently
and legally wrong, but is also morally unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. If the interest on the just
compensation due in reality the equivalent of the fruits or income of the landholdings would have yielded had these
lands not been taken would be denied, the result is effectively a confiscatory action by this Court in favor of the LBP.
We would be allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to have free use of the interest that should have gone to the
landowners.Otherwise stated, if we continue to deny the petitioners present motion for reconsideration, we
would illogically and without much thought to the fairness that the situation demands uphold the interests
of the LBP, not only at the expense of the landowners but also that of substantial justice as well.
Lest this Court be a party to this monumental unfairness in a social program aimed at fostering balance in our society,
we now have to ring the bell that we have muted in the past, and formally declare that the LBPs position is legally
and morally wrong. To do less than this is to leave the demands of the constitutional just compensation standard (in
terms of law) and of our own conscience (in terms of morality) wanting and unsatisfied.
The Delay in Payment Issue
Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure to fully pay for property already taken, a recurring
issue in the case is the attribution of the delay.
That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all be disputed. While the LBP claimed that it made initial
payments of P411,769,168.32 (out of the principal sum due of P1,383,179,000.00),the undisputed fact is that the
petitioners were deprived of their lands on December 9, 1996 (when titles to their landholdings were cancelled
and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines), and received full payment of the principal amount due them
only on May 9, 2008.
In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings because these landholdings had been taken. Nor did
they receive adequate income from what should replace the income potential of their landholdings because the LBP
refused to pay interest while withholding the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due by claiming a
grossly low valuation. This sad state continued for more than a decade. In any language and by any measure, a
lengthy delay in payment occurred.
An important starting point in considering attribution for the delay is that the petitioners voluntarily offered to sell
their landholdings to the governments land reform program; they themselves submitted their Voluntary Offer to
Sell applications to the DAR, and they fully cooperated with the governments program. The present case therefore
is not one where substantial conflict arose on the issue of whether expropriation is proper; the petitioners voluntarily
submitted to expropriation and surrendered their landholdings, although they contested the valuation that the
government made.
Presumably, had the landholdings been properly valued, the petitioners would have accepted the payment of just
compensation and there would have been no need for them to go to the extent of filing a valuation case. But, as
borne by the records, the petitioners lands were grossly undervalued by the DAR, leaving the petitioners with no
choice but to file actions to secure what is justly due them.
The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle of court actions that followed, where the LBP eventually
claimed that it could not be faulted for seeking judicial recourse to defend the governments and its own interests in
light of the petitioners valuation claims. This LBP claim, of course, conveniently forgets that at the root of all these
valuation claims and counterclaims was the initial gross undervaluation by DAR that the LBP stoutly defended. At
the end, this undervaluation was proven incorrect by no less than this Court; the petitioners were proven correct in
their claim, and the correct valuation more than five-fold the initial DAR valuation was decreed and became final.
All these developments cannot now be disregarded and reduced to insignificance. In blunter terms, the government
and the LBP cannot now be heard to claim that they were simply protecting their interests when they stubbornly
defended their undervalued positions before the courts. The more apt and accurate statement is that they adopted a
grossly unreasonable position and the adverse developments that followed, particularly the concomitant delay,
should be directly chargeable to them.
To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct in the legal steps they took in their valuation claims. They
initially filed their valuation claim before the DARAB instead of immediately seeking judicial intervention. The DARAB,
however, contributed its share to the petitioners error when it failed or refused to act on the valuation petitions for
more than three (3) years. Thus, on top of the DAR undervaluation was the DARAB inaction after the petitioners
landholdings had been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007 duly noted this and observed:
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995, when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to
sell the properties to the DAR. In view of the failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the properties, the
Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB on 14 February 1997. Despite the
lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation
of the land. Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already been cancelled and in their place a
new certificate of title was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December
1996. A period of almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case has truly languished
for a long period of time, the delay being mainly attributable to both official inaction and indecision, particularly on the
determination of the amount of just compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date, have yet to be
fully compensated for the properties which are already in the hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of
time, may have already converted or sold the land awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it not for LBPs counsel causing
unnecessary delay. At the inception of this case, DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law
to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the
cases before the RTC. We underscore the pronouncement of the RTC that the delay by DARAB in the
determination of just compensation could only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform
and the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by corporate landowners.
162

To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds
compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. [Emphasis supplied.]
These statements cannot but be true today as they were when we originally decided the case and awarded 12%
interest on the balance of the just compensation due. While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially
seeking recourse through the DAR, this agency itself hence, the government committed a graver transgression when
it failed to act at all on the petitioners complaints for determination of just compensation.
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of this case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps
of the government, not at the petitioners. We conclude, too, that the government should not be allowed to exculpate
itself from this delay and should suffer all the consequences the delay caused.
The LBPs arguments on the applicability of cases imposing
12% interest
The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[26] Reyes v. National Housing
Authority,[27] and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[28] cannot be applied to the present case.
According to the LBP, Republic is inapplicable because, first, the landowners in Republic remained unpaid,
notwithstanding the fact that the award for just compensation had already been fixed by final judgment; in the present
case, the Court already acknowledged that pertinent amounts were deposited in favor of the landowners within 14
months from the filing of their complaint. Second, while Republic involved an ordinary expropriation case, the present
case involves expropriation for agrarian reform. Finally, the just compensation in Republic remained unpaid
notwithstanding the finality of judgment, while the just compensation in the present case was immediately paid in full
after LBP received a copy of the Courts resolution
We find no merit in these assertions.
As we discussed above, the pertinent amounts allegedly deposited by LBP were mere partial payments that
amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value of the properties expropriated. They could be the basis for the
immediate taking of the expropriated property but by no stretch of the imagination can these nominal amounts be
considered pertinent enough to satisfy the full requirement of just compensation i.e., the full and fair equivalent of the
expropriated property, taking into account its income potential and the foregone income lost because of the
immediate taking.
We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory that Republic and the present case have to be treated differently
because the first involves a regular expropriation case, while the present case involves expropriation pursuant to the
countrys agrarian reform program. In both cases, the power of eminent domain was used and private property was
taken for public use. Why one should be different from the other, so that the just compensation ruling in one should
not apply to the other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a difference, the treatment of agrarian reform expropriations
should be stricter and on a higher plane because of the governments societal concerns and objectives. To be sure,
the government cannot attempt to remedy the ills of one sector of society by sacrificing the interests of others within
the same society.
Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that fixed the value of just compensation) in Republic was not a
material consideration for the Court in awarding the landowners 12% interest. The Court, in Republic, simply affirmed
the RTC ruling imposing legal interest on the amount of just compensation due. In the process, the Court determined
that the legal interest should be 12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance
on the part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should
have been imposed from the time the RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12%
interest was imposed from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took the property.
The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners erroneously relied on the ruling in Reyes v. National Housing
Authority. The LBP claims that we cannot apply Reyes because it involved just compensation that remained unpaid
despite the finality of the expropriation decision. LBPs point of distinction is that just compensation was immediately
paid in the present case upon the Courts determination of the actual value of the expropriated properties. LBP claims,
too, that in Reyes, the Court established that the refusal of the NHA to pay just compensation was unfounded and
unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case clearly demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation.
Lastly, in Reyes, the records showed that there was an outstanding balance that ought to be paid, while the element
of an outstanding balance is absent in the present case.
Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of the 12% interest in Reyes did not depend on either the finality of the
decision of the expropriation court, or on the finding that the NHAs refusal to pay just compensation was unfounded
and unjustified. Quite clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals that x x x if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. [29] This is
the same legal principle applicable to the present case, as discussed above.
While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just compensation due to the petitioners after this
Court had fixed the value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the time that the State
took the petitioners properties until the time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is
the rationale for imposing the 12% interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking.
Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners quoted our ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial out of context.
According to the LBP, the Court imposed legal interest of 12% per annum only after December 31, 2006, the date
when the decision on just compensation became final.
The LBP is again mistaken. The Imperial case involved land that was expropriated pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27,[30] and fell under the coverage of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 13.[31] This AO provided for the payment
of a 6% annual interest if there is any delay in payment of just compensation. However, Imperial was decided in 2007
and AO No. 13 was only effective up to December 2006. Thus, the Court, relying on our ruling in the Republic case,
applied the prevailing 12% interest ruling to the period when the just compensation remained unpaid after December
2006. It is for this reason that December 31, 2006 was important, not because it was the date of finality of the decision
on just compensation.
163
The 12% Interest Rate and
the Chico-Nazario Dissent
To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts deliberations on the present case, we feel it appropriate to discuss
the Justice Minita Chico-Nazarios dissent from the Courts December 4, 2009 Resolution.
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled to the 12% interest, she saw it appropriate to
equitably reduce the interest charges from P1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00. In support of this proposal, she
enumerated various cases where the Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code, [32] equitably reduced interest
charges.
We differ with our esteemed colleagues views on the application of equity.
While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the past, those cases involved
interest that was essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the
contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the present case runs as a matter of law and follows as a
matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of
the date of taking.[33]
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to the petitioners cannot be a proper premise
in denying the landowners the interest due them under the law and established jurisprudence. If the just
compensation for the landholdings is considerable, this compensation is not undue because the
landholdings the owners gave up in exchange are also similarly considerable AFC gave up an aggregate
landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave up 805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners surrendered
these sizeable landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were likewise sizeable and cannot in any
way be considered miniscule. The incomes due from these properties, expressed as interest, are what the
government should return to the petitioners after the government took over their lands without full payment of just
compensation. In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be equivalent to the principal
sum of the just compensation due; interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance
of this principal sum after taking has been completed. This is the compensation arrangement that should prevail
if such compensation is to satisfy the constitutional standard of being just.
Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation due before the finality of the judgment of this Court justify the
reduction of the interest due them. To rule otherwise would be to forget that the petitioners had to wait twelve years
from the time they gave up their lands before the government fully paid the principal of the just compensation due
them. These were twelve years when they had no income from their landholdings because these landholdings have
immediately been taken; no income, or inadequate income, accrued to them from the proceeds of compensation
payment due them because full payment has been withheld by government.
If the full payment of the principal sum of the just compensation is legally significant at all under the circumstances
of this case, the significance is only in putting a stop to the running of the interest due because the principal of the
just compensation due has been paid. To close our eyes to these realities is to condone what is effectively a
confiscatory action in favor of the LBP.
That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be paid is not per se an inequitable or
unconscionable situation, considering the length of time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve long years.
From the perspective of interest income, twelve years would have been sufficient for the petitioners to double the
principal, even if invested conservatively, had they been promptly paid the principal of the just compensation due
them. Moreover, the interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and unconscionable because
it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence standards that have taken into account fairness
and equity in setting the interest rates due for the use or forebearance of money.
If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself to blame, as this interest piled up because it
unreasonably acted in its valuation of the landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay the petitioners. To
be sure, the consequences of this failure i.e., the enormity of the total interest due and the alleged financial
hemorrhage the LBP may suffer should not be the very reason that would excuse it from full compliance. To so rule
is to use extremely flawed logic. To so rule is to disregard the question of how the LBP, a government financial
institution that now professes difficulty in paying interest at 12% per annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay
the petitioners for twelve long years.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this Court should tread lightly in imposing liabilities on the LBP because
this bank represents the government and, ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say that public interest refers to
what will benefit the public, not necessarily the government and its agencies whose task is to contribute to the benefit
of the public. Greater public benefit will result if government agencies like the LBP are conscientious in undertaking
its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this case. Greater public interest would be served if it can
contribute to the credibility of the governments land reform program through the conscientious handling of
its part of this program.
As our last point, equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and
jurisprudence.[34] As we have shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the
present case. There is thus no occasion for the equitable consideration that Justice Chico-Nazario suggested.
The Amount Due the Petitioners as Just Compensation
As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the difference between the price of the expropriated
lands (determined with finality to be P1,383,179,000.00) and the amount of P411,769,168.32 already paid to the
petitioners. The difference between these figures amounts to the remaining balance of P971,409,831.68 that was
only paid on May 9, 2008.
As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the
petitioners properties were taken on December 9, 1996 up to the time of payment. At this rate, the LBP now
owes the petitioners the total amount of One Billion Three Hundred Thirty-One Million One Hundred Twenty-Four
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Three and 05/100 Pesos (P1,331,124,223.05), computed as follows:
Just Compensation P971,409,831.68
Legal Interest from 12/09/1996
To 05/09/2008 @ 12%/annum
164

12/09/1996 to 12/31/1996 23 days 7,345,455.17
01/01/1997 to 12/31/2007 11 years 1,282,260,977.82
01/01/2008 to 05/09/2008 130 days 41,517,790.07
P1,331,124,223.05[35]
The Immutability of Judgment Issue
As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of
what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.[36] In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions
to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice and where special
and compelling reasons called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[37] Galman v.
Sandiganbayan,[38] Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications Commission,[39] and Republic
v. de los Angeles,[40] we reversed our judgment on the second motion for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping
and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations Commission,[41] we did so on a third motion for
reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v. Romillo[42] and Cosio v. de Rama,[43] we modified or amended our ruling on the
second motion for reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals,[44] Tan Tiac Chiong v.
Hon. Cosico,[45] Manotok IV v. Barque,[46] and Barnes v. Padilla,[47] we recalled entries of judgment after finding that
doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:
x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified,
directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared
to be final.[48] [Emphasis supplied.]
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from these discussions.
A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how
can compensation in an eminent domain be just when the payment for the compensation for property already taken
has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in
this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that under
eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that
these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a private interest matter is an extremely
shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.
As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences
of delay in the payment of just compensation have been settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled jurisprudence
on the issue alone accords this case primary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of
grounds, all the rulings we have established in the past.
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the nation
because of the subject matter involved agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly
sought to achieve in the past half century. This reform program and its objectives would suffer a major setback if the
government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in implementing the
needed reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda that the Solicitor General, no less,
pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and abuse, to the idea of revolution. [49] This linkage, to our mind,
remains valid even if the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of the agrarian
reform program.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. [50] As we explained in Ginete v. Court of
Appeals:[51]
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power
to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself
has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
xxxx
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.[52] [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[53] we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
"should give way to the realities of the situation.[54] [Emphasis supplied.]
We made the same recognition in Barnes,[55] on the underlying premise that a courts primordial and most important
duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final
and executory judgment.
165
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and erroneous conclusion that the petitioners are Promulgated:
not entitled to 12% interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn the assailed Resolution. We
shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the October 12, 2010
rectification, we shall let the opportunity pass. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
Attorneys Fees
We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the petitioners attorneys fees when it fixed the just compensation due
and decreed that interest of 12% should be paid on the balance outstanding after the taking of the petitioners BRION, J.:
landholdings took place. The petitioners, however, have not raised the award of attorneys fees as an issue in the
present motion for reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not touch on this issue at all in this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court En Bancs We resolve the petitioners motion for reconsideration addressing our Resolution of December 4, 2009 whose
Resolution dated December 4, 2009, as well as the Third Divisions Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and December dispositive portion directs:
19, 2007, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the
The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation and award of legal interest and attorneys fees), and reiterates the decision dated February 6, 2007 and the resolution
Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed dated December 19, 2007 of the Third Division.
from the date the Government took the properties on December 9, 1996, until the respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines paid on May 9, 2008 the balance on the principal amount. For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation of this Resolution, we hark back to the roots of this case.

Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period, payment shall be in monthly installments at the rate Factual Antecedents
of P60,000,000.00 per month until the whole amount owing, including interest on the outstanding balance, is fully
paid. Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together also referred to as petitioners, were registered
owners of vast tracks of land; AFC owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308 hectares. On October 12,
Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines. 1995, they voluntarily offered to sell these landholdings to the government via Voluntary Offer to Sell applications
filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
SO ORDERED.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO G.R. No. 164195 On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation of their properties
PLANTATION, INC., from the DARs Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare,
Petitioners, Present: AFCs land was valued at P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC
rejected these valuations for being very low.
CORONA, C.J.,
*CARPIO, In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in
CARPIO MORALES, AFCs bank account and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the petitioners then withdrew. The
VELASCO, JR., titles over AFC and HPIs properties were thereafter cancelled, and new ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in
NACHURA, the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just compensation with the DAR
* PERALTA, Adjudication Board (DARAB). When the DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more than three years, AFC and
BERSAMIN, HPI filed separate complaints for determination and payment of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court
DEL CASTILLO, (RTC) of Tagum City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court. These complaints were subsequently consolidated.
* ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR., On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing the just compensation for the petitioners
PEREZ, 1,338.6027 hectares of land[1] at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at the prevailing market interest
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MENDOZA, and rates, computed from the taking of the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus the amounts the
Respondent. SERENO, JJ. petitioners already received under the initial valuation. The RTC also awarded attorneys fees.
166

LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The RTC, in its order of December 5, 2001, modified its ruling
and fixed the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the complaint was filed until finality of the
decision. The Third Division of this Court, in its Decision of February 6, 2007, affirmed this RTC decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution of December 19, 2007, modifying its February
6, 2007 Decision by deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of the awarded just compensation. The Third
Division justified the deletion by the finding that the LBP did not delay the payment of just compensation as it had
deposited the pertinent amounts due to AFC and HPI within fourteen months after they filed their complaints for just
compensation with the RTC. The Court also considered that AFC had already collected approximately P149.6 million,
while HPI had already collected approximately P262 million from the LBP. The Third Division also deleted the award
of attorneys fees.
All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling. The Court uniformly denied all the motions in its April
30, 2008 Resolution. Entry of Judgment followed on May 16, 2008.
Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and HPI filed the following motions on May 28, 2008: (1) Motion for
Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration; (2) Second Motion for Reconsideration, with respect to
the denial of the award of legal interest and attorneys fees; and (3) Motion to Refer the Second Motion for
Reconsideration to the Honorable Court En Banc.
The Third Division found the motion to admit the Second Motion for Reconsideration and the motion to refer this
second motion to the Court En Banc meritorious, and accordingly referred the case to the Court En Banc. On
September 8, 2009, the Court En Banc accepted the referral.
The Court En Banc Resolution
On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a majority vote, denied the petitioners second motion for
reconsideration based on two considerations.
First, the grant of the second motion for reconsideration runs counter to the immutability of final decisions. Moreover,
the Court saw no reason to recognize the case as an exception to the immutability principle as the petitioners private
claim for the payment of interest does not qualify as either a substantial or transcendental matter or an issue of
paramount public interest.
Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover interest on the just compensation and attorneys fees
because they caused the delay in the payment of the just compensation due them; they erroneously filed their
complaints with the DARAB when they should have directly filed these with the RTC acting as an agrarian court.
Furthermore, the Court found it significant that the LBP deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners favor within
fourteen months after the petitions were filed with the RTC. Under these circumstances, the Court found no
unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the award of 12% interest.
The Chico-Nazario Dissent
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[2] the ponente of the original December 19, 2007 Resolution (deleting the 12%
interest), dissented from the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution.
On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice Chico-Nazario pointed out that under extraordinary circumstances,
this Court has recalled entries of judgment on the ground of substantial justice. Given the special circumstances
involved in the present case, the Court En Banc should have taken a second hard look at the petitioners positions in
their second motion for reconsideration, and acted to correct the clearly erroneous December 19, 2007 Resolution.
Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the obligation of the State, in the exercise of its inherent power of
eminent domain, to pay just compensation to the owner of the expropriated property. To be just, the compensation
must not only be the correct amount to be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time from the time the land
is taken from the owner. If not, the State must pay the landowner interest, by way of damages, from the time the
property was taken until just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a part of just compensation due, has
been established by prevailing jurisprudence to be 12% per annum.
On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the government deprived the petitioners of their property on
December 9, 1996, and paid the balance of the just compensation due them only on May 9, 2008. The delay of
almost twelve years earned the petitioners interest in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.
Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it fit to declare the computed interest to be totally due; she
found it unconscionable to apply the full force of the law on the LBP because of the magnitude of the amount due. She
thus reduced the awarded interest to P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of the computed interest.
The Present Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion to reconsider the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution (the present Motion for
Reconsideration), the petitioners principally argue that: (a) the principle of immutability of judgment does not apply
since the Entry of Judgment was issued even before the lapse of fifteen days from the parties receipt of the April 30,
2008 Resolution and the petitioners timely filed their second motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from their
receipt of this resolution; (b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot be considered immutable considering the special
and compelling circumstances attendant to the present case which fall within the exceptions to the principle of
immutability of judgments; (c) the legal interest due is at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the taking of the
subject properties and this rate is not subject to reduction. The power of the courts to equitably reduce interest rates
applies solely to liquidated damages under a contract and not to interest set by the Honorable Court itself as due and
owing in just compensation cases; and (d) the Honorable Courts fears that the interest payments due to the
petitioners will produce more harm than good to the system of agrarian reform are misplaced and are based merely
on conjectures.
The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines
The LBP commented on the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 28, 2010. It maintained that: (a) the
doctrine of immutability of the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly applies to the present case; (b) the LBP is not
guilty of undue delay in the payment of just compensation as the petitioners were promptly paid once the Court had
determined the final value of the properties expropriated; (c) the Supreme Court rulings invoked by the petitioners
are inapplicable to the present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just compensation is not a forbearance of money,
interest should commence only after the amount due becomes ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest per
167
annum applies only to the liquidated amount, from the date of finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of 12% interest
on the balance of P971,409,831.68 is unwarranted because there was no unjustified refusal by LBP to pay just
compensation, and no contractual breach is involved; (f) the deletion of the attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the
amount finally awarded as just compensation is proper; (g) this case does not involve a violation of substantial justice
to justify the alteration of the immutable resolution dated December 19, 2007 that deleted the award of interest and
attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and accordingly GRANT the present motion for
reconsideration.
Just compensation a Basic Limitation on the States
Power of Eminent Domain
At the heart of the present controversy is the Third Divisions December 19, 2007 Resolution which held that the
petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest on the balance of the just compensation belatedly paid by the LBP. In the
presently assailed December 4, 2009 Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007 Resolutions findings that: (a)
the LBP deposited pertinent amounts in favor of the petitioners within fourteen months after they filed their complaint
for determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP had already paid the petitioners P411,769,168.32. We
concluded then that these circumstances refuted the petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay on the part of the
LBP.
A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and the parties arguments, viewed in light of the just compensation
requirement in the exercise of the States inherent power of eminent domain, compels us to re-examine our findings
and conclusions.
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use.[3] It is an inherent power of State as
it is a power necessary for the States existence; it is a power the State cannot do without.[4] As an inherent power, it
does not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting
what is otherwise an unlimited power. The limitation is found in the Bill of Rights[5] that part of the Constitution whose
provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of governmental powers.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads No private property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation.) provides two essential limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose
of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property.
It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be just as the safeguard is there to ensure a
balance property is not to be taken for public use at the expense of private interests; the public, through the State,
must balance the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for what is taken, value for value.
Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of the individual and strictly against the
government. The protection of the individual is the reason for the Bill of Rights being; to keep the exercise of the
powers of government within reasonable bounds is what it seeks.[6]
The concept of just compensation is not new to Philippine constitutional law,[7] but is not original to the Philippines; it
is a transplant from the American Constitution.[8] It found fertile application in this country particularly in the area of
agrarian reform where the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers has been equated to the public
use that the Constitution requires. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,[9] a valuation case under our agrarian
reform law, this Court had occasion to state:
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it
being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning
of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample.[10] [Emphasis supplied.]
In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the petitioners landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,[11] the
RTC, acting as a special agrarian court, determined the actual value of the petitioners landholdings to
be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a finding of fact, has subsequently been affirmed by this Court, and is now
beyond question. In eminent domain terms, this amount is the real, substantial, full and ample compensation the
government must pay to be just to the landowners.
Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed from the initial valuation made by the DAR; their values differ
by P1,131,799,897.00 in itself a very substantial sum that is roughly four times the original DAR valuation. We
mention these valuations as they indicate to us how undervalued the petitioners lands had been at the start,
particularly at the time the petitioners landholdings were taken. This reason apparently compelled the petitioners to
relentlessly pursue their valuation claims all they way up to the level of this Court.
While the LBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62 into the petitioners accounts (P26,409,549.86 for AFC
and P45,481,706.76 for HPI) at the time the landholdings were taken, these amounts were mere partial payments
that only amounted to 5% of the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the expropriated properties. We point this aspect
out to show that the initial payments made by the LBP when the petitioners landholdings were taken, although
promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by any means be considered a fair exchange of values at the time
of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual deposit could not be said to be substantial even from the original LBP valuation
of P251,379,103.90.
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate taking of the landholdings but cannot
be claimed as amounts that would excuse the LBP from the payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the
compensation due. As discussed at length below, they were not enough to compensate the petitioners for the
potential income the landholdings could have earned for them if no immediate taking had taken place. Under the
circumstances, the State acted oppressively and was far from just in their position to deny the petitioners of the
potential income that the immediate taking of their properties entailed.
Just Compensation from the
Prism of the Element of Taking.
168
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to
be just, must also be made without delay.[12] Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if
the property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its
fruits or income.
This is the principle at the core of the present case where the petitioners were made to wait for more than a
decade after the taking of their property before they actually received the full amount of the principal of the just
compensation due them.[13] What they have not received to date is the income of their
landholdings corresponding to what they would have received had no uncompensated taking of these lands
been immediately made. This income, in terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current
litigation.
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] the need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of
interest to compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this
case that:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell,
i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.[15] [Emphasis supplied.]
Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Courts previous ruling in National Power Corporation v.
Angas[16] which held that just compensation due for expropriated properties is not a loan or forbearance of money
but indemnity for damages for the delay in payment; since the interest involved is in the nature of damages rather
than earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated
property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping
Lines ruling,[17] the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property
was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the Courts own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to
be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in September
1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the
taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.[18] [Emphasis supplied.]
We subsequently upheld Republics 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the
following cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20] Republic v. Court
of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-
Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]
These were the established rulings that stood before this Court issued the currently assailed Resolution of December
4, 2009. These would be the rulings this Court shall reverse and de-establish if we maintain and affirm our
ruling deleting the 12% interest on the unpaid balance of compensation due for properties already taken.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we see no compelling reason to depart from the rule
that Republic firmly established. Let it be remembered that shorn of its eminent domain and social justice aspects,
what the agrarian land reform program involves is the purchase by the government, through the LBP, of agricultural
lands for sale and distribution to farmers. As a purchase, it involves an exchange of values the landholdings in
exchange for the LBPs payment. In determining the just compensation for this exchange, however, the
measure to be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss [25] since what is involved is the
takeover of private property under the States coercive power. As mentioned above, in the value-for-value
exchange in an eminent domain situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose property is taken is not
shortchanged and must hence carry the burden of showing that the just compensation requirement of the Bill of
Rights is satisfied.
The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is
taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the
potential income lost. The just compensation is made available to the property owner so that he may derive income
from this compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived income from his expropriated property. If
full compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for the shortfall in the earning potential
immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of replacement property from which income can be derived;
interest on the unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain
and as a basic measure of fairness.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners landholdings without the corresponding full payment, it
became liable to the petitioners for the income the landholdings would have earned had they not immediately been
taken from the petitioners. What is interesting in this interplay, under the developments of this case, is that the
LBP, by taking landholdings without full payment while holding on at the same time to the interest that it
should have paid, effectively used or retained funds that should go to the landowners and thereby took
advantage of these funds for its own account.
From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting the award of 12% interest is not only patently
and legally wrong, but is also morally unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. If the interest on the just
compensation due in reality the equivalent of the fruits or income of the landholdings would have yielded had these
lands not been taken would be denied, the result is effectively a confiscatory action by this Court in favor of the LBP.
We would be allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to have free use of the interest that should have gone to the
landowners.Otherwise stated, if we continue to deny the petitioners present motion for reconsideration, we
would illogically and without much thought to the fairness that the situation demands uphold the interests
of the LBP, not only at the expense of the landowners but also that of substantial justice as well.
Lest this Court be a party to this monumental unfairness in a social program aimed at fostering balance in our society,
we now have to ring the bell that we have muted in the past, and formally declare that the LBPs position is legally
and morally wrong. To do less than this is to leave the demands of the constitutional just compensation standard (in
terms of law) and of our own conscience (in terms of morality) wanting and unsatisfied.
169
The Delay in Payment Issue
Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure to fully pay for property already taken, a recurring
issue in the case is the attribution of the delay.
That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all be disputed. While the LBP claimed that it made initial
payments of P411,769,168.32 (out of the principal sum due of P1,383,179,000.00),the undisputed fact is that the
petitioners were deprived of their lands on December 9, 1996 (when titles to their landholdings were cancelled
and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines), and received full payment of the principal amount due them
only on May 9, 2008.
In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings because these landholdings had been taken. Nor did
they receive adequate income from what should replace the income potential of their landholdings because the LBP
refused to pay interest while withholding the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due by claiming a
grossly low valuation. This sad state continued for more than a decade. In any language and by any measure, a
lengthy delay in payment occurred.
An important starting point in considering attribution for the delay is that the petitioners voluntarily offered to sell
their landholdings to the governments land reform program; they themselves submitted their Voluntary Offer to
Sell applications to the DAR, and they fully cooperated with the governments program. The present case therefore
is not one where substantial conflict arose on the issue of whether expropriation is proper; the petitioners voluntarily
submitted to expropriation and surrendered their landholdings, although they contested the valuation that the
government made.
Presumably, had the landholdings been properly valued, the petitioners would have accepted the payment of just
compensation and there would have been no need for them to go to the extent of filing a valuation case. But, as
borne by the records, the petitioners lands were grossly undervalued by the DAR, leaving the petitioners with no
choice but to file actions to secure what is justly due them.
The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle of court actions that followed, where the LBP eventually
claimed that it could not be faulted for seeking judicial recourse to defend the governments and its own interests in
light of the petitioners valuation claims. This LBP claim, of course, conveniently forgets that at the root of all these
valuation claims and counterclaims was the initial gross undervaluation by DAR that the LBP stoutly defended. At
the end, this undervaluation was proven incorrect by no less than this Court; the petitioners were proven correct in
their claim, and the correct valuation more than five-fold the initial DAR valuation was decreed and became final.
All these developments cannot now be disregarded and reduced to insignificance. In blunter terms, the government
and the LBP cannot now be heard to claim that they were simply protecting their interests when they stubbornly
defended their undervalued positions before the courts. The more apt and accurate statement is that they adopted a
grossly unreasonable position and the adverse developments that followed, particularly the concomitant delay,
should be directly chargeable to them.
To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct in the legal steps they took in their valuation claims. They
initially filed their valuation claim before the DARAB instead of immediately seeking judicial intervention. The DARAB,
however, contributed its share to the petitioners error when it failed or refused to act on the valuation petitions for
more than three (3) years. Thus, on top of the DAR undervaluation was the DARAB inaction after the petitioners
landholdings had been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007 duly noted this and observed:
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995, when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to
sell the properties to the DAR. In view of the failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the properties, the
Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB on 14 February 1997. Despite the
lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation
of the land. Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already been cancelled and in their place a
new certificate of title was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December
1996. A period of almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case has truly languished
for a long period of time, the delay being mainly attributable to both official inaction and indecision, particularly on the
determination of the amount of just compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date, have yet to be
fully compensated for the properties which are already in the hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of
time, may have already converted or sold the land awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it not for LBPs counsel causing
unnecessary delay. At the inception of this case, DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law
to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the
cases before the RTC. We underscore the pronouncement of the RTC that the delay by DARAB in the
determination of just compensation could only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform
and the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by corporate landowners.
To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds
compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. [Emphasis supplied.]
These statements cannot but be true today as they were when we originally decided the case and awarded 12%
interest on the balance of the just compensation due. While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially
seeking recourse through the DAR, this agency itself hence, the government committed a graver transgression when
it failed to act at all on the petitioners complaints for determination of just compensation.
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of this case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps
of the government, not at the petitioners. We conclude, too, that the government should not be allowed to exculpate
itself from this delay and should suffer all the consequences the delay caused.
The LBPs arguments on the applicability of cases imposing
12% interest
The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[26] Reyes v. National Housing
Authority,[27] and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[28] cannot be applied to the present case.
According to the LBP, Republic is inapplicable because, first, the landowners in Republic remained unpaid,
notwithstanding the fact that the award for just compensation had already been fixed by final judgment; in the present
case, the Court already acknowledged that pertinent amounts were deposited in favor of the landowners within 14
months from the filing of their complaint. Second, while Republic involved an ordinary expropriation case, the present
case involves expropriation for agrarian reform. Finally, the just compensation in Republic remained unpaid
170
notwithstanding the finality of judgment, while the just compensation in the present case was immediately paid in full
after LBP received a copy of the Courts resolution
We find no merit in these assertions.
As we discussed above, the pertinent amounts allegedly deposited by LBP were mere partial payments that
amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value of the properties expropriated. They could be the basis for the
immediate taking of the expropriated property but by no stretch of the imagination can these nominal amounts be
considered pertinent enough to satisfy the full requirement of just compensation i.e., the full and fair equivalent of the
expropriated property, taking into account its income potential and the foregone income lost because of the
immediate taking.
We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory that Republic and the present case have to be treated differently
because the first involves a regular expropriation case, while the present case involves expropriation pursuant to the
countrys agrarian reform program. In both cases, the power of eminent domain was used and private property was
taken for public use. Why one should be different from the other, so that the just compensation ruling in one should
not apply to the other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a difference, the treatment of agrarian reform expropriations
should be stricter and on a higher plane because of the governments societal concerns and objectives. To be sure,
the government cannot attempt to remedy the ills of one sector of society by sacrificing the interests of others within
the same society.
Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that fixed the value of just compensation) in Republic was not a
material consideration for the Court in awarding the landowners 12% interest. The Court, in Republic, simply affirmed
the RTC ruling imposing legal interest on the amount of just compensation due. In the process, the Court determined
that the legal interest should be 12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance
on the part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should
have been imposed from the time the RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12%
interest was imposed from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took the property.
The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners erroneously relied on the ruling in Reyes v. National Housing
Authority. The LBP claims that we cannot apply Reyes because it involved just compensation that remained unpaid
despite the finality of the expropriation decision. LBPs point of distinction is that just compensation was immediately
paid in the present case upon the Courts determination of the actual value of the expropriated properties. LBP claims,
too, that in Reyes, the Court established that the refusal of the NHA to pay just compensation was unfounded and
unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case clearly demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation.
Lastly, in Reyes, the records showed that there was an outstanding balance that ought to be paid, while the element
of an outstanding balance is absent in the present case.
Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of the 12% interest in Reyes did not depend on either the finality of the
decision of the expropriation court, or on the finding that the NHAs refusal to pay just compensation was unfounded
and unjustified. Quite clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals that x x x if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.[29] This is
the same legal principle applicable to the present case, as discussed above.
While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just compensation due to the petitioners after this
Court had fixed the value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the time that the State
took the petitioners properties until the time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is
the rationale for imposing the 12% interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking.
Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners quoted our ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial out of context.
According to the LBP, the Court imposed legal interest of 12% per annum only after December 31, 2006, the date
when the decision on just compensation became final.
The LBP is again mistaken. The Imperial case involved land that was expropriated pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27,[30] and fell under the coverage of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 13.[31] This AO provided for the payment
of a 6% annual interest if there is any delay in payment of just compensation. However, Imperial was decided in 2007
and AO No. 13 was only effective up to December 2006. Thus, the Court, relying on our ruling in the Republic case,
applied the prevailing 12% interest ruling to the period when the just compensation remained unpaid after December
2006. It is for this reason that December 31, 2006 was important, not because it was the date of finality of the decision
on just compensation.
The 12% Interest Rate and
the Chico-Nazario Dissent
To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts deliberations on the present case, we feel it appropriate to discuss
the Justice Minita Chico-Nazarios dissent from the Courts December 4, 2009 Resolution.
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled to the 12% interest, she saw it appropriate to
equitably reduce the interest charges from P1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00. In support of this proposal, she
enumerated various cases where the Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code,[32] equitably reduced interest
charges.
We differ with our esteemed colleagues views on the application of equity.
While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the past, those cases involved
interest that was essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the
contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the present case runs as a matter of law and follows as a
matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of
the date of taking.[33]
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to the petitioners cannot be a proper premise
in denying the landowners the interest due them under the law and established jurisprudence. If the just
compensation for the landholdings is considerable, this compensation is not undue because the
landholdings the owners gave up in exchange are also similarly considerable AFC gave up an aggregate
landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave up 805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners surrendered
171
these sizeable landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were likewise sizeable and cannot in any
way be considered miniscule. The incomes due from these properties, expressed as interest, are what the
government should return to the petitioners after the government took over their lands without full payment of just
compensation. In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be equivalent to the principal
sum of the just compensation due; interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance
of this principal sum after taking has been completed. This is the compensation arrangement that should prevail
if such compensation is to satisfy the constitutional standard of being just.
Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation due before the finality of the judgment of this Court justify the
reduction of the interest due them. To rule otherwise would be to forget that the petitioners had to wait twelve years
from the time they gave up their lands before the government fully paid the principal of the just compensation due
them. These were twelve years when they had no income from their landholdings because these landholdings have
immediately been taken; no income, or inadequate income, accrued to them from the proceeds of compensation
payment due them because full payment has been withheld by government.
If the full payment of the principal sum of the just compensation is legally significant at all under the circumstances
of this case, the significance is only in putting a stop to the running of the interest due because the principal of the
just compensation due has been paid. To close our eyes to these realities is to condone what is effectively a
confiscatory action in favor of the LBP.
That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be paid is not per se an inequitable or
unconscionable situation, considering the length of time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve long years.
From the perspective of interest income, twelve years would have been sufficient for the petitioners to double the
principal, even if invested conservatively, had they been promptly paid the principal of the just compensation due
them. Moreover, the interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and unconscionable because
it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence standards that have taken into account fairness
and equity in setting the interest rates due for the use or forebearance of money.
If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself to blame, as this interest piled up because it
unreasonably acted in its valuation of the landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay the petitioners. To
be sure, the consequences of this failure i.e., the enormity of the total interest due and the alleged financial
hemorrhage the LBP may suffer should not be the very reason that would excuse it from full compliance. To so rule
is to use extremely flawed logic. To so rule is to disregard the question of how the LBP, a government financial
institution that now professes difficulty in paying interest at 12% per annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay
the petitioners for twelve long years.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this Court should tread lightly in imposing liabilities on the LBP because
this bank represents the government and, ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say that public interest refers to
what will benefit the public, not necessarily the government and its agencies whose task is to contribute to the benefit
of the public. Greater public benefit will result if government agencies like the LBP are conscientious in undertaking
its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this case. Greater public interest would be served if it can
contribute to the credibility of the governments land reform program through the conscientious handling of
its part of this program.
As our last point, equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and
jurisprudence.[34] As we have shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the
present case. There is thus no occasion for the equitable consideration that Justice Chico-Nazario suggested.
The Amount Due the Petitioners as Just Compensation
As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the difference between the price of the expropriated
lands (determined with finality to be P1,383,179,000.00) and the amount of P411,769,168.32 already paid to the
petitioners. The difference between these figures amounts to the remaining balance of P971,409,831.68 that was
only paid on May 9, 2008.
As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the
petitioners properties were taken on December 9, 1996 up to the time of payment. At this rate, the LBP now
owes the petitioners the total amount of One Billion Three Hundred Thirty-One Million One Hundred Twenty-Four
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Three and 05/100 Pesos (P1,331,124,223.05), computed as follows:
Just Compensation P971,409,831.68
Legal Interest from 12/09/1996
To 05/09/2008 @ 12%/annum
12/09/1996 to 12/31/1996 23 days 7,345,455.17
01/01/1997 to 12/31/2007 11 years 1,282,260,977.82
01/01/2008 to 05/09/2008 130 days 41,517,790.07
P1,331,124,223.05[35]
The Immutability of Judgment Issue
As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of
what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.[36] In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions
to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice and where special
and compelling reasons called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[37] Galman v.
Sandiganbayan,[38] Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications Commission,[39] and Republic
v. de los Angeles,[40] we reversed our judgment on the second motion for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping
and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations Commission,[41] we did so on a third motion for
reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v. Romillo[42] and Cosio v. de Rama,[43] we modified or amended our ruling on the
second motion for reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals,[44] Tan Tiac Chiong v.
172
Hon. Cosico,[45] Manotok IV v. Barque,[46] and Barnes v. Padilla,[47] we recalled entries of judgment after finding that
doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:
x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified,
directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared
to be final.[48] [Emphasis supplied.]
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from these discussions.
A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how
can compensation in an eminent domain be just when the payment for the compensation for property already taken
has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in
this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that under
eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that
these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a private interest matter is an extremely
shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.
As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences
of delay in the payment of just compensation have been settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled jurisprudence
on the issue alone accords this case primary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of
grounds, all the rulings we have established in the past.
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the nation
because of the subject matter involved agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly
sought to achieve in the past half century. This reform program and its objectives would suffer a major setback if the
government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in implementing the
needed reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda that the Solicitor General, no less,
pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and abuse, to the idea of revolution. [49] This linkage, to our mind,
remains valid even if the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of the agrarian
reform program.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. [50] As we explained in Ginete v. Court of
Appeals:[51]
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power
to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself
has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
xxxx
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.[52] [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[53] we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
"should give way to the realities of the situation.[54] [Emphasis supplied.]
We made the same recognition in Barnes,[55] on the underlying premise that a courts primordial and most important
duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final
and executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and erroneous conclusion that the petitioners are
not entitled to 12% interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn the assailed Resolution. We
shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the
rectification, we shall let the opportunity pass.
Attorneys Fees
We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the petitioners attorneys fees when it fixed the just compensation due
and decreed that interest of 12% should be paid on the balance outstanding after the taking of the petitioners
landholdings took place. The petitioners, however, have not raised the award of attorneys fees as an issue in the
present motion for reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not touch on this issue at all in this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court En Bancs
Resolution dated December 4, 2009, as well as the Third Divisions Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and December
19, 2007, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation and
Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed
from the date the Government took the properties on December 9, 1996, until the respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines paid on May 9, 2008 the balance on the principal amount.
173
Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period, payment shall be in monthly installments at the rate
of P60,000,000.00 per month until the whole amount owing, including interest on the outstanding balance, is fully
paid.
Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO
AND ERWIN COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO AND FELITA
ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER LAS PIAS, LINDA LAYDA,
RESTITUTO MARIANO, SPS. ARNOLD AND MIRIAM
MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND WENCESLAO A. RAPACON,
SPS. ROMEO AND EMILYN HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO,
SPS. HELEN AND ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE TUAZON,
SPS. ZALDO AND MIA SALES, SPS. JOSEFINA AND JOEL
YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS. WILMA
AND MARIO ANDRADA, SPS. RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA
LELIS, FREDY AND SUSANA PILONEO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored their
repeated demands to vacate them.
Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas
Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the question of ownership must
first be settled before the issue of possession may be resolved.
During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed expropriation proceedings covering
G.R. No. 189239 the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project
therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a
Present: Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J., Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case against
BRION, petitioners, disposing as follows:
BERSAMIN
VILLARAMA, JR., and WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Leticia and Ervin
SERENO, JJ. Abad et. als. ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them
to VACATE and SURRENDER possession of the premises (Lots covered by TCT NOS. (71065) 21712 and (71066)
21713 otherwise known as Purok I Silverio Compound, Barangay San Isidro, Paraaque City to plaintiff and to PAY the
said plaintiff as follows:
1. The reasonable compensation in the amount of P20,000.00 a month commencing November 20, 2002 and
every month thereafter until the defendants shall have finally vacated the premises and surrender peaceful
possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, and finally
Promulgated: 3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[1] (emphasis in the original)
November 24, 2010
The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they still maintain ownership
thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the
project beneficiaries have yet to be named.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4, 2008, [2] reversed the MeTC decision
DECISION and dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:

CARPIO MORALES, J.: x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents herein) is unlawful detainer as shown by the
allegations of the Complaint. The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not the allegations of the Complaint
Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (respondents), co-owners of that finally determine whether a case is unlawful detainer, rather it is the evidence in the case.
two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21712 and 21713, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners before the Paraaque Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC).

174

Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of tolerance. Tolerance of the occupation of the property must be
present right from the start of the defendants possession. The phrase from the start of defendants possession is
significant. When there is no tolerance right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered, the case
of unlawful detainer will not prosper.[3] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the continuation of the
unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been rendered in the expropriation proceedings
which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the . . . final judgment and
writ of possession due to non-payment of just compensation:
The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties subject of this case had already been given to the
City of Paraaque since January 19, 2006 after they were expropriated. It is serious error for the court a quo to
rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development
Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which were already expropriated in favor of the
City of Paraaque.
There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo that the case for expropriation in the Regional Trial
Court would not bar, suspend or abate the ejectment proceedings. The court a quo had failed to consider the fact
that the case for expropriation was already decided by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 way back in the year
2006 or 2 years before the court a quo rendered its judgment in the unlawful detainer case in the year 2008. In fact,
there was already a Writ of Possession way back in the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation case by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 196. The court a quo has no valid reason to disregard the said final judgment and
the writ of possession already issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the City of Paraaque and against
Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation and make another judgment
concerning possession of the subject properties contrary to the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 196.[4] (emphasis in the original)
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they maintained that respondents act of
allowing several years to pass without requiring [them] to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts
to acquiescence or tolerance of their possession.[5]
By Decision of May 27, 2009,[6] the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not present evidence to rebut
respondents allegation of possession by tolerance, and considering petitioners admission that they commenced
occupation of the property without the permission of the previous owner ─ Pilipinas Development Corporation ─ as
indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor-in-interest, ruled in favor of respondents. Held the appellate court:
Where the defendants entry upon the land was with plaintiffs tolerance from the date and fact of entry, unlawful
detainer proceedings may be instituted within one year from the demand on him to vacate upon demand. The status
of such defendant is analogous to that of a tenant or lessee, the term of whose lease, has expired but whose
occupancy is continued by the tolerance of the lessor. The same rule applies where the defendant purchased the
house of the former lessee, who was already in arrears in the payment of rentals, and thereafter occupied the
premises without a new lease contract with the landowner.[7]
Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate court, citing Republic
v. Gingoyon,[8] held the same does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court a quo is
REVOKED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March 3, 2008 is hereby
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION [by] deleting the award for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26, 2009, hence, the filing of the
present petition for review.
The petition fails.
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public use upon payment
of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the
constitutional provisions on social justice.[9]
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution held in
abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538[10] enlightens, however:
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging
to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall
be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary
negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they
become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension. They
nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert
a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings
designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to continue staying there.
Petitioners position does not lie.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the Local Government Code
(LGC):
175

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount
to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of
the property.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation[11] clearly outlines the stages of expropriation, viz:
In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the premises nor filing an action to eject
him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendants possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee
or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case,
the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They stepped into the shoes of the
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners. Even if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal against petitioners to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed petitioners
of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be possession by tolerance.
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, G.R. No. 168770
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and CIELO
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than OUANO MARTINEZ,
three (3) commissioners x x x . Petitioners, Present:
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is
not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case - versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the VELASCO, JR.,
NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation.[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and DEL CASTILLO,
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU, PEREZ, JJ.
ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no Respondents.
evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys possession of the lots, contrary x-------------------------------------------x
to Section 19 of the LGC.
MACTAN-CEBUINTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the AUTHORITY (MCIAA), G.R. No. 168812
initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so.[13] Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on Petitioner,
the basis of the ordinance.
- versus -
Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are
automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before RICARDO L. INOCIAN, in his personal capacity and as
they can be considered to be beneficiaries. Attorney-in-Fact of OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES, EMILIA E.
BACALLA, RESTITUTA E. MONTANA, and RAUL L.
In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession is by mere tolerance. This too INOCIAN; and ALETHA SUICO MAGAT, in her personal
fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v. Pascual:[14] capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of PHILIP M. SUICO,
DORIS S. DELA CRUZ, JAMES M. SUICO, EDWARD M.
SUICO, ROSELYN SUICO-LAWSIN, REX M. SUICO,
176
KHARLA SUICO-GUTIERREZ, ALBERT CHIONGBIAN,
and JOHNNY CHAN,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
February 9, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the issue of the right of the former
owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or secure reconveyance
of their respective properties.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168770, petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, Leticia
Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the Decision[1] dated September 3, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027, affirming the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 57 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-20743, a suit to compel the Republic of the Philippines
and/or the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a parcel of land.
The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168812, has the MCIAA seeking principally to annul and set aside the
Decision[2] and Resolution[3] dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
64356, sustaining the RTC, Branch 13 in Cebu City in its Decision of October 7, 1988 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370.
Per its October 19, 2005 Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
Except for the names of the parties and the specific lot designation involved, the relevant factual antecedents which
gave rise to these consolidated petitions are, for the most part, as set forth in the Courts Decision[4] of October 15,
2003, as reiterated in a Resolution[5] dated August 9, 2005, in G.R. No. 156273 entitled Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and
Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (Heirs of Moreno), and in other earlier related cases.[6]
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the
properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942,
and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, as a
sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion
project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.
Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others,
however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was
viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A,
745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al.
On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the Republic, disposing,
in part, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the expropriation of Lots Nos. 75, 76, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107, 108, 104, 921-A, 88, 93, 913-B,
72, 77, 916, 777-A, 918, 919, 920, 764-A, 988, 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 762-A, 763-A, 951, 942, 720-A, x x x and
947, included in the Lahug Airport, Cebu City, justified in and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain.
xxxx
3. After the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing the latter to deliver to the plaintiff
the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title to their respective lots; and upon the presentation of the said titles to
the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel the same and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates
of Title in the name of the plaintiff.[7]
In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the owners of the lots no longer appealed the
decision of the trial court.[8] Following the finality of the judgment of condemnation, certificates of title for the covered
parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic which, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958,[9] were
subsequently transferred to MCIAA.
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely ceased
operations, Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the
ground, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no expansion
of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the
government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase. The demands went unheeded. Civil
suits followed.
G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition)
On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who originally owned six [6]
of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others, successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the
original owner of two (2) of the condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a
complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-18370, was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the court.
On September 29, 1997, one Albert Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of Lot Nos. 761-A and 762-
A but which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to intervene.
During the pre-trial, MCIAA admitted the following facts:
177

1. That the properties, which are the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, are also the properties
involved in Civil Case R-1881;
2. That the purpose of the expropriation was for the expansion of the old Lahug Airport; that
the Lahug Airport was not expanded;
3. That the old Lahug Airport was closed sometime in June 1992;
4. That the price paid to the lot owners in the expropriation case is found in the decision of the court; and
5. That some properties were reconveyed by the MCIAA because the previous owners were able to secure
express waivers or riders wherein the government agreed to return the properties should the expansion of
the Lahug Airport not materialize.
During trial, the Inocians adduced evidence which included the testimony of Ricardo Inocian (Inocian) and Asterio
Uy (Uy). Uy, an employee of the CAA, testified that he was a member of the team which negotiated for the acquisition
of certain lots in Lahug for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport. He recalled that he acted as
the interpreter/spokesman of the team since he could speak the Cebuano dialect. He stated that the other members
of the team of negotiators were Atty. Pedro Ocampo, Atty. Lansang, and Atty. Saligumba. He recounted that, in the
course of the negotiation, their team assured the landowners that their landholdings would be reconveyed to them in
the event the Lahug Airport would be abandoned or if its operation were transferred to the MactanAirport. Some
landowners opted to sell, while others were of a different bent owing to the inadequacy of the offered price.
Inocian testified that he and his mother, Isabel Lambaga, attended a meeting called by the NAC team of negotiators
sometime in 1947 or 1949 where he and the other landowners were given the assurance that they could repurchase
their lands at the same price in the event the Lahug Airport ceases to operate. He further testified that they rejected
the NACs offer. However, he said that they no longer appealed the decree of expropriation due to the repurchase
assurance adverted to.
The MCIAA presented Michael Bacarizas (Bacarizas), who started working for MCIAA as legal assistant in 1996. He
testified that, in the course of doing research work on the lots subject of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, he discovered
that the same lots were covered by the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. He also found out that the said decision
did not expressly contain any condition on the matter of repurchase.
Ruling of the RTC
On October 7, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered directing defendant Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey (free from liens and encumbrances) to plaintiffs Ricardo Inocian, Olimpia E.
Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana and Raul Inocian Lots No. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, 761-A
and to plaintiffs Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Doris S. dela Cruz, James M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn
S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez Lots No. 942 and 947, after plaintiffs shall have paid MCIAA the
sums indicated in the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. Defendant MCIAA is likewise directed to pay the
aforementioned plaintiffs the sum or P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses.
Albert Chiongbians intervention should be, as it is hereby DENIED for utter lack of factual basis.
With costs against defendant MCIAA.[10]
Therefrom, MCIAA went to the CA on appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64356.
Ruling of the CA
On January 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment for the Inocians, declaring them entitled to the reconveyance of the
questioned lots as the successors-in-interest of the late Isabel Limbaga and Santiago Suico, as the case may be,
who were the former registered owners of the said lots. The decretal portion of the CAs Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed
in this case and AFFFIRMING the decision rendered by the court a quo on October 7, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-
18370.
SO ORDERED.
The CA, citing and reproducing excerpts from Heirs of Moreno,[11] virtually held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881 was conditional, stating that the expropriation of [plaintiff-appellees] lots for the proposed expansion of the
Lahug Airport was ordered by the CFI of Cebu under the impression that Lahug Airport would continue in
operation.[12] The condition, as may be deduced from the CFIs decision, was that should MCIAA, or its precursor
agency, discontinue altogether with the operation of Lahug Airport, then the owners of the lots expropriated may, if
so minded, demand of MCIAA to make good its verbal assurance to allow the repurchase of the properties. To the
CA, this assurance, a demandable agreement of repurchase by itself, has been adequately established.
On September 21, 2005, the MCIAA filed with Us a petition for review of the CAs Decision, docketed as G.R. No.
168812.
G.R. No. 168770 (Ouano Petition)
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No.
763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to
exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997,
the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20743.
Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over
the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 not having found any reversionary condition.
Ruling of the RTC
178
By a Decision dated November 28, 2000, the RTC, Branch 57 in Cebu City ruled in favor of the Ouanos, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Anunciacion
Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez and against the Republic of the
Philippines and Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to restore to plaintiffs, the possession and
ownership of their land, Lot No. 763-A upon payment of the expropriation price to defendants; and
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title from defendant Republic of the
Philippines on Lot 763-A, canceling TCT No. 52004 in the name of defendant Republic of the Philippines and to issue
a new title on the same lot in the names of Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and
Cielo Ouano Martinez.
No pronouncement as to costs.[13]
Acting on the motion of the Republic and MCIAA for reconsideration, however, the RTC, Branch 57 in Cebu City,
presided this time by Judge Enriqueta L. Belarmino, issued, on December 9, 2002, an Order [14] that reversed its
earlier decision of November 28, 2000 and dismissed the Ouanos complaint.
Ruling of the CA
In time, the Ouanos interposed an appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78027. Eventually, the appellate
court rendered a Decision[15] dated September 3, 2004, denying the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated December 9, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, 7 th Judicial
Region, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-20743, is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Explaining its case disposition, the CA stated that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 did not state any condition
that Lot No. 763-A of the Ouanosand all covered lots for that matterwould be returned to them or that they could
repurchase the same property if it were to be used for purposes other than for the Lahug Airport. The appellate court
also went on to declare the inapplicability of the Courts pronouncement in MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, RTC, Branch
9, Cebu City, Melba Limbago, et al.,[16] to support the Ouanos cause, since the affected landowners in that
case, unlike the Ouanos, parted with their property not through expropriation but via a sale and purchase transaction.
The Ouanos filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs Decision, but was denied per the CAs May 26, 2005
Resolution.[17] Hence, they filed this petition in G.R. No. 168770.
The Issues
G.R. No. 168812
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
l. THE ASSAILED ISSUANCES ILLEGALLY STRIPPED THE REPUBLIC OF ITS ABSOLUTE AND
UNCONDITIONAL TITLE TO THE SUBJECT EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES.
ll. THE IMPUNGED DISPOSITIONS INVALIDLY OVERTURNED THIS HONORABLE COURTS FINAL
RULINGS IN FERY V. MUNICIPALITY OF CABANATUAN, MCIAA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND REYES V.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY.
lll. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THIS HONORABLE COURTS RULING
IN MORENO, ALBEIT IT HAS NOT YET ATTAINED FINALITY.[18]
G.R. No. 168770
Questions of law presented in this Petition
Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the promises, assurances and representations by
the airport officials and lawyers are inadmissbale under the Statute of Frauds.
Whether or not under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno Case, and pursuant to the principles
enunciated therein, petitioners herein are entitiled to recover their litigated property.
Reasons for Allowances of this Petition
Respondents did not object during trial to the admissibility of petitioners testimonial evidence under the Statute of
Frauds and have thus waived such objection and are now barred from raising the same. In any event, the Statute of
Frauds is not applicable herein. Consequently, petitioners evidence is admissible and should be duly given weight
and credence, as initially held by the trial court in its original Decision.[19]
While their respective actions against MCIAA below ended differently, the Ouanos and the Inocians proffered
arguments presented before this Court run along parallel lines, both asserting entitlement to recover the litigated
property on the strength of the Courts ruling in Heirs of Moreno. MCIAA has, however, formulated in its Consolidated
Memorandum the key interrelated issues in these consolidated cases, as follows:
I
WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE
EXPROPRIATED ENTITLES PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. TO
REACQUIRE THEM.
II
WHETHER PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO
RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED VERBAL
PROMISE OR ASSURANCE OF SOME NAC OFFICIALS THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WILL BE
RETUNRED IF THE AIRPORT PROJECT WOULD BE ABANDONED.
179

The Courts Ruling
The Republic and MCIAAs petition in G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit, while the Ouano petition in G.R. No. 168770
is meritorious.
At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized:
First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of
expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the
expansion and development of Lahug Airport.
Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased
by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex.[20]
Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given
assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they
are no longer used for airport purposes.[21] No less than Asterio Uy, the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, one of the
members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airports
expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug
Airport is abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their properties.[22] In Civil
Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit G, the transcript of the deposition[23] of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the
assurance made had been formally offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of
the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the
CA, recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors in interest [24] and resolved
the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and promise of the government to return the lots
taken should the planned airport expansion do not materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of Moreno, thus:
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there exists an undeniable historical
narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties covered
by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airports
venue. Some acted on this assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise
of eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondents predecessors that they would not
appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase was extended to them. A handful failed
to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted with ownership of their land.[25] (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)
For perspective, Heirs of Morenolater followed by MCIAA v. Tudtud (Tudtud)[26] and the consolidated cases at baris
cast under the same factual setting and centered on the expropriation of privately-owned lots for the public purpose
of expanding the Lahug Airport and the alleged promise of reconveyance given by the negotiating NAC officials to
the private lot owners. All the lots being claimed by the former owners or successors-in-interest of the former owners
in the Heirs of Moreno, Tudtud, and the present cases were similarly adjudged condemned in favor of the Republic
in Civil Case No. R-1881. All the claimants sought was or is to have the condemned lots reconveyed to them upon
the payment of the condemnation price since the public purpose of the expropriation was never met.Indeed, the
expropriated lots were never used and were, in fact, abandoned by the expropriating government agencies.
In all then, the issues and supporting arguments presented by both sets of petitioners in these consolidated cases
have already previously been passed upon, discussed at length, and practically peremptorily resolved in Heirs of
Moreno and the November 2008 Tudtud ruling. The Ouanos, as petitioners in G.R. No. 168770, and the Inocians, as
respondents in G.R. No. 168812, are similarly situated as the heirs of Moreno in Heirs of Moreno and Benjamin
Tudtud in Tudtud. Be that as it may, there is no reason why the ratio decidendi in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud should
not be made to apply to petitioners Ouanos and respondents Inocians such that they shall be entitled to recover their
or their predecessors respective properties under the same manner and arrangement as the heirs of Moreno and
Tudtud. Stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
established).[27]
Just like in Tudtud and earlier in Heirs of Moreno, MCIAA would foist the theory that the judgment of condemnation
in Civil Case No. R-1881 was without qualification and was unconditional. It would, in fact, draw attention to the fallo of
the expropriation courts decision to prove that there is nothing in the decision indicating that the government gave
assurance or undertook to reconvey the covered lots in case the Lahug airport expansion project is aborted.
Elaborating on this angle, MCIAA argues that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged verbal
assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their landholdings is barred by the Statute of
Frauds.[28]
Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale or
acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of the contract be in writing and
subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents.
MCIAAs invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute applies only to executory and
not to completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts.[29]Carbonnel v. Poncio, et al., quoting Chief Justice
Moran, explains the rationale behind this rule, thusly:
x x x The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they may be in writing
there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has been precisely been enacted
to prevent fraud. x x x However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence
would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him from
the transaction in litigation, and at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or
contracted by him thereby.[30] (Emphasis in the original.)
Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition that the agreement
package between the government and the private lot owners was already partially performed by the government
through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish
the more important condition in the CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated upon: the expansion
of the Lahug Airport. The projectthe public purpose behind the forced property takingwas, in fact, never pursued and,
as a consequence, the lots expropriated were abandoned. Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in
an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove
the transaction.
180
At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not
timely raised. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not, as the Ouanos and the Inocians posit,
object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to allow the former landowners to repurchase
their respective properties upon the occurrence of certain events.
In a bid to deny the lot owners the right to repurchase, MCIAA, citing cases,[31] points to the dispositive part of the
decision in Civil Case R-1881 which, as couched, granted the Republic absolute title to the parcels of land declared
expropriated. The MCIAA is correct about the unconditional tone of the dispositive portion of the decision, but that
actuality would not carry the day for the agency. Addressing the matter of the otherwise absolute tenor of the CFIs
disposition in Civil Case No. R-1881, the Court, in Heirs of Moreno, after taking stock of the ensuing portion of the
body of the CFIs decision, said:
As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being
constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air
traffic of both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the
North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is the MactanAirport to be placed in operation
and whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of the
Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgments for those of the said departments
or agencies. In the absence of such showing, the court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be
in operation.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
We went on to state as follows:
While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for
the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of the Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose
not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that Lahug Airport will continue
to be in operation. Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decisionwarrant the conclusion that the
expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer in
operation. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such
and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis the expropriated
lots x x x as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and (b) the
foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of
the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the
findings as contained in the body thereof.[33]
Not to be overlooked of course is what the Court said in its Resolution disposing of MCIAAs motion to reconsider the
original ruling in Heirs of Moreno. In that resolution, We stated that the fallo of the decision in Civil Case R-1881
should be viewed and understood in connection with the entire text, which contemplated a return of the property
taken if the airport expansion project were abandoned. For ease of reference, following is what the Court wrote:
Moreover, we do not subscribe to the [MCIAAs] contention that since the possibility of the Lahug Airports closure
was actually considered by the trial court, a stipulation on reversion or repurchase was so material that it should not
have been discounted by the court a quo in its decision in Civil Case No. R-1881, if, in fact, there was one. We find
it proper to cite, once more, this Courts ruling that the fallo of the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 must be read in
reference to the other portions of the decision in which it forms a part. A reading of the Courts judgment must not be
confined to the dispositive portion alone; rather it should be meaningfully construed in unanimity with the ratio
decidendi thereof to grasp the true intent and meaning of a decision.[34]
The Court has, to be sure, taken stock of Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[35] a case MCIAA cites at every possible
turn, where the Court made these observations:
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned, the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. x x x If, upon the contrary, however the decree
of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the
expropriator x x x and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings x x x.
Fery notwithstanding, MCIAA cannot really rightfully say that it has absolute title to the lots decreed expropriated in
Civil Case No. R-1881. The correct lesson of Fery is captured by what the Court said in that case, thus: the
government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title
over the properties. In light of our disposition in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud, the statement immediately adverted to
means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner
shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed
in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. But as has been determined below, the decision in
Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase
upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. To borrow from our underlying decision in Heirs of Moreno, [n]o
doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could readily be justified as the manifest
legal effect of consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption that Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities. [36]
Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians right to repurchase is what in Heirs of Moreno was referred
to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code,[37] the purpose
of which is to prevent unjust enrichment.[38] In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their
respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport;
failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of
land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived
nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In effect, the government merely held the properties
condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually
consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the
transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old
properties after the payment of the condemnation price.
Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the
legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good conscience, retain the beneficial interest. We add, however, as
in Heirs of Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of equitythe landowners in this instance, in establishing the
trustmust himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and reasonable.
181
The Court, in the recent MCIAA v. Lozada, Sr., revisited and abandoned the Fery ruling that the former owner is not
entitled to reversion of the property even if the public purpose were not pursued and were abandoned, thus:
On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery, which involved an expropriation suit commenced
upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market. Instead of putting up a public market,
respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for lease on the area. Claiming that the municipality lost its
right to the property taken since it did not pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots
expropriated, sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in 1915, respondent Cabanatuan
acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question, judgment was rendered in favor of the municipality, following
American jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.S. RY. Co., McConihay v. Theodore
Wright, and Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the
expropriated real property, which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for which
the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous owner, the title of the expropriating
agency being one of fee simple.
Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file
another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation
suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property
owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice,
fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued,
and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. [39] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clinging to Fery, specifically the fee simple concept underpinning it, is no longer compelling, considering the ensuing
inequity such application entails. Too, the Court resolved Fery not under the cover of any of the Philippine
Constitutions, each decreeing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
twin elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of
eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The fee does not vest until payment of just
compensation.[40]
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to
defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property
against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state
must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be
specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. [41] If the genuine public
necessitythe very reason or condition as it wereallowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The
same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different
from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the
direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen,
who will use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws.[42]
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the
said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in
keeping with the idea of fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a
fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and
more recently in Lozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which
was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one
without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into
play.There is really no occasion to apply the fee simple concept if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private
land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a
necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so
desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the
owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield ownership to the government which reneges on
its assurance that the private property shall be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the
power of eminent domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another with influence and power in the
political process, including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued
application of Fery.Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted allegation
that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This
provides an added dimension to abandon Fery.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in
question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian
return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus
legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation.[43] They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred in
182
sustaining their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent (3) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L. Inocian, et al. in G.R. No.
that they, as private owners, were benefited thereby. 168812 shall RETAIN whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the
meantime without any obligation to refund the same to MCIAA.
In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits SO ORDERED.
it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the Ouanos and Inocians need not require the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 165828
accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as just compensation.[44]
Petitioner,
Present:
Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that [i]f the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x, the Ouanos and Inocians do not have to settle the
- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
merely the natural effect of nature and time.
BERSAMIN,
HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely: DEL CASTILLO, and
Finally, We delete the award of PhP 50,000 and PhP 10,000, as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, respectively,
CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
made in favor of the Inocians by the Cebu City RTC in its judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, as later affirmed
EDGAR, PUTRI , MONGKOY*, and AMIR, all surnamed
by the CA. As a matter of sound policy, no premium should be set on the right to litigate where there is no doubt
MACABANGKIT, Promulgated:
about the bona fides of the exercise of such right,[45] as here, albeit the decision of MCIAA to resist the former
Respondents.
landowners claim eventually turned out to be untenable.
August 24, 2011
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 168770 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated September 3,
2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
ordered to reconvey subject Lot No. 763-A to petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano
Arnaiz, and Cielo Ouano Martinez. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation DECISION
of title and transfer it in the name of the petitioners within fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment.
The petition of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority in G.R. No. 168812 is DENIED, and the CAs Decision BERSAMIN, J.:
and Resolution dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356 Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
are AFFIRMED, except insofar as they awarded attorneys fees and litigation expenses that are hereby DELETED. Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution
Accordingly, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey to respondents Ricardo L. Inocian,
Olympia E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana, and Raul L. Inocian the litigated Lot Nos. 744-A, 745- The application of this provision of the Constitution is the focus of this appeal.
A, 746, 762-A, 747, and 761-A; and to respondents Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Dolores S. dela Cruz, James
M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico, and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez the litigated Lot Nos. 942 Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the review on certiorari of the decision promulgated on October
and 947. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and transfer it in 5, 2004,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision dated August 13, 1999 and the supplemental
the name of respondents within a period of fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment. decision dated August 18, 1999, ordering NPC to pay just compensation to the respondents, both rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Iligan City (RTC).
The foregoing dispositions are subject to QUALIFICATIONS, to apply to these consolidated petitions, when
appropriate, as follows: Antecedents

(1) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L Inocian, et al. in G.R. No. 168812 are Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power
ordered to return to the MCIAA the just compensation they or their predecessors-in-interest received for the Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity
expropriation of their respective lots as stated in Civil Case No. R-1881, within a period of sixty (60) days from finality for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water
of judgment; flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.[2]

(2) The MCIAA shall be entitled to RETAIN whatever fruits and income it may have obtained from the subject
expropriated lots without any obligation to refund the same to the lot owners; and
On November 21, 1997, the respondents, namely: Cebu, Bangowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Edgar, Putri,
Mongkoy and Amir, all surnamed Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land with an area of 221,573
square meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the
property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation.[3] They alleged that they had belatedly
183
discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation
of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that their discovery had occurred
in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra, President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their
offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language
Training Center and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by
Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same
reason; that Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral
because of the presence of the underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their
knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud
sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers
to relocate to safer grounds.
In its answer with counterclaim,[4] NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under
section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their
cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been
constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising
from such easement prescribed in five years.
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 1998, an ocular inspection of the land that was conducted by RTC Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara and
the representatives of the parties resulted in the following observations and findings:
a. That a concrete post which is about two feet in length from the ground which according to the claimants is the
middle point of the tunnel.
b. That at least three fruit bearing durian trees were uprooted and as a result of the construction by the defendant
of the tunnel and about one hundred coconuts planted died.
c. That underground tunnel was constructed therein.[5]
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit),[6] decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. The prayer for the removal or dismantling of defendants tunnel is denied. However, defendant is hereby directed
and ordered:
a)To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227,065 square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS
per square meter, or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND
AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00), PESOS, plus interest, as actual damages or just compensation;
b) To pay plaintiff a monthly rental of their land in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS
from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum;
c)To pay plaintiffs the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages;
d) To pay plaintiffs, the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as exemplary damages;
e)To pay plaintiffs, the sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded, as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that NPC had concealed the construction of the tunnel in 1979 from the Heirs of Macabangkit, and
had since continuously denied its existence; that NPC had acted in bad faith by taking possession of the subterranean
portion of their land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and prior consent; that the existence of the tunnel
had affected the entire expanse of the land, and had restricted their right to excavate or to construct a motorized
deep well; and that they, as owners, had lost the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of the land.
The RTC fixed the just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on the testimony of Dionisio Banawan, OIC-
City Assessor of Iligan City, to the effect that the appraised value of the adjoining properties ranged from P700.00
to P750.00, while the appraised value of their affected land ranged from P400.00 to P500.00. The RTC also required
NPC to pay rentals from 1979 due to its bad faith in concealing the construction of the tunnel from the Heirs of
Macabangkit.
On August 18, 1999, the RTC issued a supplemental decision, [7] viz:
Upon a careful review of the original decision dated August 13, 1999, a sentence should be added to paragraph 1(a)
of the dispositive portion thereof, to bolster, harmonize, and conform to the findings of the Court, which is quoted
hereunder, to wit:
Consequently, plaintiffs land or properties are hereby condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation,
upon payment of the aforesaid sum.
Therefore, paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original decision should read, as follows:
a) To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227,065 square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00)
PESOS per square meter, or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO
THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00) PESOS, plus interest, as actual damages or just
compensation; Consequently, plaintiffs land or properties are hereby condemned in favor of defendant National
Power Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid sum;
This supplemental decision shall be considered as part of paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original
decision.
Furnish copy of this supplemental decision to all parties immediately.
184
SO ORDERED.
On its part, NPC appealed to the CA on August 25, 1999.[8]
Earlier, on August 18, 1999, the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment pending
appeal.[9] The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution,[10]prompting NPC to assail the writ by petition
for certiorari in the CA. On September 15, 1999, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the
RTC from implementing its decision. The Heirs of Macabangkit elevated the ruling of the CA (G.R. No. 141447),
but the Court upheld the CA on May 4, 2006.[11]
Ruling of the CA
NPC raised only two errors in the CA, namely:
I serving.
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT NAPOCORS UNDERGROUND TUNNEL IN ITS
AGUS RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC PLANT PROJECT TRAVERSED AND/OR AFFECTED APPELLEES
PROPERTY AS THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE INDUBITABLY ESTABLISHING THE SAME
II
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES CLAIMS IN THEIR ENTIRETY FOR
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT NAPOCORS UNDERGROUND TUNNEL INDEED TRAVERSED APPELLEES
PROPERTY, THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION, ESTOPPEL AND
LACHES
On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, holding that the testimonies of NPCs witness Gregorio
Enterone and of the respondents witness Engr. Pete Sacedon, the topographic survey map, the sketch map, and the
ocular inspection report sufficiently established the existence of the underground tunnel traversing the land of the
Heirs of Macabangkit; that NPC did not substantiate its defense that prescription already barred the claim of the Heirs
of Macabangkit; and that Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395, being silent about tunnels, did not apply, viz:
As regard Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), it is
submitted that the same provision is not applicable. There is nothing in Section 3(i) of said law governing claims
involving tunnels. The same provision is applicable to those projects or facilities on the surface of the land, that can
easily be discovered, without any mention about the claims involving tunnels, particularly those surreptitiously
constructed beneath the surface of the land, as in the instant case.
Now, while it is true that Republic Act No. 6395 authorizes NAPOCOR to take water from any public stream, river,
creek, lake, spring or waterfall in the Philippines for the realization of the purposes specified therein for its creation;
to intercept and divert the flow of waters from lands of riparian owners (in this case, the Heirs), and from persons
owning or interested in water which are or may be necessary to said purposes, the same Act expressly mandates
the payment of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
appealed Decision dated August 13, 1999, and the supplemental Decision dated August 18, 1999, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Issue
NPC has come to the Court, assigning the lone error that:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION AND
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DIRECTING AND ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY JUST
COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS.
NPC reiterates that witnesses Enterone and Sacedon lacked personal knowledge about the construction and
existence of the tunnel and were for that reason not entitled to credence; and that the topographic and relocation
maps prepared by Sacedon should not be a basis to prove the existence and location of the tunnel due to being self-
NPC contends that the CA should have applied Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, which provided a period of
only five years from the date of the construction within which the affected landowner could bring a claim against it;
and that even if Republic Act No. 6395 should be inapplicable, the action of the Heirs of Macabangkit had already
prescribed due to the underground tunnel being susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years
pursuant to Article 620 of the Civil Code due to its being a continuous and apparent legal easement under Article 634
of the Civil Code.
The issues for resolution are, therefore, as follows:
(1) Whether the CA and the RTC erred in holding that there was an underground tunnel traversing the Heirs of
Macabangkits land constructed by NPC; and
(2) Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic
Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation.
1.
Factual findings of the RTC,
when affirmed by the CA, are binding
The existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit, being a factual matter, cannot now be
properly reviewed by the Court, for questions of fact are beyond the pale of a petition for review on certiorari.
Moreover, the factual findings and determinations by the RTC as the trial court are generally binding on the Court,
particularly after the CA affirmed them.[13] Bearing these doctrines in mind, the Court should rightly dismiss NPCs
appeal.
NPC argues, however, that this appeal should not be dismissed because the Heirs of Macabangkit essentially failed
to prove the existence of the underground tunnel. It insists that the topographic survey map and the right-of-way map
presented by the Heirs of Macabangkit did not at all establish the presence of any underground tunnel.
185
NPC still fails to convince.
Even assuming, for now, that the Court may review the factual findings of the CA and the RTC, for NPC to insist that
the evidence on the existence of the tunnel was not adequate and incompetent remains futile. On the contrary, the
evidence on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of the topographic survey map and the sketch map (as
indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was
strong, as the CA correctly projected in its assailed decision, viz:
Among the pieces of documentary evidence presented showing the existence of the said tunnel beneath the subject
property is the topographic survey map. The topographic survey map is one conducted to know about the location
and elevation of the land and all existing structures above and underneath it. Another is the Sketch Map which shows
the location and extent of the land traversed or affected by the said tunnel. These two (2) pieces of documentary
evidence readily point the extent and presence of the tunnel construction coming from the power cavern
near the small man-made lake which is the inlet and approach tunnel, or at a distance of about two (2)
kilometers away from the land of the plaintiffs-appellees, and then traversing the entire and the whole length
of the plaintiffs-appellees property, and the outlet channel of the tunnel is another small man-made lake. This
is a sub-terrain construction, and considering that both inlet and outlet are bodies of water, the tunnel can hardly be
noticed. All constructions done were beneath the surface of the plaintiffs-appellees property. This explains why they
could never obtain any knowledge of the existence of such tunnel during the period that the same was constructed
and installed beneath their property.[14]
The power cavern and the inlet and outlet channels established the presence of the underground tunnel, based on
the declaration in the RTC by Sacedon, a former employee of the NPC.[15] It is worthy to note that NPC did not deny
the existence of the power cavern, and of the inlet and outlet channels adverted to and as depicted in the topographic
survey map and the sketch map. The CA cannot be faulted for crediting the testimony of Sacedon despite the effort
of NPC to discount his credit due to his not being an expert witness, simply because Sacedon had personal
knowledge based on his being NPCs principal engineer and supervisor tasked at one time to lay out the tunnels and
transmission lines specifically for the hydroelectric projects,[16] and to supervise the construction of the Agus 1
Hydroelectric Plant itself[17] from 1978 until his retirement from NPC.[18] Besides, he declared that he personally
experienced the vibrations caused by the rushing currents in the tunnel, particularly near the outlet channel.[19] Under
any circumstances, Sacedon was a credible and competent witness.
The ocular inspection actually confirmed the existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit.
Thus, the CA observed:
More so, the Ocular inspection conducted on July 23, 1998 further bolstered such claim of the existence and extent
of such tunnel. This was conducted by a team composed of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 01, Lanao del Norte, herself and the respective lawyers of both of the parties and found that, among
others, said underground tunnel was constructed beneath the subject property.[20]
It bears noting that NPC did not raise any issue against or tender any contrary comment on the ocular inspection
report.
2.
Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just
compensation
The CA held that Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 had no application to this action because it covered facilities
that could be easily discovered, not tunnels that were inconspicuously constructed beneath the surface of the land.[21]
NPC disagrees, and argues that because Article 635[22] of the Civil Code directs the application of special laws when
an easement, such as the underground tunnel, was intended for public use, the law applicable was Section 3(i) of
Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, which limits the action for recovery of compensation to five years from the date
of construction. It posits that the five-year prescriptive period already set in due to the construction of the underground
tunnel having been completed in 1979 yet.
Without necessarily adopting the reasoning of the CA, we uphold its conclusion that prescription did not bar the
present action to recover just compensation.
Section 3 (i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the cited law, relevantly provides:
Section 3. Powers and General Functions of the Corporation. The powers, functions, rights and activities of the
Corporation shall be the following:
xxx
(i) To construct works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway
or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works may require:Provided, That said works be
constructed in such a manner as not to endanger life or property; And provided, further, That the stream, watercourse,
canal ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway so crossed or intersected be restored as near as possible to
their former state, or in a manner not to impair unnecessarily their usefulness. Every person or entity whose right of
way or property is lawfully crossed or intersected by said works shall not obstruct any such crossings or intersection
and shall grant the Board or its representative, the proper authority for the execution of such work. The Corporation
is hereby given the right of way to locate, construct and maintain such works over and throughout the lands owned
by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches and political subdivisions. The Corporation or its
representative may also enter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business and
purposes, including the construction of the transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of such property shall
be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby;Provided, further, That said action for damages is filed
within five years after the rights of way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have
been established; Provided, finally, That after said period, no suit shall be brought to question the said rights of way,
transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities;
A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the construction of works across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location
of said works may require. It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the
term works. Accordingly, we consider the term works as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other
developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided
under paragraph (g) of Section 3.[23] The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was obviously
unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the
186
earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, so must we not. [24] Moreover, when the language of
the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is
conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey.[25]
Even so, we still cannot side with NPC.
We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an
action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently,
NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for
damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency.[26] Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify
the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property
to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[27] On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal
wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is
exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19[28] and like provisions on human
relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the
wrongdoer is held responsible.[29]
The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on
the Constitution[30] while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises
from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter
emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former
does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation,[31] for the suit is not based on tort, but
on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.[32] It would very well be
contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken
for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from the Heirs
of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case,
NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act
No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value of such property at the time of the taking, thusly:
(h) To acquire, promote, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber and otherwise dispose of property
incident to, or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which the Corporation was
created: Provided, That in case a right of way is necessary for its transmission lines, easement of right of way shall
only be sought: Provided, however, That in case the property itself shall be acquired by purchase, the cost
thereof shall be the fair market value at the time of the taking of such property.
This was what NPC was ordered to do in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim,[33] where NPC had denied the right
of the owners to be paid just compensation despite their land being traversed by the underground tunnels for
siphoning water from Lake Lanao needed in the operation of Agus II, Agus III, Agus IV, Agus VI and Agus VII
Hydroelectric Projects in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, in Nangca and Balo-I in Lanao del Norte and in Ditucalan and
Fuentes in Iligan City. There, NPC similarly argued that the underground tunnels constituted a mere easement that
did not involve any loss of title or possession on the part of the property owners, but the Court resolved against NPC,
to wit:
Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of the
respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was created
by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them
and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the
power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents property as this power encompasses not only
the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the
imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot
be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then
see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of
law.[34]
3.
NPCs construction of the tunnel
constituted taking of the land, and
entitled owners to just compensation
The Court held in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim that NPC was liable to pay not merely an easement fee but
rather the full compensation for land traversed by the underground tunnels,viz:
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner
took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition
of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the
property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are
clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the
sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land.
This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal
beneficial use. Respondents, as the owner of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just
compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than
the money equivalent of said property.[35]
Here, like in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of
Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least
informing them beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and interests
because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface,
and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.
Did such consequence constitute taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation?
187

We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the
owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use,
to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.[36] Indeed, the expropriators action may
be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.[37] Compensable
taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. [38] It is neither
necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property,[39] nor material whether the property is
removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.[40]
As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just compensation
at P500.00/square meter based on its finding on what the prevailing market value of the property was at the time of
the filing of the complaint, and the CA upheld the RTC.
We affirm the CA, considering that NPC did not assail the valuation in the CA and in this Court. NPCs silence was
probably due to the correctness of the RTCs valuation after careful consideration and weighing of the parties
evidence, as follows:
The matter of what is just compensation for these parcels of land is a matter of evidence. These parcels of land is
(sic) located in the City of Iligan, the Industrial City of the South. Witness Dionisio Banawan, OIC- City Assessors
Office, testified, Within that area, that area is classified as industrial and residential. That plaintiffs land is adjacent to
many subdivisions and that is within the industrial classification. He testified and identified Exhibit AA and AA-1, a
Certification, dated April 4, 1997, showing that the appraised value of plaintiffs land ranges from P400.00 to P500.00
per square meter (see, TSN, testimony of Dionisio Banawan, pp. 51, 57, and 71, February 9, 1999). Also, witness
Banawan, testified and identified Two (2) Deeds of Sale, marked as Exhibit AA-2 and AA-3,[] showing that the
appraised value of the land adjoining or adjacent to plaintiff land ranges from P700.00 to P750.00 per square meter.
As between the much lower price of the land as testified by defendants witness Gregorio Enterone, and that of the
City Assessor of Iligan City, the latter is more credible. Considering however, that the appraised value of the land in
the area as determined by the City Assessors Office is not uniform, this Court, is of the opinion that the reasonable
amount of just compensation of plaintiffs land should be fixed at FIVE HUNDRED (500.00) PESOS, per square meter.
xxx.[41]
The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The
CA did not dwell on the reckoning time, possibly because NPC did not assign that as an error on the part of the RTC.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its
decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when
it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already
caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior
knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the
owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more
concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process
of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just
compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely
warranted.
In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[42] a case that involved the similar construction of an underground
tunnel by NPC without the prior consent and knowledge of the owners, and in which we held that the basis in fixing
just compensation when the initiation of the action preceded the entry into the property was the time of the filing of
the complaint, not the time of taking,[43]we pointed out that there was no taking when the entry by NPC was made
without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority.
4.
Awards for rentals, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees are deleted
for insufficiency of factual and legal bases
The CA upheld the RTCs granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of P 30,000.00/month from 1979 up to July
1999 with 12% interest per annum by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to construct the
tunnel without their knowledge and consent.
Granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly
compensated. Conformably with the ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,[44] in which the
award of interest was held to render the grant of back rentals unwarranted, we delete the award of back rentals and
in its place prescribe interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the
complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. The imposition of interest of 12% interest per annum follows a long
line of pertinent jurisprudence,[45] whereby the Court has fixed the rate of interest on just compensation at 12% per
annum whenever the expropriator has not immediately paid just compensation.
The RTC did not state any factual and legal justifications for awarding to the Heirs of Macabangkit moral and
exemplary damages each in the amount of P200,000.00. The awards just appeared in the fallo of its decision. Neither
did the CA proffer any justifications for sustaining the RTC on the awards. We consider the omissions of the lower
courts as pure legal error that we feel bound to correct even if NPC did not submit that for our consideration. There
was, to begin with, no factual and legal bases mentioned for the awards. It is never trite to remind that moral and
exemplary damages, not by any means liquidated or assessed as a matter of routine, always require evidence that
establish the circumstances under which the claimant is entitled to them. Moreover, the failure of both the RTC and
the CA to render the factual and legal justifications for the moral and exemplary damages in the body of their decisions
immediately demands the striking out of the awards for being in violation of the fundamental rule that the decision
must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Without the factual and legal justifications, the awards
are exposed as the product of conjecture and speculation, which have no place in fair judicial adjudication.
We also reverse and set aside the decree of the RTC for NPC to pay to the Heirs of Macabangkit the sum equivalent
to 15% of the total amount awarded, as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost. The body of the decision did not state
the factual and legal reasons why NPC was liable for attorneys fees. The terse statement found at the end of the
body of the RTCs decision, stating: xxx The contingent attorneys fee is hereby reduced from 20% to only 15% of the
total amount of the claim that may be awarded to plaintiffs, without more, did not indicate or explain why and how the
substantial liability of NPC for attorneys fees could have arisen and been determined.
188
In assessing attorneys fees against NPC and in favor of the respondents, the RTC casually disregarded
the fundamental distinction between the two concepts of attorneys fees the ordinary and the extraordinary. These
concepts were aptly distinguished in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC,[46] thuswise:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary
concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the
client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the
losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such
as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have
agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
By referring to the award as contingency fees, and reducing the award from 20% to 15%, the RTC was really referring
to a supposed agreement on attorneys fees between the Heirs of Macabangkit and their counsel. As such, the
concept of attorneys fees involved was the ordinary. Yet, the inclusion of the attorneys fees in the judgment among
the liabilities of NPC converted the fees to extraordinary. We have to disagree with the RTC thereon, and we express
our discomfort that the CA did not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.
An award of attorneys fees has always been the exception rather than the rule. To start with, attorneys fees are not
awarded every time a party prevails in a suit.[47] Nor should an adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of
attorneys fees to the winning party.[48] The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.[49] Too, such fees, as part of damages, are assessed only in the instances specified in Art. 2208, Civil
Code.[50] Indeed, attorneys fees are in the nature of actual damages.[51] But even when a claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorneys fees may still be withheld where no
sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a partys persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction
of the righteousness of his cause.[52] And, lastly, the trial court must make express findings of fact and law that bring
the suit within the exception. What this demands is that the factual, legal or equitable justifications for the award must
be set forth
not only in the fallo but also in the text of the decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative
and conjectural.[53]
Sound policy dictates that even if the NPC failed to raise the issue of attorneys fees, we are not precluded from
correcting the lower courts patently erroneous application of the law.[54] Indeed, the Court, in supervising the lower
courts, possesses the ample authority to review legal matters like this one even if not specifically raised or assigned
as error by the parties.
5.
Attorneys fees under quantum meruit principle
are fixed at 10% of the judgment award
Based on the pending motions of Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun and Atty. Manuel D. Ballelos to assert their respective
rights to attorneys fees, both contending that they represented the Heirs of Macabangkit in this case, a conflict would
ensue from the finality of the judgment against NPC.
A look at the history of the legal representation of the Heirs of Macabangkit herein provides a helpful predicate for
resolving the conflict.
Atty. Dibaratun was the original counsel of the Heirs of Macabangkit. When the appeal was submitted for decision in
the CA,[55] Atty. Ballelos filed his entry of appearance,[56] and a motion for early decision.[57] Atty. Ballelos
subsequently filed also a manifestation,[58] supplemental manifestation,[59]
reply,[60] and ex parte motion reiterating the motion for early decision.[61] It appears that a copy of the CAs decision
was furnished solely to Atty. Ballelos. However, shortly before the rendition of the decision, Atty. Dibaratun filed in
the CA a motion to register attorneys lien, [62] alleging that he had not withdrawn his appearance and had not been
aware of the entry of appearance by Atty. Ballelos. A similar motion was also received by the Court from Atty.
Dibaratun a few days after the petition for review was filed.[63] Thus, on February 14, 2005,[64] the Court directed Atty.
Dibaratun to enter his appearance herein. He complied upon filing the comment.[65]
Amir Macabangkit confirmed Atty. Dibaratuns representation through an ex parte manifestation that he filed in his
own behalf and on behalf of his siblings Mongkoy and Putri.[66] Amir reiterated his manifestation on March 6,
2006,[67] and further imputed malpractice to Atty. Ballelos for having filed an entry of appearance bearing Amirs forged
signature and for plagiarism, i.e., copying verbatim the arguments contained in the pleadings previously filed by Atty.
Dibaratun.[68]
On September 11, 2008, Atty. Ballelos submitted two motions, to wit: (a) a manifestation and motion authorizing a
certain Abdulmajeed Djamla to receive his attorneys fees equivalent of 15% of the judgment award, [69] and (b) a
motion to register his attorneys lien that he claimed was contingent. [70]
Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that their entitlement to attorneys fees was contingent. Yet, a contract
for a contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed percentage of what may be
recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right.
Contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without which the attorney can only recover on the basis
of quantum meruit.[71] With neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos presenting a written agreement bearing upon
their supposed contingent fees, the only way to determine their right to appropriate attorneys fees is to apply the
principle of quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for determining an attorneys professional
fees in the absence of an express agreement.[72] The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a
device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself.[73] An attorney must show that he
is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain factors
in fixing the amount of legal fees.[74]
189
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper amount of
attorney fees, to wit:
Rule 20.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficult of the questions involved;
c) The important of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the intervention of the
courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and
value of the services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof.[75] Ordinarily, therefore, the
determination of the attorneys fees on quantum meruitis remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it
will be just and equitable to now assess and fix the attorneys fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution of a
comparatively simple controversy, as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent
v. NLRC,[76] would not be needlessly prolonged, by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so
much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records.
Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos each claimed attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the principal award
of P113,532,500.00, which was the amount granted by the RTC in its decision. Considering that the attorneys fees
will be defrayed by the Heirs of Macabangkit out of their actual recovery from NPC, giving to each of the two attorneys
15% of the principal award as attorneys fees would be excessive and unconscionable from the point of view of the
clients. Thus, the Court, which holds and exercises the power to fix attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis in the
absence of an express written agreement between the attorney and the client, now fixes attorneys fees at 10% of
the principal award of P113,532,500.00.
Whether it is Atty. Dibaratun or Atty. Ballelos, or both, who should receive attorneys fees from the Heirs of
Macabangkit is a question that the Court must next determine and settle by considering the amount and quality of
the work each performed and the results each obtained.
Atty. Dibaratun, the attorney from the outset, unquestionably carried the bulk of the legal demands of the case. He
diligently prepared and timely filed in behalf of the Heirs of Macabangkit every pleading and paper necessary in the
full resolution of the dispute, starting from the complaint until the very last motion filed in this Court. He consistently
appeared during the trial, and examined and cross-examined all the witnesses presented at that stage of the
proceedings. The nature, character, and substance of each pleading and the motions he prepared for the Heirs of
Macabangkit indicated that he devoted substantial time and energy in researching and preparing the case for the
trial. He even advanced P250,000.00 out of his own pocket to defray expenses from the time of the filing of the motion
to execute pending appeal until the case reached the Court.[77] His representation of all the Heirs of Macabangkit was
not denied by any of them.
We note that Atty. Dibaratun possessed some standing in the legal profession and in his local community. He formerly
served as a member of the Board of Director of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Lanao del Norte-Iligan
City Chapter, and was an IBP national awardee as Best Legal Aid Committee Chairman. He taught at Mindanao
State University College of Law Extension. He was a Municipal Mayor of Matungao, Lanao del Norte, and was
enthroned Sultan a Gaus.
In contrast, not much about the character and standing of Atty. Ballelos, as well as the nature and quality of the legal
services he rendered for the Heirs of Macabangkit are in the records. The motions he filed in the
Court and in the CA lacked enlightening research and were insignificant to the success of the clients cause. His legal
service, if it can be called that, manifested no depth or assiduousness, judging from the quality of the pleadings from
him. His written submissions in the case appeared either to have been lifted verbatim from the pleadings previously
filed by Atty. Dibaratun, or to have been merely quoted from the decisions and resolutions of the RTC and the CA.
Of the Heirs of Macabangkit, only Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Mongkoy[78] and Edgar gave their
consent to Atty. Ballelos to appear in their behalf in the CA, which he did despite Atty. Dibaratun not having yet filed
any withdrawal of his appearance. The Court did not receive any notice of appearance for the Heirs of Macabangkit
from Atty. Ballelos, but that capacity has meanwhile become doubtful in the face of Amirs strong denial of having
retained him.
In fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de parte of the Heirs of
Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in the prosecution of the clients cause to its successful end. It is he,
not Atty. Ballelos, who was entitled to the full amount of attorneys fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney.
Given the amount and quality of his legal work, his diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of
his prosecution of the clients cause, he deserves the recognition, notwithstanding that some of the clients might
appear to have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment.[79]
Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, the only parties who
engaged him. The Court considers his work in the case as very minimal. His compensation under the quantum
meruit principle is fixed at P5,000.00, and only the Heirs of Macabangkit earlier named are liable to him.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 5, 2004 by the Court of Appeals, subject
to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
190
(a) Interest at the rate of 12% per annum is IMPOSED on the principal amount of P113,532,500.00 as just
compensation, reckoned from the filing of the complaint on November 21, 1997 until the full liability is paid;
(b) The awards of P30,000.00 as rental fee, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages are DELETED; and
(c) The award of 15% attorneys fees decreed to be paid by National Power Corporation to the Heirs of Macabangkit
is DELETED.
The Court PARTLY GRANTS the motion to register attorneys lien filed by Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun,
and FIXES Atty. Dibaratuns attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit at 10% of the principal award
of P113,532,500.00.
The motion to register attorneys lien of Atty. Manuel D. Ballelos is PARTLY GRANTED, and Atty. Ballelos
is DECLARED ENTITLED TO RECOVER from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, all surnamed
Macabangkit, the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
[G.R. No. 187677. April 17, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO, respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J p:
This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 19 June 2009 assailing the Decision 2 and
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 93227 which affirmed the Orders 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44595. The RTC barred petitioner from presenting
evidence to prove its claim of ownership over the subject property, as the presentation thereof would constitute a
collateral attack on private respondents' title.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 13 July 2001, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation
of several parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. 5 Private respondents,
Spouses William and Rebecca Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land ("subject property") covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-11603 (383648) 6 and having an area of 460 square meters.
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter dated 14 June 2002 from Engr. Patrick B. Gatan,
Project Manager IV of the DPWH-NCR, reporting that the subject property was "government land and that the transfer
certificate of title of the said claimant [respondent] . . . is of dubious origin and of fabrication as it encroached or
overlapped on a government property." 7 As a result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint on 24 June
2002, 8 seeking to limit the coverage of the proceedings to an area conforming to the findings of the DPWH:
4. To accomplish said project, which is to be undertaken by the Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH],
it is necessary and urgent for plaintiff to acquire in fee simple portions of the following parcels of land belonging to,
occupied, possessed, and/or the ownership of which are being claimed by the defendants, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
[c] Defendants William O. Genato and Rebecca G. Genato. —
xxx xxx xxx
5. The portion of the above properties that are affected by the project and shaded green in the sketch plan hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex E, consisting of an area of: . . . [c] 460 square meters of the
aforedescribed property registered in the name of defendants spouses William and Rebecca Genato; . . . . (Emphasis
in the original)
On 18 July 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion 9 to have the subject property "declared or considered
of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims."
In an Order dated 10 December 2002, 10 the RTC admitted petitioner's Amended Complaint, deferred the release
to respondents the amount of eighteen million four hundred thousand pesos (P18,400,000) deposited in the bank,
equivalent to the current zonal valuation of the land, and declared the property as the subject of conflicting claims.
While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property actually belonged to the Government,
private respondents interposed objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it
constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT No. RT-11603 (383648). The RTC then required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda.
Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued on 12 July 2005 an Order 11 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the issue of the validity of the TCT No. 11603 (383648)
can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and not in this instant proceeding. Accordingly,
plaintiff is barred from presenting evidence as they [sic] constitute collateral attack on the validity of the title to the
subject lot in violation of Sec. 48 of P.D. 1529.
On 4 August 2005, petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 12 but the motion was denied by the
RTC in an Order dated 17 November 2005. 13
On 4 January 2006, private respondents filed a Motion for the payment of just compensation amounting to twenty
million seven hundred thousand pesos (P20,700,000) and for the release of eighteen million four hundred thousand
pesos (P18,400,000) deposited in the Land Bank-South Harbor Branch as partial payment. 14 This Motion remains
pending in the RTC to date.
On 9 February 2006, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 15
The appellate court ruled that since the subject property was covered by a Torrens title, Presidential Decree No.
1529, or the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), necessarily finds significance. Thus, it held that the RTC
rightly applied Sec. 48. Accordingly, the CA issued its 29 September 2008 Decision, 16 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is accordingly DENIED.
On 29 October 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 17 but the motion was also denied in a Resolution
dated 27 April 2009. 18
Hence, the instant Petition.
A Comment 19 on the Petition was filed by private respondents on 1 September 2009, and a Reply 20 thereto by
petitioner on 27 January 2010.
ISSUE
From the foregoing, the sole issue submitted for resolution before this Court is whether petitioner may be barred from
presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondents' title under TCT No. RT-11603 (383648).
THE COURT'S RULING
191
Petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if the ownership of a property to be expropriated
is uncertain, the court in the same expropriation proceeding is also given authority to make a proper adjudication of
the matter. Section 9 of Rule 67 reads:
SECTION 9. Uncertain Ownership. Conflicting Claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there
are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the
property to be paid to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be
entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or
the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already
been made.
This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge L.
Pasicolan 21 (Republic) in which the trial court hearing the expropriation proceeding was also allowed to resolve the
issue of ownership.
Petitioner further argues that the original Complaint was amended "precisely to reflect the fact that herein private
respondents, albeit ostensibly appearing as registered owners, are to be considered as mere claimants of one of the
properties subject of the expropriation." This is the reason why the RTC issued an Order declaring the property
subject of conflicting claims.
Moreover, this being an in rem proceeding, "plaintiff Republic of the Philippines seeks the relief, both in the original
and amended complaints, to transfer to plaintiff the titles to said parcels of land together with their improvements free
from all liens and encumbrances. For this particular purpose, the expropriation suit is essentially a direct
proceeding." 22
Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke Section 48 of P.D. 1529, viz.:
SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
It is their contention that by allowing petitioner to present adversarial evidence, the court is in effect allowing
respondents' Torrens title to be collaterally attacked — an action prohibited by P.D. 1529.
We rule that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property,
but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation.
I the Government:
Proper interpretation of Section 9, Rule 67
Proceeding from the principle of jus regalia, the right to eminent domain has always been considered as a
fundamental state power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 23 It is described as the State's inherent power that
need not be granted even by the Constitution, 24 and as the government's right to appropriate, in the nature of
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. 25
Expropriation, or the exercise of the State's right to eminent domain, is proscribed by the restraints of public use and
just compensation. 26 It is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which presents procedural guidelines for the
court to ensure that due process is observed and just compensation rightly paid to the private owners.
Indeed, this Court first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of Republic. In addressing the
issue of "whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same
proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned," the Court answered in the affirmative:
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in
the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or
sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident
from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property
to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk
before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been
made.
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the properties
to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming
jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent
domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with
accuracy. 27
We arrived at the same conclusion in Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., 28 in which we held thus:
The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides thus:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property
to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the
judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the
plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's Order to award payment of just compensation
to the defendants-intervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080. Despite the fact that the lot
was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan manifested that
the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but the defendants-intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to the
conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper to remand this case to the trial court for the reception
of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to receive the payment of just
compensation.(Emphases supplied)
However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper context. The discussion in Republic was
anchored on the question of who among the respondents claiming ownership of the property must be indemnified by
Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017, the court
taking cognizance of the expropriation must necessarily determine if the sale to the Punzalan spouses by Antonio
Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be paid by the condemnor; but if invalid, the
money will be paid to someone else. . . . . 29
Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the
parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to
and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a
right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. 30
If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if
only to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through
proper actions. 31 The consequences of Sec. 9, Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate
relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment. 32
II
Inapplicability of Section 48, P.D. 1529
Verily, our interpretation of Sec. 9, Rule 67 does not run counter to Section 48 of P.D. 1529. Under Sec. 48, collateral
attacks on a Torrens title are prohibited. We have explained the concept in Oño v. Lim, 33 to wit:
192
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside
such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
In several instances, we have considered an Answer praying for the cancellation of the plaintiff's Torrens title as a
form of a collateral attack. 34 We have afforded the similar treatment in a petition questioning the validity of a deed
of sale for a registered land, 35 and in a reformation of a deed of sale to include areas registered under the name of
another party. 36 But a resolution on the issue of ownership in a partition case was deemed neither to be a direct or
collateral attack, for "until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the disputed properties." 37
Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must be emphasized
that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the contest on private respondents' title arose
only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly compensated.
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, the Complaint and Amended Complaint cannot also be considered as a direct
attack. The amendment merely limited the coverage of the expropriation proceedings to the uncontested portion of
the subject property. The RTC's Order declaring the property as subject of conflicting claims is a recognition that
there are varying claimants to the sums to be awarded as just compensation. This serves as an authority for the court
to conduct a limited inquiry on the property's ownership.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93227, as well as the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44595, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the RTC to hear the issue of ownership for the
purpose of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202690 June 5, 2013
HENRY L. SY, Petitioner,
vs.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the January 20, 2012 Decision2 and July 16, 2012 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91964 which affirmed with modification the August 22, 2008 Order4 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-96-29352, ordering respondent Local
Government of Quezon City (the City) to pay petitioner Henry L. Sy (Sy) just compensation set as P5,500.00 per
square meter (sq. m.), including P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees equivalent to one percent
(1%) of the total amount due.
The Facts
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for expropriation with the
RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Sy (subject
property),5 which was intended to be used as a site for a multi-purpose barangay hall, day-care center, playground
and community activity center for the benefit of the residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.6 The
requisite ordinance to undertake the aforesaid expropriation namely, Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, was enacted on
April 12, 1994.7
On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 198 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991," the City deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court,
representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its tax declaration.9
During the preliminary conference on November 8, 2006, Sy did not question the City’s right to expropriate the subject
property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation remained at issue.10
On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco (Commissioner Ostaco), Engr. Victor Salinas (Commissioner
Salinas) and Atty. Carlo Alcantara (Commissioner Alcantara) as commissioners to determine the proper amount of
just compensation to be paid by the City for the subject property. Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and
Alcantara, in a Report dated February 11, 2008, recommended the payment of P5,500.00 per sq. m., to be computed
from the date of the filing of the expropriation complaint, or on November 7, 1996. On the other hand, Commissioner
Salinas filed a separate Report dated March 7, 2008, recommending the higher amount of P13,500.00 per sq. m. as
just compensation.11
The RTC Ruling
In the Order dated August 22, 2008,12 the RTC, citing the principle that just compensation must be fair not only to the
owner but to the expropriator as well, adopted the findings of Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara and thus, held
that the just compensation for the subject property should be set at P5,500.00 per sq. m.13 Further, it found no basis
for the award of damages and back rentals in favor of Sy.14 Finally, while legal interest was not claimed, for equity
considerations, it awarded six percent (6%) legal interest, computed from November 7, 1996 until full payment of just
compensation.15
Dissatisfied, Sy filed an appeal with the CA.16
The CA Ruling
In the Decision dated January 20, 2012,17 the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling but modified the same, ordering the City
to pay Sy the amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees equivalent to one percent (1%) of
the total amount due.
It found the appraisal of Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara for the subject property to be more believable than
the P13,000.00 per sq. m. valuation made by independent appraisers Cuervo and Asian Appraisers in 1995 and
1996, respectively, considering that it was arrived at after taking into account: (a) the fair market value of the subject
property in the amount of P4,000.00 per sq. m. based on the September 4, 1996 recommendation of the City
Appraisal Committee;18 (b) the market value of the subject lot in the amount of P2,000.00 per sq. m. based on several
sworn statements made by Sy himself;19 and (c) Sy’s own tax declaration for 1996,20 stating that the subject property
has a total market value of P2,272,050.00. Accordingly, it held that the fair market value of P5,500.00 per sq. m.,
or P5,500,000.00 in total, for the 1,000 sq. m. subject property arrived at by Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara
was more than fair and reasonable.21
The CA also denied Sy’s assertion that he should be entitled to damages on account of the purported shelving of his
housing project, finding no sufficient evidence to support the same. Likewise, it observed that the expropriation would
not leave the rest of Sy’s properties useless as they would still be accessible through a certain Lot 8 based on the
Property Identification Map.22
Nonetheless, citing the case of Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez (MIAA),23 it awarded exemplary
damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees equivalent to one percent (1%) of the amount due
because of the City’s taking of the subject property without even initiating expropriation proceedings. 24 It, however,
denied Sy’s claim of back rentals considering that the RTC had already granted legal interest in his favor.25
Aggrieved, Sy moved for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated July 16, 2012 26 for being filed
out of time.27 The City also filed a motion for reconsideration which was equally denied for lack of merit.28
Hence, this petition.
Issues Before The Court
193
The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether the CA correctly: (a) dismissed Sy’s motion for
reconsideration for being filed out of time; (b) upheld the amount of just compensation as determined by the RTC as
well as its grant of six percent (6%) legal interest; and (c) awarded exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
A. Failure to seasonably move for
reconsideration; excusable
negligence; relaxation of procedural
rules
At the outset, the Court observes that Sy’s motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and thus, was properly
dismissed by the CA. Records show that, as per the Postmaster’s Certification, the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision
was received by Sy on January 26, 2012 and as such, any motion for reconsideration therefrom should have been
filed not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt,29 or on February 10, 2012.30 However, Sy filed his motion for
reconsideration (subject motion) a day late, or on February 13, 2012, 31 which thus, renders the CA decision final and
executory.32
In this regard, it is apt to mention that Sy’s counsel, Atty. Tranquilino F. Meris (Atty. Meris), claims that his secretary’s
inadvertent placing of the date January 27, 2012, instead of January 26, 2012, on the Notice of Decision33 constitutes
excusable negligence which should therefore, justify a relaxation of the rules.
The assertion is untenable.
A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking such
should be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen
fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. 34 The
standard of carerequired is that which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. 35 In this
accord, the duty rests on every counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into
account all court notices sent to him.36
Applying these principles, the Court cannot excuse Atty. Meris’ misstep based on his proffered reasons. Evidently,
the erroneous stamping of the Notice of Decision could have been averted if only he had instituted a credible filing
system in his office to account for oversights such as that committed by his secretary. Indeed, ordinary prudence
could have prevented such mistake.
Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.37 Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed
where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest
of justice so requires.38
As applied in this case, the Court finds that the procedural consequence of the above-discussed one-day delay in
the filing of the subject motion – which, as a matter of course, should render the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision
already final and executory and hence, bar the instant petition – is incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may
suffer. This is in line with the Court’s observation that the amount of just compensation, the rate of legal interest, as
well as the time of its accrual, were incorrectly adjudged by both the RTC and the CA, contrary to existing
jurisprudence. In this respect, the Court deems it proper to relax the rules of procedure and thus, proceed to resolve
these substantive issues.
B. Rate of legal interest and time of accrual
Based on a judicious review of the records and application of jurisprudential rulings, the Court holds that the correct
rate of legal interest to be applied is twelve percent (12%) and not six percent (6%) per annum, owing to the nature
of the City’s obligation as an effective forbearance.
In the case of Republic v. CA,39 the Court ruled that the debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of
the property subject of an expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance which therefore, warrants the application
of the 12% legal interest rate, viz:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation
is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just
value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to
be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September
1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In similar regard, the Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera,40 pronounced that:
In many cases decided by this Court,41 it has been repeated time and again that the award of 12% interest is imposed
in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government
one of forbearance. This is to ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the
owner that can drag from days to decades. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As to the reckoning point on which the legal interest should accrue, the same should be computed from the time of
the taking of the subject property in 1986 and not from the filing of the complaint for expropriation on November 7,
1996.
Records show that the City itself admitted in its Appellee’s Brief filed before the CA that as early as 1986, "a burden
was already imposed upon the owner of the subject property x x x, considering that the expropriated property was
already being used as Barangay day care and office."42 Thus, the property was actually taken during that time and
from thereon, legal interest should have already accrued. In this light, the Court has held that:43
x x x [T]he final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is
taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This is based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking."44
Notably, the lack of proper authorization, i.e., resolution to effect expropriation,45 did not affect the character of the
City’s taking of the subject property in 1986 as the CA, in its January 20, 2012 Decision, suggests. Case law dictates
that there is "taking" when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical
destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use
thereof.46 Therefore, notwithstanding the lack of proper authorization, the legal character of the City’s action as one
of "taking" did not change. In this relation, the CA noted that the City enacted Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, only on
April 12, 1994 and filed its expropriation complaint on November 7, 1996. However, as it previously admitted, it
already commenced with the taking of the subject property as early as 1986. Accordingly, interest must run from
such time.
This irregularity does not, however, proceed without any consequence.1âwphi1 As correctly observed by the CA,
citing as basis the MIAA case, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees should be awarded to the landowner if the
government takes possession of the property for a prolonged period of time without properly initiating expropriation
194
proceedings. The MIAA ruling was applied in the more recent case of City of Iloilo v. Judge Lolita Contreras-Besana
,47 wherein the Court said:
We stress, however, that the City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking private respondent’s property
without payment of just compensation. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that a
government agency’s prolonged occupation of private property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages:
Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which
in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full
payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right
of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking x x x.
xxxx
For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the subject lot without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
and without the MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain ownership of the lot and negotiating with any of the owners of the
property. To our mind, these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence,
the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
All told, the Court finds the grant of exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 as well as attorney’s fees
equivalent to 1% of the total amount due amply justified, square as it is with existing jurisprudence.
C. Amount of just compensation
Finally, the Court cannot sustain the amount of P5,500.00/sq. m. as just compensation which was set by the RTC
and upheld by the CA. The said valuation was actually arrived at after considering: (a) the September 4, 1996
recommendation of the City Appraisal Committee; (b) several sworn statements made by Sy himself; and (c) Sy’s
own tax declaration for 1996.48
It is well-settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. 49 However,
the above-stated documents do not reflect the value of the subject property at the time of its taking in 1986 but rather,
its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the case must be remanded to the RTC in order to properly determine the amount
of just compensation during such time the subject property was actually taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 20, 2012 Decision and July 16, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91964 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the
trial court for the proper determination of the amount of just compensation in accordance with this Decision. To
forestall any further delay in the resolution of this case, the trial court is hereby ordered to fix the just compensation
for petitioner Henry L. Sy's property with dispatch and report to the Court its compliance. Finally, respondent Local
Government of Quezon City is ordered to PAY exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney's
fees equivalent to one percent (1%) of the amount due, after final determination of the amount of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER
CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated July 31, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 77997. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)2 Decision3 dated March 22, 2002 in Civil Case No. 208-M-95.
The case stemmed from the following factual and procedural antecedents:
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson (respondents) are co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of
7,268 square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-430064 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Said parcel of land was among the properties taken by the government
sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for
the construction of the MacArthur Highway.5
In a letter6 dated December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject
parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras (petitioner Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan
Engineering District of petitioner Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), offered to pay the subject land
at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of
Bulacan.7 Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of
compensation at the current fair market value.8
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint9 for recovery of possession with damages
against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the possession of the subject parcel of land and that they be paid
attorney’s fees.10 Respondents claimed that the subject parcel of land was assessed at P2,543,800.00.11
Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that
the suit is against the State which may not be sued without its consent; (2) that the case has already prescribed; (3)
that respondents have no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) if respondents are
entitled to compensation, they should be paid only the value of the property in 1940 or 1941.12
On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order13 granting respondents’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. As respondents’ claim includes the recovery of damages, there is no doubt that the suit is against
the State for which prior waiver of immunity is required. When elevated to the CA,14 the appellate court did not agree
with the RTC and found instead that the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable, because the recovery
of compensation is the only relief available to the landowner. To deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice
to the landowner. Besides, petitioner Contreras, in fact, had earlier offered the payment of compensation although at
a lower rate.Thus, the CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the complaint and, consequently, remanded the
case to the trial court for the purpose of determining the just compensation to which respondents are entitled to
recover from the government.15 With the finality of the aforesaid decision, trial proceeded in the RTC.
The Branch Clerk of Court was initially appointed as the Commissioner and designated as the Chairman of the
Committee that would determine just compensation,16 but the case was later referred to the PAC for the submission
of a recommendation report on the value of the subject property.17 In PAC Resolution No. 99-007,18the PAC
recommended the amount of P1,500.00 per square meter as the just compensation for the subject property.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision,19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Department of Public Works and Highways or its duly assigned agencies
are hereby directed to pay said Complainants/Appellants the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P1,500.00) per square meter for the lot subject matter of this case in accordance with the Resolution of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee dated December 19, 2001.
SO ORDERED.20
On appeal, the CA affirmed the above decision with the modification that the just compensation stated above should
earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the filing of the action on March 17, 1995 until full
payment.21
In its appeal before the CA, petitioners raised the issues of prescription and laches, which the CA brushed aside on
two grounds: first, that the issue had already been raised by petitioners when the case was elevated before the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51454. Although it was not squarely ruled upon by the appellate court as it did not find any reason
to delve further on such issues, petitioners did not assail said decision barring them now from raising exactly the
same issues; and second, the issues proper for resolution had been laid down in the pre-trial order which did not
195
include the issues of prescription and laches. Thus, the same can no longer be further considered. As to the propriety
of the property’s valuation as determined by the PAC and adopted by the RTC, while recognizing the rule that the
just compensation should be the reasonable value at the time of taking which is 1940, the CA found it necessary to
deviate from the general rule. It opined that it would be obviously unjust and inequitable if respondents would be
compensated based on the value of the property in 1940 which is P0.70 per sq m, but the compensation would be
paid only today. Thus, the appellate court found it just to award compensation based on the value of the property at
the time of payment. It, therefore, adopted the RTC’s determination of just compensation of P1,500.00 per sq m as
recommended by the PAC. The CA further ordered the payment of interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
reckoned from the time of taking, which is the filing of the complaint on March 17, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court assailing the CA decision based on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING JUST COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THE HIGHLY DUBIOUS AND QUESTIONABLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR ALLEGED
OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING JUST COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS
BECAUSE THEIR COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES IS ALREADY BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ORDERING THE
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION BASED ON THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE OF THE ALLEGED
PROPERTY OF RESPONDENTS.22
Petitioners insist that the action is barred by prescription having been filed fifty-four (54) years after the accrual of the
action in 1940. They explain that the court can motu proprio dismiss the complaint if it shows on its face that the
action had already prescribed. Petitioners likewise aver that respondents slept on their rights for more than fifty years;
hence, they are guilty of laches. Lastly, petitioners claim that the just compensation should be based on the value of
the property at the time of taking in 1940 and not at the time of payment.23
The petition is partly meritorious.
The instant case stemmed from an action for recovery of possession with damages filed by respondents against
petitioners. It, however, revolves around the taking of the subject lot by petitioners for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway. There is taking when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period
but for a permanent duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property to public use in such a manner as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.24
It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for
the construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more than fifty years, the property owners sought
recovery of the possession of their property. Is the action barred by prescription or laches? If not, are the property
owners entitled to recover possession or just compensation?
As aptly noted by the CA, the issues of prescription and laches are not proper issues for resolution as they were not
included in the pre-trial order. We quote with approval the CA’s ratiocination in this wise:
Procedurally, too, prescription and laches are no longer proper issues in this appeal. In the pre-trial order issued on
May 17, 2001, the RTC summarized the issues raised by the defendants, to wit: (a) whether or not the plaintiffs were
entitled to just compensation; (b) whether or not the valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time
of the taking or at the time of the filing of the action; and (c) whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to damages.
Nowhere did the pre-trial order indicate that prescription and laches were to be considered in the adjudication of the
RTC.25
To be sure, the pre-trial order explicitly defines and limits the issues to be tried and controls the subsequent course
of the action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.26
Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and prescription, the same must still fail. Laches is principally a
doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation or in an injustice.27 This doctrine finds no application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving
due course to respondents’ claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his
property is taken for public use.28 Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule
"that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either
through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not
prescribe."29
When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available
to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may
demand payment of just compensation for the land taken.30 For failure of respondents to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing
the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation.31 The trial and appellate courts found that respondents are entitled to
compensation. The only issue left for determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds true when the property is taken before the
filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation.32
The issue in this case is not novel.
In Forfom Development Corporation [Forfom] v. Philippine National Railways [PNR],33 PNR entered the property of
Forfom in January 1973 for public use, that is, for railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances for use of the Carmona
Commuter Service without initiating expropriation proceedings.34 In 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for recovery of
possession of real property and/or damages against PNR. In Eusebio v. Luis,35 respondent’s parcel of land was taken
in 1980 by the City of Pasig and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City without
the appropriate expropriation proceedings. In 1994, respondent demanded payment of the value of the property, but
they could not agree on its valuation prompting respondent to file a complaint for reconveyance and/or damages
against the city government and the mayor. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,36 in the early 1970s,
petitioner implemented expansion programs for its runway necessitating the acquisition and occupation of some of
the properties surrounding its premises. As to respondent’s property, no expropriation proceedings were
initiated.1âwphi1 In 1997, respondent demanded the payment of the value of the property, but the demand remained
unheeded prompting him to institute a case for accion reivindicatoria with damages against petitioner. In Republic v.
Sarabia,37 sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of a portion of a lot
situated in Aklan, registered in the name of respondent, without initiating expropriation proceedings. Several
structures were erected thereon including the control tower, the Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport
terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group. In 1995, several stores and restaurants were
constructed on the remaining portion of the lot. In 1997, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages against the storeowners where ATO intervened claiming that the storeowners were its lessees.
The Court in the above-mentioned cases was confronted with common factual circumstances where the government
took control and possession of the subject properties for public use without initiating expropriation proceedings and
without payment of just compensation, while the landowners failed for a long period of time to question such
government act and later instituted actions for recovery of possession with damages. The Court thus determined the
landowners’ right to the payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just compensation. The
Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling
196
for purposes of compensation. In Forfom, the payment of just compensation was reckoned from the time of taking in
1973; in Eusebio, the Court fixed the just compensation by determining the value of the property at the time of taking
in 1980; in MIAA, the value of the lot at the time of taking in 1972 served as basis for the award of compensation to
the owner; and in Republic, the Court was convinced that the taking occurred in 1956 and was thus the basis in fixing
just compensation. As in said cases, just compensation due respondents in this case should, therefore, be fixed not
as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic v. Lara, et al.,38 and repeatedly held by the Court in
recent cases, thus:
x x x "The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings." For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof
may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time
it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should
be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss
or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken x x x.39
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was P0.70/sq
m.40Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of the higher value
which is P1,500.00. While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as
they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in
guarding against the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the
property owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which
ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.41
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject property for more than fifty years without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings. In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and
without payment of just compensation, petitioners clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights
which cannot be countenanced by the Court.42 For said illegal taking, respondents are entitled to adequate
compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages which in this case should be the legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full payment. 43 This is based on
the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the pet1t10n is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the valuation of the subject property owned by
respondents shall be F0.70 instead of P1,500.00 per square meter, with interest at six percent ( 6o/o) per annum
from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165386 July 29, 2013
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES SALVADOR and NENITA CRUZ, SPOUSES EDMUNDO and MERLA BARZAGA, SPOUSES
CRISANTO and JULIETA DELA CRUZ, SPOUSES LORENZO and ROSALINA PALAGANAS, SPOUSES
RICARDO and LOLITA SAGUID, SPOUSES CARMELITA and RESTITUTO ALCID, HIPOLITA NASALGA,
CRISELDA and 'REDENTOR REYES, ILUMINADA ALIPIO, REYNALDO ALIPIO, CORAZON PELAYO,
SPOUSES ROLANDO and FELICIDAD BOANGUIS, SPOUSES JOSELITO and CAROLINE MENDOZA,
SPOUSES ERLINDA and CELSO DE GUZMAN, SPOUSES MIGUEL and VIRGINIA CASAS, SPOUSES
ERLINDA and CELSO DICCION, MA. RENITA MARIANO, VICTORIA ESPIRITU, SPOUSES VICTOR and
ROSARION SOTELO, RENA TO GUIEB, DANIEL ST A. MARIA, SPOUSES MELANIO and SOTERIA TORRES,
SPOUSES CIRIACO and PERLITA BENDIJO, SPOUSES LILIA and DOMINGO TORRES, PAC IT A TORRES
and GREGORIA' CASTILLO, SPOUSES HILARIO and AMANDA DONIZA, SPOUSES JEREMIAS and ISABEL
GARCIA, SPOUSES EDUARDO and MA. MARIN CALDERON, SPOUSES ERNESTO and PELAGIA LUCAS,
CORAZON ACOSTA, TERESITA LACSON and JULIANA DE GUZMAN, PERLA REYES, SPOUSES ESMELITON
and REMEDIOS ESPIRITU, SPOUSES ROGELIO and AURORA ABALON, DITAS GARCIA, TERESITA CAPATI,
SPOUSES EFREN and MERCEDES MARTIN, SPOUSES HIPOLITO and ANTONIA STA. MARIA, DIONISIO and
ATANACIA DOMONDON, JAOQUIN and MA. THERESA DELA ROSA, SPOUSES ROMULO and NORMA
DUCUSIN, GENOVEVA CRUZ and A. BAUTISTA, PURITA SUNICO, SPOUSES MINERVA and ROQUE
NUALLA, and SPOUSES GABINO, JR. and CRISPINA ALIPIO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is the petition for review on certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the
National Power Corporation (Napocor). Napocor seeks to annul and set aside the decision2 dated February 10, 2004
and the resolution3 dated September 13, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62911, which affirmed
with modification the order dated March 31, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15,
in Civil Case No. 111-M-97.
THE FACTS
Civil Case No. 111-M-97 was an expropriation proceeding commenced by Napocor against respondents Spouses
Salvador and Nenita Cruz, Spouses Edmundo and Merla Barzaga, Spouses Crisanto and Julieta dela Cruz, Spouses
Lorenzo and Rosalina Palaganas, Spouses Ricardo and Lolita Saguid, Spouses Carmelita and Restituto Alcid,
Hipolita Nasalga, Criselda and Redentor Reyes, Iluminada Alipio, Reynaldo Alipio, Corazon Pelayo, Spouses
Rolando and Felicidad Boanguis, Spouses Joselito and Caroline Mendoza, Spouses Erlinda and Celso de Guzman,
Spouses Miguel and Virginia Casas, Spouses Erlinda and Celso Diccion, Ma. Renita Mariano, Victoria Espiritu,
Spouses Victor and Rosarion Sotelo, Renato Guieb, Daniel Sta. Maria, Spouses Melanio and Soteria Torres,
Spouses Ciriaco and Perlita Bendijo, Spouses Lilia and Domingo Torres, Pacita Torres and Gregoria Castillo,
Spouses Hilario and Amanda Doniza, Spouses Jeremias and Isabel Garcia, Spouses Eduardo and Ma. Marin
Calderon, Spouses Ernesto and Pelagia Lucas, Corazon Acosta, Teresita Lacson and Juliana de Guzman, Perla
Reyes, Spouses Esmeliton and Remedios Espiritu, Spouses Rogelio and Aurora Abalon, Ditas Garcia, Teresita
Capati, Spouses Efren and Mercedes Martin, Spouses Hipolito and Antonia Sta. Maria, Dionisio and Atanacia
Domondon, Jaoquin and Ma. Theresa dela Rosa, Spouses Romulo and Norma Ducusin, Genoveva Cruz and A.
Bautista, Purita Sunico, Spouses Minerva and Roque Nualla, and Spouses Gabino, Jr. and Crispina Alipio, who are
the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
The complaint, filed on February 17, 1997, primarily sought the determination of just compensation due the
respondents after the negotiations for the purchase of the lots failed.
In its order dated September 17, 1997, the RTC directed the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to
review and submit an updated appraisal report on the properties to be acquired by Napocor in order ‘to judicially
guide the Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants.’"4In the meantime, the RTC allowed
Napocor to take possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to their assessed value
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.5
On October 22, 1997, the PAC submitted its report6 to the RTC which pegged the just compensation at P2,200.00
per square meter. After considering the PAC’s report, the RTC issued an order dated March 31, 1998 fixing the just
compensation at P3,000.00 per square meter. Although the RTC found the PAC’s recommended amount
of P2,200.00 reasonable, it noted that an additional amount of P800.00 was necessary in view of the then prevailing
economic crises and the devaluation of the peso.
197
Napocor appealed the RTC’s March 31, 1998 order with the CA. It assailed the appointment of the PAC, claiming
that its appointment was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It also alleged that the determination of the amount
of just compensation was without basis.
THE CA RULING
The CA affirmed the RTC’s March 31, 1998 order, subject to a modification. It upheld the appointment of the PAC
and the recommendation to set the just compensation at P2,200.00 per square meter, but removed the
additional P800.00 that the RTC imposed. The CA instead imposed legal interest at 12% per annum on the amount
of just compensation, to compensate for the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency.
Its motion for reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied,7 Napocor elevates the case to us through the
present petition.
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Napocor asserts that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
specifically, Section 5 thereof which states:
Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. – Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint
not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and
place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report
shall be submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall
be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the
commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. [italics supplied; emphases ours]
It contends that Rule 67 requires the trial court to appoint three persons, and not a committee like the PAC. The
members of the PAC also did not subscribe to an oath which is required under Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.8
Napocor also points out that the RTC’s March 31, 1998 order did not specify the time and place for the first hearing
of the commissioners and the time the commissioners’ report should be submitted. No notice of hearing on the
commissioners’ report was, in fact, given to Napocor, depriving it of its right to present evidence to controvert the
findings of the PAC.
Napocor further alleges that the CA erred in disregarding the compromise agreement it entered into with the
respondents. The agreement was executed during the pendency of the appeal with the CA and fixed the amount of
just compensation at P1,900.00 per square meter. As the agreement was validly entered into by the parties, Napocor
claims it is binding on the parties and could not be disregarded by the CA.
The respondents, on the other hand, assert that Napocor’s allegations are unmeritorious. They claim that the
appointment of the PAC constituted substantial compliance with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, since the
PAC was composed of three members (the provincial assessor, the provincial engineer, and the provincial treasurer)
who are government officials without interest in the outcome of the litigation, and who are competent to evaluate and
assess valuation of the properties. They have been specifically tasked "to guide the Court in fixing the amount to be
paid by the plaintiff to the defendants,"9 which is the same task required of the commissioners by Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.
They further claim that it was Napocor’s inaction itself that denied it the opportunity to present evidence due to its
own failure to question the appointment of the commissioners and the commissioners’ report within the period
provided under the Rules. Likewise, it was Napocor which should be faulted for the CA’s refusal to take cognizance
of the compromise agreement. Although Napocor manifested that an agreement was entered into by the parties, it
consistently failed to submit a copy to the CA for the latter’s approval. For over a year, the CA granted Napocor’s
numerous motions for extension to submit a copy, but Napocor failed to comply. Consequently, the CA should not
be faulted for refusing to consider and approve the agreement. At any rate, the respondents claim that the agreement
does not bind them, as they were made to sign it without the benefit of counsel during the pendency of the case.
Finally, the respondents allege that the amount of P2,200.00 as just compensation is fully supported not only by the
findings in the report, but also by the Appraisal Report, which Napocor obtained from the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP). The LBP Appraisal Report fixed the market value of the expropriated properties at P2,200.00.10
Incidental Matters
The majority of the respondents who filed the Comment dated February 16, 2005 are represented by Atty. Reynaldo
B. Hernandez.11 During the pendency of the case, Atty. Hernandez submitted before the Court an Omnibus
Motion12 (1) seeking clarification on the participation of one Atty. Pedro S. Principe of Principe, Villano, Villacorta,
Clemente and Associates in the present proceeding, and (2) praying for an order from the Court enjoining the RTC
from hearing and resolving Atty. Principe’s Motion to Enter Attorney’s Charging Lien into the Records of This Case
Even Before Final Judgment is Rendered.
According to Atty. Hernandez, Atty. Principe claims to be the counsel of the same respondents that he (Atty.
Hernandez) is representing. However, the respondents themselves have repudiated Atty. Principe’s claim. Atty.
Hernandez also states that, as borne by the records, the RTC has already denied Atty. Principe’s appearance and
motion to intervene in the expropriation proceedings. Atty. Principe wanted to intervene, supposedly to protect his
40% share in the expropriated properties, which he (Atty. Principe) claimed constituted part of his legal fees.
In response to Atty. Hernandez’s allegations, Atty. Principe denies that he is a "nuisance interloper." Atty. Principe
claims that he is the counsel for SANDAMA,13 an organization formed by owners of the affected expropriated
properties, of which the respondents are members. It was SANDAMA, through its President, Danilo Elfa, which
engaged his and his firm’s legal services; to date, his authority has not been withdrawn or revoked. Hence, Atty.
Principe should be recognized as the counsel of record for the respondents. As counsel for the respondents, Atty.
Principe claims that there is nothing improper with his motion to enter into the records his charging lien, adding that
the lien will not anyway be enforced until final judgment in this case.
Also, during the pendency of this case, Napocor filed a Motion to Approve Attached Compromise Agreement,14which
it entered into with respondent Ditas C. Garcia on July 3, 2006. In light of the compromise agreement, the Court
issued a Resolution15 dated March 28, 2011 and considered the case closed and terminated insofar as respondent
Ditas was concerned.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court denies the petition.
The appointment of the PAC as commissioners
The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. 16To
assist the courts in this task, Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the appointment of "not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." Although the appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the
Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should
not number more than three and that they should be competent and disinterested parties.
In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners substantially complies with Section
5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee instead of three persons to act
as commissioners, since the PAC is composed of three members – the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer,
and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to perform the
duty required of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. As correctly found by the CA, they "are
government officials entrusted with the updating and time-to-time determination of currently assessed, as well as,
market value of properties within their jurisdiction."17 The mere fact that they are government officials does not
disqualify them as disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case.
198
Instead, what we find material is that the PAC was tasked to perform precisely the same duty that the commissioners,
under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, are required to discharge. The RTC order dated September 17, 1997
directed the PAC "to review and submit an updated appraisal report on the property to be acquired by the plaintiff
NAPOCOR from the defendants to judicially guide the court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the
defendants."18 The appointment of the PAC served the same function as an appointment of three persons as
commissioners under the Rules.
If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be objectionable, it should have filed its objections early on and not
belatedly raise them in its appeal with the CA. The second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 67 states that –
Copies of the order of appointment shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the
commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30)
days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. [emphasis ours]
We find nothing in the records indicating that Napocor seasonably objected to the appointment of the PAC or to any
aspect in the order of appointment (e.g., the supposed failure of the order to state the time and place of the first
session of the hearing, and the time which the commissioners’ report shall be submitted). Instead, Napocor belatedly
raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA. For its failure to comply with the Rules, we consider Napocor to
have waived its objections against any supposed irregularity in the appointment of the PAC.
The determination of just compensation
Neither do we find significant Napocor’s claim that it was denied due process in the determination of the amount of
just compensation. As against Napocor’s bare allegation that it was not notified of the PAC’s hearing, the obtaining
circumstances, set out below, lead us to believe otherwise.
The PAC members, upon their appointment and oath, are considered officers of the court, and we can extend to
them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official functions. 19 It is hard to believe that Napocor
was completely left in the dark in the proceedings conducted by the PAC to determine just compensation, considering
its interest in the case.
Likewise, we find untenable Napocor’s claim that the amount of just compensation was without factual and legal
basis. That the properties were valued at P427.76 per square meter in August 1996, then at P2,200.00 in October
1997 does not necessarily indicate that the assessment by the PAC was manipulated. Napocor itself acknowledge
an increase in the value of the properties when it modified its offered settlement from P427.76 to P1,900.00. Also,
the LBP Appraisal Report, which Napocor itself commissioned, has pegged the fair market value of the properties
at P2,200.00 per square meter. The report considered important improvements in the vicinity, among them, the
construction of a school, a church and several public buildings.
If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation fixed in the commissioners’ report, its remedy
was to file its objections within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of the report. Section 7, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court states:
Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. – x x x Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the
court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their
appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of
the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within
which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
However, as with the objections to the appointment of the PAC, Napocor failed to make a timely objection to the
report of the commissioners and raised them only before the CA.
The compromise agreement
It appears to us that Napocor has demonstrated a pattern of procrastination in this case. We note that not only did it
belatedly file its objections to the appointment of the PAC and to the commissioners’ report; it also failed to submit
copies of the compromise agreement with the CA despite the numerous extensions it requested.
As early as August 2001, during the pendency of its appeal with the CA, Napocor already manifested that it had
entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents and would be filing a copy thereof with the CA.
The CA initially gave Napocor 60 days to submit a copy of the agreement, but Napocor requested for (and was
granted) an extension of 30 days. Days before the extension expired, Napocor requested for another 30-day
extension. Napocor would repeat these requests for extension whenever the deadline loomed, without it filing a copy
of the agreement. All in all, Napocor requested for an extension of 180 days. The long delay compelled the CA to
finally resolve the appeal on the basis of the available records, notwithstanding Napocor’s manifestation of a
compromise agreement.
Significantly, the execution of the compromise agreement, by itself, did not enjoin the CA from resolving the
appeal.1âwphi1 By its terms and as found out by the CA, the compromise agreement required the approval of the
CA for it to take effect. Thus, Napocor can no longer assail the CA’s authority to resolve the appeal after it consistently
failed to furnish the CA a copy of the agreement.
The representation of Atty. Principe
We take note of the respondents’ misgivings on the claims of Atty. Principe. However, we point out that the Court
has resolved the issue of Atty. Principe’s interest in the expropriation proceedings in Malonso v. Principe. 20 Julian
Malonso is the owner of one of the expropriated properties and a member of SANDAMA.21 He assailed the authority
of Atty. Principe to represent him in the same expropriation proceedings that is the subject of the present case and
the latter’s claim of 40% of the amount to be paid by Napocor. On the basis of these contentions, he sought Atty.
Principe’s disbarment.
Ruling in favor of Atty. Principe, we found reasonable grounds supporting his claim that he possessed authority to
represent SANDAMA and its members in the expropriation proceedings 22 and could not validly be accused of
misrepresentation. Since Atty. Principe and his law firm have already rendered legal and even extra-legal services
for SANDAMA, they rightfully moved to recover the attorney’s fees due them and to protect this interest. However,
the Court refrained from ruling on Atty. Principe’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees of 40% of the purchase
price since Malonso only involved a disbarment proceeding.
Although the Court’s ruling in Malonso has become final, we cannot fully adopt it in the present case so as to make
a conclusive finding on the question of Atty. Principe’s representation and entitlement to attorney’s fees as far as the
present respondents are concerned. The available documents in the records disclose that only a few of the
respondents have executed a special power of attorney, similar to the one Malonso executed in favor of Danilo Elfa
(then SANDAMA President), that would authorize Elfa to hire Atty. Principe and his law firm to represent them. The
same documents do not show if these respondents are members of SANDAMA, which Atty.
Principe claims he represents. Also, nothing in the records would show the extent of services that Atty. Principe has
performed for the respondents. In the absence of these pertinent facts, we deem it prudent to remand the matter to
the RTC the determination of Atty. Principe's authority to represent the respondents and his entitlement to attorney's
fees, taking into consideration the Court's ruling in Malonso.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated February 10, 2004 and the resolution dated
September 13, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62911 are AFFIRMED.
The questions of Atty. Pedro Principe's representation and his entitlement to attorney's fees, insofar as the
respondents are concerned, are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15, for
resolution. The trial court is hereby ordered to resolve these matters with due haste.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147257 July 31, 2013
SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NELLY SIAPNOSANCHEZ and INOCENCIO BERMA, 1 Respondents.
199
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questions, for having been rendered with grave abuse
of discretion, the Resolution2 dated June 2, 2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of petitioner-spouses
Jesus and Joela Dycoco in CA-G.R. SP No. 58504, and the Resolution3 dated January 10, 2001 denying
reconsideration.
On November 23, 1994, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of land transfer,
damages and injunction against private respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Berma in the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Albay. Eusebio Siapno,
Rogelio Siapno, Felix Sepato, Sr., Leonora Talagtag and Pablo Bonde, Sr. were also named respondents in the
complaint.4
In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they are the absolute and registered owners of Lot No. 216, a
38,157 sq.m.-parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. VH-
5187 of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According to them, the respondents named in the complaint took advantage
of the liberality of petitioner-spouses, entered the subject property, successfully registered themselves as tenants for
agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated the property to the prejudice of petitioner-spouses. Said
respondents deprived petitioner-spouses of the enjoyment and possession of the property without paying petitioner-
spouses or the Land Bank the rentals due thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian reform laws, said respondents
subleased their respective landholdings to other persons.5
Petitioner-spouses reiterated these matters in their position paper.6
All seven respondents named in the complaint were summoned but only Bonde and Rogelio submitted their answer
and position paper.7 Bonde and Rogelio showed that they already own their portions of the property through
Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Pursuant to the said law, petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer in their favor which resulted in the issuance
to them of emancipation patents and, subsequently, OCT No. E-2333 and OCT No. E-2334, respectively.8
Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision dated June 27, 1995 finding private respondents "not
worthy to become beneficiaries" under Presidential Decree No. 27.9 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding for the complainants, respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Leonora Talagtag and Inocencio
Berma are hereby adjudged not worthy to become beneficiaries under PD 27; hence, judgment is hereby issued:
1. Ordering the ejectment of Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Leonora Talagtag, and Inocencio Berma from their respective
tillage;
2. Ordering Rogelio Siapno and Pablo Bonde, Sr. to comply with their obligation under the Deeds of Transfer in their
favor;
3. Ordering the dismissal of the case against Eusebio Siapno, for lack of evidence; and
4. Ordering the respondents under paragraph 1 to pay complainants jointly and severally nominal damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00.10
On motion of petitioner-spouses, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a writ of execution dated November 22, 1995
ordering, among others, the ejectment of private respondents from their respective tillage.11 Subsequently, petitioner-
spouses filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and to Cite Respondents in Contempt, claiming that
private respondents returned to the subject property although they have already been ordered ejected. 12 Private
respondents filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution. They explained that they
are already the owners of their respective portions of the property in question by virtue of the Operation Land Transfer
under Presidential Decree No. 27. According to private respondents, petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer
in their favor which resulted to the issuance to them of emancipation patents and, afterwards, OCT No. E-2332 in the
name of private respondent Siapno-Sanchez and OCT Nos. E-2335 and E-2336 in the name of private respondent
Berma. Private respondents further asserted that the decision ordering their ejectment from their tillage is not yet
executory as they have filed a notice of appeal on August 29, 1996.13
Petitioner-spouses submitted their Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ
of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September 16, 1996 and Supplemental Comments
[on]/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by
Respondents dated October 3, 1996 where they countered private respondents’ motion by arguing that both the
motion to quash and the notice of appeal were filed beyond the prescribed period.14
In an order dated October 16, 1996, the Provincial Adjudicator found that the copy of the decision dated June 27,
1995 was sent by registered mail to and, on July 10, 1995, received by Crispina Berma Penaranda, daughter of
private respondent Berma, who resided in a different barangay. Still, the Provincial Adjudicator ruled that private
respondent Berma was bound by his daughter’s receipt and the decision is already final and executory as against
him. Thus, with respect to him, the notice of appeal was filed out of time. On the other hand, there was no showing
that private respondent Siapno-Sanchez has been served a copy of the decision before she procured a copy of it
from the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator on August 26, 1996. Hence, as regards her, the notice of appeal was
filed on time. Therefore, the Provincial Adjudicator denied the Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the
Writ of Execution with respect to private respondent Berma, and approved and granted the same motion with respect
to private respondent Siapno-Sanchez.15
Private respondent Berma moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied.16 Nevertheless, he joined the appeal
memorandum filed by private respondent Siapno-Sanchez in the DARAB.17 On the other hand, petitioner-spouses
filed a Counter-Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated February 9, 1997, reiterating that private
respondents’ appeal was filed out of time.18
In a decision dated March 20, 2000,19 the DARAB found that both private respondents were beneficiaries of
Presidential Decree No. 27 and that they are no longer tenants but owners of their respective portions of the property
as evidenced by OCT No. E-2332 in the name of private respondent Siapno-Sanchez and OCT Nos. E-2335 and E-
2336 in the name of private respondent Berma. Ejectment would therefore not lie as against them as landholdings
covered by the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not revert to the original owner. Thus,
the DARAB reversed and set aside the decision dated June 27, 1995 in so far as private respondents were
concerned. The immediate reinstatement of private respondents to their respective landholdings was ordered, as
well as their restoration to their original status as owner-beneficiaries of the landholdings awarded to them pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27.20
Petitioner-spouses received a copy of the DARAB decision on April 3, 2000 and had until April 18, 2000 to file an
appeal. They filed a motion in the Court of Appeals praying for an extension of 30 days within which to file their
intended petition.21 The Court of Appeals granted them an extension of 15 days, with warning that no further
extension will be given.22 Thus, petitioner-spouses had until May 3, 2000 to file their petition.
Petitioner-spouses filed the petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was denied due course and
dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated June 2, 2000. In its entirety, the said resolution reads:
The petition (for review), filed under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED DUE COURSE and, as
a consequence, DISMISSED, for late filing, as the petition was filed beyond the extended period of fifteen (15) days
granted under Resolution dated May 5, 2000, which resolution was issued pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43, as
follows:
xxxx
"Sec. 4. Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of
the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the
court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment
200
of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant
an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days" x x x. 23
Petitioner-spouses moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner-spouses invoke the rule of liberality in the construction of the provisions of the Rules of Court. The petition
was filed after the period granted by the Court of Appeals because, on April 10, 2000, they secured the services of a
new counsel who still had to study the voluminous records. They claim that the petition they filed with the Court of
Appeals is supported by compelling reasons. According to petitioner-spouses, they were deprived of their property
without just compensation either from the tenant-beneficiaries or from the government. They were also deprived of
due process when the DARAB took cognizance of private respondents’ appeal although it was filed more than one
year after the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator had become final and executory. In view of the said reasons, the
Court of Appeals should have given their petition due course although it was filed five days after the lapse of the
extended period.
Petitioner-spouses are wrong.
Firstly, petitioner-spouses are before this Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which
is a wrong remedy.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the
absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 24 Contrary to the claim
of petitioner-spouses in the opening paragraph of their petition that there was no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than this petition, the right recourse was to appeal to this
Court in the form of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by
verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
The Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 of the Court of Appeals were final and appealable
judgments. In particular, the Resolution dated June 2, 2000 denied due course to the petition and dismissed it, while
the Resolution dated January 1, 2001 denied the motion for reconsideration of the former Resolution. The said
Resolutions disposed of the appeal of petitioner-spouses in a manner that left nothing more to be done by the Court
of Appeals in respect to the said appeal. Thus, petitioner-spouses should have filed an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true
even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the
exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision,
order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one
of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal.25
The failure of petitioner-spouses to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be remedied
by the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In
Balayan v. Acorda26 the Court ruled:
It bears emphasis that the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse.
The Court has often reminded members of the bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only where there is
no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party
to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a
lapsed or lost appeal. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost
through fault or negligence. In this case, petitioner-spouses received the Resolution dated January 1, 2001 on
January 19, 200127 and, under the rules,28 had until February 5, 2001 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review
on certiorari in this Court. Petitioner-spouses allowed this period to lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed
this petition for certiorari on March 16, 2001.29
Secondly, petitioner-spouses claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
appeal on the ground of late filing. This is also wrong.
The Court of Appeals granted petitioner-spouses a 15-day extension, within which to file their intended petition. The
action of the Court of Appeals was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, as the original
deadline of petitioner-spouses was April 18, 2000, they had until May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Petitioner-
spouses, however, filed the petition on May 8, 2000. Petitioner-spouses even admit that their petition in the Court of
Appeals was filed five days after the extended period.30 It is therefore clear that the Court of Appeals simply applied
the rules, while petitioner-spouses concededly failed to observe the very same rules. As such, the Court of Appeals’
dismissal of the petition of petitioner-spouses was discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner
should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner
in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.31 This is so because "grave abuse of
discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose. In
this connection, Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio32 is instructive:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore,
the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could
manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner-spouses show that the issuance of the Resolutions dated June 2,
2000 and January 1, 2001 was patent and gross that would warrant striking them down through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner-spouses simply framed the issue in this case as follows:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW FILED BY PETITIONERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.33
They did not, however, address the issue. It is noteworthy that aside from a cursory claim in the opening paragraph
and paragraph 25 of the petition that the Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
were "unjust and arbitrary" and "issued in grave abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,"34 petitioner-spouses failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
They have not advanced any argument to show that the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously,
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and hostility. Thus, they failed in their duty to demonstrate
201
with definiteness the grave abuse of discretion that would justify the proper availment of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Thirdly, petitioner-spouses make it appear that there are compelling reasons to support their petition -- deprivation
of property without just compensation and denial of due process. The petitioner-spouses, however, belatedly raised
these issues and failed to substantiate the same.
There is no question that petitioner-spouses are entitled under the law to receive just compensation for the property
taken from them and transferred to private respondents by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. 35 Due process
guarantees that taking of private property by the State for public use should be with payment of just
compensation.36 Unfortunately, petitioner-spouses themselves did not consider the issue of just compensation as
compelling enough because they did not raise it in the complaint or in the position paper which they filed in the Office
of the Provincial Adjudicator.37 They only claimed just compensation for the first time on appeal, that is, when they
filed their petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The settled rule that issues not raised in the proceedings
below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal bursts the bubble that is the alleged compelling nature of petitioner-
spouses’ claim. Petitioner-spouses ask for due process, but fairness and due process dictate that evidence and
issues not presented below cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal.38
On jurisdictional grounds, petitioner-spouses could not validly present for the first time the issue of nonpayment of
just compensation in the Court of Appeals. Under the law, the DARAB has primary, original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving payments for lands awarded under Presidential Decree No. 27.39
In any event, the right of petitioner-spouses to payment of just compensation does not include reacquisition of
ownership and possession of the property transferred to private respondents pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.
Lands acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not revert to the landowner.40
The due process claim of petitioner-spouses has no leg to stand on.They have had ample opportunity to defend their
interests in due course.41 Stripped to its basic concept, due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.42 Petitioner-spouses were given the chance to sufficiently state
their case concerning the timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by private respondents. In particular, they submitted
to the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator their Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September 16, 1996 and
Supplemental Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and
Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated October 3, 1996 where they argued that both the motion to quash and
the notice of appeal of private respondents were filed beyond the prescribed period.43 In the DARAB level, petitioner-
spouses filed a Counter-Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated February 9, 1997 where they again
pointed out that the appeal of private respondents was filed out of time.44 Thus, petitioner-spouses cannot correctly
claim that they were not heard on the matter.1âwphi1
More importantly, it has already been found that the notice of appeal was filed on time, particularly with respect to
private respondent Siapno-Sanchez.45 To question such finding is to raise a question of fact. However, it is settled
that questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari.46 Only established or admitted facts can be
considered.47 In this connection, it has been established that the copy of the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision dated
June 27, 1995 was sent by registered mail to and received by private respondent Berma’s daughter who lived in
another barangay.48 Such receipt by Berma’s daughter cannot be validly considered as service of the Provincial
Adjudicator’s decision on Berma. Sections 4 and 9, Rule V of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which became
effective on June 22, 1994, provides:
SECTION 4. Service of Pleadings, Notices and Resolutions. – a) The party filing the pleading shall serve the opposing
party with a copy thereof in the manner provided for in these Rules and proof of such service shall be filed with the
records of the case; and
b) Summons, notices and copies of resolutions, orders or decisions shall be served personally as far as practicable,
or by registered mail upon the party himself, his counsel, or his duly authorized representative. However, notice to
the counsel is notice to the party himself whether he be a complainant or petitioner, or a defendant or respondent.
xxxx
SECTION 9. Proof of Completeness of Service. – The return is a prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.
Service by registered mail is completed upon receipt by the addressee, his counsel, or by the duly authorized
representative or agent. (Emphases supplied.)
At that time, private respondent Berma had neither counsel nor duly authorized representative. Therefore, the copy
of the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision should have been served on Berma personally or by registered mail. As it
was sent by registered mail to private respondent Berma as the addressee, service thereof could only have been
completed upon receipt by Berma. As it was not received by private respondent Berma but by his daughter who
resided in another barangay, there was no proper and completed service of the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision on
Berma. Thus, with respect to him, the notice of appeal was also filed on time.
Petitioner-spouses primarily anchor this petition on an invocation of the rule on liberality in the construction of
procedural rules. However, the "liberal construction rule" is not a license to disregard procedural requirements. Like
all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the prescribed procedure.49 Petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament when they decided to change
horses in midstream and engaged the services of their present counsel on April 10, 2000 or just a week before the
expiration of the period to appeal in the Court of Appeals, discharging the services of their former counsel who
handled the case from the level of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB. They cannot escape the consequences
of a belated appeal caused by the need of their new counsel for more time to study voluminous records and familiarize
himself with the case. Moreover, as shown above, petitioner-spouses not only failed to show any persuasive reason
why they should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules when they filed their petition for review in the Court
of Appeals beyond the prescribed period. They again disregarded the rules in various ways absent any compelling
reason when they filed this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 188046. July 24, 2013.]
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMERICAN RUBBER CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) assailing the August 26,
2008 Decision 1 and May 12, 2009 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No.
00990-MIN which affirmed with modification the Orders 3 dated June 16, 2005 and March 14, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court (Special Agrarian Court [SAC]) of Pagadian City, Branch 18. ESTCHa
The facts follow:
American Rubber Corporation (respondent) is the registered owner of two parcels of land with a combined area of
940.7276 hectares situated in Barangay Baluno, Isabela City, Basilan. The first parcel with an area of 927.9366
hectares is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1286, while the second parcel consists of 12.7910
hectares under TCT No. T-1285. 4
Sometime in January 1998, respondent voluntarily offered to sell the two parcels and another property (TCT No. T-
4747) together with all improvements for the total price of P105,732,921.00. Subsequently, respondent offered to sell
only the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1285 and T-1286 at the higher amount of P83,346.77 per hectare, for the
total price of P1,066,588.60 (12.7970 hectares) and P76,928,492.00 (922.9930 hectares), respectively. 5
202
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) initially acquired 835.0771 hectares of respondent's landholding, with an xxx xxx xxx
average valuation of P64,288.16 per hectare or for a total amount of P53,685,570.62. Subsequently, an additional RECOMMENDATIONS
37.7013 hectares were also covered, with an average valuation of P62,660.10 per hectare or for a total amount of xxx xxx xxx
P1,604,141.34. The total area acquired by DAR was 888.6489 hectares valued by petitioner at P55,682,832.67. 6 In VIEW of all the foregoing considerations, this Commission hereby recommends that just compensation of the
Since respondent rejected DAR's offer based on petitioner's valuation, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) [plaintiff's] property be fixed at ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
endorsed the claim folder to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Central Office for THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIX PESOS (P115,372,206) . . . . 15
summary administrative proceedings. 7 DAR also requested petitioner to deposit the amount fixed as compensation On June 16, 2005, the SAC issued an Order 16 adopting the Commissioners' recommendation:
for respondent's land. On February 22, 2000, petitioner deposited in cash and agrarian reform bonds the sum of WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant LBP and DAR to jointly and severally pay [plaintiff]
P53,685,570.62. 8Upon orders of the DAR Secretary, respondent's titles were partially cancelled and new transfer the following:
certificates of title were issued over the areas taken in the name of the Republic of the Philippines on August 7, 2000. 1. Just compensation of [plaintiff's] property amounting to ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED
Thereafter, DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in favor of the agrarian reform SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIX PESOS (P115,372,206) which amount is broken down below:
beneficiaries. 9 LAND USE AREA VALUE/ TOTAL
Exasperated by DARAB's inaction for more than two years, respondent filed in the Regional Trial Court (SAC) a
TAKEN HECTARE VALUE
suit 10 for judicial determination of just compensation (Civil Case No. 4401-2K2). Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss 11 on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, citing the pendency of administrative
proceedings and respondent's admission that it had withdrawn and collected the preliminary amount of compensation Rubberland 814.6625 P130,342 P106,184,739
deposited by petitioner. On January 28, 2003, the SAC denied the motion to dismiss. 12 Petitioner's motion for Riceland 14.8470 P126,000 P1,870,722
reconsideration was likewise denied. 13 SDHCac
Pursuant to the Rules of Court, the SAC designated three commissioners nominated by the parties: an IBP member Coconutland 5.5676 P98,430 P548,018
(Ret. Judge Cecilio G. Martin) as Chairman, and Engr. Sean C. Collantes from the Development Bank of the Cacaoland 0.8971 P157,063 P140,901
Philippines and BIR Revenue Officer Cesar P. Dayagdag as Members. Idle/Rawland 13.4160 P80,000 P1,073,280
On July 29, 2004, the Commissioners' Report 14 was submitted to the Court, with the following findings and
recommendation: Black Pepper land 0.5918 P218,013 P129,020
INVESTIGATIONS TAKEN Plant Nursery 1.5574 P200,000 P311,480
On March 8, 2004[,] we conducted an ocular inspection. The entire membership of the Court appointed Plantation road 27.5043 P130,342 P3,584,496
commissioners were all present and both the contending parties also sent their duly authorized representatives.
Airstrip 10.1970 P150,000 P1,529,550
Our ocular inspection reveal that both parcels of land are pre-dominantly planted to rubber with an approximate
density of 290-295 rubber trees per hectare. There are relatively smaller portions thereof which are devoted to the ————————————
production of rice, cacao, coffee, black pepper, and coconuts. Also found inside the rubber plantation are plant GRAND TOTAL P115,372,206
nurseries, office buildings and other infrastructures. The land has an airstrip of about 10 hectares and is likewise
===========
traversed and criss-crossed by plantation roads, which were built by plaintiff, American Rubber, containing an area
of 27 hectares more or less. The location [of] the rubber plantation is approximately 8 kilometers to the city proper of 2. Interest based on the 91-day treasury bills rate as provided for under Section 18 of R.A. 6657 be reckoned from
Isabela, Basilan. the [date] when [plaintiff's] property was taken and/or transferred to the Republic of the Philippines;
During the course of ocular inspection, some of our members inquired from occupants/workers of 3. Commissioners fees to be taxed as part of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67, of the 1997 RCP, as
the rubber plantation and adjoining owners to get information on the probable selling price of land particularly amended, which shall be claimed in a Bill of Costs to be submitted to the Court for its evaluation and proper action
rubberland. Our inquiry revealed that rubberland commands a selling price of between P120,000 to P150,000 thereto; SETaHC
depending on the size of the land and condition of the rubber trees. 4. Reasonable attorney's fees amounting to One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00);
xxx xxx xxx 5. Costs of suit.
. . . we conducted inquiries from the different government agency/officials such as the City Assessors Office of SO ORDERED. 17
Isabela, Department of Agriculture, Register of Deeds, Department of Agrarian Reform, and the Bureau of Internal After the SAC denied its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA.
Revenue for the purpose of obtaining information on the approximate selling price of rubberland in the Isabela City On August 26, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
area. Our investigation reveal that the reasonable selling price of rubber [land] within the City of Isabela ranges from WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated June
P90,000 to P150,000. 16, 2005 and March 14, 2006 of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is
During the March 26, 2004 hearing, defendant LBP submitted a Valuation Summary for plaintiff's property while the hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONthat the award of interest based on the 91-day treasury bill is deleted.
plaintiff submitted a copy of the appraisal report prepared by Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. . . . cCaSHA SO ORDERED. 18
203
The CA also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition asserting that —
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN AFFIRMING WITH
MODIFICATION THE ORDERS DATED JUNE 16, 2005 AND MARCH 14, 2006 OF THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN
COURT (SAC), THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC NOT BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LEGALLY
PRESCRIBED VALUATION FACTORS UNDER SECTION 17 OF R.A. 6657 AS TRANSLATED INTO A BASIC
FORMULA IN DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 05, SERIES OF 1998 AND JOINT DAR-LBP MEMORANDUM
CIRCULAR NO. 7, SERIES OF 1999, AND AS RULED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF SPS.
BANAL, G.R. NO. 143276 (JULY 20, 2004); CELADA, G.R. NO. 164876 (JANUARY 23, 2006); AND LUZ LIM, G.R.
NO. 171941 (AUGUST 2, 2007).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS [ERRED] IN HOLDING PETITIONER LBP LIABLE FOR
COMMISSIONERS' FEE AS THE LATTER IS PERFORMING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION AND, THEREFORE,
NOT LIABLE FOR COST. 19
Petitioner assails the CA in affirming the SAC valuation which merely adopted the Commissioners' Report which, in
turn, is based solely on the recommended valuation by respondent's private appraiser, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. using
a different criteria. It cites our ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation Company, Inc. 20 where
this Court noted that no basis had been shown in the appraisal report for concluding that the market data approach
and income approach, the same criteria used by Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. in this case, "conformed to statutory and
regulatory requirements." 21 Accordingly, we sustained in said case the valuation made by LBP, which was patterned
after the applicable administrative order issued by the DAR. HIAEcT
Petitioner further points out that the SAC's valuation violated AO 5 guidelines stating that "the computed value using
the applicable formula shall in no case exceed the [Landowner's] offer in case of VOs." 22 In this case, respondent's
revised offer was only P83,346.77 per hectare but the SAC arrived at an average value of P129,742.38 per hectare
which is 55.66% more than the landowner's offer.
Respondent, on the other hand, distinguished the factual setting of this case from that of Land Bank v. Kumassie
Plantation Company, Inc. 23 It points out that in Kumassie, the SAC merely cited the location of the land and nature
of the trees planted, and relied heavily on the appraisal report of the private appraiser which pegged the value of the
land on its potential benefits of land ownership. But here, respondent claims that the SAC through its appointed
commissioners, "appeared to have dwelt on the Market Data Approach, Income Approach and Residual Value
Approach, in determining just compensation of respondent's property, the data gathered under the said approaches
to valuation basically encompassed/embraced most, if not all, of the factors enumerated in Section 17, R.A. 6657 in
relation to the relevant DAR Administrative Orders." 24 It cannot be said, therefore, that the SAC herein had no basis
in fixing the just compensation of respondent's property after having taken into consideration the factors enumerated
in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
Respondent further invokes our ruling in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 25 where this Court upheld the
valuation made by the RTC which did not merely rely on the report of Commissioners nor on the Cuervo appraiser's
report but also took into account the nature of the property as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value,
assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce, such valuation was considered to be in accordance
with R.A. No. 6657.
Section 17 of the law enumerates the factors to be considered by the RTC in determining just compensation to be
paid to the landowner:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation. CEaDAc
Thus, the RTC shall be guided by the following factors in just compensation cases: (1) the acquisition cost of the
land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the
owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any. 26 These factors
have been translated into the following basic formula under relevant issuances 27 by the DAR:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) +(CS x 0.3)+(MV x 0.1)
Where:LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration 28
The mandatory application by the RTC of the above formula in accordance with DAR administrative orders and
circulars had been settled by this Court. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, 29 we
cited a long line of jurisprudence and reiterated the standing rule on the matter:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we recognized that the DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with
the implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to determine just compensation
which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. We said:
"These factors [enumerated in Section 17] have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant
to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended." [emphases
ours]
In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, we emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply the formula provided in the
applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that:
"While [the RTC] is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the
government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into
a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government
agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations
to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR [Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A.
No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The [RTC]
was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision. DEICHc
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted
to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of
a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative
issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order
is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same." [emphases ours]
We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the applicable DAR administrative regulations in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Lim, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, and Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Barrido. In Barrido, we were explicit in stating that:
"While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a Special
Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically
identified by law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid
down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts
204
have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian law, the formula provided
by the DAR for the determination of just compensation." (emphases ours)
These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the pertinent DAR
administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted with grievous
error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own
basis for the valuation of the subject land. 30 [Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.]
In ruling for the respondent, the CA ruled that the RTC is not bound to adopt exclusively the formula set by DAR's
issuances, citing this Court's ruling in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 31 and that the SAC "may in the
exercise of its judicial discretion use other factors and alternative formula in fixing the proper valuation of just
compensation. ICTaEH
As already mentioned, the SAC is duty-bound to apply the formula laid down in DAR AO No. 5. The CA clearly erred
in affirming the valuation by the SAC in this case based on the private appraiser's correlated income, market data
and residual value approaches which did not conform to the guidelines set forth in DAR AO No. 5 and Joint DAR-
LBP Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 7, Series of 1999. It must be stressed that MC No. 7 was issued to provide
revised guidelines in determining the Capitalized Net Income (CNI) specifically for rubberlands:
1. PREFATORY STATEMENT
The rubber plantation income models presented under the old rubber Land Valuation Guideline (LVG No. 6, Series
of 1990) recognized the income of rubber plantations based on processed crumb rubber. However, recent
consultations with rubber authorities (industry, research, etc.) disclosed that the standard income approach to
valuation should measure the net income or productivity of the land based on the farm produce (in their raw forms)
and not on the entire agri-business income enhanced by the added value of farm products due to processing. Hence,
it is more appropriate to determine the Capitalized Net Income (CNI) of rubber plantations based on the actual yield
and farm gate prices of raw products (field latex and cuplump) and the corresponding cost of production.
There is also a growing market for old rubber trees which are estimated to generate net incomes ranging between
P20,000 and P30,000 per hectare or an average of about P100 per tree, depending on the remaining stand of old
trees at the end of its economic life. This market condition for old rubber trees was not present at the time LVG No.
6, Series of 1990, was being prepared. (The terminal or salvage value of old rubber trees was at that time pegged at
only P6,000 per hectare, representing the amount then being paid by big landholders to contractors for clearing and
uprooting old trees.
LVG No. 6, Series of 1990, was therefore revised to address the foregoing considerations and in accordance
with DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 05, Series of 1998.
Petitioner, however, admits that it did not consider data on comparative sales transactions (CS) which it said are not
applicable since under DAR AO 5, the sales transactions should have been executed "within the period January 1,
1985 to June 15, 1988 and registered within the period January 1, 1985 to September 13, 1988." 32 SECcIH
We cannot accept petitioner's valuation as it failed to consider the value of the property at the time of taking, the
current value of like properties being among those factors enumerated in Section 17. Indeed, these administrative
issuances or orders, though they enjoy the presumption of legalities, are still subject to the interpretation by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its power to interpret the law. While rules and regulation issued by the administrative
bodies have the force and effect of law and are entitled to great respect, courts interpret administrative regulations
in harmony with the law that authorized them and avoid as much as possible any construction that would annul them
as invalid exercise of legislative power. 33
This Court has defined "just compensation" for parcels of land taken pursuant to the agrarian reform program as
"the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator." The measure of compensation
is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 34 Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property
at the time of its taking. It means a fair and full equivalent value for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition
of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. 35 Thus, the current
value of like properties should have been considered by petitioner to accurately determine the value of the land at
the time of taking, that is, in August 2000 when respondent's title was transferred to the Government.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas we said that:
The "taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding."
In computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC should take into consideration the "value
of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of judgment." "The 'time of taking' is the time
when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic. 36
However, while the CA correctly observed that petitioner's valuation omitted an integral factor mandated by Section
17, the records are bereft of any supporting evidence to compute the CS. The documents submitted by the
respondent to the Commissioners consisted merely of sworn affidavits of adjacent owners/sellers and not registerable
deeds of sale. The SAC's decision actually did not contain any discussion of its application of any formula to the facts
established by evidence, as it merely adopted the Commissioners' Report, which in turn was based solely on the
findings and computation of the Cuervo Appraisal Report. EIDATc
Considering, therefore, that the SAC based its valuation on a different formula, 37 while petitioner failed to take into
full consideration the factors set forth in Section 17, and in the absence of sufficient evidence for the determination
of just compensation, 38 we are constrained to remand the present case to the SAC for the determination of just
compensation in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, DAR AO 5, Series of 1998 and Joint DAR-LBP MC No. 7,
Series of 1999. The said trial court may, motu proprio or at the instance of any of the parties, again appoint one or
more commissioners to ascertain facts relevant to the dispute and file a written report thereof. 39
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 26, 2008 Decision and May 12, 2009 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals-Mindanao Station in CA-GR. SP No. 00990-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court (Special Agrarian Court) of Pagadian City, Branch 18, which is
directed to determine with dispatch, and with the assistance of at least three commissioners, the just compensation
due to the respondent AmericanRubber Corporation, in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, DAR AO 5,
Series of 1998, Joint DAR-LBP MC No. 7, Series of 1999 and other applicable DAR issuances.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 203039. September 11, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), petitioner, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution 3 dated
06 August 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79843, affirming the Order 4 dated 03 February 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City in Civil Case No. LP 98-0031.
The Antecedent Facts
On 12 February 1998, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) filed with the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Las Piñas City, Branch 275 (trial court), a case for expropriation against portions of the
properties of Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and of Bayani Villanueva (Villanueva) situated in Pamplona, Las
Piñas City. DPWH needed 281 square meters of BPI's lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-59156
and 177 square meters from Villanueva's lot covered by TCT No. T-64556 for the construction of the Zapote-Alabang
Fly-Over. 5
205
Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the expropriation; 6 hence, the trial court constituted a Board
of Commissioners to determine the just compensation. 7 In their Report dated 29 September 1998, 8 the Board of
Commissioners recommended the amount of P40,000.00 per square meter as the fair market value. On 25 November
1998, the trial court in its Decision set the fair market value at P40,000.00 per square meter: 9
The property of BPI, which was affected, consists of 281 square meters and that of Defendant Villanueva consists of
177 square meters. Hence the amount to be awarded to the defendants shall be computed as follows: ICAcTa
BPI — 281 sq. meters x P40,000.00 = P11,240,000.00; and
Villanueva — 177 sq. meters x P40,000.00 = P7,080,000.00
Considering that the plaintiff has deposited the amount of P632,250.00 with respect to the property of BPI, the latter
should receive the amount of P10,607,750.00.
With respect to Defendant Villanueva, the plaintiff deposited the provisional amount of P2,655,000.00, hence, the
remaining amount to be paid is P4,425,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines
as represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands
the amount of TEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P10,607,750.00) and Defendant Bayani Villanueva the amount of FOUR MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY
FIVE THOUSAND (P4,425,000.00), as just compensation for their properties which were expropriated. 10
On 15 December 1998, the acting branch clerk of court issued a Certification 11 stating that:
. . . the Decision in this case dated November 25, 1998 has become FINAL, EXECUTORY and UNAPPEALABLE as
of December 11, 1998 considering that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to file any Notice of Appeal or Motion
for Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof on November 26, 1998.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Jansen Rodriguez for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
Meanwhile, BPI filed on 16 December 1998 a Motion for Partial New Trial 12 to determine the just compensation of
its building, which was not included in the Decision dated 25 November 1998 that fixed the just compensation for the
parcels of land. In the motion, BPI claimed that its motion was timely filed since it received a copy of the Decision on
01 December 1998. 13 The trial court granted partial new trial in an Order dated 06 January 1999. DAEIHT
Due to the failure of counsel for petitioner, despite notice, to appear during the scheduled hearing for the
determination of the just compensation of the building, the trial court allowed BPI to present its evidence ex
parte. 14 On O1 September 1999, the trial court admitted the exhibits presented by BPI. 15 On the same day, the
trial court also appointed as commissioner the Officer-in-Charge of the trial court, Leticia B. Agbayani (Agbayani),
and ordered her to conduct an ocular inspection of the building. 16 Agbayani reported the following findings:
a) That the undersigned found out that a new building was constructed and a picture of said building is hereto
attached and made as an integral part hereof as Annex "A" and;
b) That the building was moved back when it was constructed to conform with the requirement of the Building Code;
and
c) Improvements were introduced around the building. 17
In its Decision dated 10 September 1999, 18 the trial court held that just compensation for the building was due and
ordered petitioner to pay BPI the amount of P2,633,000.00. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay defendant Bank of the Philippine
Island (sic) the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY THREE [THOUSAND] PESOS
(PHP2,633,000.00). 19
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration 20 of the 10 September 1999 Decision on the ground that the proceeding
fixing the just compensation of the building is null and void for not complying with the mandatory procedure set forth
in Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. 21
After due hearing, the trial court granted on 14 February 2000 petitioner's motion for reconsideration and ordered
that the Decision dated 10 September 1999 be set aside and vacated. 22 From this order, BPI filed a motion for
reconsideration, 23 on the ground that there was substantial compliance with the Rules. The trial court denied BPI's
motion for reconsideration. 24
On 19 September 2000, the trial court appointed Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante, the branch clerk of court, as the
chairman of the Board of Commissioners, and gave petitioner and BPI ten days to submit their respective nominees
and their oaths of office. 25 On 28 September 2000, BPI nominated Roland Savellano (Savellano), and submitted
his oath of office. 26
Instead of submitting its nominee, petitioner filed on 13 October 2000 a Manifestation and Motion 27 objecting to the
propriety of paying just compensation for BPI's building and praying that BPI's claim for additional just compensation
be denied. Petitioner claimed that the building was never taken by the government. 28 In support, petitioner attached
a letter dated 12 September 2000 from the DPWH, addressed to the Solicitor General. The letter states, in
part: DHSCEc
. . . the original plan affecting the subject property was not implemented. The width of the sidewalk at the premises
under consideration was actually reduced from 2.50 m to 2.35 m . . . to avoid the costly structure of that bank. 29
In its opposition, 30 BPI claimed that it was not aware that the original plan was not implemented. It received no
correspondence from the DPWH on the matter, except for the letter dated 12 August 1997 from DPWH addressed
to BPI, stating in part that:
We regret to inform you that adjustment of the RROW limit of our project along this section is not possible
as it will affect the effective width of the sidewalk designated at 2.50 m. wide. 31 (Emphasis in the original)
BPI also argued that even "if a 3-meter setback is observed, only 75% of the old building could be utilized . . . [and]
cutting the support system of the building . . . would affect the building's structural integrity." 32
On 07 May 2001, the trial court denied 33 petitioner's motion dated 09 October 2000, and ruled that the demolition
of the old building of BPI can be construed as a consequential damage suffered by BPI as a result of the
expropriation. Petitioner was thus ordered to submit its nominee to the Board of Commissioners.
Petitioner nominated Romulo C. Gervacio (Gervacio), the Officer-in-Charge of the City Assessor's Office in Las Piñas
City. The Board thus constituted, the trial court ordered the Commissioners to submit their recommendation.
Commissioner for BPI Savellano recommended the amount of P2,633,000.00, which was based on the appraisal
conducted by an independent professional business and property consultant. 34 On the other hand, Commissioner
for petitioner Gervacio recommended the amount of P1,905,600.00, which was the market value indicated on the tax
declaration of said building. The Commissioner's Report 35 presented both the recommendations of Savellano and
Gervacio for the trial court's consideration.
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court issued the Order 36 dated 03 February 2003, adopting the recommendation of Gervacio of
P1,905,600.00, thus: HSAcaE
The Court approves the Recommendation dated October 22, 2001 of ONE MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,905,600.00) by Commissioner ROMULO C. GERVACIO as the just
compensation of the building of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Zapote affected by the construction of the
Zapote-Alabang Fly-over, it appearing that such amount is the existing market value of the property pursuant to the
Declaration by BPI as the market value of the building affected by the project as contained in Tax Declaration D-006-
02044.
Let the same amount be paid by the Republic of the Philippines through the Department of Public Works and
Highways as the just compensation for the property. 37
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 79843. 38
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
206
On 14 September 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. The
relevant portions of the decision state:
We cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant's proposition that the decision dated November 25, 1998 has already attained
finality there being no appeal filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Pursuant to Section l, Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the period within which an aggrieved party may move
the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and file a motion for new trial is within the period to file an
appeal, which is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the judgment or final order. It is explicit from the stated provision
that the fifteen day period to file a motion for new trial will start to run from receipt of judgment or final order. A
judgment, final order or resolution shall be served upon a party either personally or through registered mail. Moreover,
Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides for the proof of service of judgments, final
orders or resolution . . . . CIAacS
xxx xxx xxx
Guided by the foregoing provisions of law, the crucial fact in which the finality of the decision dated November 25,
1998 with respect to defendant-appellee, depends in the determination of the date of its receipt of the copy of the
said decision in order to ascertain whether its motion for partial new trial was filed within the 15-day period allowed
by law.
In this case, records bear that a copy of the decision dated November 25, 1998, ordering the payment of just
compensation for the expropriated land was received in behalf of defendant Bayani Villanueva on the same day of
its promulgation. A copy of the said decision was also served upon plaintiff-appellant through the OSG on November
26, 1998. However, there is no showing, that defendant-appellee through its counsel received a copy of the trial
court's decision on a definite date. No official return nor affidavit of the party serving the decision was attached to the
records of the case. Neither was the presence of a registry receipt issued by the mailing office nor a registry return
card containing the date of receipt of the decision be found among its records. Since there was no showing as to the
exact date of receipt of defendant-appellee of the said decision, the running of the period of 15 days within which to
file a motion for new trial did not begin to run.Therefore, the filing of defendant-appellee of a motion for partial
new trial on December 16, 1998 was never delayed but timely filed thus preventing the decision dated
November 25, 1998 from attaining finality as against them. Moreover, We find the admission of defendant-
appellee in its brief filed on June 2, 2005, that it received a copy of the trial court's decision on December 1,
1998, sufficient to comply with the requirement of a written admission of a party served with a judgment as provided
in Sec. 13 of Rule 13, of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It should also be noted that the certification issued by
Edgar Allan C. Morante, the acting clerk of court, as to the finality of judgment as of December 11, 1998 will
not stand against defendant-appellee because the 15-day period to file an appeal will only start to commence
upon the receipt of the decision which is on December 1, 1998. Counting the 15-day period from the first of
December, the period within which to file an appeal will expire on December 16, 1998. Thus, the trial court did not
err in granting the motion for partial new trial of the defendant-appellee as the same was amply filed with the
reglementary period prescribed by law.
Having settled that the motion for partial new trial was timely filed, We now rule that the trial court did not lose its
jurisdiction when it conducted subsequent proceedings determining just compensation and later on directed plaintiff-
appellant to pay additional just compensation in the amount of P1,905,600.00 for the building of defendant-appellee.
Lastly, as to the argument of plaintiff-appellant that the award of additional just compensation for the building of
defendant-appellee is erroneous and without legal basis because the building was never taken by the government in
the expropriation proceeding conducted by the trial court nor was it affected by the construction of the Zapote-Alabang
Flyover, We find the ruling of Republic of the Philippines through the DPWH vs. CA and Rosario R.
Reyes appropriate to apply in this case, to wit: TcEAIH
Petitioner contends that no consequential damages may be awarded as the remaining lot was not "actually taken"
by the DPWH, and to award consequential damages for the lot which was retained by the owner is tantamount to
unjust enrichment on the part of the latter.
Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious.
No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a
result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of private respondent
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to private respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed order
of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas, Branch 275 dated February 3, 2003 is AFFIRMED in toto. 39 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; italicization in the original.)
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 40 This was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 06
August 2012. 41
The Issues
The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the trial court's Decision dated 25 November 1998 had become final
and executory before BPI filed its motion for partial new trial; and (2) whether the award of additional just
compensation for BPI's building in the amount fixed therefor is unfounded and without legal basis.
The Court's Ruling
We find the appeal unmeritorious.
On whether BPI's motion for partial new
trial was filed out of time
Petitioner contends that the trial court's Decision dated 25 November 1998 had already become final and executory
as of 11 December 1998, as stated in the Certification 42 issued by the acting branch clerk of court. On the other
hand, BPI asserts that its motion for partial new trial filed on 16 December 1998 was timely filed because it received
a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998. aCASEH
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 25 November 1998 Decision did not become
final and executory for BPI on 11 December 1998. It argues that the appellate court erred in reckoning the 15-day
reglementary period from a mere admission of the date of receipt by BPI. Petitioner further argues that the
Certification issued by the acting branch clerk of the trial court enjoys a presumption of regularity and that BPI had
not been able to overcome the presumption. Both the trial and appellate courts found that BPI's motion for partial
new trial was filed on time.
A perusal of the Certification reveals that it certifies that the 25 November 1998 Decision had already become final,
executory and unappealable as to petitioner:
. . . the Decision in this case dated November 25, 1998 has become FINAL, EXECUTORY and UNAPPEALABLE as
of December 11, 1998 considering that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to file any Notice of Appeal or
Motion for Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof on November 26, 1998.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Jansen Rodriguez for whatever legal purpose it may
serve. 43 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no other reading of this certificate that would be supported by the record.
Section 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states that judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either
personally or by registered mail. Section 13 of the same Rule provides what consists proof of service:
Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server,
or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. . . . If service
is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender . . . . AaCcST
207
A careful review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the Decision of 25 November 1998 was served
upon BPI. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that absent any proof of service to BPI of the Decision, the
period of 15 days within which to file its motion for partial new trial did not begin to run against BPI. However, BPI's
admission that it received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998 is binding on it, and was correctly considered
by the Court of Appeals as the reckoning date to count the 15-day period.
On whether the award of additional just
compensation and the amount fixed therefor
was unfounded and without legal basis
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. 44 The State's power of eminent domain is
limited by the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. 45
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. 46 The general rule is that
the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is the market value. 47 Market
value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled
to sell, would agree on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. The general rule, however, is
modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. 48 In such a case, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the
remaining part of the property. 49
In this case, petitioner questions the appellate court's Decision affirming the trial court's Order of 03 February 2003
granting additional just compensation for consequential damages for BPI's building. Petitioner contends that BPI's
building was "never taken" by petitioner, and that to award consequential damages for the building was unfounded
and without legal basis. In support of its contention, petitioner relies on the letter dated 12 September 2000 of the
DPWH to the Office of the Solicitor General 50 stating that the proposed sidewalk of 2.50 meters was reduced to
2.35 meters, thus leaving BPI's building intact.
Petitioner's argument is untenable.
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded
if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
value. 51 The rules on expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the award of consequential damages. Section 6
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:
. . . The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or public purpose
of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. EHSTDA
In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, 52 we held that:
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property, to which should
be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the
expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded
altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case.
We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Lastly, as to the argument of plaintiff-appellant that the award of additional just compensation for the building of
defendant-appellee is erroneous and without legal basis because the building was never taken by the government in
the expropriation proceeding conducted by the trial court nor was it affected by the construction of the Zapote-Alabang
Flyover, We find the ruling of Republic of the Philippines through the DPWH vs. CA and Rosario R.
Reyes appropriate to apply in this case, to wit:
Petitioner contends that no consequential damages may be awarded as the remaining lot was not "actually taken"
by the DPWH, and to award consequential damages for the lot which was retained by the owner is tantamount to
unjust enrichment on the part of the latter.
Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious.
No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a
result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of private respondent
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to private
respondent. 53 (Italicization in the original) cAHIST
Petitioner would also have us review the bases of the courts below in awarding just compensation for the building for
consequential damages. The uniform findings of the trial court and the appellate court are entitled to the greatest
respect. They are binding on the Court in the absence of a strong showing by petitioner that the courts below erred
in appreciating the established facts and in drawing inferences from such facts. 54 We find no cogent reason to
deviate from this.
The Court would like to stress that there is a stark absence in the records of any proof that DPWH communicated its
amended plan to BPI or to the trial court. On the other hand, the trial court found that BPI was not notified of the
reduction and had relied only on the DPWH letter dated 12 August 1997 saying that it was not possible to reduce
the width of the sidewalk. Petitioner had actively participated in the expropriation proceedings of the portion of BPI's
lot according to the original plan, the decision for which was promulgated on 25 November 1998. The trial court had
also ruled that additional just compensation for the building was in order in its Decision dated 10 September 1999,
from which petitioner moved for reconsideration but only as to the procedure in the determination of the amount.
Further, the records show that by 07 September 1999, when Officer-in-Charge Agbayani conducted an ocular
inspection, a new building had already been constructed replacing the old one; whereas the amended plan was
communicated by DPWH to the OSG only in September 2000, when the trial court was constituting anew the Board
of Commissioners to determine the amount of just compensation for the building. The findings of the lower courts are
borne by the records. Hence, there was proper basis for the determination of just compensation for the building for
consequential damages.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' Decision dated 14 September 2011 and
Resolution dated 06 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79843.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980.]
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M . Gonzales for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own
behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner,
Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support
208
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter,
and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. cdasia
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
provides:
"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. — In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which
he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired."
(Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
"Sec. 7. Term of office. — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall
hold office for a term of six (6) years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980."
. . ." Batas Pambansa Blg. 51
"Sec. 4. . . .
"Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered
by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such
fact and.
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
". . . (Batas Pambansa Blg. 52) (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied).
"Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials. — . . . The election shall be held on January 30, 1980." (Batas
Pambansa, Blg. 52).
"Section 6. Election and Campaign Period. — The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in
accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29,
1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980." (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some
political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary
to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als., vs. COMELEC et als.
(G.R. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised. cdasia
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative
of the Constitution.
I. The procedural aspect.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally
unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest
is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan. Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in
the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They, respectively, contest completely different
statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of
petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead time constraints
as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort for petitioner Dumlao, on one
hand, and petitioners Igot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly
procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely:
(1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue
of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted
earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit
respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the
application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari.
His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this
Court to be "rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record." Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the
primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96
[1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of
which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions.
1) . . .
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
"Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof."
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement"
(People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to
be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with
acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them
has been alleged to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional. Theirs is a generalized grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the
absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. LibLex
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated
in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331
[1960], thus:
209
". . . it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing
for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State
for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
In the same vein, it has been held:
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of
a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality
of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys." (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez,
et als. 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP
Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve
the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing
Philippine ConstitutionAssociation vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's
suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]),
speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a well-settled ruled that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised an presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case"
for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows
that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that
his suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without
discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA
512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion
in the Tinio and Gonzales cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled
us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days
hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the
fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged
provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly
overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination. LexLib
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are
based onreasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.
For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not
so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65
years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old
may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages,
say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good
local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there
is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work
is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]).
Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes
is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class
(Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification
in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to
the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies: (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the
Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision.
Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that
laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt
(Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law,
3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires
to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
"a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity
that attached to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
210
favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear
case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this in one such clear case. Cdphil
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would
be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have
been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet,
there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one
charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies, to
the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is
mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said
paragraph reads:
"SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and
disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualifications for any of the elective
officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired."
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that ". . . the filing of
charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall
beprima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 189698. December 1, 2009.]
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO,
JR., petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
"In our predisposition to discover the 'original intent' of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status
quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their
framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day". 1 It is in this
light that we should address the instant case.
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 of
the Commission onElections (COMELEC).In view of pressing contemporary events, the petition begs for immediate
resolution.
The Antecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES". Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot. — The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain
the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite.
Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed
using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her
signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided. cHCSDa
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation
to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before
the elections: Provided,That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than
the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be
deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she
is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11,
1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice President,
Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to
participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt.
The Commissionmay contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens'
arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the
ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be
impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and
other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every
registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct. 2
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled
"AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED 'AN ACT AUTHORIZING
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSTO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11,
1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL
EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS,
211
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND
OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES'". Section
13 of the amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus: cSaATC
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section 15. Official Ballot. — The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or the size
and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the propositions to be
voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to
present the names of all candidates for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic
displays must be constructed to present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure
that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to
review and change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled,
the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type
size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under
each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font and size.
"A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the
official ballot shall be provided.
"For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy
within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he
filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
"Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates within thirty (30) days before the
start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.
"With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office
and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security
measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements.
Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the printing,
storage and distribution of official ballots. HEITAD
"To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the necessary
safeguards, such as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are provided on the
ballot.
"The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every
registered voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct." 3
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678, 4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy. — a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from
November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to
run in the coming elections, 5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the
afore-quoted Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
The Petitioners' Contention
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They
aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the
official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who
filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the
campaign period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their
government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates.
They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they
are, by law, already considered as candidates. 6 ECaHSI
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains
two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration
that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. 7
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their
CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. 8
The Respondent's Arguments
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),representing
respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit. Petitioners have not yet
filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG
further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial determination. Petitioners have admitted that they
are merely planning to file their CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus
merely speculative and contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners availed
of the wrong remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's rule-
making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an improper remedy. 9
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing
Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however, agrees with petitioners
that there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to
be no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the
same day that they file their CoCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this
"deemed resigned" provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our
present election laws with the innovations brought about by the automated system. 10
Our Ruling
I.
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their petition is a
resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation
to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in
the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. 11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what
petitioners actually seek from the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a declaration
212
of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief, 12 over which this Court does not
exercise original jurisdiction. 13 aTICAc
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both
the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state interest involved
in their early resolution — the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds
of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and
irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpower —
further dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to
expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve
the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules were promulgated to
provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the
courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. 14
II.
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief history of the assailed provision.
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start
of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned
or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.15
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso
was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. acCTSE
It may be recalled — in inverse chronology — that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978 Election Code,
contained a similar provision, thus —
SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Every person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his
certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the
filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. — Every person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or employee in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal
or administrative liabilities which he may have incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code approved on June 21, 1947, also provided
that —
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are candidates. — Every person
holding a public appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his
certificate of candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT
ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS
THEREFOR",approved on January 5, 1946, contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the following:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies
or government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such office by appointive or elective, shall be considered
to have resigned from such office from the moment of the filing of such certificate of candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THECONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS THEREOF", enacted without
executive approval on June 22, 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of
elective, but not appointive, officials. cCaDSA
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its Section 22, the same
verbatim provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180.
The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted by the
Philippine Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers. — ....
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds
said public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position
which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer
or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any
manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his
office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a term of five years: Provided, however, That the
foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any
election.
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369 — that any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy — traces its roots to the period of the American occupation.
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and
enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill, acknowledged that the said
proviso in the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which was merely copied from earlier existing
legislation, thus —
Senator Osmeña.
May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the good Sponsor. This reads like, "ANY PERSON HOLDING
[means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION. ..SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED"
[which means that the prohibition extends only to appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"...This is a prohibition, Mr. President. This means if one is
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chairman of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his certificate of candidacy. Is that the
intention?
Senator Gordon.
This is really an old provision, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña.
It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment. DAcSIC
Senator Gordon.
No, it has always been there.
Senator Osmeña.
I see.
Senator Gordon.
I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain people.
Senator Osmeña.
All right. 16
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern over the inclusion
of the said provision in the new law, given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair to potential candidates
holding appointive positions, while it grants a consequent preferential treatment to elective officials, thus —
Senator Santiago. On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point more as a matter of
record than of any feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a division of the House, it
will be upheld by the majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21. The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A
PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE. ..SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE".
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that there is, for me, no valid reason for
exempting elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the law. If we are going to consider
appointive officers of the government, including AFP members and officers of government-owned and controlled
corporations, or any other member of the appointive sector of the civil service, why should it not apply to the elective
sector for, after all, even senators and congressmen are members of the civil service as well?
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an exception to itself which is not
available to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the reason why we are special
is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other government officials except ourselves, I
think, it is the better part of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until
our term expires. But if we want to run for some other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered
resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished
Sponsor, because of sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of. It is a good policy. However, this is something
that is already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case that the rider was not upheld
and that it was valid. 17
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil servants must have
been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during the period of amendments: "ANY
PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE
CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS
COC". 18 The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by
considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying
the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the
campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436 contained a
similar provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs for any office other than
that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A.
No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act, 19 in 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 14 20 of the said act. There
was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso
facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not. EcAHDT
This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary 21 when it ruled that —
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of
theconstitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political
activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. TEHIaA
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e.,elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials,
is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification
are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 22
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fariñas, was intently focused on the main issue of whether the
repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain
with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on automatic resignation of persons holding
appointive positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-à-vis the equal protection clause. Moreover, the Court's vision
214
inFariñas was shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein, Fariñas et al., never posed a direct challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Fariñas et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional grounds, the
repealing clause, or Section 14 of the Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration inFariñas may then
very well be considered as an obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge advanced by
petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown above, was based on provisions dating
back to the American occupation, is violative of the equal protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on legal standing and on the
existence of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 23 In this case, petitioners
allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the
qualifications, to run in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed
their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in
the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters. 24 The Court believes that both candidates and voters may
challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights. 25 DcHSEa
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. 26
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. 27 The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case
or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very
acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provision — they would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections.
Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that
it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy. 28
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into the constitutional
challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of
expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft, 29 viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local newspaper, speak
out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official building to seek redress of
grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly
defined concept of public order and safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy
the individual wishes to expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to
the public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point
in time may not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to devote
additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the means of effective
expression changes, but the expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to publish
the newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the most effective way to give expression to his views and
to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to become a candidate for public office-means generally considered
among the most appropriate for those desiring to effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become
a candidate by filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in
the latter instance, the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging that his views be the views
of the elected public official, he is also attempting to become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive
program extends beyond the particular office in question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry,
the public employee, may not become a candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes
himself as a candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most important expression an
individual can summon, namely that which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of concrete public action, were
he to be selected by the voters. aEAcHI
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom to associate.
In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it virtually
impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that the First Amendment protected the
freedom to associate by forming and promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state
effectively denied a party access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects
associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an organization
or political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture
his supporters and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into
the electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has
done is to limit the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately related with the concept
of making expression effective. Party access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by
party machinery to carry the party's programs to the people are precluded from doing so because those nominees
are civil servants.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or associational
effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy alone may
open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows;
he may be able to secure equal time on television to elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover
his candidacy; he may be invited to debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his
views. In short, the fact of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to even
the most diligent of picketers or the most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public office is not an
interest protected by the First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office
was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First
Amendment right and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that
interest must be subjected to strict equal protection review. 30 EAISDH
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of
the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court
to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
215
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 31 a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal — a two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement — if it is not
germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.),in his treatise on constitutional law, explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of
the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will justify the prohibition
of the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this
same classification, however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations
because physical strength is not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher
rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no
justification for treating them differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the
vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules. 32 DHIaTS
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. 33
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one's
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. 34 The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result
in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than
to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane
to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in
the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs).With the fact that they both head executive offices,
there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven
by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
Mancuso v. Taft, 35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which restricts the rights of civil
servants to run for office — a right inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and association, is not reasonably
necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking down a similar measure in the United
States, Mancuso succinctly declares —
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we do see some contemporary
relevance of the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for the Cranston charter provision
to withstand strict scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of all government employees from candidacy is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar
statutes, see Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest
in protecting the integrity of its civil service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil service
would be seriously jeopardized if people in positions of authority used their discretion to forward their electoral
ambitions rather than the public welfare. Similarly if a public employee pressured other fellow employees to engage
in corrupt practices in return for promises of post-election reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office
he was seeking to extract special favors from his superiors, the civil service would be done irreparable injury.
Conversely, members of the public, fellow-employees, or supervisors might themselves request favors from the
candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior towards him. Even if none of these abuses actually
materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might seriously erode the public's confidence in its public employees.
For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the
assessor's office who is running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could provide
"pressure" points for furthering his campaign is destructive regardless of whether the clerk actually takes advantage
of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed has a compelling interest in maintaining
the honesty and impartiality of its public work force. HTaSEA
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat prohibition on office-seeking of all
kinds by all kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice
Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, "[s]tatutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precision'".For three sets of reasons we conclude that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far
too heavy-handed manner and hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the
regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-may be unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting
some sort of prophylactic rule may be required, the provision here prohibits candidacies for all types of public office,
including many which would pose none of the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision excludes the
candidacies of all types of public employees, without any attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose
positions make them vulnerable to corruption and conflicts of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy
high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered asipso
facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable
how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
216
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively
high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to
seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed
in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the
widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office.
Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. 36 cCAaHD
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed
freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from
them.
Mancuso v. Taft, 37 on this point, instructs —
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the leave of absence. Some
system of leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take time off to pursue his candidacy while assuring
him his old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of absence policy would eliminate many of
the opportunities for engaging in the questionable practices that the statute is designed to prevent. While
campaigning, the candidate would feel no conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion,
nor any conflict between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to confidential documents. But instead of
adopting a reasonable leave of absence policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee
cast off the security of hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for elected office.
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by enforcing, through dismissal, discipline,
or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or other forms of official corruption.
By thus attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective
without unduly burdening the First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term
in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that
the interest of "ballot box purity" justified its imposition of one year and three month residency requirements before a
citizen could vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that
could be used to punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it
appears from the record in this case that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that might be used against
opportunistic public employees.
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston has put much effort into tailoring a
narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. The charter forbids a Cranston public
employee from running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but
rather extends to statewide offices and even to national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public employee
running for the United States Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same employee
if he were running for a local office where the contacts and information provided by his job related directly to the
position he was seeking, and hence where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston
charter except the public employee who works in Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most
probably his town of residence. Here again the charter precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat
to the civil service. Finally, the charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes also those
public employees who would seek nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to partisan
political activity, and since that time other courts have found the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See
Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan and
partisan can often be blurred by systems whose true characters are disguised by the names given them by their
architects, it seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently
different from those involved in an office removed from regular party politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a
charter of this sort. ScEaAD
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter relates not to the type of
office sought, but to the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell,
330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative employees who either participate in decision-making
or at least have some access to information concerning policy matters are much more justifiable than
restrictions on industrial employees, who, but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for
purposes of access to official information, identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the
Philadelphia mint could be distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department of Agriculture; so also could
a janitor in the public schools of Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second
line of distinction that focuses onthe type of employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In
both of these cases a civil service deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The courts in both cases felt
that the no-candidacy laws in question were much too broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive
enough to justify a flat rule was one in which an inferior in a public office electorally challenged his immediate superior.
Given all these considerations, we think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing the
terms of its charter to deal with the specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to avoid.
We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy of the public
employee to the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable on-the-job
campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is indisputable that the city
has a compelling interest in the performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that
interest. Presumably the city could fire the individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts
the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies
equally well to a number of non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter.
Finally, the connection between after-hours campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous; in many cases a
public employee would be able to campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well. 38
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing 39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the automatic resignation of District
Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors
of Hides and Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes,
District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they
become candidates in any general, special or primary election. TCHcAE
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular officials, as distinguished from
all others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits the stamp of approval from
American courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more so one violative of the second requisite
for a valid classification, which is on its face unconstitutional.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had
already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too, should follow suit and,
thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such freedoms.
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section
13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, [December 1, 2009], 621 PHIL 236-375)
[G.R. No. 189698. February 22, 2010.]
217
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO,
JR., petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J p:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on Elections'
(COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors' motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of
this Court's December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision). 1
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369, 2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code 3 and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678, 4 mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from
overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the
powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit
the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the participation of
public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to
elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions
and is germane to the purposes of the law; cDaEAS
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such reversal.
We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.
I.
Procedural Issues
First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC's motion for reconsideration which
was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which
were filed after the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.
i. Timeliness of COMELEC's Motion for Reconsideration
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court, 5 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the same
rules, 6 COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to move
for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until
December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009. The
corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was
subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 — still within the reglementary period.
ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained when the
following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the
case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. 7 SCIacA
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for intervention
may be filed, viz.:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule,
when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable
parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial
court, 8 when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme
Court, 9 and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. 10 In Lim v. Pacquing, 11 the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and
injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court 12 after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances. 13 We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. 14 Its purpose
is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 15
We rule that, with the exception of the IBP-Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may properly intervene in
the case at bar.
First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision,
which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral
process; and as a public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its
system of government.
On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the May
2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in view of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet
resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed
Decision, unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another
proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Court's Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of
the land.
With regard to the IBP-Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that "this case involves the
constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections," and that "there is a need for it to be allowed
to intervene . . . so that the voice of its members in the legal profession would also be heard before this Highest
Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental importance." 16 SDHacT
Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has failed to present a specific
and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in
character, too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.
We now turn to the substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
The assailed Decision struck down Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:
218
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a) without
distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil
servants' activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the
national, municipal or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these public appointive
officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
III.
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. — Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. — Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election
Act, 17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code 18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A.
8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding
to the positions for which they are running, 19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official
may run for another position without forfeiting his seat. ADEHTS
These laws and regulations implement Section 2 (4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political
campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
MS. QUESADA.
xxx xxx xxx
Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or
employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity." This is almost the
same provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the government service have actually experienced how
this provision has been violated by the direct or indirect partisan political activities of many government officials.
So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict, and which would
deter its violation?
MR. FOZ.
Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on the matter are more than exhaustive
enough to really prevent officers and employees in the public service from engaging in any form of partisan political
activity. But the problem really lies in implementation because, if the head of a ministry, and even the superior officers
of offices and agencies of government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction against partisan political
activity, then no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft will really implement the constitutional
intent against partisan political activity. ...20 (italics supplied)
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is presently reflected and
implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46 (b) (26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 — both of Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 — respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office. TCacIE
xxx xxx xxx
Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces,
shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall
he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein
provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided,
That public officers and employees holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall
be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving
subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention by civil service
officers and employees in partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding
political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special
forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which
may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan
political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.
But Section 2 (4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants
holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials,
notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." 21 This is
because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year
round, even outside of the campaign period. 22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office,
elective positions included. 23
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as express their
views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom they support. This is
crystal clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO:
Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line
13, between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete
the word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN. AaITCS
May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas):
Commissioner Aquino may proceed.
219
MS. AQUINO:
The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which was adopted in both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a
qualification of the general prohibition against taking part in elections.
Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this prohibition, it will amount
to disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words, the
Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from any class the right to vote in an election, if public
interest so required. I would only like to reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those who
may want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or electioneering
may vote.
MR. FOZ:
There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that there was no intention on the part of the
Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee. The elimination of the last clause of this provision
was precisely intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense that they are not being deprived of
the freedom of expression in a political contest. The last phrase or clause might have given the impression that a
government employee or worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the
case. They are still free to express their views although the intention is not really to allow them to take part actively
in a political campaign. 24
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of
theConstitution. DcTSHa
i. Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions challenged in the case
at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. 25
In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials.
As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus
Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their
filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials
continues to be operative — they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the end in view of
having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to both elected and appointive officials. We held, however,
that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant
distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election
Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, failed muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of
theconstitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. ADTEaI
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political
activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials,
is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification
are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 26
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed Decision gave it new
life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really
"adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. 27 This doctrine is one of policy
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin
Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another.
"If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to
decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant,
I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and
wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then
be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the
courts. 28 CaHAcT
Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as
mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered as obiter dictum. 29 This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the
regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the
matter on which the decision is predicated. 30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as
a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even though,
220
by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the
particular point, otherwise than it did. 31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.: 32
...A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the
disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision,
brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case
presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually
decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points
can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because
another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make
statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. 33 (italics supplied)
ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. 34 What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. 35 The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 36 which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 37
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive
officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain," viz.: SCEDaT
...For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence
as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents
were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs).With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently
when both file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-
President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election
period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. 38
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice, the Legislature
need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time." 39 In addressing a
societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included
or excluded. 40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer
to the legislative judgment. 41 We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been
more fully achieved by expanding the class. 42 Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is
underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. 43 There is no constitutional requirement that
regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be applied; 44 that the Legislature must be held rigidly
to the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a
classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious." 45 He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing
treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, 46 such that the
constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly
debatable." 47 In the case at bar, the petitioners failed — and in fact did not even attempt — to discharge this heavy
burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following
thesis:
...[I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute's distinction is unfair, underinclusive,
unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably
rational reason for the differing treatment. 48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. 49 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 50 Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were
excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will.
In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until
the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials
are concerned. CaSHAc
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the
law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this
with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. 51 (emphasis in the
original)
In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating provisions of law that seek to
restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils
are unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected officials, over another in which a
significant portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least.
The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis-à-vis
appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring — but notby
this Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority,
under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the
exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislature's power to make the deemed-resigned provisions
applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and
magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself
the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.
iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision adverted to, and
extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft. 52 This was a decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our
assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms — freedom of expression
and association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to strict equal
protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force, the
deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render them
unconstitutional.
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It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question,
had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow
suit." TCHcAE
Our assailed Decision's reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the fact that the United
States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United States
Court of Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers
AFL-CIO, et al. 53 and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al., 54 the United States Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions prohibiting federal 55 and state 56 employees from taking an
active part in political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial invalidation.
Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from employment and possible criminal sanctions.
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in regulating the speech
of its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the
speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free
expression against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees'
expression interferes with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is
not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions
are to be covered by any statutory restrictions. 57 Therefore, insofar as government employees are concerned, the
correct standard of review is an interest-balancing approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of
fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question. 58
Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:
Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that partisan political
activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to
play their proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from
improper influences. The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups,
or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They discriminate against no racial,
ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence
anyone's vote at the polls.
But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education, 59 the government has an interest in regulating the conduct
and 'the speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
(employee),as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the (government),as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' Although Congress is
free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable
by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now
contained in the Hatch Act. HTSIEa
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those working
for any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance
with their own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the
Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the members thereof. A major
thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government — the impartial execution of the laws — it is
essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play
substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities
like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.
There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its employees in
fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence
in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.
Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was perhaps the immediate
occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government
work force should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine. The
experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that
substantial barriers should be raised against the party in power — or the party out of power, for that matter — using
the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man its political structure
and political campaigns. HIDCTA
A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal that employment and
advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and at the same time to make sure
that Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way
or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may
be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint judgment of the
Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and their
political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce another.
For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity,
the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that 'the prohibitions against active participation in partisan
political management and partisan political campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion .
. ..' Perhaps Congress at some time will come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government
service; but that is its current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view,
does the Constitution forbid it.
Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any event. 60 ...
xxx xxx xxx
As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so
as to comport with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)
Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally permissible, viz.:
Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan political conduct of
state employees. Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and important state interests,
particularly with respect to attracting greater numbers of qualified people by insuring their job security, free from the
vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting them from 'political extortion.' Rather, appellants maintain that
however permissible, even commendable, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and
its prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct
that must be permitted. For these and other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s
818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced against them or anyone else.
We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague. 61 We have little doubt that s 818 is similarly not
so vague that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.' 62 Whatever other problems
there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give adequate warning of what activities
it proscribes or fails to set out 'explicit standards' for those who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits
any state classified employee from being 'an officer or member' of a 'partisan political club' or a candidate for 'any
paid public office.' It forbids solicitation of contributions 'for any political organization, candidacy or other political
purpose' and taking part 'in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign.' Words
inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of such
terms in s 818 as 'partisan,' or 'take part in,' or 'affairs of' political parties. But what was said in Letter Carriers, is
222
applicable here: 'there are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably
brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they
are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and
comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.' ... IAEcCT
xxx xxx xxx
[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach protected, as well as
unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable of any constitutional
application. We do not believe that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this manner here.
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is that any
enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.
Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the
Court sparingly and only as a last resort. ...
...But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct-even if
expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly
worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a
prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing
the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly
where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real,
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not
substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of
the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its terms, at political
expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. But at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. The
statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes
have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s 818 regulates
a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal
trespass. This much was established inUnited Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed
today in Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that s 818 is valid at least insofar
as it forbids classified employees from: soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or other
partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local committees of political parties, or officers
or committee members in partisan political clubs, or candidates for any paid public office;taking part in the
management or affairs of any political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to
caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings;
soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get voters to the polls; participating in
the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in
caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate. HAIaEc
...It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of some other improper
applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be discarded in toto because some
persons' arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not
substantially overbroad and it not, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)
It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the principles enunciated
in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold, nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a
reversal of Mancuso, since they "pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set of
facts," viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce,
the Hatch Act's prohibition against "active participation in political management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs
desired to campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get federal employees to run for state and
local offices, to participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the (sic) Oklahoma's
Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of the State's classified civil servants,
in much the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of federal employees. Prior to the
commencement of the action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their superior,
and were administratively charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campaign work or to
give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving
and distributing campaign posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full
time police officer and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination as
representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the process of enforcing
the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set of
facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso. ...(italics in the original)
We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim, Letter Carriers,
Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:
(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nomination as representative to the
Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality of §14.09 (c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which
prohibits"continuing in the classified service of the city after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any
public office."
(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to
enforce, the Hatch Act's prohibition against "active participation in political management or political
campaigns" 63 with respect to certain defined activities in which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this
discussion are: THEcAS
(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members were desirous of, among others,
running in local elections for offices such as school board member, city council member or mayor;
(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for the office of Borough Councilman
in his local community for fear that his participation in a partisan election would endanger his job; and
(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan election for the
mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he would do so except for fear of losing his job by reason of violation of
the Hatch Act.
The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political campaigns" by cross-referring to the
rules made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:
30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National, State, county, or municipal
office is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity extends not merely to formal announcement of
candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading to such announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or
223
doing or permitting to be done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely passive is
immaterial; if an employee acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such acquiescence
constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political activity. (italics supplied)
Section 9 (b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds thereafter to pay
compensation to these persons. 64
(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration of
unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of Oklahoma's Merit System of Personnel Administration
Act. Section 818 (7),the paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that "[n]o employee in the classified service
shall be ...a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office ..." Violation of Section 818 results in
dismissal from employment, possible criminal sanctions and limited state employment ineligibility.
Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso.By no stretch
of the imagination could Mancuso still be held operative, as Letter Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually
identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It was thus
not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals — the same court that decided Mancuso — to holdcategorically
and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch 65 that Mancuso is no longer good law.As we priorly explained:
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975. Pawtucket's "Little Hatch Act"
prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities. Becoming a candidate for any city
office is specifically proscribed, 66 the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate dismissal. The
firemen brought an action against the city officials on the ground that that the provision of the city charter was
unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the position
that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that political candidacy was a
fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available,
was a position which was no longer viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the government's interest
in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in
regulating those of the citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against
the coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment
of Congress, and applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public
employees substantially served government interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the
employees' First Amendment rights. 67 aIcCTA
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election in Magill was characterized
as nonpartisan,as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of that case, that politically active
bureaucrats might use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. Ruled the court:
The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's candidacy in even a
nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The issue compels us to extrapolate two recent Supreme Court
decisions, Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws
barring civil servants from partisan political activity. Letter Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's
"Little Hatch Act" against constitutional attack, limiting its holding to Oklahoma's construction that the Act barred only
activity in partisan politics.In Mancuso v. Taft, we assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in
nonpartisan elections would not be constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis.
xxx xxx xxx
What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to apply the Court's interest balancing
approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in this record. We believe that the district court found more
residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains after Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to
our view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be trenched upon only if less restrictive
alternatives were not available. While this approach may still be viable for citizens who are not government
employees, the Court in Letter Carriers recognized that the government's interest in regulating both the conduct and
speech of its employees differs significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general. Not only
was United Public Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the Court gave little weight to the argument
that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring
to the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than the Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's
approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process".68 It appears that the government may place limits on campaigning
by public employees if the limits substantially serve government interests that are "important" enough to outweigh
the employees' First Amendment rights. ...(italics supplied)
Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed the major governmental interests
discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to the Pawtucket provision as follows:
In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient government, faithful to the Congress
rather than to party. The district court discounted this interest, reasoning that candidates in a local election would not
likely be committed to a state or national platform. This observation undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance
to broad policy positions is concerned. But a different kind of possible political intrusion into efficient administration
could be thought to threaten municipal government: not into broad policy decisions, but into the particulars of
administration favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts and purchasing,
hiring, zoning, licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers identified a second governmental
interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy, so there is an equivalent interest in
avoiding the appearance of political preferment in privileges, concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality)
of favoritism that the charter's authors evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal
election process. Where, as here, party support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the
city might reasonably fear that politically active bureaucrats would use their official power to help political friends and
hurt political foes. This is not to say that the city's interest in visibly fair and effective administration necessarily justifies
a blanket prohibition of all employee campaigning; if parties are not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of
favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as easily identified. CScaDH
A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of a powerful political
machine. The Court had in mind the large and growing federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The district
court felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no control over nominations. But in fact candidates sought
party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to be highly effective both in determining who would emerge
from the primary election and who would be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs, known party
affiliation and support were highly significant factors in Pawtucket elections. The charter's authors might reasonably
have feared that a politically active public work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an
unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In municipal elections especially, the small size of the electorate and the
limited powers of local government may inhibit the growth of interest groups powerful enough to outbalance the
weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated government
employees may seek to influence voters or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party
structure will mass the scattered powers of government workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional
misuse of the public trust to pursue private political ends is tolerable, especially because the political views of
individual employees may balance each other out. But party discipline eliminates this diversity and tends to make
abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of employees pressured into advancing their immediate superior's political
ambitions, the entire government work force may be expected to turn out for many candidates in every election. In
Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in political campaigns, a carefully orchestrated use of city
employees in support of the incumbent party's candidates is possible. The danger is scarcely lessened by the
openness of Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the lack of party labels on its ballots.
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The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that employees achieve
advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity.
The district court did not address this factor, but looked only to the possibility of a civil servant using his position to
influence voters, and held this to be no more of a threat than in the most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that
the possibility of coercion of employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in municipal elections as it was
in Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the systematic and coordinated exploitation of public servants for political ends
that a legislature is most likely to see as the primary threat of employees' rights. Political oppression of public
employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan system. Some superiors may be inclined to ride herd on the politics
of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party officials looking over their shoulders most
supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in nominally nonpartisan elections if
political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the absence of substantial party involvement, on the other hand,
the interests identified by the Letter Carriers Court lose much of their force. While the employees' First Amendment
rights would normally outbalance these diminished interests, we do not suggest that they would always do so. Even
when parties are absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to endanger at least one strong public interest,
an interest that looms larger in the context of municipal elections than it does in the national electionsconsidered
in Letter Carriers. The city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly against his superior
or running for a position that confers great power over his superior. An employee of a federal agency who seeks a
Congressional seat poses less of a direct challenge to the command and discipline of his agency than a fireman or
policeman who runs for mayor or city council. The possibilities of internal discussion, cliques, and political bargaining,
should an employee gather substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted) TEaADS
The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in respect of the petitioners'
overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is "not to be taken lightly, much less to be
taken in the dark," the court held:
The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" overbreadth in a closely analogous
case. Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather
than unprotected speech) and when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major
uncertainties attend the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define "substantial"
overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a
candidate, and they were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities, including soliciting
contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate. The Court found that this combination required a
substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of this case are so similar that we may reach the same result without
worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque distinction between speech and conduct.
The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial overbreadth in a statute restricting
partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone further, banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns as
well. Measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the
number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. Some sensitivity to reality is
needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. The
question is a matter of degree; it will never be possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications
makes a law substantially overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some idea
of the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits. Often, simply reading the statute in the light of
common experience or litigated cases will suggest a number of probable invalid applications. But this case is different.
Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part on the number of elections that are insulated from party rivalry
yet closed to Pawtucket employees. For all the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in
Pawtucket is actively contested by political parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties play a major role even
in campaigns that often are entirely nonpartisan in other cities. School committee candidates, for example, are
endorsed by the local Democratic committee.
The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be taken lightly, much
less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below, in the short period before the election was
held, was on the constitutionality of the statute as applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not
justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a significant
number of offices, the candidacy for which by municipal employees would not pose the possible threats to
government efficiency and integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly,
we remand for consideration of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied
upon by the ponencia, has effectively been overruled.69 As it is no longer good law, the ponencia's exhortation
that "[since] the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar
measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit" is misplaced and unwarranted. 70
Accordingly, our assailed Decision's submission that the right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two
fundamental freedoms — those of expression and association — lies on barren ground. American case law has in
fact never recognized a fundamental right to express one's political views through candidacy, 71 as to invoke
a rigorous standard of review. 72 Bart v. Telford 73 pointedly stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not in terms
confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus, one's
interest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection. 74 Moreover, one cannot bring one's
action under the rubric of freedom of association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one
is advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters. 75 HTSAEa
Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative
of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e.,(i)
efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance
of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that
employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor
from political activity).These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of
appointive officials and employees to seek elective office.
En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing 76 and Morial, et al. v.
Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al. 77 to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run
provisions are valid only when made applicable to specified officials, he explains:
...U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions when applied
to specified or particular officials, as distinguished from all others, 78 under a classification that is germane
to the purposes of the law. These resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and sweeping
provision, and thus did not violate the test of being germane to the purpose of the law, the second requisite for
a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be
overbroad. (emphasis in the original)
This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial.The resign-to-run provisions in these cases
were upheld not because they referred to specified or particular officials (vis-à-vis a general class);the questioned
provisions were found valid precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and found that a
regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.In fact, the equal
protection challenge in Clements revolved around the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public
officials are subject to the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States Supreme Court:
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Article XVI, § 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically resign their
positions if they become candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the current term is
one year or less. The burdens that § 65 imposes on candidacy are even less substantial than those imposed by §
19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially the same state interests. The District Court found § 65 deficient,
however, not because of the nature or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the manner
in which the offices are classified. According to the District Court, the classification system cannot survive equal
protection scrutiny, because Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are subject to
§ 65 and why others are not. As with the case of § 19, we conclude that § 65 survives a challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no rational predicate to the classification scheme. TcSICH
The history behind § 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step at a time" approach that this Court
has undertaken with regard to state regulation not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned by the
traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election.
Section 65 extended the terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from two to four years. The provision
also staggered the terms of other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be contested at each
election. The automatic resignation proviso to § 65 was not added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic
resignation provision was added in Art. XI, § 11, which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms
longer than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extending the terms of municipal offices from
two to up to four years.
Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's electoral reforms of 1958. That the
State did not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose terms were not
extended by § 11 or § 65, absent an invidious purpose, is not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking
process forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because
it happens to be incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected officeholder's
candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places similar restrictions on other officeholders. The
provision's language and its history belie any notion that § 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying access to the
political process to identifiable classes of potential candidates. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no blanket approval of
restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office" out of context. A correct reading
of that line readily shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling to the facts of that case, as each equal
protection challenge would necessarily have to involve weighing governmental interests vis-à-vis the specific
prohibition assailed. The Court held:
The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are unquestionably entitled to the
protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should be taken to imply that public
employees may be prohibited from expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner that does not
interfere with the proper performance of their public duties. In today's decision, there is no blanket approval of
restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any general
restrictions on the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is necessarily narrowed by the
methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that a state judge resign his office prior to becoming a candidate
for non-judicial office bears a reasonably necessary relation to the achievement of the state's interest in preventing
the actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a requirement offends neither the first amendment's
guarantees of free expression and association nor the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. (italics supplied) cTCEIS
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment positions require
restrictions on partisan political activities and which may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted for
attempting to limit the positions upon which such restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)
V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369,
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code on equal protection ground, our assailed Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects,viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts without due regard for the
type of position being held by the employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto; 79 and
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding appointive positions without due
regard for the type of office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national,
municipal or barangay level.
Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.
i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of
Incumbent Appointive Official's Position, Valid
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by
the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when the incumbent
appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by
the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful
political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its
incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." 80 As elucidated in our prior
exposition: 81 EHTSCD
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective positions
(apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable — even innocuous — particularly when viewed in
isolation from other similar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount
the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken
together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda
through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various levels of the
bureaucracy.
...[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging political machine an
"unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all
appointive public officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or the
degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)
ii. Limitation on Candidacy
Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid
The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they are made to
apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the type of elective office
being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.
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This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations
it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant
distinctive treatment," 82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged provisions can
validly apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in character. To the extent, therefore,
that such restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged
restrictions are to be considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show that the alleged
overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this issue has not been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing
of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in connection with
the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. 83 Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction
in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in
Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section 4 (a)
is clearly unsustainable. aIcDCH
Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction
with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended to apply
to elections for nonpartisan public offices.
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since these are
the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public offices. 84
In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985,
Congress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a separate
rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said provision states:
Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. — No person shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad ng sangguniang
barangay unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the commencement of the
election period but not later than the day before the beginning of the campaign period in a form to be prescribed by
the Commission. The candidate shall state the barangay office for which he is a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military
service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned
upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there
would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason,
the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in
Section 13 of RA 9369must also fail. 85
In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan
public offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:
In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan behavior has not received judicial
imprimatur, because the general proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter is simply that the government
has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees that differs significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 86
Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad, particularly
where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. 87 DaTEIc
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth would entail, among other things, a rough
balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. 88 In this
regard, some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much
weight as one that is probable. 89 The question is a matter of degree. 90 Thus, assuming for the sake of argument
that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this distinction
is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge presently mounted must demonstrate or provide
this Court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid elections (i.e., the number of elections that were
insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to appointive employees) that may in all probability result
from the enforcement of the statute.91
The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words of Magill v.
Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark, 92 especially since an
overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit the State from 'enforcing an otherwise valid measure against
conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.' 93
This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application of the
overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right
to freedom of speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a
last resort. 94 EcIaTA
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment of the court, the
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected
speech or conduct to go unpunished. 95 Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting
construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that
would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute. 96
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even
as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies
blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes — which are, at best, bold
predictions — cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against
conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to
proscribe. 97 Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications
through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself. 98
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for Reconsideration,
intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of
Candidacy without relinquishing their posts. 99 Several COMELEC election officers had likewise filed their
Certificates of Candidacy in their respective provinces. 100 Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate of
substitution for representative of the first district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009 101 — even as her
position as Justice Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors, 102 who, in turn, act as
Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers. 103 The Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial
Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We cannot allow the tilting of our electoral playing
field in their favor.
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which
merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent's and the intervenors' Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court's December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and
ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,
(2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code.IDCHTE
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr.,Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr.,Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J.,concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.
The filing of a Certificate of Candidacy for an elective position is, by the very nature of the act, an electioneering or
partisan political activity.
Two provisions of the Constitution, taken together, mandate that civil service employees cannot engage in any
electioneering or partisan political activity except to vote. Thus, the Constitution provides:
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the Constitution
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
activity.
Section 5(3), Article XVI of the Constitution
No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on these provisions of the Constitution, it was clear that
the exercise of the right to vote is the only non-partisan political activity a citizen can do. All other political activities
are deemed partisan. Thus, Commissioner Christian Monsod declared that, "As a matter of fact, the only non
partisan political activity one can engage in as a citizen is voting." 1
Indisputably, any political activity except to vote is a partisan political activity. Section 79 (b) of the Omnibus Election
Code implements this by declaring that any act designed to elect or promote the election of a candidate is an
electioneering or partisan political activity, thus:
The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity"refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office ...."
Filing a certificate of candidacy is obviously a partisan political activity.
First, the mere filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is a definitive announcement to the world that a person will actively
solicit the votes of the electorate to win an elective public office. Such an announcement is already a promotion of
the candidate's election to public office. Indeed, once a person becomes an official candidate, he abandons the role
of a mere passive voter in an election, and assumes the role of a political partisan, a candidate promoting his own
candidacy to public office. ECaITc
Second, only a candidate for a political office files a Certificate of Candidacy. A person merely exercising his or her
right to vote does not. A candidate for a political office is necessarily a partisan political candidate because he or she
is contesting an elective office against other political candidates. The candidate and the electorate know that there
are, more often than not, other candidates vying for the same elective office, making the contest politically partisan.
Third, a candidate filing his or her Certificate of Candidacy almost always states in the Certificate of Candidacy the
name of the political party to which he or she belongs. The candidate will even attach to his or her Certificate of
Candidacy the certification of his or her political party that he or she is the official candidate of the political party.
Such certification by a political party is obviously designed to promote the election of the candidate.
Fourth, the constitutional ban prohibiting civil servants from engaging in partisan political activities is intended, among
others, to keep the civil service non-partisan. This constitutional ban is violated when a civil servant files his or her
Certificate of Candidacy as a candidate of a political party. From the moment the civil servant files his or her Certificate
of Candidacy, he or she is immediately identified as a political partisan because everyone knows he or she will
prepare, and work, for the victory of his or her political party in the elections.
Fifth, the constitutional ban prohibiting civil servants from engaging in partisan political activities is also intended to
prevent civil servants from using their office, and the resources of their office, to promote their candidacies or the
candidacies of other persons. We have seen the spectacle of civil servants who, after filing their certificates of
candidacies, still cling to their public office while campaigning during office hours.
Sixth, the constitutional ban prohibiting civil servants from engaging in partisan political activities is further intended
to prevent conflict of interest. We have seen Comelec officials who, after filing their certificates of candidacies, still
hold on to their public office.
Finally, filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is a partisan political act that ipso facto operates to consider the candidate
deemed resigned from public office pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No.
9369, as well as Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
Accordingly, I vote to grant respondent Comelec's Motion for Reconsideration.
NACHURA, J.,dissenting:
I vote to maintain this Court's December 1, 2009 Decision. The automatic resignation rule on appointive government
officials and employees running for elective posts is, to my mind, unconstitutional. I therefore respectfully register my
dissent to the resolution of the majority granting the motion for reconsideration.
I earnestly believe that by this resolution, the majority refused to rectify an unjust rule, leaving in favor of a
discriminatory state regulation and disregarding the primacy of the people's fundamental rights to the equal protection
of the laws. EHDCAI
Let it be recalled that, on December 1, 2009, the Court rendered its Decision granting the petition and declaring as
unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and Section 4 (a) of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No.
8678. 1
Claiming to have legal interest in the matter in litigation, Senator Manuel A. Roxas filed, on December 14, 2009,
his Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to: (a) Intervene in the Instant Case; (b) Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration; and (c) If Necessary, Set the Instant Case for Oral Arguments. 2
On the same date, respondent COMELEC, through its Law Department, moved for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid December 1, 2009 Decision. 3
Expressing a similar desire, Franklin M. Drilon, a former senator and a senatorial candidate in the 2010 elections,
filed, on December 17, 2009, his Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Motion for Reconsideration
in Intervention. 4
On December 28, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),Cebu City Chapter, also filed its Motion for Leave
to Intervene 5 and Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention. 6
In a related development, on January 8, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which initially represented
the COMELEC in the proceedings herein, this time disagreed with the latter, and, instead of moving for the
reconsideration of the December 1, 2009 Decision, moved for clarification of the effect of our declaration of
unconstitutionality. 7
Subsequently, Tom V. Apacible, a congressional candidate in the 2010 elections, filed, on January 11, 2010,
his Motion to Intervene and for the Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 1, 2009. 8
In its January 12, 2010 Resolution, 9 the Court required petitioners to comment on the aforesaid motions.
On February 1, 2010, petitioners filed their consolidated comment on the motions.
Parenthetically, petitioner Quinto admitted that he did not pursue his plan to run for an elective office. 10 Petitioner
Tolentino, on the other hand, disclosed that he filed his certificate of candidacy but that he had recently resigned from
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his post in the executive department. These developments could very well be viewed by the Court as having rendered
this case moot and academic. However, I refuse to proceed to such a conclusion, considering that the issues, viewed
in relation to other appointive civil servants running for elective office, remain ubiquitously present. Thus, the issues
in the instant case could fall within the classification of controversies that are capable of repetition yet evading
review. cAaETS
I then implore that the Court rule on the motions.
The intervention
The motions for intervention should be denied. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that motions
to intervene may be filed at any time "before the rendition of judgment." 11 Obviously, as this Court already rendered
judgment on December 1, 2009, intervention may no longer be allowed. 12 The movants, Roxas, Drilon, IBP-Cebu
City Chapter, and Apacible, cannot claim to have been unaware of the pendency of this much publicized case. They
should have intervened prior to the rendition of this Court's Decision on December 1, 2009. To allow their intervention
at this juncture is unwarranted and highly irregular. 13
While the Court has the power to suspend the application of procedural rules, I find no compelling reason to excuse
movants' procedural lapse and allow their much belated intervention. Further, a perusal of their pleadings-in-
intervention reveals that they merely restated the points and arguments in the earlier dissenting opinions of Chief
Justice Puno and Senior Associate Justices Carpio and Carpio Morales. These very same points, incidentally, also
constitute the gravamen of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent COMELEC. Thus, even as the Court
should deny the motions for intervention, it is necessary to, pass upon the issues raised therein, because they were
the same issues raised in respondent COMELEC's motion for reconsideration.
The COMELEC's motion for reconsideration
Interestingly, in its motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC does not raise a matter other than those already
considered and discussed by the Court in the assailed decision. As aforesaid, the COMELEC merely echoed the
arguments of the dissenters.
I remain unpersuaded.
I wish to reiterate the Court's earlier declaration that the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, Section 66 of the OEC and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy (CoCs),but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones,
the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between the
two classes does not justify such disparate treatment. Constitutional law jurisprudence requires that the classification
must and should be germane to the purposes of the law. As clearly explained in the assailed decision, whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. Indeed, a
candidate, whether holding an appointive or an elective office, may use his position to promote his candidacy or to
wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. Under the same scenario, he may also, in the discharge
of his official duties, be swayed by political considerations. Likewise, he may neglect his or her official duties, as he
will predictably prioritize his campaign. Chief Justice Puno, in his dissent to the assailed decision, even acknowledges
that the "danger of systemic abuse" remains present whether the involved candidate holds an appointive or an
elective office, thus — CDHaET
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective positions
(apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable — even innocuous — particularly when viewed in
isolation from other similar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount
the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken
together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of a reigning political party to advance its own agenda through a
"carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various levels of the bureaucracy. 14
To repeat for emphasis, classifying candidates, whether they hold appointive or elective positions, and treating them
differently by considering the first as ipso facto resigned while the second as not, is not germane to the purposes of
the law, because, as clearly shown, the measure is not reasonably necessary to, nor does it necessarily promote,
the fulfillment of the state interest sought to be served by the statute.
In fact, it may not be amiss to state that, more often than not, the elective officials, not the appointive ones, exert
more coercive influence on the electorate, with the greater tendency to misuse the powers of their office. This is
illustrated by, among others, the proliferation of "private armies" especially in the provinces. It is common knowledge
that "private armies" are backed or even formed by elective officials precisely for the latter to ensure that the electorate
will not oppose them, be cowed to submit to their dictates and vote for them. To impose a prohibitive measure
intended to curb this evil of wielding undue influence on the electorate and apply the prohibition only onappointive
officials is not only downright ineffectual, but is also, as shown in the assailed decision, offensive to the equal
protection clause.
Furthermore, as the Court explained in the assailed decision, this ipso facto resignation rule is overbroad. It covers
all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction, regardless of whether they occupy positions of influence
in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker, a messenger, a chauffeur, or an industrial worker in the government
service cannot exert the same influence as that of a Cabinet member, an undersecretary or a bureau head.
Parenthetically, it is also unimaginable how an appointive utility worker, compared to a governor or a mayor, can form
his own "private army" to wield undue influence on the electorate. It is unreasonable and excessive, therefore, to
impose a blanket prohibition — one intended to discourage civil servants from using their positions to influence the
votes — on all civil servants without considering the nature of their positions. Let it be noted, that, despite their
employment in the government, civil servants remain citizens of the country, entitled to enjoy the civil and political
rights granted to them in a democracy, including the right to aspire for elective public office.
In addition, this general provision on automatic resignation is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public
elective offices, whether partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether in the national, municipal or barangay level.
No compelling state interest has been shown to justify such a broad, encompassing and sweeping application of the
law.
It may also be pointed out that this automatic resignation rule has no pretense to be the exclusive and only
available remedy to curb the uncontrolled exercise of undue influence and the feared "danger of systemic
abuse." As we have explained in the assailed decision, our Constitution and our body of laws are replete with
provisions that directly address these evils. We reiterate our earlier pronouncement that specific evils require
specific remedies, not overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms. HIaSDc
It should be stressed that when the Court struck down (in the earlier decision) the assailed provisions, the Court did
not act in a manner inconsistent with Section 2 (4) of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 2. ....
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political activity.
or with Section 5 (3), Article XVI of the Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 5. ....
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime
concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
Neither does the Court's earlier ruling infringe on Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, which reads:
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Sec. 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces,
shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall
he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein
provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That
public officers and employees holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be
unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving
subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
"Partisan political activity" includes every form of solicitation of the elector's vote in favor of a specific
candidate. 15 Section 79 (b) of the OEC defines "partisan political activity" as follows:
SEC. 79. Definitions. — As used in this Code:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose
of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office; DaScAI
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any
candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nominations
for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as
election campaign or partisan political activity.
Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or
criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not
be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
Given the aforequoted Section 79 (b),it is obvious that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for an elective
position, while it may be a political activity, is not a "partisan political activity" within the contemplation of
the law.The act of filing is only an announcement of one's intention to run for office.It is only an aspiration for
a public office, not yet a promotion or a solicitation of votes for the election or defeat of a candidate for public office.
In fact, even after the filing of the CoC but before the start of the campaign period, there is yet no candidate whose
election or defeat will be promoted. Rosalinda A. Penera v. Commission on Elections and Edgar T.
Andanar 16 instructs that any person who files his CoC shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period. Thus, in the absence of a "candidate," the mere filing of CoC cannot be considered as an "election
campaign" or a "partisan political activity." Section 79 of the OEC does not even consider as "partisan political activity"
acts performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nominations for candidacy to a public office.
Thus, when appointive civil servants file their CoCs, they are not engaging in a "partisan political activity" and,
therefore, do not transgress or violate the Constitution and the law. Accordingly, at that moment, there is no valid
basis to consider them as ipso facto resigned from their posts.
There is a need to point out that the discussion in Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 17 relative to the differential
treatment of the two classes of civil servants in relation to the ipso facto resignation clause, is obiter dictum. That
discussion is not necessary to the decision of the case, the main issue therein being the constitutionality of the
repealing clause in the Fair Election Act. Further, unlike in the instant case, no direct challenge was posed
in Fariñas to the constitutionality of the rule on the ipso facto resignation of appointive officials. In any event, the
Court en banc, in deciding subsequent cases, can very well reexamine, as it did in the assailed decision, its earlier
pronouncements and even abandon them when perceived to be incorrect.
Let it also be noted that Mancuso v. Taft 18 is not the heart of the December 1, 2009 Decision. Mancuso was only
cited to show that resign-to-run provisions, such as those which are specifically involved herein, have been stricken
down in the United States for unduly burdening First Amendment rights of employees and voting rights of citizens,
and for being overbroad. Verily, in our jurisdiction, foreign jurisprudence only enjoys a persuasive influence on the
Court. Thus, the contention that Mancuso has been effectively overturned by subsequent American cases, such
as United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers 19 and Broadrick v. State of
Oklahoma,20 is not controlling.
Be that as it may, a closer reading of these latter US cases reveals that Mancuso is still applicable. IAcDET
On one hand, Letter Carriers and Broadrick, which are based on United Public Workers of America v.
Mitchell, 21 involve provisions prohibiting Federal employees from engaging in partisan political activities or political
campaigns.
In Mitchell, the appellants sought exemption from the implementation of a sentence in the Hatch Act, which reads:
"No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government . . . shall take any active part in political
management or in political campaigns." 22 Among the appellants, only George P. Poole violated the provision 23 by
being a ward executive committeeman of a political party and by being politically active on election day as a worker
at the polls and a paymaster for the services of other party workers. 24
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce,
the Hatch Act's prohibition against "active participation in political management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs
desired to campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get federal employees to run for state and
local offices, to participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political club. 25
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the Oklahoma's
Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of the State's classified civil servants,
in much the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of federal employees. 26 Prior to
the commencement of the action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their
superior, and were administratively charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campaign
work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for
receiving and distributing campaign posters in bulk. 27
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full-
time police officer and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed his candidacy for nomination as
representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the process of enforcing
the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter. 28
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set of
facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso. Thus, in Magill v.
Lynch,29 the same collegial court which decided Mancuso was so careful in its analysis that it even remanded the
case for consideration on the overbreadth claim. The Magill court stated thus —
Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to
demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the candidacy for which by
municipal employees would not pose the possible threats to government efficiency and integrity which Letter
Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand for consideration of plaintiffs'
overbreadth claim. 30
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As observed by the Court (citing Clements v. Fashing 31 ) in the December 1, 2009 Decision, U.S. courts, in
subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run rules when applied to specified or particular
officials, as distinguished from all others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the
law.These resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and sweeping provision,and thus did not
violate the test of being germane to the purpose of the law,the second requisite for a valid classification. Directed,
as they were, to particular officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. In fact, Morial v.
Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, 32 where the resign-to-run provision pertaining to judges running for
political offices was upheld, declares that "there is no blanket approval of restriction on the right of public employees
to become candidates for public office." 33 The Morial court instructed thus — HTDcCE
Because the judicial office is different in key respects from other offices, the state may regulate its judges with the
differences in mind. For example the contours of the judicial function make inappropriate the same kind of
particularized pledges of conduct in office that are the very stuff of campaigns for most non-judicial offices. A
candidate for the mayoralty can and often should announce his determination to effect some program, to reach a
particular result on some question of city policy, or to advance the interests of a particular group. It is expected that
his decisions in office may be predetermined by campaign commitment. Not so the candidate for judicial office. He
cannot, consistent with the proper exercise of his judicial powers, bind himself to decide particular cases in order to
achieve a given programmatic result. Moreover, the judge acts on individual cases and not broad programs. The
judge legislates but interstitially; the progress through the law of a particular judge's social and political preferences
is, in Mr. Justice Holmes' words, "confined from molar to molecular motions."
As one safeguard of the special character of the judicial function, Louisiana's Code of Judicial Conduct bars
candidates for judicial office from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office." Candidates for non-judicial office are not subject to such a ban; in the conduct
of his campaign for the mayoralty, an erstwhile judge is more free to make promises of post-campaign conduct with
respect both to issues and personnel, whether publicly or privately, than he would be were he a candidate for re-
election to his judgeship. The state may reasonably conclude that such pledges and promises, though made in the
course of a campaign for non-judicial office, might affect or, even more plausibly, appear to affect the post-election
conduct of a judge who had returned to the bench following an electoral defeat. By requiring resignation of any judge
who seeks a non-judicial office and leaving campaign conduct unfettered by the restrictions which would be
applicable to a sitting judge, Louisiana has drawn a line which protects the state's interests in judicial integrity without
sacrificing the equally important interests in robust campaigns for elective office in the executive or legislative
branches of government.
This analysis applies equally to the differential treatment of judges and other office holders. A judge who fails in his
bid for a post in the state legislature must not use his judgeship to advance the cause of those who supported him in
his unsuccessful campaign in the legislature. In contrast, a member of the state legislature who runs for some other
office is not expected upon his return to the legislature to abandon his advocacy of the interests which supported him
during the course of his unsuccessful campaign. Here, too, Louisiana has drawn a line which rests on the different
functions of the judicial and non-judicial office holder. 34
Indeed, for an ipso facto resignation rule to be valid, it must be shown that the classification is reasonably necessary
to attain the objectives of the law. Here, as already explained in the assailed decision, the differential treatment in
the application of this resign-to-run rule is not germane to the purposes of the law, because whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented are not effectively addressed
by the measure. Thus, the ineluctable conclusion that the concerned provisions are invalid for being unconstitutional.
Without unnecessarily preempting the resolution of any subsequent actual case or unwittingly giving an advisory
opinion, the Court, in the December 1, 2009 Decision, in effect, states that what should be implemented are the
other provisions of Philippine laws (not the concerned unconstitutional provisions) that specifically and
directly address the evils sought to be prevented by the measure. It is highly speculative then to contend that
members of the police force or the armed forces, if they will not be considered as resigned when they file their COCs,
is a "disaster waiting to happen." There are, after all, appropriate laws in place to curb abuses in the government
service. DCISAE
The invalidation of the ipso facto resignation provisions does not mean the cessation in operation of other
provisions of the Constitution and of existing laws. Section 2 (4) of Article IX-B and Section 5 (3), Article XVI of
the Constitution, and Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 still apply. So do other
statutes, such as the Civil Service Laws, OEC, the Anti-Graft Law, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, and related laws. Covered civil servants running for political offices who
later on engage in "partisan political activity" run the risk of being administratively charged. 35 Civil servants who use
government funds and property for campaign purposes, likewise, run the risk of being prosecuted under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or under the OEC on election offenses. Those who abuse their authority to promote
their candidacy shall be made liable under the appropriate laws. Let it be stressed at this point that the said laws
provide for specific remedies for specific evils, unlike the automatic resignation provisions that are sweeping
in application and not germane to the purposes of the law.
To illustrate, we hypothetically assume that a municipal election officer, who is an employee of the COMELEC, files
his CoC. Given the invalidation of the automatic resignation provisions, the said election officer is not considered
as ipso facto resigned from his post at the precise moment of the filing of the CoC. Thus, he remains in his post, and
his filing of a CoC cannot be taken to be a violation of any provision of the Constitution or any statute. At the start of
the campaign period, however, if he is still in the government service, that is, if he has not voluntarily resigned, and
he, at the same time, engages in a "partisan political activity," then, he becomes vulnerable to prosecution under the
Administrative Code, under civil service laws, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or under the OEC. Upon
the proper action being filed, he could, thus, be disqualified from running for office, or if elected, prevented from
assuming, or if he had already assumed office, be removed from, office.
At this juncture, it may even be said that Mitchell, Letter Carriers and Broadrick, the cases earlier cited by Chief
Justice Puno and Associate Justices Carpio and Carpio-Morales, support the proposition advanced by the majority
in the December 1, 2009 Decision. While the provisions on the ipso facto resignation of appointive civil servants are
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad, the general provisions
prohibiting civil servants from engaging in "partisan political activity" remain valid and operational, and should be
strictly applied.
The COMELEC's motion for reconsideration should, therefore, be denied.
The OSG's motion for clarification
In its motion, the OSG pleads that this Court clarify whether, by declaring as unconstitutional the concerned ipso
facto resignation provisions, the December 1, 2009 Decision intended to allow appointive officials to stay in office
during the entire election period. 36 The OSG points out that the official spokesperson of the Court explained before
the media that "the decision would in effect allow appointive officials to stay on in their posts even during the
campaign period, or until they win or lose or are removed from office." 37
I pose the following response to the motion for clarification. The language of the December 1, 2009 Decision is
too plain to be mistaken. The Court only declared as unconstitutional Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, Section
66 of the OEC and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678. The Court never stated in the decision
that appointive civil servants running for elective posts are allowed to stay in office during the entire election
period. ETaHCD
The only logical and legal effect, therefore, of the Court's earlier declaration of unconstitutionality of the ipso
facto resignation provisions is that appointive government employees or officials who intend to run for elective
positions are not considered automatically resigned from their posts at the moment of filing of their CoCs. Again, as
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explained above, other Constitutional and statutory provisions do not cease in operation and should, in fact,
be strictly implemented by the authorities.
Let the full force of the laws apply. Then let the axe fall where it should.
||| (Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698 (Resolution), [February 22, 2010])
[G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010.]
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
...[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices
— choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend
or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to
disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed,
our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality.
In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an
insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox — philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable
and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions
are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than
rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of
the Commission onElections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December
16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The
case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. 4 CDAHaE
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with
the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition 5 for registration with
the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector
that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court
in AngBagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership
base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. 7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
...This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
...a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
...refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual
relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious
beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which
is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward
another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds."
(7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone):Then see what was the end of those who indulged in
sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008: CcADHI
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition's par. 6F: 'Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age'.It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated
as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as 'Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which . . . (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality ...
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: 'The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Art. 1409 of the Civil Code provides that 'Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs,public order or public policy' are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes 'Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows' as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such
literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts
or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether
live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes;
(2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography;(3) offend any race or religion;
(4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good
customs,established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
232
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to
morals. THADEI
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being
truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does
not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in
one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too
is the State's avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual
degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, 9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners
voted to deny Ang Ladlad's Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and
Elias R. Yusoph).The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion,
upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly
proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies,
then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention
of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood
persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation's — only that their interests have not been brought
to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize
lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. . . . Significantly, it has also
been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the
U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual
relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief. EcHTCD
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT's is elevated, there can be no denying
that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by
the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Public Morals
...There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
attempt to any particular religious group's moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society,
the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted
moral norms.
V.Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent
shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition's paragraph 6F:
"Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par.
24 of the Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, *Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission . . . or
anything else . . . which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality . . . ." These are all unlawful. 10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct
the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of
a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf
of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed
a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. 12 Somewhat surprisingly,
the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner's application. 13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the
opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment. 14 The COMELEC, through its Law
Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010. 15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist
from implementing the Assailed Resolutions. 16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear
as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention. 17 The CHR opined that the denial
of Ang Ladlad'spetition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR's motion to intervene. DcaECT
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which motion was granted on February
2, 2010. 19
The Parties' Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection
of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines' international obligations against discrimination
based onsexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner's
application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC's allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
233
separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner's freedom of speech, expression, • Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights. • Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC)-Metro Manila
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political • Cebu Pride-Cebu City
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first • Circle of Friends
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner • Dipolog Gay Association-Zamboanga del Norte
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports • Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
by COMELEC's field personnel. • Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)-Metro Manila
Our Ruling • Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG)-Metro Manila
We grant the petition. • Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS)-Lanao del Norte
Compliance with the Requirements of • Iloilo City Gay Association-Iloilo City
the Constitution and Republic Act No. • Kabulig Writer's Group-Camarines Sur
7941 • Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither • LUMINA-Baguio City
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the • Marikina Gay Association-Metro Manila
enumeration. • Metropolitan Community Church (MCC)-Metro Manila
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors • Naga City Gay Association-Naga City
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural • ONE BACARDI AaITCS
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be • Order of St. Aelred (OSAe)-Metro Manila
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor • PUP LAKAN
Party v. Commission on Elections, 20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not • RADAR PRIDEWEAR
exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular • Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights),Inc.-Metro Manila
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. • San Jose del Monte Gay Association-Bulacan
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had • Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family-Rizal
nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification • Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)-Metro Manila
by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in • Soul Jive-Antipolo, Rizal
almost all provinces in the country." 21 EaISTD • The Link-Davao City
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a • Tayabas Gay Association-Quezon
new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its • Women's Bisexual Network-Metro Manila
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to • Zamboanga Gay Association-Zamboanga City 23
the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner's accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged non-existence found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC's findings are to be believed,
were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad's principal place of business.
procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent's theory, and a serious violation of petitioner's Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
right to procedural due process. requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of non-
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad's initial petition existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad's morality, or lack thereof.
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 22 Ang Ladlad also represented Religion as the Basis for Refusal to
itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
LGBT networks:" Registration
• Abra Gay Association Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
• Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB)-Aklan or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government
• Albay Gay Association neutrality in religious matters." 24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
• Arts Center of Cabanatuan City-Nueva Ecija policy of neutrality." 25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
• Boys Legion-Metro Manila utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
234
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether
the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we
held in Estrada v. Escritor: 26
...The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice
Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy.
As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental
(or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments
based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions
would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion
and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors
to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an
articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. . . . Recognizing
the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine
constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based onreligion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. 27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny
Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be
religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues: aIcCTA
Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the
danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes
that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will
bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is
in danger of losing its own existence. 28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves,
have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure — religious
beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law. 29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG
agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are
committing immoral acts." 30 The OSG argues:
...A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender,
but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction
ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases
against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not
suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual
relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental
to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability. SDIaCT
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act.
It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied
equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition onclassification.
"Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances. 34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
end. 35 InCentral Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our
jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges . . . have followed the 'rational basis' test, coupled
with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing
of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution." 37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions
235
or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as
the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here — that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority —
is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation
of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for
a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and
they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the
party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. 38 We are not prepared to
single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that
the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the
case."
Freedom of Expression and
Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens
are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public
square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion
shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide.
Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits
it specifies — including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small — not only for a
majority, however large — but for each of us" — the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises
not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies
not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed
in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for
the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one. aAcDSC
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows
that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports
LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct. 41 European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds,
citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To the extent that there is
much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Court's analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines
protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human
rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas
that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group should not be hindered solely
because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned. 45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. 46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even
defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the
more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a
clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual
perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there
has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised
its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-
list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of
the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
236
A denial of the petition for registration ...does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the
conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition
has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. ...47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system,
and — as advanced by the OSG itself — the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed
by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-
qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International
Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law,
in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals
and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are
particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become
actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In
particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation,
enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. SIaHDA
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual
orientation." 48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements. 49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by
the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote)
as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form
of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25
lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles
of the Covenant.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons
entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum
age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election
should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or
by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that
person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or
category of persons from elective office. 50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the
Philippines' international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social
ills. We refer now to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human
Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), 51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current
state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article
38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous
analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. ATDHSC
We also hasten to add that not everything that society — or a certain segment of society — wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at
will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that
identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these
innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched
in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are — at best — de lege ferenda — and do not constitute binding obligations onthe
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law"
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect
for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State
practice or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged,
societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court's role
is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
237
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE,the Petition is hereby GRANTED.The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November
11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE.The Commission on Elections is
directed to GRANT petitioner's application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J.,Carpio, Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr.,Perezand Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., Pls. see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Abad.
Brion, J., joins dissent of J. Corona.
Abad, J., I certify that J. Abad wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, C.J.,concurring:
I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo.
Nonetheless, I respectfully submit this separate opinion to underscore some points that I deem significant. EScIAa
FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment
clause 1 of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal —
much less constitutional — terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for registration as a sectoral party
principally on the ground that it "tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian 2 and Muslim 3 ) beliefs."
To be sure, the COMELEC's ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule that "[t]he public morality
expressed in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state
from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions." 4 As we explained in Estrada v. Escritor, 5 the
requirement of an articulable and discernible secular purpose is meant to give flesh to the constitutional policy of full
religious freedom for all, viz.:
Religion also dictates "how we ought to live" for the nature of religion is not just to know, but often, to act in accordance
with man's "views of his relations to His Creator." But the Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against
establishment of this morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies the affirmative "establishment" of a
civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes. This agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending
the "war of all sects against all";the establishment of a secular public moral order is the social contract produced by
religious truce.
Thus, when the law speaks of "immorality" in the Civil Service Law or "immoral" in the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers, or "public morals" in the Revised Penal Code, or "morals" in the New Civil Code, or "moral
character" in theConstitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious
morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,
not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular
terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-
believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e.,to a
"compelled religion;" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs,
it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its
citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. 6 (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive that no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. 7 Ang Ladlad's right of political participation was
unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of its constituent
members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a morality police.
The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this "excessive entanglement" 8 with religion by arguing that we
"cannot ignore our strict religious upbringing, whether Christian or Muslim" 9 since the "moral precepts espoused by
[these] religions have slipped into society and . . . are now publicly accepted moral norms." 10 However, as correctly
observed by Mr. Justice del Castillo, the Philippines has not seen fit to disparage homosexual conduct as to actually
criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State has legislated to this effect, the law is vulnerable to constitutional
attack on privacy grounds. 11 These alleged "generally accepted public morals" have not, in reality, crossed over
from the religious to the secular sphere.
Some people may find homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and offensive. Nevertheless, private
discrimination, however unfounded, cannot be attributed or ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice Kennedy, speaking for
the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas, 12 opined:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by
religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these
views on the whole society through operation of the ...law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code." 13
SECOND. The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad's definition of the term "sexual orientation," 14 as well as its
citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with men, 15 as basis for the declaration that the party espouses
and advocates sexual immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual individuals a
fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty. For, the "ability to
[independently] define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum;
we all depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others." 16 As Mr. Justice Blackmun so eloquently
said in his stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 17 (overturned by the United States Supreme Court seventeen
years later in Lawrence v. Texas): 18
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality[.]"19 The fact that
individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in
a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much
of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these
intensely personal bonds. 20 AEITDH
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose
how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different choices. For example,
in holding that the clearly important state interest in public education should give way to a competing claim by the
Amish to the effect that extended formal schooling threatened their way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no
assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are 'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or
even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different." 21 The
Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling
the nature of their intimate associations with others.(italics supplied)
238
It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. 22 Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. 23 These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the due process clause. 24 At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 25 Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 26 Lawrence v. Texas27 is
again instructive:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right
to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more
than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences,
touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for
us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. (italics supplied)
THIRD. The ponencia of Mr. Justice del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in
themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using
the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only show that
the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest.
I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect
classification,as to trigger a heightened level of review.
Preliminarily, in our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed
the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a
law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 28 However, Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 29 carved out an exception to this general rule, such
that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires stricter judicial scrutiny than mere
rationality, viz.:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by
the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational
basis should not suffice. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Considering thus that labor enjoys such special and protected status under our fundamental law, the Court ruled in
favor of the Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. in this wise:
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged
proviso. IEHTaA
xxx xxx xxx
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal
protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended,
but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-
and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the
amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common
proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly ...
xxx xxx xxx
The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic
Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the
constitutionality of the classification — albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws —
between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but
must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance
but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons
who are without differences.
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt
other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the
BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of
the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment,
simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively,
through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that:
(a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination
that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining
the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated),thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis-Ã -vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over
a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative
enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination — even those that have been declared to contravene
the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process
and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics
peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees
were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one).The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP
rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
xxx xxx xxx
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears
the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination — no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory
239
character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of
unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other
jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major
cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice
imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International
School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the
policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to
"give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person,
"in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." DAEIHT
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles
of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation — all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice.
The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable]
conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay
for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
xxx xxx xxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak
and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to
the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a
private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless
of the character or nature of the actor.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is
akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically
withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive
with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank — possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement —
are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability,
it is they — and not the officers — who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in
accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend
to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to
this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (citations omitted and
italics supplied)
Corollarily, American case law provides that a state action questioned on equal protection grounds is subject to one
of three levels of judicial scrutiny. The level of review, on a sliding scale basis, varies with the type of classification
utilized and the nature of the right affected. 30 ATaDHC
If a legislative classification disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon the exercise of a "fundamental right,"
then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the
classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 31 Over the years, the United
States Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for equal protection purposes include classifications
based on race, religion, alienage, national origin, and ancestry. 32 The underlying rationale of this theory is that
where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional
political processes may have broken down. 33 In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and
the government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose. 34
On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a "quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or
heightened review. 35 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental
interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and
must not depend on broad generalizations. 36 Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect
classes include classifications based on gender or illegitimacy. 37
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be tested for mere rationality. 38 This is
a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is
peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. 39 The presumption is in favor of the classification, of the
reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if any such grounds
exist, on which the State acted. 40
240
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative classifications warrant more demanding
constitutional analysis, the United States Supreme Court has looked to four factors, 41 thus:
(1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the legislation; 42
(2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical class member's ability to contribute to
society; 43
(3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or beyond the class members' control; 44 and
(4) The political power of the subject class. 45
These factors, it must be emphasized, are not constitutive essential elements of a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
as to individually demand a certain weight. 46 The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a flexible
manner; it has neither required, nor even discussed, every factor in every case. 47 Indeed, no single talisman can
define those groups likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the equal protection clause and therefore
warranting heightened or strict scrutiny; experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide. 48
In any event, the first two factors — history of intentional discrimination and relationship of classifying characteristic
to a person's ability to contribute — have always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied. 49They
have been critical to the analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a group is a suspect or
quasi-suspect class. 50 However, the last two factors — immutability of the characteristic and political powerlessness
of the group — are considered simply to supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a need for
heightened scrutiny exists. 51
Guided by this framework, and considering further that classifications based on sex or gender — albeit on a
male/female, man/woman basis — have been previously held to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit
that classification on the basis of sexual orientation (i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect
classification that prompts intermediate review.
The first consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful unequal treatment because of
their sexual orientation. 52 One cannot, in good faith, dispute that gay and lesbian persons historically have been,
and continue to be, the target of purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual
orientation. 53 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration for party-list accreditation in fact
state: TaCDIc
6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence perpetuated against the LGBT Community,
among which are:
(a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents and/or guardians to make them conform to standard
gender norms of behavior;
(b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are butch lesbians to be raped[,so as] to "cure" them
into becoming straight women;
(c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school, NGOs, and choirs because of their identity;
(d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused admission from (sic) certain schools, are suspended
or are automatically put on probation;
(e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work benefits once one's sexual orientation and gender identity
is (sic) revealed;
(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age, are broken up by their
parents or guardians using the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw;
(g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed on gays and lesbians to "reform" them;
(h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric counseling and therapy to cure them[,] despite the
de-listing (sic) of homosexuality and lesbianism as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
(i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail but who self-identity as women and dress as such, are denied
entry or services in certain restaurants and establishments; and
(j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed against gay men, but were not acknowledged by
police as hate crimes or violent acts of bigotry.
7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testified that as a young gay person in the
Philippines, he was subjected to a variety of sexual abuse and violence, including repeated rapes[,] which he could
not report to [the] police [or speak of] to his own parents.
Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden placed on lesbian and gay people as
a class is "more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective." 54
A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to the person's ability to contribute to
society. 55 Heightened scrutiny is applied when the classification bears no relationship to this ability; the existence
of this factor indicates the classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice. 56 Insofar as sexual
orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 57 viz.:
The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a person's ability to participate in or
contribute to society, a fact that many courts have acknowledged, as well. ...If homosexuals were afflicted with some
sort of impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire phenomenon of 'staying in the
[c]loset' and of 'coming out' would not exist; their impediment would betray their status. ...In this critical respect, gay
persons stand in stark contrast to other groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect class recognition,
despite a history of discrimination, because the distinguishing characteristics of those groups adversely affect their
ability or capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in society. 58
Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, "homosexuality bears no relation at all to [an] individual's
ability to contribute fully to society." 59 Indeed, because an individual's homosexual orientation "implies no
impairment in judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities"; 60 the observation of the
United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national origin — all suspect classes entitled to the highest
level of constitutional protection — "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy" 61 is no less applicable to gay
persons. (italics supplied)
Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to perform and contribute to society than is
heterosexual orientation. 62 DECSIT
A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members of a class are entitled to heightened
protection for equal protection purposes is whether the attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is immutable
or otherwise beyond their control. 63 Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay persons from others and
qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their
social and legal ostracism, namely, their attraction to persons of the same sex. 64
Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because the inability of a person to change a
characteristic that is used to justify different treatment makes the discrimination violative of the rather "'basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.'" 65 However, the
constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not reserved to those instances in which the trait defining the
burdened class is absolutely impossible to change. 66 That is, the immutability prong of the suspectness inquiry
surely is satisfied when the identifying trait is "so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for
government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it]." 67
Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual
orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment, because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect
of one's identity. 68 Consequently, because sexual orientation "may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of
significant damage to the individual's sense of self," classifications based thereon "are no less entitled to
consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an
241
immutable characteristic." 69 Stated differently, sexual orientation is not the type of human trait that allows courts to
relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to self-help. 70
The final factor that bears consideration is whether the group is "a minority or politically powerless." 71 However, the
political powerlessness factor of the level-of-scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political
powerlessness. 72 Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be "whether the group lacks sufficient political
strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and discrimination through traditional political means." 73
Applying this standard, it would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional
protection despite some recent political progress. 74 The discrimination that they have suffered has been so
pervasive and severe — even though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or
perform in society — that it is highly unlikely that legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that
discrimination. 75 Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT community plays a role in the political process, it is apparent
that their numbers reflect their status as a small and insular minority. 76
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for
disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice
and stereotyping. 77
In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the intermediate level of review.
Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected 78 (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual
and trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based classification undertaken for its own
sake cannot survive. 79
FOURTH. It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the party-list system because it is
not a "marginalized and underrepresented sector" enumerated either in the Constitution 80 or Republic Act No. (RA)
7941. 81 However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC, 82 where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the LGBT community as marginalized and
underrepresented, considering their long history (and indeed, ongoing narrative) of persecution, discrimination, and
pathos. In my humble view, marginalization for purposes of party-list representation encompasses social
marginalization as well. To hold otherwise is tantamount to trivializing socially marginalized groups as "mere
passive recipients of the State's benevolence" and denying them the right to "participate directly [in the mainstream
of representative democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them." 83 The party-list system could not
have been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
CORONA, J.,dissenting:
Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I believe the basic issue here is simple:
does petitioner Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualify, under the terms of the Constitution and RA 7941, as a marginalized
and underrepresented sector in the party-list system? IaHCAD
The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks accreditation by the
respondent Commission on Elections as a political organization of a marginalized and underrepresented sector
under the party-list system. Finding that petitioner is not a marginalized sector under RA 7941,
the Commission on Elections denied its petition.
A SYSTEM FOR MARGINALIZED
AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS
The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the advancement of social
justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that the
advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors contributes to the advancement of the common good and
of our nation's democratic ideals.
But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-list system was designed?
THE TEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND OF RA 1 7941
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the fundamental law be consulted. Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution directs the course of our present inquiry. It provides:
SEC. 5....
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of Representatives including
those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.(emphasis supplied)
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as "marginalized" to the hands
of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995.
The law provides:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties,and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole,to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was
submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization; AcSHCD
242
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
(emphasis supplied)
THE COURT'S PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS
As the oracle of the Constitution, this Court divined the intent of the party-list system and defined its meaning
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections: 2
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political
party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite character of these parties
or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in
the Constitution and RA 7941....
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
[Section 2 of RA 7941] mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-
style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack [of]
well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-
list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system,Filipino-style. ECTHIA
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this
intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . ., to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941,which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the
clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system.It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their
meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus,
the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could
not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized
nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than
their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest
sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites
those marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even
those in the underground movement — to come out and participate,as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list
system would not only dilute,but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented,contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of
the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented.It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy
must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list
system. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
243
Hence, in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party,the Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for
those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals
and even those in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate).They are those
sectorstraditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation
of national policy although their sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the
national interest. That is why Section 2 of RA 7941 speaks of "marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole."
How should the matter of whether a particular sectoral interest is vital to national interest (and therefore beneficial to
the nation as a whole) be determined? Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno's opinion 3 in Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections 4 offers valuable insight:
...Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating
in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good";the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic
force; the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the
consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the
indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy. DIECTc
As such, the interests of marginalized sectors are by tradition and history vital to national interest and therefore
beneficial to the nation as a whole because the Constitution declares a national policy recognizing the role of these
sectors in the nation's life. In other words, the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-
list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal
tradition. They are essentially sectors with a constitutional bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions
in the Constitution, namely, labor, 5 peasant, 6 urban poor, 7 indigenous cultural
communities, 8 women, 9 youth, 10veterans, 11 fisherfolk, 12 elderly, 13 handicapped, 14 overseas
workers 15 and professionals. 16
The premise is that the advancement of the interests of these important yet traditionally and historically marginalized
sectors promotes the national interest. The Filipino people as a whole are benefited by the empowerment of these
sectors.
The long-muffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are intimately and
indispensably woven into the fabric of the national democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of
discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular sector or group in the
advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be
given a say in governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive
but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine
society.
A UNIFYING THREAD
Fidelity to the Constitution requires commitment to its text. Thus, in the exercise of its function as official interpreter
of the Constitution, the Court should always bear in mind that judicial prudence means that it is safer to construe
the Constitution from what appears upon its face. 17
With regard to the matter of what qualifies as marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system,
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution mentions "the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." On the other hand,
the law speaks of "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." 18
Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in
the implementing law (RA 7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of
theConstitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party's eight guidelines
for screening party-list participants is this: the parties, sectors or organizations "must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941." 19
For this reason, I submit the majority's decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of
whether petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner:
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
The resolution of petitions for accreditation in the party-list system on a case-to-case basis not tethered to the
enumeration of the Constitution and of RA 7941 invites the exercise of unbridled discretion. Unless firmly
anchored on the fundamental law and the implementing statute, the party-list system will be a ship floating aimlessly
in the ocean of uncertainty, easily tossed by sudden waves of flux and tipped by shifting winds of change in societal
attitudes towards certain groups. Surely, the Constitution and RA 7941 did not envision such kind of a system.
Indeed, the significance of the enumeration in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941 is
clearly explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party:
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-
list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law;namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
xxx xxx xxx
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system
are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941,which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals." cITaCS
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the
clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system.It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their
244
meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.
Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.20 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
More importantly, in defining the concept of a "sectoral party," Section 3 (d) of RA 7941 limits "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors" and expressly refers to the list in Section 5 thereof:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — ...
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section
5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, ....(emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner does not question the constitutionality of Sections 2, 3 (d) and 5 of RA 7941. (Its charges of violation of
non-establishment of religion, equal protection, free speech and free association are all leveled at the assailed
resolutions of the Commission on Elections.) Thus, petitioner admits and accepts that its case must rise or fall
based on the aforementioned provisions of RA 7941.
Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with established rules of statutory
construction and the Court's pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party,the meaning of "marginalized
sectors" under the party list system is limited and qualified.Hence, other sectors that may qualify as marginalized
and underrepresented should have a close connection to the sectors mentioned in the Constitution and in the law.
In other words, the marginalized and underrepresented sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system refer
only to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and other related or similar sectors.
This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the fundamental law and of its implementing
statute. It is coherent with the mandate of the Constitution that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the
party-list system but not mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI are "such other sectors as may be provided by
law" duly enacted by Congress.It is also consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem
generis,which requires that a general word or phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class, the general word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or
cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 21 Moreover, it reins in the
subjective elements of passion and prejudice that accompany discussions of issues with moral or religious
implications as it avoids the need for complex balancing and undue policy-making.
What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list
system? What are the family resemblances that would characterize them? 22
Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the pronouncements of this Court
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT, the following factors are significant:
(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national interest but
they have long been relegated to the fringes of society and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation
of national policy;
(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity of sectors to those expressly mentioned in
Section 5 of RA 7941 is a constitutional provision specifically recognizing the special significance of the said sectors
(other than people's organizations, unless such people's organizations represent sectors mentioned in Section 5
of RA 7941) 23 to the advancement of the national interest; and
(d) while lacking in well-defined political constituencies, they must have regional or national presence to ensure that
their interests and agenda will be beneficial not only to their respective sectors but, more importantly, to the nation
as a whole.
FOR PURPOSES OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,
PETITIONER IS NOT A MARGINALIZED SECTOR
In this case, petitioner asserts that it is entitled to accreditation as a marginalized and underrepresented sector under
the party-list system. However, the Commission on Elections disagrees.
The majority reverses the Commission on Elections. While it focuses on the contentious issues of morality, religion,
equal protection, and freedom of expression and association, by granting the petition, the majority effectively rules
that petitioner is a qualified marginalized and underrepresented sector, thereby allowing its accreditation and
participation in the party-list system.
I disagree. cTECIA
Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals
(LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the party-list
system. First,petitioner is not included in the sectors mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a
close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show its link to any of the said
sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Second, petitioner's interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition of its members' sexual orientation as
a right, cannot be reasonably considered as an interest that is traditionally and historically considered as vital to
national interest. At best, petitioner may cite an emergent awareness of the implications of sexual orientation on the
national human rights agenda. However, an emergent awareness is but a confirmation of lack of traditional and
historical recognition. 24 Moreover, even the majority admits that there is no "clear cut consensus favorable to gay
rights claims." 25
Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs through the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. It lacks the vinculum, a constitutional bond, a provision in the
fundamental law that specifically recognizes the LGBT sector as specially significant to the national interest. This
standard, implied in BANAT, is required to create the necessary link of a particular sector to those sectors expressly
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941.
Finally, considering our history and tradition as a people, to consider the promotion of the LGBT agenda and "gay
rights" as a national policy as beneficial to the nation as a whole is debatable at best. Even the majority (aside from
extensively invoking foreign practice and international conventions rather than Philippine laws) states:
We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear cut strong consensus favorable to gay
rights claims. ...26
This is so unlike the significance of the interests of the sectors in Section 5 of RA 7941 which are, without doubt,
indisputable.
Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this Court can only apply and interpret
the Constitution and the laws. Its power is not to create policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted
by the political departments if and when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread on the dangerous
grounds of judicial legislation.
In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3 (d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as
qualified marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity
to the Court's duty in our scheme of government require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned or
closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system.
That is the tenor of the Court's rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT. As there is no strong
reason for the Court to rule otherwise, stare decisis compels a similar conclusion in this case.
245
The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering to, rather than expanding,
legislative policy on the matter of marginalized sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941.
The Court has no power to amend and expand Sections 2, 3 (d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation.
The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to determine "such other [marginalized] sectors"
qualified to participate in the party-list system to Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to
include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress' determination on the matter is
proper.
A FINAL WORD
To be succinctly clear about it, I do not say that there is no truth to petitioner's claim of discriminatory and oppressive
acts against its members. I am in no position to make that claim. Nor do I claim that petitioner has no right to speak,
to assemble or to access our political departments, particularly the legislature, to promote the interests of its
constituency. Social perceptions of sexual and other moral issues may change over time, and every group has the
right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is the best. 27 But persuading one's fellow citizens
is one thing and insisting on a right to participate in the party-list system is something else. Considering the facts, the
law and jurisprudence, petitioner cannot properly insist on its entitlement to use the party-list system as a vehicle for
advancing its social and political agenda.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given no place in a truly just, democratic
and libertarian society, the party-list system has a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as
a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a platform
for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors whose interests are, by nature and history, also the
nation's but which interests have not been sufficiently brought to public attention because of these sectors'
underrepresentation.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and
underrepresented. The Court's task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we
effectively and unduly expand such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of
political will and not of judicial judgment. TAaCED
Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.
ABAD, J.:
I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo because I
arrived at the same conclusion following a different path.
I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more about what the Constitution and
Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 intends in the case of the party-list system to abate the aggravations and confusion caused
by the alarming overnight proliferation of sectoral parties.
The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 1 the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these
seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations,
clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The
Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for sectoral party
accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates
for Congress. There is no reason for it to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly
discussed this point.
What I am more concerned about is COMELEC's claim in its comment on the petition that the Ang Ladlad sectoral
party was not marginalized and underrepresented since it is not among, or even associated with, the sectors specified
in the Constitution and in R.A. 7941. 2 Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented
group of people like those representing labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. This is effectively
the COMELEC's frame of mind in adjudicating applications for accreditation.
But, the COMELEC's proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit
of the Constitution and the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court's reading, neither
the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact,
the Court said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant
for all sectors of society, it was envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in
general.
As it happened, the only clue that the Constitution provides respecting the identity of the sectors that will make up
the party-list system is found in the examples it gives, namely, the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous
cultural minorities, the women, and the youth segments of society. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides:
(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Underscoring supplied.)
Getting its bearing from the examples given above, the Congress provided in Section 2 of R.A. 7941 a broad standard
for screening and identifying those who may qualify for the party-list system. Thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied.)
The above speaks of "marginalized and underrepresented sectoral parties or organizations ...lack well defined
political constituencies ...who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." But, as
the Court said in Ang Bagong Bayani, the whole thing boils down to ascertaining whether the party seeking
accreditation belongs to the "marginalized and underrepresented." 3
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a definition of the term "marginalized and underrepresented." Nor did the
Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress
intended in adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term — marginalized and underrepresented — from
its reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation.
These examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the
youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of what they are, which was what those
who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of them.
For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of "a dog, a cat, a horse, an elephant, and a tiger" and concluding
that it is a gathering of "animals." Here, it looked at the samples of qualified groups (labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth) and found a common thread that passes through them all.
Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the "marginalized and underrepresented."
246
So what is the meaning of the term "marginalized and underrepresented?" The examples given (labor, peasant, implication of this is that, if any of the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the security guards, the microchips factory
urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth) should be the starting point in any search for definition. workers, the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the example) within the sector desires to apply for accreditation as a
Congress has added six others to this list: the fisherfolk, the elderly, the handicapped, the veterans, the overseas party-list group, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat allotted to the "labor sector" in the House of
workers, and the professionals. 4 Thus, the pertinent portion of Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides: HcTSDa Representatives. This is the apparent intent of the Constitution and the law.
Sec. 5. Registration. — ...Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,urban poor, An interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,women, youth, veterans,overseas workers, sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of
and professionals. Representatives. It will defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the
If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of qualified parties, it should be evident that they country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational
represent the working class (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, overseas workers),the service apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
class(professionals),the economically deprived (urban poor),the social outcasts (indigenous cultural In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part in the party-list system must state if
minorities),the vulnerable (women, youth) and the work impaired (elderly, handicapped, veterans).This analysis they are to be considered as national, regional, or sectoral parties. Thus: ESCDHA
provides some understanding of who, in the eyes of Congress, are marginalized and underrepresented. Sec. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just lobby or interest groups. They must purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
have an authentic identity that goes beyond mere similarities in background or circumstances. It is not enough that election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
their members belong to the same industry, speak the same dialect, have a common hobby or sport, or wish to as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, ....
promote public support for their mutual interests. The group should be characterized by a shared advocacy for This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample sectors provided by
genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to their groups. This is in keeping with the statutory the Constitution and R.A. 7941, indicates that every sectoral party-list applicant must have an inherently regional
objective of sharing with them seats in the House of Representatives so they can take part in enacting beneficial presence(indigenous cultural minorities) or a national presence (all the rest).
legislation. The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of provinces, cities, or municipalities. A sectoral
It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 merely provide by examples a sense group representing the sugar plantation workers of Negros Occidental, for example, will not qualify because it does
of what the qualified organizations should look like. As the Court acknowledged in Ang Bagong Bayani, these not represent the inherently national character of the labor sector.
examples are not exclusive. For instance, there are groups which are pushed to the margin because they advocate Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to claim that it represents the
an extremist political ideology, such as the extreme right and the extreme left of the political divide. They may be marginalized and underrepresented. That is easy to do. The party must factually and truly represent the marginalized
regarded, if the evidence warrants, as qualified sectors. and underrepresented. It must present to the COMELEC clear and convincing evidence of its history, authenticity,
Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow rather than a specific definition of the advocacy, and magnitude of presence. The COMELEC must reject those who put up building props overnight as in
class of people they seek to represent. For example, the Constitution uses the term "labor," a narrower definition the movies to create an illusion of sectoral presence so they can get through the door of Congress without running
than the broad and more abstract term, "working class," without slipping down to the more specific and concrete for a seat in a regular legislative district.
definition like "carpenters," "security guards," "microchips factory workers," "barbers," "tricycle drivers," and similar In sum, to qualify for accreditation:
sub-groupings in the "labor" group. See the other illustrations below. One,the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and underrepresented," exemplified by the
Broad *Narrow Specifically Defined Groups working class, the service class, the economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the work impaired,
or some such similar class of persons.
Definition Definition
Two,the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human
Working Class Labor Carpenters, security guards, microchip rights as these apply to the sector it represents.
factory workers, barbers, tricycle drivers Three,the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly defined as shown above. If such party is a
Economically Urban Informal settlers, the jobless, persons sub-group within that sector, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat allocated to their sector.
Four,the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent regional or national presence.
Deprived Poor displaced by domestic wars And five,except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party applying for accreditation must prove
The Vulnerable Women Working women, battered women, victims of its claims by clear and convincing evidence.
slavery In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT
Work Impaired Handi- Deaf and dumb, the blind, people on of a certain kind, 5 the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by and
Capped wheelchairs large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That
*The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their examples. the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's petition on religious and moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 for the party-list system is the Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs have been documented. At home,
second, the narrow definition of the sector that the law regards as "marginalized and underrepresented." The effeminate or gay youths are subjected to physical abuse by parents or guardians to make them conform to standard
247
gender norms of behavior, while lesbian youths are raped to cure them of their perceived affliction. LGBTs are refused
admission from certain schools, or are suspended and put on probation. Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are
denied promotions or benefits which are otherwise available to heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is
bigotry for their group.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in
the vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs)
rather than a concrete and specific definition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for
example).The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.
The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities are our brothers, sisters, friends, or
colleagues who have suffered in silence all these years. True, the party-list system is not necessarily a tool for
advocating tolerance or acceptance of their practices or beliefs. But it does promise them, as a marginalized and
underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct involvement in crafting legislations that impact on their lives
and existence. It is an opportunity for true and effective representation which is the very essence of our party-list
system. cIETHa
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.
||| (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, [April 8, 2010], 632 PHIL 32-142)
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM.
ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded
the resignation of the President and key national officials. SICDAa
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring
a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 1 A series of negotiations quelled the
teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident", petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt.
Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, 2 threw his hat in the political arena and won a
seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. 3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148,
an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" 4 (Omnibus
Motion). Among his requests were: ITcCaS
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere)
particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee
hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff
meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay
City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a
telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings
or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the
related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from
the Senate; AEIHCS
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days
for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to
assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media
regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the
performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate
in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on
Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his
comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the
Senate is not in session; and ScCIaA
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related activities
scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS
Financial Center, Pasay City. 5
By Order of July 25, 2007, 6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three. 7 The
trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007. 8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and guests
from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow
him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official
functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been
able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests 9 at the Marine Brig. CETDHA
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon
(Esperon); Philippine Navy's Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines'
Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo
Obeña (Obeña).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007, been in the
custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula
Hotel 10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-named military
officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the
case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court. 11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police
officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have
adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former custodians. 12 CTEaDc
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for Reconsideration filed
with the trial court:
I.
248
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME
HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND,
THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; cDTaSH
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE
AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D'ETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS
COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE
ACCUSED/PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIG'S COMMANDING
OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS; TIHCcA
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY,
ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND -
IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION
PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP"
ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI. 13 HSaCcE
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former
Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that
he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of
statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a
"political offense".
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against
the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. CASaEc
In sum, petitioner's first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos
respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate
the inapplicability of Jalosjos. 14
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. 15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required. 16 (Underscoring supplied) ASTDCH
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, 17 or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal action. 18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, 19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there
is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied. 20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application
for bail 21 or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, 22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale
of public self-defense 23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like
Jalosjos. TEDaAc
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, 24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-
trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional
rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda: 25
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court
to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. 26 (Underscoring
supplied) ADaEIH
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement restrains the
power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one
month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results. 27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of innocence during the
period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the
presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment
of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of
presumption of innocence prevails. 28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his agreeing to a
consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on
Elections. 29 aSCHcA
249
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily
surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside
his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007
petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain
statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident", 30 proves that petitioner's argument bites
the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding
became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable
amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail. 31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall
be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. 32 HTIEaS
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo 33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the
therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, 34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court's pronouncement
therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury." 35 At the time Montano was
indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong, 36 the Court noted the
obvious reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to
flee." 37 Petitioner's petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests
which are akin to bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court's findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña's recommendation
to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment 38 of Obeña that he interposed no objection to
such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate
security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the
performance of petitioner's duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting
up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFP's a political nature. 39 HAaDTE
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may justify the
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention. 40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a
detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the
escape of the detainee. 41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security
concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the
people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount
to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people's will, repudiating the
people's choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.
Petitioner's contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor." 42 aCSDIc
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, 43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] . . . with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison." 44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, 45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression
that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that
the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the
rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. . . . Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law. 46(Underscoring supplied) aECTcA
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been
charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who
were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to
perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits
that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house
arrest, 47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders. 48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the
trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in
February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office 49 on June
29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around, 50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket
authorizations. CSEHcT
Petitioner's position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner's case fails to compare
with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
. . . Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. 51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No. 179817, [June 27, 2008], 578 PHIL 1002-1021)
[G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009.]
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner,vs.MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE
L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A.
GAVINO,respondents.
[G.R. No. 165636. April 29, 2009.]
250
ELISEO F. SORIANO,petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD,
ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E.
ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of the Hearing and Adjudication
Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE
L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A.
GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB,respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR.,J p:
In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify and set
aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection
with certain utterances he made in his television show, Ang Dating Daan.
Facts of the Case
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m.,petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. 1 ...
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), 2 against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner's
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. 3 Forthwith, the MTRCB
sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the
August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan. 4 cDAISC
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3 (d) of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. 5 The same order also set
the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson
Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the
case. 6 Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw 7 his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing
with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, 8 docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive
suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his
utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang Dating
Daan".
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated
for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No.
165636.
In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No. 165636.
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST
2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN ...IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION ORDERS;
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW;
(D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. 10
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION ...CONSIDERING THAT:
I
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE
OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE SAME; CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO,
I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; SEcADa
II
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY,
THE [IRR],RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO,
I.E.,DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR],RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT
THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE
LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH 11
G.R. No. 164785
We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension,
although its implementability had already been overtaken and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed
September 27, 2004 decision.
It is petitioner's threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision
authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive
suspension.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-
legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. 12 They have
in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. 13 And in
determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained
as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. 14
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A perusal of the MTRCB's basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority,
albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and
is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. — The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the ...production, ...exhibition and/or
television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding
paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or
of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:
xxx xxx xxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the ...production, copying, distribution, sale,
lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to
the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in
accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be ...produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited
and/or broadcast by television;
xxx xxx xxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and
objectives of this Act ....(Emphasis added.)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB's authority and functions
expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3 (d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB
to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the . . . exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all
motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials
as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be . . . exhibited
and/or broadcast by television".
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB's express regulatory and supervisory
statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any
other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. 15 And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power
to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject
of the complaint. 16 ECaTDc
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986. The
MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive suspension through the medium of the
IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986.
Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR provides:
Sec. 3. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER. — Any time during the pendency of the case, and in order to prevent
or stop further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public, the Chairman of the Board may issue a
Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive ...suspension of the permit/permits involved, and/or closure
of the ...television network, cable TV station ...provided that the temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a
life of not more than twenty (20) days from the date of issuance.
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to deprive
the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered
by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others,
indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as
it investigates. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor
extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed
pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB's duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination
of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely
formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Sec. 3 (c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to authorize the MTRCB's assailed
action. Petitioner's restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the
law, would give the agency little leeway to operate, stifling and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3 (k) of PD 1986 clearly
intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3 (k), we reiterate, provides, "To exercise
such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of
this Act . . .." Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. As
distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or
conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act. 17 As we held in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, when a general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. 18 Clearly, the power
to impose preventive suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioner's assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable
only to motion pictures and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB's authority extends beyond motion pictures.
What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. And while the law makes specific reference to the
closure of a television network, the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be
undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be
rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
Just as untenable is petitioner's argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of
hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in response to a written notice,
appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents' complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the
order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing, 19 proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB.
Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue "[a]ny time during the pendency
of the case". In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly
violated PD 1986 20 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. 21
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing. 22
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to
the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioner's position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all persons subject to legislation
should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed". 23 It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. 24 Surely,
petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not
facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their
TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB's disciplinary action.
If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable
to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need not
252
belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers,
as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too different to even consider
whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding
that words like "putang babae" were said in exercise of his religious freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. TcEaDS
There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple
insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner's attempts to
place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious
conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting
amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious
speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they
constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply
illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could
have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day preventive suspension order,
being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible
prior restraint. The main issue tendered respecting the adverted violation and the arguments holding such issue
dovetails with those challenging the three-month suspension imposed under the assailed September 27, 2004
MTRCB decision subject of review under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping issues and arguments shall be jointly
addressed.
G.R. No. 165636
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on
the main ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3 (c) in particular, unconstitutional for reasons articulated in
this petition.
We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general concepts and principles
underlying the freedom of speech and expression.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures come within the broad
protection of the free speech and expression clause. 25 Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence in
the lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech
protection, with broadcast media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. 26 Just as
settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or
threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for
sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means official
government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. 27 The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however,
not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being
protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern. 28 In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee
"obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of language". 29 From Lucas v. Royo comes
this line: "[T]he freedom to express one's sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the
honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for
the rights of others". 30
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 31 "there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech that are harmful, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problems". In net effect, some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that
restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech clause. 32 A
speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality". 33 Being of little or no value, there is, in dealing with or
regulating them, no imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or the balancing-of-interest
test, they being essentially modes of weighing competing values, 34 or, with like effect, determining which of the
clashing interests should be advanced.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression
refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting
words",i.e.,those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and
expression endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioner's statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child.
Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in
formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations
on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that
the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently offensive"....What remains clear is that
obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judge's sound discretion. 35
Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California, 36 a patently offensive utterance would come
within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying
contemporary standards. HAaDTE
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average
adult, the utterances "Gago ka talaga ...,masahol ka pa sa putang babae ....Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang
doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but merely
indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were
used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that
253
they were uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach
even the eyes and ears of children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be
expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of
petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term "putang babae" means "a
female prostitute",a term wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal
meaning, missing the context within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, "ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba", making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then
stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be motivated by
curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without placing the phrase in context. They may be
inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon
learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from their end, view
this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form
their own ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner's words,
when speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the average
adult. The average child may not have the adult's grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that
language may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is
very suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioner's utterances
obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Even if we concede that petitioner's remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that
petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium
easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected
speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while a jurisprudential pattern involving
certain offensive utterances conveyed in different mediums has emerged, this case is veritably one of first impression,
it being the first time that indecent speech communicated via television and the applicable norm for its regulation are,
in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation, 37 a
1978 American landmark case cited in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr. 38 and Chavez v.
Gonzales, 39 is a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of these relates to indecent speech without prurient
appeal component coming under the category of protected speech depending on the context within which it was
made, irresistibly suggesting that, within a particular context, such indecent speech may validly be categorized as
unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.
In FCC, seven of what were considered "filthy" words 40 earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric humorist later
aired in the afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation. Upon the complaint of a man who heard
the pre-recorded monologue while driving with his son, FCC declared the language used as "patently
offensive" and "indecent" under a prohibiting law, though not necessarily obscene. FCC added, however, that its
declaratory order was issued in a "special factual context",referring, in gist, to an afternoon radio broadcast when
children were undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on the question of whether the FCC could regulate the subject
utterance, the US Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, owing to two special features of the broadcast medium, to
wit: (1) radio is a pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. The US Court, however,
hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other contexts, albeit it did not expound and
identify a compelling state interest in putting FCC's content-based regulatory action under scrutiny.
The Court in Chavez 41 elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is
content-based and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the
expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression
under well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the
expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one perspective,
permissible restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First, the
indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw
Katigbak, 42 easily "reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown";second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a "G" or "for general
patronage" rated program. Under Sec. 2 (A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage
is "[s]uitable for all ages",meaning that the "material for television ...in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision".The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioner's utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech. aEcTDI
A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography, 43 false or misleading
advertisement, 44 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list
is not, as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may
be stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the
Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case
constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the
welfare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his utterances
must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent
and such danger must be grave and imminent. 45
Petitioner's invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests, would
not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated
by Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior
restraint or subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantial evil which the government has the power to prohibit. 46 Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of
press is susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for
rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of government. 47 It was originally designed to determine the
latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to have serious and substantial
deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community. 48 The clear and present danger rule
has been applied to this jurisdiction. 49 As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and
present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment
in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a defendant from liability
the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. 50 As we observed in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation, the clear and present danger test "does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums". 51
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally,
said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly
undermine national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of "proximity and degree" the Court,
however, in several cases — Ayer Productions v. Capulong 52 and Gonzales v. COMELEC, 53 applied the
balancing of interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated in his
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Separate Opinion that "where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and
assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of
realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation", 54 then the "balancing of
interests" test can be applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the "balancing of interests" test:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect,
conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests
demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. ...We must, therefore, undertake the
"delicate and difficult task ...to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced
in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights ....
In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and individual interests
competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court in Douds laid the basis for what has
been called the "balancing-of-interests" test which has found application in more recent decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the "balancing" test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting the individual's
freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are to be judged in the concrete, not on
the basis of abstractions",a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of
equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom
restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e.,whether the restriction is direct or indirect,
whether or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured
by the legislation — the reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d)
whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of
such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by
some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom. 55
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper, 56 rests on the theory that it is the court's function
in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause
affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall
be placed. If, on balance, it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it
outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests
theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and
expression clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests. 57 To
the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow. ASIDTa
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month suspension was slapped
on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of
speech is ranged against the duty of the government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the
youth.
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free
speech, the Court rules that the government's interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children
adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner's prayer to continue as program
host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or
expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would
be difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also
mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide protection
to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on youth,
approved on second reading by the Constitutional Commission, explained that the State shall "extend social
protection to minors against all forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster
racial, religious or other forms of discrimination". 58
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect,
exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through
regulatory mechanisms, protect their children's minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting
experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the
field of nation-building. 59 In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character. 60
Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible
to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As
such, the welfare of children and the State's mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, 61 constitute
a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner's utterances in TV broadcast as provided
in PD 1986.
FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who, because of age or
interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive language, thus:
[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen's written message,
["Fuck the Draft"],might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a
child's vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without
restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from
making indecent material available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York that the government's interest in
the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in their own household" justified the
regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material,
coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the welfare of the young:
...It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance.
This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home
where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was
observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual
fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to
manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. 62
The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow
confines of the case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following
considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique accessibility to children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently
offensive speech; (2) the time of broadcast; and (3) the "G" rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. And in agreeing
with MTRCB, the court takes stock of and cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC:
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does not involve a two-way
radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not
decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction. ...The [FFC's] decision rested entirely
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on a nuisance rationale under which context is all important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables.
The time of day was emphasized by the [FFC].The content of the program in which the language is used will affect
the composition of the audience ....As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote a 'nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard'.We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has
entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. (Citation
omitted.)
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly
indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by
MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty,
to regulate and prevent should such action served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent,
insulting, or offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language
of FCC, a "pig in the parlor".Public interest would be served if the "pig" is reasonably restrained or even removed
from the "parlor".ADEacC
Ergo, petitioner's offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.
Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that,
however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction or
subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches
of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in
view of its access to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of
unprotected speech. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program.
The Board can classify movies and television programs and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television
broadcast.
The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television shows, even religious
programs, was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the
Court wrote:
We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its
public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium
that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which
the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e.,serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals,
or public welfare. ...
xxx xxx xxx
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is unconstitutional for Congress
to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision
subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this setup in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz.:
"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its
abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character." 63
Bernas adds:
Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and television programs or parts
of either are fit for public consumption. It decides what movies are "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people",and what "tend to incite subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or sedition",or "tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government
and/or duly constituted authorities",etc. Moreover, its decisions are executory unless stopped by a court. 64
Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 65 it was held that the power of review and prior
approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by
theConstitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit
before they air their television programs. Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that
requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. Tinga, government regulations through the MTRCB became
"a necessary evil" with the government taking the role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations
explicitly agreed to this regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as
competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each other's signals. In this scheme, station owners and broadcasters
in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of speech in radio and television programs
and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior restraint — denial of permit or subsequent punishment,
like suspension or cancellation of permit, among others.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the
broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the
suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and
obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a
sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And
the imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3 (i) of PD
1986and the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort, if
applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent
broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the sanction imposed is not per se for
petitioner's exercise of his freedom of speech via television, but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a "G"
rated TV program.
More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to
regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly
accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry.
Neither can petitioner's virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated
as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an
intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the
permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part
of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed
in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time "G" rated TV program; it
does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative
sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours, the Court,
in MTRCB, 66 sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped
TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986. IcDHaT
Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its authority were it to regulate
and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of indecent or obscene speech in a "G" rated program is not
acceptable. As made clear in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, "the freedom of television and radio broadcasting
is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media".The MTRCB, as a regulatory
agency, must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate, which would not be effective if its punitive actions would
be limited to mere fines. Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation, considering the ease
with which they can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional
disciplinary action. The suspension of a violating television program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as
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a deterrent for those responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of petitioner's television program is justified, and
does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. It behooves the Court to respond to the needs of the changing times,
and craft jurisprudence to reflect these times.
Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension, also tags as unconstitutional the very law creating the MTRCB,
arguing that PD 1986, as applied to him, infringes also upon his freedom of religion. The Court has earlier adequately
explained why petitioner's undue reliance on the religious freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an exempting
dimension to his licentious utterances in his program. The Court sees no need to address anew the repetitive
arguments on religious freedom. As earlier discussed in the disposition of the petition in G.R. No. 164785, what was
uttered was in no way a religious speech. Parenthetically, petitioner's attempt to characterize his speech as a
legitimate defense of his religion fails miserably. He tries to place his words in perspective, arguing evidently as an
afterthought that this was his method of refuting the alleged distortion of his statements by the INC hosts of Ang
Tamang Daan. But on the night he uttered them in his television program, the word simply came out as profane
language, without any warning or guidance for undiscerning ears.
As to petitioner's other argument about having been denied due process and equal protection of the law, suffice it to
state that we have at length debunked similar arguments in G.R. No. 164785. There is no need to further delve into
the fact that petitioner was afforded due process when he attended the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was
unable to demonstrate that he was unjustly discriminated against in the MTRCB proceedings.
Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986 does not provide for
the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law.
The argument is without merit.
In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in the following wise:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may
over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate
its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a
complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction
has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus
not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. 67
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question, petitioner's protestation about undue
delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for violation
of the law is untenable. His thesis is that MTRCB, in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule of
penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree, went beyond the terms of the law.
Petitioner's posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that PD
1986 does not prescribe the imposition of, or authorize the MTRCB to impose, penalties for violators of PD 1986. As
earlier indicated, however, the MTRCB, by express and direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with
supervising and regulating, granting, denying, or canceling permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of
all motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures,
programs, and materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by television. Complementing this provision is Sec. 3
(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB "to exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental
to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]". As earlier explained, the investiture of supervisory,
regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize
the supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved. As the Court
said in Chavez v. National Housing Authority: cDSAEI
...[W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. ...[W]hen the statute does not specify the particular
method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency
has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its function. 68
Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the
exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for
violation of the law sought to be enforced. And would it not be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a
permit for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend?
The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for reference, provides that agency
with the power "[to] promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this
Act, and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives . . . ". And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:
Section 1.VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS. — Without prejudice to the immediate filing of the
appropriate criminal action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent articles pursuant to Section 13, any violation
of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations governing motion pictures, television programs, and
related promotional materials shall be penalized with suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses
issued by the Boardand/or with the imposition of fines and other administrative penalty/penalties. The Board
recognizes the existing Table of Administrative Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of the Board to
amend it when the need arises. In the meantime the existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties shall be
enforced. (Emphasis added.)
This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3
(d) and (k).Contrary to what petitioner implies, the IRR does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law
or partake of the nature of an unauthorized administrative legislation. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to
regulate the public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a guardian of the public.
In Sec. 3 (c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB, along with the standards to be applied to
determine whether there have been statutory breaches. The MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television
programs, and publicity materials "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard", and, from there,
determine whether these audio and video materials "are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, [etc.] . . ." and apply the sanctions it deems proper. The lawmaking body cannot possibly
provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute. 69 The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-
delegation of legislative powers. 70 Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law". 71 Allowing the MTRCB some
reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample
latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the
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offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its
mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.
But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its decision
to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in
the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the
program host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may
prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television
personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond
what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD
1986 will be considered to be within the decree's penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable
doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought.
Thus, the MTRCB's decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent order
issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should cover only the television program on
which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the
facts obtaining call for.
In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute permissiveness
is the norm. Petitioner's flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without adverse
consequences, under the guise of free speech, does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat:
freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be
greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per
se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity
to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. As thus modified, the fallo of
the MTRCB shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty of THREE (3)
MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the instant petition.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby
exonerated for lack of evidence. DIEAHc
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, 165636, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 43-193)
[G.R. No. 160756. March 9, 2010.]
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, THE HON. ACTING SECRETARY OF FINANCE JUANITA D. AMATONG,
and THE HON. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
In this original petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1 petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Associations,
Inc. is questioning the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act (RA) 8424 2 and the revenue regulations
(RRs) issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to implement said provision and those involving creditable
withholding taxes. 3
Petitioner is an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines. It impleaded former Executive
Secretary Alberto Romulo, then acting Secretary of Finance Juanita D. Amatong and then Commissioner ofInternal
Revenue Guillermo Parayno, Jr. as respondents.
Petitioner assails the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and
creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets.
Section 27 (E) of RA 8424 provides for MCIT on domestic corporations and is implemented by RR 9-98. Petitioner
argues that the MCIT violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if there is no realized gain.
Petitioner also seeks to nullify Sections 2.57.2 (J) (as amended by RR 6-2001) and 2.58.2 of RR 2-98, and Section
4 (a) (ii) and (c) (ii) of RR 7-2003, all of which prescribe the rules and procedures for the collection of CWT on the
sale of real properties categorized as ordinary assets. Petitioner contends that these revenue regulations are
contrary to law for two reasons: first, they ignore the different treatment by RA 8424 of ordinary assets and capital
assets andsecond, respondent Secretary of Finance has no authority to collect CWT, much less, to base the CWT
on the gross selling price or fair market value of the real properties classified as ordinary assets. TCIEcH
Petitioner also asserts that the enumerated provisions of the subject revenue regulations violate the due process
clause because, like the MCIT, the government collects income tax even when the net income has not yet been
determined. They contravene the equal protection clause as well because the CWT is being levied upon real estate
enterprises but not on other business enterprises, more particularly those in the manufacturing sector.
The issues to be resolved are as follows:
(1) whether or not this Court should take cognizance of the present case;
(2) whether or not the imposition of the MCIT on domestic corporations is unconstitutional and
(3) whether or not the imposition of CWT on income from sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets under
RRs 2-98, 6-2001 and 7-2003, is unconstitutional.
OVERVIEW OF THE ASSAILED PROVISIONS
Under the MCIT scheme, a corporation, beginning on its fourth year of operation, is assessed an MCIT of 2% of its
gross income when such MCIT is greater than the normal corporate income tax imposed under Section 27 (A). 4 If
the regular income tax is higher than the MCIT, the corporation does not pay the MCIT. Any excess of the MCIT over
the normal tax shall be carried forward and credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately
succeeding taxable years. Section 27 (E) of RA 8424 provides:
Section 27 (E). [MCIT] on Domestic Corporations. —
(1) Imposition of Tax. — A [MCIT] of two percent (2%) of the gross income as of the end of the taxable year, as
defined herein, is hereby imposed on a corporation taxable under this Title, beginning on the fourth taxable year
immediately following the year in which such corporation commenced its business operations, when the minimum
income tax is greater than the tax computed under Subsection (A) of this Section for the taxable year.
(2) Carry Forward of Excess Minimum Tax. — Any excess of the [MCIT] over the normal income tax as computed
under Subsection (A) of this Section shall be carried forward and credited against the normal income tax for the three
(3) immediately succeeding taxable years.
(3) Relief from the [MCIT] under certain conditions. — The Secretary of Finance is hereby authorized to suspend the
imposition of the [MCIT] on any corporation which suffers losses on account of prolonged labor dispute, or
because of force majeure, or because of legitimate business reverses.
The Secretary of Finance is hereby authorized to promulgate, upon recommendation of the Commissioner, the
necessary rules and regulations that shall define the terms and conditions under which he may suspend the
imposition of the [MCIT] in a meritorious case.
(4) Gross Income Defined. — For purposes of applying the [MCIT] provided under Subsection (E) hereof, the term
'gross income' shall mean gross sales less sales returns, discounts and allowances and cost of goods sold.
"Cost ofgoods sold" shall include all business expenses directly incurred to produce the merchandise to bring them
to their present location and use.
258
 For trading or merchandising concern, "cost of goods sold" shall include the invoice cost of the goods sold, plus sales document or the fair
import duties, freight in transporting the goods to the place where the goods are actually sold including insurance
With a selling price of five 1.5% market value determined in
while the goods are in transit. cSTHaE
For a manufacturing concern, "cost of goods manufactured and sold" shall include all costs of production of finished hundred thousand pesos accordance with Section 6 (E)
goods, such as raw materials used, direct labor and manufacturing overhead, freight cost, insurance premiums and (P500,000.00) or less. of the Code, as amended,
other costs incurred to bring the raw materials to the factory or warehouse. whichever is higher. In an
In the case of taxpayers engaged in the sale of service, "gross income" means gross receipts less sales returns,
allowances, discounts and cost of services. "Cost of services" shall mean all direct costs and expenses necessarily With a selling price of more 3.0% exchange, the fair market
incurred to provide the services required by the customers and clients including (A) salaries and employee than five hundred thousand value of the property received
benefits of personnel, consultants and specialists directly rendering the service and (B) cost of facilities directly pesos (P500,000.00) but not in exchange, as determined
utilized in providing the service such as depreciation or rental of equipment used and cost of supplies: Provided,
however, that in the case of banks, "cost of services" shall include interest expense. more than two million pesos in the Income Tax
On August 25, 1998, respondent Secretary of Finance (Secretary), on the recommendation of the (P2,000,000.00). Regulations shall be used.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), promulgated RR 9-98 implementing Section 27 (E). 5 The pertinent With selling price of more 5.0% Where the consideration or part
portions thereof read:
than two million pesos thereof is payable on installment,
Sec. 2.27(E). [MCIT] on Domestic Corporations. —
(1) Imposition of the Tax. — A [MCIT] of two percent (2%) of the gross income as of the end of the taxable year (P2,000,000.00) no withholding tax is required to
(whether calendar or fiscal year, depending on the accounting period employed) is hereby imposed upon any be made on the periodic installment
domestic corporation beginning the fourth (4th) taxable year immediately following the taxable year in which such
payments where the buyer is an
corporation commenced its business operations. The MCIT shall be imposed whenever such corporation has zero
or negative taxable income or whenever the amount of minimum corporate income tax is greater than the normal individual not engaged in trade or
income tax due from such corporation. business. In such a case, the
For purposes of these Regulations, the term, "normal income tax" means the income tax rates prescribed under applicable rate of tax based on
Sec. 27 (A) and Sec. 28 (A) (1) of the Code xxx at 32% effective January 1, 2000 and thereafter.
xxx xxx xxx the entire consideration shall be
(2) Carry forward of excess [MCIT]. — Any excess of the [MCIT] over the normal income tax as computed under Sec. withheld on the last installment
27(A) of the Code shall be carried forward on an annual basis and credited against the normal income tax for the or installments to be paid to the
three (3) immediately succeeding taxable years.
xxx xxx xxx seller.
Meanwhile, on April 17, 1998, respondent Secretary, upon recommendation of respondent CIR, promulgated RR 2- However, if the buyer is engaged
98 implementing certain provisions of RA 8424 involving the withholding of taxes. 6 Under Section 2.57.2 (J) of RR in trade or business, whether a
No. 2-98, income payments from the sale, exchange or transfer of real property, other than capital assets, by persons
corporation or otherwise, the tax
residing in the Philippines and habitually engaged in the real estate business were subjected to CWT:
Sec. 2.57.2. Income payment subject to [CWT] and rates prescribed thereon: shall be deducted and withheld
xxx xxx xxx by the buyer on every installment.
(J) Gross selling price or total amount of consideration or its equivalent paid to the seller/owner for the sale, exchange This provision was amended by RR 6-2001 on July 31, 2001:
or transfer of. — Real property, other than capital assets, sold by an individual, corporation, estate, trust, trust fund Sec. 2.57.2. Income payment subject to [CWT] and rates prescribed thereon:
or pension fund and the seller/transferor is habitually engaged in the real estate business in accordance with the xxx xxx xxx
following schedule — (J) Gross selling price or total amount of consideration or its equivalent paid to the seller/owner for the sale, exchange
Those which are exempt from a Exempt xxx xxx xxx or transfer of real property classified as ordinary asset. — A [CWT] based on the gross selling price/total
withholding tax at source as amount ofconsideration or the fair market value determined in accordance with Section 6(E) of the Code, whichever
is higher, paid to the seller/owner for the sale, transfer or exchange of real property, other than capital asset, shall
prescribed in Sec. 2.57.5 of Gross selling price shall mean
be imposed upon the withholding agent,/buyer, in accordance with the following schedule: CIcEHS
these regulations. the consideration stated in the Where the seller/transferor is exempt from [CWT] in accordance with Sec. 2.57.5 of these regulations. — Exempt

259
Upon the following values of real property, where the seller/transferor is habitually engaged in the real estate
business.
With a selling price of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) or less. — 1.5%
With a selling price of more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00). — 3.0%
With a selling price of more than two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). — 5.0%
xxx xxx xxx
Gross selling price shall remain the consideration stated in the sales document or the fair market value determined
in accordance with Section 6 (E) of the Code, as amended, whichever is higher. In an exchange, the fair market
value of the property received in exchange shall be considered as the consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
However, if the buyer is engaged in trade or business, whether a corporation or otherwise, these rules shall apply:
(i) If the sale is a sale of property on the installment plan (that is, payments in the year of sale do not exceed
25% of the selling price), the tax shall be deducted and withheld by the buyer on every installment.
(ii) If, on the other hand, the sale is on a "cash basis" or is a "deferred-payment sale not on the installment plan" (that
is, payments in the year of sale exceed 25% of the selling price), the buyer shall withhold the tax based on the gross
selling price or fair market value of the property, whichever is higher, on the first installment.
In any case, no Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) shall be issued to the buyer unless the [CWT] due on the
sale, transfer or exchange of real property other than capital asset has been fully paid. (Underlined amendments in
the original)
Section 2.58.2 of RR 2-98 implementing Section 58 (E) of RA 8424 provides that any sale, barter or exchange
subject to the CWT will not be recorded by the Registry of Deeds until the CIR has certified that such transfers and
conveyances have been reported and the taxes thereof have been duly paid: 7
Sec. 2.58.2. Registration with the Register of Deeds. — Deeds of conveyances of land or land and
building/improvement thereon arising from sales, barters, or exchanges subject to the creditable expanded
withholding tax shall not be recorded by the Register of Deeds unless the [CIR] or his duly authorized representative
has certified that such transfers and conveyances have been reported and the expanded withholding tax,
inclusive of the documentary stamp tax, due thereon have been fully paid . . . .
On February 11, 2003, RR No. 7-2003 8 was promulgated, providing for the guidelines in determining whether a
particular real property is a capital or an ordinary asset for purposes of imposing the MCIT, among others. The
pertinent portions thereof state:
Section 4. Applicable taxes on sale, exchange or other disposition of real property. — Gains/Income derived from
sale, exchange, or other disposition of real properties shall, unless otherwise exempt, be subject to applicable taxes
imposed under the Code, depending on whether the subject properties are classified as capital assets or ordinary
assets;
a. In the case of individual citizen (including estates and trusts), resident aliens, and non-resident aliens engaged in
trade or business in the Philippines;
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) The sale of real property located in the Philippines, classified as ordinary assets, shall be subject to the [CWT]
(expanded) under Sec. 2.57.2(J) of [RR 2-98], as amended, based on the gross selling price or current fair market
value as determined in accordance with Section 6(E) of the Code, whichever is higher, and consequently, to the
ordinary income tax imposed under Sec. 24(A)(1)(c) or 25(A)(1) of the Code, as the case may be, based on net
taxable income.
xxx xxx xxx
c. In the case of domestic corporations. —
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) The sale of land and/or building classified as ordinary asset and other real property (other than land and/or
building treated as capital asset), regardless of the classification thereof, all of which are located in the Philippines,
shall be subject to the [CWT] (expanded) under Sec. 2.57.2(J) of [RR 2-98], as amended, and consequently, to the
ordinary income tax under Sec. 27(A) of the Code. In lieu of the ordinary income tax, however, domestic corporations
may become subject to the [MCIT] under Sec. 27(E) of the Code, whichever is applicable.
xxx xxx xxx
We shall now tackle the issues raised.
EXISTENCE OF A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1) there
must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. 9 SCETHa
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there is no actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication because
[petitioner] did not allege that CREBA, as a corporate entity, or any of its members, has been assessed by the BIR
for the payment of [MCIT] or [CWT] on sales of real property. Neither did petitioner allege that its members have shut
down their businesses as a result of the payment of the MCIT or CWT. Petitioner has raised concerns in mere
abstract and hypothetical form without any actual, specific and concrete instances cited that the assailed law and
revenue regulations have actually and adversely affected it. Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion,
any discussion on the constitutionality of the MCIT or CWT on sales of real property is essentially an academic
exercise.
Perceived or alleged hardship to taxpayers alone is not an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues.
Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal
issues. 10
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims which is
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 11 On the
other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. 12
Contrary to respondents' assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioner's members have shut down their operations
as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being implemented. As we stated inDidipio
Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun: 13
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. 14
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to settle such question
once and for all.
Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue:
Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the Philippines. Petitioners did not
allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege any material interest or any wrong that it may suffer
from the enforcement of [the assailed provisions]. 15
Legal standing or locus standi is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case such that it has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. 16 In Holy Spirit Homeowners
260
Association, Inc. v. Defensor, 17 we held that the association had legal standing because its members stood to be
injured by the enforcement of the assailed provisions:
Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition . . . . There is no dispute that the individual
members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either
benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and
lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it
believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. . . . Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained
direct injury arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the
selection process. 18
In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an
actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. 19 The questioned MCIT and
CWT affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental
importance of the issues raised and their overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take
cognizance of this petition. 20
CONCEPT AND RATIONALE OF THE MCIT
The MCIT on domestic corporations is a new concept introduced by RA 8424 to the Philippine taxation system. It
came about as a result of the perceived inadequacy of the self-assessment system in capturing the true
income ofcorporations. 21 It was devised as a relatively simple and effective revenue-raising instrument compared
to the normal income tax which is more difficult to control and enforce. It is a means to ensure that everyone will
make some minimum contribution to the support of the public sector. The congressional deliberations on this are
illuminating:
Senator Enrile.
Mr. President, we are not unmindful of the practice of certain corporations of reporting constantly a loss in their
operations to avoid the payment of taxes, and thus avoid sharing in the cost of government. In this regard, the Tax
Reform Act introduces for the first time a new concept called the [MCIT] so as to minimize tax evasion, tax avoidance,
tax manipulation in the country and for administrative convenience. . . . This will go a long way in ensuring that
corporations will pay their just share in supporting our public life and our economic advancement. 22
Domestic corporations owe their corporate existence and their privilege to do business to the government. They also
benefit from the efforts of the government to improve the financial market and to ensure a favorable business climate.
It is therefore fair for the government to require them to make a reasonable contribution to the public expenses.
Congress intended to put a stop to the practice of corporations which, while having large turn-overs, report minimal
or negative net income resulting in minimal or zero income taxes year in and year out, through under-
declaration of income or over-deduction of expenses otherwise called tax shelters. 23
Mr. Javier (E.)
. . . [This] is what the Finance Dept. is trying to remedy, that is why they have proposed the [MCIT]. Because from
experience too, you have corporations which have been losing year in and year out and paid no tax. So, if the
corporation has been losing for the past five years to ten years, then that corporation has no business to be in
business. It is dead. Why continue if you are losing year in and year out? So, we have this provision to avoid this
type of tax shelters, Your Honor. 24
The primary purpose of any legitimate business is to earn a profit. Continued and repeated losses after
operations of a corporation or consistent reports of minimal net income render its financial statements and its tax
payments suspect. For sure, certain tax avoidance schemes resorted to by corporations are allowed in our
jurisdiction. The MCIT serves to put a cap on such tax shelters. As a tax on gross income, it prevents tax evasion
and minimizes tax avoidance schemes achieved through sophisticated and artful manipulations of deductions and
other stratagems. Since the tax base was broader, the tax rate was lowered.
To further emphasize the corrective nature of the MCIT, the following safeguards were incorporated into the
law: TAECSD
First, recognizing the birth pangs of businesses and the reality of the need to recoup initial major capital expenditures,
the imposition of the MCIT commences only on the fourth taxable year immediately following the year in which the
corporation commenced its operations. 25 This grace period allows a new business to stabilize first and make its
ventures viable before it is subjected to the MCIT. 26
Second, the law allows the carrying forward of any excess of the MCIT paid over the normal income tax which shall
be credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately succeeding years. 27
Third, since certain businesses may be incurring genuine repeated losses, the law authorizes the
Secretary of Finance to suspend the imposition of MCIT if a corporation suffers losses due to prolonged labor
dispute, force majeure and legitimate business reverses. 28
Even before the legislature introduced the MCIT to the Philippine taxation system, several other countries already
had their own system of minimum corporate income taxation. Our lawmakers noted that most developing countries,
particularly Latin American and Asian countries, have the same form of safeguards as we do. As pointed out during
the committee hearings:
[Mr. Medalla:] Note that most developing countries where you have of course quite a bit of room for
underdeclaration of gross receipts have this same form of safeguards.
In the case of Thailand, half a percent (0.5%), there's a minimum of income tax of half a percent (0.5%) of gross
assessable income. In Korea a 25% of taxable income before deductions and exemptions. Of course the different
countries have different basis for that minimum income tax.
The other thing you'll notice is the preponderance of Latin American countries that employed this method. Okay,
those are additional Latin American countries. 29
At present, the United States of America, Mexico, Argentina, Tunisia, Panama and Hungary have their own
versions of the MCIT. 30
MCIT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
Petitioner claims that the MCIT under Section 27 (E) of RA 8424 is unconstitutional because it is highly oppressive,
arbitrary and confiscatory which amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. It explains that gross
income as defined under said provision only considers the cost of goods sold and other direct expenses; other major
expenditures, such as administrative and interest expenses which are equally necessary to produce gross income,
were not taken into account. 31 Thus, pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a corporation's gross income is
tantamount to a confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not "realized gain." 32
We disagree.
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government. Without taxes, the government can neither exist nor endure. The
exercise of taxing power derives its source from the very existence of the State whose social contract with its citizens
obliges it to promote public interest and the common good. 33
Taxation is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. 34 It is a power that is purely legislative. 35 Essentially, this means
that in the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate),
coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. 36 It has the authority to prescribe a certain tax at a specific rate
for a particular public purpose on persons or things within its jurisdiction. In other words, the legislature wields the
power to define what tax shall be imposed, why it should be imposed, how much tax shall be imposed, against whom
(or what) it shall be imposed and where it shall be imposed.
As a general rule, the power to tax is plenary and unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits,
so that the principal check against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature (which imposes
the tax) to its constituency who are to pay it. 37 Nevertheless, it is circumscribed by constitutional limitations. At the
same time, like any other statute, tax legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality.
261
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "[no] person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." In Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, et al., 38 we held that the due process clause may
properly be invoked to invalidate, in appropriate cases, a revenue measure 39 when it amounts to a
confiscation of property. 40 But in the same case, we also explained that we will not strike down a revenue measure
as unconstitutional (for being violative of the due process clause) on the mere allegation of arbitrariness by the
taxpayer. 41 There must be a factual foundation to such an unconstitutional taint. 42 This merely adheres to the
authoritative doctrine that, where the due process clause is invoked, considering that it is not a fixed rule but rather
a broad standard, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character. 43
Petitioner is correct in saying that income is distinct from capital. 44 Income means all the wealth which flows into
the taxpayer other than a mere return on capital. Capital is a fund or property existing at one distinct point in time
while income denotes a flow of wealth during a definite period of time. 45 Income is gain derived and severed from
capital. 46 For income to be taxable, the following requisites must exist:
(1) there must be gain;
(2) the gain must be realized or received and
(3) the gain must not be excluded by law or treaty from taxation. 47
Certainly, an income tax is arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital because capital is not income. In other words,
it is income, not capital, which is subject to income tax. However, the MCIT is not a tax on capital.
The MCIT is imposed on gross income which is arrived at by deducting the capital spent by a corporation in the
sale of its goods, i.e., the cost of goods 48 and other direct expenses from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is not
being taxed.
Furthermore, the MCIT is not an additional tax imposition. It is imposed in lieu of the normal net income tax, and
only if the normal income tax is suspiciously low. The MCIT merely approximates the amount of net income tax due
from a corporation, pegging the rate at a very much reduced 2% and uses as the base the corporation's gross income.
Besides, there is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and
at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. 49
Statutes taxing the gross "receipts," "earnings," or "income" of particular corporations are found in many
jurisdictions. Tax thereon is generally held to be within the power of a state to impose; or constitutional, unless it
interferes with interstate commerce or violates the requirement as to uniformity of taxation. 50 cSDHEC
The United States has a similar alternative minimum tax (AMT) system which is generally characterized by a lower
tax rate but a broader tax base. 51 Since our income tax laws are of American origin, interpretations by American
courts of our parallel tax laws have persuasive effect on the interpretation of these laws. 52 Although our MCIT is not
exactly the same as the AMT, the policy behind them and the procedure of their implementation are comparable. On
the question of the AMT's constitutionality, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in Okin v.
Commissioner: 53
In enacting the minimum tax, Congress attempted to remedy general taxpayer distrust of the system growing from
large numbers of taxpayers with large incomes who were yet paying no taxes.
xxx xxx xxx
We thus join a number of other courts in upholding the constitutionality of the [AMT]. . . . [It] is a rational
means of obtaining a broad-based tax, and therefore is constitutional. 54
The U.S. Court declared that the congressional intent to ensure that corporate taxpayers would contribute a minimum
amount of taxes was a legitimate governmental end to which the AMT bore a reasonable relation. 55
American courts have also emphasized that Congress has the power to condition, limit or deny deductions from gross
income in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax. 56 This is because deductions are a matter oflegislative
grace. 57
Absent any other valid objection, the assignment of gross income, instead of net income, as the tax base of the
MCIT, taken with the reduction of the tax rate from 32% to 2%, is not constitutionally objectionable.
Moreover, petitioner does not cite any actual, specific and concrete negative experiences of its members nor does it
present empirical data to show that the implementation of the MCIT resulted in the confiscation of their property.
In sum, petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis, its allegation that the MCIT is arbitrary and
confiscatory. The Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes. 58 Taxation is
necessarily burdensome because, by its nature, it adversely affects property rights. 59 The party alleging the law's
unconstitutionality has the burden to demonstrate the supposed violations in understandable terms. 60
RR 9-98 MERELY CLARIFIES
SECTION 27 (E) OF RA 8424
Petitioner alleges that RR 9-98 is a deprivation of property without due process of law because the MCIT is being
imposed and collected even when there is actually a loss, or a zero or negative taxable income:
Sec. 2.27(E). [MCIT] on Domestic Corporations. —
(1) Imposition of the Tax. — . . . The MCIT shall be imposed whenever such corporation has zero or negative
taxable income or whenever the amount of [MCIT] is greater than the normal income tax due from such corporation.
(Emphasis supplied)
RR 9-98, in declaring that MCIT should be imposed whenever such corporation has zero or negative taxable income,
merely defines the coverage of Section 27 (E). This means that even if a corporation incurs a net loss in its business
operations or reports zero income after deducting its expenses, it is still subject to an MCIT of 2% of its gross income.
This is consistent with the law which imposes the MCIT on gross income notwithstanding the amount ofthe net
income. But the law also states that the MCIT is to be paid only if it is greater than the normal net income. Obviously,
it may well be the case that the MCIT would be less than the net income of the corporation which posts a zero or
negative taxable income.
We now proceed to the issues involving the CWT.
The withholding tax system is a procedure through which taxes (including income taxes) are collected. 61 Under
Section 57 of RA 8424, the types of income subject to withholding tax are divided into three categories: (a)
withholding of final tax on certain incomes; (b) withholding of creditable tax at source and (c) tax-free covenant bonds.
Petitioner is concerned with the second category (CWT) and maintains that the revenue regulations on the
collection of CWT on sale of real estate categorized as ordinary assets are unconstitutional.
Petitioner, after enumerating the distinctions between capital and ordinary assets under RA 8424, contends that
Sections 2.57.2 (J) and 2.58.2 of RR 2-98 and Sections 4 (a) (ii) and (c) (ii) of RR 7-2003 were promulgated "with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" and "patently in contravention of law" 62 because they
ignore such distinctions. Petitioner's conclusion is based on the following premises: (a) the revenue regulations use
gross selling price (GSP) or fair market value (FMV) of the real estate as basis for determining the income tax for the
sale of real estate classified as ordinary assets and (b) they mandate the collection of income tax on a per transaction
basis,i.e., upon consummation of the sale via the CWT, contrary to RA 8424 which calls for the payment of the net
income at the end of the taxable period. 63
Petitioner theorizes that since RA 8424 treats capital assets and ordinary assets differently, respondents cannot
disregard the distinctions set by the legislators as regards the tax base, modes of collection and payment of taxes
on income from the sale of capital and ordinary assets.
Petitioner's arguments have no merit.
AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE TO ORDER THE COLLECTION OF CWT ON
SALES OF REAL PROPERTY CONSIDERED AS ORDINARY ASSETS
The Secretary of Finance is granted, under Section 244 of RA 8424, the authority to promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the law. Such authority is subject to the limitation
262
that the rules and regulations must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek accordance with Section 6(E) of the Code, whichever is higher, and consequently, to the ordinary income tax
to apply and implement. 64 It is well-settled that an administrative agency cannot amend an act ofCongress. 65 imposed under Sec. 24(A)(1)(c) or 25(A)(1) of the Code, as the case may be, based on net taxable income.
We have long recognized that the method of withholding tax at source is a procedure of collecting income tax which xxx xxx xxx
is sanctioned by our tax laws. 66 The withholding tax system was devised for three primary reasons: first, to provide c. In the case of domestic corporations.
the taxpayer a convenient manner to meet his probable income tax liability; second, to ensure the collection of income The sale of land and/or building classified as ordinary asset and other real property (other than land and/or building
tax which can otherwise be lost or substantially reduced through failure to file the corresponding returns and third, to treated as capital asset), regardless of the classification thereof, all of which are located in the Philippines, shall
improve the government's cash flow. 67 This results in administrative savings, prompt and efficient be subject tothe [CWT] (expanded) under Sec. 2.57.2(J) of [RR 2-98], as amended, and consequently, to the
collection of taxes, prevention of delinquencies and reduction of governmental effort to collect taxes through more ordinary income tax under Sec. 27(A) of the Code. In lieu of the ordinary income tax, however, domestic
complicated means and remedies. 68 corporations may become subject to the [MCIT] under Sec. 27(E) of the same Code, whichever is applicable.
Respondent Secretary has the authority to require the withholding of a tax on items of income payable to any person, (Emphasis supplied)
national or juridical, residing in the Philippines. Such authority is derived from Section 57 (B) of RA 8424 which Accordingly, at the end of the year, the taxpayer/seller shall file its income tax return and credit the taxes withheld
provides: ICTDEa (by the withholding agent/buyer) against its tax due. If the tax due is greater than the tax withheld, then the taxpayer
SEC. 57. Withholding of Tax at Source. — shall pay the difference. If, on the other hand, the tax due is less than the tax withheld, the taxpayer will be entitled
xxx xxx xxx to a refund or tax credit. Undoubtedly, the taxpayer is taxed on its net income.
(B) Withholding of Creditable Tax at Source. The [Secretary] may, upon the recommendation of the [CIR], require The use of the GSP/FMV as basis to determine the withholding taxes is evidently for purposes of practicality and
the withholding of a tax on the items of income payable to natural or juridical persons, residing in the Philippines, by convenience. Obviously, the withholding agent/buyer who is obligated to withhold the tax does not know, nor is he
payor-corporation/persons as provided for by law, at the rate of not less than one percent (1%) but not more than privy to, how much the taxpayer/seller will have as its net income at the end of the taxable year. Instead, said
thirty-two percent (32%) thereof, which shall be credited against the income tax liability of the taxpayer for the taxable withholding agent's knowledge and privity are limited only to the particular transaction in which he is a party. In such
year. a case, his basis can only be the GSP or FMV as these are the only factors reasonably known or knowable by him
The questioned provisions of RR 2-98, as amended, are well within the authority given by Section 57(B) to the in connection with the performance of his duties as a withholding agent.
Secretary, i.e., the graduated rate of 1.5%-5% is between the 1%-32% range; the withholding tax is imposed on the NO BLURRING OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ORDINARY ASSETS AND CAPITAL ASSETS
income payable and the tax is creditable against the income tax liability of the taxpayer for the taxable year. RR 2-98 imposes a graduated CWT on income based on the GSP or FMV of the real property categorized as ordinary
EFFECT OF RRS ON THE TAX BASE FOR THE INCOME TAX OF INDIVIDUALS OR CORPORATIONS assets. On the other hand, Section 27 (D) (5) of RA 8424 imposes a final tax and flat rate of 6% on the gain presumed
ENGAGED IN THE REAL ESTATE BUSINESS to be realized from the sale of a capital asset based on its GSP or FMV. This final tax is also withheld at source. 72
Petitioner maintains that RR 2-98, as amended, arbitrarily shifted the tax base of a real estate business' income tax The differences between the two forms of withholding tax, i.e., creditable and final, show that ordinary assets are not
from net income to GSP or FMV of the property sold. treated in the same manner as capital assets. Final withholding tax (FWT) and CWT are distinguished as
Petitioner is wrong. follows: caHASI
The taxes withheld are in the nature of advance tax payments by a taxpayer in order to extinguish its possible tax FWT CWT
obligation. 69 They are installments on the annual tax which may be due at the end of the taxable year. 70
a) The amount of income tax a) Taxes withheld on certain
Under RR 2-98, the tax base of the income tax from the sale of real property classified as ordinary assets remains to
be the entity's net income imposed under Section 24 (resident individuals) or Section 27 (domestic corporations) in withheld by the withholding income payments are intended
relation to Section 31 of RA 8424, i.e. gross income less allowable deductions. The CWT is to be deducted from the agent is constituted as a full to equal or at least approximate
net income tax payable by the taxpayer at the end of the taxable year. 71 Precisely, Section 4 (a) (ii) and (c) (ii) of RR and final payment of the the tax due of the payee on
7-2003 reiterate that the tax base for the sale of real property classified as ordinary assets remains to be the net
taxable income: income tax due from the said income.
Section 4. Applicable taxes on sale, exchange or other disposition of real property. — Gains/Income derived from payee on the said income.
sale, exchange, or other disposition of real properties shall unless otherwise exempt, be subject to applicable taxes
imposed under the Code, depending on whether the subject properties are classified as capital assets or ordinary
assets; b) The liability for payment of b) Payee of income is required to
xxx xxx xxx the tax rests primarily on the report the income and/or pay
a. In the case of individual citizens (including estates and trusts), resident aliens, and non-resident aliens engaged payor as a withholding agent. the difference between the tax
in trade or business in the Philippines;
withheld and the tax due on the
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) The sale of real property located in the Philippines, classified as ordinary assets, shall be subject to the [CWT] income. The payee also has the
(expanded) under Sec. 2.57.2(j) of [RR 2-98], as amended, based on the [GSP] or current [FMV] as determined in right to ask for a refund if the tax
263
 withheld is more than the tax due.
c) The payee is not required to c) The income recipient is still required
file an income tax return for to file an income tax return, as
the particular income. 73 prescribed in Sec. 51 and Sec. 52
of the NIRC,as amended. 74
As previously stated, FWT is imposed on the sale of capital assets. On the other hand, CWT is imposed on the
sale of ordinary assets. The inherent and substantial differences between FWT and CWT disprove petitioner's
contention that ordinary assets are being lumped together with, and treated similarly as, capital assets in
contravention of the pertinent provisions of RA 8424.
Petitioner insists that the levy, collection and payment of CWT at the time of transaction are contrary to the
provisions of RA 8424 on the manner and time of filing of the return, payment and assessment of income tax
involving ordinary assets. 75
The fact that the tax is withheld at source does not automatically mean that it is treated exactly the same way as
capital gains. As aforementioned, the mechanics of the FWT are distinct from those of the CWT. The withholding
agent/buyer's act of collecting the tax at the time of the transaction by withholding the tax due from the income
payable is the essence of the withholding tax method of tax collection.
NO RULE THAT ONLY PASSIVE
INCOMES CAN BE SUBJECT TO CWT
Petitioner submits that only passive income can be subjected to withholding tax, whether final or creditable. According
to petitioner, the whole of Section 57 governs the withholding of income tax on passive income. The enumeration in
Section 57 (A) refers to passive income being subjected to FWT. It follows that Section 57 (B) on CWT should also
be limited to passive income:
SEC. 57. Withholding of Tax at Source. —
(A) Withholding of Final Tax on Certain Incomes. — Subject to rules and regulations, the [Secretary] may
promulgate, upon the recommendation of the [CIR], requiring the filing of income tax return by certain income
payees, the tax imposed or prescribed by Sections 24(B)(1), 24(B)(2), 24(C), 24(D)(1); 25(A)(2), 25(A)(3), 25(B),
25(C), 25(D), 25(E); 27(D)(1), 27(D)(2), 27(D)(3), 27(D)(5); 28(A)(4), 28(A)(5), 28(A)(7)(a), 28(A)(7)(b), 28(A)(7)(c),
28(B)(1), 28(B)(2), 28(B)(3), 28(B)(4), 28(B)(5)(a), 28(B)(5)(b), 28(B)(5)(c); 33; and 282 of this Code on specified
items of income shall be withheld by payor-corporation and/or person and paid in the same manner and subject to
the same conditions as provided in Section 58 of this Code.
(B) Withholding of Creditable Tax at Source. — The [Secretary] may, upon the recommendation of the [CIR], require
the withholding of a tax on the items of income payable to natural or juridical persons, residing in the
Philippines, by payor-corporation/persons as provided for by law, at the rate of not less than one percent (1%) but
not more than thirty-two percent (32%) thereof, which shall be credited against the income tax liability of the taxpayer
for the taxable year. (Emphasis supplied)
This line of reasoning is non sequitur.
Section 57 (A) expressly states that final tax can be imposed on certain kinds of income and enumerates these as
passive income. The BIR defines passive income by stating what it is not:
. . . if the income is generated in the active pursuit and performance of the corporation's primary purposes, the same
is not passive income. . . 76
It is income generated by the taxpayer's assets. These assets can be in the form of real properties that return rental
income, shares of stock in a corporation that earn dividends or interest income received from savings.
On the other hand, Section 57 (B) provides that the Secretary can require a CWT on "income payable to natural or
juridical persons, residing in the Philippines." There is no requirement that this income be passive income. If that
were the intent of Congress, it could have easily said so.
Indeed, Section 57 (A) and (B) are distinct. Section 57 (A) refers to FWT while Section 57 (B) pertains to CWT. The
former covers the kinds of passive income enumerated therein and the latter encompasses any income other than
those listed in 57 (A). Since the law itself makes distinctions, it is wrong to regard 57 (A) and 57 (B) in the same way.
To repeat, the assailed provisions of RR 2-98, as amended, do not modify or deviate from the text of Section 57 (B).
RR 2-98 merely implements the law by specifying what income is subject to CWT. It has been held that, where a
statute does not require any particular procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt
any reasonable method to carry out its functions. 77 Similarly, considering that the law uses the general term
"income," the Secretary and CIR may specify the kinds of income the rules will apply to based on what is feasible. In
addition, administrative rules and regulations ordinarily deserve to be given weight and respect by the courts 78 in
view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their specific expertise in their respective
fields.
NO DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
Petitioner avers that the imposition of CWT on GSP/FMV of real estate classified as ordinary assets deprives its
members of their property without due process of law because, in their line of business, gain is never assured by
mere receipt of the selling price. As a result, the government is collecting tax from net income not yet gained or
earned.
Again, it is stressed that the CWT is creditable against the tax due from the seller of the property at the end of the
taxable year. The seller will be able to claim a tax refund if its net income is less than the taxes withheld. Nothing is
taken that is not due so there is no confiscation of property repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due process.
More importantly, the due process requirement applies to the power to tax. 79 The CWT does not impose new taxes
nor does it increase taxes. 80 It relates entirely to the method and time of payment. cDCHaS
Petitioner protests that the refund remedy does not make the CWT less burdensome because taxpayers have to wait
years and may even resort to litigation before they are granted a refund. 81 This argument is misleading. The practical
problems encountered in claiming a tax refund do not affect the constitutionality and validity of the CWT as a
method of collecting the tax.
Petitioner complains that the amount withheld would have otherwise been used by the enterprise to pay labor wages,
materials, cost of money and other expenses which can then save the entity from having to obtain loans entailing
considerable interest expense. Petitioner also lists the expenses and pitfalls of the trade which add to the
burden of the realty industry: huge investments and borrowings; long gestation period; sudden and unpredictable
interest rate surges; continually spiraling development/construction costs; heavy taxes and prohibitive "up-front"
regulatory fees from at least 20 government agencies. 82
Petitioner's lamentations will not support its attack on the constitutionality of the CWT. Petitioner's complaints are
essentially matters of policy best addressed to the executive and legislative branches of the government. Besides,
the CWT is applied only on the amounts actually received or receivable by the real estate entity. Sales on installment
are taxed on a per-installment basis. 83 Petitioner's desire to utilize for its operational and capital expenses money
earmarked for the payment of taxes may be a practical business option but it is not a fundamental right which can be
demanded from the court or from the government.
NO VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
264
Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection clause because the CWT is being
levied only on real estate enterprises. Specifically, petitioner points out that manufacturing enterprises are not
similarly imposed a CWT on their sales, even if their manner of doing business is not much different from
that of a real estate enterprise. Like a manufacturing concern, a real estate business is involved in a continuous
process ofproduction and it incurs costs and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference is that "goods"
produced by the real estate business are house and lot units. 84
Again, we disagree.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances." 85 Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not
be limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. 86
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation. 87 Inequalities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional
limitation. 88 The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly treated differently from other business
enterprises.
Petitioner, in insisting that its industry should be treated similarly as manufacturing enterprises, fails to realize that
what distinguishes the real estate business from other manufacturing enterprises, for purposes of the
imposition of the CWT, is not their production processes but the prices of their goods sold and the
number of transactions involved. The income from the sale of a real property is bigger and its
frequency of transaction limited, making it less cumbersome for the parties to comply with the withholding tax
scheme.
On the other hand, each manufacturing enterprise may have tens of thousands of transactions with several thousand
customers every month involving both minimal and substantial amounts. To require the customers ofmanufacturing
enterprises, at present, to withhold the taxes on each of their transactions with their tens or hundreds of suppliers
may result in an inefficient and unmanageable system of taxation and may well defeat the purpose ofthe withholding
tax system.
Petitioner counters that there are other businesses wherein expensive items are also sold infrequently, e.g., heavy
equipment, jewelry, furniture, appliance and other capital goods yet these are not similarly subjected to the
CWT. 89 As already discussed, the Secretary may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions. 90 Under
Section 57 (B), it may choose what to subject to CWT.
A reading of Section 2.57.2 (M) of RR 2-98 will also show that petitioner's argument is not accurate. The
sales of manufacturers who have clients within the top 5,000 corporations, as specified by the BIR, are also subject
to CWT for their transactions with said 5,000 corporations. 91
SECTION 2.58.2 OF RR NO. 2-98 MERELY IMPLEMENTS SECTION 58 OF RA 8424
Lastly, petitioner assails Section 2.58.2 of RR 2-98, which provides that the Registry of Deeds should not effect the
regisration of any document transferring real property unless a certification is issued by the CIR that the withholding
tax has been paid. Petitioner proffers hardly any reason to strike down this rule except to rely on its contention that
the CWT is unconstitutional. We have ruled that it is not. Furthermore, this provision uses almost exactly the same
wording as Section 58 (E) of RA 8424 and is unquestionably in accordance with it:
Sec. 58. Returns and Payment of Taxes Withheld at Source. —
(E) Registration with Register of Deeds. — No registration of any document transferring real property shall be
effected by the Register of Deeds unless the [CIR] or his duly authorized representative has certified that
such transfer has been reported, and the capital gains or [CWT], if any, has been paid: . . . any violation of this
provision by the Register of Deeds shall be subject to the penalties imposed under Section 269 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
CONCLUSION
The renowned genius Albert Einstein was once quoted as saying "[the] hardest thing in the world to understand is
the income tax." 92 When a party questions the constitutionality of an income tax measure, it has to contend not only
with Einstein's observation but also with the vast and well-established jurisprudence in support of the plenary
powers of Congress to impose taxes. Petitioner has miserably failed to discharge its burden of convincing the Court
that the imposition of MCIT and CWT is unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
||| (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association, Inc. v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160756, [March 9, 2010], 628 PHIL
508-547)
[G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010.]
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.
[G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010.]
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
— Justice Jose P. Laurel 1
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several
departments. 2 The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which
all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. 3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast
no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations
and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it. 4
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases 5 both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution 6 as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. 7
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as
incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then
Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,"Kung
265
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. ITESAc
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a
public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must
at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this
mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of a
nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged
sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the people's trust and
confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved,
if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the people's faith and confidence in the Government
and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the President's battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections "kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President. cTIESa
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. — There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,
investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without
fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent collegial
body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. — The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough
fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it
has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the House of
Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being
investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the
Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as
the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of
justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines be admitted for that purpose; TacADE
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of
a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their
private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under
pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the
agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require
in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined by it as
necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out
the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and
hearings, including the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives and
purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. — . . . .
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. — . . . .
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. — . . .
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. — . . . .
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. — . . . .
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. — . . . .
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. — Any government official or personnel
who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required,
shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
266
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. — . . . . .
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. — The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for the
Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities
as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible. aDSAEI
SECTION 12. Office. — . . . .
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. — . . . .
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. — The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31,
2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. — . . . .
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. — . . . .
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. — If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly
by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not
affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. — This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed
by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body
is one. 8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book
I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot
impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions. cADaIH
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and
non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of
international humanitarian law in a country's past." 9 They are usually established by states emerging from periods
of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only
past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event;
(3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. 10 "Commission's
members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to
prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more
about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and
recommend institutional reforms." 11
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are
examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity.
A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function
of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience
for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africa's model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one
writer 12 puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech:
"To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that
they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow
crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again."
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in
both cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following
manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation. cAaTED
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.
1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights
violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the
Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad
for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread
poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither
laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or
even a statute." 13
In their Consolidated Comment, 14 the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
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1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the President's executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 16 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970, 17 and settled
jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies. DIAcTE
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-
judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter's jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances
creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance
Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government
Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. 18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive
Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 19 AIHDcC
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their
personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or
are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject
of the commission's investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. 20
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.
As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 21
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers
a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a
resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which,
to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. 22
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC
and the budget for its operations. 23 It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and
disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the
President's power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an
assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo 24 explained the deep-seated rules
on locus standi. Thus: ACcHIa
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing
is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person
who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a
"citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as
a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was
first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category
from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in
the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex
rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the
right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and
that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen
and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which
he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United
State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed
in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of
that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
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This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v.
President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest." 25 cDAITS
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 26 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance
where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases, 27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance 28 laid down in CREBA v. ERC and
Meralco 29 are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo's assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but
also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. 30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people
are more than interested to know the status of the President's first effort to bring about a promised change to the
country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue
in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely
an adjunct body of the Office of the President. 31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must
be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such
power cannot be presumed 32 since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the
President to create a truth commission. 33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the
President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truthcommission
considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and
"abolish." 34 Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the
extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in
the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof. 35
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province
of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the
President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to
create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure
of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President
Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. 36 Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive
Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority. HCEaDI
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding
body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority
of the President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been
recognized. 37 According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the
inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated
functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions. 38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct
of the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of
Article VII of the Constitution. 39
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to
his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise
of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of his officials. 40 The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of
control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such
as his power to discipline subordinates, 41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes 42and in
order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know. 43
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, 44 where it was held that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of
control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG,
the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and
corruption in the government. 45
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
"reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization
of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" — an "alteration of an existing
structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary, 46 aSIAHC
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive
branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power — that which constitutes
an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the
Office of the President. InCanonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached
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to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President's
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President's power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. 47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different
from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either
a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis
under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. 48 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to
standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been
invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary. 49
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office.
Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos
of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create
offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas"
clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided
in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says "it was enacted to prepare the
transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the legislative and
executive powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D. 1416 should not be considered
effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct. cHSIDa
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Yes, Your Honor. 50
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D.
No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon
the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is
a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the
faithful execution of laws — in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency — is inherent
in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to
create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that
he is bereft of such authority. 51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus: 52
. . . . The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the
separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President
is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office
unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution
of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. . . . . cSATEH
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. 53 One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, 54 the authority of the President to issue Administrative
Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees
of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate,
the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was
also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano
Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government
structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the
political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation
of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress
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to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office
of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." 55 Moreover, since the amount that would
be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the
funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows
from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. 56 As the Chief Executive,
the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department. 57
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and
to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said
body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." 58 In simpler
terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in
the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies. caAICE
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights. 59 Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . . : to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established
by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule
on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on
the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." HScaCT
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
[Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in
a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. 60 Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power. 61
Contrary to petitioners' apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission
to conduct a fact-finding investigation." 62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on
the merits of the charges against them, 63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in
the course of its investigation," under Section 2 (g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation
from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. 64
At any rate, the Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, 65 it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the
passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of
the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis
supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under
Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of
such cases. [Emphases supplied]AIHDcC
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary
investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC's sphere of
functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC
commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman's primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the
Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to
investigate the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are
not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
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Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that
it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous
administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." 66 Thus, in order to be accorded
with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous
to that of former President Arroyo. 67
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass
acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations
where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies" 68 were reported to have been committed against the
Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized
exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation
by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain;
and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end
corruption." 69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal
with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal
force." 70 cEaDTA
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as the initial subject
of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption solely during the said administration. 71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its
proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the
equal protection clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration
as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the
evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct." 72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past
administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous
administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people's faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that
unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of
the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that
the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally
dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily
established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to
issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a
nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President
Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former
President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph
Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens' committee to investigate all
the facts and circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his predecessor, former President
Fidel V. Ramos. 73 [Emphases supplied] TcHEaI
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause. 74
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." 75 It "requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." 76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause
is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." 77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective." 78
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. 79 Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. 81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 82
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. 83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are
to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to
him." 84 cSICHD
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 85 and reiterated in a long line of cases, 86
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding
them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
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to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth"concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" 87 only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. — There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,
investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without
fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. — The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough
fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administrationand thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied] HIaSDc
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations,
these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous
administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread
reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice
Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 88
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation
to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this
point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness." 89 The reason given is
specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption
and the evil it breeds." 90
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have
already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body's limited time and resources. "The law does
not require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia). 91
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating
almost a century's worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often
quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 92
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. 93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional. 94 While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption,
Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier
administrations in the guise of "substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners' lament that the subject
executive order is only an "adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v. Cyprian, 95 it was written: "A rather
limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race,
national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor
union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights."
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. 96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature
as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in
situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from
those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way
as are the members of the class." 97 TaDAIS
The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection
clause." 98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the
evils within its reach." 99 It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not
devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. 100 In several instances, the
underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be
attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process. 101 "With regard to
equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it
fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked." 102
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In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report
to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated
by purposeful and intentional discrimination." 103
To disprove petitioners' contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does
not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous
administration. 104 The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. — If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly
by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it
does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still
depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be
meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit
the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration." 105
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 106 that the
"PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The
decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal
issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is — whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the
executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector
of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and
again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once
again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation's thrust to
progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." SECHIA
Furthermore, in Section 4 (2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These
provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-
equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the
other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them." 107
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it
by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no
more authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said
act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment
of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify
the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed
in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. 108 The
Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles.
"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be
allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude." 109
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations
would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches
of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to
be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be
within constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not of men." 110
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, 193036, [December 7, 2010], 651 PHIL 374-
773)
[G.R. No. 181704. December 6, 2011.]
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President
(BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, petitioner, vs. HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before this Court is a petition 1 for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335, 2 otherwise known as
theAttrition Act of 2005, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations 3 (IRR) unconstitutional, and the implementation
thereof be enjoined permanently.
The Facts
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on
February 11, 2005.
In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima 4 (Abakada), we said of R.A. No. 9335:
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RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the
targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the
Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a
system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and
(6) submit an annual report to Congress. aCTcDH
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue
the implementing rules and regulations of RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created for such purpose. 5
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR
was published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila
Standard, and became effective fifteen (15) days later. 6
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in
violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA),
an association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President,
Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents
Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L.
Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In its petition, BOCEA made the following averments:
Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in
order to comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance
Contracts 7 (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file employees to sign. The
Performance Contract pertinently provided:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition
Act of 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and
Employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties unto this Agreement hereby agree
and so agreed to perform the following:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target and further accepts/commits to
meet the said target under the following conditions:
a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby undertakes and binds himself/herself
that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the target with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act and its
IRR, he/she will voluntarily submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and
b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section
the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct them to accept
their individual target. The Performance Contract executed by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall
be submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before March 31, 2008.
xxx xxx xxx 8
BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Government's own policies on reduced
tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic
factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The
majority of them, however, did not sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the
Performance Contracts but they also refused. To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent
letters, and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them.
In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of
Formal Entry Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners of the BOC during command
conferences to make them sign their Performance Contracts. Likewise, BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali
(Deputy Commissioner Umali) individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said contracts. Said
personnel were threatened that if they do not sign their respective Performance Contracts, they would face possible
reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed on floating status. Thus, all the District Collectors, except a certain
Atty. Carlos So of the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance
Contracts. ESCDHA
BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan
approached Deputy Commissioner Umali to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of harassment, but the latter
merely said that he would look into the matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through counsel wrote the Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist from implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring
rank-and-file employees of the BOC and BIR to sign Performance Contracts. 9 In his letter-reply 10 dated February
12, 2008, Deputy Commissioner Umali denied having coerced any BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract.
He also defended the BOC, invoking its mandate of merely implementing the law. Finally, Pagulayan and BOCEA's
counsel, on separate occasions, requested for a certified true copy of the Performance Contract from Deputy
Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish them a copy. 11
This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality
of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees,
direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are
in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation
of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families' prejudice.
In their Comment, 12 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees.
The OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee
which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may
275
only be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added
that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
In its Reply, 13 BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are unreasonable to achieve its stated
objectives; that the law is unduly oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the extreme burden upon their
shoulders when the Government itself has adopted measures that make collection difficult such as reduced tariff
rates to almost zero percent and tax exemption of big businesses; and that the law is discriminatory of BIR and BOC
employees. BOCEA manifested that only the high-ranking officials of the BOC benefited largely from the reward
system under R.A. No. 9335 despite the fact that they were not the ones directly toiling to collect revenue. Moreover,
despite the BOCEA's numerous requests, 14 BOC continually refused to provide BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on
how such reward was distributed.
Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners in Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima, BOCEA filed a Motion to Consolidate 15 the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008. However,
pending action on said motion, the Court rendered its decision in Abakada on August 14, 2008. Thus, the
consolidation of this case with Abakada was rendered no longer possible. 16
In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, declared Section
12 17 of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional
and violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A.
No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13 18 of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown,
the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee. 19
Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our Resolution 20 dated February 10, 2009,
requiring them to submit their respective Memoranda.
The Issues
BOCEA raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE
COVERED BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS[;] AECDHS
III.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS
ENSHRINED UNDER SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]
V.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,] UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A PARTICULAR GROUP OR
CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL. 21
BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its petition, events unfolded showing the
patent unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335. It narrated that during the first year of the implementation of R.A. No.
9335, BOC employees exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue target of P196 billion which they
surpassed by as much as P2 billion for that year alone. However, this was attained only because oil companies made
advance tax payments to BOC. Moreover, BOC employees were given their "reward" for surpassing said target only
in 2008, the distribution of which they described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials
of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the employees, who did the hard task of collecting, received a mere pittance
of around P8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds Division of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated target
but the higher management gave out to the employees a measly sum of P8,500.00 while the top level officials partook
of millions of the excess collections. BOCEA relies on a piece of information revealed by a newspaper showing the
list of BOC officials who apparently earned huge amounts of money by way of reward. 22 It claims that the recipients
thereof included lawyers, support personnel and other employees, including a dentist, who performed no collection
functions at all. These alleged anomalous selection, distribution and allocation of rewards was due to the failure
of R.A. No. 9335 to set out clear guidelines. 23
In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition for the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting
five BOC officials from the Port of Manila to attrition despite the fact that the Port of Manila substantially complied
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of these officials for attrition without proper
investigation was nothing less than arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments' promulgation of
issuances and the Government's accession to regional trade agreements have caused a significant diminution of the
tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all collection. These unrealistic settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR and
BOC employees tasked with the burden of collection, and worse, subjected them to attrition. 24
BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the following grounds:
1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees' right to due process because the termination of
employees who had not attained their revenue targets for the year is peremptory and done without any form of
hearing to allow said employees to ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not comply with the
requirements under CSC rules and regulations as the dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such
immediately executory nature of the Board's decision negates the remedies available to an employee as provided
under the CSC rules.
2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees' right to equal protection of the law because R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of other
revenue generating government agencies like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, Department of
Transportation and Communication, the Air Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office, and the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are not subject to attrition.
3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees' right to security of tenure because R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure afforded
to government employees. The law likewise created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-attainment of revenue
collection target, which is not provided under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and therefore
arbitrary and unreasonable. SDaHEc
4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress granted to the Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, the manner of allocating
targets, the distribution of rewards and the determination of relevant factors affecting the targets of collection, which
is tantamount to undue delegation of legislative power.
5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and
employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of
276
hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the presumption of regularity
in the performance of the official functions of a public officer. 25
On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR are constitutional, as per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG argues that the classification
of BIR and BOC employees as public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and substantial distinction
since the revenue generated by the BIR and BOC is essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the
State, while the revenue produced by other agencies is merely incidental or secondary to their governmental
functions; that in view of their mandate, and for purposes of tax collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A.
No. 9335 complies with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests for the permissive delegation of legislative
power to the Board; that the Board exercises its delegated power consistent with the policy laid down in the law, that
is, to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters were set in
order that the Board may identify the officials and employees subject to attrition, and the proper procedure for their
removal in case they fail to meet the targets set in the Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of
BIR and BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly accorded by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG
likewise maintains that there was no encroachment of judicial power in the enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting
to a bill of attainder since R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and provided for the penalty that may
be imposed. Finally, the OSG reiterates that the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC employee under R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR shall be done only upon due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection,
subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and in compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
The OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from violating the BIR and BOC employees' right to due process,
actually serves as a notice of the revenue target they have to meet and the possible consequences of failing to meet
the same. More, there is nothing in the law which prevents the aggrieved party from appealing the unfavorable
decision of dismissal. 26
In essence, the issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;
2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA's members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process; and
3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC,
are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA's members have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR. 27
However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.
It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are being challenged.
The Court already settled the majority of the same issues raised by BOCEA in our decision in Abakada, which
attained finality on September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy of reiteration in this case.
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. 28 Necessarily
imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another. 29 However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions, 30 one of which is
the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case. cDACST
The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v. Department of
Energy, 31 to wit:
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in
today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly
to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked
to execute laws in their specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is
that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. 32
Thus, in Abakada, we held,
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets."
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to the President to fix revenue
targets:
"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is
hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue
targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection — Percent (%) of the Excess
[Over] the Revenue Collection to Accrue to the
Targets Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first 30% plus
20% of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue
collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
277
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for
a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by
the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies' revenue
targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the
BOC.
xxx xxx xxx"
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress.
Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of
the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board's authority and identifies the conditions under which
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions: DACIHc
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this
Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process:Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no
historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under
consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of
revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs
officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or
economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper
review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such
decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation
of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other
relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx"
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest", "justice and equity",
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest. 33
We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No.
9335, as evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 5 34 of R.A. No. 9335also
provides for the incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5
provides that "[t]he allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules
and regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a) 35 of R.A. No. 9335 clearly
mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court
finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA's supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the
Board.
Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities. In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 36
Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they
have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions: CDaSAE
"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject
to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx"
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management
and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary [of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of
entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx"
278
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. 37
As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues on the security of tenure of affected BIR
and BOC officials and employees and their entitlement to due process were also settled in Abakada:
Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC.
The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335,
it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%)
with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The
action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process. 38 HCTAEc
In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. 39 BOCEA's apprehension of deprivation of
due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. 40 The concerned BIR or BOC official or
employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and
its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors 41 that may affect the level of collection. In the same
manner, exemptions 42 were set, contravening BOCEA's claim that its members may be removed for unattained
target collection even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an employee's right to be heard is not
at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of him. 43 In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this
case cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his constitutional right to due process. No
less than R.A. No. 9335 in accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.
We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court proceeds to resolve the last, but new
issue raised by BOCEA, that is, whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, 44 Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.
On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are
a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and
the lack of judicial trial. 45
In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, 46 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces
the roots of a Bill of Attainder, to wit:
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament would at times
enact bills or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable
quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially
a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the
deprivation of life or liberty or property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While
cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty
other than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified person or group of
persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior charge or demand, without notice and hearing,
without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process
as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356
[1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965].
Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression. . . . 47
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a
judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee
and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights
of the concerned employee are amply protected.
A final note.
We find that BOCEA's petition is replete with allegations of defects and anomalies in allocation, distribution and
receipt of rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it intends to curb graft and corruption in the BOC in particular and in
the government in general which is nothing but noble, these intentions do not actually pertain to the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, but rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not tolerate
these pernicious acts of graft and corruption. 48 As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity
of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for
the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is.
The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
thereof. 49 Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative. 50 We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR are constitutional.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.
No costs. cCESaH
SO ORDERED.
||| (Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, [December 6, 2011], 677 PHIL 636-671)
[G.R. No. 185128. January 30, 2012.]
[Formerly UDK No. 13980]
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing
the Decision 2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution 3 dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police
operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were
riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-
storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife
and informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him
but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
279
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover.
SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods. TIaCAc
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from
the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently,
the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four
(4) heat-sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information 5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession
and control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu,"
all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any competent
authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. 7 Subsequently, trial on the
merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon,
PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and
Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical wirings and
airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was
able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a
conversation. He was able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife
that police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters away
from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a storage
place by his father. TAEDcS
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas Boy Castillo," GUILTY
of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum
of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance with
the law.
SO ORDERED. 8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION,
THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT
NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT
IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE
SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR
STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE
FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and ECaSIT
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF "POSSESSION" AS AGAINST
THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD
THE SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT
THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN. 10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the following
counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. 11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo
Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during
a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains
that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that
Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is no
longer within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the
search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand,
argues that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper
containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut. EICDSA
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just
because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating
that, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a
particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the
fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
280
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner. A Two.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must Q What happened after that?
be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the A We searched the house, but we found negative.
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
seized. 12 According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as Q What about you, where were you?
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be Q What about the barangay tanod?
searched. 13 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?
it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. 14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is to A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his shop, so we searched
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, 15 and must his shop.
employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. 16 The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder
for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?
basis for that determination. 17 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such A Yes.
facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been Q What happened at the shop?
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.
searched. 18 A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists. Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly A A plastic pack containing white crystalline. DICcTa
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or Q Was that the only item?
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the A There are others like the foil, scissor.
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. 19 In the present case, Search Warrant Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric shop?
No. 570-9-1197-24 20 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. A Yes. 21
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were actually seized were
petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:
can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation FISCAL:
of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took place?
that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still A We cordoned the area.
be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government A We waited for the barangay tanod.
authorities. The contention is devoid of merit. Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance of A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.
the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon: HCTAEc Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
Fiscal Centino: A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.
Q For how long did the chase take place? Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?
A Just a very few moments. A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him? from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod. Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod? A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean. IHaECA
A Yes. Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod? A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
A Nelson Gonzalado. Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get? SICDAa
281
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that store and furthermore the A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with
door was open. the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo? councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house. authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
xxx xxx xxx The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop? of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon. SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. — For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other persons or other person barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
that followed after Masnayon? authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or
A Then we followed suit. ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or
Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit? the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod. of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
Q What about you? By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
A I also followed suit. person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo? confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded paper which contained the confiscated items is considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence,
four shabu deck. petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper? cHSIAC seized, would still be meritorious. AaHTIE
A We were side by side because the shop was very small. 22 Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus: opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
FISCAL CENTINO: and manner of testifying, 24 unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances,
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness? the factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal 25 as in the present case.
A At his residence, the two-storey house. It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence of the accused? prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon. is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities;
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo? and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. 26
A Negative, no shabu. In People v. Tira, 27 this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
Q And what happened afterwards, if any? This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house. prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you proceeded to? not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the
A It is a nipa hut. immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo? the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control
A 5 to 10 meters. over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be? conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo. another. 28
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut? While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom
A I was just outside the nipa hut. the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant's control or
Q And who among the team went inside? CcTIDH possession. 29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod. 23 constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. 30 The records are void of
effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as: structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the
. . . any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
282
. . . As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such, conclusion could be
arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being the
case, he has control of the things found in said structure. 31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of the
structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their
basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner. 32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even
outrightly concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus: HAaDTI
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut. 33
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied what he
said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side is a structure rented by
a couple. 34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the
place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. 35 With the prosecution's failure to prove that
the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering
a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. 36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. 37
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. CEDHTa
SO ORDERED.
||| (Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, [January 30, 2012], 680 PHIL 447-467)
[G.R. No. 179579. February 1, 2012.]
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE
PORT OF SUBIC, petitioners, vs. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J p:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, 1 assailing the Decision 2 and the Resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003 4 on the tariff
classification ofwheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff
purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3)
port of discharge. 5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity
descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or
feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee
(VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest required the importer
to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. 6
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief 7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on
its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. 8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003
was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice,
and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected
to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the
regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from
notice. 9
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. 10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification ofwheat;
(2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not
legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the
Bureau ofCustoms (BOC) had yet to examine respondent's products. They likewise opposed the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation;
and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared
otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary injunction and the
Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its
Decision 11 without having to resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs Memorandum Order 27-
2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District
Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from enforcing the
said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED. 12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent concerned
the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper
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remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that respondent was a regular
importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the regulation in future transactions.
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic
requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners had
"substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination." 13 The lower
court pointed out that a classification based on importers and ports of discharge were violative of the due process
rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in
defense of CMO 27-2003. 14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation
affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must
have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. 15 We find
that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by
petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC, 16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law
or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts. This is within the scope ofjudicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in
an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, 17 we said:
. . . [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. . . .
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to
the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it
was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability
or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those
questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry
is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted
with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute
its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a
tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-2003.
Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made
shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would
be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates,
depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff
applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have to go
through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court
correctly pointed out as follows:
. . . As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and every
importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting
aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see
that business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not
minimal is shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings filed. It may
be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector of Customs and
the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency.
We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with
standing to file this petition. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable 19 for the
simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour millers classified as
food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports
food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained above, it
therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
(3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Public Participation. — (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish
or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in
a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
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(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed,
before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. 20
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera, 21 we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa — and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records — no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed
regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-2003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the
guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to
be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class. 22
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is affected
by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the
product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand,
even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay
3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to
respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their
misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but results in the
opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that are excluded from
the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that those who meet the criteria do not
import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their
wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs officer's
duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:
Section 1403. Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. —
The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether the
packages designated for examination and their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry,
invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the
articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity, measurement, weight,
and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis
when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission
into the Philippines of imported articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and sold,
and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.
Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties prescribed under
Section 3604 of this Code.
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported
article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before
the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the
powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required
the customs officer's prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. 23
In summary, petitioners violated respondent's right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed
to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent's right
to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation.
Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation
limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corp., G.R. No. 179579, [February 1, 2012], 680 PHIL 681-695)
[G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. March 6, 2012.]
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA
M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL
MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARYANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO V. MANOTOK,
JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON,
GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK,
RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS
JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa
R. Manotok, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by
TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
At bar are the motions for reconsideration separately filed by the Manotoks, Barques and Manahans of our Decision
promulgated on August 24, 2010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions filed by the Manotoks under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
as well as the petition-in-intervention of the Manahans, are DENIED. The petition for reconstitution of title filed by the
285
Barques is likewise DENIED. TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al., TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque and Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan,
are all hereby declared NULL and VOID. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby
ordered to CANCEL the said titles. The Court hereby DECLARES that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City
legally belongs to the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to
the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
The Manotoks raised the following grounds in their motion for reconsideration with motion for oral arguments:
1. It is unjust and oppressive to deprive the Manotoks of property they have long held and acquired from the State,
on consideration fully paid and received, and under registered title issued by the State itself, on nothing more than
the assumed failure of the State's agents to inscribe a ministerial "approval" on the transaction deeds.
2. The annulment of Friar Land sales, simply because physical evidence of the Secretary's ministerial approval can
no longer be found, may void transactions involving thousands of hectares of land, and affect possibly
millions of people to whom the lands may have since been parceled out, sold and resold. IACDaS
3. The Manotoks were given no due notice of the issue of reversion, which this case on appeal did not include, and
which was thrust upon the Manotoks only in the final resolution disposing of the appeal.
It would be error for the Honorable Court to let this matter go without a serious and full re-examination. This can be
accomplished, among others, by allowing this motion for reconsideration to be heard on oral argument, to try to permit
all pertinent considerations to be aired before the Court and taken into account.
4. These G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605 were an appeal from administrative reconstitution proceedings before LRA
Reconstitution officer Benjamin Bustos. But the Resolution dated 18 December 2008 which finally reversed the CA's
rulings, affirmed the denial by Bustos of the application for administrative reconstitution of the Barques' purported
transfer certificate of title, and terminated the appeal introduced a new "case" on the Manotok property. It ordered
evidence-taking at the CA, on which the Supreme Court proposed itself to decide, in the first instance, an
alleged ownership controversy over the Manotok property.
5. The Manotoks objected to the "remand" on jurisdictional and due process grounds. The original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is vested by law on the regional trial courts.
6. The Honorable Court erred in proceeding to judgment divesting the Manotoks of their title to Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate, without a trial in the courts of original and exclusive jurisdiction, and in disregard of process which the law
accords to all owners-in-possession.
7. The Honorable Court erred in concluding that the Manotoks, despite being owners in possession under a registered
title, may be compelled to produce the deeds by which the Government had transferred the property to them, and
"failing" which can be divested of their ownership in favor of the Government, even if the latter has not demanded a
reversion or brought suit for that purpose.
8. The Honorable Court erred in imposing on the Manotoks, contrary to Art. 541 of the Civil Code,the obligation to
prove their ownership of the subject property, and in awarding their title to the Government who has not even sued
to contest that ownership.
9. The Honorable Court erred in finding that Sale Certificate No. 1054, which Severino Manotok acquired by
assignment in 1923, was not approved by the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and in finding that a Sale Certificate without the Secretary's approval is void.
10. The Honorable Court erred in concluding that the Manotoks had no valid Deed of Conveyance of Lot 823 from
the Government. The original of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 gave the register of deeds the authority to issue the
transfer certificate of title in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok, which is required by law to be filed with and
retained in the custody of the register of deeds. We presume that the copy thereof actually transmitted to and
received by the register of deeds did contain the Secretary's signature because he in fact issued the TCT. And we
rely on this presumption because the document itself can no longer be found.
11. Assuming arguendo that the original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 the register of deeds received did not bear
the Department Secretary's signature, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 dated October 27, 2005 cured the
defect. To deny the Manotoks the benefit of ratification under said MO, on the erroneous interpretation that it covered
only those found in the records of the "field offices" of the DENR and LMB, would be discriminatory. The Department
Secretary's (assumed) failure to affix his signature on the deed of conveyance could not defeat the Manotoks' right
to the lot after they had fully paid for it.
Republic Act No. 9443 must be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the Manotoks and the Piedad Estate.
12. The Honorable Court erred in denying their right to be informed of the CA's report and be heard thereon prior to
judgment, as basic requirements of due process.
The Barques anchor their motion for reconsideration on the following:
I
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION
FILED BY RESPONDENTS HEIRS OF BARQUE WITHOUT STATING THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH
DENIAL. THIAaD
II
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN INSTANTLY DECLARING IN THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF THE DECISION THAT ALONG WITH FELICITAS B. MANAHAN'S TITLE,
RESPONDENTS HEIRS OF BARQUE'S TITLE TCT NO. 210177 IS LIKEWISE NULL AND VOID, WITHOUT
STATING A CLEAR AND DEFINITE BASIS THEREFOR.
III
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 210177 IN THE NAME OF HOMER L. BARQUE NULL AND VOID.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' FACTUAL FINDINGS, ADOPTED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT IN THE DECISION DATED 24 AUGUST 2010, ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
V
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT'S FINDINGS IN THE DECISION DATED 24 AUGUST 2010 ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As to the Manahans, they seek a partial reconsideration and to allow further reception of evidence, stating the
following grounds:
I. As the original of Sale Certificate No. 511 could not be found in the files of the LMB or the DENR-NCR at the
time of the hearings before the Commissioners, the existence of the certificate was proven by secondary evidence.
The Commissioners erred in ignoring secondary evidence of the contents of Sale Certificate No. 511
because of mere doubt and suspicion as to its authenticity and in the absence of contradicting evidence.
II. The OSG which has been tasked by the Honorable Court to obtain documents from the LMB and DENR-NCR
relative to the conveyance of Lot 823, Piedad Estate, furnished intevenors with a certified true copy of Sale Certificate
No. 511 which it obtained from the DENR-NCR on September 11, 2010, together with the explanation of DENR-NCR
why the document is available only now. (Certified true copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 and Sworn
Explanation of Evelyn G. Celzo attached as Annexes "I" and "II".
III. When Valentin Manahan offered to purchase Lot 823, Piedad Estate, being the "actual settler and occupant" who
under the law enjoyed preference to buy the lot, his status as "actual settler and occupant" must have been verified
by the Bureau of Public Lands because the presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed. The
administrative determination of the status of Valentin Manahan as "actual settler and occupant" can not now be
286
reviewed after the lapse of about eight (8) decades when parties, witnesses, documents and other evidence are
hardly or no longer available.
IV. Abundant evidence was submitted by intervenors that they and their predecessors-in-interest occupied and
possessed Lot 823 up to 1948 when they were dispossessed by armed men. It was error for the Commissioners to
ignore the evidence of the intervenors, there being no contradicting proof.
V. The Commissioners committed palpable error in not according evidentiary value to the Investigation
Report of Evelyn dela Rosa because it is allegedly "practically a replica or summation of Felicitas B. Manahan's
allegations embodied in her petition." Examination of the dates of the documents will show that the Investigation
Report preceded the Petition. The Petition, therefore, is based on the Investigation Report, and not the other way
around. DTcACa
VI. The pronouncement of the Commissioners that Sale Certificate No. 511 is stale is incorrect. Intervenors made
continuing efforts to secure a deed of conveyance based on Sale Certificate No. 511. Defense of staleness or laches
belongs to the party against whom the claim is asserted; it is only that party who can raise it. It can also be waived,
as in this case when the LMB which had the sole authority under Act No. 1120 to convey friar lands, issued to
intervenor Felicitas B. Manahan Deed of Conveyance No. V-2000-22.
VII. The requirement of Act No. 1120 that a deed of conveyance of friar land must be signed by the
Secretary of Interior was dispensed with pursuant to law and Presidential issuances which have the force of law.
VIII. Deeds of conveyance lacking the signature of the Department Secretary were ratified by President Joseph
Estrada and DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor.
The motions are bereft of merit.
Upon the theory that this Court had no power to cancel their certificate of title over Lot 823, Piedad Estate in the
resolution of the present controversy, the Manotoks contend that our Resolution of December 18, 2008 terminated
the appeal from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) administrative reconstitution proceedings by reversing the
CA's rulings and affirming the denial by LRA Reconstitution Officer Benjamin M. Bustos of the application for
administrative reconstitution of the Barques' Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177. The appeal having been
terminated, the Manotoks argued that the remand to the CA for evidence-taking had introduced a new "case" in which
this Court will decide, in the first instance, an "alleged" ownership issue over the property. Such action is legally infirm
since the law has vested exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to real property on the trial
courts.
The argument is untenable.
In our December 18, 2008 Resolution, we set aside the December 12, 2005 Decision rendered by the First Division
and recalled the entry of judgment. We ruled that neither the CA nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel
the Manotok title, a relief sought by the Barques in the administrative reconstitution proceedings. The Court En
Banc proceeded with the reevaluation of the cases on a pro hac vice basis. During the oral arguments, there were
controversial factual matters which emerged as the parties fully ventilated their respective claims, in the
course of which the Barques' claim of ownership was found to be exceedingly weak. Indeed, both the LRA and CA
erred in ruling that the Barques had the right to seek reconstitution of their purported title. Reevaluation of the
evidence on record likewise indicated that the Manotoks' claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques.
Following the approach in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. 1also involving a Friar Land, Republic v.
Court of Appeals 2 and Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, 3 the majority resolved to
remand this case for reception of evidence on the parties' competing claims ofownership over Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate. Given the contentious factual issues, it was necessary for this Court to resolve the same for the complete
determination of the present controversy involving a huge tract of friar land. It was thus not the first time the Court
had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the CA.
Maintaining their objection to the order for reception of evidence on remand, the Manotoks argue that as owners in
possession, they had no further duty to defend their title pursuant to Article 541 of the Civil Code which states that:
"[a] possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and
he cannot be obliged to show or prove it." But such presumption is prima facie, and therefore it prevails until the
contrary is proved. 4 In the light of serious flaws in the title of Severino Manotok which were brought to light during
the reconstitution proceedings, the Court deemed it proper to give all the parties full opportunity to adduce further
evidence, and in particular, for the Manotoks to prove their presumed just title over the property also claimed by the
Barques and the Manahans. As it turned out, none of the parties were able to establish by clear and convincing
evidence a valid alienation from the Government of the subject friar land. The declaration of ownership in favor of the
Government was but the logical consequence of such finding. EDSHcT
We have ruled that the existence of Sale Certificate No. 1054 in the records of the DENR-LMB was not duly
established. No officer of the DENR-NCR or LMB having official custody of sale certificates covering friar lands
testified as to the issuance and authenticity of Exh. 10 submitted by the Manotoks. And even assuming that Exh. 10
was actually sourced from the DENR-LMB, there was no showing that it was duly issued by the Director of Lands
and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DENR). On this point, the Manotoks hinted
that the LMB's certifying the document (Exh. 10) at the Manotoks' request was a deliberate fraud in order to give
them either a false document, the usual unsigned copy of the signed original, or a fake copy.
The Manotoks further assert that this would imply that the LMB either did not produce the genuine article, or could
not produce it. This could only mean that the document which the NBI "found" to be fake or spurious, if this Court
accepts that finding, was "planted evidence" or evidence inserted in the LMB files to discredit the Manotok title.
Nonetheless, the Manotoks insist there were independent evidence which supposedly established the prior
existence of Sale Certificate No. 1054. These documents are: (a) photocopy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No.
1054 dated 1929; (b) official receipt of payment for said certified copy; (c) photocopies of the other assignment deeds
dated 1923; (d) official receipts of installment payments on Lot 823 issued to Severino Manotok; (e) file copies in the
National Archives of the Deed of Conveyance No. 29204; and (f) the notarial registers in which the said
Deed of Conveyance, as well as the assignment documents, were entered.
The contentions have no merit, and at best speculative. As this Court categorically ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country
Club, Inc., 5 "approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for its
validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and void ab initio." In that case, the majority declared
that no valid titles can be issued on the basis of the sale or assignment made in favor of petitioner's father due to the
absence of signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of the Interior, and the approval of the
Secretary of Natural Resources in the Sale Certificate and Assignment of Sale Certificate. Applying the Alonso ruling
to these cases, we thus held that no legal right over the subject friar land can be recognized in favor of the Manotoks
under the assignment documents in the absence of the certificate of sale duly signed by the Director of Lands and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
That a valid certificate of sale was issued to Severino Manotok's assignors cannot simply be presumed from the
execution of assignment documents in his favor. Neither can it be deduced from the alleged issuance of the half-torn
TCT No. 22813, itself a doubtful document as its authenticity was not established, much less the veracity of its recitals
because the name of the registered owner and date of issuance do not appear at all. The Manotoks until now has
not offered any explanation as to such condition of the alleged title of Severino Manotok; they assert that it is the
Register of Deeds himself "who should be in a position to explain that condition of the TCT in his custody." But then,
no Register of Deeds had testified and attested to the fact that the original of TCT No. 22813 was under his/her
custody, nor that said certificate of title in the name of Severino Manotok existed in the files of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan or Quezon City. The Manotoks consistently evaded having to explain the
circumstances as to how and where TCT No. 22813 came about. Instead, they urge this Court to validate their alleged
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title on the basis of the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Such stance hardly You also got this from the records of the LMB, is that correct?
satisfies the standard of clear and convincing evidence in these cases. Even the existence of the official receipts WITNESS:
showing payment of the price to the land by Severino Manotok does not prove that the land was legally conveyed to Yes, sir.
him without any contract of sale having been executed by the government in his favor. Neither did the alleged ATTY. SAN JUAN:
issuance of TCT No. 22183 in his favor vest ownership upon him over the land nor did it validate the alleged You actually saw the sale certificate that was issued to Valentin Manahan after he paid the price of P2,140?
purchase of Lot 283, which is null and void. The absence of the Secretary's approval in Certificate of Sale No. 1054 WITNESS:
made the supposed sale null and void ab initio. 6 No, sir. I did not go further.
In the light of the foregoing, the claim of the Barques who, just like the Manahans, were unable to produce an ATTY. SAN JUAN:
authentic and genuine sale certificate, must likewise fail. The Decision discussed extensively the findings of the CA You did not see the sale certificate?
that the Barques' documentary evidence were either spurious or irregularly procured, which even buttressed the WITNESS:
earlier findings mentioned in the December 18, 2008 Resolution. The CA's findings and recommendations with Yes, Sir, but I asked only.
respect to the claims of all parties, have been fully adopted by this Court, as evident in our disquisitions on the ATTY. SAN JUAN: cDaEAS
indispensable requirement of a validly issued Certificate of Sale over Lot 823, Piedad Estate. IADaSE Who did you ask?
As to the motion of the Manahans to admit an alleged certified true copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 23, WITNESS:
1913 in the name of Valentin Manahan which, as alleged in the attached Sworn Explanation of Evelyn G. Celzo, the The records officer, sir.
latter had inadvertently failed to attach to her Investigation Report forwarded to the CENRO, this Court cannot grant ATTY. SAN JUAN:
said motion. Whose name you can no longer recall, correct?
This belatedly submitted copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 was not among those official documents which the WITNESS:
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) offered as evidence, as in fact no copy thereof can be found in the I can no longer recall, sir.
records of either the DENR-NCR or LMB. Moreover, the sudden emergence of this unauthenticated document is ATTY. SAN JUAN:
suspicious, considering that Celzo who testified, as witness for both the OSG and the Manahans, categorically And the information to you was the Sale Certificate No. 511 was issued after the price was fully paid?
admitted that she never actually saw the application to purchase and alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 of the WITNESS:
Manahans. The relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes of the cross-examination of said witness Yes, sir.
during the hearing before the CA are herein quoted: ATTY. SAN JUAN:
ATTY. SAN JUAN: And it was only after he applied for the purchase of the lot sometime after the survey of 1939 that he was issued Sale
How about this part concerning Valentin Manahan having applied for the purchase of the land? Did you get this from Certificate No. 511?
the neighbors or from Felicitas Manahan? WITNESS:
xxx xxx xxx I am not aware of the issuance of sale certificate. I am aware only of the deed of assignment, Sir.
WITNESS: xxx xxx xxx 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
No, sir. Only the Records Section, sir, that Valentin Manahan applied, sir. In view of the above admission, Celzo's explanation that the copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 signed by the
ATTY. SAN JUAN: Director of Lands and Secretary of the Interior was originally attached to her Investigation Report, cannot be given
You did not see Valentin Manahan's application but only the Records Section saw it? credence. Even her testimony regarding the conduct of her investigation of Lot 823, Piedad Estate and the
WITNESS: Investigation Report she submitted thereafter, failed to impress the CA on the validity of the Manahans' claim. Indeed,
Yes, sir. records showed that Celzo's findings in her report were merely based on what Felicitas Manahan told her about the
ATTY. SAN JUAN: alleged occupation and possession by Valentin Manahan of the subject land.
Did they tell you that they saw the application? In their Offer of Additional Evidence, the Manahans submitted a photocopy of a letter dated December 21, 2010
WITNESS: allegedly sent by Atty. Allan V. Barcena (OIC, Director) to their counsel, Atty. Romeo C. dela Cruz, which reads:
I did not go further, sir. This has reference to your letter dated August 20, 2010 addressed to the Secretary of the
xxx xxx xxx Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) requesting that Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022
ATTY. SAN JUAN: issued on October 30, 2000 over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate in favor of Felicitas B. Manahan be ratified or confirmed
And this report of yours says that Valentin Manahan was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 after completing the for reasons stated therein. The Office of the DENR Secretary in turn referred the letter to us for appropriate action.
payment of the price of P2,140? Records of this Office on Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, show that the Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022
WITNESS: covering said lot in favor of Felicitas Manahan was issued by then Director of the Land Management Bureau
Yes, sir. (LMB), now Undersecretary Ernesto D. Adobo, Jr., on October 30, 2000. The Deed was issued based on General
ATTY. SAN JUAN: Memorandum Order (GMO) No. 1 issued by then Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. of the Department of Natural
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Resources on January 17, 1977, which authorized the Director of Lands, now Director of LMB, to approve
contracts of sale and deeds of conveyance affecting Friar Lands.
It is stressed that the confirmation of the Deed by this office is only as to the execution and issuance based on the
authority of LMB Director under GMO No. 1. This is without prejudice to the final decision of the Supreme Court as
to its validity in the case of "Severino Manotok IV, et al. versus Heirs of Homer L. Barque" (G.R. No. 162335 &
162605).
Please be guided accordingly. 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
However, in the absence of a valid certificate of sale duly signed by the Secretary of Interior or Agriculture and
Natural Resources, such alleged confirmation of the execution and issuance by the DENR-
LMB of Deed of Conveyance No. V-00022 in favor of Felicitas Manahan on October 30, 2000 is still insufficient to
prove the Manahans' claim over the subject land. HICcSA
In a Supplemental Manifestation dated November 18, 2010, the Manotoks submitted an affidavit supposedly
executed on November 11, 2010 by former DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor ("Defensor Affidavit") clarifying that
MO 16-05 applies to all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary of Natural Resources,
contrary to the CA and this Court's statement that said issuance refers only to those deeds of conveyance on file with
the records ofthe DENR field offices.
By its express terms, however, MO 16-05 covered only deeds of conveyances and not unsigned certificates of sale.
The explanation of Secretary Defensor stated the avowed purpose behind the issuance, which is "to remove doubts
or dispel objections as to the validity of all Torrens transfer certificates of title issued over friar lands" thereby "ratifying
the deeds of conveyance to the friar land buyers who have fully paid the purchase price, and are otherwise not shown
to have committed any wrong or illegality in acquiring such lands."
The Manahans propounded the same theory that contracts of sale over friar lands without the approval of the
Secretary of Natural Resources may be subsequently ratified, but pointed out that unlike the Manotoks'
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 (1932), their Deed of Conveyance No. V-2000-22 (2000) was issued and approved
by the Director of Lands upon prior authority granted by the Secretary.
In their Consolidated Memorandum dated December 19, 2010, the Manahans reiterated their earlier argument that
the LMB Director himself had the authority to approve contracts of sale and deeds of conveyance over friar lands on
the basis of General Memorandum Order No. 1 issued in 1977 by then Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido,
Jr. delegating such function to the Director of Lands. This delegated power can also be gleaned from Sec. 15,
Chapter 1, Title XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that the Director of Lands shall "perform such
other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Secretary." Moreover, former President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 131 dated January 20, 1987 reorganizing the LMB and providing that the LMB
Director shall, among others, perform other functions as may be assigned by the Minister of Natural Resources.
On the basis of Art. 1317 9 of the Civil Code,the Manahans contend that deeds of conveyance not bearing the
signature of the Secretary can also be ratified. Further, they cite Proclamation No. 172 issued by former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada which declared that there should be no legal impediment for the LMB to issue such
deeds of conveyance since the applicants/purchasers have already paid the purchase price of the lot, and as sellers
in good faith, it is the obligation of the Government to deliver to said applicants/purchasers the friar lands sold
free of any lien or encumbrance whatsoever. Eventually, when MO 16-05 was issued by Secretary Defensor, all
these deeds of conveyance lacking the signature of the Secretary of Natural Resources are thus deemed signed or
otherwise ratified. The CA accordingly erred in holding that MO 16-05 cannot override Act No. 1120 which requires
that a deed of conveyance must be signed by the Secretary, considering that MO 16-05 is based on law and
presidential issuances, particularly EO 131, which have the force of law.
Meanwhile, in compliance with our directive, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the Defensor Affidavit
submitted by the Manotoks. The Solicitor General contends that said document is hearsay evidence, hence
inadmissible and without probative value. He points out that former DENR Secretary Defensor was not presented as
a witness during the hearings at the CA, thus depriving the parties including the government of the right to cross-
examine him regarding his allegations therein. And even assuming arguendo that such affidavit is admissible as
evidence, the Solicitor General is of the view that the Manotoks, Barques and Manahans still cannot benefit from the
remedial effect of MO 16-05 in view of the decision rendered by this Court which ruled that none of the parties in this
case has established a valid alienation from the Government of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, and also because the
curative effect of MO 16-05 is intended only for friar land buyers whose deeds of conveyance lack the signature of the
Secretary of the Interior or Agriculture and Natural Resources, have fully paid the purchase price and are otherwise
not shown to have committed any wrong or illegality in acquiring the friar lands. He then emphasizes that this Court
has ruled that it is not only the deed of conveyance which must be signed by the Secretary but also the
certificate of sale itself. Since none of the parties has shown a valid disposition to any of them of Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate, this Court therefore correctly held that said friar land is still part of the patrimonial property of the
national government. ASTIED
The Court is not persuaded by the "ratification theory" espoused by the Manotoks and Manahans.
The argument that the Director of Lands had delegated authority to approve contracts of sale and
deeds of conveyances over friar lands ignores the consistent ruling of this Court in controversies involving friar lands.
The aforementioned presidential/executive issuances notwithstanding, this Court held in Solid State Multi-
Products Corporation v. CA, 10 Liao v. Court of Appeals, 11 and Alonso v. Cebu Country Club 12 that
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (later the Natural Resources) is indispensable to the
validity of sale of friar land pursuant to Sec. 18 of Act No. 1120 and that the procedure laid down by said law must
be strictly complied with.
As to the applicability of Art. 1317 of the Civil Code,we maintain that contracts of sale lacking the approval of the
Secretary fall under the class of void and inexistent contracts enumerated in Art. 1409 13 which cannot be ratified.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 mandated the approval by the Secretary for a sale of friar land to be valid.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T. Carpio disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 18 of Act
No. 1120, and proposed that based on Section 12 of the same Act, it is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear the
signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources "because it is only when the final installment
is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale, the purchase price having been fully paid." It was pointed out that
the majority itself expressly admit that "it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the
Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had made full payment on the purchase price of the land", citing
jurisprudence to the effect that "notwithstanding the failure of the government to issue the proper
instrument of conveyance when the purchaser finally pays the final installment of the purchase price, the
purchase of the friar land still acquired ownership.
We are unable to agree with the view that it is only the Director of Lands who signs the Certificate of Sale.
The official document denominated as "Sale Certificate" clearly required both the signatures of the Director of Lands
who issued such sale certificate to an applicant settler/occupant and the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and
Natural Resources indicating his approval of the sale. These forms had been prepared and issued by the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, consistent with Act No. 1120 "as may
be necessary . . . to carry into effect all the provisions [thereof] that are to be administered by or under [his] direction,
and for the conduct of all proceedings arising under such provisions." 14
We reiterate that Section 18 of Act No. 1120, as amended, is plain and categorical in stating that:
SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall
be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Section 12 did not mention the requirement of signature or approval of the Secretary in the sale certificate and
deed of conveyance.
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SECTION 12. It shall be the duty of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands by proper investigation to ascertain what
is the actual value of the parcel of land held by each settler and occupant, taking into consideration the location and
quality of each holding of land, and any other circumstances giving [it] value. The basis of valuation shall likewise be,
so far as practicable, such [as] the aggregate of the values of all the holdings included in each particular tract shall
be equal to the cost to the Government to the entire tract, including the cost of surveys, administration and interest
upon the purchase money to the time of sale. When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail
that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price
so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United
States or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the final installment together with [the]
accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper
instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one
hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. The Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall, in each instance
where a certificate is given to the settler and occupant of any holding, take his formal receipt showing the
delivery of such certificate, signed by said settler and occupant. DCAHcT
On the other hand, the first paragraph of Section 15 provides for the reservation of title in the Government only for
the purpose of ensuring payment of the purchase price, which means that the sale was subject only to the resolutory
condition of non-payment, while the second paragraph states that the purchaser thereby acquires "the
right of possession and purchase" by virtue of a certificate of sale "signed under the provisions [thereof]." The
certificate of sale evidences the meeting of the minds between the Government and the applicant regarding the price,
the specific parcel of friar land, and terms of payment. In Dela Torre v. Court of Appeals, 15 we explained that the
non-payment of the full purchase price is the only recognized resolutory condition in the case of sale of friar lands.
We have also held that it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title
and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. 16 Where there is no certificate of sale issued, the purchaser does not
acquire any right of possession and purchase, as implied from Section 15. By the mandatory language of Section
18, the absence of approval ofthe Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in the lease or sale of friar
land would invalidate the sale. These provisions read together indicate that the approval of the Secretary is required
in both the certificate of sale and deed of conveyance, although the lack of signature of the Secretary in the latter
may not defeat the rights of the applicant who had fully paid the purchase price.
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales' dissent asserted that case law does not categorically state that the required
"approval" must be in the form of a signature on the Certificate of Sale, and that there is no statutory basis for the
requirement of the Secretary's signature on the Certificate of Sale "apart from a strained deduction of Section 18."
As already stated, the official forms being used by the Government for this purpose clearly show that the
Director of Lands signs every certificate of sale issued covering a specific parcel of friar land in favor of the
applicant/purchaser while the Secretary of Interior/Natural Resources signs the document indicating that the sale
was approved by him. To approve is to be satisfied with; to confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent to some act or thing
done by another; to sanction officially. 17 The Secretary of Interior/Natural Resources signs and approves the
Certificate of Sale to confirm and officially sanction the conveyance of friar lands executed by the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands (later Director of Lands). It is worth mentioning that Sale Certificate No. 651 in the
name of one Ambrosio Berones dated June 23, 1913, 18 also covering Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate and forming
part of the official documents on file with the DENR-LMB which was formally offered by the OSG as part of the official
records on file with the DENR and LMB pertaining to Lot 823, contains the signature of both the Director of Lands
and Secretary of the Interior. The Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 651 dated April 19, 1930 was also signed by
the Director of Lands. 19
Following the dissent's interpretation that the Secretary is not required to sign the certificate of sale while his signature
in the Deed of Conveyance may also appear although merely a ministerial act, it would result in the absurd situation
wherein the certificate of sale and deed of conveyance both lacked the signature and approval of the Secretary, and
yet the purchaser's ownership is ratified, courtesy of DENR Memorandum Order (MO) No. 16-05. It is also not
farfetched that greater chaos will arise from conflicting claims over friar lands, which could not be definitively settled
until the genuine and official manifestation of the Secretary's approval of the sale is discerned from the records and
documents presented. This state of things is simply not envisioned under the orderly and proper distribution of friar
lands to bona fide occupants and settlers whom the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands was tasked to identify. 20
The existence of a valid certificate of sale therefore must first be established with clear and convincing evidence
before a purchaser is deemed to have acquired ownership over a friar land notwithstanding the non-issuance by the
Government, for some reason or another, of a deed of conveyance after completing the installment payments. In the
absence of such certificate of sale duly signed by the Secretary, no right can be recognized in favor of the applicant.
Neither would any assignee or transferee acquire any right over the subject land. EaISDC
In Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 21 the Court categorically ruled that the absence of approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null
and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment. 22
Justice Carpio, however, opined that the ruling in Alonso "was superseded with the issuance by then
Department of [Environment] and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Michael T. Defensor of DENR Memorandum
Order No. 16-05." It was argued that the majority had construed a "limited application" when it declared that the
Manotoks could not benefit from said memorandum order because the latter refers only to deeds of conveyance "on
file with the records of the DENR field offices".
We disagree with the view that Alonso is no longer applicable to this controversy after the issuance of DENR MO No.
16-05 which supposedly cured the defect in the Manotoks' title.
First, DENR MO No. 16-05 explicitly makes reference only to Deeds of Conveyances, not to Sale Certificates by
which, under the express language of Section 15, the purchaser of friar land acquires the right of possession and
purchase pending final payment and the issuance of title, such certificate being duly signed under the
provisions of Act No. 1120. Although the whereas clause of MO No. 16-05 correctly stated that it was only a
ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had made full
payment on the purchase price of the land, it must be stressed that in those instances where the formality of the
Secretary's approval and signature is dispensed with, there was a valid certificate of sale issued to the purchaser or
transferor. In this case, there is no indication in the records that a certificate of sale was actually issued to the
assignors of Severino Manotok, allegedly the original claimants of Lot 823, Piedad Estate. DacASC
Second, it is basic that an administrative issuance like DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 must conform to and
not contravene existing laws. In the interpretation and construction of the statutes entrusted to them for
implementation, administrative agencies may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the statute
it is administering, or which are in derogation of, or defeat its purpose. In case of conflict between a statute and an
administrative order, the former must prevail. 23 DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 cannot supersede or amend
the clear mandate of Section 18, Act No. 1120 as to dispense with the requirement of approval by the
Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources of every lease or sale of friar lands.
But what is worse, as the dissent suggests, is that MO 16-05 would apply even to those
deeds of conveyances not found in the records of DENR or its field offices, such as the Manotoks'
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 sourced from the National Archives. It would then cover cases of claimants who
have not been issued any certificate of sale but were able to produce a deed of conveyance in their names. The
Bureau of Lands was originally charged with the administration of all laws relative to friar lands, pursuant to Act No.
2657 and Act No. 2711. Under Executive Order No. 192, 24 the functions and powers previously held by the
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Bureau of Lands were absorbed by the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) ofthe DENR, while those functions and
powers not absorbed by the LMB were transferred to the regional field offices. 25 As pointed out by the Solicitor
General in the Memorandum submitted to the CA, since the LMB and DENR-NCR exercise sole authority over friar
lands, they are naturally the "sole repository of documents and records relative to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad
Estate." 26
Third, the perceived disquieting effects on titles over friar lands long held by generations of landowners cannot be
invoked as justification for legitimizing any claim or acquisition of these lands obtained through fraud or without strict
compliance with the procedure laid down in Act No. 1120. This Court, in denying with finality the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. 27 reiterated the settled rule that "[a]pproval
by the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its
mandate." 28 Petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving their acquisition of title by clear and convincing
evidence, considering the nature of the land involved.
As consistently held by this Court, friar lands can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the
requirements of Act No. 1120. The issuance of a valid certificate of sale is a condition sine qua non for
acquisition of ownership under the Friar Lands Act. Otherwise, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 would serve
as administrative imprimatur to holders of deeds of conveyance whose acquisition may have been obtained through
irregularity or fraud.
Contrary to the dissent of Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno that our decision has "created dangers for the
system of property rights in the Philippines", the Court simply adhered strictly to the letter and spirit of the Friar Lands
Act and jurisprudence interpreting its provisions. Such imagined scenario of instability and chaos in the established
property regime, suggesting several other owners of lands formerly comprising the Piedad Estate who are
supposedly similarly situated, remains in the realm of speculation. Apart from their bare allegations, petitioners
(Manotoks) failed to demonstrate how the awardees or present owners of around more than 2,000 hectares of land
in the Piedad Estate can be embroiled in legal disputes arising from unsigned certificates of sale.
On the other hand, this Court must take on the task of scrutinizing even certificates of title held for decades involving
lands of the public domain and those lands which form part of the Government's patrimonial property, whenever
necessary in the complete adjudication of the controversy before it or where apparent irregularities and anomalies
are shown by the evidence on record. There is nothing sacrosanct about the landholdings in the Piedad Estate as
even prior to the years when Lot 823 could have been possibly "sold" or disposed by the Bureau of Lands, there
were already reported anomalies in the distribution of friar lands in general. 29
Significantly, subsequent to the promulgation of our decision in Alonso, Republic Act No. (RA) 9443 was passed by
Congress confirming and declaring, subject to certain exceptions, the validity of existing TCTs and reconstituted
certificates of title covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated in Cebu. Alonso involved a friar land already titled
but without a sale certificate, and upon that ground we declared the registered owner as not having acquired
ownership of the land. RA 9443 validated the titles "notwithstanding the lack of signatures and/or approval of the
then Secretary of Interior (later Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and/or the then Chief of the
Bureau of Public lands (later Director of Public Lands) in the copies of the duly executed Sale Certificate and
Assignments of Sale Certificates, as the case may be, now on file with the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City". IECcAT
The enactment of RA 9443 signifies the legislature's recognition of the statutory basis of the Alonso ruling to the
effect that in the absence of signature and/or approval of the Secretary of Interior/Natural Resources in
the Certificates ofSale on file with the CENRO, the sale is not valid and the purchaser has not acquired
ownership of the friar land. Indeed, Congress found it imperative to pass a new law in order to exempt the already
titled portions of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the operation of Section 18. This runs counter to the dissent's
main thesis that a mere administrative issuance (DENR MO No. 16-05) would be sufficient to cure the
lack of signature and approval by the Secretary in Certificate of Sale No. 1054 covering Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.
In any event, the Manotoks now seek the application of RA 9443 to the Piedad Estate, arguing that for said law to be
constitutionally valid, its continued operation must be interpreted in a manner that does not collide with the equal
protection clause. Considering that the facts in Alonso from which RA 9443 sprung are similar to those in this case,
it is contended that there is no reason to exclude the Piedad Estate from the ambit of RA 9443.
Justice Carpio's dissent concurs with this view, stating that to limit its application to the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
will result in class legislation. RA 9443 supposedly should be extended to lands similarly situated, citing the
case of Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 30
In the aforesaid case, the Court extended the benefits of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file
employees of other government financing institutions (GFIs) from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)to the rank-
and-file employees of the BSP. We upheld the position of petitioner association that the continued
operation of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act), which provides that the compensation
and wage structure of employees whose position fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with
the rates prescribed under RA 6758 (SSL), constitutes "invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file
employees of the [BSP]". Thus, as regards the exemption from the SSL, we declared that there were no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption from the SSL which
BSP rank-and-file employees were denied. The distinction made by the law is superficial, arbitrary and not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs. 31 TIaCAc
We are of the opinion that the provisions of RA 9443 may not be applied to the present case as to cure the
lack of signature of the Director of Lands and approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale
Certificate No. 1054.
The Court has explained the nature of equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. 32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1 of RA 9443 provides:
Section 1. All existing Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate,
notwithstanding the lack of signatures and/or approval of the then Secretary of the Interior (later
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and/or the then Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (later
Director of Public Lands) in the copies of the duly executed Sale Certificates and Assignments of Sales
Certificates, as the case may be, now on file with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Cebu City, are hereby confirmed and declared as valid titles and the registered owners recognized as
absolute owners thereof.
This confirmation and declaration of validity shall in all respects be entitled to like effect and credit as a
decree of registration, binding the land and quieting the title thereto and shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the national government and all branches thereof; except when, in a given case involving a
certificate of title or a reconstituted certificate of title, there is clear evidence that such certificate of title or
reconstituted certificate of title was obtained through fraud, in which case the solicitor general or his duly
291
designated representative shall institute the necessary judicial proceeding to cancel the certificate of title or
reconstituted certificate of title as the case may be, obtained through such fraud. (Emphasis supplied.)
Without ruling on the issue of violation of equal protection guarantee if the curative effect of RA 9443 is not made
applicable to all titled lands of the Piedad Estate, it is clear that the Manotoks cannot invoke this law to "confirm" and
validate their alleged title over Lot 823. It must be stressed that the existence and due issuance of TCT No. 22813 in
the name of Severino Manotok was not established by the evidence on record. There is likewise no copy of a "duly
executed certificate of sale" "on file" with the DENR regional office. In the absence of an existing certificate of title in
the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the Manotoks and certificate of sale on file with the DENR/CENRO, there
is nothing to confirm and validate through the application of RA 9443.
Moreover, RA 9443 expressly excludes from its coverage those cases involving certificates of title which were shown
to have been fraudulently or irregularly issued. As the reconstitution and remand proceedings in these cases
revealed, the Manotoks' title to the subject friar land, just like the Barques and Manahans, is seriously flawed. The
Court cannot allow them now to invoke the benefit of confirmation and validation of ownership of friar lands
under duly executed documents, which they never had in the first place. Strict application by the courts of the
mandatory provisions of the Friar Lands Act is justified by the laudable policy behind its enactment — to ensure that
the lands acquired by the government would go to the actual occupants and settlers who were given preference in
their distribution. 33 CTHDcE
The dissent reiterates that the existence of Sale Certificate No. 1054 was clearly and convincingly established by the
original of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 between M. Teodoro and
Severino Manotok as assignors and Severino Manotok as assignee (approved by the Director of Lands on June 23,
1923), which is on file with the LMB, as well as the Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 secured from the National
Archives which is the repository ofgovernment and official documents, the original of Official Receipt No. 675257
dated 20 February 1920 for certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 on Lot 823 and the
original of the Provincial Assessor's declaration of title in Severino Manotok's name for tax purposes on August 9,
1933 assessing him beginning with the year 1933. The dissent further listed some of those alleged sale certificates,
assignment deeds and deeds of conveyance either signed by the Director of Lands only or unsigned by both
Director of Lands and Secretary of Interior/Natural Resources, gathered by the Manotoks from the LMB. It was
stressed that if MO 16-05 is not applied to these huge tracts of land within and outside Metro Manila,
"[H]undreds of thousands, if not millions, of landowners would surely be dispossessed of their lands in these areas,"
"a blow to the integrity of our Torrens system and the stability of land titles in this country."
The Court has thoroughly examined the evidence on record and exhaustively discussed the merits of the Manotoks'
ownership claim over Lot 823, in the light of established precedents interpreting the provisions of the Friar Lands Act.
The dissent even accused the majority of mistakenly denigrating the records of the National Archives which,
under R.A. No. 9470 enacted on May 21, 2007, is mandated to store and preserve "any public archive transferred to
the National Archives" and tasked with issuing certified true copies or certifications on public archives and for extracts
thereof.
The Friar Lands Act mandated a system of recording all sale contracts to be implemented by the Director of Lands,
which has come to be known as the Friar Lands Sales Registry.
SEC. 6. The title, deeds and instruments of conveyance pertaining to the lands in each province, when executed and
delivered by said grantors to the Government and placed in the keeping of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands,
as above provided, shall be by him transmitted to the register of deeds of each province in which any part of said
lands lies, for registration in accordance with law. But before transmitting the title, deeds, and
instruments of conveyance in this section mentioned to the register of deeds of each province for
registration, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall record all such deeds and instruments at length
in one or more books to be provided by him for that purpose and retained in the Bureau of Public Lands,
when duly certified by him shall be received in all courts of the Philippine Islands as sufficient evidence of the
contents of the instrument so recorded whenever it is not practicable to produce the originals in court. (Section 1, Act
No. 1287).
It is thus the primary duty of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands to record all these deeds and instruments in
sales registry books which shall be retained in the Bureau of Public Lands. Unfortunately, the LMB failed to produce
the sales registry book in court, which could have clearly shown the names of claimants, the particular lots and areas
applied for, the sale certificates issued and other pertinent information on the sale of friar lands within the Piedad
Estate. Witness Teresita J. Reyes, a retired Assistant Chief of the Records Management Division (RMD), LMB who
was presented by the Manahans, testified that when the LMB was decentralized, the sales registry books pertaining
to friar lands were supposedly turned over to the regional offices. These consisted of copies of the appropriate
pages of the sales registry books in the LMB RMD main office which has an inventory of lots
subject of deeds of conveyance and sales certificates. However, Reyes said that the sales registry book itself is no
longer with the RMD. On the other hand, the alleged affidavit of Secretary Defensor dated November 11, 2010 states
that MO 16-05 was intended to address situations when deeds of conveyance lacked the signature of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, or such deeds or records from which the Secretary's signature or approval
may be verified were lost or unavailable.
Whether the friar lands registry book is still available in the LMB or properly turned over to the regional offices remains
unclear. With the statutorily prescribed record-keeping of sales of friar lands apparently in disarray, it behooves on
the courts to be more judicious in settling conflicting claims over friar lands. Titles with serious flaws must still be
carefully scrutinized in each case. Thus, we find that the approach in Alonso remains as the more rational and prudent
course than the wholesale ratification introduced by MO 16-05.
The prospect of litigants losing friar lands they have possessed for years or decades had never deterred courts from
upholding the stringent requirements of the law for a valid acquisition of these lands. The court's duty is to apply the
law. Petitioners' concern for other landowners which may be similarly affected by our ruling is, without doubt, a
legitimate one. The remedy though lies elsewhere — in the legislature, as what R.A. 9443 sought to rectify. TDcCIS
WHEREFORE, the present motions for reconsideration are all hereby DENIED with FINALITY. The motions for oral
arguments and further reception of evidence are likewise DENIED.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Manotok, IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 (Resolution), [March 6, 2012], 683 PHIL 448-508)
[G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.]
JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos — or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million — adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ. 1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love
their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even
to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of
abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners
such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
292
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27,
2004. 4 aHDTAI
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law provides for protection
orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties
and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children,
a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance
of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262.
She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior.
They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom
private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old. 8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the
other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience
from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends.
When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her
ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still
catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City,
who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him
about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner
told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the
bank. 10 EHTIcD
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some
bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter
leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-
old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7)
days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told
private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them
in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with
his paramour and has not sired a child with her. 13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from
her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with
him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations — 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation — of which
he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private
respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills
for utilities. 15cDCIHT
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where
all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which
is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the
conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings,
Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent. IcADSE
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to
the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family
home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger
that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this
suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance
of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or
through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards,
flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine
National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's
firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
293
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational
and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business. aCTHEA
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations
from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller,
must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to
the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect
Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial
resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the
Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for
thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van
which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the
Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) per month until the matter
of support could be finally resolved. cAaDCE
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO 21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day
notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one
vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and
(2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to
his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications
prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children
to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the
conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things
in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the
three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court; DaHSIT
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment
of such expenses. 23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and
committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application 24 for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-
Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone
and Joseph Eduard. 25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her. 26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-
Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home
of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private
respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her
things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft
against Jamola. 27 CDTHSI
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the
offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the
offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners
Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita
Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that
respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to
pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the
TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period
from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00; CIaDTE
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No.
FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner
another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real
properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the
294
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14,
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in
Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-
cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia,
who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her
signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order 29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days,
and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed,
extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that
petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already
been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder: AacDHE
xxx xxx xxx
. . . it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued
on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for
thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by
the court. STHAaD
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private
respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 35 (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for failure of petitioner to
raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction
to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to
annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that —
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW. EcHIAC
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER
TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF
THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE
BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first
tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698)
filed by petitioner. EDIHSC
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues
that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality." 41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. 42 In accordance with said
law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court
in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A.
9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz.:
SEC. 7. Venue. — The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in
the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied) HIAESC
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law." 46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of
a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that, "[p]lainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
295
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. aADSIc
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind
of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. — (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall
verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but
any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein.
Acounterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party. 50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. 51 Finally,
a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party
to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52 As
pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that
could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from
being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. IHcSCA
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising
the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not
need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz.:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. — In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible,
within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may
extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the
parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional
issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure. DcAaSI
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest
belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22 (j)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it
effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal
of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, 55 with more reason that a TPO, which
is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, 56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the
same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
(Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It
bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from
acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues
of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final
arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to
the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could
very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the
husband/father of the remedies under the law. 60 IHTaCE
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while
the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what
she called a "synthesized measure" 62 — an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence
Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 — providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence
and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We
quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed
concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as
296
well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the
efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the
spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator
respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by
women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with
the family. 65
xxx xxx xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. . . . SDITAC
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope
rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe
that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case
against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope
to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not
equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President. aIcDCA
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not,
it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is
stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are
also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and
that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection
extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection
orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints. cSCADE
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we
have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family
members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived
at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the
"men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that
proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito
Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President. EcATDH
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Sotto. . . . May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake.
At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment —
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. — more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to
minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused
by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance
and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women. DEScaT
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved. 66
297
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we
dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment.
The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal
by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate
the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union 69 is instructive: cSICHD
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding
them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as
shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men
as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. IDAaCc
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims
of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying
the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences . . . is the
essence of true equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship
between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men
gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of
men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71 HSaIET
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women
is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women,
and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men." 72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and
developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and
its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy — the institutional rule of men. Women were
seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies,
women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his
property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened
the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted
in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s
and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker
than their thumb. TcDAHS
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871,
the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband
to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or
kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law. . . In person, the
wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated
it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence,
they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for
women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded
in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992
casePlanned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults
by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted
their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because
298
surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in Cases
institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted
women per year." cIDHSC Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
or ex-partner during their lifetime. . . Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault. . . In families where wife beating
takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well. Lasciviousness
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Physical 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common. Injuries
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative
. . . Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they Sexual 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
have no other source of income. . . Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Harassment
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
. . . Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners. CHTcSE
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
(CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Abduction/ 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women. TEaADS Kidnapping
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half — and full — steps of all these women's movements. No less than Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building
———— ————— ————— ————— ————— ————— ————— —————
and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as
— — — — — — — —
well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004,
enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted) ===== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ======
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely" *2011 report covers only from January to August
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children Source: Philippine National Police — Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
show that — On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the
. . . physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four
54.31%. . . . (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
total of 5,608 cases. . . . (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester violence. 75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury
of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners. 73 much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of
an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76 CADSHI
VAW categories since its implementation in 2004, 74 thus: ADECcI While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004-2011* same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
Reported 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather
and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways,
299
streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws
as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing
animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein
merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the
community." 77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the
right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78 TcSHaD
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated
differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights
remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He
stressed that thewidespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape
or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" — first at the hands of the offender and then of the
legal system. 79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves.
Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might
later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO
under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an
"illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by
"insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing
or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men. 82 Petitioner's contention, 83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-
bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound
itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges." 85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. DHECac
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC
as:
. . . any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts: SACHcD
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical
or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C."Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children. CDEaAI
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but
is not limited to the following:
300
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of
what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner
insists 92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional
anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v.
Spouses Tan, 94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the
case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from
the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically. TCIEcH
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no
opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened." 95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control
of their life. 96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater
risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence,
and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur. 100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required
not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ
of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests, 103 among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall
order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. 104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice
upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of
the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. 106 HSCcTD
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped
of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. 107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal
of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order
dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed
or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and
that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to
do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
301
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of
the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home. 108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It
states: aIETCA
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. — The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following
reliefs:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property
rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his things and escort him from the residence;
xxx xxx xxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent
only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and
appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling,
the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution." 109
Under Section 23 (c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator.
The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection.
Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement
about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally
with the person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is
placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The pertinent provision reads, as
follows: HCDAac
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. — Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs)
refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If
the Punong Barangayis unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other
hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce
all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and
to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers." 115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there
is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,"
thePunong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of a BPO. DHEcCT
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would
remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace
and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the
instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge
of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence
shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind,
law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment." 118 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, [June 25, 2013])
[G.R. No. 181973. April 17, 2013.]
302
AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO TAGGUEG, JR., * ADELAIDA HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO BISCOCHO,
JR., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
Decision 2 dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743 be set aside. In the assailed
decision, the CA reversed the 10 August 2005 Decision 3 and 15 September 2005 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 55, Manila.
Background of the case
The Congress of the Philippines passed on 21 August 1989 5 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758 entitled "An Act
Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes"
otherwise known as The Salary Standardization Law.
Before the law, or on 31 August 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Implementation No. 97
(LOI No. 97), authorizing the implementation of standard compensation position classification plans for the
infrastructure/utilities group of government-owned or controlled corporations. On the basis thereof, the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) issued Memorandum Circular No. 57-87 dated 1 October 1987 which granted to its officials
holding managerial and supervisory positions representation and transportation allowance (RATA) in an amount
equivalent to 40% of their basic salary. 6
Thereafter, on 23 October 1989, PPA issued Memorandum Circular No. 36-89, which extended the RATA entitlement
to its Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel at the rate of 20% of
their basic pay. 7 And, on 14 November 1990, PPA issued Memorandum Circular No. 46-90, which adjusted effective
1 January 1990, the RATA authorized under Memorandum Circular No. 36-89, from 20% to 40% based on the
standardized salary rate. 8
The continued validity of the RATA grant to the maximum ceiling of 40% of basic pay finds support from the
Opinions 9 rendered by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), Department of Justice. DECSIT
Finding justification in the increase in salary due these officials brought about by the standardization mandated
by R.A. No. 6758, PPA paid RATA differentials to its officials.
The Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate Auditor, however, in a letter dated 14 November 1990, addressed
to PPA, disallowed in post-audit the payment of the RATA differentials. It likewise disallowed in audit the grant of
RATA to PPASection Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel occupying
positions with salary grades of 17 and above who were appointed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758.
The COA called PPA's attention to Memorandum No. 90-679 dated 30 October 1990 which provides that "LOImp
No. 97 series of 1979 implementing Compensation and Position Classification for Infrastructure/Utilities for GOCC is
replaced by Section 16 of R.A. No. 6758." 10
In view of the disallowances, the affected PPA officials, represented by the OGCC, filed a petition before the Supreme
Court claiming their entitlement to the RATA provided for under LOI No. 97. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
100773 entitled "Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit, et al." 11
In a decision dated 16 October 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COA and declared that an official to be
entitled to the continued RATA benefit under LOI No. 97 must be an incumbent as of 1 July 1989 and more
importantly, was receiving the RATA provided by LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989.
As a result of the aforesaid ruling, there are at present two categories of managers and supervisors at the PPA. The
first category is composed of PPA officials who were occupying their positions and actually receiving the 40% RATA
under LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989 and who continue to receive such benefit. The second category consists of
officials who were not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 or were appointed or promoted to their positions only after 1 July
1989. The second category officials therefore receive a lesser RATA under the General Appropriations Act although
they hold the same rank, title and may have the same responsibilities as their counterparts in the first category.
The Case
On 26 July 2000, petitioners, who are second category PPA officials filed a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition
before the RTC of Manila, raffled to Branch 55. They claim anew that they are entitled to RATA in the amount not
exceeding 40% of their respective basic salaries. They anchor their petition on recent developments allegedly brought
about by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al. 12 which was
decided almost six (6) years after the Court's decision in PPA v. COA, et al.13 They further claim that certain
issuances were released by the COA and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in effect,
extended the cut-off date in the grant of the 40% RATA, thus entitling them to these benefits. AaDSEC
PPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata under paragraph (f), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It
argued that a case involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action had already been resolved by this
Court inPPA v. COA, et al. 14
Finding merit in PPA's motion, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the petition in an Order dated 8 November 2000.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the Petition in this case is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground that it is already barred by the principle of res judicata. 15
Petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court by way of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
Supreme Court, however, in a Resolution 16 dated 28 March 2001 referred the case to the CA for appropriate action.
The case was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 64702.
On 31 July 2002, a decision was rendered by the CA on the referred case. It declared that the principle of res
judicata is not applicable to the case. The appellate court explained that the existence of DBM and COA issuances
which entitle herein petitioners to the grant of RATA is the pertinent fact and condition which is material to the instant
case taking it away from the domain of the principle of res judicata. 17 When new facts or conditions intervene before
the second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the party, the issues are no longer the same;
hence, the former judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar to the subsequent action. 18 At the time judgment was
rendered in the previous case, the fact and condition now in existence, which consist of the DBM and COA issuances,
has not yet come about. In view of the issuances, petitioners are faced with an entirely separate facts and conditions,
which make the principle of res judicata inapplicable. 19 The decision ordered the remand of the case to the court of
origin for continuation of proceedings.
After due proceedings in the trial court, a decision in favor of petitioners was rendered on 10 August 2005. The
dispositive portion of the decision commanded respondent PPA to pay the claim for RATA equivalent to 40% of
petitioners' standardized basic salaries authorized under LOI No. 97, commencing from their respective dates of
appointments or on 23 October 2001 when the case of Irene V. Cruz, et al. v. COA 20 was promulgated by the
Supreme Court, whichever is later. aIcDCA
The trial court ratiocinated that "when the Supreme Court En Banc ruled on 23 October 2001 in the IRENE
CRUZ case that 'The date of hiring of an employee cannot be considered as a substantial distinction,' the so-called
first (sic)category managers and supervisors whose appointments thereto were made after 01 July 1989 and who
were effectively deprived of the 40% RATA on account of the Supreme Court's ruling in the PPA v. COA, et al. case
have established a clear legal right to claim the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97 commencing on 23 October 2001, and
the correlative legal duty of respondent PPA to pay the same; thus, entitling petitioners who are qualified to avail of
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus." 21
PPA raised the matter before the CA which docketed the case as CA G.R. SP No. 91743. In a decision dated 29
August 2007, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and held:
303
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 10, 2005 Decision and the September 15, 2005 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, are hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the
Amended Petition in Civil Case No. 00-98161 is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. 22
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated 29
February 2008.
Hence, this petition assailing the 29 August 2007 decision of the CA and its 29 February 2008 resolution.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINAL DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA. G.R. SP NO. 64702.
II.WHETHER OR NOT PPA IN DENYING THE CLAIM OF PETITIONERS FOR 40% RATA HAS COMMITTED A
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION; AND
III.WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO 40% RATA AND SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO REFUND
THE RATA THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED. cCHITA
Petitioners' Argument
Petitioners submit that the decision of the CA in CA G.R. SP No. 64702 adequately cited jurisprudence and authorities
on the matter involving the issue of res judicata. Such decision of the appellate court was not appealed by
the PPA and as such, has attained finality. In view thereof, petitioners allege that the case of PPA v. COA, et
al.23 can no longer serve as a ground for the dismissal of the instant case since such would result in "the sacrifice
of justice to technicality." 24
Petitioners further submit that the CA in its decision in CA G.R. SP No. 91743 may have overlooked the significance
of the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al. 25 which extended the
prescribed date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6758 from 1 July 1989 to 31 October 1989, viz.:
In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment
of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees starting November 1, 1989
is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive
government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together.
...
Petitioners claim that the DBM, which is the agency tasked to implement R.A. No. 6758, amplified this extension in
its 4 May 1992 letter to the Administrator of the National Electrification Administration (NEA). The pertinent portion of
the letter reads:
DBM has authorized certain GOCCs/GFIs to grant also to officials and employees hired between the period of July
1, 1989 and October 31, 1989 the allowances and fringe benefit enumerated in said Item 5.5 of CCC No. 10.
At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that although the effectivity date prescribed in R.A. No. 6758 is July 1, 1989,
said Act and its implementing circulars were formally promulgated only in the later part of October 1989. The
preparation of all required documents, more particularly the Index of Occupational Services (IOS) and the Position
Allocation List (PAL) for the GOCCs/GFIs was completed at much later date. Thus, within the period of transition
from July 1, 1989 up to the date of completion of all the required documents for the actual implementation by each
GOCC/GFI of said salary standardization, flexibility in the interpretation of rules and regulations prescribed
under R.A. 6758 was necessary. DBM felt it illogical to assume that during the period R.A. 6758 was not yet issued
all GOCCs/GFIs were already aware of what implementing guidelines it (DBM) will prescribe and have their personnel
actions accordingly adjusted to said guidelines. Likewise, it is counter-productive if at that time, we advised all
GOCCs/GFIs to suspend their personnel actions as same could be disruptive to their operations and delay the
completion of important projects. cSDIHT
Premised on the above considerations, we maintain the position that our action allowing officials and employees
hired between the period of July 1, 1989 and October 31, 1989 to be paid allowances under Item No. 5.5 of CCC No.
10 is logically tenable and reasonable since same was made during the "transitory period" from the old system to the
new system. 26
They further claim that even the COA took cognizance of this extension in the memorandum 27 issued by the officer-
in-charge of the COA Audit Office, to wit:
Moreover, this office gives much weight to the position of the Secretary, DBM in his letter to the Administrator, NEA,
dated October 30, 1993 that the cut-off date of July 1, 1989 prescribed in R.A. 6758/CCC #10 was extended to
October 31, 1989 primarily on consideration that said R.A. 6758/CCC #10 were formally issued/promulgated only in
the later part of October 1989. . . .
Petitioners likewise raised as their cause of action the violation of their constitutional right to equal protection of the
law. They contend that this alone would constitute sufficient justification for the filing anew of the instant petition.
Contrary to the statement in the assailed decision of the CA to the effect that they failed to plead or raise such issue
in the trial court, they submit that a perusal of their amended petition would show that paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33
thereof were devoted to that issue.
Finally, as regards the matter of refund of the RATA being demanded by COA, petitioners submit that they should
not be required to make such refund since these were received in good faith and on the honest belief that they were
entitled to it.
PPA's Argument
Respondent PPA maintains that PPA employees who were appointed to managerial and supervisory positions after
the effectivity of RA No. 6758 are not entitled to the 40% RATA benefit provided under LOI No. 97. Consistent with
the ruling of the Court in PPA v. COA, et al., 28 respondent PPA contends that only the first category officials or those
who were granted and were receiving RATA equivalent to 40% of their salaries prior to 1 July 1989 are entitled to
such benefits. Petitioners who are included in the second category officials or those who are not incumbents as of 1
July 1989 are not entitled to the 40% RATA benefit provided under LOI No. 97.
Our Ruling
There is merit in petitioners' argument that their petition should not be dismissed on the ground of res judicata since
this is based on jurisprudence and issuances not yet in existence at the time of the promulgation of the Court's
decision in PPA v. COA, et al.29 Petitioners are, however, incorrect in their contention that the decision of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 64702 which was not appealed by the PPA has become final and as such, barred
the appellate court's subsequent ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743. CHcETA
We note that when the petition was elevated to the CA in the first instance in CA-G.R. SP No. 64702, the matter
submitted to be resolved by the appellate court was simply the issue on whether the trial court was correct in granting
the motion to dismiss and in declaring that the case is barred by the principle of res judicata. Despite the non-appeal
by PPA of the appellate court's ruling that res judicata is not applicable, the case did not attain finality in view of the
order of the CA remanding the case to the trial court for continuation of hearing. The appellate court's ruling in CA
G.R. SP No. 91743, therefore, was not barred by the ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 64702 since the ruling in the second
instance was already a ruling after trial on the merits.
Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition must still fail because our ruling must adhere to
the doctrine of stare decisis. In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington
Steel Corporation, 30 the Court expounded on the importance of this doctrine in securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions
304
and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in
one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties
may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The issues raised by petitioners are no longer novel. In a catena of cases 31 promulgated after De Jesus v.
COA 32 and Cruz v. COA, 33 this Court has ruled that the pronouncement it has established in the earlier case
of PPA v. COA, et al.34with regard to the interpretation and application of Section 12 of RA 6758 is still applicable.
The subsequent decisions maintained that allowances or fringe benefits, whether or not integrated into the
standardized salaries prescribed by R.A. 6758, should continue to be enjoyed only by employees who (1) were
incumbents and (2) were receiving those benefits as of 1 July 1989.
In those cases, the Court reiterated that the intention of the framers of the law was to phase out certain allowances
and privileges gradually, without upsetting the principle of non-diminution of pay. The intention of Section 12 to
protectincumbents who were already receiving those allowances on 1 July 1989, when RA 6758 took effect was
emphasized thus:
An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office. SCADIT
The consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent resigns or is promoted to a higher
position, his successor is no longer entitled to his predecessor's RATA privilege . . . or to the transition allowance.
Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the same case as follows:
. . . . The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and
was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant. . . . .
In Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, the Court confirmed the legislative intention in this wise:
. . . [T]here was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of
government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. . . . .
The Court stressed that in reserving the benefits to incumbents alone, the legislature's intention was not only to
adhere to the policy of non-diminution of pay, but also to be consistent with the prospective application of laws and
the spirit of fairness and justice. 35 (Emphasis omitted)
xxx xxx xxx
The disquisition of the Court in Philippine National Bank v. Palma 36 is instructive, viz.:
The reliance of the court a quo on Cruz v. COA is misplaced. It was held in that case that the specific date of hiring,
October 31, 1989, had been not only arbitrarily determined by the COA, but also used as an unreasonable and
unsubstantial basis for awarding allowances to employees. The basis for the Court's ruling was not primarily the
resulting disparity in salaries received for the same work rendered but, more important, the absence of a distinction
in the law that allowed the grant of such benefits — between those hired before and those after the said date.
Thus, setting a particular date as a distinction was nullified, not because it was constitutionally infirm or was against
the "equal pay for equal work" policy of RA 6758. Rather, the reason was that the COA had acted without or in excess
of its authority in arbitrarily choosing October 31, 1989, as the cutoff date for according the allowances. It was
explained that "when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court." And for that matter, neither should the
COA. TSAHIa
In consonance with stare decisis, there should be no more misgivings about the proper application of Section 12. In
the present case, the payment of benefits to employees hired after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the
law clearly mandated that those benefits should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them
before its enactment. Withholding them from the others ensured that the compensation of the incumbents would not
be diminished in the course of the latter's continued employment with the government agency.
It bears emphasis also that in promulgating the Irene Cruz case, there was no intention on the part of the Court to
abandon its earlier ruling in PPA v. COA, et al. 37 The factual circumstances in the former case are different from
those attendant in the case of herein petitioners. In fine, the Irene Cruz case is not on all fours with the present case.
The petitioners in the former case, who were employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, were able to obtain
from the Office of the President a post facto approval or ratification of their social amelioration benefit. No such
authority granted by the Office of the President has been presented by the second category officials of the PPA.
Petitioners further invoked that the denial of their claim of 40% RATA violated their constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws. We note that the Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated
in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate. 38
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. . . . . A law is not invalid simply
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 39
As explained earlier, the different treatment accorded the second sentence (first paragraph) of Section 12 of RA
6758 to the incumbents as of 1 July 1989, on one hand, and those employees hired on or after the said date, on the
other, with respect to the grant of non-integrated benefits lies in the fact that the legislature intended to gradually
phase out the said benefits without, however, upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay and benefits. 40
The consequential outcome under Sections 12 and 17 is that if the incumbent resigns or is promoted to a higher
position, his successor is no longer entitled to his predecessor's RATA privilege or to the transition allowance. After
1 July 1989, the additional financial incentives such as RATA may no longer be given by the GOCCs with the
exemption of those which were authorized to be continued under Section 12 of RA 6758. 41
Therefore, the aforesaid provision does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it is based on
reasonable classification intended to protect the rights of the incumbents against diminution of their pay and
benefits. 42
Anent the issue of refund, we note that petitioners were referring to the RATA received by the second category
officials pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 36-89 dated 23 October 1989 and PPA Memorandum Circular
No. 46-90 dated 14 November 1990. We deem it no longer necessary to discuss this issue considering that it was
already ruled upon in the earlier PPA case and was even part of the dispositive portion 43 of the decision which
became final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no
longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect. It is essential to an effective administration of justice that
once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein should be laid to rest. 44 The arguments of petitioners
regarding this issue should have been raised in that case and not in this present petition. EAICTS
We conclude this case with the words borrowed from former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban:
During these tough economic times, this Court understands, and in fact sympathizes with, the plight of ordinary
government employees. Whenever legally possible, it has bent over backwards to protect labor and favor it with
additional economic advantages. In the present case, however, the Salary Standardization Law clearly provides that
the claimed benefits shall continue to be granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989.
Hence, much to its regret, the Court has no authority to reinvent or modify the law to extend those benefits even to
employees hired after that date. 45
305
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 August 2007 and
Resolution dated 29 February 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Aquino v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 181973, [April 17, 2013], 709 PHIL 636-652)
__________________________________
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE
BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING) BENEDICTO
CABRERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (SCULPTURE) NAPOLEON
ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO
LUZ, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR PRODUCTION DESIGN SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR
EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD, DEAN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN DANILO
SILVESTRE (UP COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO (UP COLLEGE OF MASS
COMMUNICATION), PROF. JOSE DALISAY, DR. ANTON JUAN, DR. ALEXANDER CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL
GARCIA, DR. PEDRO JUN CRUZ REYES, PROF. JOSE CLAUDIO GUERRERO, PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA,
PROF. GERARD LICO, PROF. VERNE DE LA PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE, DR.
CRISTINA PANTOJA-HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE WENDELL CAPILI, PROF. SIR ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO
DEL CASTILLO, PROF. HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF. DANTON REMOTO, PROF. PRISCELINA PATAJO-
LEGASTO, PROF. BELEN CALINGACION, PROF. AMIEL Y. LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM NADERA, PROF.
MARILYN CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ, PROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF. CLOD MARLON YAMBAO,
PROF. KENNETH JAMANDRE, PROF. JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY. F.D. NICOLAS B. PICHAY, ATTY. ROSE
BEATRIX ANGELES, MR. FERNANDO JOSEF, MS. SUSAN S. LARA, MR. ALFRED YUSON, MS. JING
PANGANIBAN-MENDOZA, MR. ROMULO BAQUIRAN, JR., MR. CARLJOE JAVIER, MS. REBECCA T.
ANONUEVO, MR. JP ANTHONY D. CUNADA, MS. LEAH NAVARRO, MR. MARK MEILLY, MR. VERGEL O.
SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA MENDOZA, MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE BELLEN, MR. ANGELO R.
LACUESTA, MS. ANNA MARIA KATIGBAK-LACUESTA, MR. LEX LEDESMA, MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS.
CARLA PACIS, MR. J. ALBERT GAMBOA, MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA BUENDIA, MR. PAOLO ALCAZAREN,
MR. ALWYN C. JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND MAGNO GARLITOS, MS. GANG BADOY, MR. LESLIE BOCOBO, MS.
FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES, MS. JANNETTE PINZON, MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS.
CAMILLE DE LA ROSA, MR. JAMES LADIORAY, MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., and CONCERNED
ARTISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (CAP), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE NATIONALCOMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS, MS. CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, MR. CARLO
MAGNO JOSE CAPARAS, 1 MR. JOSE MORENO, MR. FRANCISCO MAÑOSA, AND ALL PERSONS, PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE, ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION, CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN
RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL ARTIST AND THE RELEASE OF
FUNDS IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE HONORS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER
OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON RESPONDENTS GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, CAPARAS, MORENO AND
MAÑOSA, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Art has traditionally been viewed as the expression of everything that is true, good and beautiful. As such, it is
perceived to evoke and produce a spirit of harmony. Art is also considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of nation-
building. The notion of art and artists as privileged expressions of national culture helped shape the grand narratives
of the nation and shared symbols of the people. The artist does not simply express his/her own individual inspiration
but articulates the deeper aspirations of history and the soul of the people. 2 The law recognizes this role and views
art as something that "reflects and shapes values, beliefs, aspirations, thereby defining a
people's national identity." 3 If unduly politicized, however, art and artists could stir controversy and may even cause
discord, as what happened in this case. IEaATD
The Antecedents
History of the Order of National Artists
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1001 4 and, upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the category of
Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and
letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist.
On May 15, 1973, Proclamation No. 1144 5 was issued. It amended Proclamation No. 1001 "by creating
a National Artists Awards Committee" that would "administer the conferment of the category of National Artist" upon
deserving Filipino artists. The Committee, composed of members of the Board of Trustees of the CCP, was tasked
to "draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created
a body of work in the arts and letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so recognized."
The authority of the National Artists Awards Committee to administer the conferment of the National Artist Award was
again reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 208 6 issued on June 7, 1973.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave
it an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts
and the Filipino cultural heritage. The NCCA was tasked with the following:
Sec. 8. The Commission. — A National Commission for Culture and Arts is hereby created to formulate policies for
the development of culture and arts; implement these policies in coordination with affiliated cultural agencies;
coordinate the implementation of programs of these affiliated agencies; administer the National Endowment Fund for
Culture and Arts (NEFCA); encourage artistic creation within a climate of artistic freedom; develop and promote the
Filipino nationalculture and arts; and preserve Filipino cultural heritage. The Commission shall be an independent
agency. It shall render an annual report of its activities and achievements to the President and to Congress.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under Republic Act No. 7356 is to "extend recognition of artistic
achievement through awards, grants and services to artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to the
Filipino's cultural legacy." 7 In connection with this mandate, the NCCA is vested with the power to "advise the
President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the creation of a special decoration or award, for
persons who have significantly contributed to the development and promotion of Philippine culture and
arts." 8 AECacT
As both the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote, develop and protect the
Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies
decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award. 9 Thereafter, they reviewed the guidelines for
the nomination, selection and administration of the National Artists Award. Pursuant to their respective powers to
draft and promulgate rules, regulations and measures to guide them in their deliberations in the choice
of National Artists, the CCP and NCCA adopted the following revised guidelines in September 2007: 10
4. ADMINISTRATION OF THE AWARD
4.1. The National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) shall plan, organize and implement the Order
of National Artists in coordination with the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP).
4.2. It shall enlist the support and cooperation of private sector experts from the various fields of art to ensure that
the awards are implemented in a successful and impartial manner.
306
4.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall commission art experts to form a Special Research Group who shall 5.5.2. critical acclaim and/or reviews of their works
verify information submitted on nominees and provide essential data. They shall be selected for their specialization 5.5.3. respect and esteem from peers.
and familiarity with the works and accomplishments of nominated artists. 6. NOMINATION PROCEDURE
4.4. The Special Research Group shall be composed of ten (10) to twenty (20) members who have expertise in one 6.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations through media releases and
or more fields or disciplines. letters to qualified organizations.
4.5. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be created before or during the nomination period. It is tasked 6.2. Candidates may be nominated under one or more of the following categories:
to screen nominees and recommend to the NCCA and CCP Boards the candidates for the Order of NationalArtists. 6.2.1. Dance — choreography, direction and/or performance.
It shall be composed of highly regarded peers, scholars, (including cultural philosophers and historians), 6.2.2. Music — composition, direction, and/or performance.
academicians, researchers, art critics, and other knowledgeable individuals. A wider age-range of experts who would 6.2.3. Theater — direction, performance and/or production design.
have first-hand knowledge of achievements of nominees shall be considered. 6.2.4. Visual Arts — painting, sculpture, printmaking, photography, installation art, mixed media works, illustration,
4.6. The selection of the members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be based on the following comics/komiks, graphic arts, performance art and/or imaging. cSCTEH
criteria: acIASE 6.2.5. Literature — poetry, fiction (short story, novel and play); non-fiction (essay, journalism, literary criticism and
(a) should have achieved authority, credibility and track record in his field(s) of expertise; historical literature).
(b) should have extensive knowledge in his field(s) and his views on Philippine art and culture must be national in 6.2.6. Film and Broadcast Arts — direction, writing, production design, cinematography, editing, camera work, and/or
perspective; performance.
(c) should be a recognized authority in the study or research of Philippine art and culture; 6.2.7. Architecture, Design and Allied Arts — architecture design, interior design, industrial arts design, landscape
(d) must be willing to devote sufficient time and effort to the work of the Council; architecture and fashion design.
(e) must be willing to sign a non-disclosure statement in order to safeguard the confidentiality of the deliberations; 6.3. Nominations for the Order of National Artists may be submitted by government and non-government cultural
(f) must not have been convicted with finality of any crime by a court of justice or dismissed for cause by any organizations and educational institutions, as well as private foundations and councils.
organization, whether public or private. 6.4. Members of the Special Research Group, as well as agencies attached to the NCCA and CCP shall not submit
4.7. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be composed of a maximum of seven (7) members each of nominations.
the seven (7) areas/disciplines. The living National Artists will automatically become members in addition to 6.5. NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically
the forty-nine (49) selected members. These members will constitute the first deliberation panel and will be invited disqualified from being nominated.
to evaluate the nominations and materials submitted by the Special Research Group. 6.6. Nominations shall be accepted only when these are submitted in writing and with proper supporting
4.8. Any member of the Council of Experts who is nominated or related to a nominee up to the fourth degree of documentation, as follows:
consanguinity or affinity shall inhibit himself/herself from the deliberation process. Likewise, any member may decline 6.6.1. A cover letter signed by the head or designated representative of the nominating organization.
to participate in the deliberation for any reason or may be removed for just cause upon recommendation to the NCCA The cover letter shall be accompanied by a Board Resolution approving the nominee concerned with the said
Board by at least two thirds (2/3) of the members; in which case, the National Artist Award Secretariat shall again resolution signed by the organization President and duly certified by the Board Secretary.
select the replacements for those who decline or resigned until the first deliberation panel is completed. 6.6.2. A duly accomplished nomination form;
4.9. The list of nominated members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be reviewed by 6.6.3. A detailed curriculum vitae of the nominee;
the National Artist Award Secretariat as needed, for purposes of adding new members or replacements. 6.6.4. A list of the nominee's significant works categorized according to the criteria;
4.10. The members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall serve for a fixed term of three (3) years. 6.6.5. The latest photograph (color or black and white) of the nominee, either 5["] x 7" or 8["] x 11"; EICSTa
5. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION 6.6.6. Pertinent information materials on the nominee's significant works (on CDs, VCDs and DVDs);
The Order of National Artists shall be given to: 6.6.7. Copies of published reviews;
5.1. Living artists who are Filipino citizens at the time of nomination, as well as those who died after the establishment 6.6.8. Any other document that may be required.
of the award in 1972 but were Filipino citizens at the time of their death. ADEaHT 6.7. Nominations received beyond the announced deadline for the submission of nominations shall not be
5.2. Artists who through the content and form of their works have contributed in building a Filipino sense of considered.
nationhood. 6.8. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations through media releases.
5.3. Artists who have pioneered in a mode of creative expression or style, thus, earning distinction and making an 6.9. All inquiries and nominations shall be submitted to
impact on succeeding generations of artists. The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT
5.4. Artists who have created a substantial and significant body of works and/or consistently displayed excellence in Office of the Artistic Director
the practice of their art form thus enriching artistic expression or style. Cultural Center of the Philippines
5.5. Artists who enjoy broad acceptance through: Roxas Boulevard, 1300 Pasay City
5.5.1. prestigious national and/or international recognition, such as the Gawad CCP Para sa Sining, CCP Thirteen or
Artists Award and NCCA Alab ng Haraya
307
 The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT
Office of the Deputy Executive Director
National Commission for Culture and the Arts
633 General Luna Street, Intramuros, Manila
7. SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS
7.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall pre-screen the nominees based on technical guideline items 5.1, 6.2,
6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The pre-screening shall not be based on the accomplishments and merits of the nominee.
7.2. The Special Research Group shall accomplish its task within six (6) months. The main objective is to verify the
validity of the data, and evaluate the quality, true value and significance of works according to the criteria. It shall
come up with the updated and comprehensive profiles of nominees reflecting their most outstanding achievements.
7.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat will meet to review the list of nominees for oversights. Consequently,
deserving nominees shall be added to the list.
7.4. The first deliberation panel (Council of Experts) shall be intra-disciplinary. The panelists shall be grouped
according to their respective fields of expertise or disciplines to shortlist the nominees in their disciplines or categories
for presentation to the second deliberation panel. HEcTAI
7.5. The second deliberation panel shall be composed of a different set of experts from the first deliberation panel
[three (3) experts each of the seven (7) areas/discipline] and may include members from varying backgrounds such
as critics and academicians. The achievements of each shortlisted nominee shall be presented by one designated
member of Council of Experts. Then panel deliberates and ranks the shortlisted nominees according to the order of
precedence following the set criteria of the Order of National Artists. In extreme cases, the Second Deliberation may
add new names to the lists.
7.6. The second deliberation panel may recommend not to give award in any category if no nominee is found
deserving. The number of awardees shall also depend on the availability of funds. All decisions and
recommendations shall be in writing.
7.7. The recommendations from the Second Deliberation Panel of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall
then be presented to the joint boards of NCCA and CCP for final selection. The presentors shall prepare their
presentation in writing together with an audio-visual presentation or powerpoint presentation. Written
interpellations/opinions will be accepted from selected critics. The review shall be based on the ranking done by the
Second Deliberation. The voting shall be across disciplines. The National Artists will be given the option whether
to vote on all categories or on his/her particular discipline.
7.8. Proxy votes will not be allowed in the Selection Process. Designation of permanent representatives of agencies
should be made at the outset to make them regular Board members of NCCA and thus, may be allowed to cast votes.
7.9. The list of awardees shall be submitted to the President of the Republic of the Philippines for
confirmation, proclamation and conferral.
8. PRESENTATION OF THE AWARDS
8.1. The Order of National Artists shall not be conferred more frequently than every three (3) years.
8.2. The Order of National Artists shall be conferred by the President of the Philippines on June 11 or any appropriate
date in fitting ceremonies to be organized by the National Artist Secretariat.
8.3. The medallion of the Order of National Artists and citation shall be given to the honoree during the conferment
ceremony. The cash award of P100,000.00 in cheque shall be given immediately after the ceremony or at another
time and place as requested by the honoree. aDcHIC
8.4. A posthumous conferral consisting of the medallion and citation shall be given to the family or legal heir/s of the
honoree. The cash award of P75,000.00 in cheque shall be given to the honoree's legal heir/s or a representative
designated by the family immediately after the ceremony or at another time and place as requested by the family.
(Emphases supplied.)
In 1996, the NCCA and the CCP created a National Artist Award Secretariat composed of the
NCCA Executive Director as Chairperson, the CCP President as Vice-Chairperson, and the NCCA
Deputy Executive Director, the CCP Vice-President/Artistic Director, the NCCA National Artist Award Officer and the
CCP National Artist Award Officer as members. They also centralized with the NCCA all financial resources and
management for the administration of the NationalArtists Award. They added another layer to the selection process
to involve and allow the participation of more members of the arts and culture sector of the Philippines in the selection
of who may be proclaimed a National Artist.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, entitled Establishing the Honors Code of the
Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes, was issued.
The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of National Artists and raised to the level of a Cultural Order,
fourth in precedence among the orders and decorations that comprise the Honors of the
Philippines. 11 Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, recognizes the vital role of the NCCA and the CCP in identifying
Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters and states that the National Artist recognition is
conferred "upon the recommendation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines and the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts." 12 Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, further created a Committee on Honors to "assist the
President in evaluating nominations for recipients of Honors," 13 including the Order of National Artists, and
presidential awards. The Committee on Honors has been allowed to "authorize relevant department or government
agencies to maintain Honors and/or Awards Committees to process nominations for Honors and/or Presidential
Awards." 14 In this connection, Section 2.4 (A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations 15 of Executive Order
No. 236, s. 2003, states: TDEASC
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various awards committees in the
various units of the government service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on Honors via the
Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery shall process nominations for the
consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on Honors shall screen and recommend these
nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure that
nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there has not been an abuse
of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination meet
these criteria, a recommendation to the President for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in the highest consideration
when making the final decision on the conferment of awards. (Emphasis supplied.)
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled Amending Section 5 (IV) of Executive Order No. 236 Entitled "Establishing
the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other
Purposes" was subsequently issued on June 8, 2005. It amended the wording of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
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on the Order of National Artists and clarified that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the We respectfully suggest, subject to Her Excellency's availability, that the Proclamation be on June 11, 2009, if
conferment of the Order of National Artists." EaIcAS possible at the Malacañan Palace.
Controversy Surrounding the 2009 Thank you for your kind attention.
Order of National Artists Very respectfully yours,
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP (Sgd.)
Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the VILMA L. LABRADOR
convening of the National Artist Award Secretariat. The nomination period was set for September 2007 to December Chairman
31, 2007, which was later extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held from January National Commission for Culture and the Arts
to March 2008.16 (Sgd.)
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. 17 A total of 87 nominees 18 were considered during the NESTOR O. JARDIN
deliberation and a preliminary shortlist 19 of 32 names was compiled. President and Artistic Director Cultural Center of the Philippines 24
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed of an entirely new set of Council of Experts According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
met and shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist. 20 On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups
conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
of Commissioners and the living National Artists. 21 From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final list of four Francisco Mañosa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and
names was agreed upon. 22 The final list, according to rank, follows: invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees. 25 SIHCDA
Name Art Field/Category Number of Votes The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards, as well as on private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. Acting on this
Manuel Conde (†) Film and Broadcast Arts (Film) 26 recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009.
Ramon Santos Music 19 Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
Lazaro Francisco (†) Literature 15 Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, respectively,
as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz Visual Arts 15 July 29, 2009. 26
On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma Labrador, and the Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of
President and Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent to the President. 23 The letter stated, thus: Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that
May 6, 2009 select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining
Her Excellency GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO order) praying that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order
President of the Philippines of NationalArtists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have
Malacañang Palace, Manila been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. 27
Subject:2009 Order of National Artist Awardees In a Resolution 28 dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo order 29 enjoining "public respondents"
Dear President Arroyo: "from conferring the rank and title of the Order of National Artists on private respondents; from releasing the cash
We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the NCCA Board of Trustees and CCP Board of Trustees for awards that accompany such conferment and recognition; and from holding the acknowledgment ceremonies for
the Proclamation of the following as 2009 Order of National Artists: HCTEDa recognition of the private respondents as National Artists."
1. Mr. MANUEL CONDE† (Posthumous) — Film and Broadcast Arts What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to confer the Order of the National Artists and how should
2. Dr. RAMON SANTOS — Music it be exercised? This is the essential issue presented in this case. It will determine whether the proclamation of
3. Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO† (Posthumous) — Literature respondents as National Artists is valid. Preliminary procedural issues on the standing of the petitioners and the
4. Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ — Visual Arts propriety of the remedies taken, 30 however, call for resolution as a prerequisite to the discussion of the main
The above persons were identified by experts in the various fields of arts and culture, including living National Artists. question.
An intensive selection process was observed following established practice. In the past, awards were presented by Contention of the Parties
the President at a Ceremony held at the Malacañan Palace followed by a program called "Parangal" at the Cultural A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the petitioners reveals that they are an aggrupation of at least three groups,
Center of the Philippines. We also propose to continue with past practice of celebrating the life and works of the four the National Artists, cultural workers and academics, and the Concerned Artists of the Philippines (CAP).
(4) Order of National Artists through an exhibit that will open and a commemorative publication that will be released The NationalArtists assert an "actual as well as legal interest in maintaining the reputation of the Order
on the day of the proclamation. of National Artists." 31 In particular, they invoke their right to due process not to have the honor they have been
conferred with diminished by the irregular and questionable conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-
309
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. For petitioners, this would adversely affect their right to live a meaningful life
as it detracts not only from their right to enjoy their honor as a fruit of their lifelong labor but also from the respect of
their peers. 32 SHEIDC
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim to be Filipinos who are deeply concerned with the preservation of
the country's rich cultural and artistic heritage. As taxpayers, they are concerned about the use of public monies for
illegal appointments or spurious acts of discretion. 33
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the
results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the President's discretion to
name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP. In adding the names of respondents Caparas,
Guidote-Alvarez, Mañosa and Moreno while dropping Dr. Santos from the list of conferees, the President's own
choices constituted the majority of the awardees in utter disregard of the choices of the NCCA and the CCP and the
arts and culture community which were arrived at after a long and rigorous process of screening and deliberation.
Moreover, the name of Dr. Santos as National Artist for Music was deleted from the final list submitted by the NCCA
and the CCP Boards without clearly indicating the basis thereof. For petitioners, the President's discretion to
name National Artists cannot be exercised to defeat the recommendations made by the CCP and NCCA Boards after
a long and rigorous screening process and with the benefit of expertise and experience. The addition of four names
to the final list submitted by the Boards of the CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of one name from the said list
constituted a substitution of judgment by the President and a unilateral reconsideration without clear justification of
the decision of the First, Second and Final Deliberation Panels composed of experts. 34
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez was illegal and unethical because, as the
then Executive Director of the NCCA and presidential adviser on culture and arts, she was disqualified from even
being nominated. 35 Moreover, such action on the part of the former President constituted grave abuse of discretion
as it gave preferential treatment to respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter a National Artist despite her not
having been nominated and, thus, not subjected to the screening process provided by the rules for selection to the
Order of National Artists. Her inclusion in the list by the President represented a clear and manifest favor given by
the President in that she was exempted from the process that all other artists have to undergo. According to
petitioners, it may be said that the President used a different procedure to qualify respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This
was clearly grave abuse of discretion for being manifest and undue bias violative of the equal protection clause. 36
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning National Artists and insists that there could be no
prejudice to the latter. They remain to be National Artists and continue to receive the emoluments, benefits and other
privileges pertaining to them by virtue of that honor. On the other hand, all the other petitioners failed to show any
material and personal injury or harm caused to them by the conferment of the Order of National Artists on
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The rule on standing may not be relaxed in favor of
the petitioners as no question of constitutionality has been raised and no issue of transcendental importance is
involved. 37 DTaSIc
Respondent Caparas further argues that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are improper as the act sought to
be enjoined — the declaration of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists —
had already been consummated. In particular, respondent Caparas was already
proclaimed National Artist through Proclamation No. 1827 issued on July 6, 2009. 38
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no grave abuse of discretion attended his proclamation
as National Artist. The former President considered the respective recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards and of the Committee on Honors in eventually declaring him (Caparas) as National Artist. The function of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards is simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of National Artists is the
exclusive prerogative of the President who is not bound in any way by the recommendation of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards. The implementing rules and regulations or guidelines of the NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive
power of the President to select the recipients of the Order of National Artists. 39
For her part, in a letter 40 dated March 11, 2010, respondent Guidote-Alvarez manifested that she was waiving her
right to file her comment on the petition and submitted herself to the Court's discretion and wisdom.
Respondent Mañosa manifested that his creations speak for themselves as his contribution to Filipino cultural
heritage and his worthiness to receive the award. Nonetheless, he expressed his conviction that the Order
of National Artists is not a right but a privilege that he would willingly relinquish should he be found not worthy of it. 41
Respondent Moreno did not file any pleading despite being given several opportunities to do so. Hence, the Court
dispensed with his pleadings. 42
In a Resolution dated July 12, 2011, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda. 43 Respondent Caparas filed his memorandum on September 8, 2011, 44 the CCP filed its
memorandum on September 19, 2011, 45 respondent Mañosa on September 20, 2011, 46 and the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that it is adopting its comment as its memorandum on September 21,
2011. 47Respondent Moreno failed to file a Memorandum, hence, the Court resolved to dispense with the
same. 48 Petitioners filed their Memorandum on May 14, 2012. 49 ACIESH
On the other hand, the original position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was similar to that of respondent
Caparas. 50 In a subsequent manifestation, 51 however, the OSG stated that the current Board of Commissioners
of the NCCA agree with the petitioners that the President cannot honor as a National Artist one who was not
recommended by the joint Boards of the NCCA and the CCP. The implementing rules and regulations
of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, recognized the binding character of the recommendation of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards and limited the authority of the Committee on Honors to the determination that (1) there has been no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NCCA and the CCP Boards in making the nomination, and (2) the
nominee is in good standing. Where a nomination meets the said two criteria, a recommendation to the President to
confer the award shall be made. 52
The OSG further argued that, while the President exercises control over the NCCA and the CCP, the President has
the duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the NCCA-CCP guidelines for selection of National Artists and the
implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003. Moreover, the laws recognize the expertise of the NCCA
and the CCP in the arts and tasked them to screen and select the artists to be conferred the Order of National Artists.
Their mandate is clear and exclusive as no other agency possesses such expertise. 53
The OSG also assailed the former President's choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez for being contrary to Republic
Act No. 7356. 54 Section 11 of the said law provides:
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. — During his/her term as member of the Commission, a Commissioner shall not
be eligible for any grant, or such other financial aid from the Commission as an individual: Provided, however, That
he/she may compete for grants and awards on the same level as other artists one (1) year after his/her term shall
have expired.
The omission of the word "award" in the first portion of the above provision appears to be unintentional as shown by
the proviso which states that a member may compete for grants and awards only one year after his or her term shall
have expired. As such, respondent Guidote-Alvarez is restricted and disqualified from being conferred the 2009 Order
of National Artists. 55
The Court's Ruling
Standing of the Petitioners
Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for
adjudication. 56 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
310
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 57 TCDHIc
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal
interest. They must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer
thereby in some indefinite way. They must show that they have been or are about to be denied some right or privilege
to which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of. 58
In this case, we find that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege to which they are entitled
as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in
the Order of National Artists.
In accordance with Section 2 (a) 59 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, the Order of National Artists is "an exclusive
association of honored individuals." To ensure the exclusivity of the membership in the Order, a rigid nomination and
screening process has been established with different sets of renowned artists and respected art critics invited to sit
as the Council of Experts for the First and Second Deliberation Panels. Moreover, all living National Artists are given
a voice on who should be included in their exclusive club as they automatically become members of the Final
Deliberation Panel that will vote on who should be included in the final list to be submitted to the President for
conferment of the Order of National Artists. To allow the untrammeled discretion and authority of the President to
confer the Order of National Artists without regard to the stringent screening and rigorous selection process
established by the NCCA and the CCP will diminish, if not negate, the exclusive nature of the said Order. It will unduly
subject the selection and conferment of the Order of National Artists to politics rather than to principles and
procedures. It will subvert the transparent and rigorous process and allow entry to the exclusive Order
of National Artists through a secret backdoor of lobbying, back channeling and political accommodation.
Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and substantial interest. Like
respondents Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, he was among the 87 nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists.
Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was
not considered by the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President.
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being
the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Mañosa and Caparas did not make it to the
preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were
treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the
NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former President
effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as a preferred class. The special
treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno fails to pass rational
scrutiny. 60 No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would
justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional
position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and
well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot
claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, 61 he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that
honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abad's right to equal protection, an interest that is
substantial enough to confer him standing in this case. ADHcTE
As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim of deep concern for the
preservation of the country's rich cultural and artistic heritage, while laudable, falls short of the injury in fact
requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a generalized grievance shared in a substantially equal measure
by all or a large class of citizens. 62 Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve
any illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayer's suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of the Congress. 63
Nonetheless, as a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced an issue which deserves the attention of this
Court in view of its seriousness, novelty and weight as precedent, it behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing
and to resolve the issue presented before it. 64 Moreover, this issue is of paramount interest, 65 which further
justifies a liberal stance on standing.
Propriety of the Remedies
The present action is a petition for prohibition, certiorari, injunction, restraining order and all other legal, just and
equitable reliefs.
It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to
restrain an act that is already fait accompli. 66 Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined has already been
accomplished or consummated, prohibition or injunction becomes moot. 67
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its merits for the future guidance
of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." 68
It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster, 69 a teacher in a
vital national seminar. 70 There are times when the controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence
and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case. 71 This is one such
case. More than being a teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in
the manner that is being assailed in this case. 72 If not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the
central question involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every President may invoke absolute
presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after his or her own heart, in total disregard of the advise
of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation
and uproar from the artists and the public.
Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and dangerous precedent whereby those in the
corridors of power could avoid judicial intervention and review by merely speedily and stealthily completing the
commission of an illegality. 73 TEIHDa
In any event, the present petition is also for certiorari and there is no procedural bar for the Court to pass upon the
question of whether the proclamations of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno
as NationalArtists were attended by grave abuse of presidential discretion.
Limits of the President's Discretion
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of the NCCA Board of Commissioners with respect to the
conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear. They jointly administer the said award and, upon their
recommendation or advice, the President confers the Order of National Artists.
To "recommend" and to "advise" are synonymous. To "recommend" is "to advise or counsel." 74 To "advise" is "to
give an opinion or counsel, or recommend a plan or course of action; also to give notice. To encourage, inform or
acquaint."75 "Advise" imports that it is discretionary or optional with the person addressed whether he will act on
such advice or not. 76 This has been clearly explained in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma: 77
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or may not adopt the
recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP
is subject to the President's discretion.
311
Nevertheless, the President's discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP (4) extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services to artists and cultural
Boards meaningless. groups which contribute significantly to the Filipino's cultural legacy;
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. xxx xxx xxx
In its classic formulation, "discretion is not unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within banks that keep it from Sec. 13. Powers and Functions. — To carry out its mandate, the Commission shall exercise the following powers
overflowing." 78 and functions:
The President's power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution xxx xxx xxx
prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President: (j) advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the creation of a special
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure decoration or award, for persons who have significantly contributed to the development and promotion of Philippine
that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied.) cSaCDT culture and arts;
The President's discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with (k) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any and all measures as may be necessary to implement
the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation this Act[.] (Emphases supplied.)
imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. 79 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of the National Artist Award, the
cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. 80 This is precisely NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the
why the law provides that "[a]dministrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration of the National Artist Award, created
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." 81 a National Artist Award Secretariat, centralized all financial resources and management for the administration of
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with the conferment of the the National Artist Award, and added another layer to the selection process so that more members of the arts and
Order of National Artists by executive issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. culture sector of the Philippines may be involved and participate in the selection of National Artists.
208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. 82 Thus, the
constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and
the category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the rules to guide its the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are
deliberations in the choice of National Artists": binding upon executive and administrative agencies, 83 including the President himself/herself as chief executor of
Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, creating the Award and Decoration of National Artist, is hereby laws. In this connection, Section 2.5 (A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations 84 of Executive Order No. 236,
amended by creating a National Artists Awards Committee, hereinafter to administer the conferment of the s. 2003 provides: ADaEIH
category of National Artist upon those deserving thereof. The Committee, which shall be composed of 2.5: General Guidelines for Awards Committees
members of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines, shall organize itself immediately A. National Orders of Cultural and Scientific Merit
and shall draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who The existing modalities of the NCCA for selecting recipients for the Order of National Artists, and the Gawad
have created a body of work in the arts and in letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so recognized. sa Manlilikha ng Bayan, and of the NAST for selecting recipients of the Order of National Scientists, shall remain in
(Emphases supplied.) force. (Emphases supplied.)
The authority of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee was reiterated in Presidential Section 2.4 (A) of the same implementing rules further states:
Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973. 2.4: Awards Committees
The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee has been recognized There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various awards committees in the
under Republic Act No. 7356: various units of the government service.
Sec. 18. The National Cultural Agencies. — The [NCCA] shall coordinate with the national cultural agencies including A. The Committee on Honors
but not limited to the Cultural Center of the Philippines, the Institute of Philippine Languages, the National Historical The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the following:
Institute, the National Library, the National Museum, the Records Management and Archives Office. However, they The Executive Secretary, Chairman
shall continue operating under their respective charters or as provided by law where provisions therein are The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. They shall serve as the national repository and/or showcase, as Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
the case may be, of the best of Philippine culture and arts. For this purpose, these agencies shall submit periodic Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
reports, including recommendations to the [NCCA]. (Emphasis supplied.) TAaIDH Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
On the other hand, the NCCA has been given the following mandate in connection with the conferment of cultural or Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
arts awards: All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on Honors via the
Sec. 12. Mandate. — The Commission is hereby mandated to formulate and implement policies and plans in Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery shall process nominations for the
accordance with the principles stated in Title 1 of this Act. consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on Honors shall screen and recommend these
(a) To encourage the continuing and balanced development of a pluralistic culture by the people themselves, it shall: nominations to the President.
xxx xxx xxx
312
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure that free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and
nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there has not been an abuse processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination meet Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with
these criteria, a recommendation to the President for conferment shall be made. grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in the highest consideration While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno
when making the final decision on the conferment of awards. (Emphasis supplied.) as National Artists, such action should not be taken as a pronouncement on whether they are worthy to be conferred
Pursuant to the above provision of the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, the authority of the that honor. Only the President, upon the advise of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, may determine that. The Court
Committee on Honors is limited to determining whether the nominations submitted by a particular awards committee, simply declares that, as the former President committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826
in this case, the joint NCCA and CCP Boards, have been tainted by abuse of discretion, and whether the nominees to 1829 dated July 6, 2009, the said proclamations are invalid. However, nothing in this Decision should be read as
are in good standing. Should the nominations meet these two criteria, the Committee on Honors shall make a a disqualification on the part of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno to be considered for
recommendation to the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists. AECcTS the honor of National Artist in the future, subject to compliance with the laws, rules and regulations governing said
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully award.
enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009
the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa, and Jose Moreno,
considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and recommended by the respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the discretion.
NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to SO ORDERED.
the instant case, the former President could not have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, ||| (Almario v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, [July 16, 2013], 714 PHIL 127-171)
Mañosa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only
will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the
NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists,
draft the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and undertake
any and all necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who was the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time,
the Guidelines expressly provides:
6. 5NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically
disqualified from being nominated. 85
Respondent Guidote-Alvarez could not have even been nominated, hence, she was not qualified to be considered
and conferred the Order of National Artists at that time. The President's discretion on the matter does not extend to
removing a legal impediment or overriding a legal restriction.
From the foregoing, the advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards as to the conferment of the
Order of National Artists on Conde, Dr. Santos, Francisco and Alcuaz was not binding on the former President but
only discretionary or optional for her whether or not to act on such advice or recommendation. Also, by virtue of the
power of control, the President had the authority to alter or modify or nullify or set aside such recommendation or
advice. It was well within the President's power and discretion to proclaim all, or some or even none of the
recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA Boards, without having to justify his or her action. Thus, the exclusion of
Santos did not constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former President.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno was
an entirely different matter. cCSDaI
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or
(2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 86
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution 87 when the former President gave
preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The former President's
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the
CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a
313
 Office of the Clerk of Court and Stenographer Isabel Siwa YNARES-SANTIAGO,
of Branch 16, all of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila. CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
November 19, 2008

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel A.M. No. P-08-2519

Morales, (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P)
Before the Court are two anonymous complaints: docketed as A.M. No. P-08-2519 charging Atty. Miguel
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Morales (Atty. Morales), Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila of misconduct;
and A.M. No. P-08-2520 charging Atty. Morales, together with Isabel Siwa (Siwa), Court Stenographer, Branch 16;
Trial Court of Manila
William Calda (Calda), Administrative Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC); Amie Grace Arreola (Arreola),
And Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 4, and Atty. Henry P. Favorito (Atty. Favorito), Clerk of Court VI, OCC, all of the MeTC,

Anonymous Letter-Complaint A.M. No. P-08-2520 Manila of misconduct, graft and corruption and moonlighting.
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P)
against Clerk of Court Atty. Henry P. Favorito of the A.M. No. P-08-2519
Office of the Clerk of Court, Clerk of Court Atty. Miguel Present:
Morales of Branch 17, Clerk of Court Amie Grace Arreola
of Branch 4, Administrative Officer III William Calda of the PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
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In an unsigned and undated letter which the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received on February 24, 2005, Parenthetically, Atty. Favorito, together with more than a hundred employees of the MeTC Manila, wrote
the writers, who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC of Manila, allege that Atty. Morales, then detailed at the
an undated letter to Chief Justice Davide assailing the spot investigation conducted by DCA Dela Cruz.ix[9] Said
OCC, was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, such as administrative cases against
employees in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The writers aver that Atty. Moraless conduct letter was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide to DCA Dela Cruz on March 28, 2005 for his comment.x[10] No comment
has demoralized them and they resorted to filing an anonymous complaint in fear of retaliation from Atty. Morales.i[1]
can be found in the records of herein administrative cases.
Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) now Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. dela Cruz,
In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now
conducted a discreet investigation on March 8, 2005 to verify the allegations of the complaint. However, since the
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) directed Atty. Morales to comment on the undated anonymous letter-
office of Atty. Morales was located at the innermost section of the Docket/Appeals Section of the OCC, DCA Dela
complaint.xi[11]
Cruz failed to extensively make an observation of the actuations of Atty. Morales. On March 16, 2005, a spot
investigation was conducted by DCA Dela Cruz together with four NBI agents, a crime photographer and a support
staff. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty. Morales and print two documents stored in its hard
drive, a Petition for Relief from Judgment for the case entitled, Manolo N. Blanquera, et al. v. Heirs of Lamberto N.
In his Manifestation which the OCA received on April 27, 2005, Atty. Morales alleged that: the anonymous
Blanquera in the name of Atty. Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr. (Atty. Icaonapo) filed with the Court of Appeals, and a Pre-trial
letter-complaint should not have been given due course as there is no truth to the allegations therein; the OCA took
Brief for the case entitled, Pentacapital Investment Corp. v. Toyoharu Aoki, et al. also in the name of Atty. Icaonapo,
almost a year to act on the anonymous letter-complaint which did not have the proper indorsement from the Office
which was filed before Branch 1, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. Atty. Morales's computer was seized and taken
of the Chief Justice; even though he brought to the OCC his personal computer, such act is not prohibited; he did not
to the custody of the OCA.ii[2] Upon Atty. Morales's motion however, the Court ordered the release of said computer
use his computer to write pleadings during office hours and neither did he use paper of the OCC; the raid conducted
with an order to the Management Information Systems Office of the Supreme Court to first retrieve the files stored
by DCA Dela Cruz without search and seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles seized therewith
therein.iii[3]
should be considered inadmissible.xii[12]

Atty. Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. against DCA
Dela Cruz and his companions for alleged conspiracy and culpable violation of Secs. 1,iv[4] 2v[5] & 3vi[6] of Art. III
of the Constitution relative to the spot investigation. Said letter-complaint was indorsed by the Chief Justice to the In a letter dated April 12, 2005, Atty. Morales applied for optional retirementxiii[13] which the Court
Court Administrator on March 31, 2005 for appropriate action.vii[7] Atty. Morales's wife, Francisca Landicho-Morales approved in its Resolution dated October 12, 2005 subject to the withholding of his benefits pending resolution of
also filed a letter-complaint dated February 15, 2005 against Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of MeTC cases against him, the instant case included.xiv[14]
Branch 16 Manila, Lenin Bravo, former Clerk of the said branch and Judge Cristina Javalera-Sulit, Presiding Judge
of MeTC Branch 18, Manila for violations of the law and ethical standards which was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide A.M. No. P-08-2520
to the Court Administrator for preliminary inquiry.viii[8] Although diligent efforts were made to ascertain from the OCA
Legal Office the current status of Atty. Morales's case against DCA Dela Cruz, the same however, could not be In another unsigned letter dated April 1, 2004, the writers who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC,

determined. Manila, charge Atty. Morales, Arreola, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Siwa of the following offenses: Atty. Morales and
Arreola, who are both detailed in the OCC, leave the office after logging-in only to return in the afternoon, which acts
are allowed by Atty. Favorito; Atty. Morales and Arreola were not given assignments and whenever they are at the

315
office, they do nothing but play computer games; Siwa is also allowed by Atty. Favorito to lend money and rediscount
checks during office hours using court premises; many people from different offices go to the OCC because of the
business of Siwa; Atty. Favorito also allows two of Siwa's personal maids to use the OCC as their office in
rediscounting checks; and Atty. Favorito and Calda charge P50.00 to P500.00 from sureties claiming said amounts
to be processing fees without issuing receipts therefor.xv[15]
In the same spot investigation conducted by DCA De La Cruz on March 16, 2005, a partly hidden plastic
box was discovered containing the amount of P65,390.00 and six commercial checks, which Siwa voluntarily opened
to the team. These were also confiscated and turned over to the custody of the OCA.xvi[16]
In a letter to then Chief Justice Davide dated April 12, 2005, Siwa requested that said money and personal
belongings that were confiscated be returned to her immediately and that a formal investigation be conducted
regarding DCA Dela Cruz's conduct during the spot investigation.xvii[17] The seized items were later returned to
Siwaxviii[18] while her letter-complaint was indorsed by the Chief Justice to the Court Administrator on April 18, 2005
for appropriate action.xix[19] As with the complaint filed by Atty. Morales, however, the status of Siwa's complaint
could not be ascertained despite diligent efforts at inquiring about the matter from the OCA Legal Office.
In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, the OCA directed Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda, Arreola
and Siwa to comment on the letter-complaint.xx[20]
Atty. Morales submitted the same Manifestation he submitted in A.M. P-08-2519.
Siwa in her Comment avers that: the anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due course
as it contravened Sec. 46(c) of Executive Order No. 292 and the implementing rules; it was not subscribed and sworn
to by the complainant and there is no obvious truth to the allegations therein; while she admits that she is involved in
the business of rediscounting checks, such is a legitimate endeavor, in fact, there are other employees of the court
engaged in the same business; she is also not aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in said endeavor; she
does not use the OCC to conduct her business and she is mindful of her duties as a government employee; thus,
she has a staff to do the encashment of the checks; there were rare occasions when her staff members were stationed
at the corridors to lend cash to employees but while said occasions may have occurred during office hours, her staff
cannot be blamed for the same since the employees go to them; she has never neglected her duty as a court
stenographer -- in fact, her last performance rating was very satisfactory; it is a known fact that because of the meager
pay given to government employees, most augment their income by engaging in business; she should not be singled
out for being enterprising and industrious; and it is unfair to accuse her of wrongdoing at a time when she has
voluntarily retired from government service due to health reasons.xxi[21]
A month after the incident, Siwa filed for optional retirementxxii[22] which the Court approved in its
Resolutionxxiii[23] dated October 12, 2005, with the proviso that the amount of P30,000.00 shall be retained from
the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the present case.
Calda explains in his letter dated April 25, 2005 that: the fees of P50.00 and P500.00 were charged in
connection with the filing of surety and cash bonds pursuant to Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court and that
corresponding official receipts were issued; at nighttime, he is the one authorized to approve the filing of surety bonds
since he is the highest ranking officer of a skeletal force detailed for night court duty; he has been with the MeTC for
16 years, rose in rank, was never involved in any controversy and would never tarnish his reputation.xxiv[24]
Arreola asserts that: her record of arrival and departure was always signed by her superiors without
question because it reflected the correct entries; she is always in the office even when there is typhoon; and she has
proven herself useful in the OCC by answering queries of litigants and verifications from other offices and attending
to complaints.
In compliance, Atty. Favorito adopted the comments of Atty. Morales, Calda and Arreola and denied that
he committed the acts alluded to in the anonymous letter-complaint.xxv[26] Atty. Favorito also incorporated in his
comment a letter of the employees of the OCC-MTC Manila disowning the alleged anonymous complaint.xxvi[27]
In a Resolution dated July 27, 2005, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, consolidated the two
complaints and referred the same to the Executive Judge of the MeTC, Manila for investigation, report and
316
recommendation.xxvii[28]
Report of the Investigating Judge
In her Report dated September 1, 2006, MeTC Executive Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta
states that discreet observation of the daily working activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa could no longer be done as
the two had already availed themselves of their optional retirement; thus, random interviews with employees who
had proximate working activities with them were resorted to, as well as perusal of court records.
The following employees were interviewed: Rueben Duque, Clerk of Court, Branch 16, MeTC; Beneluz
Dumlao, Records Officer I; Marilou Magbag, Clerk III; Estrella Rafael, Records Officer I; Lydia dela Cruz, Records
Officer III; Raymundo Bilbao, Clerk III; Marie Joy Valle, Clerk IV, and Ma. Lizabeth Marcelino, Administrative Officer
II, all of the OCC; Rosie Jose, freelance bondswoman, and Norberto D. Soriano, authorized representative of the
Commonwealth Insurance Company.xxviii[30]
After conducting her investigation, Judge Estoesta found:
Insofar as Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola are concerned, the investigation immediately
stumbled into a dead end. No one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and
positive statement affirming the charges against the said personnel. While almost all confirmed that Atty. Morales
maintained his own computer and printer at the OCC, nobody could state for certain that what he worked on were
pleadings for private cases. Rafael, who was seated right next to Atty. Morales at the OCC merely said that what
preoccupied Atty. Morales were his own administrative cases. She did not notice Atty. Morales engage in private
work in his computer although she saw Atty. Icaonapo drop by the office every now and then to personally see Atty.
Morales. Rafael explained however that this could be because Atty. Icaonapo was the counsel of Atty. Morales in his
administrative cases. While documents referring to private cases were found in the hard drive of the computer of
Atty. Morales, and while the writing style is similar to that of the Manifestation he filed in this case, still no definite
conclusion could be drawn that he has composed the said pleadings at the OCC during official working hours. A
close examination of the Pre-Trial Brief signed by Atty. Icaonapo and filed with the RTC Branch 1, Manila also
revealed that the paper and the printer used were not the same as that used in the office of Atty. Morales.
There was also no evidence to support charges of extortion against Atty. Favorito and Calda. Two
bondsmen who were randomly interviewed denied that Atty. Favorito and Calda exacted illegal sums from them. The
amounts they charged could actually refer to legal fees.
As to Arreola, the charge against her also has no basis. The interviewees were unanimous in saying that
Arreola was always around the office, and that while she fetched her son from a nearby school, she did so during
lunch or after office hours. Random checks on Arreola also revealed that she was always at the OCC and at Branch
30 where she was reassigned.
As to Siwa, she candidly admitted that she was engaged in lending and discounting activities at her station,
through her own staff which she had maintained for said purpose. Because of her business, a number of employees,
even those from other government agencies, usually huddled at her station to hold transactions. Branch Clerk of
Court Ruben Duque relates that a number of people would often go to their office looking for Siwa for lending and
rediscounting. Assuming that Siwa is not prohibited from engaging in said business, still it has distracted her from
her duties as a stenographer. A random check on the court records of Branch 16 showed that Siwa had not yet
submitted a complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases, 3 of which already had decisions rendered. In
one case, the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken to fill in the gap which not only wasted
precious time of the court but also distressed the efforts of the prosecution in the presentation of its case.xxix[34]
Judge Estoesta recommended as follows:
1. In OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2519], with no substantial evidence taken
to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales,
it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered dismissed;
2. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-2520], likewise, with no substantial evidence
taken to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C.
Morales, Atty. Henry P. Favorito, William Calda and Amie Grace Arreola, it is
RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered dismissed insofar as said court employees are
concerned; and
3. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2520] insofar as it concerns Ms. Isabel Siwa,
it is RECOMMENDED that she be directed to explain why she still has stenographic notes
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 pending for transcription despite having already availed of an optional retirement pay.xxx[35]
The report was referred to the OCA for its evaluation, report and recommendation.
OCA Report and Recommendation
The OCA, through ACA Antonio H. Dujua, in its November 7, 2007 Memorandum, states that it does not
entirely concur with the findings and recommendation of Judge Estoesta.
Instead the OCA submits the following findings.
On Atty. Morales: The allegation that Atty. Morales had been using his personal computer to draft
pleadings for private counsels was established in the spot inspection on March 16, 2005. The hard drive of Atty.
Moraless computer yielded a pre-trial brief and a petition for relief from judgment with the name of Atty. Icaonapo.
The said pre-trial brief was the same pleading that was submitted to RTC Branch 1, Manila by Atty. Icaonapo on
February 10, 2003. Atty. Morales in his Manifestation dated April 25, 2005 failed to refute the evidence that emanated
from his computer and instead chided the OCA for confiscating the same.
On Siwa: While she insisted that the anonymous letter should not have been given due course, she
admitted in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation to being involved in the business of rediscounting checks, claiming that
she was not the only employee engaged in the same, and that she maintained her own personnel to do the
rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC where Atty. Favorito is the Clerk of Court.xxxi[37]
The OCA concluded that: Atty. Morales and Siwa should be found guilty of gross misconduct. Atty. Morales,
for preparing pleadings for private counsels and litigants; and Siwa, for engaging in the business of rediscounting
checks during office hours; gross misconduct carries the penalty of dismissal from the service even for the first
offense, and while Atty. Morales and Siwa have already left the judiciary, the Court can still direct the forfeiture of
their benefits; Atty. Favorito should also be held liable for neglect of duty because as Clerk of Court of the MeTC-
OCC, he was negligent in allowing the nefarious activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa to happen right inside the
confines of the MeTC-OCC.
On Arreola and Calda: The OCA agrees with Judge Estoesta that the charges against them should be
dismissed for lack of concrete evidence.xxxii[39]
The OCA then recommended:
(a) That (resigned) Clerk of Court Miguel C. Morales, Branch 17, and (retired) Court
Stenographer Isabel A. Siwa, Branch 16, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila
be found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct with forfeiture of the benefits due them
excluding accrued leave credits;
(b) That Clerk of Court Henry P. Favorito of the MeTC-OCC, Manila be found GUILTY of
Simple Neglect of Duty and suspended without pay for a period of one (1) month and
one (1) day, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely; and
(c) That the charges made in the April 1, 2004 anonymous letter against Clerk of Court
Amie Grace A. Arreola, Branch 4 and Administrative Officer III William Calda, OCC,
both of the MeTC, Manila be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Court's Ruling.
The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA with some modifications
An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown
author. Such a complaint, however does not justify outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for the
allegations therein may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other
competent evidence. Indeed, complainants identity would hardly be material where the matter involved is of public
interest.
Liability of Atty. Morales.
The two anonymous letters charge Atty. Morales with the following offenses: attending to personal cases
while using official time, office supplies, equipment and utilities, leaving the office after logging-in in the morning only
to return in the afternoon, and playing computer games whenever he was at the office.
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 It is undisputed that pleadings for private cases were found in Atty. Morales's personal computer in the
MeTC-OCC and Atty. Morales could not provide any satisfactory explanation therefor. Such fact, by itself, could
already make Atty. Morales liable for simple misconduct for it hints of impropriety on his part. The Court has always
stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their
duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the integrity
and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved.xxxiii[42]
Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal computer which
DCA Dela Cruz confiscated without any valid search and seizure order, such evidence should be considered as the
fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.
Both the Investigating Justice and the OCA failed to discuss this matter. The Court however finds it proper
to squarely address such issue, without prejudice to the outcome of the administrative case filed by Atty. Morales
against DCA Dela Cruz regarding the same incident. The finding of guilt or exoneration of Atty. Morales hinges on
this very crucial question: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the present
administrative case against him?
The Court answers in the negative.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof.xxxiv[43] The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of such right.xxxv[44] The fact that the present case is administrative in nature does not render the above
principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals,xxxvi[45] any violation of the aforestated
constitutional right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There are exceptions to this rule one of which is consented warrantless search.
DCA Dela Cruz in his report claims that that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent
of Atty. Morales.xxxvii[47] The Court finds however that such allegation on his part, even with a similar allegation
from one of his staff,xxxviii[48] is not sufficient to make the present case fall under the category of a valid warrantless
search.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.xxxix[49] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.xl[50] The burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given
lies with the State.xli[51] Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.xlii[52] To
constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.xliii[53]
In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right.
While he may have agreed to the opening of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the presence
of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the March 16, 2005 spot investigation, it is also of record
that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons questioning the validity of the
investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee,
unfortunately, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right.
As the Court has staunchly declared:
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes
meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution,
occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental
power.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy
of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is
protected by the due process clause. This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted
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 freedom advocates, the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the
foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist, and
the right to enjoyment of life while existing.
xxxx
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against
which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to
search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may
be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government
And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer
of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court has no choice but to dismiss the charges herein against
him for insufficiency of evidence.
Liability of Siwa.
The Court agrees with the OCA that Siwa should be administratively disciplined for engaging in the
business of lending and rediscounting checks.
Siwa admits engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks, claiming that it was a legitimate
endeavor needed to augment her meager income as a court employee; that she is not aware of any rule prohibiting
her from engaging in the business of rediscounting checks; that there are other employees engaged in the same
business; and that she employs her own staff to do the encashment of the checks as she always attends to and
never neglects her duties as a stenographer.xliv[55]
Siwa is clearly mistaken.
Officials and employees of the judiciary are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession even outside office hours to ensure that full-time officers of the court render full-time service
so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases.xlv[56] The nature
of work of court employees requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility and the
entire time of judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to government service to ensure efficient and speedy
administration of justice.xlvi[57] Indeed, the Court has always stressed that court employees must strictly observe
official time and devote every second moment of such time to public service.xlvii[58] And while the compensation
may be meager, that is the sacrifice judicial employees must be willing to take.
As pronounced by the Court in Biyaheros Mart Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr.:
Government service demands great sacrifice. One who cannot live with the modest
salary of a public office has no business staying in the service. He is free to seek greener pastures
elsewhere. The public trust character of the office proscribes him from employing the facilities or
using official time for private business or purposes.xlviii[59]
Siwa's offense is compounded by the fact that she was previously verbally instructed by her superior, MeTC
Branch 16 Presiding Judge Crispin B. Bravo, to stop using court premises for her business. But she ignored the
same, prompting the latter to issue a written Memorandum dated January 18, 2005 asking her to explain why she
was still using the office in transacting/attending to her lending and rediscounting business when she was already
verbally instructed to desist therefrom in December 2004.xlix[60]
Siwa apologized and promised not to let it happen again, in her letter dated January 21, 2005.l[61] Siwa
also admitted that she was using her house-helper in the rediscounting of checks and allowed the latter to use the
court premises in the conduct of the same.li[62]
Her allegation that she never neglected her duty as a stenographer is also belied by the findings of the
Investigating Judge, who in her random check of records, discovered that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete
transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases (3 criminal and 2 civil cases), in three of which decisions were already
rendered.lii[63] In one case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken.liii[64] Thus, contrary to
Siwa's assertion, she was not able to satisfactorily perform her duties as a court stenographer while engaging in
private business.
320

Her argument that her business is a legal endeavor also cannot excuse her from liability. Many moonlighting
activities pertain to legal acts that otherwise would be countenanced if the actors were not employed in the public
sector. And while moonlighting is not normally considered a serious misconduct, nonetheless, by the very nature of
the position held, it amounts to a malfeasance in office.liv[65]
Siwa conducted her business within the court's premises, which placed the image of the judiciary, of which
she is part, in a bad light. Time and again, the Court has held that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the
conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat; thus the conduct of a person serving the judiciary
must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum, and be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the
respect of the public for the judiciary.lv[66]
Siwa's infraction constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which, under Sec. 52 A
(20) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, carries the penalty of suspension
of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Since this is her first offense
and considering the October 12, 2005 Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 12096-Ret. which approved Siwa's
application for optional retirement, retaining only the amount of P30,000.00 from the money value of her earned leave
credits pending resolution of the instant case, the Court finds she should be imposed the penalty of fine in the amount
of P30,000.00.
Liability of Atty. Favorito.
There is no evidence to show that Atty. Favorito knows or should have known that Atty. Morales had copies
of pleadings for private cases in his personal computer for which Atty. Favorito could be held liable for neglect of duty
as supervisor. As to Siwa's lending and rediscounting activities, however, the Court finds that Atty. Favorito was
remiss in addressing said matter which activity took place in the court's premises which was under his responsibility.
Clarifications, however, should be made.
The OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 stated that:
x x x in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation, Siwa admitted to being involved in the business of
rediscounting checks, claiming that 'she is not the only employee engaged in the same business.'
Respondent [Siwa] even had the audacity to admit that she 'maintained my own personnel' to do
the rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, where respondent Favorito
is the Clerk of Court.lvi[67] (Emphasis supplied)
A review of the records, however, would show that what Siwa submitted is not a Manifestation but a
Comment dated April 28, 2005 and there, instead of stating that her rediscounting activities stretched to the premises
of the MeTC-OCC, she actually denied that she used the OCC to conduct said business. Pertinent portions of said
Comment reads:
4.1. Respondent admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks x x x.
xxxx
4.2. Respondent, however, denies that she uses the Office of the Clerk of Court to conduct
this business x x x.
321

4.3. There are other occasions when the said staff will be stationed at the corridors to lend
emergency cash to employees in need. The said occasions may have occurred during
office hours, for which, the respondent's staff may not be blamed since it was the
employees themselves who go to them. However, these instances were rare. It should
also be emphasized that these transactions occurred outside of the offices and within the
common or public areas.lvii[68] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Siwa never admitted that her business stretched to the premises of the OCC-MeTC but only claimed that her
staff used corridors which were common or public areas for their transactions.
Still, Atty. Favorito failed to address such matter and to prevent such activities from taking place, even if
they were conducted in the corridors, since such areas are still part of the court's premises. As Clerk of Court of the
OCC, it is Atty. Favorito's duty to plan, direct, supervise and coordinate the activities of all divisions/sections/units in
the OCC.lviii[69] He should therefore be reprimanded for his failure to duly supervise and prevent such activities from
happening within his area of responsibility.
Liability of Atty. Favorito and Calda on the extortion charges.
On the claim that Atty. Favorito and Caldo extorted money from sureties without issuing receipts therefor,
the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the Investigating Judge and the OCA.
Investigating Judge Estoesta found that:
x x x the charges of extortion levelled against Atty. Henry P. Favorito and Mr. William
Calda x x x suffered from loose ends.
Random interviews with two (2) bondsmen denied that Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda
exacted such amounts.
The P50.00 and P500.00 specified to as processing fee could actually refer to the Legal
Fees mandated under Section 8 (o) and Section 21 (c) of Rule 141, as follows x x x
Here, it is obvious that the anonymous letter-complainant has no understanding
whatsoever of the legal fees charged by Office of the Clerk of Court.
This actually hints of the fact that said anonymous letter-complainant may not be a
personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court after all.
The extortion charge slapped against Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda, therefore, rings
empty.lix
Such finding was affirmed by the OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 which recommended
the dismissal of said charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda for lack of concrete proof.lx[71]
Liability of Arreola on absence during office hours.
As with the extortion charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to
hold Arreola administratively liable.
As reported by Judge Estoesta:
x x x the charge against Ms. Amie Grace Arreola regarding her habit of leaving the
office after logging-in found no concrete corroboration.
The interviewees were actually unanimous in saying that Ms. Arreola was not prone to
such habit as she is always around the office. Ms. Arreola may have been known to fetch her
son at a nearby school but she has always done so during lunch hours and after office hours.
As a matter of fact, at a time when the MeTC was stricken by a debilitating brown-out
schedule in the afternoon sometime [in] July 2006, Ms. Arreola was still around, having been one
of the skeletal force who volunteered to stay on. The undersigned has personally seen her around
5:30 p.m. of the same day.
As a matter of fact, several random checks on Ms. Arreola by the undersigned herself
revealed that she has always been around at the OCC and at Branch 30 where she was re-
assigned as Branch Clerk of Court. At times, personal visits were made, interspersed by
telephone calls between 8:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. where Ms. Arreola proved herself to be always
at the office.
Needless to say, therefore, the charge against Ms. Arreola is certainly without basis.lxi
322
 The OCA agreed with the said finding and likewise recommended the dismissal of the charges against
Arreola.lxii
It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
That is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, what will prevail is that respondent has regularly performed his
or her duties.lxiii[74] Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative
complaint with no leg to stand on, and charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.lxiv[75]
Since there is no proof, apart from the allegations of the letter-complaint, to hold Atty. Favorito, Calda and
Arreola liable for the afore- stated charges against them, the Court deems it proper to dismiss said charges for lack
of merit.
Other matters.
In view of the initial findings of Investigating Judge Estoesta that Siwa was remiss in her duty of transcribing
stenographic notes assigned to her, the OCA is hereby directed to conduct an audit investigation on Siwa's
transcription of stenographic notes to determine the full extent of the notes she failed to transcribe on time. If
warranted, such matter shall be treated as a separate case to be given a new docket number and assigned to another
ponente for evaluation.
The OCA should also report on the status of the complaint filed by Atty. Morales which the Court received
on March 31, 2005, the complaint of Isabel Siwa dated April 12, 2005, and the letter-complaint of Atty. Favorito
together with other MeTC employees which the Court received on March 28, 2005, against DCA Dela Cruz, regarding
the spot investigation conducted on March 16, 2005 regarding this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Isabel Siwa, Court Stenographer of Branch 16, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Manila, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is FINED in the amount of P30,000.00 to
be deducted from the money value of her leave credits which was set aside per Resolution dated October 12, 2005 in
A.M No. 12096-Ret. entitled Application for Retirement Benefits under Section 13-A of R.A. No. 8291 of Ms. Isabel A.
Siwa, Court Stenographer II, MeTC, Manila, Branch 16.
Atty. Henry P. Favorito, Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court is REPRIMANDED for his failure to
supervise the lending and rediscounting activites of Siwa which took place in the court's premises. The extortion charges
against him are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The charges against Atty. Miguel Morales, former Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, are DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence. Deputy Court Administrator Reuben de la Cruz is advised to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties.
The charges against William Calda, Administrative Officer of the Office of the Clerk of Court, and Amie
Grace Arreola, formerly Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 4 now Clerk of Court of Branch 30, both of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to conduct an audit investigation on Isabel Siwa's
transcription of stenographic notes in view of the finding of Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta in her
Investigation Report dated September 1, 2006 in A.M. No. P-08-2519 and A.M. P-08-2520 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No.
05-2155-P and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P) that Siwa has not submitted a complete transcription of stenographic notes
in several cases assigned to her. Said matter shall be treated as a separate case, to be given a new docket number and
assigned to a new ponente for final resolution.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 177148 June 30, 2009
323
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized6 and a Certification of Orderly
vs. Search7 which appellant signed.
RAUL NUÑEZ y REVILLEZA, Appellant.
In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant and sentenced him as follows:
DECISION
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Republic Act 6425 as
QUISUMBING, J.: amended and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties under
the law. Accused is ordered to pay the fine of two million pesos.
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate court affirmed the Decision2 dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial SO ORDERED.8
Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 8614-01-C for
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals on May 2,
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.3 2006, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.9 On January 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
affirming appellant’s conviction. The appellate court dismissed appellant’s defense of frame-up and upheld the
On June 25, 2001, Raul R. Nuñez was formally charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. credibility of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega. It observed that the inconsistencies in their testimony were minor at
6425, as amended. The Information reads: best, and did not relate to the elements of the crime.

That at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning of the 24th day of April 20014 at Brgy. San Antonio, Municipality of Los The appellate court in its decision decreed as follows:
Ba[ñ]os, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any authority of law, and in a search conducted at his residence as stated above, did then and there willfully, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody thirty[-]one (31) heat sealed transparent Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED.
plastic sachets containing methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu", a regulated drug, with a
total weight of 233.93 grams in violation of the aforementioned provision of law.
SO ORDERED.10

CONTRARY TO LAW.5
From the appellate court’s decision, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. This Court required the parties to
submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
The facts are as follows: appellant manifested that they are adopting their briefs before the appellate court.

At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los In his brief, appellant contends that
Baños Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez based on
reports of drug possession. The group, led by Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included SPO1 Odelon
I.
Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano, PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2
Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector Uriquia.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
PROSECUTION AND DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP INTERPOSED BY [THE] ACCUSED-
Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain
APPELLANT.
Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at
appellant’s house, Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed
Nuñez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his presence while his II.
family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31)
packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
containing P4,610 inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, THE IMPUTED CRIME DESPITE THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE.11
grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange

324
Simply, the issue is whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Possession of Regulated Drugs under
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. He points out variances in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses which cast doubt on his culpability: first, SPO1 Ilagan testified that they picked up the
barangay officials before going to appellant’s house but PO2 Ortega claimed that Chief Tanod Joaquin was already
with them when they left the police station; second, while SPO1 Ilagan confirmed the presence of the accused
during the search, PO2 Ortega related otherwise. More importantly, appellant assails the validity of the search
warrant as it did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and street of his residence. He maintains that
none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room. Finally, appellant questions
why the prosecution did not call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed light on the details of the search.
Conversely, the OSG argues that appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It agrees with the
trial court that appellant failed to overcome the presumption that the law enforcement agents regularly performed
their duties. Further, the OSG brands the testimonies of appellant, his wife and their child as self-serving, absent ill-
motives ascribed to the search team. It brushes aside appellant’s protest, on the validity of the search warrant, for
having been belatedly made.
After considering carefully the contentions of the parties and the records of this case, we are in agreement that
appellant’s petition lacks merit.
Appellant was indicted for possession of regulated drugs under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended
which provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use
any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in possession of a
regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.12 All these were found present in the instant case.
While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor as it can easily be fabricated
and is commonly used as a facile refuge in drug cases.13 In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police
officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary.14
In this case, SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellant’s room; but appellant retorts that it was planted. The latter’s
daughter, Liezel Nuñez, testified on the alleged planting of evidence as follows:
xxxx
Q: While you were walking towards the direction of your bath room at that time have you notice anything which
catches your attention?
A: I saw a man inside the room taking a plastic from his bag, sir.
Q: Did you also notice, what did that man do with that plastic in the bag?
A: He put under the bed fronting the door, sir.
xxxx
Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court what was that something that the man took out from his bag and
placed the same underneath your parents’ bed?
A: It is a plastic containing like a tawas, sir.
Q: Have you noticed Miss Witness about how many plastic bag (sic) did the man take from his bag?
A: Only one, sir.15 [Emphasis supplied.]
xxxx
Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellant’s bed, appellant had not advanced
any reason to account for the thirty-one (31) packets of shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in
his room. Instead, he readily signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly Search. Neither
did appellant’s daughter identify the police officer who allegedly planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof
why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely testify against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.16
In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the non-presentation of the
barangay officials who purportedly observed the search. The matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is
neither for accused nor even for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State
should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witness. 17 It bears
stressing that by no means did the barangay officials become part of the prosecution when they were asked to
witness the search. Hence, even the accused could have presented them to testify thereon.
Appellant alleges that SPO1 Ilagan verified his presence inside the room during the search in contrast to PO2
Ortega’s account. The records, however, disclose otherwise. On direct examination, PO2 Ortega recounted:
FISCAL:
Q: What did you do next?
325
WITNESS:
A: Capt. Mundin together with Raul and then the three of us went to the room of Raul Nuñez, sir.
xxxx
Q: So, among the group that went to the room of Raul Nuñez who went inside?
A: It was Raul Nuñez, Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo who are inside the room. I stayed near the door along with Brgy.
Capt. Mundin and Chief Tanod who were looking at what was going on, sir.18 [Emphasis supplied.]
On cross-examination, PO2 Ortega did not falter:
xxxx
Q: Who among you went inside the room of Raul Nuñez?
A: Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo, Raul Nuñez, myself, Chief Tanod Alfredo and Capt. Mundin, sir.19 [Emphasis supplied.]
Besides, any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby
was deemed waived when no objection was raised by appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or
impliedly.20
As regards the contradiction in the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega as to whether they picked up Chief
Tanod Joaquin at the barangay hall, the same is inconsequential. After all, the witnesses’ testimonies need only
corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime. 21
Here, we find the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega believable and consistent on material points:
appellant was shown the search warrant; the search was conducted in the latter’s presence; and SPO1 Ilagan
found shabu in appellant’s dresser. It has been ruled that an affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses
without motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony. Records show that appellant and the police
officers were strangers to each other. Hence, there is no reason to suggest that the police officers were ill-
motivated in apprehending appellant.22
Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is
pertinent:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities.23 In the
case at bar, Search Warrant No. 4224 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular
class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a
similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which
would repel such inference.25
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash,
grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were
not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing
the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in
appellant’s residence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in
our view, absolutely impermissible.26
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant
is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence
or articles relating to a crime.27 Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant
should be restored to appellant.1avvphi1
Lastly, we find the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court proper. Under Section
20(3)28 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, possession of 200 grams or more of shabu
(methamphetamine hydrochloride) renders the accused liable to suffer the maximum penalty under Section 16 of
Rep. Act No. 6425, which is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000.
In the case at bar, appellant was found in possession of 233.93 grams of shabu. Hence there being no modifying
circumstance proven, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, and P2,000,000 fine which the
Court of Appeals meted on appellant is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420 is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the official custodian of the objects taken during the search which are
not otherwise regulated drugs or drug paraphernalia, is ORDERED to return them to appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180595 March 5, 2010
326
ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO and ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR. and RAFAEL V. GONZAGA, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need for plaintiff to state the facts constituting his cause of action and the correct forum for
actions for damages arising from alleged wrongful procurement and enforcement of a search warrant issued in
connection with an alleged criminal violation of the intellectual property law.
The Facts and the Case
On January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City, Pampanga. After
doing surveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor Donato, Jr., the NBI agent assigned to the case,
succeeded in confirming the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol
Subdivision, Angeles City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander del Rosario.
On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City to search the subject premises. But it took a week later or on March 12, 2002 for the RTC to
hear the application and issue the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed hearing compromised the
operation, the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to implement the warrant. Their search
yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes.
Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a complaint for P50 million in
damages against respondents NBI agents Donato and Gonzaga and two others before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 62, in Civil Case 10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered the complaint with a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; b) forum shopping; and c) the
NBI agents’ immunity from suit, they being sued as such agents. The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003.
The NBI agents filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003.
Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the latter court granted the petition and annulled the RTC’s orders, first, in
alleging merely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant without stating the facts that made the
procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and second, the Del Rosarios were guilty of
forum shopping in that they should have filed their claim for damages against the NBI agents through a motion for
compensation with the court that issued the search warrant.
The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on November 19, 2007, prompting
them to file this petition for review.
The Issues Presented
The petition presents two issues:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the complaint of the Del Rosarios did not state a cause of
action; and
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping.
The Court’s Rulings
One. The CA held that the Del Rosarios’ complaint before the RTC failed to state a cause of action against
respondents NBI agents. Such complaint said that the NBI agents unlawfully procured and enforced the search
warrant issued against the Del Rosarios but it failed to state the ultimate facts from which they drew such
conclusion.
The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the
court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks.1 And judgment would be right only if the
facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff’s legal right in the
matter; (2) the defendant’s corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendant’s
subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action. 2
According to the Del Rosarios, the following allegations in their complaint state a cause or causes of action against
respondents NBI agents:
2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x x x led by Defendant Rafael I. Gonzaga x x x entered by
force the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street,
Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] of
Angeles City, Branch 57 x x x.
xxxx
2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x x x
and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No. 02-09A, no ‘fake Marlboro cigarettes and their
packaging’ were found at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x x x.
2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had no factual basis
considering that the premises searched is the property solely of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario.
2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of the series of raids and
searches that was conducted in Angeles City and Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in the
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 community and had tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entities
who were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes.
xxxx
3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and possession counterfeit
Marlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search warrant, and the malicious service of the such
warrant at the residential premises of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members of
the community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within Angeles City and
Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good names which Plaintiffs have painstakingly
built and maintained over the years.
xxxx
3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the raid conducted on the
subject residential premises, and subjected them to much unwarranted speculation of engaging in the
sale of fake merchandise.
Essentially, however, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained
search warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get such
warrant, the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosario’s premises.
But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the court’s order
"unlawful." The Del Rosarios did not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating
testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents
used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes as true
the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to conclusions of law.3 Statements of mere
conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.4
Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious manner is also not sufficient.
Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere
conclusions of law.5
The Del Rosarios’ broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted "in full and plain view of
members of the community" does not likewise support their claim that such search was maliciously enforced. There
is nothing inherently wrong with search warrants being enforced in full view of neighbors. In fact, when the
respondent or his representative is not present during the search, the rules require that it be done in the presence
of two residents of the same locality. These safeguards exist to protect persons from possible abuses that may
occur if searches were done surreptitiously or clandestinely.
Two. Invoking Section 21 of this Court’s Administrative Matter (A.M.) 02-1-06-SC (not A.O. 01-1-06-SC as cited),
the CA held that, rather than file a separate action for damages, the Del Rosarios should have filed their claim for
compensation in the same proceeding and with the same court that issued the writ of search and seizure. The Del
Rosarios were thus guilty of forum shopping.
A.M. 02-1-06-SC, the Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights,
provides:
SEC. 21. Claim for damages. – Where the writ [of search and seizure] is discharged on any of the grounds
provided in this Rule, or where it is found after trial that there has been no infringement or threat of infringement of
an intellectual property right, the court, upon motion of the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party
and after due hearing, shall order the applicant to compensate the defendant or expected adverse party upon the
cash bond, surety bond or other equivalent security for any injury or damage the latter suffered by the issuance and
enforcement of the writ. Should the damages exceed the amount of the bond, the applicant shall be liable for the
payment of the excess.
When a complaint is already filed in court, the motion shall be filed with the same court during the trial or before
appeal is perfected or before judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the applicant, setting forth the facts
showing the defendant’s right to damages and the amount thereof. The award of damages shall be included in the
judgment in the main case.
Where no complaint is filed against the expected adverse party, the motion shall be filed with the court which
issued the writ. In such a case, the court shall set the motion for summary hearing and immediately determine the
expected adverse party’s right to damages.
A judgment in favor of the applicant in its principal claim should not necessarily bar the alleged infringing defendant
from recovering damages where he suffered losses by reason of the wrongful issuance or enforcement of the writ.
The damages provided for in this section shall be independent from the damages claimed by the defendant in his
counterclaim.
But the subject search warrant was not issued under A.M. 02-1-06-SC, which governed the issuance of a writ of
search and seizure in a civil action for infringement filed by an intellectual property right owner against the
supposed infringer of his trademark or name. Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes, did not go by
this route. Philip Morris did not file a civil action for infringement of its trademark against the Del Rosarios before
the RTC of Angeles City.
Instead, Philip Morris sought assistance from the NBI for the apprehension and criminal prosecution of those
reportedly appropriating its trademark and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes. In turn, the NBI instituted a police action
that included applying for a search and seizure warrant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure (not under the provisions of A.M. 02-1-06-SC) against the Del Rosarios upon the belief that
they were storing and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes in violation of the penal provisions of the intellectual property
law.
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The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for the filing of counterclaims for damages
against those who may have improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the Del
Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by separate civil action for the wrong
inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded,
failed to state a proper cause of action.1avvphi1
Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully included him as respondent in their
application for a search warrant since he neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor resided in it. But the
rules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of the premises to be searched. If
this were the case, criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply use other people’s residence for storing
such articles to avoid being raided and searched.
possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential Decree No. 1866,
otherwise known as the "Illegal Possession of Firearms," as amended.
On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against accused-appellant for illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of firearm. The Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 17619-R
The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8,
ART. II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Marijuana), committed as follows:

The Del Rosarios raise a number of procedural issues: a) the supposed failure of respondents NBI agents to file
That on or about 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
their motion for reconsideration of the RTC order denying their motion to dismiss within 15 days of receipt of the
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully
order; b) their resort to a special civil action of certiorari to challenge the RTC’s denial of their motion to dismiss; c)
have in her possession, custody, and control the following, to wit:
the propriety of their inclusion of a motion to dismiss in their answer; d) the CA’s grant to them in 2003 of a 15-day
extension to file a petition for certiorari after the lapse of 60 days when the Court did not yet come out with a ruling
that barred such extension; and e) their being represented by private counsel rather than by the Office of the a) Nine (9) bricks of dried Marijuana leaves with an approximate total weight of 18.750 kgs., and
Solicitor General.
b) One (1) plastic bag containing dried Marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kg.
With the Court’s rulings in the principal issues raised in this case, it finds no sufficient reason to further dwell on the
lesser issues that the Del Rosarios raise above. Besides, the Court finds no error in the CA’s disposition of the without any authority of law to do so in violation of the above-cited provision of law.3
same.
Criminal Case No. 17620-R
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
79496 dated June 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated November 19, 2007 for the reasons stated in this Decision, The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF
with the MODIFICATION that Civil Case 10584 is DISMISSED without prejudice. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1866, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Firearm), committed as follows:

SO ORDERED. That on or about the 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully
G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010 have in her possession, custody, and control one (1) Cal. .357 S & W revolver, a high-powered firearm, without any
license, permit or authority duly issued by the government to possess or keep the same in violation of the above-
cited law.4
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA, Accused-Appellant. Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her counsel de parte, pleaded "NOT
GUILTY" to both charges.5 Pre-trial and trial proper then ensued.
DECISION
During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Modesto F. Carrera (Carrera),
Police Officer (PO) 2 Jaime Chavez (Chavez), SPO2 Fernando Fernandez (Fernandez), and Forensic Chemist II
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Marina Carina Madrigal (Madrigal).

For review is the Decision1 dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381,
The events, as recounted by the prosecution, are as follows:
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated April 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal Case No. 17619-R, of illegal
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At around nine o’clock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong)
and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain "Estela Tuan" had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang,
Baguio City. Present at that time were Police Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional Officer of the 14th Regional
CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy Regional Officer; and other police officers.6
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one o’clock in the afternoon of the
same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to
the accused-appellant’s house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellant’s house, while SPO2 Fernandez
waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellant’s house and
showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office, SPO2
Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from accused-appellant. When said
laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search
Warrant for accused-appellant’s house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge
Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at
about one o’clock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three o’clock, Judge Cortes
personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being
satisfied of the existence of probable cause. The Search Warrant read:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned of the existence of facts upon which the application for Search
Warrant is based, after personally examining by searching questions under oath SPO2 Fernando V. Fernandez of
the CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection Group with office address at DPS Compound, Utility Road, Baguio
City and his witnesses namely: Frank Lad-ing of Happy Hallow, Baguio City and Jerry Tudlong, of Barangay Kitma,
Baguio City, after having been duly sworn to, who executed sworn statements and deposition as witneses, that
there is a probable cause to believe that a Violation of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 has been committed
and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Estela Tuan, has in her possession and control at her
resident at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, the following:
- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish
xxxx
which are subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime in the day the house of the accused Estela
Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following:
- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish
x x x nothing follows x x x
and bring said items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue, thereafter, it shall be void.
The officers must conduct the search and seize the above-mentioned personal items in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of her family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
The officers seizing the items must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the house in
whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of
the 2 witnesses mentioned, leave a receipt in the place in which the seized items were found; thereafter, deliver the
items seized to the undersigned judge together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
Baguio City, Philippines, this 25th day of January, 2000.
(SGD)ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES
Executive Judge
MTCC, Branch IV7
Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel,
SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez and PO2 Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going
to the accused-appellant’s house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the Search
Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-
appellant’s neighbor, to come along.
The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellant’s house. Even though accused-appellant was not
around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellant’s father,
after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez
guarded the surroundings of the house,8 while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside.
SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the presence of Magno and
Pascual. They continued their search on the second floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellant’s
room, below which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six o’clock that evening, accused-
appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-appellant to open a built-in cabinet, in which they
saw eight more bricks of marijuana.9 PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confiscated from accused-
appellant10 and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and recovered from the house and in
accused-appellant’s presence.
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The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.
The defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different version of what transpired that day. It presented four
witnesses, namely, accused-appellant herself; Beniasan Tuan (Beniasan), accused-appellant’s husband; Magno,
accused-appellant’s father; and Mabini Maskay (Maskay), the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela
Silang.1avvphi1
In her testimony, accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor at Hangar Market. Sometime in January
2000, while she was selling vegetables at Hangar Market, her son arrived with two police officers who asked her to
go home because of a letter from the court.11 At about six o’clock in the afternoon, she and her husband Beniasan
reached their residence and found a green paper bag with marijuana in their sala. According to the police officers,
they got the bag from a room on the first floor of accused-appellant’s house. Accused-appellant explained that the
room where the bag of marijuana was found was previously rented by boarders. The boarders padlocked the room
because they still had things inside and they had paid their rent up to the end of January 2000.12 The police officers
also informed accused-appellant that they got a gun from under a cabinet in the latter’s room, which accused-
appellant disputed since her room was always left open and it was where her children play.13 Accused-appellant
alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house because of a quarrel with her neighbor named Lourdes
Estillore (Estillore). Accused-appellant filed a complaint for the demolition of Estillore’s house which was
constructed on the road.14
Beniasan supported the testimony of his wife, accused-appellant. He narrated that he and accused-appellant were
at their Hangar Market stall when two police officers came and asked them to go home. Beniasan and accused-
appellant arrived at their residence at around six o’clock in the evening and were shown the marijuana the police
officers supposedly got from the first floor of the house. The police officers then made Beniasan sign a certification
of the list of items purportedly confiscated from the house.15
Magno testified that he resided at the first floor of accused-appellant’s residence. He was present when the search
was conducted but denied that the Search Warrant was shown to him.16 He attested that the confiscated items
were found from the vacant room at the first floor of accused-appellant’s house which was previously occupied by
boarders. Said room was padlocked but was forced open by the police officers. In the course of the police officers’
search, they pulled something from under the bed that was wrapped in green cellophane, but Magno did not know
the contents thereof.17 The police officers also searched the rooms of accused-appellant and her children at the
second floor of the house, during which they allegedly found a gun under the cabinet in accused-appellant’s room.
Magno claimed that he did not personally witness the finding of the gun and was merely informed about it by the
police officers.18
Maskay, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, was the last to testify for the defense. He
corroborated accused-appellant’s allegation that the latter had a quarrel with Estillore, and this could be the reason
behind the filing of the present criminal cases. He further remembered that the members of the CIDG went to his
office on January 24, 2000 to ask about the location of accused-appellant’s house.19
The RTC, in its Decision dated April 9, 2002, found accused-appellant guilty as charged and adjudged thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 17619-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of marijuana (nine [9] bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of
18.750 kilograms and the one [1] plastic bag containing the dried marijuana weighing about .3 kilograms) in
violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act 7659 as
charged in the information and sentences her to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and one (1) plastic
bag containing dried marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kilograms (Exhibit F, F-1, F-1-A to F-1-J) are
ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in
the service of her sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 17620-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of firearms (one [1] caliber .357 S & W revolver), a high powered firearm, without any
license, permit or authority issued by the Government to keep the same in violation of Section 1, Republic Act No.
8294 which amended Section 1 of PD 1866 as charged in the information and hereby sentences her, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to imprisonment ranging from 4 years 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional in
its maximum period as Minimum to 6 years and 8 months of prision mayor in its minimum period as Maximum and
a fine of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The firearm caliber .357 S & W revolver without serial number is ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be
disposed of immediately in accordance with law.
The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in
the service of her sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.20
The records of the two criminal cases were forwarded to this Court by the RTC, but the Court issued a Resolution 21
dated October 13, 2004 transferring said records to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo. 22
On September 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision.
The Court of Appeals held that the contested search and consequent seizure of the marijuana bricks were done
pursuant to the Search Warrant validly issued by the MTCC. There was no showing of procedural defects or lapses
in the issuance of said Search Warrant as the records support that the issuing judge determined probable cause
only after conducting the searching inquiry and personal examination of the applicant and the latter’s witnesses, in
compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of
accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana.
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The Court of Appeals, however, modified the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting accused-appellant of the
charge for illegal possession of firearm. According to the appellate court, the records were bereft of evidence that
the gun supposedly confiscated from accused-appellant was unlicensed. The absence of a firearm license was
simply presumed by the police officers because the gun was a defective paltik with no serial number. That the said
condition of the gun did not dispense with the need for the prosecution to establish that it was unlicensed through
the testimony or certification of the appropriate officer from the Board of the Firearms and Explosives Bureau of the
Philippine National Police.
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the RTC
of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated April 9, 2002, is hereby MODIFIED such that the conviction of accused-appellant
for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, RA 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED while her conviction for Violation of PD
1866, as amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is accordingly ACQUITTED of the latter
offense.23
In its Resolution dated October 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-appellant’s Partial
Notice of Appeal and accordingly forwarded the records of the case to this Court.
This Court then issued a Resolution24 dated February 28, 2007 directing the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. Accused-appellant25 opted not to file a
supplemental brief and manifested that she was adopting her arguments in the Appellant’s Brief since the same
had already assiduously discussed her innocence of the crime charged. The People26 likewise manifested that it
would no longer file a supplemental brief as the issues have all been addressed in its Appellee’s Brief.
Accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors in her Brief: 27
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING AS VOID THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Given that accused-appellant was already acquitted of the charge of violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on
the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, her instant appeal relates only to her conviction for
illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The Court can no longer pass
upon the propriety of accused-appellant’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17620-R because of the rule that a
judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the
State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of
Appeals.28
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case No. 17619-R, a case becomes a
contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the
assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying. Hence, its factual findings are accorded respect – even finality – absent any
showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied.29
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule in the case at bar.
Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.30
All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The search conducted by
SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-appellant’s house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a
prohibited drug, thus, accused-appellant’s possession thereof could not have been authorized by law in any way.
Accused-appellant evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even offering the same for sale. The
bricks of marijuana were found in accused-appellant’s residence over which she had complete control. In fact,
some of the marijuana were found in accused-appellant’s own room.
Accused-appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding her guilty of
illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
that supposedly manifested their lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test buy and the manner by which the doors
of the rooms of the house were opened.
These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that they do
not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal possession of
marijuana by accused-appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the
central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other
on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.31
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the
veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as
they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.32
Accused-appellant further questions the non-presentation as witnesses of Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants,
and Pascual, the neighbor who supposedly witnessed the implementation of the Search Warrant, during the joint
trial of Criminal Case Nos. 17619-R and 17620-R before the RTC. This Court though is unconvinced that such non-
presentation of witnesses is fatal to Criminal Case No. 17619-R.
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The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. The prosecution need
not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore,
be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. The Court has ruled that the non-presentation of
corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecution’s case.33
Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the following pronouncement of this
Court in People v. Salazar,34 relating to the illegal sale of the same drug, still rings true:
Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's failure to present the informer
who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative
and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the
fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the
non-presentation of the informer on the witness stand would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecutions'
evidence. (Emphasis ours.)
Lastly, accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are inadmissible as evidence
because the Search Warrant issued for her house was invalid for failing to comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirements. Accused-appellant specifically pointed out the following defects which made said Search
Warrant void: (1) the informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, made misrepresentation of facts in the Application for
Search Warrant filed with the MTCC; (2) Judge Cortes of the MTCC failed to consider the informants’ admission
that they themselves were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search Warrant failed to particularly describe the place to
be searched because the house was a two-storey building composed of several rooms.
The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and protected by no less than the
Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III which provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. (Emphases ours.)
Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid down the following
requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued
upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.35
There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant were complied with,
i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under oath or affirmation, of
SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to
determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular
description of the place to be searched and things to be seized.
In People v. Aruta,36 the Court defined probable cause as follows:
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he
relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of
evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it
must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.37 Such substantial basis exists in this case.
333
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s residence after Q. What did you do when you asked them regarding that matter?
said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.
A. They had a test buy and they were able to buy some commodities yesterday, Your honor.
SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing
and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant. He testified before Q. Who bought?
Judge Cortes:
A. Tudlong and Lad-ing, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. How did you go about it?
Q. You are applying for a Search Warrant and you alleged in your application that Estela Tuan of Brgy.
Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, is in possession of dried marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, how did
A. I accompanied the said persons and kept watch over them and gave them money after which, they
you come to know about this matter?
were able to purchase and when they purchased the said items or drugs, they were even informed that if
you wanted to sell then you could come and get. Your Honor.
A. Through the two male persons by the name of Frank Lad-ing and Jerry Tudlong, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. When did these two male persons report to your office?
Q. Where is that P300.00?
A. January 22, Your Honor.
A. It is with them, Your Honor.
Q. This year?
Q. You did not entrap her?
A. Yes, your honor.
A. No, Your Honor, because it is only a test buy.
Q. To whom did they report?
Q: And that was January 22. Why did you not apply immediately for search warrant?
A. To me personally, Your Honor.
A: Because we still have to look at the area and see to it that there are really some buyers or people who
Q. How did they report the matter? would go and leave the place, Your Honor.

A. They reported that a certain Estela Tuan is selling dried Marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, Your Q: What did you observe?
Honor.
A: Well, there are persons who would go inside and after going inside, they would come out bringing
Q. What else? along with them something else.

A. She is not only selling marijuana but also selling vegetables at the Trading Post in La Trinidad, Your Q: Did you not interview these people?
Honor.
A: No, Your Honor. We did not bother.38
Q. They just told you, she is selling marijuana and selling vegetables, that is already sufficient proof or
sufficient probable cause she is in possession of marijuana, what else did they report?
Lad-ing and Tudlong affirmed before Judge Cortes that they were the ones who informed SPO2
Fernandez that accused-appellant was keeping and selling marijuana at her house, and that they took
A. That they are also selling marijuana in large volume at their house. part in the test buy.
334
Lad-ing narrated: Q: How big?

COURT: A: A dimension of 10 x 4 inches, Your Honor.

Q: Mr. Lad-ing, you said that you are working at the Trading Post. What kind of work do you have there? Q: With that size, where did she show you the box of this cellophane?

A: I am a middleman of the vegetable dealers, Your Honor. A: At the place where we were sitted at the receiving room, Your Honor.

COURT: Q: In other words, she went to get it and then presented or showed it to you?

Q: Did you come to know of this person Estela Tuan? A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Your Honor, because there was an incident wherein we were conducting our line of business Q: Where did she go, if you know?
when they came and joined us and we became partners, Your Honor.
A: Because at the sala, there is a certain room located at the side that is the place where she got the
Q: You said, they, how many of you? same, Your Honor.

A: A certain Jerry Tudlong, Estela Tuan and myself, Your Honor. Q: Where is this house of Estela Tuan located, is it along the road or inside the road or what?

Q: In other words, Estela Tuan went with you and later on she became your partner in that business? A: It is near the road but you have to walk in a little distance, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: Will you describe the place where Estela Tuan is residing?

Q: And so what happened when she became a partner of your business? A: Well, it is a two storey house, the walls are made of galvanized iron Sheets, Your Honor.

A: When we were about to divide our profit, we then went at their residence at Gabriela Silang, Baguio COURT:
City, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know who are staying there?
Q: What happened?
A: I do not know who is living with her, however, that is her residence, Your Honor.
A: While we then sitted ourselves at the sala, she told us that if we wanted to earn some more, she told
us that she has in her possession marijuana which could be sold, Your Honor. Q: How many times did you go there?

Q: And so, what happened? A: It was my second time to go at that time we were sent by PO Fernandez to purchase marijuana, Your
Honor.
A: After which, she showed the marijuana, Your Honor.
Q: Where is the marijuana now?
Q: Where was the marijuana?
A: It is in the possession of PO Fernandez, Your Honor.
A: It was placed in a cellophane, in a newspaper, Your Honor.
Q: Where is the marijuana placed?
335
A: In a newspaper, Your Honor. A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next? xxxx

A: We handed to her the amount of P300.00, your Honor. Q: Will you tell what happened when you went to the house of the woman?

Q: And she gave you that marijuana? A: Well, we were allowed to go inside the house after which, we were made to sit down at the receiving
area or sala, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: When you went there, you were allowed to enter immediately?
xxxx
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How many rooms are there in the first floor of the house of Estela Tuan?
Q: Who allowed you to enter?
A: Three rooms, Your Honor, it has a dining room and beside the place is the receiving room where we
sitted ourselves, Your Honor. A: The female person, Your Honor.

Q: When you already bought marijuana from her, what did she tell you, if any? Q: What happened when you were asked to be sitted?

A; Well, if we would be interested to buy more, I still have stocks here, Your Honor.39 A: During that time, Frank and the female person were the ones conferring, Your Honor.

Tudlong recounted in more detail what happened during the test buy: Q: Did you hear what they were talking about?

COURT: A: That Frank was purchasing marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: My question is, when she told you that she has some substance for sale for profit and you mentioned Q: What did the woman tell you?
marijuana, did you talk immediately with Frank or what did you do?
A: After we handed the money, a plastic which was transparent, was then handed to Frank, it was a
A: We reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, your Honor. plastic and there was a newspaper inside, Your Honor.

xxxx xxxx

Q: What time? Q: So, you did not actually see what is in the newspaper?

A: We went to the office at 9:00 – 9:30 o’clock in the morning, Your Honor. A: No, Your Honor, however, I know that that is marijuana.

Q: When you went there, what did you do? Q: Why?

A: The amount of P300.00 was given to Frank and we were instructed to purchase, Your Honor. A: Because that was our purpose, to buy marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: Did you go? Q: And you have not gotten marijuana without Estela Tuan informing you?
336
 A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Will you tell us what kind of materials were used in the house of Estela Tuan?
A: Two storey, the walls are made of GI sheets, Your Honor.\
Q: Is the house beside the road or do you have to walk?
A: It is near the road. Upon reaching the road, you still have to walk a short distance, Your Honor.
Q: Where did Estela Tuan get the newspaper placed in a transparent plastic?
A: She got it from a room because were then made to wait at the sala, Your Honor.
Q: Did she tell you how much she can sell marijuana?
A: She told us, Your Honor.
Q: What?
A: Well, the marijuana that we purchased was worth P300.00[.] However, we could divide it into two small
packs and we could sell it at P20.00 per piece so that you can also have some gain.
COURT:
Q: After that, to whom did you sell?
A: We did not sell the marijuana, Your Honor.
Q: I thought you are going to sell marijuana and so you went there?
A: We were just instructed by PO Fernandez to verify what we are telling him was true, Your Honor. 40
Accused-appellant’s contention that MTCC Judge Cortes failed to consider the informants’ admission that they
themselves were selling marijuana is utterly without merit. First, even after carefully reviewing the testimonies of
Lad-ing and Tudlong before Judge Cortes, this Court did not find a categorical admission by either of the two
informants that they themselves were selling marijuana. In fact, Tudlong expressly denied that he and Lad-ing sold
the marijuana, having only bought the same from the accused-appellant for the test buy. Moreover, even if the
informants were also selling marijuana, it would not have affected the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-
appellant’s house. The criminal liabilities of accused-appellant and the informants would be separate and distinct.
The investigation and prosecution of one could proceed independently of the other.
Equally without merit is accused-appellant’s assertion that the Search Warrant did not describe with particularity the
place to be searched.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads
the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.41 In the case at bar, the address and
description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house
located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors
and composed of several rooms.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s house issued
by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be
presented as evidence against the accused-appellant.
Since it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the accused-appellant is, indeed, guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court shall now consider the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon
her.
Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 20(3), of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provides:
SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. (As amended by
R.A. 7659)
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The
penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
337
 7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal possession of 750 grams or more of
the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in her
possession a total of 19,050 grams of marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to reclusion perpetua by
the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still within the range of fines imposable on any person who possessed
prohibited drugs without any authority, under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
on about the validity of the search warrant.
A party cannot change his theory on appeal nor raise in the appellate court any question of law or of fact that was
not raised in the court below or which was not within the issue raised by the parties in their pleadings. 33
In a long line of cases, this Court held that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to
the attention of the trial court ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 34
We opt to get out of the ordinary in this case. After all, technicalities must serve, not burden the cause of justice. It
is a prudent course of action to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to
attain the ends of justice. 35
We thus allow the new arguments for the final disposition of this case.
The contention of the accused-appellant, as asserted through the Public Attorney’s Office, is that the issued search
warrant was not based on probable cause.36 The accused-appellant relied heavily on its argument that SPO4
Gotidoc, as the applicant of the search warrant, did not testify on facts personally known to him but simply relied on
stories that the accused- appellant was peddling illegal drugs.37
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.38
On the other hand, probable cause means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.39
Based on the records, the Court is convinced that the questioned search warrant was based on a probable cause.
A portion of the direct testimony of SPO4 Gotidoc is hereby quoted:
Q: What is your basis for applying for search warrant against the accused?
A: Because there were many persons who were going to her place and we’ve been hearing news that
she is selling prohibited drugs and some of them were even identified, sir.
Q: But you did not conduct any surveillance before you applied for search warrant?
A: Prior to the application for search warrant, we conducted surveillance already.
Q: Because personally you heard that the accused was dealing prohibited drugs and that was the basis
for you to apply for search warrant with Branch 66?
A: Yes, sir. 40(Emphasis supplied)
xxx
Section 6, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:
If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause
to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these
Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided
in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the findings
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.41
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A
magistrate’s determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by
a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.42
338
The defense’s reliance of the quoted testimony of the police officer alone, without any other evidence to show that the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner in the total amount of P11,135,642.00 more or less, Philippine
there was indeed lack of personal knowledge, is insufficient to overturn the finding of the trial court. The accused- Currency.
appellant, having failed to present substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of regularity of duty of
the issuing judge, will not be sustained by this Court. Contrary to law.4

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. Consequently, on April 22, 2003, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Edgar A. Reyes filed two separate applications for the
No. 28482 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant. issuance of a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. The applications were later docketed
as Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 and raffled off to Branch 7, RTC, Manila.
SO ORDERED.
In the said applications, P/Insp. Reyes alleged that he had personal knowledge that respondent Felicidad Chan Sy
G.R. No. 174570 February 22, 2010 had in her possession five boxes of Hennessy XO, as well as 286 company checks taken from Guan Yiak
Hardware. He prayed that the court issue a search warrant authorizing him or any other agent of the law to take
ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner, possession of the subject property and bring them before the court.
vs.
SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN In support of the applications, P/Insp. Reyes submitted the sworn statements of petitioner Romer Sy Tan5 and
and BRYAN SY LIM, Respondents. witnesses Maricho Sabelita6 and Anicita Almedilla.7 On April 22, 2003, presiding Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas posed
searching questions to the applicant and his witnesses to determine if probable cause existed to justify the
issuance of the search warrants.
DECISION

Thereafter, or on April 22, 2003, Judge Lanzanas issued Search Warrant Nos. 03-36118 and 03-3612,9 directing
PERALTA, J.:
any peace officer to make an immediate search of the 8th floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for five boxes of
Hennessy XO; and the 7th floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for various checks payable to the Guan Yiak
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated December 29, 2005 of Hardware, respectively; and, if found, to take possession thereof and bring the same before the court.
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 and the Resolution2 dated August 18, 2006 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The warrants were later served in the afternoon of April 22, 2003. Under Search Warrant No. 03-3611, three boxes
containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs, were seized. However, the
The antecedents are as follows: enforcement of Search Warrant No. 03-3612 yielded negative results.

On January 11, 2006, an Information3 for the crime of Robbery was filed against respondents Sy Tiong Gue, On May 21, 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants,10 which petitioner opposed.11
Felicidad Chan Sy, Sy Chim, Sy Tiong Yan, Sy Yu Bun, Sy Yu Siong, Sy Yu San, Bryan Sy Lim, Sy Yu Hui-
Pabilona, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Mamerto J. Madronio, and PO1 Marvin Sumang for the alleged taking of
On September 1, 2003, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the motion. Respondents filed a Motion for
P6,500,000.00 cash, 286 postdated checks, five boxes of Hennessy Cognac, a television set, a computer set, and
Reconsideration,13 but it was denied in the Order14 dated October 28, 2003.
other documents from the Guan Yiak Hardware, committed as follows:

Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari15 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA arguing
That on or about April 15, 2003, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
that:
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons and force upon things, to wit: by forcibly entering the Office of
Guan Yiak Hardware located at 453-455 Tomas Pinpin Street, Binondo, Manila, while being armed with guns, and I.
thereafter, take rob and carry away cash in the amount of P6,500,000.00 from the vault; 286 postdated checks with
total face value of P4,325,642.00 issued by several customers payable to Guan Yiak Hardware, Five (5) boxes of The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
Hennessy XO Cognac valued at P240,000.00 more or less; a television set valued at P20,000.00 more or less; refused to quash the subject search warrants, notwithstanding the manifest absence of probable cause.
Computer set valued at P50,000.00 more or less and other papers/documents or all valued at P11,135,642.00
more or less belonging to SY SIY HO AND SONS, INC. (Guan Yiak Hardware) represented by Romer S. Tan, to II.
339
There is no appeal, nor any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law from the
assailed Orders.16
On December 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the respondent court in
Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to
Quash Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.17
The CA opined that quashing the search warrants for lack of personal knowledge was unwarranted. It added that
the description of the items to be seized complied with the requirement of particularity. Moreover, the CA found the
inquiries made by the judge to be sufficiently probing. However, the CA agreed with the respondents and
concluded that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the subject search warrants; thus, respondents’
motion to quash should have been granted by the RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the assailed Resolution dated August 18, 2006.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
A
The honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in setting aside the search warrants
issued by honorable executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7, manila.
B any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
The honorable court of appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in granting the petition for certiorari
filed with it by the respondents, despite lack of showing that honorable executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7,
manila, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its orders
(annexes "l" and "p") denying respondents’ motion to quash search warrants and motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that there was substantial basis for the findings of facts and circumstances, which led the issuing
court to determine and conclude that the offense of robbery had been committed by the respondents. Petitioner
insists that there was probable cause, which justified the issuing judge to issue the questioned search warrants.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC issued the search warrants after determining the existence of probable cause
based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the affiants and the testimonies given by them during the hearing of the
applications for search warrant.
On their part, respondents maintain that the CA’s finding that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrants was in accordance with the facts and the law. Respondents contend that the CA correctly
appreciated the numerous statements and admissions of petitioner and his witnesses, all of which, taken together,
clearly negate any finding of probable cause for the issuance of the subject search warrants.
The sole issue to be determined in the instant action is whether or not there was probable cause warranting the
issuance by RTC of the subject search warrants. We answer in the affirmative
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and to bring it before
the court.18 The issuance of a search warrant is governed by Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the relevant sections
of which provide:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.1avvphi1
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with the
affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued
upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.19
In the case at bar, the CA concluded that the RTC did not comply with any of the requisites required for the
issuance of the subject search warrants. The CA ratiocinated that although the RTC judge personally determined if
probable cause existed by examining the witnesses through searching questions, and although the search
warrants sufficiently described the place to be searched and things to be seized, there was no probable cause
warranting the issuance of the subject search warrants. We do not agree.
Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means
taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead
a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with that offense are in the place to be searched.20 In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,21 this Court stressed
that:
340
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations
of a judge after a full-blown trial.
Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
judge in issuing the subject search warrants.
A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay22 and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes23 reveals that Judge Lanzanas,
through searching and probing questions, was satisfied that there were good reasons to believe that respondents,
accompanied by five maids, took five boxes of Hennessy XO owned by the Guan Yiak Hardware and brought them
to the 8th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila; and that a person named "Yubol" took various checks from
the company’s vault, which was later brought to the 7th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila. When they
entered the premises, Felicidad Chan Sy was accompanied by two policemen, which stunned Romer Sy Tan, so
that he was not able to do anything in the face of the calculated and concerted actions of his grandmother,
Felicidad Chan Sy, and her seven companions. Based on the foregoing circumstances, Romer Sy Tan believed
that the crime of robbery was committed by the respondents.24
The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial
functions.25 A finding of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant, needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused.26 The determination of whether probable cause exists as to justify the issuance of a search warrant is
best left to the sound discretion of a judge.27 Apparent in the case at bar and as aptly found by the RTC judge,
there was probable cause justifying the issuance of the search warrants. This was established by the Sinumpaang
Salaysay and the testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses who had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense were in the place sought to be searched. The facts narrated by the witnesses while
under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient justification for the issuance of the
subject search warrants.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the
inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction, or to prevent it from committing such grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.28 This Court finds nothing irregular, much less, grave abuse of
discretion, committed by the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants. The RTC judge complied with all
the procedural and substantive requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. This Court is, therefore, bound
by the RTC judge’s finding of probable cause for issuing Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612.
It is to be noted, however, that while this Court affirms the sufficiency of probable cause in the issuance of the
search warrants in connection with the crime of robbery allegedly committed by the respondents, the guilt of the
accused still remains to be determined in the appropriate criminal action against them, not in the present case
which is limited only to the propriety of the issuance of the subject search warrants by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated December 29,
2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The
validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182147 December 15, 2010
ARNEL U. TY, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY, and ALVIN TY, Petitioners,
vs.
NBI SUPERVISING AGENT MARVIN E. DE JEMIL, PETRON GASUL DEALERS ASSOCIATION, and
TOTALGAZ DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners seek the reversal of the Decision 1 dated
September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98054, which reversed and set aside the
Resolutions dated October 9, 20062 and December 14, 20063 of the Secretary of Justice, and reinstated the
November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution4 of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. Petitioners assail also the CA
Resolution5 dated March 14, 2008, denying their motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation (Omni) as per Omni’s General Information Sheet 6 (GIS)
dated March 6, 2004 submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Omni is in the business of
trading and refilling of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders and holds Pasig City Mayor’s Permit No. RET-04-
001256 dated February 3, 2004.
The case all started when Joaquin Guevara Adarlo & Caoile Law Offices (JGAC Law Offices) sent a letter dated
March 22, 20047 to the NBI requesting, on behalf of their clients Shellane Dealers Association, Inc., Petron Gasul
Dealers Association, Inc., and Totalgaz Dealers Association, Inc., for the surveillance, investigation, and
apprehension of persons or establishments in Pasig City that are engaged in alleged illegal trading of petroleum
products and underfilling of branded LPG cylinders in violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 33,8 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1865.9
Earlier, the JGAC Law Offices was furnished by several petroleum producers/brand owners their respective
certifications on the dealers/plants authorized to refill their respective branded LPG cylinders, to wit: (1) On October
341
3, 2003, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) issued a certification10 of the list of entities duly
authorized to refill Shellane LPG cylinders; (2) on December 4, 2003, Petron Corporation (Petron) issued a
certification11 of their dealers in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao authorized to refill Petron Gasul LPG cylinders; and
(3) on January 5, 2004, Total (Philippines) Corporation (Total) issued two certifications12 of the refilling stations and
plants authorized to refill their Totalgaz and Superkalan Gaz LPG cylinders.
Agents De Jemil and Kawada attested to conducting surveillance of Omni in the months of March and April 2004
and doing a test-buy on April 15, 2004. They brought eight branded LPG cylinders of Shellane, Petron Gasul,
Totalgaz, and Superkalan Gaz to Omni for refilling. The branded LPG cylinders were refilled, for which the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents paid PhP 1,582 as evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 9004013 issued by Omni
on April 15, 2004. The refilled LPG cylinders were without LPG valve seals and one of the cylinders was actually
underfilled, as found by LPG Inspector Noel N. Navio of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Association (LPGIA)
who inspected the eight branded LPG cylinders on April 23, 2004 which were properly marked by the NBI after the
test-buy.
The NBI’s test-buy yielded positive results for violations of BP 33, Section 2(a) in relation to Secs. 3(c) and 4, i.e.,
refilling branded LPG cylinders without authority; and Sec. 2(c) in relation to Sec. 4, i.e., underdelivery or
underfilling of LPG cylinders. Thus, on April 28, 2004, Agent De Jemil filed an Application for Search Warrant (With
Request for Temporary Custody of the Seized Items)14 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City,
attaching, among others, his affidavit15 and the affidavit of Edgardo C. Kawada,16 an NBI confidential agent.
On the same day of the filing of the application for search warrants on April 28, 2004, the RTC, Branch 167 in
Pasig City issued Search Warrants No. 262417 and 2625.18 The NBI served the warrants the next day or on April
29, 2004 resulting in the seizure of several items from Omni’s premises duly itemized in the NBI’s Receipt/Inventory
of Property/Item Seized.19 On May 25, 2004, Agent De Jemil filed his Consolidated Return of Search Warrants with
Ex-Parte Motion to Retain Custody of the Seized Items20 before the RTC Pasig City.
Subsequently, Agent De Jemil filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) his Complaint-Affidavits against
petitioners for: (1) Violation of Section 2(a), in relation to Sections 3(c) and 4, of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended by P.D.
1865;21 and (2) Violation of Section 2(c), in relation to Section 4, of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended by P.D. 1865,22
docketed as I.S. Nos. 2004-616 and 2004-618, respectively.
During the preliminary investigation, petitioners submitted their Joint Counter-Affidavit,23 which was replied24 to by
Agent De Jemil with a corresponding rejoinder25 from petitioners.
The Ruling of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor
in I.S. No. 2004-616 and I.S. No. 2004-618
On November 7, 2005, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Leandro C. Catalo of Manila issued a Joint Resolution, 26
later approved by the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño upon the recommendation of the Head of the Task
Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TFAIPP), Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Leah C. Tanodra-
Armamento, finding probable cause to charge petitioners with violations of pertinent sections of BP 33, as
amended, resolving as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that two (2) Informations for violations of Section 2
[a] (illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products) and Section 2 [c] (underfilling of LPG cylinders), both of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 33, as amended, be filed against respondents [herein petitioners] ARNEL TY, MARIE
ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY and ALVIN TY.27
Assistant City Prosecutor Catalo found the existence of probable cause based on the evidence submitted by Agent
De Jemil establishing the fact that Omni is not an authorized refiller of Shellane, Petron Gasul, Totalgaz and
Superkalan Gaz LPG cylinders. Debunking petitioners’ contention that the branded LPG cylinders are already
owned by consumers who are free to do with them as they please, the law is clear that the stamped markings on
the LPG cylinders show who are the real owners thereof and they cannot be refilled sans authority from Pilipinas
Shell, Petron or Total, as the case may be. On the underfilling of one LPG cylinder, the findings of LPG Inspector
Navio of the LPGIA were uncontroverted by petitioners.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,28 was denied through a Resolution29 by the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor issued on May 3, 2006.
In time, petitioners appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.30
The Ruling of the DOJ Secretary
in I.S. No. 2004-616 and I.S. No. 2004-618
On October 9, 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution31 reversing and setting aside the
November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Chief State Prosecutor is
directed to cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of Sections 2(a) and 2(c) of B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended by P.D. 1865, against respondents Arnel Ty, Mari Antonette Ty, Jason Ong, Willy Dy and Alvin Ty and
report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.32
The Office of the Secretary of Justice viewed, first, that the underfilling of one of the eight LPG cylinders was an
isolated incident and cannot give rise to a conclusion of underfilling, as the phenomenon may have been caused by
human error, oversight or technical error. Being an isolated case, it ruled that there was no showing of a clear
pattern of deliberate underfilling. Second, on the alleged violation of refilling branded LPG cylinders sans written
authority, it found no sufficient basis to hold petitioners responsible for violation of Sec. 2 (c) of BP 33, as amended,
since there was no proof that the branded LPG cylinders seized from Omni belong to another company or firm,
holding that the simple fact that the LPG cylinders with markings or stamps of other petroleum producers cannot by
itself prove ownership by said firms or companies as the consumers who take them to Omni fully owned them
having purchased or acquired them beforehand.
342
Agent De Jemil moved but was denied reconsideration33 through another Resolution34 dated December 14, 2006
prompting him to repair to the CA via a petition for certiorari35 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 98054.
The Ruling of the CA
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment36 on Agent De Jemil’s appeal, sought the dismissal of the
latter’s petition viewing that the determination by the Office of the Secretary of Justice of probable cause is entitled
to respect owing to the exercise of his prerogative to prosecute or not.
On August 31, 2007, Petron filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention37 and
Petition-in-Intervention38 before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 98054. And much earlier, the Nationwide Association of
Consumers, Inc. (NACI) also filed a similar motion.
On September 28, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision39 revoking the resolutions of the Office
of the Secretary of Justice and reinstated the November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions dated October 9, 2006 and December
14, 2006 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Joint Resolution dated November 7, 2005 of the Office of
the Chief State Prosecutor finding probable cause against private respondents Arnel Ty, Marie Antonette Ty, Jason
Ong, Willy Dy, and Alvin Ty is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.40
Citing Sec. 1 (1) and (3) of BP 33, as amended, which provide for the presumption of underfilling, the CA held that
the actual underfilling of an LPG cylinder falls under the prohibition of the law which does not require for the
underfilling to be substantial and deliberate.
Moreover, the CA found strong probable violation of "refilling of another company’s or firm’s cylinders without such
company’s or firm’s written authorization" under Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. The CA relied on the affidavits of
Agents De Jemil and Kawada, the certifications from various LPG producers that Omni is not authorized to refill
their branded LPG cylinders, the results of the test-buy operation as attested to by the NBI agents and confirmed
by the examination of LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA, the letter-opinion41 of the Department of Energy (DOE) to
Pilipinas Shell confirming that branded LPG cylinders are properties of the companies whose stamp markings
appear thereon, and Department Circular No. 2000-05-00742 of the DOE on the required stamps or markings by the
manufacturers of LPG cylinders.
After granting the appeal of Agent De Jemil, however, the motions to intervene filed by Petron and NACI were
simply noted by the appellate court.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was rebuffed by the CA through the equally assailed March 14, 2008
Resolution.43
Thus, the instant petition.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF
CERTIORARI IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.
II. WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BELIEVE THAT PETITIONERS VIOLATED SECTION 2(A) OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 33, AS
AMENDED.
III. WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BELIEVE THAT PETITIONERS VIOLATED SECTION 2(C) OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 33, AS
AMENDED.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 33,
AS AMENDED, FOR BEING MERE DIRECTORS, NOT ACTUALLY IN CHARGE OF THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE BUSINESS AFFAIRS OF THE CORPORATION.44
The foregoing issues can be summarized into two core issues: first, whether probable cause exists against
petitioners for violations of Sec. 2 (a) and (c) of BP 33, as amended; and second, whether petitioners can be held
liable therefor. We, however, will tackle at the outset the sole procedural issue raised: the propriety of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 availed of by public respondent Agent De Jemil to assail the resolutions of the Office of
the Secretary of Justice.
Petron’s Comment-in-Intervention
On April 14, 2009, Petron entered its appearance by filing a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Comment-
in-Intervention45 and its Comment-in-Intervention [To petition for Review on Certiorari dated 13 May 2008].46 It
asserted vested interest in the seizure of several Gasul LPG cylinders and the right to prosecute petitioners for
unauthorized refilling of its branded LPG cylinders by Omni. Petitioners duly filed their Comment/Opposition47 to
Petron’s motion to intervene. It is clear, however, that Petron has substantial interest to protect in so far as its
business relative to the sale and refilling of Petron Gasul LPG cylinders is concerned, and therefore its intervention
in the instant case is proper.
The Court’s Ruling
We partially grant the petition.
Procedural Issue: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 Proper
343
Petitioners raise the sole procedural issue of the propriety of the legal remedy availed of by public respondent
Agent De Jemil. They strongly maintain that the Office of the Secretary of Justice properly assumed jurisdiction and
did not gravely abuse its discretion in its determination of lack of probable cause—the exercise thereof being its
sole prerogative—which, they lament, the appellate court did not accord proper latitude. Besides, they assail the
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies when Agent De Jemil immediately resorted to court action through a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA without first appealing the resolutions of the Office of
the Secretary of Justice to the Office of the President (OP).
We cannot agree with petitioners.
For one, while it is the consistent principle in this jurisdiction that the determination of probable cause is a function
that belongs to the public prosecutor48 and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the filing of the
corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case;49 such determination is subject to judicial review
where it is established that grave abuse of discretion tainted the determination.
For another, there is no question that the Secretary of Justice is an alter ego of the President who may opt to
exercise or not to exercise his or her power of review over the former’s determination in criminal investigation
cases. As aptly noted by Agent De Jemil, the determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice is, under
the doctrine of qualified political agency, presumably that of the Chief Executive unless disapproved or reprobated
by the latter.
Chan v. Secretary of Justice50delineated the proper remedy from the determination of the Secretary of Justice.
Therein, the Court, after expounding on the policy of non-interference in the determination of the existence of
probable cause absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the public prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice, however, concluded, citing Alcaraz v. Gonzalez51 and Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,52 that an aggrieved party from the resolution of the Secretary of Justice may directly resort to judicial
review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x [T]he findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based
on the allegation that he acted with grave abuse of discretion. This remedy is available to the aggrieved party.53
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is thus clear that Agent De Jemil, the aggrieved party in the assailed resolutions of the Office of the Secretary of
Justice, availed of and pursued the proper legal remedy of a judicial review through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 in assailing the latter’s finding of lack of probable cause on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
First Core Issue: Existence of Probable Cause
Petitioners contend that there is no probable cause that Omni violated Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of
BP 33, as amended, prohibiting the refilling of another company’s or firm’s LPG cylinders without its written
authorization. First, the branded LPG cylinders seized were not traded by Omni as its representative annotated in
the NBI receipt of seized items that the filled LPG cylinders came from customers’ trucks and the empty ones were
taken from the warehouse or swapping section of the refilling plant and not from the refilling section. Second, the
branded LPG cylinders are owned by end-user customers and not by the major petroleum companies, i.e., Petron,
Pilipinas Shell and Total. And even granting arguendo that Omni is selling these LPG cylinders, still there cannot
be a prima facie case of violation since there is no proof that the refilled branded LPG cylinders are owned by
another company or firm.
Third, granting that Petron, Total and Pilipinas Shell still own their respective branded LPG cylinders already sold to
consumers, still such fact will not bind third persons, like Omni, who is not privy to the agreement between the
buying consumers and said major petroleum companies. Thus, a subsequent transfer by the customers of Petron,
Total and Pilipinas Shell of the duly marked or stamped LPG cylinders through swapping, for example, will
effectively transfer ownership of the LPG cylinders to the transferee, like Omni.
Fourth, LPG cylinder exchange or swapping is a common industry practice that the DOE recognizes. They point to
a series of meetings conducted by the DOE for institutionalizing the validity of swapping of all and any kind of LPG
cylinders among the industry players. The meetings resulted in a draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which
unfortunately was not signed due to the withdrawal of petroleum major players Petron, Total and Pilipinas Shell.
Nonetheless, the non-signing of the MOA does not diminish the fact of the recognized industry practice of cylinder
exchange or swapping. Relying on Republic Act No. (RA) 8479,54 petitioners maintain that said law promotes and
encourages the entry of new participants in the petroleum industry such as Omni. And in furtherance of this
mandate is the valid practice of cylinder exchange or swapping in the LPG industry.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ strained rationalizations.
Probable violation of Sec. 2 (a) of BP 33, amended
First. The test-buy conducted on April 15, 2004 by the NBI agents, as attested to by their respective affidavits,
tends to show that Omni illegally refilled the eight branded LPG cylinders for PhP 1,582. This is a clear violation of
Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of BP 33, as amended. It must be noted that the criminal complaints, as
clearly shown in the complaint-affidavits of Agent De Jemil, are not based solely on the seized items pursuant to
the search warrants but also on the test-buy earlier conducted by the NBI agents.
Second. The written certifications from Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total show that Omni has no written authority to
refill LPG cylinders, embossed, marked or stamped Shellane, Petron Gasul, Totalgaz and Superkalan Gaz. In fact,
petitioners neither dispute this nor claim that Omni has authority to refill these branded LPG cylinders.
Third. Belying petitioners’ contention, the seized items during the service of the search warrants tend to show that
Omni illegally refilled branded LPG cylinders without authority.
On April 29, 2004, the NBI agents who served the search warrants on Omni seized the following:
Quantity/Unit Description
7 LPG cylinders Totalgaz, 11.0 kg [filled]
344
 1 LPG cylinder Petron Gasul, 11.0 kg [filled]
1 LPG cylinder Shellane, 11.0 kg [filled]
29 LPG cylinders Superkalan Gaz, 2.7 kg [empty]
17 LPG cylinders Petron Gasul, 11.0 kg [emptly]
8 LPG cylinders Marked as Omnigas with Shell emboss, 11.0 kg [empty]
5 LPG cylinders Marked as Omnigas with Totalgaz emboss, 11.0 kg [empty]
23 LPG cylinders Shellane, 11.0 kg [empty]
3 LPG cylinders Marked as Omnigas with Gasul emboss, 11.0 kg [empty]
21 LPG cylindersTotalgaz, 11.0 kg [empty]
The foregoing list is embodied in the NBI’s Receipt/Inventory of Property/Item Seized 55 signed by NBI Agent Edwin
J. Roble who served and implemented the search warrants. And a copy thereof was duly received by Atty. Allan U.
Ty, representative of Omni, who signed the same "under protest" and made the annotation at the bottom part
thereon: "The above items/cylinders were taken at customers’ trucks and the empty cylinders taken at the
warehouse (swapping section) of the company."56
Even considering that the filled LPG cylinders were indeed already loaded on customers’ trucks when confiscated,
yet the fact that these refilled LPG cylinders consisting of nine branded LPG cylinders, specifically Totalgaz, Petron
Gasul and Shellane, tends to show that Omni indeed refilled these branded LPG cylinders without authorization
from Total, Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Such a fact is bolstered by the test-buy conducted by Agent De Jemil and
NBI confidential agent Kawada: Omni’s unauthorized refilling of branded LPG cylinders, contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in
relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. Said provisos provide:
Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts.—The following acts are prohibited and penalized:
(a) Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products;
xxxx
Sec. 3. Definition of terms.—For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be construed to mean:
Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products—
xxxx
(c) Refilling of liquefied petroleum gas cylinders without authority from said Bureau, or refilling of another
company’s or firm’s cylinders without such company’s or firm’s written authorization; (Emphasis supplied.)
As petitioners strongly argue, even if the branded LPG cylinders were indeed owned by customers, such fact does
not authorize Omni to refill these branded LPG cylinders without written authorization from the brand owners
Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total. In Yao, Sr. v. People,57 a case involving criminal infringement of property rights
under Sec. 155 of RA 8293,58 in affirming the courts a quo’s determination of the presence of probable cause, this
Court held that from Sec. 155.159 of RA 8293 can be gleaned that "mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a
registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to
cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark
infringement."60 The Court affirmed the presence of infringement involving the unauthorized sale of Gasul and
Shellane LPG cylinders and the unauthorized refilling of the same by Masagana Gas Corporation as duly attested
to and witnessed by NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and test-buys.
Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Omni refilled various branded LPG cylinders even if owned by its
customers but without authority from brand owners Petron, Pilipinas Shell and Total shows palpable violation of BP
33, as amended. As aptly noted by the Court in Yao, Sr. v. People, only the duly authorized dealers and refillers of
Shellane, Petron Gasul and, by extension, Total may refill these branded LPG cylinders. Our laws sought to deter
the pernicious practices of unscrupulous businessmen.
Fourth. The issue of ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders is irrelevant and hence need no belaboring.
BP 33, as amended, does not require ownership of the branded LPG cylinders as a condition sine qua non for the
commission of offenses involving petroleum and petroleum products. Verily, the offense of refilling a branded LPG
cylinder without the written consent of the brand owner constitutes the offense regardless of the buyer or possessor
of the branded LPG cylinder.
After all, once a consumer buys a branded LPG cylinder from the brand owner or its authorized dealer, said
consumer is practically free to do what he pleases with the branded LPG cylinder. He can simply store the cylinder
once it is empty or he can even destroy it since he has paid a deposit for it which answers for the loss or cost of the
empty branded LPG cylinder. Given such fact, what the law manifestly prohibits is the refilling of a branded LPG
cylinder by a refiller who has no written authority from the brand owner. Apropos, a refiller cannot and ought not to
refill branded LPG cylinders if it has no written authority from the brand owner.1avvphi1
Besides, persuasive are the opinions and pronouncements by the DOE: brand owners are deemed owners of their
duly embossed, stamped and marked LPG cylinders even if these are possessed by customers or consumers. The
Court recognizes this right pursuant to our laws, i.e., Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Thus the
issuance by the DOE Circular No. 2000-05-007,61 the letter-opinion62 dated December 9, 2004 of then DOE
Secretary Vincent S. Perez addressed to Pilipinas Shell, the June 6, 2007 letter63 of then DOE Secretary Raphael
P.M. Lotilla to the LPGIA, and DOE Department Circular No. 2007-10-000764 on LPG Cylinder Ownership and
Obligations Related Thereto issued on October 13, 2007 by DOE Secretary Angelo T. Reyes.
Fifth. The ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders, allegedly owned by Omni customers as petitioners
adamantly profess, is of no consequence.
345
The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom
the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.65 Petitioners cannot deny that
the seized LPG cylinders were in the possession of Omni, found as they were inside the Omni compound.
In fine, we also note that among those seized by the NBI are 16 LPG cylinders bearing the embossed brand names
of Shellane, Gasul and Totalgaz but were marked as Omnigas. Evidently, this pernicious practice of tampering or
changing the appearance of a branded LPG cylinder to look like another brand violates the brand owners’ property
rights as infringement under Sec. 155.1 of RA 8293. Moreover, tampering of LPG cylinders is a mode of
perpetrating the criminal offenses under BP 33, as amended, and clearly enunciated under DOE Circular No. 2000-
06-010 which provided penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation.
Foregoing considered, in the backdrop of the quantum of evidence required to support a finding of probable cause,
we agree with the appellate court and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, which conducted the preliminary
investigation, that there exists probable cause for the violation of Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as
amended. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.66 After all, probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief—probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.67
Probable violation of Sec. 2 (c) of BP 33, as amended
Anent the alleged violation of Sec. 2 (c) in relation to Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, petitioners strongly argue that
there is no probable cause for said violation based upon an underfilling of a lone cylinder of the eight branded LPG
cylinders refilled during the test-buy. Besides, they point out that there was no finding of underfilling in any of the
filled LPG cylinders seized during the service of the search warrants. Citing DOE’s Bureau of Energy Utilization
Circular No. 85-3-348, they maintain that some deviation is allowed from the exact filled weight. Considering the
fact that an isolated underfilling happened in so many LPG cylinders filled, petitioners are of the view that such is
due to human or equipment error and does not in any way constitute deliberate underfilling within the
contemplation of the law.
Moreover, petitioners cast aspersion on the report and findings of LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA by assailing
his independence for being a representative of the major petroleum companies and that the inspection he
conducted was made without the presence of any DOE representative or any independent body having technical
expertise in determining LPG cylinder underfilling beyond the authorized quantity.
Again, we are not persuaded.
Contrary to petitioners’ arguments, a single underfilling constitutes an offense under BP 33, as amended by PD
1865, which clearly criminalizes these offenses. In Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,68 the
Court affirmed the validity of DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 which provided penalties on a per cylinder basis for
each violation, thus:
B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of
petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products,
the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price
display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no
trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings
on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the
pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.69 (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in denying the motion for reconsideration of the LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc., the
Court upheld the basis of said DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 on the imposition of penalties on a per cylinder basis,
thus:
Respondent’s position is untenable. The Circular is not confiscatory in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis.
Those penalties do not exceed the ceiling prescribed in Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which penalizes
"any person who commits any act [t]herein prohibited." Thus, violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the
phrase "any act" as mandated in Section 4. To provide the same penalty for one who violates a prohibited act in
B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, regardless of the number of cylinders involved would result in an indiscriminate,
oppressive and impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. The equal protection clause demands that "all
persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed."70
The Court made it clear that a violation, like underfilling, on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase of any act as
mandated under Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended. Ineluctably, the underfilling of one LPG cylinder constitutes a clear
violation of BP 33, as amended. The finding of underfilling by LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA, as aptly noted by
Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Catalo who conducted the preliminary investigation, was indeed not controverted
by petitioners.
On the issue of manifest bias and partiality, suffice it to say that aside from the allegation by petitioners, they have
not shown that LPG Inspector Navio is neither an expert nor qualified to determine underfilling. Besides, it must be
noted that the inspection by LPG Inspector Navio was conducted in the presence of NBI agents on April 23, 2004
who attested to that fact through their affidavits. Moreover, no rules require and petitioners have not cited any that
the inspection be conducted in the presence of DOE representatives.
Second Core Issue: Petitioners’ Liability for Violations
Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, provides for the penalties and persons who are criminally liable, thus:
Sec. 4. Penalties. — Any person who commits any act herein prohibited shall, upon conviction, be punished with a
fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) but not more than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), or
imprisonment of at least two (2) years but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. In
cases of second and subsequent conviction under this Act, the penalty shall be both fine and imprisonment as
provided herein. Furthermore, the petroleum and/or petroleum products, subject matter of the illegal trading,
346
adulteration, shortselling, hoarding, overpricing or misuse, shall be forfeited in favor of the Government: Provided,
That if the petroleum and/or petroleum products have already been delivered and paid for, the offended party shall
be indemnified twice the amount paid, and if the seller who has not yet delivered has been fully paid, the price
received shall be returned to the buyer with an additional amount equivalent to such price; and in addition, if the
offender is an oil company, marketer, distributor, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer and other retail outlets, or hauler, the
cancellation of his license.
Trials of cases arising from this Act shall be terminated within thirty (30) days after arraignment.
When the offender is a corporation, partnership, or other juridical person, the president, the general manager,
managing partner, or such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs thereof, or employee
responsible for the violation shall be criminally liable; in case the offender is an alien, he shall be subject to
deportation after serving the sentence.
If the offender is a government official or employee, he shall be perpetually disqualified from office. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Relying on the third paragraph of the above statutory proviso, petitioners argue that they cannot be held liable for
any perceived violations of BP 33, as amended, since they are mere directors of Omni who are not in charge of the
management of its business affairs. Reasoning that criminal liability is personal, liability attaches to a person from
his personal act or omission but not from the criminal act or negligence of another. Since Sec. 4 of BP 33, as
amended, clearly provides and enumerates who are criminally liable, which do not include members of the board of
directors of a corporation, petitioners, as mere members of the board of directors who are not in charge of Omni’s
business affairs, maintain that they cannot be held liable for any perceived violations of BP 33, as amended. To
bolster their position, they attest to being full-time employees of various firms as shown by the Certificates of
Employment71 they submitted tending to show that they are neither involved in the day-to-day business of Omni nor
managing it. Consequently, they posit that even if BP 33, as amended, had been violated by Omni they cannot be
held criminally liable thereof not being in any way connected with the commission of the alleged violations, and,
consequently, the criminal complaints filed against them based solely on their being members of the board of
directors as per the GIS submitted by Omni to SEC are grossly discriminatory.
On this point, we agree with petitioners except as to petitioner Arnel U. Ty who is indisputably the President of
Omni.
It may be noted that Sec. 4 above enumerates the persons who may be held liable for violations of the law, viz: (1)
the president, (2) general manager, (3) managing partner, (4) such other officer charged with the management of
the business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity, or (5) the employee responsible for such violation. A
common thread of the first four enumerated officers is the fact that they manage the business affairs of the
corporation or juridical entity. In short, they are operating officers of a business concern, while the last in the list is
self-explanatory.
It is undisputed that petitioners are members of the board of directors of Omni at the time pertinent. There can be
no quibble that the enumeration of persons who may be held liable for corporate violators of BP 33, as amended,
excludes the members of the board of directors. This stands to reason for the board of directors of a corporation is
generally a policy making body. Even if the corporate powers of a corporation are reposed in the board of directors
under the first paragraph of Sec. 2372 of the Corporation Code, it is of common knowledge and practice that the
board of directors is not directly engaged or charged with the running of the recurring business affairs of the
corporation. Depending on the powers granted to them by the Articles of Incorporation, the members of the board
generally do not concern themselves with the day-to-day affairs of the corporation, except those corporate officers
who are charged with running the business of the corporation and are concomitantly members of the board, like the
President. Section 2573 of the Corporation Code requires the president of a corporation to be also a member of the
board of directors.
Thus, the application of the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the thing upon which it is to
operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. 74 The fourth
officer in the enumerated list is the catch-all "such other officer charged with the management of the business
affairs" of the corporation or juridical entity which is a factual issue which must be alleged and supported by
evidence.
A scrutiny of the GIS reveals that among the petitioners who are members of the board of directors are the
following who are likewise elected as corporate officers of Omni: (1) Petitioner Arnel U. Ty (Arnel) as President; (2)
petitioner Mari Antonette Ty as Treasurer; and (3) petitioner Jason Ong as Corporate Secretary. Sec. 4 of BP 33,
as amended, clearly indicated firstly the president of a corporation or juridical entity to be criminally liable for
violations of BP 33, as amended.
Evidently, petitioner Arnel, as President, who manages the business affairs of Omni, can be held liable for probable
violations by Omni of BP 33, as amended. The fact that petitioner Arnel is ostensibly the operations manager of
Multi-Gas Corporation, a family owned business, does not deter him from managing Omni as well. It is well-settled
that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 75 As to
the other petitioners, unless otherwise shown that they are situated under the catch-all "such other officer charged
with the management of the business affairs," they may not be held liable under BP 33, as amended, for probable
violations. Consequently, with the exception of petitioner Arnel, the charges against other petitioners must perforce
be dismissed or dropped.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. Accordingly, the assailed
September 28, 2007 Decision and March 14, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98054
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners Mari Antonette Ty, Jason Ong, Willy Dy and Alvin Ty are
excluded from the two Informations charging probable violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 33, as amended. The
Joint Resolution dated November 7, 2005 of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor is modified accordingly.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
347
BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner,
vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer
were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1
dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo to nullify the
proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and
penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na"
program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson
Karina Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain
"Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management Office
(IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents marked "Confidential" are left
unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an
employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly
think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the
Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the Csc.
The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly because our
perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.
Concerned Govt employee3
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT),
and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."4 After some briefing, the team proceeded
at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the
team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director
III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At
around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the
office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC
Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:
"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of
the Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be better."
"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair."
"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.
"We can’t do anything about … it … it’s a directive from chair."
"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint"; "ill send a copy of the memo via mms" 5
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a
lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team from
CSC main office: "Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin."6 At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the
investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the
purpose of preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the
hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters7 in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
348
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring
the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from
notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioner’s personal files, Chairperson David made the following
observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected with
administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-
Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and on behalves of
parties, who are facing charges as respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the
one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and
inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline
misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings so prepared further
demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming regularity.
It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against common human experience, to believe that
the person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of the
retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft pleadings were obtained
from the computer assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a
hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control and disposition. 9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had
no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He
accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in
his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-
incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave,
citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their
sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection
against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property, the
temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the
anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal
complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal
search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being
"fruits of a poisonous tree."10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07038211 finding prima facie case against the petitioner and
charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner
was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal
investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days
preventive suspension effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution
No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as
without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such
power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with pending cases at the
CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom he
permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to
the motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioner’s CPU
and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosa’s client who attested that petitioner had nothing to do with
the pleadings or bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner.
Petitioner contended that the case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal
complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had instigated this
administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution
No. 07051912 dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said
motion as petitioner’s answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February
26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction.
Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel
D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office
of the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida.14
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of the case
on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary
injunction.15 Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the
same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing
conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-parte.16 Petitioner moved to
defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in
abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the
pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his
counsel’s non-appearance.17 This prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents,
including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07113419 denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the denial of
his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The
hearing officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was
deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,20 the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo
GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of
Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties,
349
namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities
and bar from taking future civil service examinations.21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC noted the dearth
of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as employer invades the private
files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial investigation
of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latter’s consent or participation. The CSC thus
turned to relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of O’Connor v. Ortega 22
as authority for the view that government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could
validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant
requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v.
Mark L. Simons23 which declared that the federal agency’s computer use policy foreclosed any inference of
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein recognized that such
policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondent’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the
computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the employee’s office was upheld as valid because a
government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related
misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer
use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to a computer
assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the
search of petitioner’s computer successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the search in its capacity
as government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-related
misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of admissibility
of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the
charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of R.A.
No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioner’s dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the
service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he
likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 07180025 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the basis of
the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation was conducted and the
results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in
petitioner’s computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a
judge in view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as government property and that employee-
users thereof have no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the
computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in CSC’s act of proceeding with the formal investigation
as there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that –
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS
IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN
TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF
SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL
RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT
INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL
MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE
COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL
RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO
PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF
DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING
AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA
STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE
PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002.
AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF
O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW
ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO
EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC
RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED
SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO
RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26
350
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of
his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to
privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, 27 which
provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches
and seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it
is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court
declared in People v. Marti29 :
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and
constituted a "search and seizure". Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area.
In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). 32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the workplace, the
US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to an office at union
headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The
Court thus "recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of
O’Connor v. Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital, claimed a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of mismanagement of the
psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities involving
his private patients under the state medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal items from his
desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically declared that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer."35 A plurality of four
Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because "some government offices may be so
open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable", a court must consider "[t]he
operational realities of the workplace" in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are
implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that
expectation "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances."36
On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace, O’Connor teaches:
x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of
employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by
legitimate regulation. x x x The employee’s expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the
employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and
business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and
other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the
nature of government offices that others – such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the
general public – may have frequent access to an individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that
"[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because
the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer," x x x but some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether
an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.37
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortega’s Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed "an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider as reasonable." Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not
share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in
his own office while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and
there being no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging
employees from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the absence of such a
policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr.
Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was reasonable, the
O’Connor plurality decision discussed the following principles:
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Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals
simply concluded without discussion that the "search…was not a reasonable search under the fourth amendment."
x x x "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the
inquiry into the standards governing such searches…[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a
search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the
search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires
"balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." x x x In the case of searches conducted
by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee’s office,
desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would
be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would
otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other
circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the
business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the
primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict
with the "common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter." x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these
agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an employee’s desk
for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of
probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is
to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine
inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient
and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee
offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee
misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest substantially different from "the
normal need for law enforcement." x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate
in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency,
incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases,
public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or
incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials,
therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and
overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our
view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the
need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often
irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
the…probable-cause requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither
unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace,
nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should
be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether
the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’"
xxx
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of
work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such
as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of
the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the character of
the search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was undertaken, the case
was remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the search and seizure, and evaluation of
the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope.
In O’Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless searches involving public employees
for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed
against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable
cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.40
O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the workplace. One of
these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons41
where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of
receiving and possessing materials containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did
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not share with anyone, and a computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use
stating that employees were to use the Internet for official government business only and that accessing unlawful
material was specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the agency will
periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the user’s Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed
its contractor for the management of the agency’s computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet
activity originating from Simons’ computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and examination of Simons’ computer.
After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on the
hard drive of Simon’s computer were copied from a remote work station. Days later, the contractor’s representative
finally entered Simon’s office, removed the original hard drive on Simon’s computer, replaced it with a copy, and
gave the original to the agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched Simons’
office in the evening when Simons was not around. The search team copied the contents of Simons’ computer;
computer diskettes found in Simons’ desk drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes;
videotapes; and various documents, including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress
these evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a
hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons’ computer and office
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the search remains
valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was discovered in
the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy
happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and
interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
standard announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the search, the employer had "reasonable grounds
for suspecting" that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that
Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the
hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive.
Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate
expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a legitimate
expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared
to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights
because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded
from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by FBIS’
retrieval of Simons’ hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his Internet
use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would "audit, inspect, and/or
monitor" employees’ use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail
messages, "as deemed appropriate." x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they could not
reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons subjectively
believed that the files he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable
after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS’ actions in remotely
searching and seizing the computer files Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x x Here,
Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted above, the operational realities of Simons’
workplace may have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is no evidence in the record of
any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude that, on this
record, Simons possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employee’s supervisor entering the employee’s government office and
retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had absolutely no expectation of privacy –
equipment that the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the employee in the employee’s
office. This situation may be contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a government employee were
unrelated to his employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the employer’s policy and
the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS’ intrusion into Simons’ office to retrieve the hard
drive is one in which a reasonable employer might engage. x x x42 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board43 which involved the constitutionality of a
provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion
of privacy in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the
office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the
following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?;
353
and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s
computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee’s relationship to the
item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3)
whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to both the
subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together. 44 Thus,
where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same
locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and items located therein must
comply with the Fourth Amendment.45
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not
allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always
locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any
means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the
public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and
even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown people" and that in the past 22 years he had been
discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting
cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism,
Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the
office as a paying customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation
of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is
negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for
legitimate business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their
respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to
handle the confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other computer network. Users understand
that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the
exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or
operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their passwords for access
to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or given to others.
Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using their passwords. No User may access the
computer system with another User’s password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer system or to
encode particular files or messages does not imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in the
material they create or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global
passwords that permit access to all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded with a particular User’s password. Only members of the
Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.
x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the
use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections
may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in determining whether an employee’s expectation of
privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of
Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his computer files where the university’s computer policy, the computer user is informed not to expect
354
privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is specifically told that computer files,
including e-mail, can be searched when the university is responding to a discovery request in the course of
litigation. Petitioner employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university officials
conducted a warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials.49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, we
answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-
ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals
with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from unknown sources
adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in
another government agency, "selling" cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all done during office hours and
involved the use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to warrant an
investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions involved in
the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on the
integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to back up the files in the computers of
the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x50
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.51 Thus,
in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government agency’s
computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided
that employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and
technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his
office computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in
prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant employee’s computer hard drive was first remotely
examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was inaccessible
and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor
confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express
policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative
investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial remote search of
the hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the
O’Connor ruling that a public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at
inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.52
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope.
We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the
guidelines established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received
recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending cases with
the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously
disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties
with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission
as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and
objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be
actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence
in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit
any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search
was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the
computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an
employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in
ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to
impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-
related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to
observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text
messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in
any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the
Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-
related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed
admissible.53
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Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking
the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also
untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the
government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor
and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography.
As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being
conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This
situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in
O’Connor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54 involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the
basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal
cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents.
The team was able to access Atty. Morales’ personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive,
which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of
another lawyer. Atty. Morales’ computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered
released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with
the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no
one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the
charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that while
Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, the Court cannot
use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were
able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed an
administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the validity of the
investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as
there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of
Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for
insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which involved a personal
computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate
and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors
and circumstances under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S.
2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are admissible in the
administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding the
petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only
respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.55
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and
documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses it
presented during the formal investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed to be similar or
exactly the same content-wise with those on the case records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV,
CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with the
CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the explanation given by petitioner, to the effect
that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa
whom he allowed the use of his computer for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and
doubtful under the circumstances. We hold that the CSC’s factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject
pleadings and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to the orders,
decisions or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such as a petition for certiorari or a motion
for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof knowingly and willingly participated in
the promotion or advancement of the interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the
appearance in one of the retrieved documents the phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," lends
plausibility to an inference that the preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a
laudable motivation. Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing the same for the money – a
"legal mercenary" selling or purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he
was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer. More significantly, one of the
witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written copy of one of the pleadings found in the case
records lying on the table of the respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed
to the Court of Appeals. The said circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the
interest of the Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents were the
personal files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally served as his
counsel of record during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a sworn
affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution
witness, Reyes, who testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the
computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in close proximity with Pollo
and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally knows, was using the computer in question. Further,
Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that
the same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of weight and credence. The same is true with the other
supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.
356
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact that he was
unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him for official purpose, not only once but
several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the interests of the Commission.
He was, in effect, acting as a principal by indispensable cooperation…Or at the very least, he should be
responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the electricity,
to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing in one of
the documents, "Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," was a private joke between the person alluded to
therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more sinister. The same is
too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the computer
assigned to the respondent, unless he had something to do with it?56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous complaint since
Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II – Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it
is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper
disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation therein or
supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person complained of may be required to
comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated
by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive of
computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining authority’s own fact-
finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the petitioner who was then
directed to file his comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals57 --
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or
employee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to. Considering that
the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As to petitioner’s challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant consideration.
The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the
Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored, was
already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflor’s previous
memo expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this case. According to
Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the
January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores.
Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further
because the CUP being for internal use of the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order.58
Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the
CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling that petitioner is
guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A.
No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with
all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and
Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 148117 : March 22, 2007]
MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI, Petitioners, v. THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 15, 2000
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684.
The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:
In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province charged
Mabini Epie, Jr. and Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, 2 as
amended. The Informtion reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway at Acop, Municipality of
Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
357
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding each other and without any authority of law or without any
license or permit granted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY
FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum
aforesaid.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet (presided by respondent Judge
Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138.
When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an information from a confidential agent that a jeepney
with Plate No. AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.
SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1 Domingo Pulig. They then
swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They
flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.
The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted vegetables, like womboc3 and chili.
When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his companions
admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners,
Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged with violation of Section 68
of the Revised Forestry Code.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress Evidence of
the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.
In a Resolution4 dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it was denied in a Resolution dated September 27,
1999.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 55684 assailing the said Resolutions of the trial court.
On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that
respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the
search conducted without warrant by the police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber are
admissible in evidence against the accused.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied in a Resolution5 dated April
11, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe
that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a
warrant.
In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the right of a person to privacy against
unreasonable intrusions by the agents of the State. This right to undisturbed privacy is guaranteed by Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the above provision shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such
search and seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.6
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where search
and seizure may be conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause.
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place to be searched.8 In People v. Aruta,9 we ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination
varies according to the facts of each case.
358
Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be
conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause to justify
such warrantless search and seizure.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a
passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The
lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to
intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down
but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle
disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit
to cut and transport the same.
In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with
their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the
persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments
of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding
that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
she ruled that the warrantless search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55684. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175783
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus - Promulgated:
BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS, September 3, 2007
Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01799 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas, affirming the Decision[2] dated 14 October
2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, [3] as
amended.
The Information filed against appellant alleged:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON y NICOLAS of the crime of
Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as amended, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags each containing
97.92 grams, 95.46 grams, 40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and 3.17 grams
for a total weight of 250.74 grams of white crystalline substance, which after the corresponding
laboratory examination conducted gave positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride also known as shabu a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[4]
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.[5]
The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno)
who testified that in the morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a
confidential information that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411 [6] would deliver an unspecified amount
of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana
dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision,
they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a
window of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City
Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan
inquired about the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent
document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As soon
as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of
which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately brought to the police station.
In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that when they frisked appellant, they
discovered 2 big plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium size plastic (sic) and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing
serial number C-9890 with one loaded magazine with eleven ammunition.[7]
359

The white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon Cityfor examination. The test conducted on the specimen turned
over to the crime laboratory yielded the following:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x
x.[8]
Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment. According to him,
he used to work as a caretaker of Curacha, a beer house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road, Marville
II Subdivision and owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported for work at six oclockin the
evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him. One of these men asked him regarding the ownership
of the car parked outside the bar. He allegedly accompanied the men outside so he could confirm the identity of the
owner of the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green colored Isuzu Gemini
car which according to him was driven by his employer, Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified
men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men allegedly
asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A
few hours passed and he was then brought to the police headquarters where he was asked regarding his address
and the name of his employer. After two days, he was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact the owner of the
Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged
with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession of shabu and Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct examination, appellant
reiterated that he should not have been the one charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was driving
the Gemini car.
The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict and imposed
upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[9]
On 17 September 2003, we resolved to accept the appeal interposed by appellant, the records of the case having
been forwarded to this Court by the RTC, Antipolo City, Branch 71. We also required the parties to file their respective
briefs.[10]
In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in which he questioned the validity
of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence presented against him. He contends that at the time of his
warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within Marville Subdivision. He had not committed, was not committing,
and was not about to commit any crime which could have justified his apprehension. He goes on to argue that even
if he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his arrest by his failure to raise the matter before entering his plea,
such waiver did not affect the unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police. Appellant claims that
as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities
were already informed of his identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior surveillance
and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized from him should be excluded
from evidence. [11]
On 23 February 2005, we ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals conformably with our decision
in People v. Mateo, which modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court with respect to direct appeals from
the RTCs to this Court of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.[12]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
71, Antipolo City, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is hereby AFFIRMED.[13]
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony to be clear and unequivocal [14] and
should therefore prevail over appellants defense of denial. [15] The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants
contention that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been viewed with disfavor and has become a
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [16] It also took note
of appellants failure to give any credible reason why the police singled him out considering that they were strangers
to one another prior to the date of the incident.[17]
Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by making a lone assignment of error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.[18]
360
 WITNESS:
Appellant contends that the trial courts reliance on the prosecutions evidence was erroneous considering that he, as A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
a mere grade school graduate, could not have concocted his narration of the events that led to his arrest.[19] He also
maintains that he was an easy target of police operatives, since he was a new employee in the videoke bar and was Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?
therefore unfamiliar with the people who frequented said establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution
A: Yes, sir.
failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty required for conviction and that the trial court should not have
applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties on the part of the police officers. [20] Q: How did you come to know him?

A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.

Appellant likewise points out the trial courts supposed failure to substantiate the factual and legal bases for his
conviction. He notes that the court a quos evaluation of the facts and evidence was contained in only two paragraphs Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you please point him out?
and was utterly lacking in substantial discussion, in contravention of this Courts edict that the decisions must distinctly
A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
and clearly express their factual and legal bases.[21]
LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:
On 19 February 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. On 17
The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when confronted give his name as
April 2007, appellant filed a Manifestation stating that he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all relevant Bernardo Tuazon.
matters for his defense were already discussed in his previous pleadings.[22] The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief.[23] PROS. LUNA:

Q: Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning of March 7, 1999?
The appeal must fail.
WITNESS:
In insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Bueno, appellant is
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
basically making an issue about a witnesss credibility. In this regard, we reiterate the rule that appellate courts will
generally not disturb factual findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting Q: What were you doing then at that time?
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
testifying.[24] Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the
factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal.[25] Our careful review of the records of this Q: Who were your companions at that time?
case reveals that the trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of PO3 Bueno. In open court, PO3 Bueno
A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
recounted their encounter with appellant as follows:
Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual incident at that time?
PROS. LUNA:
A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.
Thank you, your honor.
Q: About what?
Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime in the month of March
1999? A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville
Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
361
 Q: What happened after flagging down the car?
Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed to deliver an undetermined
amount of shabu? A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police officers, sir.

A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the telephone that the car Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?
is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC 411 who will deliver at said place.
A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of the Antipolo City
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next? Police Station, sir.

A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir. Q: What was the reaction of the driver?

Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana? A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.

A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area. Q: What did you do next? In your case what did you do?

Q: What did you do next? A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.

A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle and proceeded to COURT:
the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q: Did you know what Padlan did?
Q: Where is this located?

A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City. WITNESS:

Q: Upon reaching that place what happened? A: Yes, sir.

A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate number PFC 411, sir. Q: What did he do?

Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to identify it? A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent document for his gun.

A: Yes, sir. Q: What do you mean he was asked? Who was asked?

Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1 and B-2. What relation has A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
this to the one you mentioned?
PROS. LUNA:
A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?
Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?
WITNESS:
A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
A: He said that the gun is not his.
Q: Specifically, what did you do?
Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon what did you do as police
A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir. officer?

362
 A: I ordered him to get down from the car.
COURT:
Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers seat.
Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?
A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it contained shabu, sir.
Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?
A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the evidence, sir.
Q: What did you do with the shabu?
A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.
Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?
A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride sir. [26]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3 Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt
appellants culpability. His testimony regarding the circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7 March 1999
from the moment their office received a confidential tip from their informer up to the time they accosted appellant
deserved to be given significance as it came from the mouth of a law enforcement officer who enjoys the presumption
of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance
of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or that they were moved by ill-
will.[27]
Appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative testimony offered by
the prosecution. It is well-settled that positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of
an accused.[28] A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence
becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over
convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters.[29] Denial is an inherently weak defense
which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[30]
We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the admissibility of the physical evidence
presented against him. No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures
admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search
of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.[31]
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,[32] this Court had the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the
exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever
a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible
in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
363

Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the
police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the
aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could
amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles
does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse,
jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless
search of a vehicle.[33]
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[34] the term probable cause was explained to mean
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he
is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items,
articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of
the case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the
search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[35]
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by
appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville
Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said
vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in
the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellants
waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened
the polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against
appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that the
same was obtained through a warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of
the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit
said evidence. [36]
Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional requirement that (n)o decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.[37] Again, we disagree.
Faithful adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is a vital component of due process and
fair play.[38] The rule takes an even more important significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he
lost so that he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision needs to be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.[39]
In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially complied with the requirements
of the Constitution. The decision contained a summary of the facts of the case as presented by the prosecution and
by the defense. It likewise contained an explanation as to why it found appellant guilty as charged.Admittedly, the
decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently informed appellant as regards the bases for his conviction. It readily
informs appellant that the trial court disregarded his defense of bare denial in favor of the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties enjoyed by police officers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799
dated 31 July 2006, finding appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 180914
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Present:
Plaintiff-Appellee,
CORONA, C.J.,
364
 Chairperson,
Accused-appellant was indicted for four counts of rape and one count of attempted rape, all qualified by
VELASCO, JR., his relationship with and the minority of the private offended party. The criminal informations read:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Criminal Case No. 02-548 [Amended Information]
- versus - PERALTA,* and
That on or about July 20, 2001 at more or less 7:00 oclock in the evening, at barangay
PEREZ, JJ. Anibong, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, that is by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy being the father of the victim
Promulgated: [AAA], a minor, 12 years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the said victim against her will and without her consent, to her damage
and prejudice.
DOMINGO DOMINGUEZ, JR., alias SANDY, November 24, 2010
The qualifying aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship are present
Accused-Appellant. considering that the victim is 12 years of age and the accused is the father.[5]
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Criminal Case No. 02-549 [Amended Information]

That on the 4th week of July 2001 at more or less 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at
DECISION barangay Anibong, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, that is by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy being the father of the victim
[AAA], a minor, 12 years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the said victim against her will and without her consent, to her damage
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: and prejudice.

The qualifying aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship are present

considering that the victim is 12 years of age and the accused is the father.[6]
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02131
which affirmed with modifications the Decision[2]dated February 6, 2006 of Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon, convicting accused-appellant Domingo Dominguez, Jr., also known as Sandy, of three Criminal Case No. 02-550 [Amended Information]
counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape of his minor daughter.

Consistent with our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto[3] and People v. Guillermo,[4] this Court withholds the
real name of the private offended party and her immediate family members as well as such other personal
circumstances or any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity. The initials AAA represent
the private offended party, the initials BBB refer to her mother, and the initials CCC stand for one of her relatives.
That in the second week of August 2001 at more or less 1:00 oclock in the afternoon,
at barangay Anibong, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence
and intimidation, that is by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy being the father of the
victim [AAA], a minor, 12 years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with the said victim against her will and without her consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
365

The qualifying aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship are present
considering that the victim is 12 years of age and the accused is the father.[7]
Criminal Case No. 02-551 [Amended Information]
That in the second week of September 2001 at more or less 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon, at barangay Anibong, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, that is by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy being the father
of the victim [AAA], a minor, 12 years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said victim against her will and without her consent,
to her damage and prejudice.
The qualifying aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship are present
considering that the victim is 12 years of age and the accused is the father.[8]
Criminal Case No. 02-552
That on or about November 20, 2001 at more or less 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at
barangay Anibong, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commence the commission of the crime of Rape
directly by overt acts upon the person of [AAA], a minor, 12 years of age, through force and
intimidation taking advantage of his moral ascendancy being the father, to wit: by undressing the
victim, thereby removing all her clothing apparel with the intention of having carnal knowledge,
against her will and without her consent, but said accused did not however perform all the acts
of execution which should have produced the crime of rape, as a consequence, by reason of
some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is because somebody
saw them, and said acts produced psychological and emotional trauma to said [AAA], to her
damage and prejudice.
The qualifying aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship are present
considering that the victim is 12 years of age and the accused is the father.[9]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. A pre-trial conference[10] followed and,
thereafter, the criminal charges were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, the private offended party, AAA; [11] her mother, BBB;[12] her
relative who claimed to be an eyewitness to the sexual abuse, CCC;[13] and the medico-legal who physically examined
her for signs of sexual abuse, Dr. Irene V. Ella.[14] The documentary exhibits of the prosecution consisted of the
Medico-Legal Report[15] dated November 23, 2001 issued by Dr. Ella; the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA [16] issued
by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Magallanes, Sorsogon; and the Marriage Contract of AAAs
parents.[17] The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of accused-appellant.[18]
Based on the combined testimonies of the witnesses and documentary evidence for the prosecution, the
RTC accounted the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution shows and as narrated in open court by the victim herself [AAA];
that the first incident of rape happened before the fiesta of Magallanes which was in the month
of July 2001. Her small siblings were already asleep and she was about to go to sleep also, when
she noticed her father (the accused) already beside her. Her father (accused) undressed her
while he also undressed himself, and as he was about to mount her for the purpose of raping
her, her mother arrived and inquired why she was naked. Because of fear of bodily harm brought
about by the threat coming from the accused who was then holding a bolo, the victim did not say
anything. She positively identified her father (the accused) inside the courtroom when asked to
do so by the public prosecutor. The accused failed to consummate the rape during the first
incident.
The second rape happened after a week from the first attempt, which could be between the fourth
week of July or first week of August 2001 because the victim stated that it was no longer in the
month of July 2001. It happened in a coconut farm in Anibong, Magallanes, Sorsogon. The victim
was asked by her father to accompany him in getting coconut leaves because they are going to
weave it in their house. When the two (2) of them reached the place, her father (accused)
undressed her and thereafter undressed himself also and made her lie down then inserted his
penis into her vagina. She felt weak and pain all over her body including her vagina which she
felt to be swollen at that time. She tried to struggle but she was helpless, particularly so, that the
accused was also armed with a bolo at that time. After the bestial act was consummated they
proceeded home bringing with them the coconut leaves that they gathered. She did not tell
anyone about the incident because of fear of the accused and the thought that they might not
believe her.
The third incident of rape happened two (2) weeks after the second incident, which was sometime
in the month of August 2001. While the fourth incident of rape happened three (3) weeks after
the third incident which was sometime in the month of September 2001. The fifth and last incident
of rape happened according to the victim sometime in the 20th of November 2001. All the 3rd,
4th and 5th incidents of rape happened in the same coconut farm although in the different places
of the farm. The same pattern of execution was adopted by the accused. He would ask the victim
to go with him to the coconut farm to gather coconut leaves, and once they reached the place
the accused would undress the victim then undress himself also and have sexual intercourse
with her against her will. The victim could not refuse or disobey the command of the accused
(her father) because he will scold and threaten her with punishment if she would not go with
366
 him. She could not also tell her mother about it because of fear. At the time of the first and second
rapes the victim was only 12 years old. She was already 13 years old when the third, fourth, and
fifth incidents of rape happened. Her date of birth was January 3, 1989.
During the fifth incident of rape on November 20, 2001 the accused and the victim [were] again
in the same coconut farm in order to get coconut leaves. Both of them were already naked and
the accused was about to mount the victim when they were seen by prosecution eyewitness
[CCC] who shouted at them, thats why the accused fled leaving the victim behind. Because of
what happened the victim was able to gain enough courage to tell her mother and to report the
incident to the barangay captain of their place, thus leading to the apprehension of the
accused.[19] (Citations omitted.)
The RTC pointed out that on cross-examination, AAA again narrated straightforwardly how, when, and
where she was sexually abused by her own father:
On cross-examination the credibility of the victim was even enhanced by her consistent and very
candid answers to the very important questions propounded on her by the defense counsel. This
notwithstanding some minor lapses on her part, which can be explained by her tender age and
lack of exposure to a usually pressure packed court atmosphere. The minor-victim was
consistent in her claim that accused Domingo Dominguez is her natural father; that she was
raped by him; that nobody forced her to file these cases against her own father; that they are
seven (7) children in the family; that the first attempted rape happened in the year 2001 before
the fiesta in Magallanes at around 7:00 oclock in the evening; their house is situated on a hill
where there is no electricity and they are only using kerosene lamp in their house; there are no
rooms in their house and usually sleep in one place; at the time of the first attempted rape she
and her five small siblings together with her father were the only ones present in their house; her
mother went to her lolas house in order to get a viand; while she was attending to her five small
siblings making them sleep the accused undressed her; when her mother arrived she was
already naked but her father (the accused) made an alibi that he was just dressing her up
because they were going to the market; when her mother asked her about it she did not give any
answer; nothing happened during that time because of the timely arrival of her mother; the first
consummated rape (the second incident) happened in the coconut farm in Anibong, Magallanes,
Sorsogon, which is far from their house at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon; it was her first
sexual experience and her private part bled; she could not refuse to go with her father to the
coconut plantation because of fear of punishment if she will not go with him, her mother could
not go against her father; she did not tell her mother about the rape for fear that she might not
believe her, because the culprit is her own father who is her own blood; during the second incident
she threw her panty away because it was already stained with blood and just used her shorts;
the third incident of rape (second consummated rape) happened in the same coconut plantation;
the accused told her brother to fetch the carabao, when they were already alone the accused
raped her and after he was through with her they gathered coconut leaves and when her brother
together with the carabao arrived later, they loaded them on the carabao and proceeded home;
during the 3rd incident there was no more bleeding of her vagina unlike the second she did not
throw her panty after the rape, she used it again; she did not tell her mother, not even her friends
nor her teacher nor her lola about the rape because of fear that they might laugh at her; the fourth
incident of rape (3rd consummated rape) happened in the same coconut plantation under the
same pattern of execution with the accused succeeding in inserting his penis into her vagina; the
fifth and last incident of attempted rape happened on November 20, 2001 in the same coconut
farm when [CCC] saw her and her father (accused) both naked; because of what happened the
victim gained courage to open up to her lola and reported the incident to their barangay captain,
knowing that [CCC] will support her accusation; that even if her father will be meted out the
penalty of death she will not withdraw the case against her father and will insist in her accusation
that she was raped by him.[20] (Citation omitted.)
The RTC also summed up the corroborating evidence for the prosecution as follows:
The aforequoted testimony of the offended party, [AAA], was amply supported by the medical
findings and the testimony made in open court by the medico-legal officer who physically
examined her, Dr. Irene V. Ella, MHO Magallanes, Sorsogon.
Dr. Ella declared, that the minor victim was brought to her office by the Barangay Captain of
Anibong and the Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer of Magallanes, Mrs. Mercadero,
for physical examination based on the alleged complaint of rape. Based on the result of the
physical examination, it was found out that the vaginal canal of the victim admits 1 cm. in diameter
test tube with no resistance. Meaning, that something has been inserted on it for several times
thats why the vaginal canal admits very easily a 1 cm. in diameter test tube with no
resistance. Accordingly, a girl without sexual experience would show some resistance if you
insert on her vagina a 1 cm. in diameter test tube. Another finding was that the labia
majora/minora was slightly gaping indicative of a sexual experience on the part of the
victim. Normally, a girl without any experience in sex or sexual abuse would show a closely
adherent labia majora/minora which is the covering of the vaginal canal. The medico legal officer
concluded, that the above findings confirmed penile penetration for several times. Her basis is
the laxity of the vaginal wall and the easy insertion of the 1 cm. test tube. Accordingly, if the
penetration only happened once it will not cause such laxity or it might cause a laxity but not as
manifest as what was reflected in her findings.
The claim of the offended party, [AAA], that the last attempt to rape her was committed by her
father (accused) on November 20, 2001 at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon was supported
by the very candid and credible testimony of prosecution eyewitness [CCC] who declared that
on November 20, 2001 at more or less 1:00 oclock in the afternoon he was at the forest of
Anibong, Magallanes, looking for snails when he chanced upon father and daughter, Sandy
(accused) and [AAA], standing close to each other totally naked. [AAA] was crying while Sandy
367
 was standing. He did not go near them because of fear of Sandy who had a bolo with him, so he
left the place and went home. He related the incident to his cousin x x x. Both Sandy and [AAA]
saw him when he chanced upon them.
On cross-examination, the aforenamed witness was able to clarify further his position when he
stated, that he was about 3 to 4 meters away from the two when he first saw them standing both
naked. He took two steps forward closer to them thats why he was able to confirm that it was his
Manoy Sandy (Domingo Dominguez, Jr./Accused) and his daughter [AAA] who were
standing. [AAA] was shouting for help but the witness could not come to her aid because of fear
of Sandy who was carrying a bolo. What was made clear however from the testimony of said
witness was the fact, that he did not witness any sexual intercourse between the two thus
implying in all probability that the rape was just in its attempted stage.[21] (Citations omitted.)
The RTC then summarized the evidence for the defense, based on the denial and alibi of accused-
appellant, as follows:
Accused Domingo Dominguez, Jr. admitted during his testimony on direct examination, that he
is the father of the victim [AAA]; that his wife is [BBB]; that they have seven (7) children; three of
them were girls, the eldest is x x x while the youngest is [AAA]; his main occupation is that of a
farmer who works in the rice field; all his children are in school and he provides for their education
and daily sustenance; that he loves his children and just wanted to discipline them but he was
placed into this kind of situation; he cannot afford to do to [AAA] the charges that were filed
against him; he cannot say whether he still loves [AAA] considering that he is presently
incarcerated; he had no bad record in the barangay and had never been charged of a similar
case before; he likewise scold his two other daughters if they commit a wrong.
On cross-examination, the accused further stated, that he spanks or maltreats his children
whenever they commit mistakes as a form of discipline; that whenever he physically maltreats or
disciplines his children they suffer injuries, although he do[es] it only when he is angry; sometime
when he arrived from work and nobody is around he gets mad; that his children [have] developed
that fear of him because of his way of disciplining them even his wife is afraid of him; he claims
that all the charges filed against him were fabricated by members of his family because they
wanted to show other people that he is bad, but he denied having done those criminal acts; that
[AAA] filed this case against him because he scolded her; that if he really planned to rape
somebody he could have done it to other persons but not to [AAA]; in 1999, [AAA] was about ten
(10) years old and [had] many male friends who are her classmates but had no
boyfriend.[22] (References to case records deleted.)
In its Decision dated February 6, 2006, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
counts of qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550 and 02-551, and two counts of attempted rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552. The dispositive portion of said RTC judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the GUILT of accused DOMINGO
DOMINGUEZ, JR. alias Sandy having been established beyond reasonable
doubt, SENTENCE is hereby pronounced against him as follows:
a) In Criminal Case No. 02-548, above-named accused who is
found guilty only of Attempted Rape, defined and penalized under Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of
Prision Mayor to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal, present the aggravating circumstances of
minority and relationship without any mitigating circumstance;
b) In Criminal Case No. 02-549, above-named accused having been
found guilty of Qualified Rape is sentenced to indivisible penalty of death, to indemnify [AAA]
in the amount of Php75,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto; another Php75,000.00 as moral damages
and another Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages, with no subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;
c) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-550 and 02-551, above-named accused is
likewise found guilty of Qualified Rape in each case and sentenced to an indivisible penalty of
death for each count of Qualified Rape, to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of Php150,000.00 as
indemnity ex delicto; another Php150,000.00 as moral damages; and another Php100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, with no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
d) In Criminal Case No. 02-552, above-named accused is likewise
found guilty of Attempted Rape, defined and penalized under Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of Prision
Mayor to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal, present the aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship without any mitigating circumstance.
The period of preventive imprisonment already served by the accused shall be credited
in the service of his sentences pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The above-mentioned penalties shall be served by the accused in the order of
succession provided for in Article 70 of the same Code.[23] (Emphases ours.)
Accused-appellant interposed his appeal from the judgment of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. On April
11, 2006, the trial court transmitted the records of the cases to the appellate court. Accused-appellant filed
his Brief[24] on November 21, 2006 while the plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its Brief[25] on March 21, 2007.
368
 In his appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused-appellant cited the following assignment of errors:
I
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
attempted rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552.
II
Granting arguendo that the accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, the penalty imposed was not proper.
III
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550 and 02-551 thereby imposing upon him the supreme penalty
of death.
Accused-appellant asserted his innocence and asked for his acquittal from all the charges.
On the two counts of attempted rape, accused-appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to show any
overt act which would prove his intent to rape AAA. AAAs claims during her testimony that accused-appellant was
about to rape her or about to go on top of her were it not for the timely arrival of her mother, BBB, in Criminal Case
No. 02-548, or were it not for the fortunate appearance of a relative, CCC, in Criminal Case No. 02-552, were allegedly
so vague that one cannot make a clear conclusion whether the accused-appellant really intended to rape AAA.
Accused-appellant also noted that should his conviction for the crime of attempted rape be sustained, the
trial court committed an error in the imposition of the proper penalty. With the abrogation of the death penalty, the
imposable penalty for the crime of rape committed in the attempted stage, which must be two degrees lower than
that of the penalty imposed for the crime intended to be committed, should be prision mayor.
Anent the three counts of qualified rape, accused-appellant denied the accusations and questioned the
motive of AAA in charging him with said crime. Accused-appellant pointed out that it was implausible that AAA would
not tell her mother and siblings about the alleged rapes. It was also incredible that AAA would still accompany
accused-appellant repeatedly to the coconut farm despite her having been previously sexually assaulted by him, with
AAA knowing that their seclusion was another opportunity for accused-appellant to sexually assault her
again. Accused-appellant averred that AAAs unexplained silence and continuous acquiescence to the sexual abuses
supposedly committed against her made her accusations dubious.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, claimed that accused-appellant was properly convicted in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551 for three counts of qualified rape. Citing settled jurisprudence, plaintiff-
appellee argued that the appreciation by the trial court of all the evidence on the rape charges deserved great weight
and respect. AAAs consistent, candid, and straightforward narrations that she was raped for several times by her
own father were duly supported by the medico-legal findings of sexual abuse. Accused-appellants bare denials and
ascription of ill motive on AAAs part in filing the criminal charges were allegedly untenable.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, however, plaintiff-appellee posited that accused-appellant
should be held criminally liable for two counts of acts of lasciviousness instead of attempted rape. Plaintiff-appellee
noted that the most significant element of attempted rape is the intent of the offender to penetrate the sexual organ
of his victim.[26] In the aforesaid cases, accused-appellant was able to do nothing more than undress AAA and himself.
After its review of the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellants conviction in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551 for three counts of qualified rape; while it modified the RTC judgment in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552 and convicted accused-appellant for two counts of acts of lasciviousness. The
appellate court also modified the penalties and damages imposed against accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 6, 2006 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Cases Nos. 02-549; 02-550; and 02-551, the penalty of death
imposed on the accused-appellant for each count of qualified rape is hereby
reduced to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 without
eligibility for parole. The award of exemplary damages for each count of
qualified rape committed, is reduced to P25,000.00.
(2) In Criminal Cases Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, the accused-appellant is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum penalty to six (6) years of prision correccional as
maximum penalty for each count of the acts of lasciviousness
committed. The accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages for each count of the acts of lasciviousness
committed.[27]
Thereafter, accused-appellant appealed his convictions before us.
In a Minute Resolution[28] dated February 4, 2008, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. The parties, however, manifested that they had exhausted their arguments before the Court of
Appeals and, thus, would no longer file any supplemental brief.[29]
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and affirm accused-appellants conviction in Criminal Case
Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551 for three counts of qualified rape.
369
 A: Yes, maam.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) Q: After you were undressed and after he also undressed himself, what happened next?
when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or A: His penis was inserted inside my vagina.
grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Orillosa,[30] we held that in incestuous Q: Were you made to lie down?
rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the A: Yes, maam.
father would suffice.
Q: Now, what did you feel when his penis [was] inserted [into] your vagina?
A: I felt weak and I felt pain in all of my body and even my vagina felt pain and I felt it is swollen.
In this case, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant, through
force, threat or intimidation, had carnal knowledge of his daughter, AAA, who was then only 12 to 13 years old. Q: Now, did you see your father holding anything at that time?
A: There was.
AAA recounted in sufficient detail the rape incidents as follows:
Q: What was that?
[Criminal Case No. 02-549] A: It was also a bolo because we were about to get coconut leaves.

Q: Now after that incident, was it repeated? Q: Now did you not struggle or fight him back?
A: Yes, maam. A: Yes, I tried to struggle.

Q: And when did it happen? xxxx

A: That second time happened after a week.
Q: Now, after your father inserted his penis in your private organ, what happened next?
Q: A week after the first incident? A: After that we proceeded home because we brought home the coconut leaves that we
A: Yes, maam. gathered.

Q: Where did it happen? Q: Now did you not tell anyone about the incident?
A: In a coconut farm. A: None.

Q: In what place? Q: Why not?

A: Anibong, Magallanes, Sorsogon. A: I was afraid and that they might not believe me.[31]

Q: Now why were you in that farm at that time?

A: He told me to accompany him to get coconut leaves because we were going to weave it in our [Criminal Case No. 02-550]
house.
Q: Now [AAA], after that second incident, was it again repeated for the third time?
Q: Who is that he who told you to accompany him? A: Yes, maam.
A: My father.
Q: Now when you reached the place, what happened? Q: Do you remember the date when it was repeated?
A: He undressed me and after undressing me he also undressed himself. A: I cannot recall the exact date but I could remember that it was two (2) weeks after the second
incident and I was free then because I didnt have any classes.
Q: You were at that coconut plantation, only the two of you?
370
Q: Now where did it happen? A: The same place, coconut farm.
A: At the coconut farm also.
Q: Now why were you with him at that time?
Q: The same coconut farm where the second incident took place? A: Still to gather coconut leaves.
A: Yes, maam.
Q: So when you reached the place, what happened?
Q; And how did it happen? A: The same happened, he undressed me and he also undressed himself.
A: The same, he undressed me and he undressed himself and he made me [lie] down.
Q: And what happened next after both of you were already undressed?
Q: Now why were you with him on that particular date? A: He again inserted his penis to my vagina.
A: The same, I helped him in getting coconut leaves.
Q: And what did you feel at that time?
Q: Now why did you go with him considering the second incident of rape that happened to you? A: I felt weak and my body felt pain.
A: Of course, because he was threatening me that I went with him.
Q: By the way [AAA], do you know how old were you at that time of the first incident?
Q: What did he exactly tell you that made you fear [him]? A: Yes, maam.
A: Because he scolded us why we were not going with him.
Q: How old were you then?
Q: Now when he undressed himself and you were also undressed, what happened next? A: Twelve.
A: He again inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: The second time, how old were you?
Q: And afterwards, what happened next? A: Twelve.
A: We proceeded home and again we brought with us the coconut leaves.
Q: Until the fourth time, you were still 12 years old when the incident happened?
Q: Did you not tell your mother or anyone about the third incident that happened? A: During the third time I was already 13 years old.
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Why not? Q: Now after your father inserted his penis on your vagina the fourth incident, what happened
A: Because I was still afraid.[32] next?
A: We again gathered coconut leaves in order to bring to our house.[33]

[Criminal Case No. 02-551]

The birth certificate of AAA shows that she was born on January 3, 1989. Medical examination revealed
Q: Now after this third incident, [AAA], do you still remember of another incident that took place? AAAs old hymenal laceration and the examining physician concluded penile penetration for several times. These
A: Yes, maam. support AAAs claim that she was repeatedly raped when she was only 12 to 13 years old.

Q: And do you still remember when it happened? We also affirm the convictions of accused-appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, for two
A: Yes, maam. counts of acts of lasciviousness and not for attempted rape.

Q: When? The Court of Appeals aptly cited Perez v. Court of Appeals[34] in which we ruled:
A: Three (3) weeks after the third incident.
[A] careful review of the records of the case shows that the crime committed by petitioner was
Q: Now where did it happen? acts of lasciviousness not attempted rape.
371
 Q: Why were you afraid of your father at that time?
Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences A: Of course, because he was threatening me and I was before already afraid of him.
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own Q: And how did he threaten you?
spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to A: That he was going to kill everyone of us.
produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have
commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for Q: Now at the time of the incident, did you see him holding anything?
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, A: There was.
however slight, is not completed.
Q: And what was that?
There is no showing in this case that petitioners sexual organ had ever touched complainants A: Bolo.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
vagina nor any part of her body. x x x.[35] (Emphasis ours.)

[Criminal Case No. 02-552]

We also reiterated in Perez our pronouncements in People v. Caingat,[36] that the offenders acts of lying on
top of the victim, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty, and touching Q: Now after that fourth incident, do you still remember of any other incident?
her sexual organ, which were interrupted were it not for the timely arrival of the victims mother, do not constitute the A: Yes, maam.
crime of attempted rape, absent any showing that the offender actually commenced to force his penis into the victims
sexual organ, and that said acts rather constitute the crime of acts of lasciviousness punishable under Article 336 of Q: And do you still remember when did it happen?
the Revised Penal Code. A: November 20, 2001.

Q: Fifth?
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, there is a similar dearth of evidence that accused-appellant was A: Yes, maam.
able to commence penetration of his penis into AAAs vagina. What the evidence on record established was that
during these two occasions, accused-appellant was only able to undress himself and his daughter before the arrival Q: Are you sure?
of BBB and CCC. As AAA testified: A: Yes, maam.
[Criminal Case No. 02-548] Q: Where did it happen?
A: The same place, coconut farm.
Q: Can you still remember the first incident that happened?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And why were you at that time also with him?
A: We were still going to get coconut leaves.
Q: And what happened at that time?
A: The first incident happened before the Fiesta of Magallanes during which my siblings, small Q: And after reaching the coconut plantation, what happened next?
ones, were already asleep and I was also about to go to sleep and then I suddenly
A: He undressed me and he undressed himself also.
noticed that my father was beside me and then he undressed me and he also
undressed himself and when he was about to rape me my mother arrived and she
Q: Then after both of you were already undressed, what happened next?
asked me why I was naked. I was afraid then. A: When he was about to go on top of me he suddenly saw [CCC] and I saw also
[CCC]. What he did was to flee.
Q: Now what did you observe in the person of your father at that time that he undressed you?
A: Because he was about to rape me.
Q: Both of you were already undressed from top to your drawers?

372
 A: During that time I was only using shorts and my shorts [were] already taken off but I had [a] b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
shirt [on] my body. or

Q: How about your panty, was it still on your body? c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
A: Yes, maam.
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.[39]
xxxx

Q: Now at that time, when [CCC] witnessed you and your father, was your father still wearing an
upper apparel?
A: Only upper apparel.
Q: What about his underwears and his shorts?
A: He was only wearing brief[s] but his shorts [were] already taken off.
Q: Was your father able to mount on your top?
A: No, he was about to go on top of me.
Q: Now when [CCC] witnessed you and your father in that position, what happened next?
A: My father hid from [CCC] and what I did was to leave the place. So what [CCC] did was to go
home.[38] (Emphases supplied.)
We cannot simply assume in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552 that accused-appellant was intending
to rape AAA simply because accused-appellant undressed himself and AAA during these two instances, plus the fact
that accused-appellant did rape AAA on three other occasions. Such a presumption hardly constitutes proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape. The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had
been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina,
before the interruption.
As the Court of Appeals found, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos.
02-548 and 02-552 that accused-appellant committed the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
The elements of acts of lasciviousness, punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, are:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
All elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552.
Lewdness is defined as an obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous act which signifies that form of
immorality carried on a wanton manner.[40] It is morally inappropriate, indecent, and lustful for accused-appellant to
undress himself and his own daughter (who was completely capable of dressing or undressing herself), while his
wife was away and his other children were asleep; or doing the same acts in an isolated coconut farm where only
the two of them were present.
We find completely understandable AAAs silence and apparent assent to the sexual abuses of her father
for a period of time. No standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement,
particularly a child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. [41] More importantly, in
incestuous rape cases, the fathers abuse of the moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate
the latters will thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.[42] Otherwise stated, the moral and physical dominion of
the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires.[43] AAA sufficiently explained that fear
of her fathers authority and shame kept her from revealing to others her ghastly ordeal at the hands of her own
father. Moreover, AAAs fear of physical harm if she defied her father was real. By accused-appellants own admission,
on cross examination, he had used physical force to discipline his children whenever he was angry or mad. [44]
We find no reason to doubt AAAs credibility, and accord great weight and respect to the findings of the trial
and appellate courts that her testimonies are consistent, candid, and straightforward. Accused-appellants bare
denial, as opposed to AAAs positive testimonies, and accused-appellants uncorroborated allegation of ill motive on
AAAs part in filing the criminal charges, are bereft of evidentiary value.
Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the
province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence
of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts[45] and
[a]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances
are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the
case.[46] This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court.
In People v. Nieto,[47] we stressed further that the bare denial and uncorroborated alibi of the accused
cannot overcome his positive identification by the victim and straightforward recounting of his commission of a crime:

373
 It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence
to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult
to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-
serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a
positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the
commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be
anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.[48]
This is even more particularly true in rape cases where the accused and the victim are father and daughter,
respectively. We declared in People v. Mendoza[49] that:
It is well-settled that denial is essentially the weakest form of defense and it can never
overcome an affirmative testimony particularly when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness. Accused-appellants bare assertion that private complainant was just using him to allow
her to freely frolic with other men, particularly with a certain Renato Planas, begs the credulity of
this Court. This is especially true in the light of our consistent pronouncement that no decent and
sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt -
the dire consequence of a rape charge unless she is, in fact, a rape victim. More in point is our
pronouncement in People v. Canoy, to wit:
It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit
herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public
scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or even
ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could
mean the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had
she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do we believe that the victim would
fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to exact revenge against
her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating her.[50]
Finally, we adopt the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-appellant, but modify the
damages awarded in AAAs favor.
Given the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, the Court of Appeals properly reduced the penalty of death
and, instead, imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each
count of his three convictions for qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551.
The appellate court also correctly ordered accused-appellant to pay the victim for each count of qualified
rape, the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, consistent with current jurisprudence on qualified rape.However,
the exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) should be increased to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) in line with recent case law.[51]
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-appellant for his conviction
on two counts of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552. Under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is punishable by prision correccional. With the alternative
circumstance of relationship taken as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the penalty
prescribed by law shall be imposed in its maximum period following Article 64(3) of the said Code, or four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the said penalty shall
constitute the maximum term while the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to that of the penalty provided by law which is arresto mayor or one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Thus,
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty of imprisonment
for six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
The award by the Court of Appeals of moral damages to AAA in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), for each count of acts of lasciviousness, is appropriate, in the same way that moral damages are
awarded to victims of rape even without need of proof because of the presumption that the victim has suffered moral
injury, rests on settled jurisprudence.[52] We also deem that AAA is further entitled to an award of civil indemnity in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), for each count of acts of lasciviousness.[53] The amount of
exemplary damages should also be increased from the Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) awarded by the
Court of Appeals, to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), for each count of acts of lasciviousness, considering the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in the commission of the crime. Exemplary damages should
be awarded in order to deter fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon their
young daughters.[54]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02131, which affirmed with modifications the Decision dated February 6, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, of Bulan, Sorsogon, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, to read as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550 and 02-551, accused Domingo Dominguez, Jr. is hereby
held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for three counts of qualified rape and that, for each
count, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, and ordered to pay the private offended party civil indemnity in the amount of Seventy-
374
 - versus - VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), moral damages also in the amount of Seventy-Five
PERALTA,
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
MENDOZA,
(P30,000.00);
REYES,* and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, accused Domingo Dominguez, Jr. is hereby
Respondent.
held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of acts of lasciviousness and that, for
Promulgated:
each count, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months
January 30, 2012
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordered
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
to pay the private offended party civil indemnity in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(P20,000.00), moral damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), and

exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and

DECISION
(3) Accused Domingo Dominguez, Jr. is further ordered to pay the private offended party interest

on all damages awarded at the legal rate of Six Percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of

this judgment.
PERALTA, J.:
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo
assailing the Decision[2] dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution[3] dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, G.R. No. 185128
Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Petitioner, [Formerly UDK No. 13980]
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Present:

375

Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police
operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding
and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey
house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and
informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him
but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for
cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned
with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from
the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently,
the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four
(4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information[5]reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, did then and there have in his possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline
powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as shabu, all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any
competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. [7] Subsequently, trial on the
merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon,
PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and
Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical wirings and
airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was
able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a
conversation. He was able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife
that police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters away
from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a storage
place by his father.
376

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo alyas Boy
Castillo, GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. There
being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1)
Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31
gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and
shall be destroyed in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED,
with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[9]
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF
WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT
OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY
BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE
PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING
TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT
OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS
OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4)
PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT
OF POSSESSION AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE
SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the
following counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of
Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence against
him.
377

III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.[11]
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo
Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during
a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains
that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section
14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show
that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is no
longer within the permissible area that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search
warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues
that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government
authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs
of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just
because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner,
stating that, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied
by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law,
and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must
be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.[12] According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.[13] A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion;
it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.[14] The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,[15] and must employ
a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.[16] The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings
of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination.[17] Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.[18] A review
of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
378
 Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.[19] In the present case, Search Warrant A Nelson Gonzalado.

No. 570-9-1197-24[20] specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be
searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search A Two.
warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a
violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that,
Q What happened after that?
assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items
A We searched the house, but we found negative.
should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private
individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against
government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit. Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?

A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance of
the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Q What about you, where were you?

A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.

Fiscal Centino:
Q What about the barangay tanod?

A Together with Milo and Pogoso.

Q For how long did the chase take place?

A Just a very few moments.

Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?

A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
shop, so we searched his shop.
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.

Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?

Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named Dolly
A Yes. del Castillo.

379
 Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo
Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?
Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes.
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.

Q What happened at the shop?

Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.

Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?

Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw
that Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.

Q Was that the only item?

A There are others like the foil, scissor. Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean.

Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric shop?

A Yes.[21] Q What did you do afterwards, if any?

A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were actually seized were
found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?

FISCAL: A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that store
and furthermore the door was open.

Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took
place? Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A We cordoned the area. A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.

Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen? xxxx

A We waited for the barangay tanod.

380
 Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop? Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?

A At his residence, the two-storey house.

A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence of
the accused?
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other
persons or other person that followed after Masnayon? A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.

A Then we followed suit.

Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?

Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit? A Negative, no shabu.

A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.

Q And what happened afterwards, if any?

Q What about you? A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.

A I also followed suit.

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It is a nipa hut.
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded
paper which contained four shabu deck.

Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper? A 5 to 10 meters.

A We were side by side because the shop was very small. [22]

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?

A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:

Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
FISCAL CENTINO:
A I was just outside the nipa hut.

381
 Q And who among the team went inside?

A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.[23]

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who
the confiscated items is considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence,
effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanodstherefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article
petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs
152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as:
seized, would still be meritorious.

x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of

some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority. opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying,[24] unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances,
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority,
is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and the factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal[25] as in the present case.
property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person
in authority.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every
prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused
is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities;
and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.[26]
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent
of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:

In People v. Tira,[27] this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each
barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However,
officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the
maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
382
 control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control
over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the proceeded to?
contraband is located, is shared with another.[28] A It is a nipa hut.

Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom A 5 to 10 meters.

the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or
possession.[29] The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. [30] The records are void of
any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the
A I was just outside the nipa hut.[33]
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a
resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such, However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied what he
conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is
actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:
structure.[31]

ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:

Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of the A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.
structure where the seized articles were found.During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their
basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.[32] During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
outrightly concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
A Yes.

FISCAL CENTINO:
383
 Q How big is the structure? RODEL LUZ y ONG, G. R. No. 197788
Petitioner,
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side is
a structure rented by a couple.[34] Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the REYES, JJ.
place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs.[35] With the prosecution's failure to prove that
the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1] Promulgated:
Respondent.
a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal
February 29, 2012
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[36] Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.[37] SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011[2] and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case

SO ORDERED. The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are
as follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga
City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around
3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet;
that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited
the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused
is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing
a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and
kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
384
 out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-
like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones,
one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked
the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover
and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of
the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not guilty to the charge of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully
arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two
plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak,
self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1
September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF
THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE
REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the
finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police
Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring
the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and
prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing
a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet
in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag
down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their
presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being
caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or
arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
385

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of
other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of
this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not
contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate
a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of
said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension
will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual [12] provides the following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car.
This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew
shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic
Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or
argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or
take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the
only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer,
and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the
freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law
of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having
stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be
enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned
will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A
motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be
obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks
his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely
386
 will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic
stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which
the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority
surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion
in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to
respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps
most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called
Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The
comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any
suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly
noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
xxxxxxxxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass.
It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects
freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463
U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic
stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while
still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional
equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time that his
traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need
not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a
corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid
arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could
be used against them.[14] It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with
by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police
do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently compelling
pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which work to undermine the individuals will
to resist, and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to
try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes
are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as
they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while
he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
387
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.[15] None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It
was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by
clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice
to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents
of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a
public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief
that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which
the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State
that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at
three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding
of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop
and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when
the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering
the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the
need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales
for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate and weighty,
x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than
in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger
to an officer because of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody
and transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that [t]he danger
to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the
other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop
. . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be
less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a
routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But
while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the minimal additional
intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify
the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the
search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,
Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a patdown of a driver
and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of a vehicle
upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the
passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New
York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
388
 Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need
to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a
citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further
evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the
passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his
arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to
the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights
of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.[24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The drugs are the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless
his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191532 August 15, 2012
MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
PEREZ,*
REYES,**
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the November 26, 2009 Decision 1 and
the March 9, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957, which affirmed the
September 1, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City, (RTC) in Criminal Case No ..
C-73029, finding petitioner Margarita Ambre y Cayuni (Ambre) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
THE FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against Ambre, and co-accused, Bernie Castro (Castro) and Kaycee
Mendoza (Mendoza), before the RTC charging them with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia docketed as
Criminal Case No. C-73028, and illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu,
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73029. The Informations indicting the accused read:
Criminal Case No. C-73028
That on or about 20th day of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) unsealed transparent plastic sachet containing
traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) rolled aluminum foil
strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1)
folded aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE) and two (2) disposable plastic lighters, knowing the same are paraphernalias instruments
apparatus fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing dangerous drug
(METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) into the body.
Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. C-73029
That on or about the 20th of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and sniff Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
389
Contrary to law.5
When arraigned, Castro and Mendoza pleaded guilty to both charges. Consequently, they were meted the penalty
of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months and a fine of P25,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. C-73028. For their conviction in Criminal Case No. C-73029, the RTC ordered their confinement
at the Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents (CUREDD) for a period of six (6) months.6
Ambre, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.7 Trial on the merits ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), PO1 Ronald Allan Mateo (PO1
Mateo), PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), and P/Insp. Jessie dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa), it appeared that
on April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust
operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina
Aderp (Aderp) were engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that the
buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao (Tagoranao); that Sultan ran
away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in
the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, the police operatives
found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre, in particular, was caught sniffing what was
suspected to be shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1
Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
The items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory examination. Physical
Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05 stated that the urine samples taken from Ambre and her coaccused
were positive for the presence of shabu while Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 showed that the items seized
from them were all found positive for traces of shabu.8
The Version of the Defense
Ambre vehemently denied the charges against her. Through the testimonies of Ambre, Mendoza and Lily
Rosete (Rosete), the defense claimed that on the afternoon of April 20, 2005, Ambre was inside the residential
compound in Caloocan to buy malong; that her mother asked Rosete to accompany her because Rosete’s
daughter-in-law, Nancy Buban (Buban), was a resident of Phase 12, Caloocan City, an area inhabited by Muslims;
that when they failed to buy malong, Rosete and Buban left her inside the residential compound to look for other
vendors; that ten minutes later, the policemen barged inside the compound and arrested her; that she was
detained at the Caloocan City Jail where she met Castro, Mendoza and Tagoranao; and that she was not brought
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for drug testing.
Rosete further testified that after she had left Ambre inside the compound to find other malong vendors, she
returned fifteen minutes later and learned that the policemen had arrested people inside the compound including
Ambre.
Mendoza, who was convicted in Criminal Case No. C-73029, claimed that no pot session took place on the
afternoon of April 20, 2005. She averred that she and Ambre were merely inside the residential compound, when
policemen suddenly came in and pointed guns at them.9
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 1, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with
certitude the guilt of Ambre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of Section 15, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however, acquitted her of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove with particularity the drug paraphernalia found in her possession. The
trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. C- 73028, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI not guilty of the crime of
Violation of Section 12, Article II, RA 9165;
2)In Crim. Case No. C-73029, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. II RA 9165 and hereby sentences her to be confined and rehabilitated at the
government rehabilitation center in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for a period of six (6) months. The six (6) month
period of rehabilitation shall commence only from the time that she is brought inside the rehabilitation center and its
promulgation by this court for which the accused shall be notified.
The shabu subject of these cases is hereby confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance
with the rules governing the same.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.10
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, Ambre appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA professing her innocence of the crime. On
November 26, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 1, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Ambre's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its March 9, 2010 Resolution. Hence, she filed this
petition
390
 THE ISSUES
Ambre raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER ON APRIL 20,
2005 (THAT YIELDED ALLEGED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA) CONFORMED WITH THE MANDATED LEGAL
PROCEDURES IN CONDUCTING A BUY-BUST OPERATION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER WERE PART
AND PARCEL OF THE DISMISSED AND DISCREDITED BUY-BUST OPERATIONS OF THE POLICE AND/OR
"FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE" AND HENCE, WERE ILLEGAL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE THAT WERE SEIZED DURING THE ILLEGAL BUY-
BUST OPERATION ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXCLUSION OR DISREGARD OF THE FAVORABLE TESTIMONY OF
PETITIONER'S WITNESS, HER CO-ACCUSED, KAYCEE MENDOZA, ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER
EARLIER PLED GUILTY TO SUCH ILLEGAL USE, HAD VIOLATED THE RULE ON INTER ALIOS ACTA UNDER
SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S PENALTY OF SIX (6) MONTHS REHABILITATION IN A
GOVERNMENT CENTER IS A NULLITY GIVEN THE LACK OF CONFIRMATORY TEST AS REQUIRED UNDER
R.A. 9165 ("COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002").12
A perusal of the pleadings filed by the parties leads the Court to conclude that the case revolves on the following
core issues:
1.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid; and
2.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence.
Essentially, Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal because no offense
was being committed at the time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the
dwelling of Sultan. She argues that the alleged "hot pursuit" on Sultan which ended in the latter's house, where
she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found having a pot session, was more imaginary than real. In this
regard, Ambre cites the April 29, 2005 Resolution of the Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City dismissing the case
against Aderp and Sultan for insufficiency of evidence because the April 20, 2005 buy-bust operation was highly
suspicious and doubtful. She posits that the items allegedly seized from her were inadmissible in evidence being
fruits of a poisonous tree. She claims that the omission of the apprehending team to observe the procedure
outlined in R.A. No. 9165 for the seizure of evidence in drugs cases significantly impairs the prosecution’s case.
Lastly, Ambre maintains that she was not subjected to a confirmatory test and, hence, the imposition of the penalty
of six months rehabilitation was not justified.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges this Court to affirm the challenged decision for failure
of Ambre to show that the RTC committed any error in convicting her of illegal use of shabu. The OSG insists that
Ambre was lawfully arrested in accordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It is of the opinion that
the credible and compelling evidence of the prosecution could not be displaced by the empty denial offered by
Ambre.
THE COURT'S RULING
The conviction of Ambre stands.
Section 2, Article III13 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.14
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception
established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest.15 In this exception, the law requires that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, recognizes
permissible warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest
of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of
his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
391
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.16
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu
and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected
shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.17 Ambre, however, made much of the fact that there was no
prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in
flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in
the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro
and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only
authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
To write finis to the issue of validity and irregularity in her warrantless arrest, the Court holds that Ambre is deemed
to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising them before entering her plea. 18
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her person
was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense.19
Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Ambre, together with
Castro and Mendoza, were illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken from them were found positive for the
presence of shabu, as indicated in Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05. It was likewise found that
the items seized from the three were all positive for traces of shabu as contained in Physical Science Report No. D-
149-05 dated April 21, 2005. These findings were unrebutted.
Ambre's assertion that her conviction was incorrect, because the evidence against her was obtained in violation of
the procedure laid down in R.A. No. 9165, is untenable.
While ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.20 This Court, however, has consistently held that the most
important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.21 In this case, the
prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia
had not been compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory
and photograph of the drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu, this will not render Ambre's arrest illegal or the
items seized from her inadmissible.
Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza, the following items were confiscated
from them: one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) strip of rolled up aluminum foil with
traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded piece of aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also
believed to be shabu; and two (2) yellow disposable lighters. Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran turned
over the seized items to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the former. All the pieces of
evidence were placed inside an improvised envelope marked as "SAID-SOU EVIDENCE 04-20-05." With the
Request for Laboratory Examination, PO2 Hipolito brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory and
delivered them to P/Insp. dela Rosa, a forensic chemist, who found all the items, except the disposable lighters,
positive for traces of shabu. Verily, the prosecution had adduced ample evidence to account for the crucial links in
the chain of custody of the seized items.
Even if the Court strikes down the seized drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu as inadmissible, Ambre will not
be exculpated from criminal liability. First, let it be underscored that proof of the existence and possession by the
accused of drug paraphernalia is not a condition sine qua non for conviction of illegal use of dangerous drugs. The
law merely considers possession of drug paraphernalia as prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked,
ingested or used a dangerous drug and creates a presumption that he has violated Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165. 22
Secondly, the testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral certainty the commission of
the crime charged in the information and the identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. At this juncture, the Court affirms
the RTC's finding that the police officers' testimonies deserve full faith and credit. Appellate courts, generally, will
not disturb the trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances have
been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.23 The Court finds no reason to deviate from this rule in this case.
Likewise, the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption
remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not
properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. The presumption was not overcome
as there was no showing that PO3 Moran, PO1 Mateo, PO2 Hipolito, and P/Insp. dela Rosa were impelled with
improper motive to falsely impute such offense against Ambre.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the defense of denial offered by Ambre must
simply fail. Bare denials cannot prevail over positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses.24 Besides,
this Court has held in a catena of cases that the defense of denial or frame-up has been viewed with disfavor for it
can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.25
Finally, Ambre contends that the penalty of six months of rehabilitation in a government center imposed on her was
a nullity, in view of the alleged lack of confirmatory test. The Court is not persuaded.
It must be emphasized that in no instance did Ambre challenge, at the RTC, the supposed absence of confirmatory
drug test conducted on her. Ambre only questioned the alleged omission when she appealed he·r conviction before
the CA. It was too late in the day for her to do so. Wellentrenched is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for
the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.26
392
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed November 26, 2009 Decision and the March 9, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of marij11ana under
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of custody of the marijuana from the
time of its seizure until the time of its presentation as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal because the State fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823 grams of marijuana in
violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was
found guilty of the crime charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P 500,000.00.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January 23, 2006.2 Hence, this final appeal for his
acquittal.
Antecedents
Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with a violation of Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in the Manila RTC through the information:
That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) plastic bag colored red
and white, with label "SHIN TON YON", containing the following:
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 830.532 grams;
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 959.291 grams.
With a total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.3
After Belocura pleaded not guilty,4 the State presented three witnesses, namely: Insp. Arlene Valdez Coronel, Chief
Insp. Ferdinand Ortales Divina, and SPO1 Gregorio P. Rojas. On the other hand, the Defense presented Belocura
as its sole witness.
I
The State’s Evidence
On March 22, 1999, at 11 o’clock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the
Western Police District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a call from a male person
who refused to identify himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be staged along
Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila. After relaying the tip to his superior officer, he was immediately ordered to form a
team composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to coordinate with the Special Weapons and
Attack Team (SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the site before
1:00 pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00 pm,
Chief Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas
Street and told the rest of the team about it. The numbers of the car plate were painted white. The driver was later
identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for verification but the latter ignored the
signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued Belocura’s jeep until they blocked its path with their
Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of the team approached
the jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp. Divina queried Belocura on the
government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated Belocura’s Berreta 9 mm. pistol (Serial Number M13086Z) that was
tucked in his waist and its fully loaded magazine when he could not produce the appropriate documents for the
pistol and the government plate. They arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocura’s jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the driver’s seat. Chief Insp. Divina
directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks
of marijuanawrapped in newspaper.
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned
over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for proper disposition.5
Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything about any vehicle; that he and his men were in
civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the red plastic bag containing
the marijuanabricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the contents of the bag in his presence.6
393
SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation.7 He conceded that he was not present when the red plastic bag
containing the bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time only at the police
station.8
Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received from the General Assignment Section of the WPD
one red plastic bag labeled "SHIN TON YON" containing two bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
individually wrapped in newspaper at about 12:30 pm of March
23, 1999. The first brick bore the marking "RB-1" and weighed 830.532 grams while the other bore the marking
"RB-2" and weighed 959.291 grams, for a total weight of 1,789.823 grams. She conducted a chemical examination
of the marijuana bricks pursuant to the request for laboratory examination from Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut of the
WPD; and concluded as the result of three qualitative examinations that the submitted specimen tested positive
for marijuana, a prohibited drug.9
II
Evidence of the Defense
Belocura denied the charge. His version, which differed from that of the Prosecution, was as follows.
On March 22, 1999, Belocura was a police officer assigned in Police Station 6 of the WPD with a tour of duty from
3:00 pm to 11:00 pm. At 2:00 pm of that day, he was on his way to work on board his owner-type jeep when about
thirty police officers blocked his path. He introduced himself to them as a police officer, but they ignored him.
Instead, they disarmed and handcuffed him, and confiscated the memorandum receipt covering his firearm, his
money and his police ID card. He recognized some of his arrestors as former members of the CIS. They forced him
into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD headquarters, where they locked him up in a room that looked like a
bodega. They subjected him to interrogation on his alleged involvement in a robbery hold-up. They informed him of
the drug-related charge to be filed against him only three days later.
Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the bricks of marijuana for the
first time only in court. He insisted that it was physically impossible for the bricks of marijuana to be found under the
driver’s seat of his jeep on account of the clearance from the flooring being only about three inches. At the time of
his arrest, he was in Type-B uniform (i.e., blue pants with white side piping and blue T-shirt) because he was
reporting to work that afternoon. Belocura said that his arrest was effected possibly because he had incurred the ire
of a superior; that it was not unusual for a policeman like him to incur the ire of a superior officer or a fellow
policeman; that he had arrested a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in Police Precinct 2, but the
suspect turned out to be the nephew of Captain Sukila of Precinct 2 who admitted to him that Captain Sukila owned
the drugs; that on the day following the arrest of the suspect, Captain Sukila called Belocura to request the release
of the suspect (ina-arbor ang huli ko); that he told Captain Sukila that they should meet the next day so that he
could turn over the suspect; and that on the next day, he was surprised to learn that the suspect had already been
released.10
Belocura did not personally know Chief Insp. Divina prior to his arrest,11 or the other arresting policemen. He
mentioned that his owner-type jeep had been assembled in 1995, and that he had attached the plate number
assigned to his old vehicle pending the registration of the jeep despite knowing that doing so was a violation of law;
and that the incident involving the arrest of the nephew of Captain Sukila was the only reason he could think of why
charges were filed against him.12
On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the bricks of marijuana whether at the time of his
arrest, or at the police precinct, or during the inquest proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that while the driver’s
seat were fixed to the jeep, the bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the driver’s seat only if
pressed hard enough, but in that case the wrappings would get torn because the wirings of the car underneath the
seat were exposed. He recalled that the wrappings of the bricks of marijuana were intact.13
On April 22, 2003, the RTC convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay the fine of P 500,000.00.14
As already stated, the CA affirmed the conviction.15
Issues
Belocura now submits that:16
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE PHYSICIAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE DRIED BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
PLACED UNDER THE DRIVER’S SEAT (sic).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED
ON THE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF ITS
SEIZURE DUE TO THE ABSENSE (sic) OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED WHEN
HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt;
that his warrantless arrest was unlawful considering that his only violation was only a breach of traffic rules and
394
regulations involving the illegal use of a government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless
search of his jeep was contrary to law for violating his right against illegal search and seizure protected under
Section 17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution;17 and that the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized
from him, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Belocura’s arrest and the ensuing search of the jeep were
valid, the search being incidental to a valid, albeit warrantless, arrest; that the arresting policemen had a
reasonable ground to effect his warrantless arrest; that it became their duty following the lawful arrest to conduct
the warrantless search not only of the person of Belocura as the arrestee but also of the areas within his reach,
which then resulted in the recovery of the dried bricks of marijuana from under the driver’s seat; and that any
irregularity attendant to the arrest was cured by Belocura’s failure to object to the validity of his arrest before
entering his plea and by his submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC when he entered his plea and participated in
the trial.18
Ruling
After a meticulous examination of the records, the Court concludes that a reversal of the conviction is justified and
called for.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So
sacred are the right of personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures that
no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set
down in Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless search and seizure are not absolute.
There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or
reasonable. Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists
down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following
exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court;19 (b) seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented
warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency
circumstances.20 In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the incriminating bricks
of marijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights under the Constitution because he was then violating
only a simple traffic rule on the illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no
probable cause to search his vehicle for anything.
The argument of Belocura does not persuade.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation
and Traffic Code).21 In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante
delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such
identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption."22 Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the presence or
within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell under the first
category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen
thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article
he might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of
the case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or
other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being
harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not
by itself be the basis of his acquittal.23
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to
establish the fact of possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record
indicates, however, that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such
395
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.24 What a I had a chance to see it at the place where we had flagged down a vehicle.
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done
by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has q You saw only the plastic bag. Is that correct?
the direct knowledge of the possession.
a No, Sir. When the bag was recovered from under the driver’s seat and when it was opened, I had the chance to
Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2 Santos, a member of the team, see it.
who had discovered and had actually recovered the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana from the
jeep. Excerpts of Chief Insp. Divina’s relevant declarations follow:
THE COURT:

ATTY LEE:
q Including the contents?

q Mr. Witness, it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents of the plastic bag. That is correct?
WITNESS:

a I had testified that it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents.
a Yes, your Honor.

q Okay, it was Mr. Rojas who retrieved the plastic bag? Is that correct?
ATTY LEE:

a No sir, It was not SPO1 Rojas.

q It was not you who bring that bag to xxx

q It was not you who retrieved that plastic bag from the jeep?
THE COURT:

a No, Sir. I was not the one.

Already answered.

q It was Dela Cruz?

ATTY LEE:

a No, Sir.
q And after that, you never had the chance to see that bag again. Is that correct?

q Who retrieved the plastic bag from the jeep?

a Not anymore Sir.25

WITNESS:
The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of the team, but he provided no direct evidence
about the possession by Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks, and actually stated that he did not witness
A It was PO2 Reynaldo Santos, Sir. the recovery of the marijuana bricks from Belocura, viz:

ATTY LEE : PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:

q It was Santos who brought the plastic bag to the headquarters. Is that correct? q While you were taking the gun of this accused what were your other companion specifically Major Divina doing?

A Yes, Sir. WITNESS:

q And you never had a chance to examine that plastic bag, the contents of that plastic bag is that correct?

396
a Since I was the first one who approached Reynaldo Belocura I was the one who took the gun from his waistline q What did you see or observe while in your office?
and I informed Major Divina that I already took the gun and place it inside the Tamaraw FX and when I left the
members of the SWAT arrive at the scene and I don’t know what transpired. a He was investigated.

PUB. PROS. TAN, JR: q Investigated for what?

q And where was Major Divina then? a According to them the recovery of the plate number and the expired MR of the gun and the marijuana recovered.

a Beside the owner type jeep, sir. PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:

q You are referring to the owner type jeep of the accused? q Before whom was he investigated?

a Yes, sir. WITNESS:

q Did you go back to the said jeep? a General Assignment Section, sir.28

a I did not return there anymore sir because the members of the other group surrounded the place, sir. xxx

q Since you were then at that scene did you come to know if there is any other thing that was retrieved from the On further examination, SPO1 Rojas reiterated that he did not actually witness the seizure of the marijuana bricks
herein accused in the said vehicle?26 from Belocura’s possession, to wit:

xxx ATTY LEE:

WITNESS: q Mr. Witness, so you did not see the actual the alleged recovery of marijuana, is that correct?

a Yes. When I was there according to them marijuana was taken from the owner type jeep. WITNESS:

PUB. PROS. TAN, JR: a Yes sir.

q Who said that?27 ATTY LEE:

xxx q And you have never that marijuana?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

a The member of the SWAT and other team, sir were there. a Yes sir. But only in the office.

q And then what else happen after such recovery? q What do you only took from the accused is a gun, is that correct?

a Actually sir at the scene I did not see anything recovered but it was only in the office that I heard their a Yes sir.
conversation about it.
397
q So you cannot say positively that there was a marijuana recovered from the accused because you did not see?
a I just got the information from my co-police officer, sir.29
xxx
PUB. PROS TAN, JR:
q Were you able to see the marijuana in the police station?
WITNESS:
a Yes sir.
q You mean to say that was the first time that you saw the marijuana?
a Yes, sir.30
The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas’ declarations were insufficient to incriminate Belocura,
much less to convict him. If neither of them was personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of
the marijuana bricks from Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering that the
Rules of Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his own knowledge, that is, only to
those facts derived from his own perception.31
Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocura’s illegal possession of the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp.
Divina’s account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the RTC did not give due and proper significance to the failure to
present PO2 Santos as a witness against Belocura.
Nonetheless, the OSG contends that the State had no need to present PO2 Santos because his testimony would
only be corroborative; and that the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas sufficed to establish
Belocura’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The OSG’s contention is grossly erroneous.
As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocura’s vehicle beyond the viewing
distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the Prosecution’s only witness who could have reliably
established the recovery from Belocura of the marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag labeled as "SHIN
TON YON." Without PO2 Santos’ testimony, Chief Insp. Divina’s declaration of seeing PO2 Santos recover the red
plastic bag from under the driver’s seat of Belocura’s jeep was worthless. The explanation why none of the other
police officers could credibly attest to Belocura’s possession of the marijuana bricks was that they were at the time
supposedly performing different tasks during the operation. Under the circumstances, only PO2 Santos was
competent to prove Belocura’s possession.
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti itself.
The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the suspicion
that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the
incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That
account goes to the weight of evidence.32 It is not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the
issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not
relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with
the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence
are important.33
Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following excerpts from the testimony of Chief Insp. Divina bear
out, to wit:
PUB. PROS TAN, JR:
q How about the plastic bag containing the suspected stuff, what did you do with the same? You did not know?
WITNESS:
a I think it was turned over to the investigator of the General Assignment Section who made the proper disposition.
q Who is the investigator again, Mr. witness?
a I remember SPO4 Boy Guzman
q Did you know what SPO4 Boy Guzman did with the accused as well as the confiscated stuff?
xxx
WITNESS:
a The items upon turn over to the investigator on case were handed to the custodian with proper receipt and after
those disposition, there were case filed against the subject.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q Were you able to know what did they do with the accused as well as the confiscated stuff if you know?
398
a I remember appearing in the MTC court Br, 20, I saw the exhibits, firearm and plate number, two blocks
of marijuana. I don’t have any idea where did the investigator brought them or have done.34
xxx
q You never had a knowledge of what happened to that bag and the contents thereof?
a I learned later that the items that were confiscated were turned over to the General Assignment Section which
held the investigation.
q So, it was not your group who conducted the examination and the alleged things that were recovered from the
alleged accused?35
xxx
a No, Sir.
q How about the things that were allegedly recovered from the accused?
a I just said that it was the General Assignment Section who handled the investigation.36
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2
Santos from Belocura’s jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as
evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens
of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly seized from
Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuanaultimately
presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that
unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core was
the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established.371âwphi1
The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.38The requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002),39 by reason of Section 2140 of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly regulating the
actual custody and disposition of confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs, controlled precursors, essential
chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate under Section
94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates the requirement, stating:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
xxx
That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement applied under both laws by
virtue of the universal need to competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the Rules of
Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to, the facts in issue to
be established by one party or disproved by the other.41 The test of relevancy is whether an item of evidence will
have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether
it would reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant
evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by inference between the fact
offered and the fact to be proved.42
The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused to the
evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court said in Mallillin v. People:43
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it
is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain,
an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a
witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.44
399
The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the red plastic bag said to
contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing because the Prosecution did not present PO2
Santos, the only person with direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his
testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The second link
was the turnover of the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to
this, Chief Insp. Divina stated that he learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that the marijuana bricks were
turned over to the General Assignment Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas’
testimony contributed nothing to the establishment of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing
the gun from Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the records45 showed that the marijuana bricks were
forwarded to the General Assignment Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the identities
of the officer from the General Assignment Section who received the red plastic bag containing
the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer received the marijuana bricks. Although Chief
Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of the marijuana bricks,46which were thereafter
examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had
received the marijuana bricks from the arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was dated March 23,
1999, or the day following Belocura’s arrest and the seizure of the marijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the
Prosecution did not identify the person from whom Chief Insp. Yabut had received the marijuana bricks.
Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the corpus delicti was not
credibly proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks might easily be open to
doubt and suspicion, and thus the incriminatory evidence would not stand judicial scrutiny.
Thirdly, Belocura’s denial assumed strength in the face of the Prosecution’s weak incriminating evidence. In that
regard, Belocura denied possession of the marijuana bricks and knowledge of them as well, to wit:
q Were you able to view the alleged marijuana that were confiscated from you?
a: I saw it for the first time when it was presented in Court, Sir.
q: Now, according to Inspector Divina, it was police officer Santos who was able to recover from your vehicle these
two bricks of marijuana. What can you say about this?
a: At first, I did not see this marijuana, Sir, that they are saying because they immediately handcuffed me and
disarmed me even before I could board my owner type jeepney.47
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere
suspicion of his guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every evidence favoring him
must be duly considered. Indeed, the presumption of innocence in his favor was not overcome. Hence, his acquittal
should follow, for, as the Court fittingly said in Patula v. People:48
xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every element of the
crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its
success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises
from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.
Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free
should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of
the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused
as the malefactor responsible for it.49
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 23,
2006; ACQUIT accused REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; DIRECT the immediate release from detention of REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, unless he
is also detained for some other lawful cause; and ORDER the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to forthwith
implement this decision upon receipt and to report his action hereon to this Court within 10 days from receipt. No
pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198694 February 13, 2013
RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the June 30, 2011
Decision2 and September 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 32544 which affirmed
the April 30, 2009 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-358669
convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez (Ramon) of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3) Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.’’
The Factual Antecedents
At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2
Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who wereall assigned tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of
the Malate Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila.
In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" Forpurportedly violating Section
844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (Manila City Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the peace,
400
the man, later identified as Ramon,was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In the course thereof, the
police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to beshabu.PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where
the former markedthe item with the latter’s initials, "RMG." There, Police Superintendent Ferdinand
RicafrenteQuirante(PSuptQuirante) prepared a request for laboratory examination which, together with the
specimen, was brought by PO2 Soque to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal (PSInspCalabocal)examinedthe specimen which
contained 0.173 gram of white crystalline substanceand found the same positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165
throughan Information dated January 3, 2008 which states:
That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO
POINT ONE SEVEN THREE (0.173) gram of white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous drug.5
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the incident. He narrated that on December 29,
2007, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, whilewalking alongBalingkit Street to borrow a welding machine from one
Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity,
he was immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they
boarded a tricycle (sidecar) wherethe said officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he
was still brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soquepropositioned Ramon and asked
for P20,000.00 in exchange for his release.When Ramon’s wife,AmaliaGoco, was unable to produce the
₱20,000.00 which PO2 Soquehad asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest
proceedings.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs as charged,
finding all its elements tohave been established through the testimonies of the prosecution’sdisinterested
witnesses. In this relation,it alsoupheld the legality of Ramon’s warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was
disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the time of his apprehension. Consequently,
Ramon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment oftwelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Aggrieved, Ramon
elevated his conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramon’s appeal and thereby affirmedhis conviction. Itupheld the
factual findings of the RTC which found that the elements of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs were
extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in possession of a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.6
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on Ramon as an incident of alawful warrantless
arrest for breach of the peace which he committed in the presence of the police officers, notwithstanding its (the
case for breach of the peace)subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, the CAobserved that every link in the chain of custody of the prohibited drug wassufficiently
establishedfrom the time PO2Soque took the sameup to its actual presentation in court.
Finally, it did not give credence to Ramon’s claim of extortion as his asseverationsfailed to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ official duties.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC convicting
Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against unwarranted intrusions by the government. Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by government
authoritiesin contraventionof the foregoingarerendered inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any
proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to Section 2] shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid
one.7 As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs searches,8 searches of moving
401
vehicles,9seizure of evidence in plain view,10 consented searches,11 "stop and frisk" measures12 andsearches ASST. CITY PROS. YAP:
incidental to a lawful arrest.13 This last-mentioned exception is of particular significance to this case and thus,
necessitates further disquisition. Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there on patrol? PO2 Soque:

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the parameters of A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man shouting on top of his voice telling "Putang ina mo! Limang
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court14 which requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred daan na ba ito?" pointing to his right front pocket, sir.
by probable cause to arresta person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure,the term probable cause has been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting, where was the shouting came from?
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.15 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.16In A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir.
this light, the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the
factual incidents. Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said?

Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance A: About ten (10) meters, sir.
which provides as follows:
Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows?
Sec. 844. – Breaches of the Peace. – No person shall make, and, countenance, or assist in making any riot, affray,
disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; or assault, beat or use personal violence upon another without just A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then, we saw a man, sir.
cause in any public place; or utter any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibit or
display any emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or thing; or do any act, in Q: Who was that man?
any public place, meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons
in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
A: Goco, sir.
assembly.1âwphi1

Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?

PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and / or fine not more than Two Hundred pesos (PHP
200.00)
A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir.
As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinancepenalizes the following acts: (1) making, countenancing, or
assisting in making any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; (2) assaulting, beating or using Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
personal violence upon another without just cause in any public place; (3) uttering any slanderous, threatening or
abusive language or expression or exhibiting or displaying any emblem, transparency, representation, motto, A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir.
language, device, instrument, or thing; and (4) doing any act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose, or Q: What was he doing then when you said you responded immediately, when you saw a man?
disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen of these
offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir.
be established that the apprehension was effected after a reasonable assessment by the police officer that a public
disturbance is being committed.
Q: That is why you came near him, the one who shouted?
In this regard, PO2 Soque’s testimony detailed the surrounding circumstances leading to Ramon’s warrantless
warrant, viz: A: Yes, sir.

DIRECT EXAMINATION: Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with your other cooperatives?

402
A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of the serenity of the place, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident of shouting? Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether?

A: Past 9:00, sir. A: They were talking casually.

Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted? x x x x18

A: Me, sir.
Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time present with Goco?
A: They scampered away when they saw the police were coming near the place, sir, they scampered in different
directions.
Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also when you approached the accused?
A: They followed me, sir.
Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you approached accused therein Goco?
A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm scandal, sir.
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of probable cause when the police officers
conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place, with many people conversing
with each other on the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City
Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach
of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another; and, the words he allegedly
shouted – "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" –are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not
have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still
teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever complained that Ramon’s shouting
disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal)
even testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the store of a certain MangRomy when a man in civilian
clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed and took him away. 19

x x x x17 In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances could not have engendereda well-founded
belief that any breach of the peace had been committed by Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was
CROSS EXAMINATION: effected. All told, noprobable cause existedto justify Ramon’s warrantless arrest.

xxxx Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary
to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for
ATTY. AMURAO: the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,20 this should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person’s
liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. Aslaw enforcers, it is largely expectedof them to conduct a more
circumspect assessment of the situation at hand. The determination of probable cause is not a blanket-license to
Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly populated? PO2 Soque:
withhold liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line between legitimate human
conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be performedwisely
A: Yes, sir. and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as
constitutionally guaranteed rightslie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be clothed with utmost
Q: And there are many people outside their houses? conscientiousness as well as impelled by a higher sense of public accountability.

A: Yes, sir. Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the warantless search that resulted from it was
also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the
Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was talking also? proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the above discussed constitutional provision. In this regard,

403
considering that the confiscated shabuis the very corpus delicitof the crime charged, Ramon's acquital should
therefore come as a matter of course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and September 20, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32544 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon Martinez y
Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City, Branch 19, dated June 5, 2000, finding
Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of High Powered
Firearm and Ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) in Criminal Case No. 4559-98, and
of violating Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, vis-à-vis COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 (Gun Ban) in Criminal Case No. 4563-98.
Petitioner was charged under the following Informations:
In Criminal Case No. 4559-98 —
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of the offense of
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED FIREARM & ITS AMMUNITIONS (Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294), committed as follows:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m., in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and without any
prior authority, license or permit to possess or carry the firearm hereunder described, have in his possession and
control the following firearm classified as high powered, with its corresponding ammunitions and accessory, viz:
- one (1) cal. 45 pistol (NORINCO) bearing SN 906347;
- one (1) magazine for pistol cal. 45
- seven (7) rounds live ammunitions for cal. 45,
in gross violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
In Criminal Case No. 4563-98 —
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of Election Offense
in violation of Sec. 261 (9)3 , BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE), vis-à-vis COMELEC RESOLUTION # 1958
(GUN BAN), committed as follows:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m. within the Election period which is from January 11, 1998 to June 30, 1998, in
Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y
GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, carry in his person a cal. .45 (NORINCO) pistol, bearing
serial number 906347, and loaded with seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions, without any prior authority from the
COMELEC in gross violation of Sec. 261 (9) of BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE) in relation to COMELEC
RESOLUTION No. 2958 (GUN BAN).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the RTC and summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The prosecution showed that three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, through its Company Commander Major Pedronisto Quano, created a
team composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at
said city, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3
Cipriano Q. Pascua was the designated team leader.
The team proceeded to Barangay Danlugan, arriving thereat at 8:15 in the morning of May 8, 1998. Team leader
SPO3 Pascua coordinated with the Barangay Chairman of Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the
marking "COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were required by the team to stop and
their occupants were then politely requested to alight in order to allow routine inspection and checking of their
vehicles. Motorists who refused the request were not forced to do so.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the check point was
stopped by the team and directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not be
seen through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team, knocked on the vehicle’s window
and requested the occupants to step down for a routine inspection. The eight occupants, which included the
accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay Chairman of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del
Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this juncture, SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm
was tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the
shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry
404
the firearm, and whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC.
Accused answered in the affirmative. The policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to
support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’ firearm, which was
later identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347, including its magazine containing seven
live ammunitions.
Subsequently SPO3 Pascua, using his privately owned jeep, brought Abenes to the PNP Headquarters at Camp
Abelon in Pagadian City. Upon reaching the Headquarters, SPO3 Pascua indorsed Abenes to Major Quano who in
turn referred Abenes to a certain SPO2 Benvienido Albon for further investigation (TSN, August 24, 1998 [SPO3
Cipriano Q. Pascua] pp. 5-27, [SPO1 Eliezer Requejo] pp. 29-50).
A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives License Processing Section of the PNP,
Pagadian City disclosed that Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder (Record of Criminal Case No.
4559-98, p. 56).
After the prosecution presented its evidence, [the] accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Dismiss
(supra, pp. 72-79), which was denied by the trial court in a Resolution dated March 5, 1999 (supra, pp. 80-82).
In his defense, accused-appellant tried to establish that the firearm did not belong to and was not recovered from
him; that the firearm was recovered by the policemen from the floor of the vehicle inside a clutch bag which was
allegedly left by an unidentified person who hitched a ride somewhere along the national highway of Tawagan
Norte Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted near the Mabuhay Bazaar in Pagadian City (TSN, July 12, 1999 [Noel
Rivera], pp. 7-13; September 15, 1999 [Rodolfo Abenes], pp. 11-15; September 27, 1999 [Manuel Sabado
Gengania], pp. 9-16).5
On June 5, 2000, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision convicting the petitioner on both charges, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, this Court hereby finds accused Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, having
been found in possession without license/permit of a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347 and 7
rounds of ammunitions and sentences him to imprisonment ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its MEDIUM PERIOD, as MINIMUM, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of
PRISION MAYOR in its MINIMUM, as MAXIMUM and a FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00),
Philippine currency. Insofar as Criminal Case No. 4559-98 is concerned. The .45 Caliber Pistol aforementioned and
the seven (7) rounds of ammunitions are hereby forfeited in favor of the government the same being effects of the
Violation of P.D. 1866, amended.
As regards Criminal Case No. 4563-98, this Court also finds herein accused Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan GUILTY of
Violation of Section 264, in relation to Section 261, paragraphs (p) and (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code and sentences him to imprisonment for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, and in
addition thereto, herein accused is disqualified to hold any public office and deprived [of] the right of suffrage. It
shall be understood that the sentence herein imposed shall be served simultaneously with the sentence imposed in
Criminal Case No. 4559-98.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC found that, as between the positive and categorical assertions of facts by the two policemen – the
witnesses for the prosecution – and the mere denial of the accused and his witnesses, the former must prevail over
the latter; that the prosecution successfully proved that the petitioner had no license or permit to carry the firearm
through the officer-in-charge of the firearms and explosives office who testified that, based on his records, the
petitioner had not been issued a license, and whose testimony had not been impugned by the defense; and that
the testimonies of the accused and his two witnesses to the effect that while aboard their private vehicle and on
their way to attend an election campaign meeting, they simply stopped and allowed a complete stranger to hitch a
ride who was carrying a clutch bag, left the same in the vehicle when he alighted, and which later turned out to
contain the subject firearm, were flimsy and unbelievable. The RTC ruled that the defense of alibi or denial cannot
prevail over the positive identification by eyewitnesses who have no improper motive to falsely testify against the
petitioner, especially where the policemen and the petitioner do not know each other; and, that the petitioner failed
to show any license or any other document to justify his lawful possession of the firearm.
The petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and/or
that the frisking of the petitioner who was ordered to alight from the Tamaraw FX, along with his companions in the
vehicle, violated his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure; and, that the trial court erred in
believing the version of the incident as testified to by the policemen instead of the version presented by the
defense’s witness which is more consistent with truth and human experience.7
On November 29, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
with respect to Criminal Case No. 4559-98, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years,
2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 7 years and 4 months of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.8
With respect to the validity of the checkpoint, the CA found that not only do the police officers have in their favor the
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed, but also that the proximity of the day the checkpoint
had been set up, to the day of the May 11, 1998 elections, specifically for the purpose of enforcing the COMELEC
gun ban, gives a strong badge of the legitimacy of the checkpoint; that after a review of the records, the evidence
adduced by the prosecution prevails over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of the petitioner that he had
been "framed"; and, that with respect to the admissibility of the firearm as evidence, the prosecution witnesses
convincingly established that the .45 caliber pistol, tucked into the right waist of the petitioner when he alighted
from the vehicle, was readily visible, and, therefore, could be seized without a search warrant under the "plain view"
doctrine.
The petitioner is now before this Court, raising the following issues:
405
 I.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, was the check-point validly established?
II.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, was the petitioner’s constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure violated?
III.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, did not the honorable court of appeals commit a
grave abuse of discretion for adopting the trial court’s unsubstantiated findings of fact?
IV.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, is not the petitioner entitled to an acquittal, if not on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on the ground of
reasonable doubt itself . . . as to where the gun was taken: from the floor of the vehicle or from the waist
of petitioner?9
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court reverses the CA’s finding of his conviction in Criminal Case No. 4559-
98.
After a thorough review of the records, this Court is of the view that the courts a quo – except for a notable
exception with respect to the negative allegation in the Information – are correct in their findings of fact. Indeed, the
version of the defense, as found by the lower courts, is implausible and belies the common experience of mankind.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.10 In addition, the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.11For
this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.12
The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding
unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered.13 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted
arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts. 14 Thus, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower courts that the police found in plain view a gun
tucked into the waist of the petitioner during the Gun Ban period enforced by the COMELEC.
So too must this Court uphold the validity of the checkpoint. The petitioner insists that the prosecution should have
produced the mission order constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec,15 where the Court
purportedly held that firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are inadmissible because there was no
indication that would trigger any suspicion from the policemen nor any other circumstance showing probable cause.
On both points the petitioner is wrong. In the present case, the production of the mission order is not necessary in
view of the fact that the checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and, the
circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant.
In People v. Escaño,16 the Court, through the ponencia of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., held:
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that the
checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced. They also complain of its
having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period
issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881). The national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of the month. The incident,
which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as
a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a
brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of
an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area,
are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC
would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It
would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said
period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against
illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such
as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting
its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation
demands.17(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s reliance on Aniag is misplaced.
In Aniag, the police officers manning the checkpoint near the Batasang Pambansa complex stopped the vehicle
driven by the driver of Congressman Aniag. After stopping the vehicle, the police opened a package inside the car
406
which contained a firearm purportedly belonging to Congressman Aniag. In declaring the search illegal, the
Supreme Court stated that the law enforcers who conducted the search had no probable cause to check the
content of the package because the driver did not behave suspiciously nor was there any previous information that
a vehicle hiding a firearm would pass by the checkpoint.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into
his waist uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.18 The "plain view" doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.19
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial
intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly
viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and
discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
As accurately found by the CA:
xxx It must be emphasized that the policemen discovered the firearm [on] the person of the [petitioner] shortly after
he alighted from the vehicle and before he was frisked. SPO3 Pascua’s testimony[,] corroborated by that of SPO1
Requejo[,] convincingly established that the holstered .45 caliber pistol tucked at the right waist of the [petitioner]
was readily visible to the policemen (TSN, August 24, 1998, pp. 18, 37). Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a
Search Warrant, the policemen may validly seize the firearm and the same is admissible in evidence against the
[petitioner] pursuant to the "plain view doctrine" xxx.20
Nor can the Court believe petitioner’s claim that he could not have freely refused the "police orders" issued by the
police team who were "armed to the teeth" and "in the face of such show of force." The courts a quo consistently
found that the police team manning the checkpoint politely requested the passengers to alight from their vehicles,
and the motorists who refused this request were not forced to do so. These findings of fact are fully supported by
the evidence in the record.
However, the Court must underscore that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove the negative allegation in the
Information that the petitioner possessed no license or permit to bear the subject firearm.
It is a well-entrenched rule "that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the subject firearm, and the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same." 21
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution. The
absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession
of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.22
Witness for the prosecution SPO4 Gilbert C. Senados admitted that his records were outdated, i.e., that his Master
List of holders of firearms only covered licenses up to 1994; that it was possible for the petitioner to acquire a
license after 1994; and that he issued the Certification, dated May 18, 1998, stating that the petitioner carried no
license or permit to possess the guns because he was ordered to do so by his superiors.23
There is no evidence that between 1994 and May 8, 1998, the date the crime was allegedly committed, no license
was issued to petitioner.
While the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the
possession of the petitioner, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the same,
such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words,
such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the
firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned. 24
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was carrying a firearm without
prior authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as
amended.
With respect to the charge of violating Section 261(q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court is constrained to affirm the conviction of the petitioner, since the prosecution
successfully discharged its burden of proof.
Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), as originally worded, provides:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although possessing a permit to
carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless
authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a
residence or place of business or extension hereof.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code,
provides:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. – During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or
other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance,
407
even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of
firearm licenses shall be suspended during the election period. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing provisions, while it is well-settled that under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, the burden to
prove the negative allegation that the accused has no license or permit to carry a firearm lies with the prosecution;
under the Omnibus Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence that accused is exempt from the
COMELEC Gun Ban, lies with the accused.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is clear and unequivocal25 that the prohibited act to which this provision refers is made
up of the following elements: 1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons;
2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place. Under said
provision, it is explicit that even if the accused can prove that he is holding a valid license to possess such firearm,
this circumstance by itself cannot exculpate him from criminal liability. The burden is on the accused to show that
he has a written authority to possess such firearm issued by no less than the COMELEC.
On this point, the petitioner failed to present any form of such authority, and, therefore, his conviction must be
affirmed.
Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 264. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation. In
addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right
of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term
has been served.
The CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the RTC. However, the RTC failed to apply Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law26 which provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty that should be meted out to petitioner should have a minimum and a maximum period. The Court
deems it reasonable that petitioner should suffer imprisonment for a period of one (1) year as the minimum and two
(2) years, as the maximum.
Furthermore, under Section 34 of R.A. No. 7166, the subject firearm shall be disposed of according to existing
laws, which, in this case, must be read in light of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime.— Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forefeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools
with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they
be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.1awphi1.net
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Criminal Case No. 4559-98 is concerned. Petitioner Rodolfo Abenes Y
Gacutan is ACQUITTED from the charge of illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond unreasonable doubt.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 4563-98, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year of imprisonment as
minimum to two years of imprisonment as maximum, not subject to probation; and he shall
suffer DISQUALIFICATION to hold public office and DEPRIVATION of the right of suffrage. The subject firearm
is CONFISCATED and FORFEITED in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 182010 : August 25, 2010]
SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) challenges the
November 27, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July 28, 2003
Decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 convicting
Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
(the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) - possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting petitioner reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu).[2] (underscoring supplied)
408
At the trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary evidence of the prosecution, Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence of
particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metabolite AMPHETAMINE. x x x
Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen (de Belen),[3] subject to her defenses, to thus dispense with the testimony of
de Belen. x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

De Belen recorded the results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Dangerous Drugs Based on its documentary evidence and the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1 Cruzin), [6] a member of the Pasay
Report No. DD-02-613,[4] viz:
City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG), the prosecution established its version as follows:
xxxx On the basis of an informant's tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around
4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of
SPECIMEN: an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as "Ryan."
White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked "SRE" and further placed As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in
in bigger marked transparent plastic sachet. the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case
what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz
xxxx was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as
he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the
F I N D I N G S: plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee
to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent
Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram plastic sachet from the cigarette case.
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet[7] on which he
HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug. x x x marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police
Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum [8] dated
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied) December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory
examination of the substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the
With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the results thereof in Toxicology conduct of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of
Report No. TDD-02-4128[5] reading: Apprehension[9] recounting the details of their intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioner's
arrest.
xxxx
Repudiating the charges, petitioner[10] gave the following tale:
SPECIMEN:
At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at home, several policemen in
Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo. Bayanihan, Maricaban, civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and asked her whether she knew one named "Ryan" who
Pasay City. they claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative. The police
officers then forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was detained.
xxxx
While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed
F I N D I N G S: contained shabu and recovered from her.

Volume of urine = 60 mL. In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was "planted," stemming from an all too obvious attempt by
pH of urine = 5.0 the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioner's daughter Josan Lee[11] and family friend Ma. Stella
409
Tolentino,[12] corroborated petitioner's account. They went on to relate that the police officers never informed them
of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner.
By Decision[13] of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment finding
the accused Susan Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of par. 3 of
Section 11, Article II of R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and
absent any modifying circumstance to either aggravate or mitigate the criminal liability of the same accused, and
furthermore, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14)
years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P350,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus
costs.
The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or "Shabu" involved in this case is declared forfeited in
favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
proper and appropriate disposition in accordance with the provisions of the law.[14] (underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to thus render any evidence
obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.
In its challenged Decision affirming petitioner's conviction, the appellate court, citing People v. Chua,[15]held that the
police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the "stop-and-frisk" concept, a recognized exception
to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.[16]
Brushing aside petitioner's defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner failed to adduce evidence
that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to falsely charge her, and that she was even found
positive for substance abuse.
In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate court's application of the "stop-and-frisk" principle in light of
PO1 Cruzin's failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing
something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle
could only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion. [17]
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision but
seeks a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant's conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest - before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to
quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest - as well as the
inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof- for the first time only on appeal before the appellate
court.[18] By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.[19]
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search
on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law
enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was
instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee
after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more
pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant is settled. The
same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of
immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to
enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.[20] (emphasis underscoring
supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the determination of what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account,
among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[21]
Elucidating on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v.
Chua[22] held:
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized
that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the
policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to
be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v. Solayao, we
also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the following circumstances: the
drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the
policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity. (emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
410
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.[23]
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid "stop-and-
frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's possession - later
voluntarily exhibited[24] to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed
inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of
her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had
identified himself.
It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dangerous Drugs and
Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available defenses she would raise. While such admissions do
not necessarily control in determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they nevertheless provide a
reasonable gauge by which petitioner's credibility as a witness can be measured, or her defense tested.
years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum."
Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
xxxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, metamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" or other dangerous drugs
such as, but not limited to MDMA or "ecstacy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possesses is far
behind therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It has not escaped the Court's attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by adopting two completely inconsistent or
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is punished by a law other than the
incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she argues that the "stop-and-frisk" search upon her person and
Revised Penal Code, "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
personal effects was unjustified as it constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Constitution. In the same
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her version that she was at home resting on the date in
prescribed by the same."
question and had been forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives and brought to the police station,
for no apparent reason than to try and extort money from her. That her two witnesses - a daughter and a friend -
The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the penalty is thus in order.
who were allegedly present at the time of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim that they
were not informed why she was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their testimony.
The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of petitioner's, that they are victims of
a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been held as a shop-worn defense of the accused in drug-
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
related cases, the allegation being easily concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the defense must
penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as
adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government
maximum. In all other respects, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is AFFIRMED.
officials. This it failed to do.
SO ORDERED.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over SECOND DIVISION
that of petitioner.[25]

A word on the penalty.

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 191366
While the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, it overlooked the error in the penalty imposed by the PHILIPPINES,
trial court. The trial court, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced petitioner to Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
"suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,
411
 NACHURA, Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.[3]
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ. Version of the Prosecution
- versus -
As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon),
one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at
ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON
Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Promulgated: the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct
Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL December 13, 2010 and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad
GONZALES Y CUNANAN,
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz),
Accused-Appellants.
and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which
affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal
Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
The Facts
The Information indicting the accused reads:
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out
of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold
Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised
by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were seized
and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted
a laboratory examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and
27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were
subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD
MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO,
ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law,
confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in
empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting,
or in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].
Version of the Defense
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the morning of
September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with
a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting
of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house
412
and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity
policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in and evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption
Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu. of regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.

Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for the reversal of the
The Ruling of the RTC
subject decision, presenting the following

The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.

Assignment of Errors

On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino, and 1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants
RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Possession to be having a pot session at the time of their arrest;
of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under
Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced 2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to plant the shabu
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the accused-appellants without warrant;
to pay the cost of suit.
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed established;
of in accordance with the law.
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Azardon
insufficient to convict the accused-appellants of the crime charged;
SO ORDERED.[4]
5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.

The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1 Azardon, without any
For accused Rafael Gonzales
showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused
were held to have been in constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present as I
there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.

II
The Ruling of the CA
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the constructive THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.
possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further held that although the procedure regarding the custody
413

After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible;
and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established.
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before
arraignment.[5] However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[6]
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it has been held that
this Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just
decision,[7] especially when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake. [8] While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are
mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be used
to defeat substantive rights.[9] Thus, despite the procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the
admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accuseds right to be protected against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens
as well as into their houses, papers and effects.[10]Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant (i)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;[11] (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[12]
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view
search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee.
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless
arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated
as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit[13] with PO1 Dela Cruz, they
proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a
pot session was going on in said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you how many
persons were actually conducting the pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
414
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed with a search
warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not know
personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot session in the
house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police blotter before you
proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the person who
told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing pot session in the
house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not want to be
identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you that he was
informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot session going on inside
the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael Gonzales and you
arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.[14]
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand,
may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable
cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.[15]

Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases[16] that tipped information is sufficient
house of Rafael Gonzales?
probable cause to effect a warrantless search,[17] such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said
A: No more, sir.
cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to
went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir. effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case of People v. Bolasa[18] is informative on this
matter.
xxx

Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could not see what
is happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of shabu on the
table while you were outside the premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman were repacking
prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked
towards the house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small
window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as
police officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:

xxx
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any
of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had
no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to
COURT: Answer.
believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who
have escaped from a penal establishment.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.
415
 Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered.
The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained
the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be
categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search,
or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the
evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first
a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause
for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a
valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise
illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-
appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.[19]
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual
facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. [20]
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the
time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no
probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the
accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a
concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was based on a
tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?
A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of one
of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information originated but
from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on? [No Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session was going
on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going on
somewhere in Arellano but you dont know the exact place where the pot session was
going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the alleged pot
session because he claimed that he derived that information from somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session, sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?
A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was really happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there, sir.[21] [Emphasis
supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.[22]
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered the house with
no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking
of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless
416
search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and
address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure.
The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion
of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should
be excluded.[23] The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction,
and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have glossed over
illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to present the alleged evidence of the crime,
regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights
in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our system of
justice and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to
act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.[24]
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be in order
for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral certainty as the
chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A.
No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation
No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items
taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and
no showing of how the items were handled from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime
laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt as to their
guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in possession of
the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the dangerous drug.[25] Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an
additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at
a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the existence of the drug, its chain of
custody must be sufficiently established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts
regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the
seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[26] Malillin v. People was
the first in a growing number of cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.[27]
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[28] defines chain of custody as follows:
417
 b. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seal it again with a new seal since the police officers seal has been broken. At the trial, the
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment technician can then describe the sealed condition of the plastic container when it was handed to
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the
safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly ones possession has been. Each of them has to
testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted while in
his care.[29]
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity
and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborates, and
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure:
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled precursors and
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory andphotograph the same in the presence of
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
given a copy thereof.
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]

People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or confiscated items
in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as follows:
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not necessarily render the seizure and
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii)
supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for
testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a number of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable
times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary
marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be
value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation
removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then identify
the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the in court. A review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case reveals
crime laboratory. irreparably broken links in the chain of custody.

If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal
the same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were confiscated from the accused,
it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the to wit:
nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic container and
418
 C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu
residue without markings.[33]
a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues.
[Emphases supplied]

b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs colored yellow,
one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ). Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a Confiscation Receipt was
issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:
c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006
d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.[30]
[Emphases supplied]
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together

At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were indorsed to Duty
Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for proper disposition.[31] A letter-request for
laboratory examination was prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues marked DC&A-
1.
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked DC&A-
2.
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked DC&A-3.[32]
[Emphases supplied]
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by SPO3 Froilan
Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the specimens which were submitted for
testing, to wit:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:
with our precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of SPO1
Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin Guarin apprehended
the following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married,
jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle
driver, a resident of 471 Lucao Dist., this city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old,
married, jitney driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old,
married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd.,
Arellano-Bani this city.
Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to Dagupan
City Police Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to record
the incident and the sachet of suspected Shabu Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime
Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.
Seizing Officer:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Affiant Affiant

A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with tag each Remarks:
containing suspected shabu residue without markings.
Refused to Signed
B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu Refused to Signed
residue without markings. Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed[34]
419
 [Emphases supplied]
case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may have had
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used
should have dissipated by the time they reached the police station, as the suspects had already been arrested and
aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in the Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and
the items seized. Moreover, it has been held that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending
marked as Exhibits H and series, I and series, and J and series, respectively. Said items were identified by PO1
officer from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items at their place of seizure, as
Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.[35]
it is more in keeping with the laws intent to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[38]
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved as there was
resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases
sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized from the accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime
are People v. Garcia,[39] People v. Dela Cruz,[40] People v. Dela Cruz,[41] People v. Santos, Jr.,[42]People v.
laboratory for examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination.
Nazareno,[43] People v. Orteza,[44] Zarraga v. People,[45] and People v. Kimura.[46]

A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.

requirement of marking, to wit:
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure and confiscation of the
subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared,
signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,[36] admitted that
no photographs were taken. The only discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure was that the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and
went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[37]
[Emphasis supplied]
the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the letter-request for laboratory examination that the subject items
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The suddenness of the
were indicated to have been marked with DC&A-1, DC&A-2 and DC&A-3. There is no showing, however, as to who
situation cannot justify non-compliance with the requirements. The police officers were not prevented from preparing
an inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is instructive on the
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify
is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when
these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency
with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure
that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence
- should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits
based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized
items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the
seized items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container
shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain
of custody.[47][Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz does it appear that
420
made those markings and when they were made. Moreover, those purported markings were never mentioned when
the subject items were identified by the prosecution witnesses when they took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets, rolled and cut aluminium
foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was
only in the Chemistry Report[48] that the precise number of each type of item was indicated and enumerated. The
Court notes that in all documents prior to said report, the subject items were never accurately quantified but only
described as pieces,[49] several pcs,[50] and shabu paraphernallas.[51] Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates that
all the subject items had no markings, although each item was reported to have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion
in the course of processing the subject items during laboratory examination and testing. [52] Doubt, therefore, arises
as to the identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that the subject items seized from
the accused were the same ones subjected to the laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of seized items in
dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,[53] People v. Kimura,[54] and People v. Laxa.[55]
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives rise to more uncertainty.
Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it was prepared only three days after. More important,
the receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their quantity. These are basic information
that a confiscation receipt should provide. The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of
arrest of the accused and the general description of the subject items as the sachet of suspected Shabu
paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The receipt is made even more dubious by PO1 Azardons
admission in his testimony[56] that he did not personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly
who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification[57] issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject items were indorsed by
PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3
Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and when the subject items were transferred
from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness testified on how the subject
items were kept after they were tested prior to their presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar
shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,[58] People v. Garcia,[59] People v. Sanchez,[60] and Malillin v. People.[61]
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to PO1 Azardons
testimony[62] that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the police station, the Letter[63] to the Executive
Director of the DDB states that the apprehending officers were tipped off while conducting monitoring/surveillance.
Said letter also indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and seizure occurred on September 4,
2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in the Information. It was also mentioned in the aforementioned
Certification of the Dagupan Police and Joint Affidavit of the police officers that a glass tube suspected to contain
shabu residue was also confiscated from the accused. Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory
examination.
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecutions position that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied
on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been shown to be
grossly insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes
the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential before
the accused can be found guilty.[64]
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, in People
v. Sta. Maria,[65] this Court held that said section was silent as to the consequences of such failure, and said silence
could not be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence
obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead
agency in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still
possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be
transferred to the latter.
421
 Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect the admissibility of
the evidence but only its weight.[66] Thus, had the subject items in this case been admissible, their evidentiary merit
and probative value would be insufficient to warrant conviction.
It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty should prevail.However, such presumption obtains only when there is no deviation
from the regular performance of duty.[67] Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, the presumption of
regularity cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be irregular. When
challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the
presumption of innocence of the accused.[68]
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous drugs cases due to
the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and seizure procedure under the law.[69] Some bona
fide arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because drug enforcement
operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law
enforcement agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and
handling of seized drugs.
It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be
possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in procedure
must be recognized, addressed and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.[70]
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 [71] (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs) and Sec. 15[72] (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law
enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence
of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges
under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive
confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the
possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time
offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec.
11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them
with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal,
the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under
Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14[73] (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec.
12[74] (Possession of Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine
of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia
is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec.
15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law
enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence
of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is
positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of
422
 They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of
his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3 and
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO. two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to
03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment enteredACQUITTING the accused and ordering
possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao
their immediate release from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause. Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on
duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for petitioner guilty of the offense charged as follows:
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days
from receipt of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-General, Philippine WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court , finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
National Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information and guidance.
It appearing that the accuse d was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized items to the of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months
Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the costs.

The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the government and the
SO ORDERED. Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao
Metrodiscom, Davao City. 5
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner. 6
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and
seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence
Rudy G. Agravate for petitioner. against him.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of
the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged
that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
423
 (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to
flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know
what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as
follows:
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his light against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not
to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about
by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at
the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in
the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:
. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed
by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We
need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
424
 manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the
character of the articles procured.
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General:
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is
illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men repeatedly
walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third
man. This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the behaviour of
the men indicated that they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police
officer approached the men and asked them for their names, they mumbled a reply.
Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him. Finding a
concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the
prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and
seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine
his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the
stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon
was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the
poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial
judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone
call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later
narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side
to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant,
was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later
identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken
from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who
identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on
June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police,
indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that
he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been
"Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the
objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's
conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
425
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its
illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a
warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is
the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His
reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b)
of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at
least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts
"created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense
had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What
offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen"
and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been
different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a
darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street
shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking
in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze
of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting
from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers,
as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the
policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the
informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North
Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the
impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because
there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to
be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused,
426
be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless
arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently
established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred
from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than
the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit
an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no
probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a
warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that
the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of
the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As
for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had
been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to
possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is
an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There
is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that
under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding
his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any
person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over
liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is
sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal
arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against
Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in the
brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional
rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward
makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness
to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered
inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of
persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been
observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
427
 [G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997] Marijuana residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.

xxx xxx xxx.

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Appellant remained on provisional liberty.[7] Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of
Appeal[8] dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court[9] promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the
appeal and affirming the trial court:[10]
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs
against appellant.
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably
there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses -- like Respondent Court[11] denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:
stop-and-frisk -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever
vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizens constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellants motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.
search and seizure.

The Facts
The Case Version of the Prosecution

This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January
20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon.
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,[1] Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan
City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as
follows:[2]
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and
knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. [3] With the agreement of
the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.[4] After trial in due course, the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a
decision[5]convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:[12]
At about 2:10 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez
was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance
was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a
male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish
eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he
was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could
see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to
examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was
turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the
confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y
DIZON.
428
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the
same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote Evidence A 4/11/88 Alain Manalili.The white sheet of paper
was marked as Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a
chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint
Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit D) to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The
signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit D.
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana residue at
7:40 oclock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit D.
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen which
she identified. (Exhibit E)[13] Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as crushed marijuana leaves in her
Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit F).[14] These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana,
according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she also found
that the crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her
examinations (Exhibit G).
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed
it. (Exhibit E). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit E-1).
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl.
Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of
Kalookan City. (Exhibit C)
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery
when he was apprehended.[15]
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows: [16]
At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A.
Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the
driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of
marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen
were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused
asked the policemen why he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying
marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the
tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said
they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to follow him. The
neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused
was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned
over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found,
except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to
release the accused.The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana
inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and was led to the
Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to settle the case. The policemen
who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was
the policeman who told the accused to call his parents.The accused did not call his parents and he told the
policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest
Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the
accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were stopped by
policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on
his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his pants
at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing that
tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.[17]
The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the
arresting officers testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral and disinterested witnesses, testifying
only on what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially, they asserted that the appellant was
found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
429
 The trial court disbelieved appellants defense that this charge was merely trumped up, because the appellant Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the credibility
neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3)
fiscal of Kalookan City. the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures. On the alleged serious discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the
appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the narration. It The Courts Ruling
further found petitioners contention -- that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue -- to
be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
The petition has no merit.

Issues
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk

Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were
I products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as
memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court. never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that,
even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless
II arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of the case of Terry vs. Ohio,[18] a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to
accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt. stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):

III x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and
witnesses were material and substantial and not minor. makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
IV carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. [19]
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the purpose of
extorting money.
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention
and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes
V
of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual
arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is consistent with approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for
both innocence and guilt. an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times;
and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years experience to have
VI failed to investigate this behavior further.

The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
430
 In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what
justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. [20] Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a fruit of
the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute.[21] The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search
of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their
right against unreasonable search and seizure.[22] In People vs. Encinada,[23] the Court further explained that [i]n
these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although
the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a
warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,[24] the Court held that there are many instances where a search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which is stop-and-frisk. In said case,
members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting
suspiciously. They found inside petitioners bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live
ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to
require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless,
futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant
had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information
was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan
City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they
found marijuana in petitioners possession:[25]
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan
City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini
Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one Arnold
Enriquez, what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his
attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as police
officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
431
 A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the
trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge,
actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[26] Otherwise, the
Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce
acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed
to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is
generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal.[27]
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers testimony contained polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained contradictions which did not support petitioners conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect,
since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial
facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would
materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.[28]
We concur with Respondent Courts ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses
testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People vs.
Avila, it was held that As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their
remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full
credence on Pat. Espiritus testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas contradictory
testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit[29] signed by both arresting policemen. The question of
whether the marijuana was found inside petitioners wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that
petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that
marijuana was found in petitioners possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor, and does not destroy
Espiritus credibility.[30]
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.[31]
The substance found in petitioners possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be
crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioners lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His awareness
thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he
resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew
that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the
extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or
present any evidence, other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and unbelievable,
considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988. [32] Since then, he
could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-
up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.[33]
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by
sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of
six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
432
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment;
to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated
the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.
(Underscoring supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal
possession of marijuana:
Sec. 8. x x x x
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.[34]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and
to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ESQUILLO VS PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 138081. March 30, 2000]
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC) and THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU
(EIIB), petitioners, vs. NELSON OGARIO and MARK MONTELIBANO, respondents. Juri smis
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture
proceedings in the Bureau of Customs. In accordance with what is now settled law, we hold it does not.
The facts are as follows: On December 9, 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued
a Warrant of Seizure and Detention[1] of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan"
shipped on board the M/V "Alberto," which was then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the
basis of the report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been
illegally imported. The report stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in
sacks marked "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V
"Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in the customs office in Cebu, docketed as Cebu Seizure
Identification Case No. 17-98.
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer,
respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case No. CEB-23077) in the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, alleging:
4.) That upon arrival of the herein-mentioned sacks of rice at the PIER 5 of Cebu City,
Philippines on the 7th day of December 1998 all of the defendants rushed to the port with long
arms commanding the plaintiffs laborer[s] to stopped [sic] the unloading of the same from the
vessel named M/V Alberto. The defendants alleged that the herein-mentioned rice were [sic]
smuggled from abroad without even proof that the same were [sic] purchased from a particular
country.
5.) By the mere suspicion of the defendants that the goods were smuggled from abroad, they
immediately put on hold the release of the goods from the ship and at the same time they jointly
barred unloading and loading activities of the plaintiffs laborers of the herein-mentioned rice.
6.) The plaintiffs then presented all the pertinent and necessary documents to all of the
defendants but the latter refused to believe that the same is from Palawan because their minds
are closed due to some reason or another [while] the plaintiffs believed that the same is merely
an act of harassment. The documents are as follows: Jjj uris
A.) Certification from the National Food Authority that the same is from
Palawan. This is hereto attached as Annex A.
B.) Bill of Lading issued by ANMA PHILIPPINES Shipping Company. This
is hereto attached as Annex B.
7.) The acts of the defendants in stopping the loading and unloading activities of the plaintiffs
laborers [have] no basis in law and in fact; thus, unlawful and illegal. A mere suspicion which is
not coupled with any proof or evidence to that effect is [a] matter which the law prohibits.
8.) That for more than three days and despite the repeated plea of the plaintiffs that their goods
should be released to them and the defendants should stop from barring the unloading and
loading activities, the latter blindly refused [to] heed the same.
433
9.) That the acts of all of the defendants which are greatly unlawful and erroneous would
caused [sic] irreparable damage, injury, and grave injustice to the plaintiffs.
10.) That by way of example or correction for the public good and to deter the defendants from
doing the same acts to other businessmen, defendants should be held liable for exemplary
damages in the amount of not less than One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
11.) That the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed in this complaint and the whole or part of
such reliefs consist in restraining perpetually the defendants from holding the herein-mentioned
twenty-five thousand sacks of rice. That defendants should be restrained perpetually from
barring the unloading and loading activities of the plaintiffs laborers.
12.) That allowing the defendants to continue their unlawful acts would work grave injustice to
the plaintiffs. Unless a preliminary injunction be granted ex-parte, grave and irreparable injury
and damage would result to the plaintiffs before the latter can be heard on notice.
13.) That if the defendants be not restrained perpetually from their unlawful acts, the herein-
mentioned rice will deteriorate and turn into dusts [sic] if not properly disposed.
14.) That a Warrant of Seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated
December 9, 1998 be quashed because the defendants act of seizing and detaining the herein-
mentioned sacks of rice are illegal. The continuing act of detaining the herein-mentioned sacks
of rice will lead to the deterioration of the same. That no public auction sale of the same should
be conducted by the Bureau of Custom[s] or any government agenc[y]. lex
15.) That plaintiffs are ready and willing to file a bond executed to the defendants in an amount
to be fixed by this Honorable Court to the effect that plaintiffs will pay to the defendants all
damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if this Honorable Court should
finally decide that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Premised on the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed before this Honorable
Court that a restraining order or temporary injunction be immediately issued prohibiting the
defendants from holding plaintiffs above-mentioned goods. That it is further prayed that a
restraining order or temporary injunction be issued prohibiting the defendants from barring the
unloading and loading activities of the plaintiffs laborers. Further, the plaintiffs prayed that the
warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated December 9, 1998
be quashed and no public auction sale of the same should be conducted by any government
agency or authority.
It is further prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Making the restraining order and/or preliminary injunction permanent.
2.) Ordering the defendants jointly to pay exemplary or corrective damages to the plaintiff[s] in
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
Such other relief which are just and demandable under the circumstances are also prayed for.[2]
In separate motions, petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu[3] and the EIIB, as well as the Philippine
Navy and Coast Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction, but
their motions were denied. In its resolution, dated January 11, 1999, the RTC said: Jksm
The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs cannot divest this
court of jurisdiction since its issuance is without legal basis as it was anchored merely on
suspicion that the items in question were imported or smuggled. It is very clear that the
defendants are bereft of any evidence to prove that the goods were indeed imported or
smuggled, that is why the plaintiffs have very vigorously protested against the seizure of
cargoes by the defendants. In fact, as revealed by defendants counsel, the Warrant of Seizure
and Detention was issued merely to shift the burden of proof to the shippers or owners of the
goods to prove that the bags of rice were not imported or smuggled. However, the court feels
this is unfair because the settled rule is that he who alleges must prove the same. Besides, at
this time when our economy is not good, it would be a [dis]service to the nation to use the
strong arm of the law to make things hard or difficult for the businessmen.[4]
The 25,000 bags of rice were ordered returned to respondents upon the posting by them of an P8,000,000.00
bond.
Petitioners BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC in its order dated
January 25, 1999.[5] In the same order, the RTC also increased the amount of respondents bond to
P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the resolution and order of the RTC were sustained.[6]
Accordingly, on April 26, 1999, upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the sheriff to place in respondents
possession the 25,000 bags of rice.
Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of Cebu (Cebu Seizure Identification Case
No. 17-98), a decision was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks
bearing Plate Nos. GCC 844 and GHZ 388 are all FORFEITED in favor of the government to
be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law while the seven (7) trucks bearing Plate Nos.
GFX 557; GFX 247; TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 are RELEASED in favor of
their respective owners upon proper identification and compliance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. Chief
434
 Since this decision involves the release of some of the articles subject matter of herein case
which is considered adverse to the government, the same is hereby elevated to the
Commissioner of Customs for automatic review pursuant to Republic Act 7651. [7]
The District Collector of Customs found "strong reliable, and convincing evidence" that the 25,000 bags of rice were
smuggled. Said evidence consisted of certifications by the Philippine Coast Guard, the Philippine Ports Authority,
and the Arrastre Stevedoring Office in Palawan that M/V "Alberto" had never docked in Palawan since November,
1998; a certification by Officer-in-Charge Elenita Ganelo of the National Food Authority (NFA) Palawan that her
signature in NFA Grains Permit Control No. 00986, attesting that the 25,000 bags of rice originated from Palawan,
was forged; and the result of the laboratory analysis of a sample of the subject rice by the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) stating that the sample "does not compare with any of our IRRI released varieties."
Respondent Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings before the District Collector of Customs despite due
notice sent to his counsel because he refused to recognize the validity of the forfeiture proceedings. [8]
On April 30, 1999, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated April 15, 1999, upholding the resolution of the RTC denying petitioners motions to dismiss. They
contend that:
I. SINCE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, AND THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS HAD ALREADY EXERCISED EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
SAME, THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE EXERCISE
BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW AND IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL JUDGES RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY 11, 1999 AND ORDER DATED
JANUARY 25, 1999 IN CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-23077. Esmsc
II. SINCE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE TRIAL JUDGES DENIALS OF PETITIONERS SEPARATE MOTIONS TO
DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION.[9]
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[10] this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs
and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts
are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or
issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are
appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of
Appeals.
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored
upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the governments drive, not only to
prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective
and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the
government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we
have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction
thereon. Esmmis
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular courts still retain jurisdiction "where, as in this
case, for lack of probable cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs
jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings."[11] They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the
question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial
Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on
board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the
power to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative
hearings.[12] As the Court held in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya:[13]
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive
authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of
illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain
circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does
not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence
when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The
proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of
Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the
appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus
indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of injunction, the Supreme Court issued on
June 25, 1999 Administrative Circular No. 07-99 to all judges of lower courts entitled re: exercise of utmost caution,
prudence, and judiciousness in issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. The
circular states in part:
435
 Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison v. Natividad
(213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported by well-
settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or
put it to naught."
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately
disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.
WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued on May 17, 1999 is hereby made permanent. The decision,
dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. CEB-23077 in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Cebu City is DISMISSED. Es-mso
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147817 August 12, 2004
FELICISIMO RIETA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime. It may be proven by the credible testimonies of
witnesses, not necessarily by physical evidence. In-court identification of the offender is not essential, as long as
the identity of the accused is determined with certainty by relevant evidence. In the present case, there is no doubt
that petitioner was the same person apprehended by the authorities and mentioned in the Information. His
possession of the smuggled cigarettes carried the prima facie presumption that he was engaged in smuggling.
Having failed to rebut this presumption, he may thus be convicted of the crime charged.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the December 22,
2000 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 17338. The CA affirmed with modification the
February 18, 1994 Consolidated Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)4 of Manila (Branch 46) in Criminal
Case Nos. CCC-VI-137(79) and CCC-VI-138(79), finding Felicisimo Rieta guilty of smuggling. The assailed CA
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the trial court finding Felicisimo Rieta, Arturo Rimorin, Pacifico
Teruel and Carmelo Manaois GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime charged.
(b) Appellants Ernesto Miaco, Guillermo Ferrer, Fidel Balita, Robartolo Alincastre and Ernesto de Castro
are ACQUITTED as recommended by the Solicitor General."5
Reconsideration was denied in the April 16, 2001 CA Resolution,6 which petitioner also assails.
Petitioner and his six co-accused -- Arturo Rimorin, Fidel Balita, Gonzalo Vargas, Robartolo Alincastre, Guillermo
Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco -- were charged in an Information, which reads:
"That on or about October 15, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with the evident intent to defraud the government of the
Republic of the Philippines of the legitimate duties accruing to it from merchandise imported into this
country, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully [and] fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines or
assist in so doing contrary to law, three hundred five (305) cases of assorted brands of blue seal
cigarettes which are foreign articles valued at P513,663.47 including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell,
transport or assist and facilitate the buying, selling and transporting of the above-named foreign articles
after importation knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law which was found in the
possession of said accused and under their control which articles said accused fully well knew have not
been properly declared and that the duties and specific taxes thereon have not been paid to the proper
authorities in violation of said Sec. 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 34, in relation to Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of the National Internal
Revenue Code."7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution (Respondent)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)8 presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch of the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information that certain syndicated groups
were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further revealed that the
activities [were being] done at nighttime and the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck
[were] being escorted by some police and military personnel. He fielded three surveillance stake-out
436
teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they
were to watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of it.
On the basis of his investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was registered in the name of Teresita
Estacio of Pasay City.
"At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men returned to the
same area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in
Port Area, Manila, because as per information given to him, the said cargo truck will come out from the
premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime
Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu
panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same
day.
"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that morning, a green cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167
came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely by a light brown Toyota
Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no
information whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his men to intercept only the cargo
truck. The cargo truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo truck
suddenly made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck [that] was going south. Almost by
impulse, Col. Lacson's car also made a U-turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was
running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for less than 5
minutes until said car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and
his men searched the car and they found several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and one
(1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota car, and
his companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre,
[all] belonging to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders.
"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or untaxed
cigarettes were found inside. The cargo truck driver known only as 'Boy' was able to escape while the
other passengers or riders of said truck were apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay
City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Lacson's men hauled the intercepted vehicles, the arrested men and confiscated goods to Camp Crame,
Quezon City. All the 371 cases (305 + 66) of blue seal cigarettes were turned over to the Bureau of
Customs. Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba executed an Affidavit of Arrest together with Arnel Acuba. The Booking
and Information Sheet of Ernesto de Castro showed that he was arrested by the MISG after delivering
assorted blue seal cigarettes at 185 Sanciangco St., Tonsuya, Malabon."9
Version of the Defense (Petitioner)
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied any knowledge of the alleged smuggling of the blue-seal cigarettes. He sets
forth his version of the facts as follows:
"Petitioner Rieta testified that he was a policeman assigned at Kawit Cavite. In the early morning of
October 15, 1979, he was in Manila together with Boy. He met Boy in 1978 when the latter figured in a
vehicular accident in Kawit, Cavite. x x x After a week, Boy visited him at the Kawit Police Station and
thereafter, met him four to five times. He learned that Boy was a businessman hauling slippers, fish and
vegetables from Divisoria. For several times, he had accompanied Boy on his business trips when [the
latter] hauled fish, vegetables and slippers from Divisoria to Cavite. He was requested by Boy to
accompany him on his various trips because there were times when policemen on patrol were
demanding money from [the latter]. At other times, other policemen accompanied Boy aside from him, on
his trips.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he met Boy in front of the Kawit Town Hall. He learned that Boy
will haul household appliances from Divisoria. They boarded a jeep driven by Boy and they proceeded to
Cartimar, Pasay City. At Cartimar, Boy left him at a gasoline station, and told him to standby because
Boy will get the cargo truck they will use. When Boy returned, he had companions, who were introduced
to him as Gonzalo Vargas and Sgt. Rimorin, the petitioner's co-accused in Criminal Case No. CC-VI-138
(79). From Cartimar, the four (4) of them proceeded to Divisoria and they passed under the Del Pan
Bridge. While passing therein, he told Boy that he was hungry, so that when they passed by a small
restaurant, he alighted and Sgt. Rimorin followed. Boy told them that he and Gonzalo will proceed to the
Port Area and will be back. After thirty to forty five minutes, Boy and Gonzalo returned, and he and Sgt.
Rimorin boarded the truck and proceeded to Roxas Boulevard. While they were along Roxas Boulevard
near the Daily Express Building, two (2) vehicles intercepted them and ordered them to pull-over. The
passengers of the said vehicles introduced themselves as Metrocom soldiers, and ordered them to alight
and to raise their hands while poking guns at them. They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their belly on
the pavement and were bodily frisked and searched. The Metrocom soldiers did not find anything from
their bodies. Thereafter, they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were ordered by the Metrocom soldiers to
transfer to a jeep. While they were aboard the jeep, he overheard from the Metrocom soldiers that their
driver was able to escape. Likewise, they were also informed by the Metrocom soldiers that the cargo
truck was loaded with blue seal cigarettes. The cargo truck was not opened in their presence, nor were
the contents thereof shown to them upon their apprehension. From the time he boarded the cargo truck
in Cartimar until he and Sgt. Rimorin alighted to take their snacks, up to the time they were apprehended
by the Metrocom soldiers, he had not seen a pack of blue cigarette in the cargo truck. He did not notice
whether the Metrocom soldiers opened the cargo truck. At Camp Crame, he was investigated without the
benefit of counsel, but, nonetheless, he executed and signed a statement because as far as he was
concerned he has done nothing wrong. He was detained at Bicutan for more than a year.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he was not carrying any firearm because he has no mission
order to do so, and besides Manila was not his jurisdiction. He was suspended from the service, but was
reinstated in January 1981. After he was released from Bicutan, he looked for Boy so that he could clear
the matter, but he [did not find] Boy anymore.
437
"In corroboration with the testimony of petitioner Rieta, accused Rimorin, a policeman assigned at Pasay was something fishy or wrong in their apprehension. It was very [conspicuous] that the driver was able to
City, testified that the first time he met Boy was in 1978 in the wake and internment of the Late Police escape because at the time they were apprehended they were the only people at Bonifacio Drive, and
Officer Ricardo Escobal. Thereafter, Boy dropped by on several occasions at the Pasay Police Station to thus the possibility of escape was very remote, considering that they were unarmed and the Metrocom
request for assistance. Prior to October 15, 1979, Boy again dropped by at the police station and asked soldiers were all fully armed. In both cases at bar, there were about three Pasay policemen who were
him if he had an appointment on the next day. He told Boy that he had no appointment, and the latter apprehended. He was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa for more than a year. He knew nothing about the
requested to accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan to get some rice. Prior thereto, in one of their casual charge against him. When he was at Camp Crame he tried getting in touch with a lawyer and his family,
conversations, he learned that Boy was a businessman engaged in hauling various merchandise. He but the MISG did not let him use the telephone."
agreed to the request of Boy to accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan. At Sta. Maria, Bulacan, they
proceeded to a warehouse containing bags of rice, and they hauled several bags into a truck, and Ruling of the Court of Appeals
thereafter, proceed[ed] to Quezon City. As compensation Boy gave him a sack of rice. The said
transaction was followed by another on October 15, 1979. In the afternoon of October 14, 1979, Boy
Affirming the RTC, the CA noted that while petitioner and his co-accused had mainly raised questions of fact, they
again dropped by at the police station and requested him to accompany him to haul household fixtures.
had nonetheless failed to point out specific errors committed by the trial court in upholding the credibility of the
They usually haul vegetables and rice early in the morning to avoid the traffic and that was the reason
prosecution's witnesses. The defense of denial proffered by petitioner was considered weak and incapable of
why they met in the early morning of October 15, 1979. He told [Boy] that he will see if he will have [the]
overturning the overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence of respondent. Further, the appellate court
time, but just the same they made arrangements that they will see each other at Cartimar, Pasay City not
ruled that the non-presentation in court of the seized blue-seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondent's cause, since
later than 2:30 a.m. in the early morning of October 15, 1979. At the appointed time and place, he met
the crime had sufficiently been established by other competent evidence.
Boy with a companion, who was introduced to him as Gonzalo Vargas, his co-accused in the instant
case. Thereafter, they proceeded to a gasoline station nearby. At the gasoline station, at the corner of
Taylo and Taft Avenue, near Cartimar, they picked up another person who was later on introduced to him The CA rejected the belated claim of petitioner that his arrest was irregular. It ruled that the alleged defect could not
as Felicisimo Rieta. Then the four of them (Boy, Gonzalo, Rieta and Rimorin) boarded the cargo truck be raised for the first time on appeal, especially in the light of his voluntary submission to and participation in the
and they proceeded to Divisoria. It was Boy who drove the cargo truck, while petitioner was seated next proceedings before the trial court.
to Boy while accused Rimorin and Gonzalo to his right. While enroute to Divisoria, along Roxas
Boulevard before reaching Del Pan Bridge, Boy turned right under the bridge. He commented that it was The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the other co-accused who, unlike petitioner, had
not the route to Divisoria, and Boy answered 'meron lang ikakarga dito'. On the other hand, Rieta told not been found to be in possession of blue-seal cigarettes.
Boy that he was hungry, and thus, Boy pulled-over at a carinderia at Del Pan Bridge near Delgado Bros.
When Rieta alighted he followed, while Boy and Gonzalo proceeded. After less than an hour, Boy and Hence, this Petition.11
Gonzalo returned. They then proceeded towards Roxas Boulevard, Bonifacio Drive, and Boy drove
straight at the corner of Aduana to Roxas Boulevard. When he noticed that the truck was not bound for Issues
Divisoria as earlier informed, he asked Boy why they were not taking the route going to Divisoria. Boy
replied 'bukas na lang wala ng espasyo'. Immediately, they were intercepted by two vehicles and one of
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:
the occupants thereof ordered the driver to pull over. The driver pulled over, and they were ordered to
raise their hands and to lay flat on their belly on the pavement right in front of the truck, and they were
bodily frisked but they found nothing. He asked the Metrocom soldiers what was it all about, but the "1. The respondents trial and appellate courts committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
Metrocom soldiers were shouting 'asan ang blue seal'. Then they were ordered to board a jeep owned by and/or excess of jurisdiction when [they] convicted herein petitioner notwithstanding the prosecution's
the Metrocom soldiers, and they were brought to Camp Crame. Before they left the area, he did not see failure to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
the Metrocom soldiers open the cargo truck. He was brought to the MISG at Camp Crame. When they
arrived at Camp Crame, the soldiers thereat were clapping their hands, thus he asked 'ano ba talaga ito' "2. The evidence obtained against the accused is inadmissible in evidence because petitioner and his co-
and he got an answer from Barrameda, 'yun ang dahilan kung bakit ka makukulong', pointing to a truck. accused were arrested without a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and seizure order (ASSO) which was
When he saw the truck, it was not the same truck they boarded in the early morning of October 15, 1979. subsequently declared illegal and invalid by this Honorable Supreme Court."12
The truck they boarded was galvanized iron pale sheet covered with canvass while the one at Camp
Crame was color red and not covered. He entertained the idea that they were being framed-up. Two days The Court's Ruling
after, he was interrogated and the alleged blue seal cigarettes were shown to him, and he was informed
by the investigator that the same blue seal cigarettes were the contents of the cargo truck. When the The Petition has no merit.
alleged blue seal cigarettes were taken out of the cargo truck, he was not asked to be present. He asked
for the whereabouts of Boy, but he was informed that the latter escaped. The more he believed that there
438
 First Issue: Q Now you stated that a search was made on the truck and you found how many cases of
Sufficiency of Evidence blue seal cigarettes?

Petitioner contends that the existence of the untaxed blue seal cigarettes was not established, because the A Three hundred five (305) cases, Sir.
prosecution had not presented them as evidence. He further argues that there was no crime committed, as the
corpus delicti was never proven during the trial. Q Blue seal cigarettes?

Corpus Delicti Established A Yes, Sir.

by Other Evidence
Q What do you mean by blue seal cigarettes?
We do not agree. Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss sustained.13 It is the fact of the commission of
the crime14 that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses.15 In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not
A Blue seal cigarettes are untaxed cigarettes, Sir.
necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered,16 to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of
unlicensed firearms,17 to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom,18 or -- in the present case -- to
the seized contraband cigarettes.19 Q Did you find out how many were there on board the truck which was intercepted by your
men per your order?
In Rimorin v. People,20 the petitioner therein similarly equated the actual physical evidence -- 305 cases of blue-
seal cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti. The appellate court allegedly erred in not acquitting him on reasonable A Yes, Sir, [there] were three.
doubt arising from the non-presentation in court of the confiscated contraband cigarettes. Holding that corpus
delicti could be established by circumstantial evidence, the Court debunked his argument thus: Q Who?

"Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single A They were P/Sgt. Arturo Rimorin, Sr.
witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence. Q P/Sgt. Of what department?

"Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by A Of Pasay City Police Force, Sir, and Pat. Felicisimo Rieta.
respondent's evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody Receipt
issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods. Q Of that police department?

"Col. Panfilo Lacson's testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the blue seal A Of Kawit, Cavite Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, Sir.
cigarettes was clear and straightforward. He categorically testified as follows:
Q Who is this Gonzalo Vargas?
Q Let us go back to the truck after you apprehended the COSAC soldiers on board the
[C]orona car, what did you do thereafter?
A Civilian Sir.
A We took them to the place where the cargo truck was intercepted, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did you notice thereat?
Fiscal Macaraeg:
A Inside the truck were hundreds of cases of blue seal cigarettes, and I also found out that
I am showing to you a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979, which states:
my men were able to apprehend the occupants of the cargo truck although they reported to me
Received from Lt. Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, AC of S, M2/CC, MISG. PC
that the driver managed to make good escape, Sir.
METROCOM
439
 (Thru S/Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, PC) THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (371) cases of
assorted brands of 'Blue Seal' Cigarettes, which were intercepted and confiscated by
elements of the MISG, PC METROCOM on or about 0400 15 October 79 along
Bonifacio Drive, Manila, which for [purposes] of identification we respectfully request
that it be marked [on] evidence as Exhibit 'A'.
COURT:
Mark it Exhibit 'A'.
Fiscal Macaraeg:
Q Will you please do examine Exhibit 'A' and tell us whether this is the same receipt?
A This is the same receipt, Sir.
Q By the way, were photographs taken of the car as well as the vehicle involved in this
case, together with the blue seal cigarettes that were confiscated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you have copies of these photographs?
A The copies are with our evidence custodian, Sir.
Q Can you bring those pictures if required next time?
A Yes, Sir.
"So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo –customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau –categorically testify that
the MISG had turned over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for which he issued a Custody Receipt
dated October 15, 1979.
"We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving credence to the narration of
prosecution witnesses, especially when they are public officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner."21
Petitioner argues that the receipt issued by Abrigo, a customs official, was beset with doubt because: 1) it did not
state specifically that the blue-seal cigarettes identified therein had been confiscated from petitioner and turned
over to Abrigo by Colonel Lacson and/or his men; and 2) it mentioned 371 (instead of 305) cases of confiscated
blue-seal cigarettes.
We note, however, that Colonel Lacson himself identified the Custody Receipt as the same one issued for the 305
cases of cigarettes found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and his co-accused rode, and from which the 66
cases of cigarettes -- subject of Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-138(79) -- were confiscated in Malabon, Metro
Manila.22 This fact (305 plus 66) explains why 371 cases were indicated therein. At any rate, petitioner argues on
minor discrepancies that do not affect the integrity of the Receipt, issued in due course by a customs official who
was duty-bound to put the seized contraband cigarettes in safekeeping.
The existence of the 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes found in the possession of petitioner and his co-accused
was duly proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses -- Lacson and Abrigo. They had testified in
compliance with their duty as enforcers of the law. Their testimonies were rightly entitled to full faith and credit,
especially because there was no showing of any improper motive23 on their part to testify falsely against petitioner.
Further, the Court accords great respect to the factual conclusions drawn by the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court as in this case.24
Absurd is the claim of petitioner that, because Colonel Lacson was not the officer who had actually intercepted the
cargo truck in which the former rode, the latter's testimony was therefore hearsay. The testimony of the colonel on
his participation in the apprehension of the truck sufficiently rebutted this contention.
Lacson testified that he had personally received information regarding the smuggling activities being conducted by
a syndicated group in that place. He was also informed that smuggled items would be transported from the 2nd
COSAC Detachment in the Port Area to Malabon by a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167. During the stakeout
surveillance on the night of October 14, 1979, he saw -- from his post within the vicinity of the 2nd COSAC
Detachment -- the identified cargo truck coming out of the Port Area. While trailing behind, he radioed his men
posted along Roxas Boulevard to stop the truck. Later in court, he described how his men had actually intercepted
it.25
Petitioner insists that Colonel Lacson, who had given chase to a Toyota car and was not among the officers who
had intercepted the truck, could not have seen him as one of the passengers of the latter vehicle. Notably,
however, the chase of the Toyota car had lasted no more than 5 minutes, and the colonel's team immediately
returned to the subject truck after the chase.26 Lacson, however, categorically said that he had seen 305 cases of
blue-seal cigarettes inside the cargo vehicle, and that petitioner was one of its passengers.
It should be borne in mind that Colonel Lacson -- as head of that particular surveillance operation -- had full
knowledge, control and supervision of the whole process. He had organized the surveillance teams and given
orders to his men prior to the apprehension of the vehicles suspected of carrying smuggled items. Furthermore, he
was present during the surveillance operations until the apprehension of the cargo truck. Thus, he was clearly
competent to testify on the matter.
The denial by petitioner that he was among the occupants of the truck is highly self-serving and riddled with
inconsistencies. He had been directly identified as one of its passengers. Besides, he himself admitted that he had
been on board the vehicle when it was intercepted, and that there were no other person in the area.
Courtroom Identification Unnecessary
440
Next, petitioner belabors the failure of the prosecution to ask Colonel Lacson to identify him in open court.
However, the colonel's positive and categorical testimony pointing to him as one of the passengers of the cargo
truck, as well as petitioner's own admission of his presence therein, dispelled the need for a courtroom
identification. In People v. Quezada, the Court said:
"x x x. While positive identification by a witness is required by the law to convict an accused, it need not
always be by means of a physical courtroom identification. As the Court held in People v. Paglinawan:
'x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to point out the accused in open court by
way of identification, the fact that the witness x x x did not do so in this case was because the
public prosecutor failed to ask her to point out appellant, hence such omission does not in any
way affect or diminish the truth or weight of her testimony.'
"In-court identification of the offender is essential only when there is a question or doubt on whether the
one alleged to have committed the crime is the same person who is charged in the information and
subject of the trial."27
In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was a passenger of the truck, that he was apprehended by the
authorities, and that he was the same individual charged under the Information in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-
137(79).
Prima Facie Proof of
Nonpayment of Taxes Sufficient
There is no merit, either, in the claim of petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the nonpayment of the taxes
and duties on the confiscated cigarettes. There is an exception to the general rule requiring the prosecution to
prove a criminal charge predicated on a negative allegation, or a negative averment constituting an essential
element of a crime. In People v. Julian-Fernandez, we held:
"Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately
within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not
incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the
truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily
be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge
or control. For example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without
a license x x x, the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiar[ly] within his knowledge and he
must establish that fact or suffer conviction."28(Emphasis supplied)
The truth of the negative averment that the duties and specific taxes on the cigarettes were not paid to the proper
authorities is fairly indicated by the following circumstances that have been established: (1) the cargo truck, which
carried the contraband cigarettes and some passengers including petitioner, immediately came from the 2nd
COSAC Detachment; (2) the truck was intercepted at the unholy hour of 4:00 a.m.; (3) it fitted the undisclosed
informer's earlier description of it as one that was carrying contraband; and (4) the driver ran away. Hence, it was
up to petitioner to disprove these damning circumstances, simply by presenting the receipts showing payment of
the taxes. But he did not do so; all that he could offer was his bare and self-serving denial.
Knowledge of the Illegal
Nature of Goods
The fact that 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes were found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and his co-
accused were riding, was properly established. Nonetheless, he insists that his presence there was not enough to
convict him of smuggling, because the element of illegal possession had not been duly proved. He adds that he
had no knowledge that untaxed cigarettes were in the truck.
Petitioner's contention is untenable. Persons found to be in possession of smuggled items are presumed to be
engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.29 The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. To rebut this presumption, it is not enough
for petitioner to claim good faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful source of the cigarettes. He should have
presented evidence to support his claim and to convince the court of his non-complicity.
In the case adverted to earlier, Rimorin v. People, we held thus:
"In his discussion of a similarly worded provision of Republic Act No. 455, a criminal law authority
explained thus:
'In order that a person may be deemed guilty of smuggling or illegal importation under the
foregoing statute three requisites must concur: (1) that the merchandise must have been
fraudulently or knowingly imported contrary to law; (2) that the defendant, if he is not the
importer himself, must have received, concealed, bought, sold or in any manner facilitated the
transportation, concealment or sale of the merchandise; and (3) that the defendant must be
shown to have knowledge that the merchandise had been illegally imported. If the defendant,
however, is shown to have had possession of the illegally imported merchandise, without
satisfactory explanation, such possession shall be deemed sufficient to authorize
conviction.'"30(Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the explanation given by petitioner was found to be unacceptable and incredible by both the
RTC and the CA, which said:
"Now on the explanations of Police Sgt. Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force and Pat. Rieta of Kawit
Police Force, riders in the loaded cargo truck driven by 'Boy.' Their claim that they did not have any
knowledge about the cargo of blue seal cigarettes is not given credence by the court. They tried to show
lack of knowledge by claiming that along the way, 'Boy' and Gonzalo Vargas left them behind at a certain
point for snacks and picked them up later after the cargo had been loaded. The Court cannot see its way
through how two policemen, joining 'Boy' in the dead of the night, explicitly to give him and his goods
some protection, which service would be paid, yet would not know what they are out to protect. And
441
 neither could the Court see reason in 'Boy's' leaving them behind when he was going to pick up and load
the blue seal cigarettes. 'Boy' knew the risks. He wanted them for protection, so why will he discard
them? How so unnatural and so contrary to reason."31
Being contrary to human experience, his version of the facts is too pat and stereotyped to be accepted at face
value. Evidence, to be believed, not only must proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must also be
credible in itself, as when it conforms to common experience and observation of humankind.32
The absence of any suspicious reaction on the part of petitioner was not in accordance with human nature. The
involvement or participation he and his co-accused had in the smuggling of the goods was confirmed by their lack
of proper and reasonable justification for the fact that they had been found inside the cargo truck, seated in front,
when it was intercepted by the authorities. Despite his protestation, it is obvious that petitioner was aware of the
strange nature of the transaction, and that he was willing to do his part in furtherance thereof. The evidence
presented by the prosecution established his work of guarding and escorting the contraband to facilitate its
transportation from the Port Area to Malabon, an act punishable under Section 3601 of the Tax Code.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as
the law upon which it was predicated -- General Order No. 60, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos --
was subsequently declared by the Court, in Tañada v. Tuvera,33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any
evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in evidence.
We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its declaration of the invalidity of various
presidential issuances. Discussing therein how such a declaration might affect acts done on a presumption of their
validity, the Court said:
"x x x. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing
no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. x x x It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination
of its invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects –with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'
xxxx xx xxx
"Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is 'an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'"34
The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative
necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in operation
should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects.35 The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under
General Order No. 60 -- long before our Decision in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that
can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been introduced into the country in violation of
customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions36 to the constitutional provision. Such provision
mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who has
personally determined the existence of probable cause.37
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a warrant for
purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the
Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store
or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law.38
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005]
TOMAS SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
442
 DECISION At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported over his radio that three (3) persons had boarded the
Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued its surveillance.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded
At bar is the petition for review oncertiorari[1]
filed by Tomas Salvador assailing the Decision[2] dated August 9, the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck with
2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 20186. its lights off.

On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador, then aircraft The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima
mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off, identified himself
and Manila Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later identified as Tomas Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio
thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos. Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the tow truck.

Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City with violation
of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843. The Information reads:
That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity, Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the concealment and unlawful importation of
the following items:
198 pieces of means watches P187,110.00
76 pieces of mens diving watches 8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches 11,600.00
1600 grams of assorted jewelry. 322,000.00
with a total market value of P537,500.00 FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREEE HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS, more or less, Philippine Currency, without authority or permit from proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing a girdle.
While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the
package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, Positive! Thereupon, the rest of the team
surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered without a fight. The team searched their bodies and
found that the three were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in packaging tape.
Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team confiscated the packets and
brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.
At around 8:00 oclock the following morning, Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of Customs, arrived
at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the packets and on seeing that it contained dutiable goods, she
proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from the accused. She then prepared an inventory of the items
seized and listed the weight of the packets.[4] Thereafter, she brought the seized packets to the In-Board Section,
Bureau of Customs, Airport Office where their contents were identified and appraised. The Bureau of Customs found
248 pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries valued as follows:
QTY.
UNIT DESCRIPTION APPRAISED VALUE
10
pcs. Half-bangles with Charms Tricolors 122.8 gms.

When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits 6
pcs. Bracelet with Charms Tricolors 52.4 gms.
then ensued.
8
The prosecution established the following facts: pcs. Bracelet (Tricolor) 64.2 gms.
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, headed by Major 5
Gerardo B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts. Rodolfo A. Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola, Virgilio M. Sindac and pcs. Bangles (3 pcs./set) Tricolor 155.3 gms.
Edwin B. Ople, conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of
Babys Bangles with charm 18.2 gms.
alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel.
Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to keep close watch on the second airplane parked L-Bangles with charm 68.5 gms.
inside the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is an Airbus 300 with tail number RPC-3001. It arrived at the NAIA
at 10:25 in the evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong as Flight No. PR-311. After its passengers disembarked
L-Bangles 112.3 gms.
and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL ground crew and parked at the ramp area of the Domestic Airport
terminal.

443
 L-Creolla Earrings 901.56 gms. All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were framed-up by the military.
Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994, he was assigned to the Airbus 300 with tail No. RPC-
TOTAL GRAMS +P 299,052.00 3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then working on said aircraft. He was conducting a visual check of
1,495 x P200.00/gm. the plane when a tow truck arrived on its way to Nichols Airfield. He told one of the junior mechanics that he would
take a break and be back in an hour. He then boarded the tow truck. When it was near the Lima Gate, a jeep with
four (4) men in civilian attire aboard approached him. The four pointed their firearms at him and, after searching him
Assorted Watches for drugs, he was frisked but nothing was found. He was nonetheless brought by the men to the PAFSECOM Office,
204 then to Villamor Airbase Hospital for a medical examination and alcohol test. Thereafter, he was brought back to the
pcs. Citizen M watches with black dial with gold PAFSECOM Office. There, another military man arrived and brought out a box containing packets. Then he and his
metal bracelet (-1) x $25 companions were told to put on their mechanics uniforms and to wear girdles. The packets were placed on their
$2,600.00 bodies, after which they were photographed. He further testified that he was asked to sign a certain paper but was
24 not allowed to read it thoroughly. During the investigation, he was not apprised of his rights nor assisted by a counsel.
pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with blue dial with
white metal bracelet (-1) x $25 Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any knowledge of the questioned items seized from him. He testified
600.00 that during the incident in question, he only boarded the tow truck to take a break at the PAL canteen. He saw a box
on the tow truck but was not aware of its contents. After his arrest, he was made to sign a document under duress.
16
pcs. Seiko Divers Watch Mens- Black dial with Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense charged. He declared that after his arrest, he was made to
rubberized bracelet (-1) x $50 sign a document by the PAF personnel, the contents of which he was not able to read. He signed it because he was
800.00
struck with a .45 caliber handgun by one of the military men and threatened him with summary execution if he would
4 not do so. He was not informed of his rights nor given the services of counsel during the investigation.
pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with yellow dial
with gold metal bracelet (1) x $25 After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting all the accused of the offense charged, thus:
100.00
4 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aurelio Mandin y Liston, Danilo Santos y
pcs. Citizen L-watches with white dial (4) x $20 80.00 Antonio and Tomas Salvador y Magno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance and applying
62
pcs. Seiko 5 Mens watches with yellow dial with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court sentences each of the accused to an indeterminate term of EIGHT (8)
gold metal bracelet (1) x $25 YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and
1,550.00 to pay a fine of EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P8,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The court also orders the forfeiture of the confiscated articles in favor of the Government.
34
pcs. Seiko 5 Mens watches with black dial with
gold metal bracelet (1) x $25 SO ORDERED.[5]
850.00
____
248 pcs. All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
$6,580.00 20186.
On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision, thus:
The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest and thereafter recommended that petitioner and his
co-accused be charged with violating Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Accordingly, the Information,
We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.
mentioned earlier, was filed with the RTC.
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Joint Demurrer to Evidence. THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court denied the demurrer and directed the accused to present
their evidence. SO ORDERED.[6]

444
 They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001. [7]
Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this Court by way of the instant petition for review
on certiorari. He submits for our consideration the following assignments of error:
I
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE UNLAWFUL
IMPORTATION, POSSESSION OF UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES AND CONSPIRACY IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE SAME, WERE NEVER PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
gate in the airport perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and his companions agreed to the search after
one of them was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under these circumstances, the search and seizure is
legal and the seized items are admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.
As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a persons body, personal effects or
residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure
mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Thus, Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
provide:

II SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE PERSONS OF THE
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
ACCUSED.
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
III
SEC. 3.
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
xxx
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, AS WELL AS ALL ITS DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE APPARENTLY OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE UNLAWFUL. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
IV
x x x.
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS. [8] The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.
Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search
warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs
The above assignments of error boil down to these issues: (1) whether the seized items are admissible in
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful
evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
arrest.[10]
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the PAF
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to
operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,[9] he maintains that at the time he and his co-accused were stopped by
conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the
the PAF law enforces, they were unaware that a crime was being committed. Accordingly, the law enforcers were
vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the
actually engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of his Constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure.
nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant
Thus, the seized items should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
since it exercised police authority under the customs law.[11]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual circumstances of the case at bar,
In Papa vs. Mago[12] involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his companions.
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article,
They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other PAL personnel working therein.
cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced
They stayed inside the plane for sometime and surprisingly, came out with bulging waists. They then stopped and
into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any
looked around and made apparent signals. All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable suspicion that
vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.
petitioner and his colleagues were up to something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was conducted in
connection with the enforcement of customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding a motor vehicle.
In addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila Domestic Airport which, like every
445
 In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers
who evade payment of customs duties. The Governments policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling cannot
be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has not been paid are
entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individuals private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason
not to apply this State policy which we have continued to affirm.[13]
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board a moving PAL
aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception
to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be
obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to
obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can quickly
be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. [14] Verily, we rule that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the articles involved in the instant controversy were validly
seized by the authorities even without a search warrant, hence, admissible in evidence against petitioner and his co-
accused.
On the second issue, petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for readily sustaining the trial courts finding that
the witnesses for the prosecution were credible, notwithstanding that their testimonies contain glaring inconsistencies
which tend to detract from their veracity. Petitioner submits that these inconsistencies create serious doubt which
should have been resolved in his favor.
We are not persuaded.
After a careful examination of the purported inconsistencies mentioned by petitioner, we find that they do not
relate with the elements of the offense charged. Rather, they tend to focus on minor and insignificant matters as for
instance: which PAF operative was in possession of the hand-held radio; how the girdles (garters) were removed;
and what time the aircraft in question arrived.
It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from the fact that all members of the special PAF team
who conducted the search positively identified the petitioner and his co-accused as the same persons who boarded
the PAL plane; stayed therein for a significant length of time; disembarked in a manner which stirred suspicion from
the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms, rode an aircraft tow truck towards Lima Gate where they were caught
in flagrante delicto.
As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to trivial and insignificant details do not
destroy their credibility.[15] Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the prosecutions
case as they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby negating any misgivings that
the same were perjured.[16]
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in part:
SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or assist in
so doing, any article contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, seal or in any manner facilitate the importation,
concealment or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law,
shall be guilty of smuggling
xxx
When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have had possession of the article in
question, possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant
shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court: Provided, however, That payment of the tax due
after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under this section.
Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the Philippines or assists
in importing or bringing into the Philippines any article, contrary to law, or (2) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have
been imported contrary to law.[17] Importation commences when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction
of the Philippines with intention to unload and is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes and other
charges due upon the articles and the legal permit for withdrawal has been issued, or where the articles are duty-
free, once the articles have left the jurisdiction of the customs. [18]
In the instant case, the prosecution established by positive, strong, and convincing evidence that petitioner and
his co-accused were caught red-handed by a team from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, while in the
possession of highly dutiable articles inside the premises of the airport. The contraband items were taken by petitioner
and his co-accused from a PAL plane which arrived from Hong Kong on the night of June 3, 1994. Petitioner and his
colleagues then attempted to bring out these items in the cover of darkness by concealing them inside their uniforms.
When confronted by the PAF team, they were unable to satisfactorily explain why the questioned articles were in
their possession. They could not present any document to prove lawful importation. Thus, their conviction must
necessarily be upheld. Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial courts Decision
convicting petitioner and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
446
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-
rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were
being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the
4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the
Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television
station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several John Does whose true names
and identities have not as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition
and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No.
1866, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, and without authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their
possession, custody and control, the following to wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the proper
authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their
conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by common designs, come to an
agreement and decision to commit the crime of rebellion, by then and there participating therein
and publicly taking arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its
activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several
John Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon
the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted
homicide.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to possess any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there was a
rebellion during the period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division,
National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The
surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements
of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar
building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on
foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of
the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and
immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six
meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the
wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they
sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao
as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of
M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of
the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar
Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano,
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the
room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested
appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were
then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so
much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there
was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez
and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November 30, 1989, he
was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on
December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on
December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building. According to him,
he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the building. He denies,
however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives
447
in his possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and
made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers
that he does not know anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the
explosives were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the
1987coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col. Matillano then
told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at
the Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata raw ako ni Col.
Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted
homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a
recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing or obeying orders and
pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that Rolando de
Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that he
did not have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the
same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he
was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col.
Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is
necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death
shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes
of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety
due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which
criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the
country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the transitional
government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which
tend to disturb public peace and order.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms
and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the
law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this
law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of
firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance
since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, 8in which case
good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. 9
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and
intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime;
but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to
commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. 11 Such intent to
possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored
in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the
use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent.
448
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as Presidential Decree
No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is
absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of
having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or
authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter
the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room
and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied any
knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in
behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to
possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal
or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration
the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of
thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier,
having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence
without leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about
the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his
possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and
power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a
large quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a
military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal
or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this
nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or
indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia actually intended
to possess the articles confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. While
the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence thereto by the
parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding team, considering the gravity of
the offense for which herein appellant stands to be convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant
at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily
and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at
that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed
and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in People vs.
Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of
the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer
of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way
to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
449
 prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs,
based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to
act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the
bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was
initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused,
during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The
failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to
arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily
present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused
was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a
probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of
the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open
his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside
them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability
and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them
in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts
of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are)
of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues
cannot be less justified.
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and until
December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the
firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of
rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or
executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The
court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose
active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the
act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the
lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in
determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that
appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete
penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other
offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of
firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the
Court has explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is
penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the
prosecution and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each
case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate
prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an
offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant
elements.
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised Penal Code in
this prosecution for a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for
executive clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with good
450
behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision thereon
should be insulated against any tenuous importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia
were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. In the words of
the court a quo:
2. the nature and quantity of the items — 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of M-16 ammo
and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by the military that the
Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the rebels was not without basis. Those items are
clearly not for one's personal defense. They are for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted
that per instruction of Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to
stay guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that office is
not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col.
Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-soldiers were present which self-
evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his boss, was still very much at home and
constantly in touch with soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8
or 9, 1989 was a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with
caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand
man of Col. Matillano; and (d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was earlier seen with some
men who fired upon a car of the AFP intelligence agents. 25
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the
governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently,
appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted
out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein for
executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by
two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box
was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of
the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof(tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He
was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went
to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
451
 Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the
NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that
the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being
the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27,
1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the
dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS
WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p.
1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81
S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible
any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling
and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache
& Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No.
81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured
by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
452
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of
a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384
US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched
the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of
police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses
are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal.
App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d
938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the owner of a
motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to
the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should
not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-
8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the
NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest
of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on
the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559,
71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody
of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is
no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
453
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986;
Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of
the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured
by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof
(SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30,
1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone
else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by
an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a
private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in
serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to
privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave
statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of
his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and
their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear
from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under
investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination.
As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled
confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and
nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was
utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner
of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant
met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship
the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave
the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half
an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the
purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents.
As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as
the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The
454
Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship
the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed
to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989];
People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January
1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise
convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People
v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567
[1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or
passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should
have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed
the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is
therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997]
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller.[1]
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent Antonia
Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a true Servant, thereby assailing the 30 September 1993 decision[2] and 2
December 1993 Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-
93, which sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private respondent [4] and denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[5]
The facts are as follows:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August
1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum[6] from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma
R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters accounts because the same
was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum[7] to Catolico warning her not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the
companys control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was due to
negligence, since fellow employee Irene Soliven obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation
when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept. Catolico then asked the company to look
into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.[8]
In a memorandum[9] dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico
against the rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity
involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:
A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266
representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc.
showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00
per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated
December 15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the
cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the
difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their
check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check
no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989....
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms.
455
Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her
talagang ganyan, bukas. It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.[10]
Forthwith, in her memorandum[11] dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her
side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation,[12] and she was granted a
48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6
February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the
company.[13]
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for
her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaas invasion of her privacy when
Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico.[14]
In a letter[15] to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she
received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice.She also averred that the preventive
suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Cos secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum [16] notifying Catolico of
her termination; thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990
respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of dishonesty. However,
said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist
stationed at Espana Branch, you actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of
Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in
the amount of P640.00 actually represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this was
confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company. Accordingly,
you are hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, and illegal suspension.[17]
In his decision[18] of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice
against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to prove what [they]
alleged as complainants dishonesty, and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was
without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed
reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to
Catolico computed at one-half months pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum
of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension representing 30 days work. Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico
as follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P 2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor
Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her
services.
In its decision[19] of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioners
evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw
when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to
Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. [20] It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which
cannot be used as a legal basis for complainants dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision
by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate
of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari, which
is anchored on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving commissions from YSP,
or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the
last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolicos receipt of YSPs check,
aggravated by her propensity to violate company rules, constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings
of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti,[21] the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's
decision, as it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent with its
456
findings of fact; and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private respondent does not
warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. It observed that Catolico was given several opportunities to
explain her side of the check controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent
explanation satisfy the requirements of just cause and due process. The OSG was also convinced that Catolicos
dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolicos admission of the existence of the check, as well as her lame
excuse that it was a Christmas gift from YSP, constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed
petitioners argument that there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication in this case, [22] adding that
petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that
the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest.
In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC contends that
petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It
then prays that we dismiss this petition.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners evidence is too flimsy to justify her dismissal. The check in
issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an
employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as
a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on
the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never received
a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a check from YSP, she meant that
she did not receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what she received was a token gift. All
that can be gathered from the audit report is that there was apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that
Catolico pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere
suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS because,
being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle confidential information or sensitive properties. She was doing the
task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the
instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised
of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires.[23] Ample opportunity connotes every
kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense,
including legal representation.[24]
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the
service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her
counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisors
memorandum spoke of evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession, which were not, however, submitted. What the
evidences [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid
cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal
is unjustified.[25] Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
It is evident from the Supervisors memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous
transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an
overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolicos inappropriate transaction,
stated in his affidavit:[26]
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the
[company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines
like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of
only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle
was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed
that there was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check
voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank
Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolicos dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor
executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay
evidence carries no probative value.[27]
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through the
formers memorandum[28] of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832,
the said check was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an
overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989[29] stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per box, while
the purchase order dated 5 October 1989[30] priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price
may then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended by
Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice President-General
Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders were silent as to Catolicos participation in the purchase. If the price
increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should have disapproved the
transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but themselves. This set of facts
emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico
not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the
opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all involved
in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez
called an under the table deal with YSP.
Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employees
dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment;[31] and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial
457
grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.[32] Besides, Catolico was not shown
to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term trust and confidence is restricted.[33]
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise
the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti[34] that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolicos reinstatement would not be to the best
interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
computed at one months salary for every year of service.[35] In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed
the separation pay at one-half months salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an
objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR
CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the
evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights
of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 109279-80. January 18, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-a
ppellee, vs. OCTAVIO MENDOZA y LANDICHO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court found her
husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence is the
spouses only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge with
parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable
motive, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38 caliber revolver
one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal gunshot wounds which
directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 637
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt with
Serial No. 41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide, without first securing the necessary
license or permit therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced,
following which, a judgment of conviction was rendered, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 636, and finding accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of PARRICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties attendant thereto.
He is further ordered to pay to Alipio Eusebio the amount of P66,000.00 for the funeral, wake, burial and incidental
expenses that said Alipio Eusebio spent by reason of the death of his daughter Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza.
And to Charmaine Mendoza the accused is hereby ordered to pay her the following
1. P50,000.00 for causing the death of her mother Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza;
2. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. P25,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.
Plus costs of the proceedings.
458
Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child Charmaine
Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.
2. In Criminal Case No. 637, and finding the accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions, used in the Commission of Parricide, defined and
penalized under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Presidential decree No. 1878-A said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.
The firearms and ammunitions used, a Colt Revolver Cal. 38, with a Serial Number 41001 is hereby forfeited in
favor of the government together with all the ammunitions.
With costs against the accused.
Conformably with the Circular of the Honorable Supreme Court, the accused is hereby ordered committed to the
Bureau of Corrections.
The accused, if he appeals the decision is not entitled to Bail.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 76-77, Rollo.)
Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
I the subdivision where they live, they saw the car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilias god-daughter, and they hitched a
. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable
documents, in grave violation of accuseds constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
II
. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable direct testimony of the minor
daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or contradictions thereof
to the facts clearly and decisively testified by and/or findings of the police investigators.
III
. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused as corroborated by his witness.
IV
. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of Firearms despite
the police investigators undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a situation consistent with the
decisively clear postulate of the defense.
V
. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the crime of
parricide was committed, the law and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide,
parricide, etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must only be
considered an aggravating circumstance. This is consistent to the rule that Penal laws favorable to the accused
shall have retroactive effects.
The facts as established by the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
On November 11, 1988, accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then 10-year-old daughter
attended the birthday party of a relative of accused-appellant held at McDonalds in Harrison Plaza. While the party
was going on, accused-appellant left and proceeded to Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where he had some
beer. When it was time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not find accused-appellant, hence, they
decided to just leave, proceeding directly to their residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III,
Pamplona, Las Pias (p. 4, Appellees Brief.).
Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 oclock in the evening but accused-appellant was not yet
there. After a while, mother and daughter left for the house of Cecilias parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring some
perfume for Cecilias brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid.).
At about 9 oclock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They rode a jeepney and at the gate of
ride home. Finally home, they saw their car already parked in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their house
were on but the screen door was locked. They knocked at the window but accused-appellant did not respond. A
moment later, however, accused-appellant opened the back door and mother and daughter went straight to the
masters bedroom (Ibid.).
While inside the masters bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold water
and to douse him. She willingly obliged, after which she was told to go to her room.She change her clothes and
readied herself for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and
Charmaine having left accused-appellant at the party.Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three
gunshots. Running out of her room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room, bleeding
profusely. Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a gun under the bed in her parents room (pp. 5-6, Ibid.).
Charmaine ran towards her gasping and bleeding mother and held her. Then, accused-appellant asked
Charmaine to call her Aunt Dolores Mendoza to inform her of the death of Cecilia. Dolores could not believe
Charmaine and talked to accused-appellant instead (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, the victim bled to death on the floor.
Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had
been shot and is already dead. Gabac, on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he
459
would be arriving shortly. When Gabac finally arrived, he and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia
into accused-appellants car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.
Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival. The autopsy report indicated the cause of death as follows:
Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder
Upon receiving information about the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa, together with
investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas, Cpl. Gorgonio Nortales and Pfc. Rolando Almario, proceeded to the hospital to
investigate the incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any statement or comment. Thereafter , the policemen
invited Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III,
Pamplona, Las Pias. While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something tucked inside Gabacs
waist. He promptly told Gabac Pare pakisurrender mo nga iyong baril. Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38
caliber revolver with Serial No. 41001 and with two empty shells and two live rounds.Gabac informed Africa that the
gun was handed to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the crime scene to respond to the call of
accused-appellant for assistance (p. 7, Ibid.)
Cecilias father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughters death, and that valuables were being
taken out of his daughters house, decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein,
including accused-appellants personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)
From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order No. 86-580-893 dated
November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander,
580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to carry a
Colt Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December 15, 1986. There was also a
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the
Philippine Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant
Director for Personnel which described the firearm as One Colt Revolver SN 41001 (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).
Accused-appellants own account of the incident is to the effect that before the shooting incident on the night of
November 11, 1988, he and his wife Cecilia were arguing about the latter carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver,
and that a few weeks earlier they likewise argued because he found out that his wife was still supporting her parents
as well as her brothers and sisters.
Further, accused-appellant claimed that he saw men roaming near their house and that he had received death
threats over the telephone because Cecilia owed $35,000.00 to some people, in relation to her jewelry and perfumes
business. She also allegedly owed people some cash which was coursed through her by workers from Saudi Arabia
to be sent to their relatives in the Philippines (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 14-19).
Accused-appellant claimed that he went home at around 7 oclock on the night of November 11, 1988, after his
wife, Cecilia, and daughter, Charmaine, had left him at the party. When his wife and Charmaine arrived, they
proceeded to the masters bedroom, after which, her daughter kissed him goodnight. He and his wife were then left
alone in their room and at that moment, his wife showed him some money and uttered Dad, okey na. She also
brought out the .38 caliber revolver from her bag then changed her clothes, and went to the bathroom, and he fell
asleep (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 21-28).
Thereafter, accused-appellant declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside their
room. When he went out, he saw his wife wounded and bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody run from the
backdoor of their house which banged. Consequently, he ran outside and pursue the intruder who ran from the
backdoor, but accused-appellant claimed that he only went up to their gate because of his concern over his wifes
condition.
When he went back, he woke up Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia, both of them cried. After a
while, he called up his brother-in-law, policeman Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 32, p. 34, p. 37) and
the two of them then brought Cecilia to the hospital.
In the hospital, some police investigators from the Las Pias Police Station asked accused-appellant about the
incident, but he refused to comment. He was later invited to the police station for investigation, but due to the advice
of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any statement to the police about the incident.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. While he admitted having been married to Cecilia on
February 28, 1976, he claimed that his wife was killed by somebody else. Further, even as he denied possession of
a .38 caliber revolver, he admitted to have been authorized to carry a .45 caliber between the years 1968 and 1969
(tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 7 and 68).
Accused-appellant swore that he had no reason to kill his wife because he loved her. However, he admitted to
have sired children by another woman (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 51).
The trial court did not give credence and weight to the defenses theory that the victim was engaged in illegal
activities which supposedly led to her death. Rather, the trial court found that accused-appellant had the opportunity
and the propensity to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Accordingly, although the evidence was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a pronouncement that all
elements which were needed to arrive at a conclusion that accused-appellant killed his wife were present and that
no proof had been established by him to overturn its findings (p. 67, Ibid.).
After going through the evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced
that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza has been duly established.
Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996]).
During the trial of the case, it was duly established that the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella
Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias, were the Mendozas, namely, accused-appellant Octavio, his daughter
Charmaine, and his now deceased wife Cecilia. On the night Cecilia was shot to death, no one was there except
these three persons. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the trial court of his innocence by denying that he
killed his wife, insinuating that another person is the killer. This stance of denial is negative self-serving evidence
which deserves no evidentiary weight (People vs. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 [1996]). The insinuation of accused-
appellant that some convenient intruder perpetrated the killing is absolutely without basis and unsubstantiated. It is
plainly an afterthought, a devised plot to escape just punishment. In fact, accused-appellant even refused to give any
statement or comment to the police investigators to enlighten them about the shooting incident. If indeed, Cecilia was
460
shot and killed by somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely have been but natural for him, as
a husband to cooperate with police authorities for the speedy apprehension of the gunman, by informing them
immediately of the alleged intruder-killer. But he did not and instead, he took the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo,
to keep silent about the incident when the police conducted the investigation, which is rather odd if he really were
innocent. Verily it was only on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came out with the story about
the handy intruder. He kept silent for two long years.
Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of his
father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter, Charmaine Mendoza. But having been in a better position to
observe the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves
the highest respect (People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]).
As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his family
went to the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had already several occasions of altercation. Such fact
was shown when accused-appellant left his wife and daughter at the party without informing them where he would
be. The victims father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-appellant and his daughter, Cecilia, had been
quarrelling. Accused-appellant suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man. He contends
that Alipio is not a credible witness for the prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents
him on account of his having children with another woman.
It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is
biased. The Court finds improbable and contrary to human experience accused-appellants claim that Alipio testified
for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit.
The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads us to
believe that accused-appellant killed his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory
that when Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear to be a naturally spontaneous
narration, but rather evidently a coached one. According to to him, this theory was bolstered when she cried and
suddenly, embraced accused-appellant in public view.
On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility, this,
being in accord with human behavior and nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for her,
at a very tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she loves and respects as shown by the act of
embracing him.
Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaines retraction. But the trial court correctly
disregarded the same. The first time Charmaine took the witness stand was in December, 1988, barely a month after
her mothers death. Her recantation was made two years later when she was already in the custody of accused-
appellant who was allowed to go out on bail. Charmaines first testimony was to the effect that she saw her father,
accused-appellant, hiding a gun under the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such act. Such
contradictory statements should not discredit Charmaine as a witness. The present rule is that testimony of a witness
may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities and
improbabilities of the case (People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction by a prosecution
witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony.Testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside
and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be
carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made carefully and keenly scrutinized,
and the reasons or motives for the change discriminatingly analyzed (Molina vs. People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).
The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former testimony
for the prosecution. The second declaration was received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial court. Neither
are we persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that Charmaine was living with and dependent upon
her father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her second declaration.
Another fact which militates against accused-appellants denial that he killed his wife is that the paraffin test
conducted on him yielded positive results. Notably, this test was conducted a day after the shooting incident.
Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal
weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a
dispute between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she went, and
not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the
fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her
mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense witness,
Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was
surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by
accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed by accused-appellant himself and a
mission order authorizing him to carry the said weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these
documents were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers,
and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the
occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity
of ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-
in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellants claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber pistol,
the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and
Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm holder of any kind
(p. 69, Rollo).
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accused-
appellant, the established circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each
other and with the hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses that he is
not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances
corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused
(People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546 [1996]). The unbelievable story of accused-appellant that the killing was
perpetrated by the smuggling syndicates man is all too plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant designed to
exculpate himself from criminal liability.
461
 Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July
7, 1997 amended the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 115835-
36, July 22, 1998).
Withal, accused-appellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of
use of an unlicensed firearm. This notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating circumstance,
the penalty imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be increased. The death
penalty cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in November, 1988, when the
imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN
MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 [2] as amended, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly
known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA 7659.[3]
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry
5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port
of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her
missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4)
other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at
the economy section.[4] The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed
of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry
was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The
accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused
opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship
captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance.[5] At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and
RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized
items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag[6] and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance.[7] When
asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican Alex
Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latters brother in Iligan City.[8] The accused and the seized items were later
turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector
Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters, [9] while the packs of white
y crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI
Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, weighing 399.3266 grams.[10]
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in
Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican Alex Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested
by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to
Macapudis brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage
full of clothes, a small luggage or maleta containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the
Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.[11] He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel
was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able
to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five
(5) members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106
came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no.
106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section
and took the big luggage and Macapudis Samsonite suitcase. He left the small maleta containing sunglasses and
brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened
the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret
combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance
inside which they suspected to be shabu. They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him to sign a
turn over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.[12]
462
 On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659
and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of such preventive
detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the National
Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED
EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.[14]
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v.
Marti[15] is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a
policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.[16] Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that
protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case
of People v. Marti,[18] [i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State.[19] The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.[20]
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel.
It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the
vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the
former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private
employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state
tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other
agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite
suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained shabu. He submits that without knowledge or intent to
possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged.[21]
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated
drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.[22] The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left
with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,[23] this Court has ruled that to warrant conviction,
the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed
together with the possession or control of such articles.[24] It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous
drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.[25] Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused
to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[26]
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and
incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in
the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.[27] Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve
credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage,
he knew it would be inspected.[28] Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a
combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small maleta for
inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated,[29] but he
brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches.[30]
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. [31] To overcome this
presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points
to a certain Alican Alex Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim.
As aptly observed by the trial judge:
463
First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of the
imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling sunglasses
in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood
person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has
friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused. [32]
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the
accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this
Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542,
convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191023 February 06, 2013
DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated September 30, 2009 and
Resolution2dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942. The CA upheld the
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 231 finding petitioner Don Djowel Sales y
Abalahin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of marijuana.
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) under an Information which states:
That on or about the 24th day of May 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused DON DJOWEL A. SALES, without authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.23 gram of dried Marijuana
fruiting tops, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. x x x4
Upon arraignment, petitioner duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Evidence adduced by the prosecution at the trial established that on May 24, 2003, petitioner was scheduled to
board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan at its 9:45 a.m. flight. He arrived at the old Manila Domestic
Airport (now Terminal 1), Domestic Road, Pasay City at around 8:30 in the morning. As part of the routine security
check at the predeparture area, petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal Detector Machine and immediately
thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male frisker on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed personnel
(NUP) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation Security Group (ASG).5
While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short pants. When
Soriano asked petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his hands. Soriano struggled
with petitioner as the latter was nervous and reluctant to show what he brought out from his pocket. Soriano then
called the attention of his supervisor, PO1 Cherry Trota-Bartolome who was nearby.6
PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked him to open his hands. Petitioner finally opened his right
hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After informing petitioner of his
constitutional rights, PO1 Trota-Bartolome brought petitioner and the seized evidence to the 2nd Police Center for
Aviation Security (2nd PCAS), PNP-ASG Intelligence and Investigation Branch and immediately turned over
petitioner to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Airport Team at the Ramp Area, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex, Pasay City.7 The investigating officer, POII Samuel B. Hojilla,8 placed the
markings on the two marijuana sticks: "SBH-A" and "SBH-B."9
The specimens marked "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" when subjected to chemical analysis at the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Camp Crame, Quezon City yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.10
Denying the charge against him, petitioner testified that on May 24, 2003, he, together with his girl friend and her
family were headed to Boracay Island for a vacation. While he was queuing to enter the airport, he was frisked by
two persons, a male and a female. The two asked him to empty his pockets since it was bulging. Inside his pocket
were a pack of cigarettes and cash in the amount of P8,000.00 in 500 peso-bills. His girl friend told him to get a
boarding pass but he asked her to wait for him as he will still use the comfort room. On the way to the comfort
room, he was blocked by a male person who frisked him for a second time, asking for his boarding pass. This male
person wearing a white shirt without an ID card, asked petitioner to empty his pockets which he did. The male
person then said it was "okay" but as petitioner proceeded to go inside the comfort room, the male person called
him again saying that "this fell from you" and showing him two "small white wrappings which seemed to be
marijuana." Petitioner told the male person that those items were not his but the latter said they will talk about it in
the comfort room.11
At that point, petitioner claimed that his girl friend was already shouting ("Ano ‘yan, ano ‘yan?") as she saw PO1
Trota-Bartolome approaching them. PO1 Trota-Bartolome then told petitioner to explain at the ground floor while
the male person (Soriano) was showing to her the marijuana sticks saying "Ma’am, I saw this from him." Petitioner
went back to the comfort room and there he saw his girl friend’s father (the Mayor of their hometown, Camiling,
Tarlac) talking with a police officer. However, his girl friend and her family left him and he was investigated by the
police officers.12
464
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following: PO1 Trota-Bartolome, P/Insp. Sandra Decena-Go
(Forensic Officer, Chemistry Division, PNP-Crime Laboratory) and NUP Soriano.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused, Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 0.23 gram of dried marijuana fruiting tops confiscated from the accused is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of
the government. The officer-in-charge of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately turnover the same to the
appropriate government agency for proper disposition in accordance with law.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the CA ruled that the body search conducted on petitioner is a valid warrantless search made pursuant
to a routine airport security procedure allowed by law. It found no merit in petitioner’s theory of frame-up and
extortion. On the issue of the integrity and probative value of the evidence used to convict petitioner, the CA held
that there is no hiatus or confusion that the marijuana that was marked at the airport, then subjected to qualitative
examination on the same day and eventually introduced as evidence against petitioner, is the same prohibited drug
that was found in his custody and possession when he was apprehended at the pre-departure area of the airport in
the morning of May 24, 2003.
The CA also explained that while the "marijuana leaves" referred to by Soriano in his testimony was otherwise
called by the public prosecutor and the Forensic Chemical Officer as "dried marijuana fruiting tops" in both the
criminal information and the Laboratory Report, these do not refer to different items. Both marijuana leaves with
fruiting tops were rolled in two papers which were actually found and seized from petitioner’s possession in the
course of a routine security search and frisking.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner is now before us alleging that the CA failed to address
the following assigned errors:
IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS SUPPOSEDLY TAKEN
FROM THE APPELLANT WERE THE VERY SAME ITEMS THAT REACHED THE CHEMIST FOR ANALYSIS;
THIS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROSECUTION’S IMPROBABLE SCENARIO AT THE AIRPORT WHERE,
FOR NO SPECIAL REASON GIVEN, THE APPELLANT HAD TO BE METICULOUSLY BODILY SEARCHED
EVEN AFTER HE HAD TWICE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED THROUGH THE DETECTOR. 14
The petition has no merit.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 15
In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the person of
petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the airport’s
pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants pocket to Soriano who
became suspicious when his hand felt the "slightly bulging" item while frisking petitioner.
In People v. Johnson,16 which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at
the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant
to airport security procedures, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.17
Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the airport is a standard procedure but assails the conduct of
Soriano and PO1 Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him stretch out his arms and empty his pockets.
Petitioner believes such meticulous search was unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no
beep sound when petitioner walked past through the metal detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by
that initial security check. He likewise mentioned the fact that he was carrying a bundle of money at that time, which
he said was not accounted for.
We find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets
upon the frisker’s reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioner’s short pants was a
prohibited or illegal substance.
Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No.
6235. Said provision reads:
465
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the
following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and
seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the
aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. (Italics in the
original)
The ruling in People v. Johnson was applied in People v. Canton18 where the accused, a female passenger was
frisked at the NAIA after passing through the metal detector booth that emitted a beeping sound. Since the frisker
noticed something bulging at accused’s abdomen, thighs and genital area, which felt like packages containing rice
granules, accused was subjected to a thorough physical examination inside the ladies’ room. Three sealed
packages were taken from accused’s body which when submitted for laboratory examination yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused was forthwith arrested and prosecuted for illegal
possession of a regulated drug.
Affirming accused Canton’s conviction for the crime of illegal possession of shabu, we ruled that accused-appellant
was lawfully arrested without a warrant after being caught in flagrante delicto. We further held that the scope of a
search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry
search"19 doctrine. The more extensive search conducted on accused Canton was necessitated by the discovery of
packages on her body, her apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused the suspicion of the frisker that
she was hiding something illegal. Thus:
x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit
the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as
suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to
further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in
law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip search in the ladies’ room was justified under the
circumstances.20 (Emphasis supplied)
The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence.
Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers
containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed
carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities.
The trial and appellate courts correctly gave credence to the straightforward and candid testimonies of PO1 Trota-
Bartolome and NUP Soriano on the frisking of petitioner at the pre-departure area, during which the two rolled
papers containing dried marijuana fruiting tops were found in his possession, and on petitioner’s immediate arrest
and investigation by police officers from the 2nd PCAS and PDEA teams stationed at the airport. As a matter of
settled jurisprudence on illegal possession of drug cases, credence is usually accorded the narration of the incident
by the apprehending police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.21
Petitioner reiterates his defense of being a victim of an alleged frameup and extortion.1âwphi1 However, the CA
found his claim unworthy of belief considering that there is no evidence that the apprehending police authorities
had known petitioner before he was caught and arrested for possession of marijuana. The CA aptly observed:
It bears stressing that while the defense of Sales is anchored heavily on his theory of purported frame-up and
extortion, nonetheless Sales’ testimony is without any allegation that the police and security personnel who
participated in his arrest, investigation and detention have demanded money in exchange for his freedom, the
withdrawal of the drugs charge against him, or otherwise their desistance from testifying against him in court. True
enough, Sales himself admitted in the course of the trial that the security and police personnel demanded him to
turn over and surrender all his possessions, to wit: cellular phone, pla[n]e ticket and boarding pass, except his
money (TSN, April 16, 2008, p. 18). This, to the mind of this Court, strongly belied Sales’ imputation of frame-up by
the police to secure monetary gain.22 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Petitioner questions the integrity of the drug specimen supposedly confiscated from him at the airport by PO1
Trota-Bartolome. He maintains that there was no evidence adduced to assure that those items that reached the
Chemist were the same items which were taken from him. This is crucial since the Chemist had said that the items
were brought to her, not by the PNP officer, but another person (SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca of PDEA) who was not
presented as witness.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation and admission of the
seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. This requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as well as
to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the
movements and custody of the seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for
examination, and to its presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony about
every link in the chain or movements of the illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in
evidence. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is almost always
impossible to obtain.23
The identity of the seized substance in dangerous drug cases is thus established by showing its chain of custody.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined the concept of "chain of custody"
as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) expressly
demands the identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the
authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the
accused until the time they are presented in court.24 We have held, however, that the failure of the prosecution to
show compliance with the procedural requirements provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is
not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible.25 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
466
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.26 As long
as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.27
After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the prosecution in this case has established by facts proved at
the trial that the chain of custody requirement was not broken.
During her direct-examination, PO1 Trota-Bartolome narrated clearly and consistently how she obtained initial
custody of the seized dangerous drug while on duty at the airport’s pre-departure area. Said witness identified
Exhibits "G" and "H" with markings "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" presented in court to be the same dried marijuana fruiting
tops in two rolled papers that they found in the possession of petitioner while the latter was being frisked by
Soriano. She also testified that petitioner and the confiscated marijuana were promptly brought to the PDEA team
stationed at the airport where it was marked in her presence by the assigned officer, Samuel B. Hojilla, using his
own initials.28 The two rolled papers containing marijuana fruiting tops with markings "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" was
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory on the same day by SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca. 29 Police Inspector Engr.
Sandra Decena-Go, Forensic Chemical Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory likewise testified that on the same
day, she personally received from SPO2 Olandesca the letter-request together with the seized dried marijuana
fruiting tops in two rolled papers (sheet cigarette wrapper) like improvised cigarette sticks, marked as "SBH-A" and
"SBH-B" and wrapped in white bond paper.30 After describing the condition of the specimen at the time she
received it, P/Insp. Decena-Go confirmed the findings of the chemical analysis of the said substance already
presented in court, and identified her Initial Laboratory Report and Certification, both dated May 24, 2003, stating
that the qualitative examination gave positive results for the presence of Marijuana.31
We find no merit in petitioner’s argument that the non-presentation of SPO2 Olandesca and PO2 Hojilla as
witnesses is fatal to the prosecution’s case. As this Court held in People v. Amansec32:
x x x there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and everyone who
came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was
clearly established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it
is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness
stand." This Court, in People v. Hernandez,33 citing People v. Zeng Hua Dian,34 ruled:
After a thorough review of the records of this case we find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was
not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The
nonpresentation as witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the
officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the
prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it
has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.35
In the light of the testimonial, documentary and object evidence on record, the CA correctly concluded that the
identity, integrity and probative value of the seized marijuana were adequately preserved. The prosecution has
proved with moral certainty that the two pieces of rolled papers containing dried marijuana fruiting tops presented in
court were the same items seized from petitioner during the routine frisk at the airport in the morning of May 24,
2003. Its presentation in evidence as part of the corpus delicti was therefore sufficient to convict petitioner.
As to the penalty imposed by the R TC, we find the same in order and proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009 and
Resolution dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942 are hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review through this appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 28 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-I I
C. No. 03316, which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant Hadji Socor Cadidia (Cadidia) of violation
of Section 53 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
The prosecution presented Marilyn Trayvilla (Trayvilla), a Non-Uniformed Personnel of the Philippine National
Police, who testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while performing her duty as a female
frisker assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I (domestic airport) in Pasay City, she frisked the accused
Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area4 and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s
buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual
thickness.5 Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M. Bagsican
(Bagsican) brought the accused to the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican
asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu . The two sachets
of shabu were turned over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang).6 Trayvilla recalled that
Cadidia denied that the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she was only asked by an unidentified
person to bring the same.7 The accused was identified and found to be bound for Butuan City on board Cebu
Pacific Airline as evidenced by her confiscated airline ticket.8 In open court, Trayvilla identified the two sachets
containing shabu previously marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3." She also identified the signature placed by her co-
employee, Bagsican, at the side of the items, as well as the picture of the sanitary napkin used by the accused to
conceal the bags of shabu.9
467
The second prosecution witness, Bagsican, corroborated the testimony of Trayvilla. She testified that together with
Trayvilla, she was also assigned as a frisker at the departure area of the domestic airport. While frisking the
accused, Trayvilla noticed something bulky in her maong pants.10 As a result, Trayvilla asked for her help and with
the accused, they proceeded to the comfort room inside the domestic airport. While inside the cubicle of the
comfort room, Bagsican asked the accused to open her pants and pull down her underwear. Inside the accused’s
sanitary napkin were two plastic sachets of shabu which they confiscated. Thereafter, she reported the incident to
their supervisor SPO3 Appang, to whom she endorsed the confiscated items. They then proceeded to their office to
report to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group.11 In open court, she identified the accused Cadidia as the
one whom they apprehended. She also identified the two plastic sachets of shabu they confiscated from Cadidia
and pointed to her initials "LMB" she placed on the items for marking as well as the picture of the napkin likewise
marked with her initials.12
Finally, the prosecution presented domestic airport Police Supervisor SPO3 Appang who testified that on 31 July
2002 at around 6:40 in the morning, the accused passed the walk-thru machine manned by two domestic airport
friskers, Trayvilla and Bagsican. When Trayvilla frisked the accused, she called his attention and informed him that
something was kept inside the accused’s private area. Accordingly, he instructed Trayvilla and Bagsican to proceed
to the comfort room to check what the thing was.13 Trayvilla and Bagsican recovered two plastic sachets containing
shabu from the accused. The plastic sachets together with the sanitary napkin were turned over to him by the
friskers Trayvilla and Bagsican. Subsequently, he turned over the two plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to the
Intelligence and Investigation Office of the 2 nd Regional Aviation Security Office (RASO), Domestic International
Airport.14 The seized items were then turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of NAIA-DITG.15 SP03 Appang placed
his initials on the confiscated items at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Office (PDEA) located at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport.16
The specimens in turn were referred by PO2 Samuel B. Cobilla (PO2 Cobilla) of the NAIA-DITG to Forensic
Chemist Elisa G. Reyes (Forensic Chemist Reyes) of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for
examination.17
Due to the loss of the stenographic notes regarding the latter part of the direct testimony of SPO3 Appang and of
Forensic Chemist Reyes, the prosecution and the accused agreed to dispense with their testimonies and agreed
on the following stipulation of facts:
a. The prosecution will no longer recall SPO3 Appang to the witness stand in view of his retirement from
service;18
b. The parties agreed on Forensic Chemist Reyes’ competence and expertise in her field;19
c. That she was the one who examined the specimen in this case against Hadji Socor Cadidia, consisting
of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, previously marked as Exhibit "1" containing 48.48
grams of white crystalline substance of Shabu, and, one (1) knot-tied transparent plastic bag with
marking "Exhibit-2 LMB, RSA containing 98.29 grams white crystalline substance of Shabu or
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;20
d. That after conducting laboratory examination on the two (2) specimens, she prepared the document
and reduced her findings into writing which is Chemistry Report No. D-364-02 which is the Initial
Laboratory Report marked as Exhibit "C"21; and,
e. That thereafter, Forensic Chemist Reyes likewise prepared the Final Chemistry Report marked as
Exhibit "D."22
The accused, of course, has a different story to tell.
Cadidia testified that on 31 July 2002, at around 8:15 in the morning, she proceeded to the departure area of the
domestic airport at Pasay City to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Butuan City. When she passed-by the x-ray
machine, two women, whom she later identified as Trayvilla and Bagsican, apprehended her.23 Trayvilla and
Bagsican held her arms and asked her if she was a Muslim. When she replied in the affirmative, the two women
said that she might be carrying gold or jewelries.24 Despite her denial, Trayvilla and Bagsican brought her to the
comfort room and told her she might be carrying shabu. She again denied the allegation but the two women told
her to undress.25 When she asked why, they answered that her back was bulging. In reply, she told them that she
was having her menstrual period. Trayvilla and Bagsican did not believe her and proceeded to ask her to remove
her underwear. They later frisked her body but failed to recover anything.26 Thereafter, the two women asked for
money as they allegedly recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from her.27 At this moment, Cadidia
became afraid and called her relatives for money, particularly her female relative Dam Bai. 28 Her relatives arrived at
the airport at around 1 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day but she failed to talk to them because she has
already been brought to Camp Crame for drug examination.29 She called her relatives again to ask for P200,000.00
and to bring the amount at 7 o’clock in the morning of the next day. Her relatives arrived on the agreed day and
time but managed to bring only P6,000.00 which the police officers found unacceptable.30 As a consequence,
Cadidia was subjected to inquest proceedings.31 In her re-direct, she testified that at that time, she was engaged in
selling compact discs in Quiapo, Manila. She recalled that the names of the relatives she called for money were a
certain Lani and Andy.32
The defense presented its next witness Haaji Mohamad Domrang (Domrang) to corroborate the statement of
accused Cadidia that she called up her relatives including him to bring money to the airport and give the same to
the police officers.33 Domrang testified that he knew Cadidia as a jeweller with a place of business in Greenhills. He
recalled at around 9 o’clock in the morning of 31 July 2002, he was with his nephew when the latter received a call
from Cadidia and was told by the accused that she needed money amounting to P200,000.00.34 His nephew told
him that he would go to the airport, so he accompanied him. They arrived there at around one o’clock in the
afternoon but failed to see Cadidia. However, they were able to talk to the police officers at the airport and inquired
about the accused. The police officers replied that she was brought to Camp Crame but will be brought back to the
airport at 7:00 o’clock in the evening.35 The police officers told Domrang and Andy that if they would not be able to
raise the P200,000.00, they would file a case against Cadidia. Since they were able to raise P6,000.00 only, the
police officers rejected the money.36
After the arrest, the following Information was filed in Criminal Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of
Republic Act No. 9165:
468
That on or about the 31st of July 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transport 146.77 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.37
Upon arraignment on 12 August 2002, Cadidia entered a plea of "not guilty."38
On 7 April 2008, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. The disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5 of Republic Act [No.] 9165, she is hereby sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay the fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
The methamphetamine hydrochloride recovered from the accused is considered confiscated in favor of the
government and to be turned to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its disposal.39
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the
conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses’ Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who among them instructed the
accused-appellant to bring out the contents of her underwear.40 Another contradiction pressed on by the defense
was the recollection of Bagsican that when she and Trayvilla found the illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her
blazer for safekeeping, in contrast with statement of SPO3 Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of
the comfort room, they immediately handed him the shabu allegedly taken from the accused-appellant.41Appellant
likewise argued against her conviction by the trial court despite the fact that the identity of the illegal drugs allegedly
seized was not proven with moral certainty due to the broken chain of custody of evidence. 42
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the inconsistencies of the
prosecution’s witnesses did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be disregarded for they failed to affect
the credibility of the evidence as a whole. The alleged inconsistencies failed to diminish the fact that the accused-
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the departure area of the domestic airport transporting shabu. The
defenses of frame-up and alibi cannot stand against the positive testimonies of the witnesses absent any showing
that they were impelled with any improper motive to implicate her of the offense charged.43 Finally, the OSG
posited that the integrity of evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is any showing of bad faith, and
accused-appellant failed to overcome this presumption.44
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the alleged
contradictory statements of the prosecution’s witnesses did not diminish their credibility as they pertained only to
minor details and did not dwell on the principal elements of the crime. It emphasized that the more important matter
was the positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime of illegal transportation of
dangerous drug.45 Further, it upheld the trial court’s ruling that the prosecution satisfactorily preserved the chain of
custody of evidence over the seized drugs as well as the integrity of the specimen confiscated from the accused-
appellant.46
In this instant appeal, the accused-appellant manifested that she would no longer file her Supplemental Brief as
she had exhaustively discussed her assignment of errors in her Appellant’s Brief.47
Before this Court for resolution are the two assigned errors raised by the accused-appellant:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE
ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.48
We uphold the ruling of both the trial and the appellate courts.
At the outset, We find it unnecessary to discuss the propriety of the charge of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165 against Cadidia for illegal transportation of 146.77 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride by the
prosecution. As elucidated by the trial court, "there is no doubt that the accused had the intention to board the flight
bound for Butuan as per her plane ticket and had submitted herself to body frisking at the final check-in counter at
the airport when she was found to be carrying prohibited drugs in her persons (sic). In like manner, considering the
weight of the "shabu" and the intention of the accused to transport the same to another place or destination, she
must be accordingly penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, x x x.49"
Now to the issues presented before this Court.
As to the first assignment of error, the accused casts doubt on the set of facts presented by the prosecution
particularly the narration of Trayvilla, Bagsican and SPO3 Appang. She alleges that since the testimonies given by
the witnesses were conflicting, the same should not be given credit and should result in her acquittal. She cited two
instances as examples of inconsistencies. First, Trayvilla in her testimony recalled that she was the one who asked
the accused to bring out the contents of her underwear. However, in her re-direct, she clarified that it was Bagsican
who asked the accused. Bagsican, in turn testified that she was the one who asked the accused while Trayvilla
was beside her.50 Second, Bagsican in her testimony recalled that after confiscation of the alleged illegal drugs,
she placed the items inside her blazer for safekeeping. However, SPO3 Appang testified that when the two female
friskers came out from the comfort room, they immediately handed to him the seized illegal drugs allegedly taken
from Cadidia.51
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by
the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.52 Further, the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight
and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if
they are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of the lower court in the appreciation
of facts and credibility of the witnesses.53
469
Upon review of the records, we find no conflict in the narration of events of the prosecution witnesses. In her direct
testimony, Trayvilla testified that both of them asked Cadidia to remove what was inside her underwear when she
and Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room to check what was hidden inside.54 However, in her re-
direct, she clarified that it was really Bagsican who particularly made the request but she was then also inside the
cubicle with the accused.55 This clarification is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the two of them were inside
the cubicle when the request to bring out the contents of the underwear was made and the concealed illegal drug
was discovered.
The other inconsistency alleged by the accused pertains to what happened during the confiscation of the illegal
drug at the cubicle. The accused alleges that Bagsican and SPO3 Appang differed in their statements. Upon
review, We find no such inconsistency. Bagsican testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic sachets of
shabu in her blazer for safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she turned over the accused and the
plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang.56 SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified that when the two female friskers went out of
the comfort room, they handed to him what was taken from the accused. The statements can be harmonized as a
continuous and unbroken recollection of events.
Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, We have consistently held time and again
that minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator
of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility
would still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one another on material
details surrounding the commission of the crime.57
The accused also assails the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of the witnesses.
She claimed that the self-serving testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.58
Again, we disagree.
In People v. Unisa,59 this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is
given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers."
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against
Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered the
x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused
especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted
Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the accused would only
show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside
accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the
other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of
frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who
corroborated on circumstances surrounding the apprehension.
As final attempt at acquittal, the accused harps on the alleged broken chain of custody of the confiscated drugs.
She casts doubt on the identity of the drugs allegedly taken from her and the one presented in open court to prove
her guilt.60 She also questions the lack of physical inventory of the confiscated items at the crime scene, the
absence of photographs taken on the alleged illegal drugs and the failure to mark the seized items upon
confiscation.61
The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is discharged when the arresting law
enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
Series of 2002, defines the chain of custody as:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody was of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.62
In Mallillin v. People,63 the requirements to establish chain of custody were laid down by this Court. First, testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence.
Second, witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition
of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the item.
The prosecution in this case was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that the integrity of the
seized item was preserved every step of the process.
As to the first link, Trayvilla and Bagsican testified that upon confiscation of the two plastic sachets of illegal drug
from the accused, the seized items were transferred to SPO3 Appang, who himself confirmed such transfer. The
second link pertains to the point when SPO3 Appang turned over the two plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to the
RASO of the Domestic International Airport.64 As to the marking, Bagsican testified that she put her initials and
signature on the plastic sachet and the sanitary napkin at the Investigation Office. Afterwards, the seized items
were turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of the NAIA-DITG.65 SP03 Appang signed the confiscated items at the
PDEA Office which is also located at the airport.66
As evidenced by the Initial Laboratory Report,67 the specimens were referred by PO2 Cobilla of the NAIA-DITG to
Forensic Chemist Reyes of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination. Finally, based on
the Chemistry Report68 of Forensic Chemist Reyes and stipulation69 of facts agreed upon by both parties, the
specimen submitted by PO2 Cobilla tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride after qualitative testing.
The same specimens contained in the two plastic sachets previously marked were identified by two female friskers
Trayvilla and Bagsican in open court as the same ones confiscated from the accused.70
As to non-compliance of all the requirements laid down by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 regarding the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, 71 the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 states that non-compliance with these requirements
470
under justifiable grounds shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.
What is important is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.72 The successful presentation of the
prosecution of every link of chain of custody as discussed above is sufficient to hold the accused liable for the
offense charged.
On a final note, we held that airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure.1âwphi1 As held in similar
cases of People v Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes
Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in their body illegal
drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the validity of airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation s airports. Passengers attempting to
hoard an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage arc
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches arc
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity or the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed. travellers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that the are subject to search and. if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would he subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.75
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 August
2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 03316 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs CONDE
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
(ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and
banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of
checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and
Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of
the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged
fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality
of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims
that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have
occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints
are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of
petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
471
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs.
Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were
violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits,
are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the
National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain
and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of
the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are
peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required
warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any
time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints,
on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of
security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic
checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion
might impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we
can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed
wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the
existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the
Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.)
It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism
rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation."
(Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
472
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day by
virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial
law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures,
the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at
EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the
aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I
submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The
petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident"
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable,
and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants"
unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But
the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one
simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big
Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve routine
checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but
armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I
have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore correct
here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a warrantless
search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the
same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time
around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of
democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its
stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain
and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of
the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are
peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required
warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any
time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints,
on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of
security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic
checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion
might impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we
can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed
wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the
existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the
Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.)
It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism
473
rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation."
(Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day by
virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial
law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures,
the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at
EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the
aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I
submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The
petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident"
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable,
and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants"
unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But
the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one
simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big
Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve routine
checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but
armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I
have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore correct
here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a warrantless
search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the
same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time
around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of
democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its
stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.
G.R. No. 83988 May 24, 1990
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLES'S RIGHTS
(ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and co-petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners' petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of the
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. Before
submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his comment, to which
petitioners filed a reply.
It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e.
at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se.Thus,
under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the
lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.
Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will
have absolutely no reason to remain.
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either
military or police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d' etat (stronger than all previous ones) was staged only
last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d' etat is taken almost for granted. The NPA, through its sparrow
units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex
crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have
become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all time high. Whether or not effective as expected,
474
checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and
insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs
and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must
concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of
government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right,
under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is
evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without
interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the
vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S. Supreme Court:
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential
interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by
surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not
be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not
chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the
most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials
will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a
class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less
room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol
stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review. 2
The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore,
violative of the Constitution. 3
As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few
questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court—
Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not
justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160,
93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543,45 S Ct
280, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers
conducting the search have 'reasonable or probable cause to believe that they will find the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless
search. ... 4
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and seizures
accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter. In People vs. Kagui
Malasuqui it was held—
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape
in many instances. 5
By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas
of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest,
safety, and necessity.
Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the
military manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government
employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the Court's
inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation
is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena.
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become aware of how some checkpoints have
been used as points of thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the increased prices of
foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and other urban centers, are largely blamed
on the checkpoints, because the men manning them have reportedly become "experts" in mulcting travelling
traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy .
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the men in uniform are rascals or thieves.
The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to the
checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a military "concoction." It behooves the
military to improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or institution will
succeed unless the men behind it are honest, noble and dedicated.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not
above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who
man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable
criminally and civilly for their abusive acts; 7 This tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by
higher military authorities.
475
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 76005. April 23, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN and JAIME P. FERNANDEZ, accused, RESTITUTO B.
BOCALAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amador E. Mostajo and Presbiterio Velasco, Jr. for accused -appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A MILITARY OR POLICE
CHECKPOINT, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN UPHELD, IS ONE OF THE INSTANCES
WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT PRIOR ARREST OR WARRANT. — There are
indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An
illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of
which has already been upheld by this Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints
after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is
because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that either
the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an
offense. However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that no
person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except by
virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The case before Us is an incident to or an offshoot
of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE MAY BE WAIVED, AS IN THIS
CASE. — Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any
protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubt on their professed innocence but also confirms
their acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure. In one case We held — ". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol.
I, p. 361). The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST MADE UPON DISCOVERY OF ACT OF DISPATCHING
IN TRANSIT OR TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED, IS
LAWFUL AND REQUIRES NO WARRANT; AN INSTANCE OF WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER SEC. 5, PAR.
(A), RULE 113, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED. — The arrest of the three (3) accused
was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession. There was no need
for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of the situations envisioned by Sec. 5,
par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when a warrantless arrest may be
made. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4,
Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT OF FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS BY TRIAL COURT RELATIVE TO CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; CASE AT BAR. — Factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect and are generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been
overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result. There is none in this case on appeal.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; OBJECTION ON THE LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF SEARCH IS WAIVED WHEN NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, AND
THE COURT IS BOUND TO ADMIT THE EVIDENCE. — We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the
marijuana as evidence in the light of Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since
the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue
was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the
ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view
of such waiver, the court is bound to admit evidence.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MATERIALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROHIBITED DRUG IN A PROSECUTION FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED. — Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused
is charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not
require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or
transporting a prohibited drug.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT AN ORDINARY CHECKPOINT IS
ILLEGAL FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS ENVISIONED IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS. — I do not agree that
in the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched
without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause
envisioned in the Bill of Rights. In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the
search. The search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a
crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer
has personal knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is the culprit . . . I realize that this view would
result in the inadmissibility of the seized marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal.
But as I have always maintained, we cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all,
the articles seized are illegal.
DECISION
476
BELLOSILLO, J p:
The admissibility of the evidence seized from the accused at a checkpoint after being stopped for routine inspection
is put to test in this appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City finding inter alia accused-
appellant Restituto B. Bocalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
On 2 November 1982, at about 8:15 in the evening, a private jeep driven by accused-appellant Restituto B.
Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and
other prohibited items. With Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc. Ricardo
Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms
inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight
inside. He noticed a black leather bag measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long with its sides
bulging. He asked what it contained. There was deadening silence. Nobody answered. Instead, the three (3)
accused, Restituto B. Bocalan, Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious,
Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened. He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana,
napakaraming marijuana!" At this juncture, the three (3) remained motionless in their seats and appeared petrified
with fear. They were brought to the police station that same night for further investigation. 2
After laboratory examination, the bag was verified to contain more than two (2) kilos of Indian hemp otherwise
known as marijuana. 3
Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala, Restituto B. Bocalan and Jaime P. Fernandez were accordingly charged for violation
of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment. A fine of P25,000.00 was also
imposed. 4 The other two (2) were convicted as accomplices and received lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Exala did not.
Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is now before Us assailing his conviction; hence, We
deal only with him in this appeal.
Appellant Bocalan seeks exculpation by imputing ownership of the bag to Exala alone. 5 Bocalan claims that while
on the way to Cavite City, he and Fernandez offered Exala a ride. Exala accepted the offer and requested Bocalan
to make a detour to Salitran, Dasmariñas, Cavite, where he was to pick up some clothes. They agreed and Exala
got the bag which he kept beside him all the time until their apprehension at the checkpoint. 6
Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against him since it was
obtained through a warrantless search. 7
The protestations of Bocalan are devoid of merit. We agree with the trial court that the conduct of Bocalan was not
only unusual but also contrary to normal human experience. 8 He alleged that he knew Exala only by face and had
no personal association with him; 9 yet, on that eventful day of 2 November 1982, he agreed to detour to Salitran
which was some fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers out of his way. Thus, his contention that it was Exala who
owned the bag containing the marijuana is hardly credible.
On the other hand, Exala declared that it was he who did not know the contents of the bag as it was already in the
jeep when he boarded it. Exala asserted that it was either Bocalan or Fernandez who owned the bag. Exala swore
that Bocalan and Fernandez offered him P5,000.00, later raised to P10,000.00, to take the blame alone, but he
refused. 10
Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. 11
Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before
he can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug. The law simply provides thus —
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to prove that Bocalan was directly involved in the unlawful dispatch in
transit or transport of marijuana. The evidence of the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of Pfc. Ricardo
Galang and Pat. Rosauro de Guzman, belies the defense of Bocalan and establishes beyond cavil that he was
caught in flagrante delicto of transporting the prohibited drug; that he was the driver of the jeep owned by his father
that carried the stuff; and, that he was in fact the owner of the bag. The trial court noted that Bocalan picked up
Fernandez and Exala one after the other to accompany him to the place where the bag of marijuana was taken and
to help him bring the marijuana to Cavite City. 12 Regardless of the degree of participation of Fernandez and
Exala, Bocalan is correctly punished for his direct involvement in the crime.
Such factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and
are generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been overlooked or misconstrued
as to affect the result. 13 There is none in this case on appeal.
We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in the light of Bocalan's contention
that it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan
argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest.
This issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence
on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. 14 In
view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. 15 But even assuming arguendo that there was no
waiver, still appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.
477
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest. 16 An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court. 17 Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through
these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in
the commission of an offense. 18 However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with
the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his
residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 19 The case before Us is an
incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to
search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing
through it. 20 When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the
occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the sides of
which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that moment,
the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing
something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar
apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable
cause justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.
Significantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search. The accused remained silent even after
their arrest.
Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their
part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence 21 but also confirms their
acquiescence to the search. 22 Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure. 23 In one case 24 We held —
". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be
secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly" (emphasis supplied).
The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in
their possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one
of the situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
when a warrantless arrest may be made. 25 The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or
transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
The alleged contradiction between the sworn statements of Pfc. Galang and Pat. de Guzman was explained in their
separate testimonies and, in any event, has been resolved by the trial court as a factual issue. We find no reason
to reverse its findings.
Anent the argument that the three (3) accused should not have been assigned different levels of liability, suffice it
to say that whether a principal, co-principal or conspirator, accused-appellant would have been meted out the same
penalty imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant
RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the same is AFFIRMED, with
costs against him.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990
EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES,
ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD
ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA,
ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA,
MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE,
MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO
GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA
MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO
SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT, petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers represented by
public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers
and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or general interest in the
preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their
communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition contending inter alia that
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action.
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:
478
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San Sebastian Street, Tondo,
Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land,
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during
the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow
a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours,
police and military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more
than one residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most
of them are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows
of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then
ordering the residents within to come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men are ordered
to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the raiders, some of
the members of the raiding team force their way into each and every house within the cordoned
off area and then proceed to conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from
the neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack their homes,
tossing about the residents' belongings without total regard for their value. In several instances,
walls are destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating
evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their
money and valuables have disappeared after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are
arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers
where they are interrogated and 'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without any warrants
of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest.
Some hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the period wherein
they can be legally detained without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested
persons are released without charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the residents during
these illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are subjected to mental and
physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the
petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the
accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of the
Constitution which provides:
479
 The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature described by the
petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and
the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be
consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the
Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a
matter of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of
the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of
the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic
institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional
protections which are their distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history
to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his
own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which
he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must
cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals(164
SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his
privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have explained in the case
of People vs. Burgos(144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right
is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked
upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to
be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966], Brennan J. and Boyd v. United States, 11 6 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in
his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly
characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to
value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long
reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards. (ibid, p. 74.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952])
emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend a sense of justice. The
court ruled:
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the present case, we are
compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more
than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime
too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy
of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to
the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
480
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and which should be prohibited. Rather, it
is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities."
In Breithaupt v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court validated the use of evidence, in this
case blood samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where there was nothing brutal or offensive in the
taking. The Court stated:
In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo, President Aquino
branded all accusations of deliberate disregard for human rights as 'total lies'. Here are
excerpts from her strongest speech yet in support of the military:
All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been shown- up to be total lies.

Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking
of a sample of blood when done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a physician. To be
sure, the driver here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious
consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional
light; and certainly the rest was administered here would not be considered offensive by even
the most delicate. Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yardstick of personal
reaction or the sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense
of 'decency and fairness that has been woven by common experience into the fabric of
acceptable conduct....
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far outweighed by the value of
its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the police action.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every assurance that I will stand by you
through thick and thin to share the blame, defend your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with
you the final victory that I am certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for it is still a long way to lasting peace.
. . . The dangers and hardships to our men in the field are great enough as it is without having
them distracted by tills worthless carping at their backs.

It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the determination of the exact facts Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic development to pull out the roots-
surrounding a particular case. and military operations to slash the growth — of the insurgency.

The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains their truth,
not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent
pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the petitioners are a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
This a complete lie.
The answer to terror is force — now.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic and social initiatives bear
fruit. . . Now that the extreme Right has been defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution
of the war against the communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs against
attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1, Annex 15; emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it can be said that
petitioners misrepresent as human rights violations the military and police's zealous vigilance
over the people's right to live in peace and safety. (Rollo, pp. 36-38)

Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human rights. Not only that, they
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us consists of allegations.
were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual operation. They were
According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the
executed in coordination with barangay officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit
petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig;
themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification. Local and foreign
and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in
correspondents, who had joined these operations, witnessed and recorded the events that
the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial
transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November
court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of
20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far
thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested.
conducted, the alleged victims who numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those affected has apparently complained.

A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement that local and foreign co-
respondents actually joined the saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the events. In other words, the
481
activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full view of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being
used to fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been good television copy. If true, this was probably
effected away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General contends, the allegation is a
"complete lie."
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
sought to overthrow the present Government introduces another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly
why those directly affected by human rights violations should be the ones to institute court actions and why
evidence of what actually transpired should first be developed before petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat areas,
enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion
without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in
the White Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the first week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or criminal
activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no impediment to securing
search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were
arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could not be
achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court
to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights
of the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where
the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the
thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives,"
as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged
pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted
by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain
abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the
rights of people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would
limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific
individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim
complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically
one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of
the events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the
Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation have
been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers
sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the
stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and
policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses
and identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should bring together
the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads of affected
agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be
given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by administration officials at the
policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in
of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of
residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the
conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City
where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear
guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and
subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police actions
are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75909 February 5, 1990
482
RAMON FRANCISCO and CRISTINA MANALO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. BERNARDO P. PARDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XLIII, and SPS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN and EMILIANA
BANGAYAN, respondents.
Manuel B. Dulay for petitioners.
Natalio M. Panganiban for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioners spouses Ramon Francisco and Cristina Manalo seek a review of the decision dated August 29,
1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), now Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 06866,
entitled "Ramon Francisco, et al., Petitioners vs. Hon. Bernardo Pardo, etc., et al., Respondents", denying
due course to their petition, thereby affirming their ejectment from the subject premises as decreed by
both the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The facts as found by the RTC and adopted by the IAC are as follows:
The premises in question located at 1512 Antipolo St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, consist of a lot
and a two-storey building owned by Antonio Chua. Defendant (herein petitioner) Ramon
Francisco leased the ground floor and a room in the second floor of the said building
since 1961, (and) used (the same) as an auto spare parts store and residence. . . . (T)he
latest rental as of June, 1982 was Pl,500.00 duly paid to Antonio Chua.
In 1978, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents) acquired the ownership of the
premises by purchase from the former owner Antonio Chua but it was agreed between
the plaintiffs and the former owner that the tenant defendant Ramon Francisco would
continue to pay to the former owner the monthly rental of P1,000.00 until the end of 1978
and that thereafter the rentals shall accrue to the plaintiffs. Nonetheless, starting
January, 1979, plaintiffs received the monthly rentals not from defendants but from the
former owner Antonio Chua who agreed to assume responsibility in paying the rental on
behalf of Ramon Francisco. Because Antonio Chua failed to remit the rental to the
plaintiffs, since September, 1979 and effective January, 1981 at the increased rate of
Pl,500.00 a month, on February 3, 1982, plaintiffs wrote former owner Antonio Chua to
pay the unpaid rentals then amounting to P35,000.00. Parenthetically on July 3, 1982,
plaintiffs counsel sent a letter of demand to the defendant Ramon Francisco by
registered mail but the latter was returned unclaimed.
Another letter dated January 24, 1983 was addressed to defendant Cristina Manalo but
was also returned unclaimed.
In fact, however, defendants were paid up to the month of June, 1982 and defendants
stopped paying rentals when they received a copy of the letter of plaintiffs to the former
owner Antonio Chua. 1
On March 7, 1983, private respondents Benjamin and Emiliana Bangayan filed before the MTC of Manila a
complaint for ejectment against the petitioners on the following grounds: a) non-payment of the agreed
monthly rental of P2,000.00; and b) subleasing of the premises in violation of the condition of the lease.
Petitioners denied the existence of the grounds for ejectment. They asserted that Antonio Chua, the
previous owner of the leased property assumed the responsibility of paying the rentals. They further stated
that there was no existing sublease but only a change of name of their auto parts business from Impala
Auto Supply to Starlet Supply Center. They likewise denied knowledge of the transfer of ownership of the
property involved from Antonio Chua, the previous owner, to the private respondents.
The MTC, after due hearing, rendered judgment declaring petitioners to have defaulted in the payment of
the rent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants Ramon Francisco
and Cristina Manalo and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate
the premises . . . and to restore possession thereof to plaintiffs; and for the said
defendants to pay jointly and severally the herein plaintiffs the amount of Pl,500.00 as
monthly rentals of the premises from August 1982 and every month thereafter (less any
amount they have paid to the plaintiffs) until they have actually vacated the premises
and the costs of the suit. 2
On appeal to the RTC, the lower court's decision was affirmed with modification. The RTC pronounced:
WHEREFORE, the court affirms the decision subject of the appeal with modification so
as to make the decision definite and certain because in the appealed decision, the lower
court authorized deduction of any amount they have paid the plaintiffs which being
undetermined, makes the decision uncertain and void (Cf. del Rosario vs. Villegas, 49
Phil. 634). Defendants and all persons claiming rights under them are ordered to
immediately vacate the premises . . . and to restore possession thereof to plaintiffs, to
pay plaintiffs the sum of Pl,500.00 a month as rental for the premises from July, 1982
and every month thereafter until they actually vacate the premises, and costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
483
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals also denied due course to petitioners' petition for review. Hence,
this recourse, petitioners contending that the appellate court committed the following errors in its
decision:
I ownership then, the contract of lease subsisted. As aptly held by the appellate court:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO CONTRACT OF
LEASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MERELY
STEPPED INTO THE SHOES OF THE PREVIOUS OWNER;
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NON-PAYMENT OF RENTALS
FROM JULY, 1982 UP TO JANUARY, 1983 WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO EJECT
PETITIONERS;
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEMAND ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PRODUCED THE EFFECT OF NOTIFICATION
V under the same or under new terms and conditions.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT
EXERCISE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FIXING A LONGER PERIOD OF LEASE. 4
Petitioners allege that when private respondents finally disclosed to them in July, 1982 that they, private
respondents, were the new owners and lessors of the leased premises, a confrontation occurred because
of the disagreement regarding the rate of rental. Since no agreement as to the rate of rental was arrived at,
no contract of lease was created. This being the case, petitioners aver that they could not have violated the
lease contract as there was no contract to speak of in the first place.
Such contention is clearly fallacious. The property subject of the controversy was sold by the former
owner Antonio Chua to private respondents while the lease was subsisting. Under Article 1676 of the New
Civil Code,
The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the
Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the
contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the
lease.
In the case at bar, private respondents chose to allow the lease to continue. Despite the change of
As buyers of the premises, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of the
previous owner. The change of ownership did not affect the contract of lease between
the petitioners and previous owner. Petitioners still had the same obligations, including
the payment of rentals, under the contract without the necessity of entering into another
agreement with the new owners. 5
Having shown the existence of the lease, all the other issues can be easily resolved.
No error was committed by the appellate court in ruling that the failure of petitioners to pay the rentals
from July, 1982 to January, 1983 was sufficient ground to eject them. It is a basic tenet that if the lessor
raises the rent at the expiration of the lease, the tenant has to leave if he does not pay the new
rental. 6
As held in the case of Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302, it is the owner's prerogative to fix
the rental for which he wishes to lease his property and the occupant has the option of accepting the rent
as fixed or negotiating with the owner and in the event of failure to come to an agreement, to leave the
property so as not to be liable for the rental fixed and demanded by the owner.
The rent in this case was being paid monthly. The lease was therefore on a month-to-month basis, which
expires at the end of each month and at which time, either party may opt to terminate or continue the lease
Private respondents having opted to increase the rate of rentals, petitioners either have to accept the new
rate or leave the premises if no agreement is reached. But they cannot excuse themselves from paying
rentals altogether just because the negotiation as to such increase failed to materialize. For the fact is that
they still occupy the leased property. They derive benefit from such occupation. NEMO CUM ALTERIUS
DETRIMENTO LOCUPLETARI PROTEST. No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.
Petitioners' argument that no demand to vacate was given them deserves scant consideration. As found by
the Court of Appeals, private respondents' counsel sent petitioners two (2) letters of demand, one
addressed to Ramon Francisco and the other to Cristina Manalo. These letters were returned unclaimed
despite the fact that they were properly addressed to the petitioners and despite notice given to the
addressees of the letters. In the case of Gaspay vs. Hon. Sangco, et al., L-27826, December 18, 1967, we
held that therein petitioners' claim that they were not served with notice is belied by proof that they had
refused to receive the same. No person is entitled to profit from his wrong act of commission or omission.
484
As to the issue of whether the appellate court erred in not fixing a longer period of lease, we find no cogent SUPREME COURT
reason to depart from the aforesaid court ruling. Article 1687 of the New Civil Code empowers the courts to
fix the period of lease. Such prerogative is addressed to the court's sound judgment. 7 And such discretion Manila
was certainly judiciously exercised in the case at bar for, again, as observed by the appellate court:
FIRST DIVISION
. . . Certainly, the default of petitioners in the payment of the rentals could not have
inspired the court to extend any further their stay in the premises as this would have
imposed more unjustifiable burden on the part of the owners. 8
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,
SO ORDERED.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA, respondents.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortés, JJ., concur.
Isabel de la Puerta for and in her own behalf.

Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.

Footnotes

1 pp. 20-21, Rollo.

CRUZ, J.:
2 p. 25, Rollo.
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who
3 pp. 21-22, Rollo. claims successional lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.

4 p. 5, Petition, p. 7, Rollo. Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her three
surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free
5 p. 28, Rollo. portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. 1

6 46 Phil. 184. The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their
mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning.
7 F.S. Divinagracia Agro Commercial, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 180. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. 2

8 p. 29. Rollo Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died,
leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4
$ + GRSI ® Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}77867_2_6_90_footnotes>mainG.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990 On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by
Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for
the dismissal of the case 6
Republic of the Philippines

485
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a
motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta. 7 At the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which
Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the
evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts
claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was) too
weak to discredit the same. 8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court, 9 which is now in turn being
challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was
married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real
parents are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita
Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have
been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial
and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and had three children, including a
girl named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was legally
married. 10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they
separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started
living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where she
herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husband and Gloria was well known
in the community. 11
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that she was born on
December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A); that her father was Vicente de la
Puerta and her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and
wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but was
separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon the death of Vicente de
la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last will and testament, she was the only
child who survived him together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he
did not beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from
the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact that she was treated as a child of
Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la
Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as
her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption case in Special
Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta
categorically stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria
Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent
for her subsistence, support and education; . . . 12
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those circumstances we have laid
down in a long line of decisions that will justify reversal. 13 Among these circumstances are: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis
that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and
Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation
of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
486
These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and Gloria were married at the time of
Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that:
Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(bb) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be refuted with evidence to the contrary. As
the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at bar.
The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because they involve situations where the
couples lived continuously as husband and wife and so could be reasonably presumed to be married. In
the case before us, there was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together
as a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanita
Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not continuously live together as a
married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, if he was really married to her, Juanito did not object
when Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same
neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was different with Genoveva for she herself
swore that she had separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had long lost interest in her
husband. In fact, she even renounced in open court any claim to Vicente's estate. 15
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it became necessary for
the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally married. She did not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's
contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she
is not a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled
that:
The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than natural children,
commonly known as bastards, include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock
to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man
cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and
successional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the
investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances
specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on
compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on
proof of filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children. 16
This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private respondent's certificate of birth as
proof of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la
Puerta at the hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as
follows:
Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la Puerta?
A She is my daughter. 17
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and
successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did
not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
It is settled that —
In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second,
when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when
the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there
is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person
represented to succeed by right of representation. 18
xxx xxx xxx
487
 The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try
to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. In the present case,
however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a
fact that at the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died
two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs,
the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy.
. . . In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right
to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in
said property. 19
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in
his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her
father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was
already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation
of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting
from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate
and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court declared:
. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by
right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes
considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock
as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were
not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.
At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes.
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it
is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment. 22
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta
for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them
either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent
the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted
child is not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction
of law is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters
can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to
the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and
inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
A.M. No. RTJ-88-272 February 6, 1990
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO T. GARCIA, respondent.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This administrative complaint against respondent Judge Pedro Garcia is the culmination of the
complainant's frustrations with Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where in 1985 or five years
ago, he filed a criminal case for estafa against millionaire Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Hermilo Rodis of the
notorious Philfinance caper. Up to this time, Silverio has not been arraigned allegedly because his heart
condition will not permit him to fly to Cebu to be arraigned, although he has flown in and out of the country
and is still out now.
For some cause not shown in the records of this administrative case, even before the defendant was
arraigned, Criminal Case No. CU-10568 reached the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. SP No. 04445) which
488
rendered a decision on October 14, 1986 directing the Presiding Judge of Branch 20 (then Judge
Exaltacion A. Navarro) to set the arraignment and trial of Silverio, Sr. "as soon as possible" (p.145, Rollo).
Instead of complying with the Appellate Court's directive, Judge Navarro dismissed the case. On January
30, 1988, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, and numerous other
pleadings. However, on April 16,1988, Judge Navarro retired without acting on his motion for
reconsideration.
On June 6, 1988, respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia was appointed to the position vacated by Judge
Navarro. According to complainant, respondent Judge Garcia also refused to act on his motion for
reconsideration and on his other pleadings in the Silverio case praying for the immediate arraignment and
trial of Silverio.
Finally on August 15, 1988, Judge Garcia issued an order for the arrest of Silverio and set his arraignment
on October 18, 1988.
The accused filed a motion for postponement which the complainant opposed. Nevertheless, Judge Garcia
granted Silverio's motion, and made it appear in his order that there had been no objection by the
complainant. The latter filed two manifestations and memoranda objecting to the judge's statement in the
order of October 18, 1988.
On November 29, 1988, respondent Judge issued an order chastising Attorney Sesbreño for the insolent,
disrespectful, and contemptuous language of his pleadings and for imputing that he (respondent Judge)
granted Silverio's motion for postponement without his (Atty. Sesbreño's) knowledge and consent.
Attorney Raul H. Sesbreño has charged respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia with the following
misfeasances:
1. Neglect of duty — for delay in acting on the complainant's pleadings praying for the arrest and
arraignment of Silverio;
2. Dishonesty or serious misconduct — if the respondent Judge misrepresented in his Certificates of
Service for the months of May or June, 1988 that there were no motions pending resolution in his sala, so
he could collect his salary for that period;
3. Oppression — for warning the complainant in his Order of November 29, 1988 that the complainant
would be declared in contempt of court if he repeats the allegedly offensive language he used in his two
Manifestations/Memoranda dated October 19,1988, without giving complainant an opportunity to explain
that the language in his pleadings was not insolent, disrespectful, nor contemptuous; and
4. Acts of impropriety or intemperance — for accusing the complainant, without factual basis, of making a
veiled threat that he would file administrative charges against Judge Garcia should the latter decide
Criminal Case No. CU-10568 in favor of Silverio.
Complainant explained that he opposed the accused's motion for postponement of the October 18, 1988
hearing because four (4) long years have already elapsed since Criminal Case No. CU-10568 was filed in
1985, but due to the many postponements granted by the court to the accused, the latter has yet to be
arraigned. While he was agreeable to the postponement of the October 18, 1988 hearing, complainant
wanted the court to limit the delay to only one month, or not later than November 18, 1988. However,
respondent Judge reset Silverio's arraignment on December 7, 1988 although the accused was also
scheduled to appear in Branch 9 on that date, and that respondent Judge would by then have gone on
leave of absence. As it happened later, Silverio did not appear in both salas of the court.
In his comment on the verified complaint, respondent Judge explained that when he assumed the position
of Presiding Judge of Branch 20 on June 6, 1988, his predecessor had previously issued an Order on
March 30, 1988, deferring action on all motions and pleadings in the case "pending on whatever action the
Court of Appeals may take on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the private respondent." (p.
30, Rollo.) On June 20, 1988, he called complainant's attention to that order of Judge Navarro. He explained
that the delay in resolving complainant's motions could not be helped because "the entire records of the
above-entitled case is still with the Court of Appeals in Manila" (Annex A of Respondent's Answer).
In his order dated June 27, 1988, respondent Judge remarked that the complainant's Urgent Motion dated
June 26, 1988 was "highly litigious" meaning hostile and provocative (p. 54, Rollo).
Upon receipt of the records from the Court of Appeals, Judge Garcia issued on August 15, 1988 a warrant
for the arrest of Silverio and his co-defendant (Exh. E, Respondent's Answer).
Silverio posted bail. The case was set for arraignment on October 18, 1988. Instead of appearing in court
on the scheduled date, Silverio, through his counsel, Atty. Reyes, asked for postponement on account of
his heart condition.
The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on October 18, 1988 records the following
exchanges on the defendant's motion for postponement:
ATTY. REYES:
We pray that the arraignment be postponed to another date, your Honor.
ATTY. SESBREÑO
The prosecution, your Honor, has filed the opposition to that motion today, October 18,
and in that opposition, we aver that up to today, I have not been furnished with a copy of
said motion, so that the 3-day prior notice as required in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
has not been complied, and therefore, that motion is just a mere scrap of paper, and
should be denied for failure to comply with the requirements. It is very clear in the
medical certificate that accused Silverio is not confined in a hospital, and he is a walking
patient. Considering that he is a walking patient, there is no reason, no valid reason, for
489
him why he cannot attend to this arraignment, your Honor. He can come to court just to ATTY. SESBREÑO:
listen to the reading of the information, which activity is not strenuous. It will not strain
him physically. There is no record that he is hospitalized. He can walk and can move If that is the condition that the accused can only come if he gets clearance from his
around, and there is no impossibility to attend the arraignment. As stated in our doctor, then there is no assurance, your Honor, that we can have the arraignment.
opposition, your honor, accused Silverio has filed cases against the PNB for the
recovery of his Delta Motors Corporation and also against the Securities and Exchange
COURT:
Commission and a bank for the rehabilitation of Philfinance. In all these cases, he never
complained that he is sick. Only in this case, your Honor, that he complained that he is
sick, and this case has been filed in 1985 yet, or more than three (3) years ago, and he Yes, but in the meanwhile, we give the benefit of the doubt for the sickness of the
has not been arraigned yet. So, this is another dilatory tactic, your Honor. accused in this case. In the sense of fairness and good judgment, we will give him the
chance to recuperate at least, if he is really sick. It will be unchristian to order him to
come here if he is really sick. He might die on the way.
COURT: (to Atty. Reyes)
xxx xxx xxx
By the way, the doctor who issued the medical certificate, is he a government
physician?
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
ATTY. REYES:
May I suggest, your Honor, that during the next setting, if it is possible, just to have the
arraignment of this case. Anyway, we could have the trial ex-parte later on without the
Your Honor, please. He is a very prominent heart specialist at the Philippine Heart
presence of accused. The accused, your Honor, is a wailing patient and he should be
Center. And there is no reason, your Honor, to doubt his professional competence. I
required to attend even in the company of his physician so that if he is really having a
would not like to take responsibility of advising my client to come to Cebu at the risk of
heart ailment, as what was said he had a heart attack, a physician should attend to him,
exposing him to a heart attack. His heart condition is not an ordinary illness, your
because if the accused says that he will attend the arraignment only if he gets clearance
Honor.
from his doctor (unfinished)

COURT:
COURT: (butted in)

In the interest of justice, at least to give the accused reasonable time to come, only for
The image of the Court will be placed in a predicament, as it will appear that this is a
purposes of arraignment.
one-way traffic affair, if we allow that condition. It is a matter of public knowledge that
the accused here is a multi- millionaire. He might think his is an exceptional case. That is
ATTY. REYES: why I am asking the cooperation of Atty. Reyes. For purposes of the arraignment, to
satisfy also Atty. Sesbreño because this is his personal case. He is the plaintiff himself,
Yes, your Honor, if he gets clearance from his doctor. and you know, Atty. Sesbreño is very brave. He is one of the fightingest lawyer here in
Cebu. He fights for his right, even to the extent of filing cases after cases against
COURT: Judges. In other words, the Court would decide this case on the level and would be
impartial and fair in handling this case, in accordance with law, as his conscience may
dictate.
If he gets clearance? If that is the condition, we have no way of knowing when will that
be?
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
ATTY. REYES:
I would like to make it of record, that if only the medical certificate shows that the
accused Silverio is confined in a hospital, I could not have interposed my objection, but
Well, at any rate, we can have the next setting on another date, your Honor.
he is not confined and he is a walking patient.

490
COURT: I think there might be some hitches, because the accused there in that case has not
been arrested, your Honor.
Millionaires, usually do not want to be confined in a hospital. They dislike that. They just
want to stay in their luxurious homes, and they can afford to call any specialist they COURT:
want. They can have the best services of any specialist if they want to. So, I think that
the accused in this case do the same. I know the old man, the late Durano, He avoided Who?
staying in hospitals if possible. He even sent his personal physician to the United States
to fetch the best doctor when he had the coronary ailment, the heart attack.
ATTY. SESBREÑO:

The Court do not look with favor to the accused in this case, but because according to
Accused Silverio has not been arrested in that case.
the words of Atty. Reyes that he is not taking responsibility of advising his client to
come for the arraignment, so we will just give him at least the chance to appear for the
arraignment. COURT:

So, when shall be the most reasonable time? Will it be next month? For purposes of Oh, Atty. Reyes?
arraignment.
ATTY. REYES:
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
He is bonded, your Honor.
I suggest within one (1) month, your Honor.
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
COURT:
But the bond has expired. The 30-day period has expired and the bonding company was
Yes, within one month. We will do that. ordered to produce the accused and to explain why the bond should not be confiscated.

xxx xxx xxx COURT:

ATTY. REYES: The problem of the Court now is whether on December 7 he can be here. Well, inasmuch
as the accused has another case in another sala on December 7, we might as well set
the arraignment here on said date, to coincide with the date of the arraignment of the
May I suggest, your Honor, because we have another case, an arraignment on December
accused in Branch 9, so that the accused will travel only in one instance.
7, 1988, May I suggest that date?
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
COURT:
May I suggest within one month, your Honor, the arraignment be set within one
Here?
month, to conform with the rules.

ATTY. REYES:
COURT:

In Branch 9, your Honor, before Judge Gaviola.

Make it one month, but due to the exceptional predicament of the accused, we will just
reset this to December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in the morning, to give the accused the chance.
ATTY. SESBREÑO:

491
 ATTY. SESBREÑO:
In view of the suggestion of the Court, I may accede. (pp. 3-12, t.s.n., October 18, 1988;
pp. 74-83, Rollo; italics supplied.)
The order of the Court dated October 18, 1988 reads as follows:
On the suggestion of Atty. Edwin Reyes, counsel for the accused Ricardo Silverio, to
reset the arraignment and pre-trial to December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in the morning,
considering that the accused Silverio is also appearing in Branch 9 of this Court on said
date and without objection on the part of Atty. Raul Sesbreño the court is constrained to
defer the arraignment of the accused on said date and time. On suggestion also of Atty.
Sesbreño Atty. Reyes is hereby directed to handcarry the subpoena for his client and
also the bondsmen to appear before this Court on December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in the
morning. (p. 61, Rollo.)
Postponements are left to the sound discretion of the court. The fact that the postponement exceeded one
month from October 18, 1988 was not such a grave abuse of discretion as to call for disciplinary action
against respondent Judge, it appearing that there was a good reason for resetting the arraignment of the
accused on December 7, 1988 because he (Silverio) would be appearing in another sala on that date. He
would have to make only one trip to Cebu for the two cases. The postponement of less than two months
was a reasonable period.
Complainant's allegation that respondent Judge neglected to resolve with reasonable dispatch
complainant's pleadings, urging the immediate arrest and arraignment of Silverio, Sr. is not supported by
the records of the case. Indeed, more than four (4) long years have elapsed since Criminal Case No. CU-
10568 was filed in 1985, but that delay may not be laid at respondent Judge's doorstep for he assumed
office as Presiding Judge of Branch 20 on June 6, 1988 only. However, respondent Judge erroneously
believed that the records of the case were still in the Court of Appeals. The fact is that the records were
returned by the Court of Appeals to the lower court on January 9, 1987 yet.
On August 15, 1988, or two months after Judge Garcia took over from Judge Navarro, he issued a warrant
for the arrest of Silverio. He clearly acted with reasonable promptitude, but since the accused has not been
arraigned up to this time, there is reason for Attorney Sesbreño's complaint that the court has not acted
with determination and resourcefulness to foil the dilatory maneuvers of the accused and his lawyers.
The charge of dishonesty or serious misconduct against Judge Garcia is not worth considering as it is
hypothetical, i.e., if respondent Judge stated in his certificates of service for the months of May and/or
June, 1988 that no motions were pending resolution in his sala. Complainant did not even attempt to
present a shred of evidence to prove this charge.
Complainant's charges of oppression and acts of impropriety or intemperance refer to respondent Judge's
Order of November 29, 1988 which reads in part as follows:
A cursory reading of the above-mentioned facts will ineluctably show that the court had
traversed on the middle ground of the road in order to satisfy both parties. As to why
Atty. Raul Sesbreño filed two (2) manifestations/memoranda using insolent,
disrespectful and contemptuous language impressing the court that the latter opted in
favor of the postponement of this case, without his knowledge and consent and that he
was just compelled to accept because the Court, in effect, handled the postponement in
arbitrary manner is beyond the comprehension of the Court.
Parenthetically, the offended party made mentioned to place on records his reaction to
postpone the arraignment, which was not reflected in the transcript of the stenographic
notes, especially his veiled threat, which is covertly contumacious when he said in the
two (2) manifestations/memoranda that the same are filed for: (1) for record purposes;
and (2) for reference use in the future in the appropriate opportuned time. The Court is
not naive to understand that should this case be adversed to him, he would use this
incident as a means to vindicate or retaliate against the Presiding Judge. It is already a
matter of public knowledge that movant counsel is in the habit of filing cases against
any government official before whom the investigation or hearing are conducted
whenever the orders or decisions are adverse to him.
Let it be known that it either pressure nor threat/influence of any material considerations
whatsoever can dissuade the court from properly exercising and dispensing the
administration of justice.
To think that one has the absolute monopoly of legal knowledge and virtue is downright
officious and a pretension of the highest magnitude. They say, in heaven one can not
find a saint who was never humble here on earth.
xxx xxx xxx
Without further digging into the intricacies and insolent words, which are self-evident
and self-explanatory, the Court hereby warns him not to repeat using words of the same
import and meaning, otherwise the Court will be constrained to cite him for contempt of
court in order to protect and enforce its dignity and honor as well as the majesty of the
law. (pp. 23 & 23-A, Rollo.)
We have read the two manifestations/memoranda (Annexes C & D) of Attorney Sesbreño and find nothing
therein which can be described as "insolent, disrespectful and contemptuous" or "covertly contumacious"
or resembling a "veiled threat" against respondent Judge to warrant a warning that he may be cited for
contempt of court if he should repeat words of the same import.
More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish judges not to be onion-skinned when confronted
by dissatisfied lawyers or litigants. Their power to punish for contempt is not a bludgeon to be used for the
purpose of exacting silent submission to their rulings and orders however questionable or unjust they may
492
be. It should be used only to protect and vindicate the dignity and authority of the court (Slade Perkins vs. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271). Courts should exercise their power to punish for contempt on the ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of
punishment (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265; Gamboa vs. Teodoro, III
L-4893, May 13, 1952; People vs. Rivera, L-364, May 26, 1952; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801).
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Pedro Garcia is admonished to abstain from intemperate and abrasive DOUBT CONSIDERING THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BEYOND
language in his orders. He is further urged to be decisive and resourceful in implementing the processes REASONABLE DOUBT. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p.41)
and orders of his court. He should dispose of his cases with equal dispatch, whether the parties be
menials or millionaires, so that the aggrieved party will have no reason to complain that justice is only for
Hence, this appeal presents the issue of whether or not the quantum of evidence sufficient to render a
the rich and influential and that the poor must await the rich man's pleasure.
judgment of guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been met.

SO ORDERED. The information filed on September 25,1985 on the basis of a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) headed by Police Lieutenant Leonardo Lavares reads:
G.R. No. 77756 March 26, 1990
That on or about the 11th day of September 1985, in the municipality of Las Pinas, Metro
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
vs. accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver dried
RENATO MENDOZA JAVIER y TORRES, accused-appellant. marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug. (Rollo, p. 6)

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. The facts for the prosecution are stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief for the Appellee as follows:

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 11, 1985, the Narcotics Command
Unit (NARCOM) of the Philippine Constabulary in Camp Crame, Quezon City, received a
report that a certain Ray was selling marijuana to out-of-school youth in Pulang-Lupa,
Las Piñas (p. 7, tsn, Jan. 6,1986).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The NARCOM Commanding Officer, Lt. Manuel Raval, ordered Lt. Lavares to form a team
for the 'buy-bust' operation and to arrest the suspect. The team was composed of Lt.
Defendant-appellant Renato Mendoza Javier y Torres was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 133, in Criminal Case No. 19359 of violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as Lavares as team leader, Sgt. Aladano buyer-poseur, Sgt. Lagos, Pfc. Labucay and
Pulang-Lupa, Las Pinas Brgy. Capt. De La Cruz who was the informant. The team
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
immediately proceeded to Tramo, Pulang-Lupa of Las Piñas. Upon arriving at the
life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00. He now seeks a reversal of the judgment of conviction by the
designated place, Lt. Lavares gave Sgt. Aladano four 5 peso bills which were previously
court a quo assigning as errors, to wit:
dusted with ultra-violet powder to use as purchase money (pp. 2-3, tsn, Dec. 2, 1985).
I
Sgt. Aladano and Brgy. Capt. De La Cruz found appellant at around 4:45 o'clock that
afternoon and approached him De La Cruz, who was appellant's cousin, introduced Sgt.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE Aladano to appellant. Sgt. Aladano intimated his desire to buy marijuana. For marijuana
PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES WHICH WERE TAINTED WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND in two (1) aluminum foils, Sgt. Aladano gave appellant the marked money. Thereafter,
IMPROBABILITIES. appellant left.

II After some time, appellant returned. He handed over to Sgt. Aladano something wrapped
in a piece of paper. When Sgt. Aladano opened the package, he found the two small
493
 packages of marijuana. Immediately, he signaled his companions who were more or less
7 to 10 meters away from them (p. 7, tsn, January 6, 1986).
Appellant tried to escape, but Sgt. Aladano held him by his waist. The team swooped
down on appellant. They introduced themselves as members of the NARCOM.
The team brought appellant and the marijuana to their headquarters.
Lt. Tita Advincula, a forensic chemist of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory, examined the
contents of the package (Exhibit "H") seized from appellant. She reported that the
contents were indeed marijuana.
Appellant himself was examined at the PC Crime Laboratory. In her report (Exh. E ),
Engr. Isidra de Guzman stated that she found appellant positive of ultra-violet
flourescent powder on both hands, arms and face. (Rollo, pp. 55-58)
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant has a different version of the facts as follows:
... [O]n September 11, 1985 between the hours of five and six in the evening, defendant-
appellant was having a snack in a store near their house when all of the sudden, a group
of men, introducing themselves as NARCOM agents, arrested him for allegedly selling
marijuana fruit tops. After he was handcuffed, he saw a red car with three men on board
which suddenly stopped behind him. Two men alighted from the car and approached
him. One of them, whom he later identified as Lt. Lavares, placed dried marijuana leaves
on his pocket, while a policeman from Las Piñas, a certain Pat. Antonio, demanded
money from him in exchange for his release. Since accused-appellant failed to produce
any money, he was then brought to Camp Crame in Quezon City,
At Camp Crame, he was brought to the Office of the NARCOM and led into a room where
he was interrogated by an investigator in civilian clothes. Inside said room was a table,
on top of which were marijuana leaves wrapped in an empty pack of Philip Morris
cigarettes (Exhs. "H" and "H-1"). The said marijuana leaves were not the same one (sic)
which was placed on his pocket earlier that day.
He was then forced to admit ownership of such marijuana leaves and was made to affix
his signature on the wrapper. Although very much against his will, he nevertheless
reluctantly affixed his signature on said wrapper because he was afraid that more
punishment would be inflicted upon his person if he will refuse to do what was told of
him. Before he was actually led inside said room, he asked permission from his escorts
for him to use the comfort room. While he was then relieving himself, a NARCOM agent
in civilian clothes started kicking him. With said NARCOM agent was another man who
held his hands and rubbed powder on it. Accused-appellant attempted to wash-off said
powder but was prevented from doing so by the two men. It was then after he was
maltreated by the NARCOM agent and his companion, when accused-appellant was
brought to the room for investigation.
Two days after he was arrested, he was brought before a forensic chemist of the PC-INP
Crime Laboratory who examined his hands for possible presence of ultra-violet powder.
He narrated to said chemist how said powder got into his hands, but the latter just
laughed-off his claim. (Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 5-6)
At the arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered by the defendant-appellant.
During the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution included Lt. Leonardo Lavares, head of the buy-bust
operation, Sgt. Aladano the poseur-buyer, Chemical Engineer Isidra de Guzman of the PC Crime
Laboratory who conducted the physical examination of the defendant-appellant to determine the presence
of ultra-violet powder on his person and Lt. Tita Advincula, Forensic Chemist of the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory who examined the specimen submitted to her, in connection with this case containing two foils
of dried leaves.
The report submitted by Isidra de Guzman shows the following findings:
xxxxxxxxx
Findings:
Examination conducted under the ultra-violet radiation revealed the following results:
A. Renato Mendoza — POSITIVE for the presence of a bright yellow ultra-violet,
flourescent powder on both hands, arms and on his face.
B. The above-mentioned money bills — POSITIVE for the presence of a bright yellow
ultra-violet flourescent powder. (Exh. E ) (Rollo, p. 21)
The pertinent portion of the report filed by Lt. Tita Advincula reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE
result to the tests for marijuana, a prohibited drug. (Exh. 1) (Rollo, p. 21)
494
The witnesses presented by the defense were the defendant-appellant himself and his mother in support of
the claim that the former was plainly a victim of an incriminatory machination perpetrated by the members
of the alleged buy-bust operation team of Lt. Lavares.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Cpl. Antonio B. Antonio to disprove the extortion charges against
him by the defendant-appellant who averred that the said police officer demanded money in exchange for
the latter's release after his arrest.
On sur-rebuttal, the defendant-appellant's father Eleuterio Javier was called to the witness stand to bolster
the claim that Cpl. Antonio was guilty of extortion.
After trial, the defendant-appellant was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged.
In resolving the issue of whether or not the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met, the
credibility of witnesses who appeared in court becomes a foremost matter. On credibility, it is an oft-
repeated rule that this Court will not disturb the findings of the trial judge unless he has plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case (see People v.
Jose Pirreras, G.R. No. 63462, November 6, 1989 and People v. Eduardo Paco y Tamayo, G.R. No. 76893,
February 27,1989)
The defendant-appellant alleges that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are tainted with
inconsistencies and improbabilities, namely: (a) that in Sgt. Aladano's testimony, it took the accused
twenty minutes to get the marijuana leaves after the deal to sell them to the poseur-buyer was made while
according to Lt. Lavares, almost an hour transpired before the defendant-appellant came back and handed
something to Sgt. Aladano; (b) that the buy-bust operation team of Lt. Lavares was planned, executed and
successfully carried out within a matter of two hours without any preliminary surveillance on the
defendant-appellant; and (c) that if the defendant-appellant was indeed a drug pusher, the fact that he
trusted his cousin, Barangay Captain Dela Cruz, the alleged informer as to the poseur-buyer's identity
would mean that the latter had acted as "middleman" in previous transactions otherwise the defendant-
appellant would not allow the said informer to be involved in his illegal activity.
We find the above allegation devoid of merit. The inconsistencies pointed out by the defendant-appellant
are too minor to affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers presumed to have
regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. (People v. Lamberto
Borja y Martinez, G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990, citing People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]; People v.
Said Sariol y Muhamading, G.R. No. 83809, June 22, 1989 citing People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988];
People v. Boholst 152 SCRA 263 [1987] citing People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642 [1983]; People v.
Campana, 124 SCRA 271 [1983]; People v. Rosas, 149 SCRA 464 [1987]) With respect to the alleged
improbabilities, they are grounded on fanciful conjectures and speculations which cannot topple the
evidence adduced by the prosecution. Thus, we are constrained to give credence to the witnesses of the
prosecution who had proven beyond reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime of which
defendant- appellant was charged. After all, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" is defined under Rule 133,
section 2 of the Rules of Court as follows:
... Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced and mind.
In the instant case, there is clear proof that the defendant-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, i.e., in
the very act of selling and delivering dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug under Article I, section
2, subsections (e) and (i) of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.
Prosecution witnesses Sgt. Aladano and Lt. Lavares competently narrated the pertinent details attendant
to the crime of which the trial court convicted the defendant-appellant who was positively identified as the
perpetrator by the said witnesses. Furthermore, corroborative evidence was offered by the prosecution
through the testimonies of the chemical engineer and forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory.
The defense of having been framed-up was not satisfactorily proved by convincing evidence. Like alibi, it
is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult to prove (See People v. Sergio Nabinat y Asag, G.R.
No. 84392, February 7, 1990). It is difficult to believe that the NARCOM agents who did not know the
appellant and whom the appellant did not know would suddenly pounce upon a completely unknown and
innocent person taking a merienda and not only plant marijuana in his clothes but also forcibly rub
ultraviolet powder on his hands while he was relieving himself in the toilet at Camp Crame. During the
cross-examination of the defendant-appellant, he made the following declarations:
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You were present when Sgt. Aladano testified here in Court and
pointed to you?
A. Yes sir.
COURT: Was he the one who planted the marijuana?
A. No Your Honor, it was Lt. Lavares.
FISCAL:
Q. Prior to September 11, 1985, did you know already Sgt. Salvador
Aladano?
A. No sir.
495
Q. In the same manner that you do not know also Lt. Lavares prior to
September 11, 1985?
A. Yes sir.
Q. As a matter of fact, not knowing anyone of them, you did not have
any misunderstanding with anyone of them prior to September 11,
1985, is it not?
A. I do not have sir.
Q. Who was the one who placed this powder in your hands?
The extortion theory advanced by defense was not also substantiated as can be gleaned from the evidence
on record. During the direct examination of the defendant-appellant's father, the defense failed to lay the
basis of the extortion charges, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. GARIN:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Pat. Antonio likewise testified he denies the allegations of your son
that he was extracting money from you, what can you say about this?

A. A man, but I think he was not a Narcom agent. FISCAL:

Q. According to you, Lt. Lavares this marijuana in your pocket against Objection. No basis because according to the witness, while he
you and did you file any case against this Lt. Lavares? admitted he met this Antonio and conversation was pondered on
asking why he was arresting his son.
A. I cannot file any case or complaint because I was handcuffed and
they brought me to Camp Crame. ATTY. GARIN:

Q. You did not file any complaint against the man who put this powder The basis is the testimony of this witness Antonio. Now I am asking to
which according to you is against your will confirm or deny the same.

A. No sir, because I was brought upstairs and I was instructed to wait FISCAL:
for my parents.
But basis should be laid.
Q. Were you not presented by the arresting officers to the
investigators in Camp Crame? ATTY. GARIN:

A. I was presented sir. I will reform the question your Honor.

Q. They wanted to get your statement but you refused to give ant Q. This Pat. Antonio testified here in Court denying that he never
statement? asked money from you, did you have any conversation regarding that
extraction of money?
COURT:
FISCAL:
Q. Why did you refuse to give your statement?
The question has no basis.
A. Because I have not committed any offense. I was just taking my
snack or 'meryenda' (Original Records, pp. 123-124). ATTY. GARIN:

496
 We thought that would be the proper subject of this examination. According to the appellant, the fact that he trusted the barangay captain who introduced the buyers to him
shows that the captain must have acted as middleman in other drug transactions. Assuming this to be
FISCAL: true, we fail to see how it proves that the appellant is innocent. In truth, familiarity and trust do not arise
solely from joint participation in illegal acts. Mr. dela Cruz was not only a leading member of the Pulang-
lupa community but he was also the appellant's relative. It simply did not occur to the appellant that dela
This is a direct testimony of the witness and proper basis should be
Cruz was against his drug dealing activities to the extent of turning him in to the authorities;
laid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
COURT:

SO ORDERED.
Sustain. Reform.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

ATTY. GARIN:

$ + GRSI ® Copyrightregno N94-027

Q. Were you able to talk to your son while he was in prison?
{bmr footnote.bmp}_78583_84_3_26_90_footnotes>mainG.R. Nos. 78583 March 26, 1990
BENIGNO TODA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
A. No sir.
Republic of the Philippines
Q. Your wife?
SUPREME COURT
A. I do not know whether my wife was able to talk to my son while in
prison.
Manila
Q. On or before the ll th day of September 1985, do you remember this
SECOND DIVISION
Antonio talking to your wife?

G.R. Nos. 78583-4 March 26, 1990

A. No sir.

BENIGNO TODA, JR., petitioner,

ATTY. GARIN:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, respondents.
That will he all for the witness. (Original Records, pp. 130-131)
G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990
In the absence of any motive shown on the part of the NARCOM agents to implicate the defendant-
appellant and considering the foregoing evidence for the prosecution, we agree with the trial court's
ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, petitioner,
assessment that the presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant-appellant has been overcome.
vs.
BENIGNO TODA, JR., respondent.
The argument that the Narcotics Command cannot organize a team and send it from Camp Crame to Las
Piñas in a period of two hours has no merit. The NARCOM's main function is to stem the traffic in
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for Benigno Toda, Jr. Belo, Abiera & Associates for petitioner Rose
prohibited drugs and catch and prosecute violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. By the very nature of its
Marie Tuason Toda.
work, NARCOM should have agents on duty all the time and ready to rush wherever they are needed. Two
hours is not too short for this purpose.

497
REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January
29,1987 1 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 06675 and 07936, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the payment of the cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 amounting to
P2,191.62 and those declared on July 25, 1981 amounting to P40,196.12 to Rose Marie
Toda as her separate property. The cash dividends declared on April 25, 1981 amounting
to P37,196.30 (sic) are hereby adjudicated to Benigno Toda, Jr. as his share in the
conjugal partnership assets; the portion of the order dated November 2, 1981 with
respect to the payment of the amount of P360,095.12 to Rose Marie T. Toda is set aside;
2. Ordering the payment of the amount of P4,1623,982.24 to Rose Marie Toda
representing the balance of P15, 749,135.32 obligated to be paid as estate taxes by
Benigno Toda, Jr.;
3. Setting aside the order of the lower court dated June 2, 1982 directing Benigno Toda,
Jr. to pay interest and non-payment penalty of 18% and 5%, respectively; and
4. Setting aside the order of the lower court directing the annotation of lien on the
property of Benigno Toda, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno for brevity) and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (Rose Marie for brevity) were married
on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of
Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979
in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, 2 as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of
conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further "disagreeable proceedings," filed on April 1,
1981 a joint petition forjudicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil
Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, 3 which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case.
This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise agreement
allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with
prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121
of this Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in
its order of June 9, 1981. 4
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the interpretation and
implementation of the compromise agreement, as follows:
1. Order, dated November 20, 1981, ordering Benigno, inter alia, to pay Rose Marie the
cash dividends on the shares declared on April 25, 1981 amounting to P37,126.30; that
declared on July 25, 1981 amounting to P40,196.12; that declared on July 1, 1981, given
on September 25, 1981 amounting to P2,191.62; and the payment of P360,095.12 to Rose
Marie which is the balance of P2 million paid on April 4, 1981; 5
2. Order, dated June 2, 1982, ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie interest at 18% per
annum on the amounts required to be paid in the order of November 20,1981, as well as
5% non-payment penalty should the said order of November 20,1981 be sustained on
appeal; 6
3. Order, dated December 9, 1982, denying Benigno's motion to inhibit Judge Rizalina
Bonifacio Vera from hearing the case; 7
4. Order, dated March 1, 1983, ordering the annotation of a lien on certain properties of
Benigno as security for any and all amounts that he may finally be ordered to pay to
Rose Marie under the compromise agreement; 8 and
5. Order, dated March 14, 1983, ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie the amount of
P4,623,929.24, with interest and penalties thereon
at the rates stipulated in the compromise agreement from date of at the rates stipulated in the compromise
agreement from date of demand by Rose Marie. 9
The compromise agreement which, as earlier stated, was incorporated in the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership and was approved by the court below, contains the following stipulaitons:
xxx xxx xxx
4. For the best interest of each of them, petitioners have agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership and to partition the assets thereof, under the following terms and
conditions — this document, a pleading, being intended by them to embody and
evidence their agreement;
(a) Petitioners as the parties hereto agree upon the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership during the marriage and further agree to obtain judicial approval of their
said agreement as provided by Article 191 of the Civil Code.
(b) The following shall be adjudicated to petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda:
(1) Forty Million Peson (P40,000,000.00) to be paid as follows:
498
 (a) Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume the
payment of the estate taxes, interest and penalties
thereon, pertaining to the estate of petitioner Rose
Marie Tuason Toda's late brother Manuel Tuason,
Jr. in the sum of P15,749,135.32 as of March 31,
1981 — all interest and penalty charges after March
31, 1981 to be the responsibility of petitioner
Benigno Toda, Jr.
(b) P2,000,000.00 to be paid within 30 days after
signing of this agreement.
(c) The balance shall be paid within six (6) months
after date of signing of this agreement. If not paid
when due, the balance shall bear interest at 18%
per annum until paid and there shall be a 5% non-
payment penalty. The proceeds from any sale of or
loss with respect to, Rubicon's shares in Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., shares of Cibeles Insurance
Corporation or Hermana Mayor shall be applied
when received against the aforesaid balance,
except to the extent such proceeds are used to
satisfy any other obligation under this agreement.
(2) All shares of stock in San Nguel Corporation registered solely in
the name of petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda whether stock
dividends or stocks acquired on pre-emptive rights including those
acquired in the names of both petitioners Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose
Marie Tuason Toda (whetherjointly or alternately 'and/or'), free from
all liens and encumbrances.
(3) All shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation acquired whether as
stock dividends of or on pre-emptive zighta pertaining to the shares
of stock in said corporation of petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda's
brother the late Manuel Tuason, Jr. (of course, the original shares of
the latter pertain to petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda also), free
from all liens and encumbrances except for the estate tax lien.
Petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda hereby grants petitioner Benigno
Toda, Jr. an irrevocable proxy, for three years through the 1983
stockholders' meeting whether annual or special to elect directors for
all shares of stock she owns directly or indirectly including those
from the late Manuel Tuason, Jr. in San Miguel Corporation.
(4) The Banaba Forbes Park conjugal dwelling and its contents free
from all liens and encumbrances except that petitioner Benigno Toda,
Jr. shall remove therefrom his personal effects including furniture and
appliances in his study room and T.V. room and, from the family
rooin, all antiques, rugs, paintings of Old Fort Manila, books and
mementos. Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. commits that no servant now
living in the Tolentino street apartments shall be evicted.
(5) The San Francisco apartment at Apartment 905, No. 1750 Taylor
Street, San Francisco, California, U.SA., and its contents, free from all
liens and encumbrances, except that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
shall remove therefrom his personal effects.
(6) The artifacts already removed by petitioner Rose Marie Tuason
Toda from the Madrid Apartment at No. 4 San Pedro de Valdivia. She
shall return to it its silver ware, china ware, paintings and etchings.
She may retain the three fans encased in glass and may remove her
clothes, perfumes and toiletries, the Sansa painting ofa shell
dedicated to her, the painting of the Madonna and tapestry hanging in
her bedroom, 5 Persian rugs, 1 writing desk and chair and the 2 lamps
thereon and 1 lamp on the night table, and the statuette given her by
Hagedorn.
(7) Jewelry.
(8) Motor vehicles registered in her name.
(9) Within forty-five (45) days from signing of this agreement, One
Million Pesos (Pl,000,000.00) as attorneys' fees — petitioner Rose
Marie Tuason Toda agreeing to hold petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
harmless from any claim fo attorneys' fees and expenses that may be
filed against the conjugal partnership or herself for services rendered
to her in the prosecution of her claims against said conjugal
partnership or against petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. or to secure her
paraphernal estate.
(10) Two shares with two lots in Valley Golf & Country Club.
(11) One share in Club Puerta de Hierro in Madrid, Spain if there is one
registered in petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda's name.
499
 (12) Share in Montemar Beach Club in Bagac, Bataan — petitioner
Rose Marie Tuason Toda agreeing to assume the balance of the
acquisition cost thereof.
(c) All other properties of the conjugal partnership of whatever and wherever located
shall be adjudicated to petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. even though acquired in the name of
petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda or both of them — she undertaking to execute the
corresponding deeds of conveyances.
(d) Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume the payment of all conjugal obligations,
petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda representing and warranting that she has no pending
obligation or incurred no obligation chargeable to the conjugal partnership except those
listed in Annex 'A' hereof.
If the Rosaria Apartment is subject to a mortgage loan and such loan is a conjugal debt,
petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume such loan and shall obtain the discharge of
the mortgage.
(e) After the signing of this document:
(1) Each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy
his or her separate estate, present and future, without the consent of
the other;
(2) All earnings from any profession business or industry shall
likewise belong to each of them respectively;
(3) All expenses and obligations incurred by each of them shall be
their respective and separate responsibilities.
(f) With the signing of this document, Civil Case No. 35566 of this same Court, CA-G.R.
No. 11123-SP and SC-G.R. No. L-56121 shall be deemed dismissed with prejudice as
between the parties hereto. 10
The parties then prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Approving the agreement for voluntary dissolution and partition of the conjugal
partnership;
(b) declaring the conjugal partnership of petitioners dissolved and adjudicating to each
of them his or her share in the properties and assets of said conjugal partnership in
accordance with the agreement embodied in paragraph 4 hereof; and
(c) enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and conditions of the aforesaid
agreement. 11
Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable settlement of all the disputes
of the spouses. Instead, as lamented by the counsel of one of them, the compromise agreement which was
designed to terminate a litigation spawned two new petitions, with each party initiating one against the
other. Thus, illustrative of the saying that a solution which creates another problem is no solution, the
contradictory interpretations placed by the parties on some provisions of the agreement resulted in
appeals to respondent court and, eventually, the present recourse to us.
Benigno appealed from the aforestated orders of the trial court of November 20, 1981, June 2, 1982,
December 9, 1982, March 1, 1983 and March 14, 1983 containing the directives hereinbefore respectively
set out. The same were disposed of by the Court of Appeals as explained at the start of this decision.
Rose Marie now submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In holding that the compromise agreement of the parties herein became effective only
after its judicial approval on June 9, 1981 and not upon its execution on March 30,1981;
2. In setting aside the order of the lower court dated June 2, 1981 directing Benigno to
pay interest of eighteen percent and non-payment penalty of five percent; and
3. In setting aside the order of the lower court directing the annotation of Rose Marie's
lien on Benigno's property. 12
On the other hand, Benigno contends in his present petition before us that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it affirmed the lower court's
award of P4,623,929.24 without trial and evidence-taking and overruled petitioner's claim
of violation of his due process right;
2. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law and due process when it upheld the
lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for her inhibition/disqualification;
3. Since the document (the parties' compromise agreement) explicitly provided for
assumption of liability rather than agency to pay and since there was no evidence-
taking, the Court of Appeals finding of an agency to pay is reviewable as a question of
law; and
4. The Court of Appeals on a question of law involving the parol evidence rule. 13
500
The award of cash dividends basically depends on the date of effectivity of the compromise agreement as
this will determine whether the same is conjugal property or separate property of the spouses.
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement became
effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981
when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 "(i)n the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected by
the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the
same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is void. 15 Furthermore,
Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the
issuance of a decree of separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be considered dissolved only
on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal
partnership. Conformably thereto, the cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 and July 25,1981 in the
amount of P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to Rose Marie; and that declared on April
2,5, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid to Benigno, pursuant to Paragraph 4 (c) of the
compromise agreement which awards to Benigno the conjugal assets not otherwise specifically assigned
to Rose Marie.
With respect to the amount of P360,095.12 which Benigrio deducted from the P2 million supposed to be
paid to Rose Marie, it is not clear from the records where said amount came from. The Court of Appeals, in
holding that it is conjugal and therefore belongs to Benigno, presumed it to be in the nature of cash
dividends declared prior to the approval of the compromise agreement by reason of the fact that the
amount was deducted by Benigno from the P2 million which he paid on April 14,1981. While no sufficient
proof was adduced to conclusively explain such deduction, there exists the legal presumption that all
property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership absent any proof that it is the exclusive
property of either spouse. 16 Since Rose Marie failed to prove that the amount forms part of her
paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal property. Consequently, Benigno is entitled to the said
amount of P360,095.12, hence he rightfully deducted the same from the amount due to Rose Marie.
The issue regarding the annotation of the lien on Benigno's properties has been mooted by our resolution
dated Aprjl 3, 1989 wherein, at his instance, we ordered the cancellation thereof upon his posting of the
corresponding bond. In our resolution of February 26, 1990, we noted Benigno's comphance, approved the
bond he filed, and ordered the cancellation of the hens annotated on the certificates of title of the
propertiesinvolved.
Likewise, the order denying the motion to inhibit Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera has become academic
considering that she no longer presides over the court where the case was filed. Besides, as correctly
explained by respondent court, the groundfor inhibition raised by Benigno is not valid it being merely on
the basis of the judge having acquired knowledge of the facts surrounding the agreement of the parties,
hence she would be a material witness to the issue of the true agreement which is contested by the parties.
However, those facts came to the knowledge of the judge in the course of her efforts to effect a
compromise between parties and are also known to the parties.This is not a ground for disqualification; on
the contrary, said, acts of the judge were in accord with the rule encouraging compromises in litigations,
especially between members of the same family.
Anent the tax savings of P4,623,982.24 obtained by Benigno, we hold that this forms part of the P40 million
allocated to Rose Marie under paragraph 4 (b) (1) of the compromise agreement.We give credit to the
ratiocination thereon of the trial court as quoted with approval by respondent court:
The records show that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. paid only Pl,125,152.48 in estate
taxes, although the amount stated in the m Compromise Agreement was P15,749,135.32.
The balance of P4,623,929.24 is now being claimed by both parties as aforestated. In the
opinion of this court, the pertinent terms of the Agreement as quoted, are clear and do
not require any interpretation. In brief, under, the Agreement, petitioner Rose Marie T.
Toda is adjudicated the fixed sum of P40 million, to be paid as follows: (a) Payment by
petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. of the estate taxes, interests and penalties thereon,
pertaining to the estate of the late Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the amount of Pl5,749,135.32 as
of March 31, 1982; (b) P2 million within 30 days after signing of the Agreement; (c) the
balance within six months after date of signing of the Agreement. This Court notes that
the amount of taxes, interests and penalties is fixed at P15,749,135.32 and this figure
was provided by Benigno Toda, Jr. There is no provision as contended by petitioner
Benigno Toda, Jr. that the amount was only an assumed liability and that he could
attempt to reduce it by suit or compromise. It is clear that if the amount of P4,623,929.24
is to be credited to Benigno Toda, Jr. then the P40 million which petitioner Rose Marie T.
Toda is to receive would be short by that amount. This Court is also of the opinion that
under the Agreement, petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. was constituted as agent to pay to
the government the liability of the estate of the late Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the fixed
amount of P15,749,135.32 and if he was able to secure a reduction thereof, then he
should deliver to his principal such reduction... 17
We do not believe that Benigno was denied due process when the trial court resolved the motion of Rose
Marie for the payment of P4,623,982.24 without the benefit of a hearing. The records disclose that the
hearing thereon was postponed twice at the instance of Benigno, which prompted the court to thereafter
consider the motion submitted for resolution on the basis of the allegations therein and the answer filed by
counsel for both parties. Benigno cannot now be heard to claim that he was deprived of his day in court.
Furthermore, respondent court correctly held that the issue involved was more of a question of
interpretation of a contract rather than a determination of facts. Benigno failed to make a plausible
showing that the supposed evidence he had intended to present, if any, would not be merely collateral
matters.
Considering that the amount of P4,623,982.24 actually forms an integral part of the P40 million (minus the
lawful and authorized deductions that may be made therefrom) which Benigno categorically undertook to
pay to Rose Marie, the same must earn interest at the rate of 18% per annum and 5% non-payment penalty,
the same being included in and within the contemplation of Paragraph 4 (b) (1) (c) of the compromise
agreement. Said provision of the agrdement provides for the payment of the interest and penalty upon non-
501
payment of the balance of the P40 million after the specific authorized deductions therefrom. Since the
amount of P4,623,982.24 was not to be lawfully deducted by Benigno, as hereinbefore explained, it
constitutes part of the contemplated contingent balance which might tum out to be due to Rose Marie and,
therefore, subject to the imposition of said increments on Benigno's liability.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Benigno Toda,
Jr. is hereby ordered to pay Rose Marie Tuason Toda interest at the rate of a 18% per annum and 5% non-
payment penalty on the tax savings of P4,623,982.24 from date of formal demand until the same is fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62603 March 27, 1990
UNITED REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REVEREND FATHER JOSE TORRALBA SY, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Whether the contract of lease is for a definite or indefinite period of time and the applicability of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20 and Batas Pambansa Bilang 25 are the issues in this case.
The facts are undisputed.
In March 1964 and December 1964 petitioner and private respondent Rev. Father Jose Torralba Sy, entered
into separate contracts of lease over two apartments located at 913-E and 193-F Josefina Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, with the common provision covering its duration as follows:
To hold the same for one month from the (15th day of March, 1964 for Apt. No. 913-E and
lst day of January, 1964 for Apt. No. 913- F) and so on from month to month at a rent of
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00), Philippine Currency, per month, payable in advance
on the first TEN (10) days of each calendar month, until the lease shall terminate, which
termination shall be determined by either party giving FIVE (5) days notice in writing. 1
It was further stipulated in the two contracts that "in case the lessee shall continuously withhold
possession of the apartments after he or she has been properly notified of the termination of his or her
right to occupy the same, the lessor shall be entitled to collect P400.00 every month or fraction thereof, as
reasonable compensation for the use of the place and as damages."
Private respondent removed the portion separating the two apartments and converted the same principally
for use as a Buddhist chapel.
On August 1, 1970, petitioner leased to private respondent the apartment at 937-E Josefina Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, effective August 1, 1970 for the monthly rental of P300.00, 2 payable in advance within
the first ten (10) days of the month for his use as residence only. It was also stipulated in said contract that
"in case the lessee shall continuously withhold possession of the apartments after he/she has been
notified of the termination of his/her right to occupy the same, the lessor shall be entitled to collect P500.00
every month or fraction thereof, as reasonable compensation for the use of the place and as damages.
On September 24, 1975, petitioner sent a letter to private respondent that effective November 1, 1975 the
new rental for the two apartments will be P500.00 per door or P1,000.00 for the two doors, likewise payable
in advance within the first ten (10) days of the calendar month, with the request that petitioner be informed
of private respondent's decision as to the new rate not later than October 25, 1976 so that it may be guided
accordingly. 3 Instead private respondent complained to the Department of Public Information,
Malacanang, Manila. In the confrontation between the parties, the Presidential Complaint and Action
Committee found that there was no violation of P.D. No. 20 as the subject premises are being principally as
a Buddhist Temple and therefore are not covered. Private respondent then sent a letter-complaint thru
counsel dated November 13, 1975 to them Asst. Executive Secretary Ronaldo E. Zamora who in response
issued Opinion No. 480, Series of 1975 dated November 20, 1975 signed by Deputy Executive Secretary
Roberto V. Reyes. 4 Therein it was held that the increase in rental demanded was in violation of P.D. No. 20
and that as 1/4 of the two-door apartments is being used likewise as a chapel incidental to the calling of the
private respondent as a monk it cannot be called as a commercial or public establishment or as a place for
the exercise of one's profession because the same is not for profit.
However, on November 16, 1976, in response to the letter of petitioner, Secretary Ronaldo E. Zamora, as
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, issued Opinion No. 629, Series of 1976, as follows:
While it may be conceded arguendo that for being used as a place for worship, the
premises may not necessarily be considered as commercial for purposes of ruling out
the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 20 dated October 12, 1972, which freezes
rates of rentals of dwelling unit at their present levels when the same do not exceed
P300.00 per month, it is equally true that the same will, as it does, not fall within the
protective mantle of the decree.
It is to be noted that the decreed prohibition against rental increase applies only to
dwelling units or lots used for residential purposes, the monthly rent of which does not
exceed P300.00. On this point Republic Act No. 6359 defines 'dwelling unit as follows:
"A dwelling unit refers to a house and lot used for residential
purposes and shall include not only buildings, dwelling places, except
motels, hotels, or hotel rooms; but also those used for home
industries or retail store if the owner thereof and his family actually
live therein and use it principally for residential purpose; Provided,
502
 That in case of a retail store the capital thereof does not exceed five
thousand pesos." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus if the leased apartment units are used principally for purposes of religious
worship, the incidental fact that Father Sy and/or his family live therein will not include
them in that class of tenants favored by the emergency law on housing (Morales vs.
Zamora, 31 Phil. 204). In such case, the matter of regulating the monthly rentals become
conventional between him and the URC. This should not be understood to mean,
however, that the latter is free to demand an arbitrary amount. Equity and justice require
that both parties observe reasonable terms and conditions in bringing about a mutual
covenant.
Under the circumstances, therefore, this Office, on equitable considerations and for
reasons of public policy, believes that rental increases should be raised to reasonable
levels only. 5
On January 3, 1977, petitioner through counsel furnished private respondent through counsel a xerox copy
of said Opinion No. 629, Series of 1976 and demanded that the private respondent vacate and surrender
the two premises within five (5) days from receipt of the same and to pay his rental indebtedness minus the
deposit made. Nevertheless, private respondent failed to vacate the premises.
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court of Manila on March 7, 1977. After
the issues were joined and the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered on February 16, 1981
dismissing the complaint and counter-claim without pronouncement as to costs. Both parties asked for a
reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied. Hence, both parties appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on December 28, 1981 affirming the
judgment of the City Court with the modification finding private respondent entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P4,000.00, exemplary damage ages in the amount of P2,000.00 and attorney's fees of
P2,000.00 and the costs of the suit. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the trial
court in an order of February 25, 1982.
Hence, a petition for review was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals, wherein after the issues were
joined, a decision was rendered on October 7, 1982 dismissing the petition with costs against
petitioner. 6 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the decision was denied in a resolution of
November 17, 1982.
Thus, this petition.
A reading of the two contracts of lease entered into between petitioner and private respondent hereinabove
reproduced show that its period is from month to month and that the lease may be terminated when either
party gives a 5 days notice in writing.
No doubt such a stipulation between the parties demonstrates that the agreement of lease is for a definite
period and not for an indefinite period as held by the appellate court.
In Rantael vs. CA, 7 involving a similar contract of lease between the parties this Court found that a lease
on a month to month basis expires after the last day of the 30th day period repeating the same cycle of the
30-day period until either party express their prerogative under their agreement to terminate the same.
The only difference between Rantael and the present case is that in the former the parties may terminate
the agreement upon 30 days notice while in this case, the agreement is that the termination by either party
may be upon 5 days notice. Such difference is of no moment. And such agreement is binding and is the
law between the parties.
Since the lease agreement in question is for a definite period it follows that petitioner has a right to
judicially eject private respondent from the premises as an exception to the general rule provided for in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 20 which provides as follows:
Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article
1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on
which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided; but
other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease
contracts insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, under Section of 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 25 one of the grounds for ejectment is the expiration of the
period of a written lease contract. In this case, because of the failure of the private respondent to pay the
increased rental demanded by petitioner, petitioner elected to terminate the contract and asked the private
respondent to vacate the premises. A lease contract may be terminated at the end of any month, which
shall be deemed terminated upon the refusal to pay the increased monthly rental demanded by the
petitioner, provided the same is not exhorbitant. 8
Further, there is no question in this case that the two apartments subject of litigation if not a greater
portion thereof is not used by private respondent as his residence but for a Buddhist Temple. Thus, it is
with more reason that this lease agreement does not fall within the protective mantle of the provision of
P.D. No. 20 and B.P. No. 25 which covers only dwelling units.
Lastly, considering that during the pendency of this appeal, the private respondent died on August 23,
1987, thus the said lease agreements were effectively terminated by the death of private respondent who is
the lessee of the premises in question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 7, 1982 and its
Resolution dated November 17, 1982 are hereby reversed and set aside and another judgment is hereby
rendered ordering private respondent and/or his heirs or successors-in-interest to immediately vacate the
503
premises of the property in question and to pay the unpaid rentals thereof of P1,000.00 a month for the two
apartments until they vacate the premises, with costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87585 March 27, 1990
BLUE MANILA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
and EMMANUEL E. ABELLANEDA, respondents.
Capuyan & Quimpo Law Office for petitioner.
Manuel L. Montilla for private respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petition for certiorari alleges a single ground for the allowance of the writ, to wit:
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION DESPITE CLEAR AND PATENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FINDINGS
OF FACT AND LAW AND THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION. (p. 11, Rollo.)
The petitioner is the recruitment agent that shipped the private respondent, Emmanuel Abellaneda, to the
Middle East to serve for a period of six (6) months as a seaman on the vessel of its foreign principal, the
Seatrans Offshore Ltd. After his contract was preterminated, he sued for his unpaid wages. The facts, as
alleged in the pleadings and summarized in the decision of the POEA, are as follows:
The complainant in his complaint-affidavit alleged that sometime in May, 1986, he
applied for overseas work with respondent Blue Manila, Inc. On September 16, 1986, he
was sent to Bahrain to board the vessel 'GRAY-VANGUARD' as AB/Oiler at the agreed
basic salary of US$335 per month for a period of six (6) months with a further
understanding that he will receive a war zone bonus at 100% of his basic salary plus
overtime pay. On October 3, 1986, the vessel actually entered the war zone until
November 10, 1986. On said date, the principal SEATRANS OFFSHORE LTD. informed
the crew that its lease over the vessel had expired, hence, the crewmembers
disembarked at Kharg Island, Iran where complainant was offered the same job to work
with the vessel MV 'SEATRANS 23' leased by the same principal. Complainant accepted
the offer and on November 11, 1986, he embarked and commenced working thereon with
the sole purpose of completing the remaining portion of his contract. However, from the
time he started working, he was not paid his salary and other benefits due him. This
prompted him to get cash advances for his family's sustenance in the Philippines
allegedly amounting to $512.48. For the same reason, complainant voluntarily decided to
disembark on January 28, 1987 at Bahrain. While therein, he demanded from the
Operations Manager of Seatrans, Mr. Horst Jager, his long overdue salaries and other
benefits covering the period from November 11, 1986 to January 28, 1987. However,
instead of giving in to complainant's just and valid claims, Mr. Jager charged him for
simulated offenses for which complainant was incarcerated from 8:00 P.M. of January
28, 1987 until 10:00 A.M. of the next day. After representation with the Immigration Office
in Bahrain, Mr. Jager promised that complainant shall receive his entire salary in Manila
giving him a letter dated January 29, 1987 (attached as Annex 'A' of the complaint)
addressed to Capt. Mangabat to evidence said promise. However, in Manila, Capt.
Mangabat refused to pay said claim for alleging that the money has not been remitted
yet. Despite repeated demands for payment Capt. Mangabat still refused to pay
complainant's claim saying that the latter was no longer entitled to receive his claim
considering that respondent has paid for his plane fare and his replacement.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent in its answer specifically denied the money claims of
complainant asserting that complainant had obtained substantial cash advances and
that it had paid the airfare ticket of complainant and his replacement which
consequently compensated, satisfied and/or extinguished the same. Respondent,
further claimed that if ever there is any balance due the complainant, the same has not
been remitted by its foreign principal Seatrans Offshore Co., Ltd. (pp. 46-48, Rollo.)
The POEA ascertained that the amount of $1,451.22 was the cost of airfare for both complainant and his
replacement. Hence, it concluded that complainant's airfare was half of that amount, or $725.64 (p. 50,
Rollo.)
After computing the unpaid wages due Abellaneda as well as the cash advances he had received from his
employer, the POEA rendered judgment ordering respondent to pay to complainant the following amounts,
to wit:
1. THREE THOUSAND SEVENTEEN and 54/l00 US DOLLARS (US$3,017.54) or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing the balance of
unpaid salaries, less cash advances in the total amount of P23,500.00;
504
 2. SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE and 64/100 US DOLLARS (US$725.64) or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing airfare ticket of
complainant's replacement;
3. TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total award as and by way of attorney's fees.
There is no other pronouncement. (p. 51, Rollo.)
It may be observed that in computing the amount due Abellaneda, the POEA failed to deduct the airfare of
US$725.64 which his employer paid for his return trip to Manila. Instead, the POEA erroneously ordered the
petitioner to pay him the airfare (US$725.64) of his replacement, as if Abellaneda (instead of the petitioner)
had advanced the cost of said airline ticket.
In its appeal to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to notice this error in the decision (p. 46, Rollo). It assailed
only that part of the decision holding it solidarily liable with its foreign principal for the money judgment in
favor of Abellaneda. It argued that:
1. Respondent Blue Manila, Inc. [now petitioner] is merely an agent of a disclosed
principal and it has not waived its right to non-liability nor acted beyond its authority;
and
2. It is error to state that the joint and solidary liability of the local agent and the foreign
principal is well-settled in this jurisdiction. (p. 53, Rollo.)
Upon the affirmance in toto of the POEA decision by the NLRC (p. 65, Rollo), the petitioner filed this
petition for certiorari pointing out the inconsistency between paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the
POEA decision and the finding in the body of the decision that since "complainant (Abellaneda *) out of his
volition unilaterally preterminated his contract of employment, ..., it is only equitable that respondent (now
petitioner *) deduct the repatriation expenses from the complainant's salary. However, it is unfounded to
deduct the airfare ticket of complainant's replacement from his salary" in accordance with Sec. H (4), Part II
of the Standard Format which provides that "the seaman when discharged shall not be liable for the
transportation cost of his replacement." (pp. 48-49, Rollo.)
The Solicitor General in his comment on the petition admits an error in the dispositive portion of the
POEA's decision. He says:
... petitioner should not have been ordered to pay private respondent the sum of
US$725.64 since the latter did not spend for the transportation of his replacement nor
was the amount reflected as a deduction from his gross salary receivable. In the same
manner, the cost of the ticket for private respondent himself was not reflected as a
deduction from his salary receivable. Since petitioner spent for the return ticket of
private respondent, the amount must be allowed as additional deduction from private
respondent's unpaid salary so that petitioner may be refunded of the amount spent for
the return ticket of private respondent as ruled by the POEA. (pp. 97-98, Rollo.)
He argues, however, that since the error was not raised by the petitioner in its appeal to the NLRC, the
error is deemed waived. Errors of judgment may not be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
(Hermogenes vs. Amores, 111 SCRA 658). Appeal is the proper remedy.
While the rule is that — "No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief," the exception to the
rule is: "save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors"
(Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court).
The mathematical error in the POEA decision is a plain error which this Court may correct (Sec. 7, Rule 51,
Rules of Court). To overlook it would be inconsistent with substantial justice, for it would permit a party to
unjustly profit from a mistake or inadvertence of another or others, the POEA and the petitioner in this
case. It would also put a premium on a technicality contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Labor Code
(Art. 221, Labor Code).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The dispositive part of the decision of the POEA and the
NLRC in Case No. M-87-06-525 is hereby modified as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent
Blue Manila, Inc. to pay to complainant Emmanuel E. Abellaneda the following amounts,
to wit:
1. THREE THOUSAND SEVENTEEN and 54/100 US DOLLARS (US$3,017.54) or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing the balance of
unpaid salaries, less cash advances in the total of P23,500.00 and the sum of SEVEN
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE and 64/100 US DOLLARS (US$725.64) or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing the airfare ticket for the
repatriation of the complainant; and
2. TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total award as and by way of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79329 March 28, 1990
MOBIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (MEA) and INTER-ISLAND LABOR ORGANIZATION-IBMEWA (ILO),
petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC. (MOPI), MOBIL PHILIPPINES,
INC. (MPI), MOBIL PETROLIUM COMPANY, INC. (MOBILPET), J.P. BAILLEAUX, E.G. JAVELOSA, V.S.
505
TINTOC and F.U. UMALI; CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. (CPI) and A.R. GUTIERREZ and OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, respondents.
Bayani V. Faylona for petitioners.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In 1983, Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. ("MOPI"), a domestic corporation engaged in the marketing of petroleum
products, was the subject of sale negotiations between Mobil Petroleum Company of New York ("Mobil
Pet") and Caltex Petroleum Company, New York, U.S.A., ("Caltex Pet"). The negotiations covered, among
other things, the sale of (a) Mobil Pet's one hundred percent (100%) interest in MOPI to Caltex Pet and (b)
Mobil Pet's forty percent (40%) interest in the Bataan Refining Company ("BRC").
To protect its interests, Mobil Employees Association ("MEA"), with whom MOPI-Luzon had an existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") covering the period from 1 May 1982 to 30 April 1985, inquired
about the impending sale in talking to officials of MOPI. The latter were then non-commital as no definite
agreement had as yet been reached. The negotiations on the proposed sale were taking place off-shore,
i.e., between two (2) foreign corporations, Mobil Pet and Caltex Pet, outside the Philippines. The sale of
Mobil Pet's 40% interest in BRC was made one of the conditions precedent to the perfection of the sale of
MOPI. Finally, approval by Philippine government agencies such as the Board of Investments and the
Central Bank of the projected sale had yet to be obtained.
On 3 August 1983, the Philippine National Oil Company ("PNOC"), owner of sixty percent (60%) interest in
BRC signified its intention to buy all of Mobil Pet's interest in BRC. Thus, on the same date, officials of
MOPI issued a memorandum circular addressed to all their employees regarding the conclusion of the sale
negotiations and eventually, the cessation of MOPI's business operation on 31 August 1983.
In a letter dated 5 August 1983, MOPI's President, J.P. Bailleaux informed all the employees that on 31
August 1983 their employment with the company would cease as a result of MOPI's withdrawal from
business. Mr. Bailleaux however, assured them that they would be paid compensation up to or until 5
September 1983; that they would be given separation pay equivalent to 2.25 months basic salary as of 31
August 1983 for every year of service; and that their unused vacation leave for the current year would be
paid in cash. Simultaneously, notices of MOPI's withdrawal from business were also sent to the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE") and its regional offices in places where MOPI had branches.
In a letter dated 12 August 1983, MOPI employees requested Mr. Bailleaux to improve their termination
package.
On 18 August 1983, MOPI, thru Mr. Bailleaux, improved the employees' termination package considerably:
(1) repayment of all personal loans of employees, except those obtained under the company car policy,
was waived by the company; (2) for purposes of computation of their termination pay, CBA increases due
to union-represented employees in October, November and December 1983 on one hand were incorporated
in their basic salary, while the budgeted merit increase from September to December, 1983 for non-
bargainable employees on the other hand was added to their basic salary; (3) employees who were not
previously scheduled to receive merit increases in 1983 were granted an adjustment to their basic salary;
(4) the monthly cost of living allowance was included in the calculation of the encashment of outstanding
and unused vacation leave for separating employees; (5) the ten (10) working days sick leave encashment
privilege under company policy was granted to separating employees in Salary Groups 1 to 15 pro-rated on
the basis of 8/12 of one year privilege; (6) the actual unused sick leave carry-over as of December 31, 1975,
maximum of 15 working days, was encashed irrespective of salary grouping of the affected separating
employees; and (7) the 1983 year-end bonus was paid to separating employees pro-rated on the basis of
8/12 of one year's privilege.
Upon conclusion of the contract of sale between Mobil Pet and Caltex Pet, on 31 August 1983, 1 the latter
caused MOPI's dissolution by appropriate filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in
Manila. All the employees separated from the service, 467 of them, were paid a total of P5,646,817.73
including loans waived, pursuant to the revised termination package. Some of these employees were hired,
on a contractual basis, to wind up MOPI's affairs, by a newly formed subsidiary of Mobil Pet, Mobil
Philippines, Inc. ("MPI").
On 31 August 1983, MEA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice ("ULP"), illegal lay-off and separation
benefits against MOPI with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"), National Capital Region.
The complaint was later on amended to include Mobil Philippines, Inc. ("MPI"), Mobil Pet, Caltex Pet and all
the members of their respective Boards of Directors as respondents. Still later, another amendment to the
complaint was filed to include as additional petitioner Inter-Island Labor Organization ("ILO"), with whom
MOPI-Iloilo had a CBA for the period from 1 May 1982 to 31 May 1985. Finally, a supplementary mental
complaint was filed charging respondents with another count of ULP, i.e., failure of the latter to check-off
and pay petitioners' union dues for September, 1983.
In a decision in NLRC Case No. NCR-8-3929-83 dated 12 December 1984, 2 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint for failure of petitioner to prove that MOPI was guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter found that the termination of all MOPI employees was caused by cessation of MOPI's business
operations in the country; that in respect of this kind of termination, MOPI's only task pursuant to the
Labor Code was to serve notice of termination on its employees and on the then MOLE and its regional
offices at least thirty (30) days before its effectivity date and to pay separation pay to affected employees in
accordance with law; 3 that MOPI did comply with these requirements; that the dissolution was done in
good faith, no proof having been presented to establish that the dissolution was carried out to circumvent
the CBAs between MOPI and the petitioner unions; that the newly created subsidiary of Mobil Pet, MPI,
could not be categorized as a successor-in-interest of MOPI because MOPI's main line of business was the
marketing of petroleum products while MPI was engaged in the marketing of Mobil Pet's chemicals and
international business like high octane aviation fuels, marine fuels and exports; that Caltex Pet, upon
acquiring the shares of stock of MOPI caused the latter's dissolution at the SEC; that MPI's hiring of some
506
of MOPI's employees was merely for the purpose of liquidating and winding up the affairs of MOPI; that
MOPI had not restricted exercise of the right to self-organization of members of MEA, who had free access
to the use of the conference room of MOPI in Makati, which access had not been availed of by MEA; that
MEA had not proved that its counsel, who was not an employee of MOPI, was refused entrance to MOPI's
Makati-based conference room; and that, finally, check-off was no longer available considering that MOPI's
relationship with the employees had ceased by 31 August 1983.
In a resolution of the NLRC Second Division dated 6 April 1987, petitioners' appeal from the decision of the
Labor Arbiter was dismissed for lack of merit.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioners claim that private respondents committed acts constituting
unfair labor practices. These acts, in their allegations, were:
(a) the termination of the employment of MOPI's employees without notice to the
petitioner unions, in violation of relevant provisions of their CBAS;
(b) the failure of private respondents to check off and pay to petitioner unions their dues
for September 1983;
(c) the dissolution of MOPI and the creation of MPI were done to circumvent the CBA
agreements between MOPI and petitioner MEA on the one hand and MOPI and petitioner
ILO on the other hand; and
(d) the interference with petitioner unions' members in the exercise of their right to self-
organization by refusing a non-MOPI employee the use of the company conference
room.
Petitioners supplementarily argue, apparently in relation to (c) above, that MPI is a successor-in-interest of
MOPI, considering that MPI is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Pet in the same manner that MOPI was;
that the members of MPI's Board of Directors are the same persons who had served as Directors of MOPI;
and that MPI had hired some of MOPI's former employees.
We do not find the contentions of petitioners persuasive.
The relevant provisions in the CBAs invoked by petitioners are identical and read as follows:
EFFECTIVITY
Section 1. This agreement shall be effective from the l st day of May l982 to 30th April
1985, subject to automatic extension for yearly periods unless terminated at the end of
the original period or any subsequent year thereafter upon sixty (60) days prior written
notice by either party to the other of its intention to terminate, modify, amend or
supplement this agreement. (Art. XVIII MEA-MOPI CBA, Annex 'A'; Art. XIX, Annex 'LL'
for ILO CBA, emphasis supplied). 4
Art. II — Management Clause
Section 1. The union recognizes the following as the rights of the company.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases of termination, dismissal, lay-off and shut down, the company may effect such
actions, subject to the provisions of the New Labor Code and its implementing Rules
and Regulations.
In the exercise of its above rights, time and circumstances permitting the management
whenever possible shall enlist the support of the union in actions affecting the vital
interests of the bargainable employees. Art II, MEA CBA; Art. II, ILO CBA. 5
Examination of the CBA provisions entitled "Effectivity " shows that the written notice to terminate that is
required to be given by either party to the other relates to notice to terminate the CBA at the end of the
original three-year period or any subsequent year thereafter, in the absence of which written notice, the
duration of the CBA would be automatically extended for one (1) year periods. What is involved in the
instant Petition is not, however, the termination of the CBA itself, considering that the sale by Mobil Pet of
its wholly owned subsidiary MOPI to Caltex Pet took place in 1983, in the middle of original period of the
CBAs. It appears to the Court that the applicable provision is Article II, Section 1, quoted above. Under
Article II, Section 1, in cases of termination of services of employees, the company is required to comply
with the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations and, "time and
circumstances permitting" and "whenever possible," management should enlist the support of the unions
in actions affecting the vital interests of the bargainable (i.e., member) employees. It may be well to add
that, since actual notice was given to all of MOPI's employees, including, of course, the employees who
were members of petitioner unions, such notice may also be regarded as effectively the notice to the
unions contemplated by the CBA provision on "Effectivity."
Article 284 of the Labor Code as it existed in 1983 provided as follows:
Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this title by serving a written notice on the workers and
the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date
thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent
to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of
507
 service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under Article 284 above, three (3) requirements may be seen to be established in respect of cessation of
business operations of an employer company not due to business reverses, namely:
(a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the MOLE at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof;
(b) the cessation of or withdrawal from business operation petitions must be bona
fide in character; and
(c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for each year of service, or one (1) month pay, whichever is higher.
As noted earlier, MOPI's employees and the MOLE were notified in writing on 5 August 1983 that the
employees' services would cease on 31 August 1983, but that employees would nonetheless be paid their
salaries and other benefits until or as of 5 September 1983. We believe that is more than substantial
compliance with the notice requirements of the Labor Code. In respect of requirement (c) above relating to
payment of termination pay to the employees, we also noted earlier that the termination pay package given
by MOPI to all its employees far exceeded the minimum requirement of one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service laid down in Article 284 of the Labor Code. The very generosity of the termination pay
package thus given to the employees argues strongly that the cessation of business operations by MOPI
was a bona fide one. It is very difficult for this Court to believe that MOPI would be dissolved and all its
employees separated with generous separation pay benefits, for the sole purpose of circumventing the
requirements of MOPI's CBA with petitioner unions. Indeed, petitioners have not suggested any reason
why MOPI should have undertaken such a fundamental and non-reversible business reorganization merely
to evade its obligations under the CBA. The establishment of MPI with the same Directors who had served
as such in MOPI and the hiring of some former MOPI employees for the purpose of settling and winding up
the affairs of MOPI, does not detract from the bona fide character of MOPI's dissolution and withdrawal
from business. MPI's residual business consisting of the marketing of chemicals, aviation and marine fuels
as well as exports, all of which constituted a fraction of the prior business of MOPI, similarly does not
argue against the bona fide character of the corporate reorganization which here took place. The net effect
of the reorganization was the liquidation by Mobil Pet of the great bulk of its former business in the
Philippines, the dissolution of the corporate entity of MOPI and the transfer of its physical assets and
business to some other Philippine entity owned and controlled by Caltex Pet, presumably Caltex
Philippines, without any impact upon the foreign exchange reserves of the Philippines.
The final argument of petitioner unions need not detain us for long. Having validly ceased to operate as of
31 August 1983, the duty of MOPI to cheek off and turn over to petitioners union dues from their members
for September 1983, or until the expiration of the CBA in accordance with its terms, also ceased. In respect
of alleged interference by MOPI with the rights of petitioners' members to self-organization, petitioners
have not adduced any compelling reason for overturning the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
that MOPI had not interferred or encroached upon such right. Petitioner MEA admitted that it had not been
denied the use of the company conference room. Indeed, this matter appears to us to be a de
minimis affair.
We conclude that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its decision dated 6 April 1987.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80042 March 28, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO QUIÑONES, RONILO CANABA, AMADO CONDA, JR., ZALDY CIVICO and ALFREDO ABAN,
accused-appellants.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in barangay Tuaco, Basud,
Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and
bullet wounds, and other injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later positively identified as
Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana.
In due time, an information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against Adolfo Quiñones, Alfredo
Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr., Santiago Solarte, Armando Buitre and one John
Doe. 1
On their arraignment on November 13, 1986, Quiñones, Canaba, Aban, Civico and Conda pleaded not
guilty. On November 20, 1986, Conda, Canaba, and Quiñones withdrew their plea of not guilty and entered
508
a plea of guilty. 2 On April 1, 1986, Conda was allowed to withdraw his former plea of guilty and substitute
the same With not guilty. 3 Solarte escaped and is presently at large while Buitre was killed in an encounter
with the Manila police. 4
Judge Luis D. Dictado of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte directed the prosecution to
present evidence also against Quiñones and Canaba despite their plea of guilty, which they maintained
even after being informed of its possible consequences, including the death penalty. After trial, judgment
was rendered convicting all the accused (except Solarte, who had not yet been arrested, and Buitre). 5
The evidence for the prosecution established that the three victims were riding in a dark blue Mitsubishi
car at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28, 1986, when they were intercepted along the
Maharlika Highway in the above-named barangay by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road to
block the way. The three were taken to the nearby woods where they were killed. 6 According to his
brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections
of his business, a necklace with pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a licensed .22
caliber handgun. 7 All this, together with the other articles belonging to the victims, were taken by the
accused, who also used the car in fleeing to Sapang Palay, where it was recovered without the stereo and
the spare tire. 8
The first to be picked up for questioning was Conda, who implicated the other accused and led a police
team to the house of Sonny Tabalan, where Solarte was hiding, Inexplicably, Conda and Solarte both
escaped. However, the police found in Tabalan's house one live grenade, one .38 caliber pistol, a defective
air rifle with magazine, and a wooden rifle which he said had been brought there by Solarte and Quiñones.
In separate extra-judicial statements, 9 both Quiñones and Canaba identified these weapons as the ones
used in the commission of the crime. 10
Testifying for the prosecution, Francisco Bariuan declared that on July 7, 1986, Solarte came to his house
and asked him to pawn a watch for P300.00. Solarte returned the following day with Canaba and Conda.
They were carrying guns and a grenade. Solarte informed him that they were the ones who, together with
Buitre, Quiñones and Aban, had killed Sy and his companions. He and Solarte left later to hire jeep and
Canaba and Conda stayed behind, warning him that they would blow up his house if he squealed on
them. 11
But the case for the prosecution really depended on the statements of the accused themselves, principally
Quiñones and Canaba. Both were informed of their constitutional rights before their investigation and were
actually assisted by Atty. Santiago Ceneta when they gave their separate confessions. 12 Both confessed to
the crime charged and narrated in detail their participation in its commission.
Quiñones later testified that he had been subjected to torture to force him to admit the killing and
robbery, 13 but as the trial judge noted, no proof of such coercion was ever presented in court. Moreover,
the witness' narration of the commission of the offense substantially jibed with the testimony of the other
accused, thus negating the suspicion that it had been merely concocted. Understandably, Quiñones
sought to minimize his participation in this crime by claiming that he stayed in the car when the three
victims were forcibly taken to the woods where they were robbed and slain. 14 This is another indication
that the had not been manhandled into signing the confession.
lt is important to note that when asked at the trial if he was affirming his extra-judicial statement, he
categorically said he was, 15 thus in effect reiterating his detailed account of the conduct of the several
accused, including their escape to Manila in the stolen car and their distribution of the loot among
themselves. This was now a judicial confession. Interestingly, Quiñones also admitted to two other hold-
ups and his membership in another gang of robbers headed by one Kapitan Mitra, an unnecessary
embellishment that lent further credence to his confession. 16
Canaba's own statement corroborated Quiñones' confession and provided more elaboration. Like
Quiñones, he admitted that they had placed sacks on the load and forced the three victims to go with them
to the parke where they were unclothed and killed, two by Buitre and the third by Solarte. Quiñones
remained in the car. Afterwards, the accused distributed the cash among themselves, each receiving
P10,000.00, with Solarte and Buitre getting the weapons also. Using Sy's car, they proceeded to Sapang
Palay after leaving the weapons with Sonny Tabalan in his house in Tigbinan. 17
Conda also gave an extra-judicial confession, but this was not made with the assistance of counsel and so
must be rejected. It is totally worthless and inadmissible against him. Such a confession is anathema in a
free society. It was not recognized even during the era of martial law under the 1973 Constitution as
interpreted by the Court in People v. Galit. 18 And it is also scorned under the present Constitution, which
is more deeply committed to the protection of the rights of the accused.
Civico also gave an extra-judicial confession, likewise without the assistance of counsel. 19 But testifying
on his behalf, he purged it of invalidity when he freely affirmed it on the stand in the presence of the judge
himself and with the assistance of defense counsel. 20 By so testifying, he in effect reiterated but validly
this time — his earlier narration, replete with all the damming details, of the commission of the crime.
The Court is satisfied that the evidence against the accused is sufficient to justify their conviction. The
declarations of the prosecution witnesses — and more so of defendants Quiñones and Canaba, both of
whom had pleaded guilty — are telling enough to toll their guilt. The seized weapons and the other exhibits
offer strong corroboration that has not been refuted. The state of the cadavers — of the swollen scrotums
and the protruding tongues — tell a tale of their own of the defendants' perverted ruthlessness.
By contrast, the defense was practically one of mere denial. Even the claimed maltreatment of Quiñones
has not been established.
It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime to
rob and slay. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. This need not be established by direct evidence but may
be proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of the common unlawful
purpose. 21
509
Proof of conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied, paradoxically enough, mainly by defendants Quiñones
and Canaba themselves. From the time they blocked the road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing
in the woods, to the distribution of the loot and their escape in the stolen car, all the accused were acting
in concert and in accordance with their common plan.
It is argued that Civico and Aban were not part of the conspiracy and that Quiñones himself categorically
said so in answer to a question from the prosecution. Interpreting this merely as a gesture of loyalty or
perhaps goodwill or charity toward his fellow criminals, we dismiss it as a falsity. On the other hand, Civico
himself admitted his own participation in the offense, and in his sworn confession (which he affirmed in
court) also implicated Aban. And there is also Bariuan's testimony that Aban was one of the armed group,
including the other accused, that went to his house on July 8, 1986, and talked of their commission of the
crime. These declarations are enough to place the two defendants within the conspiracy together with the
other defendants.
In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every one of the conspirators is guilty with the others in
equal degree. Hence, every member of the group that perpetrated the killing and robbery of the three
victims must suffer the same penalty prescribed by law even if they had different modes of participation in
the commission of the crime. 22
The trial judge found all the accused guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to serve
the triplepenalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P380,000.00 to the heirs of Alexander Sy, P50,000.00 to the heirs of Augusta Gabo, and P50,000.00 to the
heirs of Frisco Marcellana. The firearms were also confiscated in favor of the State.
The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with multiple homicide and so
were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The reason is that there is no crime of robbery with
multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide
only regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of the robbery. In this special
complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in
Article 294 of the said Code. As held in People v. Cabuena: 23
But it was error to sentence the appellants to three life imprisonments each as if 3
separate crimes had been committed. The complex crime of robbery with homicide is
not to be multiplied with the number of persons killed. As was said by this Court
in People vs. Madrid(88 Phil. 1), "the general concept of this crime does not limit the
taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying of human being in excess of
that number punishable as separate individual offense or offenses. All the homicides or
murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so
long as the killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua, to be imposed
only once even if multiple killings accompanied the robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by the trial court
of the attendant circumstances was unnecessary because Article 63 of the Code provides that when the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied without regard to the mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.
The civil indemnity for each of the three victims is reduced to P30,000.00, to be paid to their respective
heirs. The heirs of Alexander Sy are also awarded the additional sum P330,000.00, representing the value
of the articles taken from him by the accused.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of all the accused-appellants is AFFIRMED, but each of them is sentenced to
only one term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of robbery with homicide. The monetary awards are also
modified in accordance with the preceding paragraph. It is so ordered
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any
order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the
offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who
is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding
sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations
of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That
such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
510
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is
about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition,
such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have
actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be
obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2)
the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period
of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed
sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in
the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an
affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times
covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no
duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies
are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not
be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the
court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or
persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial
jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 19, 1965
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section
1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the
petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions
for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to
P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit:
(a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in
persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical
High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
511
 (d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against
Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance
on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office
of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico
guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment
with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by
Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues;
(a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in
nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act
No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d)
whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally
or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not
the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or
not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should
both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged
attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico
was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished
from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the
authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously,
complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an
P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with
the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force
the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the
caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads
which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime
512
might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his
own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other
device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the
user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their
bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a
proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly
known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being
considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably
the most popularly known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate.
Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices
"commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however
otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted
from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the
context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It
is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver
not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one
place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning
from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of
a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be
there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see
Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the
same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c)
and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be
construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that
'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is
based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed
specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend
other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the
parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW
383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use
of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not
of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not
have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably
has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a
telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S.
107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to
ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes
the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to
overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy
of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not
occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating
the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between
that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
513
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case
of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or
arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People
v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the
rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44
L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind
531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d
452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in
Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a
prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of
recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is
certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which
Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less
possible with the amendment than without it, because with the amendment
the evidence of entrapment would only consist of government testimony as
against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they would
have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would
have the right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could
record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is
more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as
experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions,
with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is
no way of checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a recording in
any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence
is not very much.
Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the
presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could
prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be wonderful. But what
this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic
devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in
court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence
for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among
such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16,
1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No.
4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
514
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on
different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules
of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962,
said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67,
of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights
of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect
the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose
homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence
based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United
States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are
valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and
things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:
515
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," —
as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described —
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized
are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of
the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to
an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free
from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
516
 right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause,
the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was
not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had
always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending
the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or
federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part
of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by
the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of
its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality
to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be
secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no
longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to
like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of
justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge
to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their
conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the
corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the
federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in
their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution
of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to
suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof,
contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application
of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our
opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
517
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without
special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general
warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared,
abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and
void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said
residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have
legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places
other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places
and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph
(numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants
served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under
the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly
and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That
the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or
otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain
void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of
the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or
of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the
petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and
effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers
and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of
documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or
constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search
warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against
the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation,
"the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three
corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also
the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all
the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to
be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the
petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and
gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the
time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of
the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized
518
in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books
seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683
(10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when
he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when
he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will
be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the
petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless
other cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual
contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt,
the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December
12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis
supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club;
Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the
papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the
books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the
searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly
technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however,
that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law
in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been
shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See
Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report,
Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized
in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved
for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate
documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was
entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at
bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article
and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the
necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S.
461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may
expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of
the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected
him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution
against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650,
652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First
— he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises
searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and
had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal
Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did
not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the
invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
519
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police
officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held
that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving
defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his
files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The
court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and
papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the
mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C.
S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of
Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the
records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's)
"control and management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with
corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of
these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court
which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to
move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs.
Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S.,
supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively
against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first
search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search
warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such
was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters
not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S.
Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this
decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the
searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were
directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of
the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under
their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their
residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the
petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from
the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful
searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were
they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or
possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in
securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which
issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to
move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions,
the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of
their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature
[G.R. No. 104504. October 31, 1997]
520
PEDRITO PASTRANO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE That on or about the 20th day of February 1989 and during the period prior thereto, in Barangay Lower
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Langcangan, Oroquieta City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring together and collaborating with each other, did then and there keep, possess and maintain at their
DECISION residence known as Door #1, Aguja Apartment, Capitol Drive, Lower Langcangan, Oroquieta City, the following
firearms:
MENDOZA, J.:
One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345, Made in Germany ROHM GMBH
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the conviction of SONTHEM/BRENZ;
petitioner Pedrito Pastrano of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms by the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta
City, Branch 13. One (1) round Ammunitions for Cal. 22 Magnum;
The facts are as follows:
One (1) Revolver Cal. 32 with serial No. 233833 Colt. Made in U.S.A.;
On February 13, 1989, a group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, then intelligence operations
officer of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Naranjo, at Oroquieta City. They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano
Six (6) rounds live ammunition for Cal. 32 Revolver.
beaten up by his father, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but expressed fear of the
petitioner who, according to them, had firearms. Clyde Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been the
victim of foul play. Without having the necessary license, authority and/or permit duly issued to or granted them by the proper
government agency/official as determined by law.
On February 20, 1989, two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife - James Clement G. Pastrano and
Clinton Steve G. Pastrano - also saw Capt. Maoza, seeking his assistance in connection with the death of their Contrary to law.
brother Clyde. The brothers reported that their father and his common-law wife were keeping unlicensed firearms in
their house.They executed a joint affidavit on February 20, 1989 in which they stated that they had personal
On January 14, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty, even as it found his common-
knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different calibers in the
law wife, Erlinda Ventir, innocent of the charge. The dispositive portion of its decision read:
bedroom of his house.
On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Maoza applied for a search warrant on the same WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Erlinda Ventir innocent of the crime charged but finds accused Pedrito
day. Pastrano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions for which he is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico M. Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of
to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY reclusion temporal, as maximum. No
Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a search warrant which Capt. Maoza and his men later served at the residence of
pronouncement as to costs.
Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol Drive, Oroquieta City. Seized from petitioners dwelling was a sack containing the
following:
SO ORDERED.
One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345. Made in Germany ROHMGMBH
SONTHEM/BRENZ; On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends:
One (1) round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum;
1. The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in affirming the findings of the trial court convicting the
One (1) Revolver Cal. 32 with Serial No. 233833 Colt Made in U.S.A.; accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearms despite clear and convincing proof that accused is
duly authorized to carry firearms per PTCFOR No. 40448 and Mission Order No. 01-06-89.
Six rounds of live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.
2. The Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias is invalid for failure to comply with the basic
On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano y Capapas and his common-law wife, requirements of the Constitution. Hence, the evidence obtained is inadmissible in court.
Erlinda Ventir y Sanchez, were charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition as penalized under P.D.
No. 1866, 1. The information against them alleged:
521
 The first ground for the petition is without merit. P.D. No. 1866, 1 punishes any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. Section 2 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1866 provides that
Any person or entity desiring to import, manufacture, deal in, receive, acquire, buy, sell, dispose of or possess any
firearm, part of firearms, ammunition, or explosives or machi-nery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm, parts of firearm, ammunition or explosives shall first secure the necessary
permit/license/authority from the Chief of Constabulary, except that in the case of application to manufacture
firearms, ammunition or explosives, the corresponding permit/license shall be issued, only with the prior approval of
the President.
The possession of any firearm without the requisite permit/license is thus unlawful. In this case two witnesses
for the prosecution, both from the Philippine Constabulary, testified that petitioner had no license to possess the
firearms seized from him. Sgt. Eugenio Salingay, officer-in-charge of the licensing of firearms at Camp Naranjo in
Oroquieta City, testified that petitioner and his common-law wife Erlinda Ventir were not in the list of registered firearm
holders in Misamis Occidental. Neither did they have any pending application for a gun permit.
Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, on the other hand, testified that he had made inquiries from the Southern Command in
Zamboanga City whether the firearms seized from petitioner were organic firearms of that command and was
informed that they did not belong to that command. He also inquired from the commanding officer of the 55th Infantry
Battalion whether Pedrito Pastrano and Erlinda Ventir were members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) in Oroquieta City, and he found they were not.
Petitioner admitted ownership of the .32 cal. revolver bearing Serial No. 233833 (Exh. J) but claimed that the
.22 cal. magnum revolver with Serial No. 07345 (Exh. I) belonged to his cousin, a certain Luz Laspias, who gave it
to him merely for safekeeping. Petitioner claimed that he had bought the .32 cal. revolver in January 1989 from the
grandson of the late Atty. Felipe Tac-an who had a license to possess the gun. Petitioner produced a Mission Order
dated January 9, 1989 issued to him by Lt. Col. Celso A. Undag, Philippine Army, Deputy Brigade Commander, and
a Mission Order issued to Luz Laspias, also by Lt. Col. Undag, as authority for them to possess the firearms in
question. He also presented a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside of Residence dated January 1, 1989 signed by Major
General Ramon Montao, then chief of the Philippine Constabulary, for the firearm he purchased and another Permit
to Carry Firearm Outside of Residence issued to Luz Laspias for the latters gun.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both ruled that the Mission Orders and the Permits to Carry Firearm
Outside of Residence did not give petitioner authority to possess the firearms in question. We agree. It is clear from
P.D. No. 1866, 1 and the Implementing Rules, 2 that a license is necessary in order to possess a firearm. A Permit
to Carry Firearm Outside Residence does not render the license unnecessary because its purpose is only to authorize
its holder to carry the firearm outside his residence. A Permit to Carry a Firearm Outside the Residence presupposes
that the party to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess the firearm in question. This is clear from the following
provision of the Implementing Rules:
3. Authority of private individuals to carry firearms outside of residence.
a. As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or
M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence.
b. However, the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions
as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearm outside [of] resi-dence.
c. Except otherwise provided in Secs. 4 and 5 hereof, station in pursuance of an official mission or duty shall have
the prior approval of the Chief of Constabulary.
For the same reason, a Mission Order cannot take the place of a license. As the trial court pointed out:
Sec. 1(d) of the implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 1866 defines a mission order as a written directive
or order issued by competent authority to persons under his supervision and control for a definite purpose or
objective during a specified period and to such place or places as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer
thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed firearm outside of his residence when so specified therein.
As in the case of Permit to Carry Firearm Outside the Residence, a Mission Order can only be issued to the holder
of a permit/license or authority to possess firearm.
Nor is there any merit in petitioners contention that since the .32 cal. revolver is covered by a license issued to
its former owner, petitioners possession of the same firearm is legal. The permit/license or authority to possess
firearm contemplated by P.D. No. 1866 and its Implementing Rules is one which is issued to the applicant taking into
account his qualifications. Contrary to petitioners contention, therefore, the possession of firearms is unlike the
registration of motor vehicles. A permit/license or authority to possess firearms is not transferrable to the purchaser
of the firearm.
The second ground for the present petition is that the evidence against petitioner was obtained through illegal
search. Petitioner cites the constitutional provision that
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[1]
Petitioner contends that Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, who applied for the search warrant, did not have personal
knowledge of the facts on which the warrant was based. But the trial court actually examined the two brothers, James
Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton G. Steve Pastrano. These two were the ones who reported the matter to Capt.
Maoza. They gave information of the illegal possession of firearms by their father, petitioner herein, on the basis of
personal knowledge. Their testimonies, not that of Capt. Maoza, formed the basis of the trial courts finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. As Capt. Maoza testified:[2]
Q: When Clinton and James Pastrano went to your office on February 20, 1989, and told you that their
father and his paramour possessed some firearms, what steps did you take?
A: I applied for a Search Warrant and brought the two brothers before Judge Durias.
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 ....
Q: What happen[ed] after that, when you filed this application for Search Warrant with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 1, Oroquieta City, what happen[ed] when you filed?
A: Judge Durias examined the two witnesses, the two brothers, and after that, he issued the Search
Warrant.
Petitioner finally assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the judge had examined the
complainant and his witnesses by means of searching questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126,
4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
4. Examination of complainant, record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
Rule 126, 4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant and his witnesses to be put in writing and
under oath. But although this is a ground for quashing a search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing to this
end. He did not move to quash the information before the trial court. [3] Nor did he object to the presentation of the
evidence obtained as being the product of an illegal search. In the case of Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,[4] we held:
At any rate, objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby
were deemed waived when no objection to the legality of the search warrant was raised during the trial of the case
nor to the admissibility of the evidence obtained through said warrant.
Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the search. As held in People v. Omaweng,[5] the
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.
We find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of the crime charged and that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition.
We hold, however, that the penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified by reducing it, in view of R.A. No.
8294,[6] which took effect on July 6, 1997. Penal statutes are to be retroactively applied insofar as they are favorable
to the accused. Under the new statute, the penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearm has been reduced to prision
correccionalmaximum and a fine of not less than P15,000.00 with respect to the possession of the .32 cal. revolver
and to prision mayor minimum and a fine of P30,000.00 with respect to the possession of the .22 cal. Magnum
revolver. Additional benefit would redound to petitioner because the Indeterminate Sentence Law will have to be
applied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner is hereby
SENTENCED to 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to 6 years and 8
months of prision mayor minimum, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00, for his illegal possession of the .22 cal.
Magnum revolver; and to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 4 years, 9 months,
and 11 days of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P15,000.00 for his possession of the .32 cal. revolver.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE,
BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS,
ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO
PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA
TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO,
CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO,
MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV
(95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question
whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the
military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa
(TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs
allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in
most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who
interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part
of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to
terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
523
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or
a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the
courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of
their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said
motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan
Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores,
Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated
Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C.
Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the
defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in
the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that
assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since
there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties
in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant
Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise
direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the
same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition
are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed
by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the
defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the
plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez,
Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon
Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the
case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any
suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to
resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration
signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P.
Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on
said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion to set
aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez
represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos
represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel,
Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983,
dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period,
as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging
that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino,
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of
November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set
aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs,
although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of
May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already
become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In
the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of
dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is
deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
524
 7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or
complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects and refers to
defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3, 1983 is
granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the
respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September
21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was
filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in
behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely
525
 separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights
and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights
with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield
— borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the
transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to
nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of
progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made.
Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we
discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which
reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers
they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or
function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to
safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call
them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but
providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of
the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the
call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection
rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent
General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist
terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its
subsequent implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation of their
constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to
silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members
of the task force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members of
the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to
recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties
run contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v.
Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of
protecting the performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly
or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v.
Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is now
a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944;
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v.
Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232;
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for
the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their
powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner
what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority,
under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation
and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for
the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any
manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers
vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts
cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of
this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to
their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981,
and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground
houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional
526
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected
by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian
or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages
for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their
mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left
or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their
very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and
legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of
competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that
psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of
the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged
illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged
damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their
constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the
petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take
place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President,
petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other
violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of
habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D.
No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from
or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the
same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot
suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and
academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent
superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional
rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine
of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant
(i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and
their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to
the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning
and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors
that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or
indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go
naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando
Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro
Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been
specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiff which
acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is
not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
527
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical
violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any
manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional
rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The
complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or
substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects
belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search
warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and
subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose
of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the
plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article
32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well
established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause
of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause
of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the
motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint
against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint
contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a
cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs
Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for
reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through
counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio
Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino
and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph
Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this
must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the
motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio
Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and
Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the
plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a
party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was
never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule
that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the
plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is
obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the
complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for
reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated November
8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to
the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6157 July 30, 19101
W. CAMERON FORBES, J. E. HARDING, and C. R. TROWBRIDGE, plaintiffs,
vs.
CHUOCO TIACO (alias CHOA TEA) and A. S. CROSSFIELD, defendants.
W. A. Kincaid, for plaintiffs.
O'Brien and DeWitt and Hartford Beaumont, for defendant Chuoco Tiaco.
528
JOHNSON, J.:
An original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the Hon. A. S. Crossfield, as one
of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit him from taking or continuing jurisdiction
in a certain case commenced and pending before him, in which Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) (respondent
herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron Forbes, J. E. Harding, and C. R. Trowbridge (petitioners herein) are
defendants.
Upon the filing of the petition in this court, Mr. Justice Trent granted a preliminary injunction restraining the said
lower court from proceeding in said cause until the question could be heard and passed upon by the Supreme
court.
The questions presented by this action are so important and the result of the conclusions may be so far reaching
that we deem it advisable to make a full statement of all of the facts presented here for consideration. These facts
may be more accurately gathered from the pleadings. They are as follows:
FACTS.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The plaintiffs set forth:
I. That all the parties in this case reside in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
II. That the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and that the
plaintiff J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge are, respectively, chief of police and chief of the secret
service of the city of Manila.
III. That the defendant A. S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila.
IV. That the defendant Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) is a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a subject
of the Chinese Empire.
V. That on the 1st of April, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) filed a suit in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the plaintiffs in which substantially the following allegations and
petition were made, alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the said W. Cameron
Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, he was deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China,
by the aforesaid J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of the police and of the
secret service, respectively, of the city of Manila, and that having been able to return to these Islands he
feared, as it was threatened, that he should be again deported by the said defendants, concluding with a
petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them
from deporting the defendant, Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea), and that they be sentenced to pay him
P20,000 as an indemnity.
VI. It is true that the said defendant Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea), was, with eleven others or his
nationality, expelled from these Islands and returned to China by the plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C. R.
Trowbridge, under the orders of the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes, on the date mentioned in Paragraph V
of this complaint, but the said expulsion was carried out in the public interest of the Government and at
the request of the proper representative of the Chinese Government in these Islands, to wit, the consul-
general of said country, the said W. Cameron Forbes acting in his official capacity as such Governor-
General, the act performed by this plaintiff being one of the Government itself and which the said plaintiff
immediately reported to the Secretary of War.
VII. The said complaint having been filed with the defendant A. S. Crossfield, he, granting the petition,
issued against the plaintiffs the injunction requested, prohibiting them from deporting the defendant
Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea).
VIII. The plaintiffs having been summoned in the matter of the said complaint, filed a demurrer against
the same and presented a motion asking that the injunction be dissolved, the grounds of the demurrer
being that the facts set out in the complaint did not constitute a motive of action, and that the latter was
one in which the court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction against the plaintiffs for the reasons
set out in the complaint; notwithstanding which, the defendant A. S. Crossfield overruled the demurrer
and disallowed the motion, leaving the complaint and the injunction standing, in proof of which the
plaintiffs attach a certified copy by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila of all the
proceedings in said case, except the summons and notifications, marking said copy "Exhibit A" of this
complaint. (See below.)
IX. The Court of First Instance, according to the facts related in the complaint, lacks jurisdiction in the
matter, since the power to deport foreign subjects of the Chinese Empire is a private one of the
Governor-General of these Islands, and the defendant A. S. Crossfield exceeded these authority by
trying the case and issuing the injunction and refusing to allow the demurrer and motion for the dismissal
of the complaint and the dissolution of the injunction.
Therefore the plaintiffs pray the court:
(a) That an injunction immediately issue against the defendant A. S. Crossfield ordering him to
discontinue the trial of said cause until further orders from this court;
(b) That the defendants being the summoned in accordance with law, a prohibitive order issue against
the said defendant A. S. Crossfield, restraining him from assuming jurisdiction in said case and ordering
him to dismiss the same and cease from the trial thereof;
(c) Finally, that the plaintiffs be granted such other and further relief to which they may be entitled
according to the facts, and that they may be allowed the costs of the trial.
529
Manila, July 9, 1910. [United States of America, Philippine Islands. In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. No. 7740.
Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea), plaintiff, vs. W. Cameron Forbes, Charles R. Trowbridge, and J. E.
IGNACIO VILLAMOR, Harding, defendants.]

Attorney-General. COMPLAINT.

W. A. KINCAID, Comes now the plaintiff, by his undersigned attorneys, and for the cause of action alleges:

THOMAS L. HARTIGAN, First. That the plaintiff is and has been for the last thirty-five years a resident of the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands.
By W. A, KINCAID,
Second. That the defendant W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine islands and
resides in the municipality of Baguio, Province of Benguet, Philippine Islands; that the defendant Charles
Attorneys for the plaintiffs.
R. Trowbridge is chief of the secret service of the city of Manila, and that the defendant J. E. Harding is
chief of police of the city of Manila, and that both of said defendants reside in the said city of Manila,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Philippine Islands.

Philippine Islands, city of Manila, ss: Third. That the said plaintiff is a Chinese person and is lawfully a resident of the Philippine Islands, his
right to be and remain therein having been duly established in accordance with law by the Insular
W. A. Kincaid, being first duly sworn, states that he is one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the customs and immigration authorities.
preceding second amended complaint, and that all the facts alleged therein are true, to the best of his
knowledge and belief. Fourth. That on or about the 19th day of August, 1909, the defendants herein, Charles R. Trowbridge and
J. E. Harding, unlawfully and fraudulently conspiring and conniving with the other defendant herein, the
(Signed) W. A. KINCAID. said W. Cameron Forbes, and acting under the direction of the said defendant, W. Charles Forbes, did
unlawfully seize and carry on board the steamer Yuensang the said plaintiff herein against his will, with
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of July, 1910. Cedula No. F. 1904, issued in Manila on the intent by said force to unlawfully deport and expel the said plaintiff herein from the Philippine Islands
January 3, 1910. against the will of the said plaintiff herein.

(Signed) IGNACIO DE ICAZA, Notary Public. (My appointment ends Dec. 31, 1910.) Fifth. That the said defendants herein and each of them, after forcibly placing the said plaintiff herein
upon the said streamer Yuensang, as hereinbefore alleged, did cause the said steamer Yuensang to take
We have received a copy of the above. and carry away the plaintiff herein from the Philippine Islands to the port of Amoy, in the Empire of China.

(Signed) O'BRIEN AND DEWITT, Sixth. That the said defendants herein, unlawfully conspiring and conniving together, the said Charles R.
Trowbridge and the said J. E. Harding, acting under the direction of the said defendant, W. Cameron
Forbes, did forcibly prevent the plaintiff herein from returning to these Philippine Islands until the 29th day
HARTFORD BEAUMONT,
of March, 1910.

Attorneys for defendants.

Seventh. That the defendants herein, by their unlawful acts hereinbefore alleged, have damaged the
plaintiff herein in the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) Philippine currency.
EXHIBIT A.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.

As a second cause of action the plaintiff alleges:

530
First. He repeats and reiterates each and every allegation contained in the first (1st) and second (2nd)
paragraphs of the first cause of action, and hereby makes the said paragraphs a part of this cause of
action.
Second. That the said plaintiff herein is a Chinese person who is and has been a resident of the
Philippine Islands for the last twenty-nine years, he having duly established his right to be and remain in
the Philippine Islands since the American occupation thereof in accordance with law.
Third. That the said plaintiff herein, during his residence in these Islands, has acquired and is actually the
owner, or part owner, of property and business interests and enterprises of great value within the
Philippine Islands, and that said property and business interests and enterprises require the personal
presence of the plaintiff herein in the Philippine Islands for the proper management and supervision and
preservation thereof.
Fourth. That the plaintiff has a family in the Philippine Islands and that said family is dependent upon the
said plaintiff for support and that it is impossible for the said plaintiff to give the said family that support
unless he, the said plaintiff, is actually present within the Philippine Islands.
Fifth. That on or about the 19th day of August, 1909, the defendants herein, Charles R. Trowbridge and
J. E. Harding, unlawfully and fraudulently conspiring and conniving with the other defendant herein, the
said W. Cameron Forbes, and acting under the direction of the said defendant, W. Cameron Forbes, did
unlawfully seize and carry on board the steamer Yuensang the said plaintiff herein with the intent by said
force to unlawfully deport and expel the said plaintiff herein from the Philippine Islands against the will of
the said plaintiff herein.
Sixth. That, notwithstanding the efforts of the said defendants herein to forcibly and unlawfully prevent
the said plaintiff herein from returning to the Philippine Islands, the said plaintiff here in returned to the
said city of Manila, Philippine Islands, on the 29th day of March, 1910, and was duly landed by the
customs and immigration authorities in accordance with law, after having duly established his right to be
and to remain herein.
Seventh. That since the arrival of the said plaintiff herein in the Philippine Islands on the 29th day of
March, 1910, as hereinbefore alleged, the said defendants herein unlawfully and fraudulently conniving
and conspiring together, the said J. E. harding and Charles R. Trowbridge, acting under the orders and
directions of the said defendant, W. Cameron Forbes, have threatened, unlawfully, forcibly, and against
the will of the plaintiff herein, to expel and deport plaintiff herein from the Philippine Islands, and that the
defendants herein, and each and every one of them are doing all that is in their power to procure the
unlawful, forcible, and involuntary expulsion of the plaintiff herein from the Philippine Islands in violation
of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to remain in the Philippine Islands as established by law.
Eight. That the plaintiff herein has no adequate remedy other than that herein prayed for.
Wherefore, the plaintiff prays that a temporary writ of injunction issue out of this court enjoining the said
defendants and each of them and their and each of their agents, servants, employees, attorneys,
successors in office, subordinate officers, and every person in any way in privity with them, from expelling
or deporting or threatening to expel or deport or procure in any way the expulsion or deportation in any
way of the plaintiff herein during the continuance of this action.
And upon the final hearing of the cause of the said temporary writ of injunction be made perpetual, and
that the defendants and each of them be condemned to pay to the plaintiff herein the sum of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000) damages and the costs of this action.
Manila, P. I., April 1, 1910.
(Signed) O'BRIEN AND DEWITT,
H. BEAUMONT,
Attorneys for plaintiff.
CITY OF MANILA, Philippine Islands, ss:
C. W. O'Brien, holding cedula No. 1095, dated at Manila, P. I., January 4, 1910, being duly sworn, upon
oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys for the plaintiff and has read the above-entitled
complaint and knows that the facts therein stated are true and correct, except such as are stated upon
information and belief, and as to those he believes them to be true.
(Signed) C. W. O'BRIEN.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of April, 1910, at Manila, P.I.
(Signed) J. McMICKING.
The Hon. A. S. Crossfield issued the following order:
ORDER.
To the defendants, W. Cameron Forbes, Charles R. Trowbridge, J. E. Harding, and all their
attorneys, agents, subordinates, servants, employees, successors in office, and all persons in
any way in privity with them, greeting:
The plaintiff having presented a complaint before this Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, in the
cause above entitled, against the defendants W. Cameron Forbes, Charles R. Trowbridge, and J. E.
Harding, above named, and having prayed likewise that a temporary injunction issue against the said
531
defendants restraining them from doing and continuing to do certain acts mentioned in the said complaint I. The complaint is insufficient to justify the issuance of the injunction.
and which are more particularly set forth hereinafter in this order; in view of the said complaint and the
verification thereof by this attorney, and it appearing satisfactorily to me because of the facts alleged in II. The court is without jurisdiction to issue said injunction.
said complaint that the case is one in which a preliminary injunction ought to issue, and the required bond
having been executed in the sum of P2,000.
(Signed) W. A. KINCAID and THOMAS HARTIGAN,

It is hereby ordered by the undersigned, judge of this Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, that the
By W. A. KINCAID,
said defendants, W. Cameron Forbes, Charles R. Trowbridge, and J. E. Harding, and all of their
attorneys, agents, subordinates, servants, employees, successors in office, and all persons in any way in
privity with them, are, each of them is, hereby restrained and enjoined from spelling or deporting or Attorneys for defendant W. Cameron Forbes.
threatening to expel or deport, or procuring in any way the expulsion or deportation in any way of the
plaintiff herein during the continuance of this action. (Signed) IGNACIO VILLAMOR, Attorney-General.

Manila, P.I. , April 9, 1910.

(signed) A. S. CROSSFIELD, DEMURRER.

Judge, Court of First Instance, city of Manila, P. I. Come the defendants, C. R. Trowbridge and J. E. Harding, and —

DEMURRER.
Comes the defendant, W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and —
I. Demurs to the first count or cause of action in the complaint because the same does not state fact
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant.
II. He demurs to the second count or cause of action in the complaint because the same does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against this defendant.
I. Demur to the first count or cause of action in the complaint because the same does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these defendants.
II. They demur to the second count or cause of action in the complaint because the same does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these defendants.
(Signed) W. A. KINCAID,
THOMAS HARTIGAN,

Wherefore he prays the judgment of the court upon the sufficiency of each of the pretended causes of By W. A. KINCAID,
action set forth in the complaint.
Attorneys for defendants C. R. Trowbridge and J. E. Harding.
(Signed) W. A. KINCAID,
(Signed) IGNACIO VILLAMOR, Attorney-General.
THOMAS L. HARTIGAN.
ORDER.
By W. A. KINCAID,
This case is now before the court for hearing the demurrer presented by the defendants to plaintiff's
Attorneys for defendant W. Cameron Forbes. complaint and defendants' motion to dissolve the injunction issued against the defendants upon plaintiff's
complaint.
Comes the defendant, W. Cameron Forbes, and moves the court to dissolve the temporary injunction
issued against him in this cause, without notice to this defendant, for the following reasons: Messrs. O'Brien and DeWitt appeared for the plaintiff; W. A. Kincaid, esq., for the defendants.
532
 The demurrer is based upon the ground that the complaint does not state the facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The motion to dissolve the injunction is grounded upon an insufficiency of the
complaint and lack of jurisdiction in the court.
Counsel for both parties made exhaustive arguments, both apparently considering the primal issue to be
whether the defendant, W. Cameron Forbes, had authority at law, as Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, to deport plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint, and whether the court had jurisdiction to restrain
him from making such deportation.
No question was raised as to the sufficiency of the complaint if all question as to the Governor-General's
authority was eliminated.
Whereas, from the facts alleged in the complaint filed in the above-entitled case, it is found that the
plaintiffs are entitled to the preliminary injunction prayed for by them;
Therefore, the bond of P500 mentioned in the order of the 24th of May, 1910, having been filed, the Hon.
A. s. Crossfield, judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, is hereby notified that, until he
shall have received further orders from this court, he is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of the
case filed by the defendant Chuoco Tiaco, alias Choa Tea, in the Court of First Instance of this city,
against the within plaintiffs for indemnity as damages for the alleged deportation of the said
Chuoco alias Choa Tea.
Given in Manila this 24th day of May, 1910.

A reading of the complaint discloses that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, as such, is not a (Signed) GRANT TRENT,
party to the action.
Associate Justice, Supreme Court, acting in vacation.
The allegations of the second paragraph of the complaint, to the effect that W. Cameron Forbes is the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, that Charles R. Trowbridge is chief of the secret service of On the 2nd of June, 1910, the defendants presented the following demurrer to the original complaint:
Manila, are descriptive only, and there is no allegation in the complaint that any of the defendants
performed the acts complained of in his official capacity.
And now come the defendants in the above-entitled cause, by their undersigned attorneys, and hereby
file their demurrer to the complaint upon the grounds that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
The court can not determine the authority or liability of an executive officer of the Government until the constitute a right of action.
pleadings disclose that his actions as such officer are brought in issue.
Therefore the court is petitioned to dismiss the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff.
The complaint upon its faces a cause of action.
Manila, June 2, 1910.
The complaint, stating a cause of action and alleging that the plaintiff is threatened with an injury by the
defendants, they may be properly restrained from committing the alleged injury until issues raised have
(Signed) O'BRIEN & DEWITT, and HARTFORD BEAUMONT, Attorneys for
been tried and determined and the courts has jurisdiction to issue an injunction.
defendants.

The demurrer is, therefore, overruled. The motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction is denied.
To the plaintiffs or their attorneys;

Manila, P. I., this 17th day of May, 1910.

You are hereby notified that on Monday, the 15th inst., at nine o'clock in the morning, we shall ask the
court to hear and decide the preceding demurrer.
(Signed) A. S. CROSSFIELD,
Manila, June 2, 1910.
Judge.
(Signed) O'BRIEN & DEWITT, and HARTFORD BEAUMONT,
Upon filing of the original complaint and after a due consideration of the facts stated therein, the Hon. Grant Trent,
acting as vacation justice, on the 24th day of May, 1910, issued the following order or injunction:
Attorney for plaintiffs.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
We have this day, June 2, 1910, received a copy of the above.

533
 (Stamp) W. A. KINCAID and THOMAS L. HARTIGAN, By J. BORJA,
Attorneys for plaintiffs.
On the 2nd day of June, 1910, the defendants made a motion to dissolve the said injunction, which motion was in
the following language:
And now come the defendants in the above-entitled case and pray the court to dissolve the preliminary
injunction issued in the above-entitled case, on the 24th day of May, 1910, on the grounds:
(1) That the facts alleged in the complaint are not sufficient to justify the issuance of the said preliminary
investigation;
(2) That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a right of action.
Manila, P.I., June 2, 1910.
(Signed) O'BRIEN & DEWITT, and HARTFORD BEAUMONT, Attorneys for defendants.
To the plaintiffs and to their attorneys:
You are hereby notified that on Monday, the 13th inst., at nine o'clock a.m. we shall ask for a hearing on
the preceding motion.
Manila, June 2, 1910.
(Signed) O'BRIEN & DEWITT, and HARTFORD BEAUMONT, Attorneys for defendants.
We have this day received a copy of the foregoing.
(Stamp) W. A. KINCAID and THOMAS L. HARTIGAN, By J. BORJA,
Attorneys for plaintiffs.
Later the plaintiffs obtained permission to file the second amended complaint above quoted. By a stipulation
between the parties "the demurrer" and "motion to dissolve" were to be considered as relating to the said second
amended complaint.
By said "demurrer" and "motion to dissolve" the question is presented whether or not the facts stated in "the second
amended complaint" are sufficient upon which to issue the writ of prohibition prayed for. If it should be determined
that they are not, then, of course, the writ should be denied and the injunction should be dissolved. If, on the other
hand, it should be determined that the facts stated are sufficient to justify the issuance of said writ, then it should be
granted and the injunction should not be dissolved, but should not be made perpetual.
From the allegations of the complaint (second amended complaint), including Exhibit A (which constituted the
pleadings in the court below), we find the following facts are admitted to be true:
First. That the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands;
Second. That the plaintiff J. E. Harding is the chief of police of the city of Manila;
Third. That the plaintiff C. R. Trowbridge is the chief of the secret service of the city of Manila;
Fourth. That the defendant, A. S. Crossfield, is one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila;
Fifth. That the defendant Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) is a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a subject of the
Chinese Empire;
Sixth. That the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes, acting in his official capacity as Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, in the public interest of the Philippine Government and at the request of the proper representative of the
Imperial Government of China, to wit: the consul-general of the said Imperial Government, did, on or about the 19th
day of August, 1909, order the said defendant, together with eleven others of Chinese nationality, to be deported
from the Philippine Islands;
Seventh. That whatever the said plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge did in connection with said
deportation was done by each of them, acting under the orders of the said Governor-General, as the chief of police
of the city of Manila and as the chief of the secret service of the city of Manila;
Eight. That later, and on the 29th day of March, 1910, the said defendant Chouco Tiaco returned to the Philippine
Islands;
Ninth. That the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes, acting through the said chief of police and the said chief of the secret
service, was threatening to again deport the said Chuoco Tiaco from the Philippine Islands;
Tenth. That upon the 1st day of April, 1910, the said Chuoco Tiaco commenced an action against the plaintiff
herein (the said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General) in the Court of said court over which the said A. S.
Crossfield was presiding as one of the judges of said court, for the purpose of —
(a) Recovering a judgment against said defendants (plaintiffs herein) for P20,000 damages for said alleged
wrongful deportation; and
(b) To procure an injunction against said defendants (plaintiffs herein) to prevent them from again deporting said
plaintiff (defendant herein) from the Philippine Islands;
534
Eleventh. That upon the presentation or filing of the petition in the said action in the Court of First Instance and on
the 9th day of April, 1910, the said A. S. Crossfield issued a preliminary injunction against the defendants, W.
Cameron Forbes, J. E. Harding, and C. R. Trowbridge, and all their attorneys, agents, subordinates, servants,
employees, successors in office, and all persons in any way in privity with them, forbidding them from expelling or
deporting or threatening to expel or deport or procuring in any way the expulsion or deportation of the plaintiff
(chuoco Tiaco) during the continuance of the action;
Twelfth. Later, and on the .......... day of ........., 1910, the plaintiffs herein (defendants below) each presented —
(1) A demurrer to the causes of action described in the petition filed; and
(2) A motion to dissolve the said preliminary injunction upon the general grounds —
(a) That the facts alleged were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action or for the issuance of the injunction; and
(b) Because the court was without jurisdiction.
Thirteenth. On the 17th day of May, 1910, A. S. Crossfield, after hearing the arguments of the respective parties,
found —
(1) That the fact alleged in the petition did constitute a cause of action; and
(2 That the Court of First Instance did have jurisdiction to try the questions presented.
Fourteenth. On the 24th day of May, 1910, the plaintiffs herein, through their attorney, W. A. Kincaid, presented a
petition in the Supreme Court asking that —
(a) An injunction be issued against the said A. S. Crossfield, restraining him from proceeding in said action until
further orders from this court; and
(b) That the writ of prohibition be granted against the said judge, forbidding him from taking jurisdiction of said
action and to dismiss the same.
Fifteenth. On the 24th day of May, 1910, the Hon. Grant Trent, Associate Justice, acting in vacation, issued the
preliminary injunction prayed for.
On the 2nd day of June, 1910, the attorneys for the defendants (herein), Messrs. O'Brien and DeWitt, and Hartforf
Beaumont, filed:
(1) A demurrer to the petition; and
(2) A motion to dissolve said injunction, each based upon the general ground that the facts alleged in the petition
were insufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The said "demurrer" and "motion to dissolve" were brought on for hearing before the Supreme Court on the 11th
day of July, 1910, and the questions presented were argued at length by the attorneys for the respective parties.
One of the questions which is presented by the pleadings and by the arguments presented in the cause is whether
or not the action pending in the lower court is an action against the Governor-General, as such, as well as against
the other defendant in their official capacity. If it should be decided that the action is one against the defendants in
their official capacity, then the question will be presented for decision whether or not the courts have jurisdiction
over the Governor-General, for the purpose of reviewing his action in any case and with especial reference to the
facts presented.
The pleadings presented in this court affirmatively allege that the action in the lower court was against the
defendants (plaintiffs herein) in their official capacity. The pleadings here also allege positively that the acts
complained of in the lower court were done by the defendants in their official capacity; that the expulsion of the
defendant (plaintiff below) was in the public interest of the Government, at the request of the consul-general of the
Imperial Government of China; that the said plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge acted under the orders of
the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes; that W. Cameron Forbes acted in his official capacity as Governor-General, the
act being an act of the Government itself, which action was immediately reported to the Secretary of War.
The pleadings in the lower court simply described the defendants (plaintiffs herein) as W. Cameron Forbes, the
Governor-General; J. E. Harding, chief of police of the city of Manila, and C. R. Trowbridge, chief of the secret
service of the city of Manila. The lower court held that:
The allegations of the second paragraph of the complaint, to the effect that W. Cameron Forbes is the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, that Charles R. Trowbridge is the chief of the secret service
of Manila, and that J. E. Harding is the chief of police of Manila, are descriptive only, and there is no
allegation in the complaint that any of the defendants (plaintiffs herein) performed the acts complained of
in his official capacity.
The theory of the lower court evidently was that the defendants should have been described, for example, "W.
Cameron Forbes, as Governor-General," etc. In this theory the lower court has much authority in its support.
However, this failure of correct and technical description of the parties is an objection which the parties themselves
should present, but when all the parties treat the action as one based upon a particular theory, that theory should
be accepted. Upon this question the lower court, in his order, said:
Counsel for both parties made exhaustive arguments, both apparently considering the primal issue to be
whether the defendant, W. Cameron Forbes, had authority at law, as Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, to deport plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint and whether the court had jurisdiction to restrain
him from making such deportation.
535
It will be noted also that the prayer of the complaint in the lower court asked for relief against "his successors in
office." The injunction also ran against "his successors in office." Thus clearly it appears that the action was against
the defendants in their official capacity.
In this court there was no pretension by the attorney for the defendant (plaintiff below) that the action was not
against the Governor-General as Governor-General, and the others as well, in their official capacity. In fact, when
an inquiry was made of the attorney for the defense concerning his theory, his reply was simply that the acts of the
Governor-General, being illegal, were not performed in his official capacity.
The argument of the attorney for the defendant was directed to the proposition that the Governor-General, in
deporting or expelling the said Chinamen, did not act in accordance with that provision of the Philippine Bill (sec. 5,
Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that:
No law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; or deny to any person therein equal protection of the laws.
The attorney for the plaintiffs, in answering this argument, maintained:
First. That the act of the Governor-General was the act of the Philippine Government and that he had a right,
inherent in him as the representative of the Government and acting for the Government, to deport or expel the
defendant; and
Second. In the absence of express rules and regulations for carrying such power into operation, he (the Governor-
General) had a right to use his own official judgment and discretion in the exercise of such power.
In order to arrive at a correct solution of the questions presented by the foregoing facts, we shall discuss the
following propositions:
I.
WHAT ARE THE POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO DEPORT OR EXPEL
OBJECTIONABLE ALIENS?
The Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands is a government with such delegated, implied,
inherent, and necessary military, civil, political, and police powers as are necessary to maintain itself, subjected to
such restrictions and limitations as the people of the United States, acting through Congress and the President,
may deem advisable, from time to time, to interpose. (Instructions of the President McKinley to the Taft
Commission; executive order of President McKinley dated June 21, 1910, appointing Mr. Taft Civil Governor of the
Philippine Islands; that part of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1901, known as the Spooner Amendment;
Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. Rep., 87; U. S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. Rep., 7, 8 Off. Gaz., 271.)
The Spooner Amendment provided that —
All military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall, until otherwise
provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as
the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil governments and for
maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property,
and religion.
By this Act of Congress a system of government was established in the Philippine Islands which carried with it the
right and duty on the part of such government to perform all acts that might be necessary or expedient for the
security, safety, and welfare of the people of the Islands.
In the case of United States vs. Bull, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Elliot, said:
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippine Islands is a complete governmental
organisms, with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly
assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments.
Having reached the conclusion that the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands is a government
with all the necessary powers of a government, subject to certain control in the exercise thereof, we are of the
opinion and so hold, that it has impliedly or inherently itself in conformity with the will of the Congress of the United
States and the President thereof, and to this end it may prevent the entrance into or eliminate from its borders all
such aliens whose presence is found to be detrimental or injurious to its public interest, peace, and domestic
tranquility. Every government having the dignity of a government possesses this power. Every author who has
written upon the subject of international law and who has discussed this question has reached the same
conclusion. Among these authors may be mentioned such noted men and statemen as Vattel, Ortolan, Blackstone,
Chitty, Phillimore, Puffendorf, Fiore, Martens, Lorimer, Torres, Castro, Bello, Heffer, Marshall, Cooley, Wharton,
Story, Moore, Taylor, Oppenheim, Westlake, Holland, Scott, Haycroft, Craies, Pollock, Campbell, and others.
Not only have all noted authors upon this question of international law reached this conclusion, but all the courts
before which this particular question has been involved have also held that every government has the inherent
power to expel from its borders aliens whose presence has been found detrimental to the public interest.
This court, speaking through its Chief Justice, in the case of In re Patterson (i Phil. Rep., 93), said:
Unquestionably every State has a fundamental right to its existence and development, and also to the
integrity of its territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession of its dominions, which it may guard
and defend by all possible means against any attack. . . . We believe it is a doctrine generally professed
by virtue of that fundamental right to which we have referred that under no aspect of the case does this
right of intercourse give rise to any obligation on the part of the State to admit foreigners under all
circumstances into its territory. The international community, as Martens says, leaves States at liberty to
fix the conditions under which foreigners should be allowed to enter their territory. These conditions may
be more or less convenient to foreigners, but they are a legitimate manifestation of territorial power and
not contrary to law. In the same way a State may possess the right to expel from its territory any foreigner
who does not conform to the provisions of the local law. (Marten's Treatise on International Law, vol. 1, p.
536
 381.) Superior to the law which protest personal liberty, and the agreements which exist for their own
interests and for the benefit of their respective subjects, is the supreme and fundamental right of each
State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty. Therefore it is not strange
that this right should be exercised in a sovereign manner by the executive power, to which is especially
entrusted, in the very nature of things, the preservation of so essential a right, without interference on the
part of the judicial power. If it can not be denied that under normal circumstances when foreigners are
present in the country the sovereign power has the right to take all necessary precautions to prevent such
foreigners from imperiling the public safety and to apply repressive measures in case they should abuse
the hospitality extended to them, neither can we shut our eyes to the fact that there may be danger to
personal liberty and international liberty if to the executive branch of the government there should be
conceded absolutely the power to order the expulsion of foreigners by means of summary and
discretional proceedings; nevertheless, the greater part of modern laws, notwithstanding these
objections, have sanctioned the maxim that the expulsion of foreigners is a political measure and that the
executive power may expel, without appeal, any person whose presence tends to disturb the public
peace.
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, in the case of Chao Chan Ping vs.
United States (130 U. S., 581) (A. D. 1888) said:
These laborers are not citizens of the United States; they are aliens. That the Government of the United
States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is
an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence, subject to the control of another
power. The United States in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation
invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. . . .
. . . The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty, belonging to the Government
of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its
exercise at nay time when, in the judgment of the Governments, the interests of the country require it,
can not be granted away or restrained on behalf of anyone. The powers of the Government are
delegated in trust to the United States and are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They (the
incidents of sovereignty),can not be abandoned or surrendered nor can their exercise be hampered when
needed for the public, by any consideration of private interests.
In the case of Ekiu vs. United States (142 U. S., 651, 659) (A. D. 1891) the Supreme Court of the United States,
speaking through Mr. Justice Gray, said:
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions or
to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United
States this power is vested in the National Government, to which the Constitution has committed the
entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war. It belongs to the political department of
the Government and may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate or
through statutes enacted by Congress.
Later, The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Fong Yue Ting vs. United States (149 U. S., 698) (A.
D. 1892), speaking through Mr. Justice Gray, again said:
The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or taken any steps
toward becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds and is as absolute and unqualified
as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.
The power to exclude or expel aliens being a power affecting international relations is vested in the political
department of the Government. The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one
foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are, in truth, but the exercise of
one and the same power.
In a very recent case — The Attorney-General of Canada vs. Cain (House of Lords Reports, Appeal Cases, 1906),
Lord Atkinson, speaking for the court said (p. 545):
In 1763 Canada and all its dependencies, with the sovereignty, property, and possession, and all other
rights which had at ant time been held or acquired by the Crown of France, were ceded to Great Britain
(St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company vs. Reg., 145 Appeal cases, 46, 53). Upon that event the
Crown of England became possessed of all legislative and executive powers within the country so ceded
to it and save so far as it has since parted with these powers by legislation, royal proclamation, or
voluntary grant, it is still possessed of them.
One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien
to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or
deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers his presence in the
State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or to its social or material interests. (Citing
Vattel's Law of Nations in support of his proposition.)
In the case of Hodge vs. Reg. (9 Appeal Cases, 117) it was decided that a colonial legislature, under the British
Government, has, within the limits prescribed by the statute which created it, an authority as plenary and as ample
as the imperial parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow.
See also In re Adams, 1 Moore's Privy Council, 460, 472-476 (A. D. 1837); Donegani vs. Donegani, 3 Knapp, 63,
68 (A. D. 1835); Cameron vs. Kyte, 3 Knapp, 332, 343 (A. D. 1835); Mustgrave vs. Pulido, Law Reports, 5 Appeal
Cases, 102 (A. D. 1879); Nudtgrave vs. Chun Teong Toy, Law Reports, Appeal cases, 272 (a. D. 1891); Hill vs.
Bigge, 3 Moore's Privy Council, 465; The Nabob of Carnatic vs. The East Indian Company, 1 Vese, Jr.,
388; Fabrigas vs. Mostyn, 1 Cowpoer, 161.
Mr. Vattel, writing as early as 1797, in discussing the question of the right of nation or government to prevent
foreigners from entering its territory or to expel them, said:
537
Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the country when he can not enter without putting the
nation in evident danger or doing it manifest injury. What it (the nation) owes to itself, the care of its own safety,
gives to it this right; and in virtue of its national liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge whether its circumstances
will or will not justify the admission of the foreigner. Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere it if has just
cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners of the citizens; that they will create religious disturbances or
occasion any other disorder contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right, and is even obliged in this
respect, to follow the rules which prudence dictates." (Vattel's Law of Nations, book 1, Chapter 19, secs. 230, 231.)
Mr. Ortolan said:
The Government of each State has always the right to compel foreigners who are found within its territory
to go away, by having them taken to the frontier, not making a part of the nation, his individual reception
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance and creates no obligation. The
exercise of this right may be subject, doubtless, to certain forms prescribed by the domestic laws of each
country; but the right exists, none the less, universally recognized and put in force. In France, no special
form is now prescribed in this matter; the exercise of this right of expulsion is wholly left to the executive
power. (Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, book 2, chapter 14, edition, p. 297.)
Mr. Phillimore said:
It is a received maxim of international law that the government of the State may prohibit the entrance of
strangers into the country and may, therefore, regulate the conditions under which they shall be allowed
to remain in it or may require or compel their deportation from it. (1 Phillimore's International Law, 3d
edition, chapter 10, sec. 220.)
Mr. Taylor said:
Every independent State possesses the right to grant or refuse hospitality. Undoubtedly such a State
possesses the power to close the door to all foreigners who, for social, political or economical reasons, it
deems expedient to exclude; and for like reasons it may subject a resident foreigner or a group of them to
expulsion, subject, of course, to such retaliatory measures as an abuse of the excluding or expelling
power may provoke. (Tayloy, International Public Law, p. 231.)
Mr. Oppenheim said:
Just as a State is competent to refuse admission to foreigners, so it is in conformity with its territorial
supremacy competent to expel at any moment a foreigner who has been admitted into its territory. And it
matter not whether the respective individual is only on a temporary visit or has settled down professional
or business purposes on that territory, having taken his domicile thereon.
It has also been held that a State may expel a foreigner who has been residing within its territory for
some length of time and has established a business there, and that his only remedy is to have his home
State, by virtue of the right of protection of a State over its citizens abroad, to make diplomatic
representations to the expelling State and ask for the reasons for such expulsion; but the right being
inherent in the sovereignty or State, it can expel or deport even domiciled foreigners without so much as
giving the reasons therefor. The expulsion of aliens from a State may be an unfriendly act to the State of
the individual expelled, but that does not constitute the expulsion an illegal act, the law nations permitting
such expulsions. (Oppenheim, International Law, sec. 323.)
Mr. Marthens said:
The Government of each State has always a right to compel foreigners who live within its territory to go
away, having them conveyed to the frontier. This right has its cause in the fact that as a stranger does
not form a part of a nation, his individual admission into the country is merely discretional, a mere act of
tolerance, in no way obligatory. The practice of this right might be subject to certain forms prescribed by
the international laws of each country, but the right is always universally acknowledged and put into
practice. (Marten's Droit des Gens, book 3, p. 91.)
This implied or inherent right in the Government to prevent aliens from entering its territory or to deport or expel
them after entrance, has not only been recognized by the courts and eminent writers of international law, but has
also been recognized many times by the executive and legislative branches of the Government. Acts of the
Congress of the United States, of the Parliament of Great Britain, as well as the British colonial parliaments, and
royal decrees might be cited in support of this doctrine.
One of the very early Acts of Congress of the United States (A. D. 1798) authorized the President of the United
States to order all such aliens as he should judge to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the country, or that
he should have reasonable grounds to suspect of being concerned in any treasonable machinations against the
Government, to deport out of the territory of the United States within such time as he should express in his order.
And it was further provided that if any such aliens, so sent out, should return without the permission of the
President, they should be imprisoned so long as, in the opinion of the President, the public safety might require.
Mr. Frelinghuysen, as Secretary of State of the United States (1882), said:
This Government (United States) can not contest the right of foreign governments to exclude, on policy or
other grounds, American citizens from their shores.
Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State of the United States, in speaking of the right of Hayti to expel from its borders
American citizens from their shores.
This government does not propose to controvert the principle of international law which authorizes every
independent State to expel objectionable foreigners or class of foreigners from its territory. The right of
expulsion or exclusion of foreigners is one which the United States, as well as many other countries, has,
upon occasions, exercised when deemed necessary in the interest of the Government or its citizens. . . .
Every State is authorized, for reasons of public order, to expel foreigners who are temporarily residing in
its territory, but when a Government expels foreigners without cause and in an injurious manner, the
538
 State of which the foreigner is a citizen has a right to prefer a claim for this violation of international law
and to demand satisfaction, if there is occasion for it.
Many other cases might be cited showing the arbitrary manner in which aliens have, from time to time, been
deported.
Expulsion is a police measure, having for its object the purging of the State of obnoxious foreigners. It is a
preventive, not a penal process, and it can not be substituted for criminal prosecution and punishment by judicial
procedure.
The right of deportation or expulsion is generally exercised by the executive head of the Government, sometimes
with and sometimes without express legislation. Sometimes it is delegated in particular instances to the heads of
some departments of the Government. (Act No. 265, U. S. Philippine Commission.)
In Canada the right was given by statute to the attorney-general of Canada. (Dominion Act, 60th and 61st Victoria,
chap. 11, sec. 6, as amended by 1st Edward 7th, Chap. 13.)
It having been established that every government has the implied or inherent right to deport or expel from its
territory objectionable aliens, whenever it is deemed necessary for the public good, we deem it pertinent to inquire:
II
IN WHAT DEPARTMENT OR DEPARTMENTS OF THE INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENTS OF A
GOVERNMENT DOES THIS INHERENT POWER EXISTS?
The rule of law permitting nations to deport or expel objectionable aliens, while international in its character is yet,
nevertheless, in its application, executed by the ]particular nation desiring to rid itself of such aliens and must,
therefore, be carried into operation by that departments of the government charged with the execution of the
nation's laws. Its enforcement belongs peculiarly to the political department of the government. The right is inherent
in the government and, as Mr. Justice Field said, "can not be granted away or restrained on behalf of anyone." It
being inherent in the political department of the government, it need not be defined by express legislation, although
in some States the legislative department of the government has prescribed the condition and the method under
which and by which it shall be carried into operation. The mere absence of legislation regulating this inherent right
to deport or expel aliens is not sufficient to prevent the chief executive head of the government, acting in his own
sphere and in accordance with his official duty, to deport or expel objectionable aliens, when he deems such]
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. One of the principal duties of the chief
executive of a nation is to preserve peace and order within the territory. To do this he is possessed of certain
powers. It is believed and asserted to be sound doctrine of political law that if in a particular case he finds that there
are aliens within its territory whose continued presence is injurious to the public interest, he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them. The legislative department of the government is not always in session. It may
require days and even months for that department to assemble. Sudden and unexpected conditions may arise,
growing out of the presence of obnoxious and untrustworthy foreigners, which demand immediate action. Their
continued presence in the country may jeopardize even the very life of the government. To hold that, in view of the
inherent power of the government, the chief executive authority was without power to expel such foreigners, would
be to hold that at times, at least, the very existence and life of the government might be subjected to the will of
designing and obnoxious foreigners, who were entirely out of sympathy with the existing government, and whose
continued presence in the territory might be for the purpose of destroying such government.
Suppose for example, that some of the inhabitants of the thickly populated countries situated near the Philippine
Archipelago, should suddenly decide to enter the Philippine Islands and should, without warning appear in one of
the remote harbors and at once land, for the purpose of stirring up the inhabitants and inciting dissensions against
the present Government. And suppose, for example, that the Legislature was not in session; could it be denied that
the Governor-General, under his general political powers to protect the very existence of the Government, has the
power to take such steps as he may deem wise and necessary for the purpose of ridding the country of such
obnoxious and dangerous foreigners? To admit such a doctrine would be to admit that every government was
without the power to protect its own life, and at times might be subjected to the control of people who were out of
sympathy with the spirit of the Government and who owe no allegiance whatever to it, and are under no obligation
to assist in its perpetuity.
It has never been denied, in a government of separate and independent departments, executive, legislative, and
judicial, that the legislature may prescribe the methods or conditions for the exercise of his power, but the mere
absence of such rules neither proves that the power does not exist nor that the executive head of the government
may not adopt himself such methods as he may deem advisable for the public good and the public safety. He can
only be controlled in the conditions and methods as to when and have the powers shall be exercised. The right
itself can not be destroyed or bartered away. When the power is once created and no rules are adopted for its
enforcement, the person or authority who has to exercise such power has the right to adopt such sane methods for
carrying the power into operation as prudence, good judgment and the exigencies of the case may demand; and
whatever rules and regulations may be adopted by the person or department possessing this power for carrying
into operation this inherent power of the government, whether they are prescribed or not, will constitute due
process of law. (See speech delivered by John Marshall in the House of Representatives of the United States,
Annals of the Sixth Congress, 595; United States vs. Robins, Fed. Cas. No. 16,175, 27 Fed. Cas., 825;
Moyer vs. Peabody, 212 U. S., 78; Murray vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How., 272; U. s., vs. Ju
Toy, 198 U. S., 253, 263.)
We have said that the power to deport or expel foreigners pertains to the political department of the government.
Even in those jurisdictions where the conditions under which persons may be deported are left to the courts to
decide, even then the actual deportations must be carried into operation by the executive department of the
government. The courts have no machinery for carrying into operation their orders except through the executive
department.
In the present case the fact is charged and admitted that the defendant was deported by W. Cameron Forbes as
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, acting for the Government. Mr. Forbes is "the chief executive authority
in all civil affairs of the Government of the Philippine Islands" as such it is his duty to enforce the laws. It is out
opinion and we so hold that as such "executive authority" he had full power, being responsible to his superiors only,
to deport the defendant by whatever methods his conscience and good judgment might dictate. But even though
we are wrong in our conclusions that he is the possessor of the inherent right to deport aliens, and it is true that the
power belongs to the legislative department to prescribe rules and regulations for such deportation, yet, in the
539
present case, the legislative department expressly recognized his authority and approved his acts by a resolution
adopted by it on the 19th of April, 1910. This power of the legislature to expressly ratify acts alleged to be illegal by
the executive department, has been expressly recognized by the Supreme court of the United States in the case
of United States vs. Heinszen & Co., (206 U. S., 370); O'Reilly de Camara vs. Brooke, Major-General (142 Fed.
Rep., 859). An act done by an agent of the Government, though in excess of his authority, being ratified and
adopted by the Government, is held to be equivalent to previous authority. (142 Federal Reporter, supra;
Phillips vs. Eyre, Law Reports, 6 Queen's Bench Cases, 1; Secretary of State vs. Kamachee Baye Sahaba, 13
Moore's Privy Council, 22; O'Reilly de Camara vs. Brooke, Major-General, 209 U. S., 54.)
It is also admitted that the act of the Governor-General in deporting the defendant was in compliance with a request
made by the official representative of the Imperial Government of China. It would seem, therefore, that said
request, in the absence of any other power, would be sufficient justification of his act. The mere fact that a citizen
or subject is out of the territory of his country does not relieve him from that allegiance which he owes to his
government, and his government may, under certain conditions, properly and legally request his return. This power
is expressly recognized by the Congress of the United States. (See Act of Congress of January 30, 1799, 1
Statutes at large, 613; sec. 5533, Revised Statutes of United States; sec. 5, United States Penal Code, adopted
March 4, 1909.)
It was strenuously argued at the hearings of this cause that the defendant was deported without due process of
law, in fact, that was the burden of the argument of attorney for the defendant.
Due process of law, in any particular case, means such an exercise of the powers of the government as
the settled maxims of law permit and sanction and under such safeguards for the protection of individual
rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in questions belongs. (U.
S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. Rep., 104, 111; Moyer vs. Peabody, 212 U. S., 78; Murray vs. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Co., 18 How., 272; U. S. vs. Ju Toy, 198 U. S., 253, 263.)
An examination of the methods by which the defendant was deported, as stated by the attorney for the defendant,
as compared with the numerous cases of deportation by the various governments of the world, shows that the
method adopted in the present case was in accordance with the methods adopted by governments generally and
the method sanctioned by international law. (See Moore's International Law Digest, vol. 4.)
It has been repeatedly decided when a government is dealing with the political rights of aliens that it is not
governed by that "due process of law" which governs in dealing with the civil rights of aliens. For instance, the
courts of the United States have decided that in the deportation of an alien he is not entitled to right of trial by jury,
the right of trial by jury being one of the steps in the "due process of law" in dealing with civil rights. (Fong Yue
Ting vs. U. S., 149 U. S. 698; U. S. vs. Wong Dep Ken, 57 Fed. Rep., 206; U. S. vs. Wong Sing, 51 Fed. Rep., 79;
In re Ng Loy Hoe, 53 Fed. Rep., 914.)
In the case of Moyer vs. Peabody, Governor of Colorado (212 U. S. , 78), Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
court upon the question of what is "due process of law," said:
But it is familiar that what is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-
matter and the necessities of the situation. Thus, summary proceedings suffice for taxes and executive
decisions for exclusion from the country.
Neither will the fact that an alien residing in the territory holds a certificate of admission justify his right to remain
within such territory as against an act of the executive department of the Government which attempts to deport him.
(Chae Chan Ping vs. U. S. 581, 36 Fed. Rep., 431.) The certificate is a mere license and may be revoked at any
time. An alien's right to remain in the territory of a foreign government is purely a political one and may be
terminated at the will of such government. No cases have been found, and it is confidently asserted that there are
none, which establish a contrary doctrine.
Having established, as we believe:
(a) That a government has the inherent right to deport aliens whenever the government believes it necessary for
the public good; and
(b) That the power belongs to the political department of the government and in the Philippine Islands to the
Governor-General, who is "the chief executive authority in all civil affairs" in the Government of the Philippine
Islands:
We deem it pertinent to inquire:
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS CAN TAKE JURISDICTION IN ANY CASE RELATING TO THE
EXERCISE OF THIS INHERENT POWER IN THE DEPORTATION OF ALIENS, FOR THE PURPOSE
OF CONTROLLING THIS POWER VESTED IN THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE
GOVERNMENT.
The question whether or not the courts will ever intervene or take jurisdiction in any case against the chief
executive head of the government is one which has been discussed by many eminent courts and learned authors.
They have been unable to agree. They have not been able to agree even as to what is the weight of authority, but
they all agree, when the intervention of the courts is prayed for, for the purpose of controlling or attempting to
control the chief executive head of the government in any matter pertaining to either his political or discretionary
duties, that the courts will never take jurisdiction of such case. The jurisdiction is denied by the courts themselves
on the broad ground that the executive department of the government is separate and independent department,
with its duties and obligations, the responsibility for the compliance with which is wholly upon that department. In
the exercise of those duties the chief executive is alone accountable to his country in his political character and to
his own conscience. For the judiciary to interfere for the purpose of questioning the manner of exercising the legal,
political, inherent duties of the chief executive head of the government would, in effect, destroy the independence
of the departments of the government and would make all the departments subject to the judicial. Such a
conclusion or condition was never contemplated by the organizers of the government. Each department should be
sovereign and supreme in the performance of his duties within its own sphere, and should be left without
540
interference in the full and free exercise of all such powers, rights, and duties which rightfully, under the genius of
the government belong to it. Each department should be left to interpret and apply, without interference, the rules
and regulations governing it in the performance of what may be termed its political duties. Then for one department
to assume to interpret or to apply or to attempt to indicate how such political duties shall be performed would be an
unwarranted, gross, and palpable violation of the duties shall be performed would be an unwarranted, gross, and
palpable violation of the duties which were intended by the creation of the separate and distinct departments of the
government.
It is no answer to this conclusion to say that the chief executive authority may violate his duties and the
constitutional guaranties of the people, or that injustice may be done, or that great and irreparable damage may be
occasioned without a remedy. The judicial is not the only department of the government which can do justice or
perpetually conserve the rights of the people. The executive department of the government is daily applying laws
and deciding questions which have to do with the most vital interest of the people. (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch,
U. S., 152; State of Miss. vs. Johnson, 4 Wall., 475, 497; Hawkins vs. The Governor, 1 Ark., 570 (33 Am. Dec.,
346); Sutherland vs. The Governor, 29 Mich., 320; People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill., 229 (68 Am. Dec., 591);
State vs. Warmoth, 22 La. An., 1.)
In the case of State vs. Warmoth (22 La. An., 10 Mr. Justice Taliaferro said (pp. 3,4):
He [the governor] must be presumed to have this discretion, and the right of deciding what acts his duties
require him to perform; otherwise his functions would be trammeled, and the executive branch of the
government made subservient, in an important feature, to the judiciary.
When the official acts to be performed by the executive branch of the government are divided into
ministerial and political, and courts assume the right to enforce the performance of the former, it opens a
wide margin for the exercise of judicial power. The judge may say what acts are ministerial an what
political. Circumstances may arise and conditions may exist which would require the Governor of a State,
in the proper exercise of his duty, and with regard to the interests of the State, not to perform a ministerial
act. Is the judge to determine his duty in such case, and compel him to perform it? The reasons of the
executive for the nonperformance of an act, the judge may never know, or, if brought to his knowledge,
he may review and overrule them, and, in doing, assume political functions. He would determine, in such
a case, the policy of doing the act. The legislator himself, who prescribed the act might hold the executive
harmless while the judge condemned him.
We believe that there are certain inherent powers vested in the chief executive authority of the State which are
universally denominated political, which are not defined either by the constitution or by the laws. We believe that
those inherent powers would continue to exist for the preservation of the life and integrity of the State and the
peace and quietude of its people, even though the constitution were destroyed and every letter of the statutes were
repealed. This must necessarily be true, or, otherwise, the hands of the chief executive authority of the government
might, at times, be paralyzed in his efforts to maintain the existence of the government. The United States
Government never intended to create in the Philippine Islands a government without giving it adequate power to
preserve itself and to protect the highest interests of the people of the Archipelago.
These inherent, inalienable, and uncontrollable powers which must necessarily exists in the absence of express
law in the chief executive authority of a nation have been clearly demonstrated by the action of the President of the
United States, notably in putting down what is known as the "Whisky Rebellion" in the State of Pennsylvania, in the
case of the protection of a judge of the United States (In re Neagle, 135 U. S., 1, 64), as well as in the case of the
uprising of labor organizations in the city of Chicago under the direction and control of Mr. Debbs (In re Debbs, 158
U. S., 568).
These powers and the right to exercise them according to his own good judgment and the conscience and his acts
in pursuance of them are purely political and are not subject to control by any other department of the government.
It is believed that even the Legislature can not deprive him of the right to exercise them.
Upon the question of the right of the courts to interfere with the executive, this court has already pronounced, in the
case of In re Patterson (1 Phil. Rep., 93) that:
Superior to the law which protects personal liberty and the agreements which exist between nations for
their own interests and the benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of
each state to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty. Therefore it is not
strange that this right should be exercised in a sovereign manner by the executive power to which is
entrusted, in the very nature of things, the preservation of so essential a right, without interference on the
part of the judicial power.
This court has also announced the doctrine, in the case of Barcelon vs. Baker et al (5 Phil. Rep., 87) that:
Under the form of the government established in the Philippine Islands one department of the
Government has no power or authority to interfere in the acts of another, which acts are performed within
the discretion of the other department.
In the case of Martin vs. Mott it was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, whenever the performance
of a political duty developed upon the chief executive authority of a nation and when he had decided as to the
method of performing that duty, that no court could question his decision. We are of the opinion and so hold,
whenever the authority to decide a political question devolves upon any separate and distinct department of the
Government, which authority impose upon that department the right to decide whether the exigencies for its
exercise have arisen, and when that department had decided, that decision is conclusive upon all other persons or
departments.
This doctrine has been further recognized by this court in the case of Merchant vs. Del Rosario (4 Phil. Rep., 316)
as well as in the case of Debrunner vs. Jaramillo (12 Phil. Rep., 316).
Under the system of government established in the Philippine Islands the Governor-General is "the chief executive
authority," one of the coordinate branches of the Government, each of which, within the sphere of its governmental
powers, is independent of the others. Within these limits the legislative branch can not control the judicial nor the
judicial the legislative branch, nor either the executive department. In the exercise of his political duties the
Governor-General is, by the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, invested with certain important governmental
541
and political powers and duties belonging to the executive branch of the Government, the due performance of can not take jurisdiction in any case against him which has for its purpose the declaration that such acts are illegal
which is entrusted to his official honesty, judgment, and discretion. So far as these governmental or political or and that he is, in consequence, liable for damages. To allow such an action would, in the lost effective way
discretionary powers and duties which adhere and belong to the Chief Executive, as such, are concerned, it is possible, subject the executive and political departments of the Government to the absolute control of the
universally agreed that the courts possess no power to supervise or control him in the manner or mode of their judiciary. Of course, it will be observed that we are here treating only with the political and purely executive duties
discharge or exercise. (Hawkins vs. The Governor, supra; People vs. The Governor, supra; in dealing with the political rights of aliens. The conclusions herein reached should not be extended to cases where
Marbury vs. Madison, supra; Meecham on Public Officers, sec. 954; In re Patterson, supra; vested rights are involved. That question must be left for future consideration.
Barcelon vs. Baker, supra.)
From all the foregoing facts and authorities, we reach the following conclusions:
It may be argued, however, that the present action is one to recover damages against the Governor and the others
mentioned in the cause, for the illegal acts performed by them, and not an action for the purpose of in any way First. That the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands is a government possessed with "all the
controlling or restraining or interfering with their political or discretionary duties. No one can be held legally military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands" and as such has the power and duty,
responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. through its political department, to deport aliens whose presence in the territory is found to be injurious to the public
Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law, to deport or expel the defendants, and the good and domestic tranquility of the people.
circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he can not be held
liable for damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any
Second. That the Governor-General, acting in his political and executive capacity, is invested with plenary power to
manner, for the purpose of controlling or interfering with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief
deport obnoxious aliens, whose continued presence in the territory is found by him to be injurious presence to the
executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts can not intervene for the purpose of
public interest, and in the method of deporting or expelling them, he may use such method as his official judgment
declaring that he is liable in damages for the exercise of this authority. Happily we are not without authority upon
and good conscience may dictate.
this question. This precise question has come before the English courts on several different occasions.
Third. That this power to deport or expel obnoxious aliens being invested in the political department of the
In the cases of The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland (Governor of Ireland), Tandy vs. Earl of Westmoreland (27 State
Government, the judicial department will not, in the absence of express legislative authority, intervene for the
Trials, 1246), and Luby vs. Lord Wodehouse (17 Iredell, Common Law Reports, 618) the courts held that the acts
purpose of controlling such power, nor the purpose of inquiring whether or not he is liable in damages for the
complained of were political acts dine by the lord-Lieutenant in his official capacity and were assumed to be within
exercise thereof.
the limits of the authority delegated to him by the Crown. the courts if England held that, under the circumstances,
no action would lie against the lord-lieutenant, in Ireland or elsewhere.
Therefore the lower court was without jurisdiction to consider the particular questions presented in the cause, and it
is hereby ordered and decreed that the writ of prohibition shall be issued, directed to the defendant, the Hon. A. S.
In the case of Chun Teeong Toy vs. Musgrave (Law Reports, Appeal Cases 1891, p. 272) the plaintiff, a Chinese
Crossfield, perpetually prohibiting him from proceeding in the cause in which Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) is
subject, brought an action for damages against the defendant as collector of customs of the State of Victoria in
plaintiff and W. Cameron Forbes, Charles R. Trowbridge, and J.E. Harding are defendants, and to dismiss said
Australia, basing his action upon the refusal of the Victorian government to permit him to enter that State. Upon a
action, as well as to enter an order dissolving the injunction granted by him in said cause against the said
full consideration the Privy Council said:
defendants.

Their Lordships can not assent to the proposition that an alien refused permission to enter British territory
It is further ordered that a decree be entered overruling the demurrer presented in this cause, and ordering that
can, in an action against the British Crown, compel the decision of such matters as these, involving
said action be dismissed, as well as a decree making perpetual the injunction heretofore granted by Mr. Justice
delicate and difficult constitutional questions affecting the respective rights of the Crown and
Trent.
Parliament and the relation of this country to her self-governing colonies. When once it is admitted that
there is no absolute and unqualified right of action on the behalf of an alien refused permission to enter
British territory, their Lordships are of opinion that it would be impossible, upon the facts which the It is so ordered, without any finding as to costs.
demurrer admits, for an alien to maintain an action.
G.R. No. 191193 November 14, 2012
If it be true that the Government of the Philippine Islands is a government invested with "all the military,. civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands until otherwise provided by Congress" and that the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Governor-General is invested with certain important political duties and powers, in the exercise of which he may vs.
use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his superiors in his political character and to his own conscience, GODOFREDO MARIANO y FELICIANO and ALLAN DORINGO y GUNAN, Accused-Appellants.
and without authority to interfere in the control of such powers, for any purpose, then it must follow that the courts
542
 DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 9 November 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03343 affirming the 5 March 2008 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 65, finding
appellants Godofredo Mariano Y Feliciano (Godofredo) guilty of the crimes of illegal sale of shabu and illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia, and Allan Doringo y Gunan3 (Allan) guilty of the illegal sale of shabu.
On the one hand, Godofredo was charged with the offenses of violation of Sections 5 and 12, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 in two (2) separate Informations, which read:
Criminal Case No. 04-706
That on or about the 17th day of October, 2004, at around 10:45 o’clock in the morning, at Zone 2, Municipality of
Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, dispose,
distribute and/or give away for value two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride locally known as "Shabu", a prohibited drugs (sic), containing 0.5680 gram to a poseur-buyer in
exchange of One Thousand Peso Bill.4
Criminal Case No. 04-707
That on or about the 17th day of October, 2004, at around 10:45 o’clock in the morning, at Zone 2, Municipality of
Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, custody and control one
(1) aluminum foil, one (1) aluminum tooter and one (1) lighter which are used and intended to be used for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body, without any
authority of law.5
Allan, on the other hand, was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 2004, at around 10:45 o’clock in the morning, at Zone 2, Municipality of
Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell, deliver, dispose,
distribute and/or give away for value two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride locally known as "Shabu", a prohibited drugs (sic), containing 0.1996 gram to a poseur-buyer in
exchange of Six Hundred Peso Bill.6
The facts, according to the evidence for the prosecution, follow.
Acting on an informant’s tip, a buy-bust team was formed composed of SPO1 Reginal Goñez (SPO1 Goñez), the
team leader, with PO1 David Olleres, Jr. (PO1 Olleres) as the poseur-buyer, and police back-ups, PO3 Virgilio
Razo (PO3 Razo), and a certain PO1 Pabrigas, and an unidentified member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA).7 SPO1 Goñez produced the marked money consisting of one (1) One Thousand Peso bill and six
(6) One Hundred Peso bills. PO1 Olleres placed his initials on the marked bills.8 On 17 October 2004, the team
conducted a buy-bust operation in the house of a certain Gerry Angustia located at Pier Uno, Zone 2, Bulan,
Sorsogon. PO1 Olleres, PO3 Razo and the asset proceeded to the target house and they witnessed an ongoing
pot session. They looked for "Galog" and they were introduced to Godofredo. They asked Godofredo if they can
"score." Godofredo immediately left the house and went to a street at the back of the house. He returned carrying
two (2) sachets of shabu, which he handed to PO1 Ollares. In exchange, PO1 Olleres paid him the One Thousand
Peso marked bill. Allan also offered PO3 Razo two (2) more sachets of shabu. The latter asked for the Six Hundred
Peso marked bills from PO1 Olleres and handed them to Allan as payment for the shabu. After these exchanges,
they requested appellants for an actual test of shabu. Godofredo provided them with a tooter and aluminum foil.
While they were testing said shabu, they declared an arrest.9 PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo identified the appellants
in open court.10
An Affidavit of Arrest was prepared and signed by PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo.11 PO1 Olleres also prepared a
receipt of the property seized containing his and appellants’ signatures.12 The buy-bust team marked the plastic
sachets containing shabu at the crime scene and PO1 Olleres brought the seized items to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.13 They also took photographs of the items confiscated and of appellants.
In Chemistry Report No. D-174-04 dated 18 October 2004, Police Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic
chemist, found that the specimen submitted to her was Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu.14
A different version of the incident was presented by the defense. Allan claimed that on 17 October 2004 at around
10:45 a.m., he was near the fence of Jessie Angustia’s house waiting for a pumpboat coming from Masbate. He
heard someone from inside the house saying "tadihan ta ini" or "let’s taste it." Allan thought that there was food
being cooked so he went inside the house. He then saw shabu scattered on the table while a certain Ludy Gubat
(Ludy) was holding an aluminum foil. He also saw Godofredo and PO1 Ollares. Allan tried to leave but Ludy poked
a knife on the left side of his stomach and held him in the collar. Ludy apparently threatened to stab Allan if the
latter did not go with him. Allan was brought by police officers to the 509th Mobile Group where he was forced to
sign a document without reading its contents. He was eventually transferred to the PNP Station of Bulan,
Sorsogon.15
Godofredo admitted that he was a drug user and that he went to the house of Jessie Angustia to "score" shabu.
Thereat, he saw Ludy and PO1 Olleres sniffing shabu. When Allan arrived, Ludy cursed him and held him on his
shoulders. Ludy pulled out a knife and poked it at Allan. Thereafter, PO1 Olleres arrested Godofredo. He was
boarded in a tricycle and brought to Camp Crame.16
On 5 March 2008, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellants guilty. The dispositive portion reads:
543
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Godofredo Mariano y Feliciano and Allan Doringo y Guban, having
been found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Sections 5 and 12, Article II of RA 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), respectively, are hereby sentenced as follows:
a) In Criminal Case No. 04-706 (Violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165) accused Godofredo Mariano y
Feliciano is sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00);
b) In Criminal Case No. 04-707 (Violation of Section 12, Article II, RA 9165) accused Godofredo Mariano
y Feliciano is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) months and one (1) day to four
years and a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00);
c) In Criminal Case No. 04-708 (Violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165) accused Allan Doringo y
Guban is sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).
The dangerous drugs as well as the drug paraphernalia subject matter of the three (3) instant cases are hereby
ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government (Sec. 20, RA 9165) to be disposed in accordance with
the provisions of Section 21 of the same Act.17
The trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish that the buy-bust operation was successfully
conducted when appellants were caught in flagrante delicto selling drugs, resulting in their apprehension. The trial
court dismissed the defense of alibi and denial over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals on 9 November 2009 issued the challenged Decision denying the appeal and
affirming appellants’ conviction.
Failing to secure a favorable decision, appellants filed a notice of appeal before this Court. 18
On 22 March 2010, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their supplemental briefs.19
In two separate
manifestations, both parties expressed their intention not to file any supplemental brief since all the issues and
arguments have already been raised in their respective Briefs.20
Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in admitting the seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia as
evidences against them. They assail the validity of their warrantless arrest by stating that the arresting officers
should have secured a warrant because they were already in possession of pertinent information, such as the
identity of their target, upon which an application for a warrant could be based. Thus, the alleged shabu obtained
by virtue of an invalid warrantless arrest is inadmissible. In addition, appellants question the validity of the inventory
receipt in that the signing was done without the assistance of counsel.
In its appellee’s brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the convictions of the appellants. It justifies
the legality of the warrantless arrest of appellants as they were caught in flagrante delicto. Moreover, the OSG
avers that appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest having raised them only on appeal.
We deny the appeal.
Appellants were charged and convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.21
All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Appellants were caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu during a buy-bust operation conducted by the buy-bust team. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Olleres, positively
testified that the sale took place and that appellants sold the shabu, thus:
A: At about 10:30 in the morning of that day our team leader instructed me to be with them in conducting a buy bust
operation.
Q: And who was with you at that time?
A: PO3 Razo and an asset.
Q: Where is the venue of the buy bust operation?
A: In the house of a certain Gerry Angustia (sic).
Q: At what time did you proceed to said place more or less?
A: About 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Ma’am, we proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic). As per
information of our asset, Galog was already on that house.
Q: Who is that Galog that you are referring to?
A: Godofredo Mariano.
Q: When you reached the place of Gerry Angustia (sic), what happened?
A: When we arrived at the scene there was an ongoing pot session but we did not disturb them because the
subject of our operation for the day is Godofredo Mariano and when we arrived we asked who is Galog and he was
introduced to us and so we asked him if we can buy some items from him.
Q: The place where you proceeded to, Mr. Witness, is it a house?
544
A: It is just a small house and to our knowledge it was being occupied by Gerry Angustia (sic). A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: Mr. Witness, what happened when you were there and being introduced to Galog? Q: Please go down and identify him?

A: We talked with him and asked him if we can score and Godofredo Mariano left the house and went to a street at A: (Witness pointed to a man in black shirt and identified as Allan Doringo when asked.)22
the back of the house and when he came back he has already with him two (2) sachets of shabu.
Simply put, Godofredo produced two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave it to PO1 Olleres in exchange
Q: Now, what happened when he returned with two (2) sachets of shabu? for P1,000.00. Also, Allan had offered and given two (2) more sachets containing shabu to PO3 Razo, who in turn,
handed him P600.00. PO3 Razo corroborated the account of PO1 Olleres, to wit:
A: Upon arrival of Godofredo Mariano with those two (2) sachets of shabu, we paid him one thousand
(Php1,000.00) pesos and right then and there Allan Doringo approached us and offered to us to buy also two (2) Q: Mr. Witness, on October 17, 2004 at more or less 10:45 in the morning do you still recall your whereabouts?
sachets of shabu.
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: Did you likewise buy the shabu offered by Allan Doringo?
Q: Will you please tell us where?
A: Yes, Ma’am, Police Officer Razo gave Allan Doringo six hundred (Php600.00) pesos.
A: On October 17, 2004 at 10:45 a.m. from the camp we proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic).
Q: Afterwards, what happened?
Q: And what was your purpose in going to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic)?
A: And right after the exchanged of items we requested the two (2) of them to have the actual test of shabu and
while they were testing the shabu we declared arrest. A: To conduct a buy bust operation.

Q: What do you mean when you say they were actually testing the shabu? Q: By the way, where is that house of Gerry Angustia (sic) located?

A: They tested the shabu by providing us the totter and aluminum foil and while we were testing the said shabu we A: At pier Uno of Zone 2, Bulan, Sorsogon just in front of the Coast Guard.
declared arrest.
Q: Okay, when you proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic) to conduct buy bust operation, who was with
Q: Is accused Godofredo Mariano present today in court? you at that time?

A: Yes, Ma’am. A: PO3 David F. Olleres, Jr. and our asset.

Q: Please identify him to us? Q: When you proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic) and when you arrived at the house of Gerry Angustia
(sic) what happened next?
A: (Witness pointed to a man in a blue strife sweet shirt (sic) who identified himself as Godofredo Mariano.)
A: While at the house of Gerry Angustia (sic), Godofredo Mariano offered to our asset to taste the shabu and he
Q: What about accused Allan Doringo (sic), is he present today in court? also offered two (2) sachets of shabu worth Php1,000.00 to PO3 David Olleres, Jr. while this Allan Doringo
persuaded us to buy also two (2) sachets of shabu which was offered to PO3 Olleres who gave him also
A: Yes, Ma’am. Php600.00 pesos.

Q: If you are required to identify him, will you be able to do so? Q: What did Olleres do when he was offered this shabu by Godofredo Mariano?

545
A: He received the two (2) sachets of shabu from Godofredo Mariano and gave Godofredo Mariano the
Php1,000.00 bill then PO3 David Olleres identified himself to Godofredo Mariano.
Q: Now, before Olleres identified himself as a police officer, did you already buy the shabu from Allan Doringo?
A: Godofredo Mariano sold his shabu to PO3 David Olleres while this Allan Doringo insisted to me to buy his shabu
for Php600.00 pesos.
Q: And what did you do when Allan Doringo offered you this shabu in the amount of Php600.00.
A: I get Php600.00 from David Olleres and paid Allan Doringo the same amount after I received from him the
shabu.
Q: Then what happened afterwards?
A: Then after that we introduced ourselves as police officers and we brought them to the camp for police
investigation.
Q: Are accused Allan Doringo and Godofredo Mariano present today in court?
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: If you are required to identify them, will you be able to do so?
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: Please point at them?
A: (The witness pointed to a man in yellow shirt who identified himself as Allan Doringo when asked and also the
witness pointed to a man in black shirt and identified himself as Godofredo Mariano when asked.)23
The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride on the white
crystalline substances inside the four (4) plastic sachets confiscated from appellants. The marked money was
presented in evidence. Thus, the delivery of the illicit drug to PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo and the receipt by
appellants of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
Godofredo was further charged and convicted of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. The elements of illegal
possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12,
Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.24
The prosecution has convincingly established that Godofredo was in possession of drug paraphernalia such as
aluminum foil, aluminum tooter and lighter, all of which were offered in evidence.25 The corresponding receipt and
inventory of the seized shabu and other drug paraphernalia were likewise presented in evidence.26 Police
Superintendent Leonidas Diaz Castillo attested to the veracity of the contents of these documents.27
While both appellants admitted their presence in the scene of the crime, they both denied the existence of a buy-
bust operation.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted.
Denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law
enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellants cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of any improper
motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation to falsely testify against appellants.28
Appellants’ insistence on the illegality of their warrantless arrest equally lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected under the first mode or aptly termed as in flagrante delicto.
PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo personally witnessed and were in fact participants to the buy-bust operation. After
laboratory examination, the white crystalline substances placed inside the four (4) separate plastic sachets were
found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Under these circumstances, it is
beyond doubt that appellants were arrested in flagrante delicto while committing a crime, in full view of the arresting
team.
Anent the absence of counsel during the execution of an inventory receipt, we agree with the conclusion of the
appellate court that notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the inventory receipt, the prosecution has sufficiently
proven the guilt of appellants, thus:
Admittedly, it is settled that the signature of the accused in the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in
evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a
546
declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that appellants
signed receipt of the property seized unassisted by counsel, this only renders inadmissible the receipt
itself.1âwphi1
In fact, in the case at bar, the evidentiary value of the Receipt of Property Seized is irrelevant in light of the ample
evidence proving appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-
bust operation was conducted to entrap appellants. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly established that the
sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the shabu, was presented in court and
confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust team. They acknowledged that they were the same drugs placed
in four (4) plastic sachets seized from appellants.29
In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellants sold shabu. Under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including
any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Hence, the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. As
to Godofredo who was further convicted of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, Section 12, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 imposes the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon any
person, who unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and any other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
Based on the foregoing rules, we also affirm the imposition of penalties by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 9 November 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03343 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision dated 5 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Sorsogon City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-706, 04-707, and 04-708, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs UYBOCO
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision [1] promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming the
Regional Trial Courts (RTC) Judgment[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, finding
Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several John Does were
charged in three separate Informations, which read as follow:
In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years
old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting
ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash
and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or
a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by
said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victim/or his parents.[3]
In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years
old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting
ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash
and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or
a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by
said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victim/or his parents.[4]
547
 In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain NIMFA CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus
depriving her of liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for her release, which after payment
thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry,
including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim.[5]
The arraignment was held in abeyance twice.[6] Finally, the arraignment was set on 22 October
1996. Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however refused to enter a plea. This prompted
the RTC to enter a plea of Not Guilty for each of them. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson), Police
Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan), Police Inspector
Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of facts are summarized as follows:
At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby
Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan). Driver Pepito
Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for Yusan, Acon drove
along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian Church, a stainless jeep with
two men and one woman described as a tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way. One of the men, who was in
police uniform accosted Acon and accused him of hitting the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG) General
apparently with a stone when the vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to the stainless
jeep while the man in police uniform drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit
on her lap while Jeson Kevin was sitting on the tomboys lap. They were brought to a house in Merville Subdivision,
Paraaque.[7]
While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to the secretary
of her employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville Subdivision. She came back to the car undetected and
after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from the car and they were locked inside the comfort room.[8]
Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He received a call from his wife asking him if
Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them at Metrobank where she was dropped off earlier. After 15
minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical because she could not find the car when she roamed around
the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother Jaime and some police officers to inform them that his sons were
missing. When Jepson arrived at Metrobank at around 11:30 a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing
him that Nimfa called about their whereabouts. When Jepson got back to his office, his secretary informed him that
an unidentified man called to inform them that he has custody of the children and demanded P26 Million.[9]
Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge. He
asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her employers telephone number. She feigned ignorance of
those information. She even claimed that she was merely a new employee.[10] Sarge informed Nimfa that they were
in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go home. Nimfa chose to stay with her wards. When the
phone rang, Sarge went out of the house and Nimfa again sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that
they were being held up in Merville Subdivision.[11]
Jepson, through Jaimes help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President
Estrada) at 8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen. Canson), General Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson)
and Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals to rescue Jepsons sons
and arrest the kidnappers.[12]
548
 At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to P10 Million.[13] That night, Nimfa
was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the telephone to her. She recognized one of them as appellant,
because she had seen the latter in her employers office sometime in the first week of December 1993. [14]
On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to negotiate
for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several
business transactions with the latter and they have talked for at least a hundred times during a span of two to four
years.[15]
On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million. Jepson offered P1.3 Million
in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol.[16] Appellant asked Jepson to bring the
ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen. Canson and Gen. Lacson
to inform them of the pay-off.[17]
At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter informed her that they
would be released that afternoon.[18] At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and proceeded to
Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He placed the money inside a gray bag and put it on the
backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the
trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and
the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline
Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at
the corner of the gas station.[19]
P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together with two other
police officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned themselves in front of the Maranao Arcade located
at Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off. He took a total of 24
shots.[20] He identified Macias together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial Center and the latter as the one
who took the ransom.[21]
P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial Center in Makati on
22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed pay-off. He witnessed the pay-off and identified
appellant as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money from the car trunk of Jepson. [22]
P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat and
one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on 22 December 1993 with the primary task of
apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves children and helper. His group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await
instructions from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson. They had been waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00
p.m. when they received information that the kidnap victims were released unharmed. They were further asked to
maintain their position in Fort Bonifacio. At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a
red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached
Dasmarias Village in Makati.They continuously followed the car inside the village. When said car slowed down, they
blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle.[23]
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be
appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue
appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found
inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to Camp Crame for
questioning.[24]
At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp Crame. He and Nimfa
went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag containing
the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the table. Photographs were taken and Jepson was asked to
identify them.[25]
549
 A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag.[26] It was found out that a portion of the ransom
money was missing. It was then that appellant revealed that the missing money was in the possession of
Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias in Camp Aguinaldo.P/Supt.
Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed him under arrest. Macias was asked where
the rest of the ransom money was and Macias went inside the house and retrieved a red bag inside a small
cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the seized property from Macias. Macias placed his signature on the
receipt.[27]
Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap victims were
detained. She stated that she leased the house to appellant. On 23 December 1993, it came to her knowledge that
said house was used in the kidnapping. She noticed that the lock of the comfort room was reversed so that it could
only be locked from the outside. She considered this unusual because she personally caused the door knob to be
installed.[28]
The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal (Dr.
Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).
Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989
as the importer of police equipment and accessories.Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens and paging
system. Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who was then selling his security agency in July 1993. He
admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his total borrowings amounted to P8.5 Million in
December 1993. Appellant also knew Nimfa since 1990 and had met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson where
Nimfa usually served him coffee.[29]
In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother. He was given the key to the
house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993.
At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for P1 Million, as partial payment
of his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons were kidnapped and he requested appellant to negotiate with
the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of pity, appellant agreed. He actively participated in the negotiations
between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully negotiated a lower ransom of P1.5 Million.
On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the ransom money to
the kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He asked Macias, who was in his office that day, to accompany
him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati area and wait for further instructions. Appellant called
up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to appellant once instructions were given by the kidnappers.
The kidnappers finally called and asked appellant to proceed to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes. He informed
Jepson of this fact and the latter asked appellant to meet him in Magallanes Commercial Center where he would just
put the money inside the car trunk and leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money from Jepsons car and put it inside
his car trunk and proceeded to Shell Gasoline station.[30] Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and
Jepsons children at the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him. They then decided to go
back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00 p.m., he received a call from the kidnappers who were cursing him
because they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there were many policemen stationed
in the area, which prompted them to release the victims. Appellant left his office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in
Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was about ten (10) meters away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his
path.He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica and two other men alight from the car and were heavily armed. They
pulled him out of the car and hit him with their firearms.[31]
Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by the secretary, who
appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant. She saw appellant arrive at the office with Macias.[32]
Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented the
medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the injuries of appellant could have been sustained during the
scuffle.[33]
550

Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was privy to the loan transactions between appellant and
Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter. He even served as guarantor of some of the obligations of
appellant. When the checks issued by appellant were dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed a case against Navarro
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the latter was eventually acquitted.[34]
While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died. Consequently, his criminal liability is totally
extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.[35]
On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized by Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084. He is hereby ordered to suffer the prison
term of reclusion perpetua for three (3) counts together with the accessory penalties provided by
law. He should pay private complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of P150,000.00 as moral
damages.
The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well as the
Nissan Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused to the Bureau of
Corrections, National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director of said bureau is ordered
to inform this court in writing soonest as to when the said official took custody of the accused.[36]
The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum of evidence that the elements of
kidnapping for ransom were present and that appellant was the author of said crime.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Conformably to People v. Mateo,[37] this Court in a Resolution
dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.[38]
On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial
Region, Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, in
convicting Ernesto Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. No costs.[39]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 22 December
2006. Hence, this appeal.
On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. On 25 October
2007, appellants counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance. Appellee manifested that it is no longer filing a
Supplemental Brief.[40] Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorneys Office as counsel de oficio for
appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all the arguments in the appellants brief
submitted before the Court of Appeals.[41]
Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based on the following
assignment of errors:
551
 I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE DISTURBING WHISPERS OF DOUBT REPLETE IN THE
PROSECUTIONS THEORY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO NIMFA CELIZ
TESTIMONY NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCREDIBILITY OF HER STORY.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OVER THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED UYBOCO.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF JEPSON
DICHAVEZ NOTWITHSTANDING HIS DISPLAYED PROPENSITY FOR
UNTRUTHFULNESS.
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime,
namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of
the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of
his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.[43]

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING MOST OF THE OBJECT EVIDENCE

PRESENTED AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SINCE THEY WERE We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were proven by the prosecution,
PROCURED IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
thus:
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING OF FACT THAT THE MERVILLE
PROPERTY LEASED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT FROM MS. CAROLINA ALEJO
WAS THE VERY SAME HOUSE WHERE NIMFA CELIZ AND HER WARDS WERE
1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual;
ALLEGEDLY DETAINED.
2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of accused
Uyboco, referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED UYBOCO AS HAVING
complainant Jepson Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin and two-year
PARTICIPATED IN THE ABDUCTION OF JESON KEVIN, JESON KIRBY, AND
old Jeson Kirby as well as their maid or yaya Nimfa Celiz. Their abduction occurred at
NIMFA CELIZ AS NOT A SINGLE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SUPPORTS THE SAME.
about 10:30 in the morning of December 20, 1993. The three victims were on board
Jepsons Isuzu pick-up driven by Jepsons driver Pepito Acon. The moving pick-up was
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED CONSIDERING
in front of San Sebastian Church, Legarda, Manila when its path was blocked by a
THAT ABDUCTION, AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE CRIME, WAS NEVER
stainless jeep. A man in white t-shirt and brown vest accosted driver Pepito for having
ESTABLISHED AGAINST HIM.
allegedly ran over a stone that hit a son of a general working at the Presidential Security
Group. Pepito was made to ride in a jeep. The same man drove the pick-up to a house
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
in Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, where the victims were illegally
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITHOUT DISCUSSING THE PARTICIPATION OF
detained from December 20 to 23, 1993.
ACCUSED MACIAS CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE WAS FOR
CONSPIRACY.[42]
xxxx

3)
The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts, this Court is unerringly led to resolve this issue in the
affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss.
The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably
illegal. Their detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the private
individual whose mind and heart were focused to illegally amassed huge amount of
money thru force and coercion for personal gain;
552
 xxxx ATTY. PAMARAN:

5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by compelling Q: What?
the parents of the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get the huge
amount of money, a gun, and pieces of jewelry x x x.[44] A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita College there was
a stainless jeep that block our path, Sir.

Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know?
These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecutions witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa, the
A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.
victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children abducted and the person from whom ransom was extorted.
Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?

A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to stay on the side,
Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20 December 2003 and detained sir.
in a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, thus:
Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him?

A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.
A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then we left, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?
xxxx
xxxx
A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2)
children and myself, Sir. A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we then make a turn at
Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG from Malacaang, Sir.
xxxx
xxxx
A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.
Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?
xxxx
A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.
Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?
Q: Then what followed next?
A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank, Sir.
A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep boarded and he was
Q: And then what followed next? the one who drove, Sir.

A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself made a right turn and we entered an alley, xxxx
Sir.
A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on the passengers
xxxx side, Sir.

Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that happened? xxxx

A: Yes, sir. Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed?
553
 A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when we went straight ATTY. PAMARAN:
as to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir.

xxxx
Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?
A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir.

Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what happened? A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.

A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir.

Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate? Q: What followed?

A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside, Sir.
A: After some more bargaining and begins he further reduced their demand to1.5 million x x x.
xxxx

Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?

xxxx
A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir.[45]
Q: And after that what followed?

Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and eventually got hold of the money, A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.

thus:
Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?

A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir.
A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir.

A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco was again the
one continuing the conversation, Sir. Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?

Q: What did you say? A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.

A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million, and he asked for Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?
my wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to talk too, Sir.

A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.

554
Q: How about the other balance? Q: What else did he tell you?

A: My jewelry, Sir.[46] A: x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my trunk compartment, leave it and lock
the car, and walk away without looking back for ten (10) minutes.

xxxx
Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do?

A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive and park the car beside the car
Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the jewelries, the gun and Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate NO. NRZ-863.
the bag?

Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?
A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.

A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.

Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?

Q: And then, what did you do?

A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries.

A: I followed his instruction.

Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?

Q: And what followed next?

A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the

Magallanes Commercial Center.

A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the Mercury Drug Store
already.
Q: Where did you place that bag?

Q: And what was your answer?

A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the Pancake House.

A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I walk back
xxxx towards the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes.

555
Q: And? A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell station after the
Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan.[47]

A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.

Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing inconsistencies,
ATTY. PAMARAN: untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies.

Q: Did you comply with that instruction?

Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely: First, Nimfa stated
that on the day they were to be released, they, together with Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00 p.m. while
A: Yes, sir. appellant stayed behind. However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw Macias and appellant
at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not properly identify the number of kidnappers. Third, Nimfa

Q: What did you do?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten (10) minutes.
failed to state in her affidavit and during the direct examination that Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination,
she intimated that Sarge had a gun. Fourth, it was incredible that Nimfa was able to identify the route taken by the
kidnappers to the safe house because she was not allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to say that
two persons, Macias and appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism whenever they hand the
phone to her. Sixth, it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an operational telephone while in captivity.[48] The

Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the parked form that Court of Appeals correctly dismissed these inconsistencies as immaterial, in this wise:
Colt Mirage?

The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or

A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.
Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned to the back of
the supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is gone already.
number; hence, the reference thereto would understandably vary. The rule is that inconsistencies
in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect
the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. The
inconsistencies and discrepancies of the testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature
as would warrant the reversal of the decision appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial
inconsistencies strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz testimony as they erase suspicion that the
same was rehearsed.

The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor
blindfolded or tied up their victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the
Q: And what followed thereafter? crime. Besides, familiarity with the victims or their families has never rendered the commission

556
 of the crime improbable, but has in fact at times even facilitated its commission.Moreover, the
fact that there was a usable phone in the house where Celiz and the kids were held captive only
proves that, in this real world, mistakes or blunders are made and there is no such thing as a
perfect crime. On a different view, it may even be posited that the incredible happenings narrated
by Celiz only highlights the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions. Verily, in committing the
crime of kidnapping with ransom, they adopted and pursued unfamiliar strategies to confuse the
police authorities, the victim, and the family of the victims.[49]
Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he claimed that appellant
owed him only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed him P8.5 Million. Appellant charges Jepson of downplaying
his closeness to him when in fact they had several business deals and Jepson would address appellant as
Ernie. Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able to identify with utmost certainty that the kidnapper he was
supposedly talking to was appellant. Finally, appellant claims that Jepsons motive to maliciously impute a false
kidnapping charge against him boils down to money. Among the businesses that Jepson owns was along the same
line of business as that of appellant, which is the supply of police equipment to the PNP. To eliminate competition
and possibly procure all contracts from the PNP and considering his brothers close association to then Vice-President
Estrada, Jepson crafted and executed a frame up of appellant.
And the Court of Appeals had this to say:
For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly used strategy,
to apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves children is, by reason of their special
knowledge and expertise, the police operatives call or prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence
of any evidence that said agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in
their performance of official duties and disregard Uybocos unsubstantiated claim that he was
framed up.
Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the determination of which
evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court to decide, but the same rests upon
the prosecution. This is so since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly
vests in the prosecution the direction and control over the prosecution of a case. As the
prosecution had other witnesses who it believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco,
its non-presentation of other witnesses cannot be taken against the same.[50]
Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense
of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.[51]
We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to the
positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses
testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them. As a rule, the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which
had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude.[52] While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the
truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present
during the trial, as in this case, cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.[53]
Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecutions theory, thus:
If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand
only P1.325M x x x as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up the ransom
money using his own car registered in his sons name? Why did he not open the bag containing
the ransom to check its contents? Why would he be the one to personally hand the phone to
Nimfa Celiz without any mask covering his face x x x. Why would he go back to his family
residence x x x with the ransom money still intact in the trunk of his car?
If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded x
x x? Why were they not tied x x x?
557
 xxxx

However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to engaging in a battle of endless
If it is true that the house at Merville, Paraaque was used by accused-appellant Uyboco
speculations, which do not have a place in a court of law where proof or hard evidence takes precedence. On the
as the place of the alleged detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the lease contract under his
own name? x x x Certainly, any person with the education attainment of at least high school other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and evidence to prove that kidnapping occurred and that appellant
degree, much more so an established businessman like accused-appellant would know that the is the author thereof.
lease contract and the post-dated checks are incriminating evidence.

x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping?
x x x Why is their story focused only on the day of the ransom payment? Why did they not apply
for a warrant of arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly knew that from
day 1, he was the kidnapper?
Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations
between the kidnappers x x x.[54]
Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to anchor his argument that he has
been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police officers who participated in the operation. Appellant claims that
despite knowledge of the place of alleged detention, the police did not try to rescue the kidnap victims.Appellant also
notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies installing any listening device to record the conversations of the kidnappers
and Jepson, the interview made by a reporter for a television network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped
conversations of appellants alleged negotiations for the ransom with Jepson. Appellant insists that these taped
conversations do exist.

Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off businessman Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to discredit the testimony of P/Supt.
negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping. Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant failed to prove the existence of the alleged taped conversations. The
matters of failure of the police officer to properly document the alleged pay-off, the non-production of the master copy
If we indulge appellants speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all these questions that appellant
of the video tape, and the chain of custody supposedly broken are not semblance of neglect so as to debunk the
originally demanded P26 Million but this had been substantially reduced due to aggressive bargaining and
presumption of regularity. In the absence of proof of motive on the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a
negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the ransom money because he could not trust anybody to do the
serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
work for him; that appellant did not open the bag containing the money because he trusted Jepson, who then out of
trial court's assessment on the credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over the accused's self-serving
fear, would deliver as instructed; that appellant did not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa
and uncorroborated claim of frame-up.[55]
would not recognize him; that appellant went back to his family residence because he never thought that Jepson
would recognize him as the voice behind one of the kidnappers; that the victims were not blindfolded or tied because
Nimfa, who appeared to be ignorant to the kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would be emboldened
Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his car in absence of a warrant. The
to escape; that appellant never thought that the police would discover the place of detention; that the police employed
arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
a different strategy, which is to first secure the victims before they apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a warrant
would be futile as the police then did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the crime of kidnapping;
that there were no actual record of the telephone conversations between Jepson and the kidnappers.

558
 SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2)
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.[56]
Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in
Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of
kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed
to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. [57]
It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough
for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge
based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such
search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search
the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's
reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control"
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.[58] Therefore, it is
only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact participated in the abduction
of the victims. Lacking this element, appellant should have been acquitted. In a related argument, appellant contends
that conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime, therefore, appellants participation was not sufficiently
established.
The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to wit:
559

The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house
where Celiz and the Dichaves children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2) Uyboco was
present in the said house at the time when Celiz and the Dichaves children were being kept
thereat; 3) there being no evidence to the contrary, Uybocos presence in the same is voluntary;
4) that Uyboco has in his possession some of the ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the
one who told them that the balance of the ransom payment is with Macias.All these
circumstances clearly point out that Uyboco, together with several unidentified persons, agreed
or decided and conspired, to commit kidnapping for ransom.
x x x Uybocos claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers of the jeep
which waylaid the Dichaves vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not be convicted of
kidnapping for ransom considering that his participation, if any, was merely to provide the house
where the victims were kept, is misplaced.
Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate
would entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal scheme, i.e.
possession of the ransom payment, to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no
knowledge whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan.[59]
The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of appellant. While he was not
present during the abduction, he was present in the house where the victims were detained, oftentimes giving the
phone to Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from Jepson. The conspiracy was likewise
proven by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with Macias and other John Does in committing the
crime. Therefore, even with the absence of appellant in the abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom
because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.[60]
Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-
132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for ransom, and the Decision
dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 which
affirmed in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati
(appellant) of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and
to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The Factual Antecedents
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his
motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding
and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the
appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.4
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver.
Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and
confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th
Avenue Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon
marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of
the arrest.5
560
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the investigator,
PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared a letter
request7 for the laboratory examination of the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and
the confiscated item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police
Senior Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.8
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, tested
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03 gram which, when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive
result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. 11
In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the date and time of the
incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th
Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant approached the person,
who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his wallet which
contained P1,000.00.12
Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled by eight other
detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the Sangandaan Headquarters
where two other police officers, whose names he recalled were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the
headquarters’ firing range. There, "Michelle" and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen
cellphone, firing a gun right beside his ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he
continued to deny knowledge about the cellphone.13 Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which he was
brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment.14
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who informed him that he was
being charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11."15 The first charge was eventually dismissed.
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the elements of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established, to wit: (1) the appellant is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possesses said drug. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 de Leon to testify
falsely against appellant, coupled with the fact that the former had previously arrested the latter for illegal
possession of drugs under Republic Act No. 642516 (RA 6425), the RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leon’s
testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain
view of PO3 de Leon at the place and time of the arrest.
On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of denial and frame-up proffered by the
appellant, being uncorroborated, and in the light of the positive assertions of PO3 de Leon. It refused to give
credence to appellant’s claim that PO3 de Leon robbed him of his money, since he failed to bring the incident to the
attention of PO3 de Leon’s superiors or to institute any action against the latter.
Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA
held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion," 18aggravated
by the existence of his past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.
Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution had adequately shown the continuous
and unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it was confiscated from appellant by PO3 de Leon,
marked at the police station, turned over to PO2 Hipolito and delivered to the crime laboratory, where it was
received by PSI Arturo, the forensic chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper identification.
The Issue
The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC’s
Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
561
 (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.19 On the
other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it.20
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a
fact that a crime has just been committed.
In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an "in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
The Court disagrees.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon’s testimony on direct examination in court is revelatory:
FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th
Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?
PO3 DE LEON: Yes Ma’am.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in his hand, Ma’am.
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Ma’am.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Ma’am.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Ma’am.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Ma’am.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand was a shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu, Ma’am.21 (Underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his
presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance
(0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests,
all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was
indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed
to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining
something in one’s hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been
exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been
sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have
been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had
been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe
that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in
this case.
562
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely
impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge22 for the same offense. The CA stressed
this point when it said:
It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view.1âwphi1 PO3 Renato de Leon saw
appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white powderly substance. PO3 Renato
de Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having arrested him twice before for the same illegal possession of drug.
It was not just a hollow suspicion. The third time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of
plastic wrapper appellant was holding and scrutinizing also contained shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts
regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record. He would have been irresponsible to just ‘wait and see’ and
give appellant a chance to scamper away. For his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug,
sensing trouble from an equally familiar face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with
him through the aid of a tricycle driver. Appellant’s act of running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leon’s
reasonable suspicion that appellant was actually in possession of illegal drug. x x x23
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the
exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal
knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal
knowledge" as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on
knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under
Section 5.
It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on "personal
knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is unquestionably not what
"personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be strictly construed.24
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against
him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of
guilt.25 It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are
many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as
witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from
PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify
innocence.
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be
dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5
above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or
functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the
person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without
unduly compromising a citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the
case of People v. Tudtud:31
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is
a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of
arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be
absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests
without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged and
ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause
or ground.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185719 June 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO, SAMUEL
SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQUE,* AND REYNALDO RANADA Y ALAS**, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere allegations and self-serving statements will not overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties accorded to police officers. There must be a showing of clear and convincing evidence to
successfully rebut this presumption.
On appeal is the February 28, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02626 which
affirmed with modification the December 7, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
154 in Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D, 13783-D and 13784-D. The RTC convicted the appellants and several other
563
accused for violations of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and On the other hand, appellants Mark Cipriano (Cipriano), Samuel Sherwin Latario (Latario), Reynaldo Ranada
imposed upon them the penalty of imprisonment and payment of fine in each of their respective cases. (Ranada), together with co-accused Melody Apelo (Apelo), Marwin Abache (Abache), Michael Angelo Sumulong
(Sumulong), and Jay Madarang (Madarang), were charged with possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of
Factual Antecedents Section 14, Article II of RA 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13784-D, viz:

On October 14, 2004, appellants Marcelino Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra) were charged with the CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13784-D
crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den, dive or resort in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of
Article II, RA 9165 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D and 13782-D, respectively, viz: On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, each
being in the proximate company of two (2) persons and in conspiracy with one another, without having been duly
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13781-D authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and under their
custody and control the following paraphernalias [sic], fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body, to wit:
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Richard a. one (1) strip aluminum foil containing traces of white crystalline substance marked as Exh-D;
N. Noble, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams
(0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methylamphetamine b. one (1) improvised glass tooter containing traces of white crystalline substance marked as Exh-D1;
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
c. one (1) pack transparent plastic sachet marked as Exh-D2;
Contrary to law.3
d. two (2) plastic disposable lighters marked as Exhs. "G-H";
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13782-D
e. one (1) tape-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) rolled aluminum foil marked as Exh.
On or about or immediately prior to October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable D5;
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maintain a den, dive or resort located at No. 32 R. f. five (5) unsealed transparent plastic sachets marked as Exh. D6;
Hernandez St., Brgy. San Joaquin, Pasig City, where x x x dangerous drugs are used or sold in any form, in
violation of the said law.
g. one (1) stainless scissor marked as Exh. D7;

Contrary to law.4
h. one (1) rectangular glass marked as Exh. D8; and

Marcelino was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the same law
i. one (1) roll of aluminum foil marked as Exh. D9.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 13783-D, viz:
[Specimens] marked as Exh-D and Exh-D1 were found positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13783-D
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not
Contrary to law.6
being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
six centigrams (0.06 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found to be positive to the test for Upon arraignment on November 4, 2004, all the appellants and the other accused pleaded not guilty. 7 Pre-trial and
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. joint trial on the merits subsequently ensued.

Contrary to law.5 Version of the Prosecution

564
The prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Richard Noble (PO2 Noble) and SPO2 Bernardo Cruz (SPO2 Cruz)
who were involved in the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of the appellants. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On October 9, 2004, PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were
engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using their residence in 32 R.
Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for their drug sessions.8 After recording the report in the police blotter,
PO2 Noble relayed the information to his superior, P/Insp. Earl B. Castillo (P/Insp. Castillo), who in turn ordered the
conduct of a surveillance operation.9 PO2 Noble, SPO2 Cruz and PO1 Anthony Bitbit, conducted a surveillance on
the couple’s residence. After confirming the reported activities, SPO2 Cruz looked for an asset who could introduce
them to Marcelino and Myra in the ensuing buy-bust operation.10
A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
as evidenced by a Pre-Operation Report,11 the team proceeded to Marcelino’s and Myra’s residence on board two
private vehicles. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of
shabu.12 When asked how much shabu he needed, PO2 Noble replied, "dalawang piso," which means P200.00
worth of drugs. But when PO2 Noble was handing over the marked money to Marcelino, the latter motioned that
the same be given to his wife, Myra, who accepted the money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal
container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave the
same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside
the house of the couple around which were seven persons.13 When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the
backup team rushed to the scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble introduced himself as a policeman and arrested
Marcelino. He frisked him and was able to confiscate the metal container that contained another sachet of white
crystalline substance. PO2 Noble wrote the markings "MCC-RNN October 9, 2004" on both the plastic sachets of
white substance sold to him by Marcelino and the one found inside the metal container.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they found
Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a table littered with various
drug paraphernalia such as an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance,
disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered from
Ranada. The buy-bust team arrested all these persons, advised them of their constitutional rights, and brought
them to police headquarters for investigation and drug testing.
A chemistry report14 on all the seized items yielded positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Another
chemistry report15 showed Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada positive for drug use while Myra, Abache,
Sumulong, Madarang, and Latario were found negative.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the testimonies of Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada, who all essentially put up the defense of
denial. The following is their version of the story.
Marcelino and Myra owned an electronics and appliance repair shop annexed to their house. In the evening of
October 9, 2004, Marcelino was in the living room with his children and nieces fixing a VCD player. Apelo, their
househelp, was in the kitchen preparing food while Ranada, their repairman, was outside the house fixing
Sumulong’s motorcycle. Cipriano and Madarang were also present at the shop, the former to redeem his car stereo
and the latter to borrow a play station CD. Latario, a housemate of Marcelino and Myra, was also present at the
time.
Marcelino suddenly heard someone say "Walang tatakbo!" Four armed men rushed inside the house and pointed
their guns at him and said "Wag ka nang pumalag." He was thereafter dragged outside where he saw the other
accused already in handcuffs. Marcelino was later informed that they were being arrested for selling shabu.
Marcelino protested and disclaimed any knowledge about drugs. When the officers frisked all the accused,
Marcelino claimed that nothing illegal nor incriminating was recovered from them.
When Myra arrived at the scene, she was shocked to see her husband being arrested. The police officers then
brought all the accused to the police station for further questioning.
At the police station, PO2 Noble asked Marcelino for P50,000.00 as settlement of their case. Marcelino, Apelo,
Cipriano, and Ranada were also made to drink water that according to Marcelino tasted bitter. 16 They were then
brought to Camp Crame for medical examination and drug tests. Those who drank the bitter water tested positive
for drugs use while the others, who did not drink, tested negative.
Marcelino surmised that their arrest was due to a misunderstanding he had with a former police officer named Rey
who bought a VCD player from his shop. He specifically instructed Rey not to let anyone repair the VCD player
should it malfunction. However, when the VCD player malfunctioned, Rey had it repaired by somebody else, hence
Marcelino refused to accept the VCD player and return Rey’s money. This earned the ire of Rey who threatened
him with the words "Humanda ka pagbalik ko."17
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision18 dated December 7, 2005, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 13781-D, finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan and MYRA COLLADO y
Senica GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (sale of dangerous
drug) and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
Additionally, the two accused are ordered to pay a fine of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) EACH.
In Crim. Case No. 13782-D, judgment is rendered finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan and
MYRA COLLADO y Senica NOT GUILTY of the crime of violation of Section 6.
565
In Crim. Case No. 13783-D, finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan GUILTY of the offense of
violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS.
The accused Marcelino Collado is also ordered to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00).
In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused MELODY APELO y Roman, MARK
CIPRIANO y Rocero, MARWIN ABACHE y Aquilino, MICHAEL ANGELO SUMULONG y Belarmino, JAY
MADARANG y Gomez, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO y Enrique and REYNALDO RANADA y Alas GUILTY of the
offense of violation of Section 14 of R.A. 9165 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS imprisonment. Each of them is also
ordered to pay a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).
Let the shabu and paraphernalia alleged to be the subject[s] of the Information be turned over and delivered
immediately to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.19
Accused Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang applied for probation.20 Hence, only Marcelino, Myra, Cirpriano,
Latario and Ranada appealed to the CA.21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful considering that they were caught in
the act of committing a crime.22 Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of Marcelino and Myra for violation of Section
5 of RA 9165 (sale of dangerous drugs), as well as the conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section 11 of RA
9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs). Anent the violation of Section 14 of RA 9165 (possession of drug
paraphernalia), the CA affirmed the conviction of Ranada as he was caught having custody and control of a drug
paraphernalia intended for smoking and injecting illegal drugs into one’s body.23 As regards Cipriano and Latario,
as well as the other accused Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang, the CA found them guilty not as principals
but only as accessories.
Thus, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court’s Decision through a Decision24 dated February
28, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with respect to the conviction and imposition of the respective
penalties against the following: (A) appellants Marcelino Collado and Myra Collado in Crim. Case No. 13781-D25 for
violation of Section 5, Article II, RA No. 9165; (B) appellant Marcelino Collado in Crim. Case No. 13783-D for
violation of Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165; (C) appellant Reynaldo Ranada in Crim. Case No. 13784-D for
violation of Section 14, Article II, RA No. 9165.
In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, MODIFICATION is hereby ordered as to appellants Mark Cipriano and Samuel
Sherwin Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael Angelo Sumulong and Jay
Madarang – insofar as they were found GUILTY, not as principals, but as ACCESSORIES in the offense of
violation of Section 14, Article II of RA No. 9165, in relation to the aforecited provision of the Revised Penal Code.
Each of them shall suffer the straight penalty of Four (4) Months of arresto mayor. The fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
already imposed by the trial court upon each of them is MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.26
Not satisfied, the appellants are now before this Court arguing that irregularities attended their arrest and detention
as well as the procedure in handling the specimen allegedly seized from them. Because of these, they assert that
their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appealed Decision should be affirmed, with modification.
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must
be upheld in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overturn the
same.
Appellants question the validity of the buy-bust operation and point out the following irregularities which they claim
attended its conduct: (1) lack of warrant of arrest; (2) non-compliance with the procedures laid down under Section
21 of RA 9165; and, (3) the alleged extortion of money from them by PO2 Noble in exchange for dropping the
charges against them. Due to these irregularities, appellants argue that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties accorded to police officers does not apply in this case.
Lack of a warrant of arrest
Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal since it was not
supported by a valid warrant. They thus posit that their right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated.27
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
566
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two
requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer."28 A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one
made after conducting a buy-bust operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto
made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra
performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and
custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police
officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually committing the
said crimes.
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question the
validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment. Neither did they
take steps to quash the Informations on such ground.29 They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the
appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by
them.30
Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."31 This proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. 32
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search
was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search
and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants’ claim of unreasonable search and
seizure must fail.1âwphi1
Extortion
Appellants aver that PO2 Noble tried to extort money from them in exchange for dropping the drug charges against
them.
The defense of extortion and/or frame-up is often put up in drugs cases in order to cast doubt on the credibility of
police officers. This is a serious imputation of a crime hence clear and convincing evidence must be presented to
support the same. There must also be a showing that the police officers were inspired by improper motive. In this
case, we find such imputation unfounded.
In People v. Capalad,33 this Court held thus:
Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus, cautious in dealing with
such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
police officers’ duties. To substantiate such defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear
and convincing and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or
were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full
faith and credit.
Here, aside from Marcelino’s self-serving testimony, appellants’ claim of extortion is not substantiated by other
convincing evidence. Neither was it established during trial that PO2 Noble or the other members of the buy-bust
team were impelled by improper motive. Appellants’ allegation that PO2 Noble and his team arrested them
because of Marcelino’s previous misunderstanding with a certain retired policeman named Rey deserves no
credence. No evidence was presented to show any connection between Rey and the buy-bust team. It was not
even shown by the defense who this person Rey really is. Also, it is highly unlikely that a team of police officers
would pursue a surveillance, conduct a buy-bust operation, and arrest all the accused for a measly P1,000.00 VCD
player. In view of these, appellants’ allegation of extortion and improper motive deserves no credence.
Chain of Custody
Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 was not followed. They specifically harp on
the fact that the confiscated drugs were not photographed and inventoried. Moreover, they contend that the police
officers who handled the seized specimen were not presented in court to testify on the condition in which they
received the said specimen. For the appellants, these defects constitute a clear break in the chain of custody and,
consequently, the prosecution failed to establish corpus delicti.34
The Court, however, finds this argument unmeritorious.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated drugs, to
wit:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
This rule is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, viz:
567
a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/ team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the above-cited provisions, this Court has consistently ruled that the failure of the police officers to
inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecution’s cause,35 provided that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved, as in this case. Here, PO2 Noble, after
apprehending Marcelino and confiscating from him the sachets of shabu, immediately placed his markings on
them. He testified thus:
PROSECUTOR PAZ:
Q: What did you do with that sachet containing white substance that was bought from Marcelino and the one that
you were able to confiscate from him?
A: I put my markings.
Q: What were those markings?
A: MCC-RNN October 9, 2004.36
In the Request for Laboratory Examination37 the seized items were listed and inventoried. After the conduct of the
laboratory examination, Chemistry Report No. D-807-0438 revealed that the contents of the said sachets tested
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Moreover, it is of no moment that Forensic Chemist Alejandro De Guzman who conducted the laboratory
examination was not presented as a witness. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons who had custody
of the illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the prosecution.39 There is no requirement for the prosecution to
present as witness in a drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the
seizure of the prohibited drugs from him.40 To stress, the implementing rules are clear that non-compliance with the
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.41
Criminal Case No. 13784-D
With regard to Criminal Case No. 13784-D for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, we find it imperative to re-
examine the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
The RTC’s findings are as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution clearly shows that certain things or paraphernalia which are fit or intended [for]
smoking shabu were found in the house of the accused Marcelino and Myra Collado on the same occasion that the
said spouses were arrested by the police officers. This fact makes all the accused without exception liable for
violation of Section 14. While it was only Reynaldo Ranada who was caught having in his possession an item used
in smoking marijuana, i.e., a strip of aluminum foil x x x and nothing was found in the possession of the other
accused, this fact nonetheless does not render Reynaldo Ranada the only person liable for violation of Section 14.
[Take note] that the law speaks not only of possession but also of having under one’s control the paraphernalia
intended for smoking. In the instant case, the paraphernalia were found by the police on top of the table around
which the accused were gathered. Hence, even if the x x x accused other than Ranada did not have in their
possession any of the paraphernalia, it can, however, be said that the paraphernalia found on top of the table were
under their control. x x x42
Thus, the RTC found Ranada, Cipriano, Latario, Apelo Abache, Sumulong and Madarang all equally guilty of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia.
On appeal, however, the CA found Ranada guilty as principal while Cipriano, Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong
and Madarang were adjudged as accessories only for the crime of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. The
CA ratiocinated thus:
On the one hand, we sustain the conviction of Rañada in Crim. Case 13784-D. He was actually caught having
custody and control of the confiscated drug paraphenalia intended for smoking, injecting, etc. into one’s body. It
was also indubitably shown that he failed to present authority to possess the prohibited articles, much less, an
explanation of his possession thereof. However, as regards the other accused who were seen in the company of
Rañada, the evidence of conspiracy against them was insufficient.
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt
act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended.
It may be that appellants Mark Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin Latario and co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin
Abache, Michael Angelo Sumulong, Jay Madarang were in close proximity [to] Rañada at the time and place of the
incident. But mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy. The prosecution failed to show
specific overt acts that would link these accused to Ranada’s possession of the said contrabands. As to why they
were there [in] the vicinity of the crime scene was not explained. They could be mere innocent onlookers although
they were aware of the illegality of the principal’s acts.
568
In any event, appellants Cipriano and Latario and the rest of the accused cannot be totally A-
exonerated.1âwphi1 [However, we] downgrade their culpability corresponding to their criminal design and
participation. Evidently, they are guilty as accessories who, according to paragraph 1, Article 19 of the Revised Some were seated, some were standing and there was x x x smoke.
Penal Code, are criminally liable by ‘profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime’.43
Q-

We find that the CA erred in convicting Cipriano, Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang as accessories.
Where was this smoke coming from?
As pointed out by Justice Arturo D. Brion:
A-
"[I]llegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs during
parties, social gatherings or meetings under Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of malum prohibitum, that is,
the act is made wrong or evil because there is a law prohibiting it. x x x I did not see where the smoke [was] coming from because some of the persons were blocking [my view].

Since violation of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of mala prohibita, the degree of participation of the Q-
offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the prohibited act are penalized to the same extent. There is no
principal or accomplice or accessory to consider. In short, the degree of participation of the offenders does not About how many persons were inside who were seated and who were standing?
affect their liability, and the penalty on all of them are the same whether they are principals or merely accomplices
or accessories.44 A-

In addition, Section 98 of RA 9165 specifically provides that "[n]otwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the Seven (7).
contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of
this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life Q-
imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death." It is therefore clear that the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 19 on Accessories, cannot be applied in determining the degree of
Will you tell us if they are male or female or both?
participation and criminal liability of Ranada’s co-accused.

A-
At any rate, this Court is convinced that only Ranada should be held liable for violation of Section 14 of RA 9165. It
is clear that it was only Ranada who was caught having in his possession an aluminum foil intended for using
dangerous drugs.45 As to the other co-accused, namely Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Six (6) male persons and one (1) female.
Sumulong, not one drug paraphernalia was found in their possession. The police officers were only able to find the
other drug paraphernalia scattered on top of a table. It is already established that there was no conspiracy between Q-
Ranada and the other co-accused. As the CA correctly held, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
imply conspiracy.46 What are these persons who were seated inside the house doing?

PO2 Noble, when placed on the witness stand, only testified as follows: A-

A- They were allegedly engaged in drug session.

While I was checking the item that I bought, I saw several persons inside their house. COURT:

Q- Q-

What were these persons doing? What do you mean allegedly?

569
A- Q-

Because there was smoke and I did not see what they were using. So, nothing was confiscated in the person of all other accused except for Ranada?

PROSECUTOR PAZ: A-

Q- Yes, sir.48

What about those who were standing, what were they doing? Therefore, Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong should be acquitted of the charge of
violation of Section 14, RA 9165 on possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
A- dangerous drugs.

The persons who were standing were looking at the persons who were sitting. I could not see them clearly because All told, this Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the police officers
some of them were blocking my view. involved in this case. The defense was not able to show by clear and convincing evidence why the presumption
should be overturned. The prosecution, on the other hand, was able to establish that Marcelino, Myra and Ranada
committed the crimes imputed against them, they having been caught in flagrante delicto. This Court, being
Q-
convinced that the guilt of Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, must uphold
their conviction.
How far were they, those who were seated and those who were standing?
As to Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong, the Court finds that they should be acquitted of
A- the offense of violation of Section 14, Article II, RA 9165, since the prosecution was not able to clearly show
specific overt acts that would prove that they were in possession of drug paraphernalia.
They were close to each other.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The February 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Q- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02626 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Mark Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin
Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael Angelo Sumulong, and Jay Madarang are
How long did you take a look at these persons inside the house? hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section 14, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. They are ordered
released unless they are being lawfully held for some other cause.
A-
SO ORDERED.
Only for a while, only for a glance, sir.47
G.R. No. 175604 April 10, 2008
On the other hand, SPO2 Bernardo Cruz testified that it was only Ranada who was caught holding the aluminum
foil, viz: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
Q- SALVADOR PEÑAFLORIDA, JR., Y CLIDORO, appellant.

How about the aluminum foil that you recovered from another? DECISION

A- TINGA, J.:

I saw him holding the strip of aluminum foil, sir.

570
Subject of this appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01219, dated 31 July 2006,
affirming in toto the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. T-
1476. The trial court found appellant Salvador Peñaflorida y Clidoro guilty of transporting marijuana and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos.
The Information against appellant reads:
That on or about the 7th day of June, 1994, in the afternoon thereat, at Barangay Huyon-huyon,
Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to sell, possess and to deliver with the use of a
bicycle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody, [o]ne bundle estimated to be one (1) kilo more or less, of dried marijuana leaves (Indian Hemp)
without the necessary license, permit or authority to sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug from a competent officer as required by law.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Two police officers and one forensic chemist testified for the prosecution.
SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente) narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and Operation
Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an
asset that a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in
Tigaon, Camarines Sur.4 Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then organized a team
composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Ricardo Callo (Callo), SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar
Latam. The team boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon.5 They
overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped
in a cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in
appellant's possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was
then brought to the headquarters where he was booked. 6
Callo, who was the chief intelligence officer of Tigaon PNP, recounted that at around 1:00 p.m. on 7 June 1994, he
was called by Competente and was briefed about the operation. While they were in Nasulan, the members of the
police team caught a man riding a bicycle who turned out to be appellant. Callo saw the marijuana wrapped in a
cellophane and newspaper in the bicycle of appellant so the latter was brought to the police headquarters and
turned over to the desk officer. 7
Major Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory Regional Office No. V, was presented
as an expert witness to identify the subject marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a representative sample
from the 928-gram confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested positive of marijuana. The findings were reflected
in Chemistry Report No. D-26-94 dated 9 June 1994.8
Appellant denied the accusations against him. Appellant, who is a resident of Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines
Sur, testified that in the morning of 7 June 1994, he first went to the house of Igmidio Miranda (Miranda) in Sagnay,
Camarines Sur. The latter accompanied appellant to the house of Arnel Dadis in San Francisco, Tigaon to buy a
dog. They, however, failed to get the dog; prompting them to leave. On their way home, they met Boyet Obias
(Obias) who requested appellant to bring a package wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy Gonzales
(Gonzales).9 Appellant placed it in the basket in front of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town
proper. He and Miranda parted ways when they reached the place. Appellant dropped by the grocery store and the
blacksmith to get his scythe. On his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was invited to go with them
to the headquarters. Upon inspection of the package in his bicycle, the police discovered the subject marijuana.
Appellant tried to explain that the package was owned by Obias but the police did not believe him. He was sent to
jail.10
Miranda corroborated the testimony of appellant that the two of them went to San Francisco, Tigaon, Camarines
Sur in the morning of 7 June 1994 to buy a dog. On their way back to the town proper of Tigaon, they met Obias
who requested appellant to bring a package, which Miranda thought contained cookies, to Gonzales. Upon
reaching the town proper, they parted ways.11
On 26 October 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known
as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.] is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with law, in case of insolvency for the fine and for him to pay the
costs.
The accused Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.] shall be entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he
agreed to abide with the rules imposed upon convicted person, otherwise, he shall be entitled to four-fifth
(4/5) credit thereof.
The subject marijuana consisting of 928 grams, possession thereof being mala prohibita, the court
hereby orders its confiscation in favor of the Government to be destroyed in accordance with law.
This court, however, hereby recommends to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, through the
Honorable Secretary of Justice to commute the above penalty herein imposed, being too harsh;
accordingly, the said penalty imposed to accused Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr] shall be six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.12
In convicting appellant, the trial court lent credence to the testimonies of the police officers, thus:
571
 Now going over the evidence adduced, the court is convinced that the accused Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.]
committed the offense of illegal possession of 928 grams of marijuana, if not, of transporting it, as
charged. This is so, because it appears undisputed that on June 7, 1994, at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon police officers Vicente Competente and his four (4) other co-police officers apprehended the
accused Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.] on the roadside at Nasulan, Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur [,]
then riding on his bicycle and placed on the still structure at its front, a thing wrapped in a newspaper and
found to be 928 grams of marijuana. No ill-motive has been presented by the defense against the police
officers Vicente Competente and companions by falsely testifying against the accused Salvador
Peñaflorida, Jr. So, the conclusion is inevitable that the presumption that the police officers were in the
regular performance of their duties apply. The confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case
and the arrest of the accused Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.] by the said police officers being lawful, having
been caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for the warrant for the seizure of the fruit of the crime,
the same being incidental to the lawful arrest. Rightly so, because a person caught illegally possessing or
transporting drugs is subject to the warrantless search. Besides, object in the "plain view" of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.13
In view of the penalty imposed, the case was directly appealed to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to our
decision in People v. Mateo,14 however, this case was referred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed appellant's conviction on 31 July 2006.
In a Resolution15 dated 14 February 2007, the parties were given to file their supplemental briefs, if they so desire.
Both parties manifested their intention not to file any supplemental brief since all the issues and arguments have
already been raised in their respective briefs.16
Hence, the instant case is now before this Court on automatic review.
In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had freely and consciously possessed
marijuana. First, he claims that the alleged asset did not name the person who would transport the marijuana to
Huyon-huyon. In view of the "vague" information supplied by the asset, the latter should have been presented in
court. Second, upon receipt of the information from the asset, the police officers should have first investigated and
tried to obtain a warrant of arrest against appellant, instead of arbitrarily arresting him. Third, appellant maintains
that he is not aware of the contents of the package. Fourth, upon arrival at the headquarters, the police did not
determine the contents and weight of the package. Fifth, appellant argues that the findings of the forensic expert
are questionable because there is doubt as to the identity of the package examined.17
Prefatorily, factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witness' credibility are entitled to
great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirm the findings.18 Indeed, the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since it has observed firsthand their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grilling examination.19 After a review of the records of this case, we find no cogent
reason to disregard this time-honored principle.
We shall retrace the series of events leading to the arrest of appellant and resolve the issues raised by him.
Acting on an asset's tip, a police team was organized to apprehend appellant who was allegedly about to transport
the subject marijuana. Appellant is wrong in concluding that the asset did not name appellant. As early as 16
November 1996, appellant through counsel had already conceded in his Memorandum 20 filed with the trial court
that based on the tip, he was about to transport the contraband. It further cited excerpts from the result of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the judge on Competente, and we quote:
Q: Did your [a]sset tell you the place and the person or persons involved?
A: Yes[,]sir.
Q: Where and who?
A: He said that marijuana is being transported from Tigaon town to Bgy. Huyon-huyon by Salvador
Peñaflorida, Jr.21
Moreover, on cross-examination, the defense counsel even assumed that according to the asset's tip it was
appellant who was assigned to deliver the contraband. And the witness under cross-examination affirmed it was
indeed appellant who would be making the delivery according to the tip:
Q: Will you inform this Honorable Court who has given you the tip that the accused was going to
deliver that marijuana[?] [W]ho is [this] person?
A: It was a confidential tip.
Q: Now, but [sic] on June 1 you were in your office?
A: Yes[,] sir[.] I was in the office.
Q: Since your office is just near the Municipal Trial Court of Tigaon and you were given a tip that
Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.] will be delivering marijuana, why did you not get a [w]arrant of [a]rrest?
xxx
Q: The tip that was given to you that it was Salvador Peñaflorida [who] will be dealing marijuana on
that date and according to you Salvador was to travel from a certain town to Tigaon, is that the tip?
A: Yes[,] sir[.] That he would deliver marijuana.
Q: So, at the time that you form[ed] a team, Salvador was nowhere to be seen, you have not seen the
shadow of Salvador?
572
 A: When the tip was given to us[,] I have not seen him[.] [B]ut the tip is he will deliver from Tigaon to A: Yes[,] sir.
Huyon-huyon, that is why we chased him.22 [Emphasis supplied]
Q: Tell us the name of your suspect?
Prescinding from the above argument, appellant insists that the asset should have been presented in court. He
invoked the court ruling in People v. Libag,23 wherein the non-presentation of the informant was fatal to the case of A: Salvador Peñaflorida[,] Jr. y Clidoro.
the prosecution. Libag cannot find application in this case. In that case, the crime charged was the sale
of shabu where the informant himself was a poseur-buyer and a witness to the transaction. His testimony as a
Q: And after stopping the accused in this case, what else did you do[,] if any[,] together with the team?
poseur-buyer was indispensable because it could have helped the trial court in determining whether or not the
appellant had knowledge that the bag contained marijuana, such knowledge being an essential ingredient of the
offense for which he was convicted.24 In this case, however, the asset was not present in the police operation. The A: When we saw the marijuana and other groceries in his bicycle we invited him to the headquarters. 26
rule is that the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative. Callo also confirmed that he saw appellant transporting and in possession of the subject marijuana:
Informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their
invaluable service to the police.25 Q: When you reached there[,] what happened next?

Competente testified that his team caught up with appellant who was riding a bicycle. He saw the marijuana in a A: We have not reached yet [sic] the Huyon-huyon proper. [W]e are in Nasulan when we met the man
package which appellant was carrying inside his basket, thus: who had with him the marijuana.

Q: And so as the team leader x x x and in connection with the instruction of Chief Domingo Agravante, xxx
what did you do?
Q: After you talked with the person with marijuana[,] what happened next?
A: We used the mobile and proceeded to the place, to the route where the marijuana was being
transported. A: We saw on his bicycle a wrap[ped] marijuana.

Q: When you said we to whom are you referring to? Q: Who was in possession of that?

A: The team. A: Salvador Peñaflorida[,] Jr.

Q: Were you able to go to the place as you said? Q: How is that person related to the accused in this case now?

A: Yes, sir. A: He is the one, sir.

Q: So, upon reaching the place, [sic] what place was that? Q: Kindly describe to us the marijuana that you are able to tell that it was marijuana?

A: Sitio Nasulan, Barangay Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur. A: It was wrapped on [cellophane] and newspaper. We saw the edges of the marijuana.

Q: And upon reaching the place together with the other member of the team, what did you find if you Q: For the [record], kindly describe to us the edges of the marijuana[;] its appearance and color.
found any?
A: It was like a shape of ½ ream of coupon bond and the color is green.27
A: We overtook our suspect while riding in a bicycle and we stopped him.
These positive and categorical declarations of two police officers deserve weight and credence in light of the
Q: And did the suspect stop? presumption of regularity accorded to them and the lack of motive on their part to falsely testify against appellant.
573
Appellant resorts to a challenge on the validity of his arrest predicated on lack of a warrant of arrest. The OSG
correctly justifies the failure to apply for an arrest warrant because at that point, time was of the essence in
appellant's apprehension, noting in the same breath that there is no law requiring investigation and surveillance
upon receipt of tips from assets before conducting police operations.28 The police officers succinctly testified on this
point when cross-examined, viz:
Q: Will you inform this Honorable Court who has given you the tip that the accused was going to deliver
that marijuana, who is that person?
A: It was a confidential tip.
Q: Now, but [sic] on June 1 you were in your office?
A: Yes[,] sir[.] I was in the office.
Q: Since your office is just near the Municipal Trial Court of Tigaon and you were given a tip that
Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.] will be delivering marijuana, why did you not get a [w]arrant of [a]rrest from the
court?
A: There was no time to apply for a search warrant because just after the information was received, we
proceeded.
xxx
Q: If that is true, Mr. Competente that you were given a tip, the most that you will do is first see the Judge
of Tigaon in as much as you have not seen yet [sic] the said person carrying marijuana?
A: There was no time for us to apply, because the marijuana is being delivered so we have no more time
to see the Judge.
xxx
Q: Are you aware of the law that illegally confiscated marijuana cannot be used in court?
FISCAL SOLANO: Conclusion of law.
A: Yes, sir[.] [I]f it is illegally confiscated it cannot be used in court.
ATTY. CLEDERA: Despite that prohibition under the rules[,] you insisted in apprehending Salvador
Peñaflorida[,Jr.] without warrant of arrest inspite of the fact that you know that restriction?
A: Our apprehension was in plain view.
Q: How can you see that it was in open view when according to you the house of Salvador is 120
meters[?] [H]ow can you see that distance?
A: I could see that because the marijuana was carried in his bicycle, we have seen it.
Q: In what street?
A: Huyon-huyon[,] Sitio Nasulan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur.
Q: About what time did you see him?
A: 1:00 o'clock sir.
x x x29
The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly,
they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime.
The arrest was effected after appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying
with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed. Under the
circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the
warrantless arrest is justified.
Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker
in any of such transactions. x x x.
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another."30 In the instant case, appellant
was riding his bicycle when he was caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the package,
which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.
Appellant, however, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession contained marijuana. But the trial
court rejected his contention, noting that it was impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the
package because "marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma x x x which would have alarmed him." 31
Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the crime
under R.A. No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or knowledge
thereof is not necessary.32
574
Appellant, in the main, asserts that he did not freely and consciously possess marijuana.33 In criminal cases
involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly
possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his
possession or control of such article. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may
be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and
did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus
possidendi.34
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused
and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a
state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually
must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case. 35
Despite intense grilling from the defense counsel, Arroyo never faltered and was in fact consistent in declaring that
she received the specimen from Agravante on 9 June 1994 and immediately conducted the laboratory test.
Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of one million pesos by virtue of the amendment to Section 4, R.A. No. 6425 by R.A. No. 7659.38
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur,
Branch 30 in Criminal Case No. T-1476, finding appellant Salvador Peñaflorida y Clidoro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), is AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED

Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in the instant case. First, the
marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first readily saw in plain view PEOPLE vs SEMBRANO
the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask
Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do the delivery errand since the package was Accused-appellant MICHAEL SEMBRANO y CASTRO (appellant) is before this Court appealing from the 18 June
wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram. The same observation was reached by the trial court:
2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 02762 captioned People of the Philippines v. Michael Sembrano y
Finally, it is very hard for the court to accept the claim of the accused Salvador Peñaflorida[,Jr.] that he Castro. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction[2] by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC, QC) for the crimes of
does not know that the thing wrapped in a newspaper which Boyet Obias, now dead, requested the
accused Peñaflorida[,Jr.] would deliver to a certain Jimmy Gonzales whose present whereabouts is not illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of Republic Act No.
known, was a marijuana. Its odor is different especially from tobacco. This was observed by the court 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.[3]
during the trial of the case, everytime the wrapper containing the subject marijuana with a volume of 928
grams is brought to court its odor is noticeable. For the accused Peñaflorida[,Jr.], not to notice it is hard to
believe. Rightly so, because marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma very different from The antecedent facts
(and not nauseating) unlike tobacco. This aroma would have alarmed him.36

Furthermore, it appeared from the cross-examination of appellant that Obias was an acquaintance. In the ordinary On 26 July 2004, the operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) of the Novaliches Police Station arrested
course of things, one is expected to inquire about the contents of a wrapped package especially when it is a mere
acquaintance who requests the delivery and, more so, when delivery is to a place some distance away. appellant in broad daylight, in the course of a buy-bust operation and after a follow-up search on him.

Anent appellant's claim that the package examined by Arroyo was not the one confiscated from him, the appellate
court had this to say: On 28 July 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City in the National Capital Region (QC-NCR) filed two
separate Informations against him for (1) illegal sale and (2) illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug. The two cases
SPO3 Competente testified that marijuana was confiscated from appellant. The pictures of appellant,
together with the items seized from him, depict a package containing dry leaves suspected to be were raffled to Branch 82 of the RTC, QC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-04-128370 and Q-04-128371, imputing the
marijuana. On the other hand, Forensic Chemist Arroyo testified that the specimen she examined was following acts against him:
delivered to her by Major Agravante on June 9, 1994 or two days after the apprehension. From these
series of events, it can be inferred that the package confiscated from appellant and the specimen
delivered to Forensic Chemist Arroyo for laboratory examination were one and the same.37
Criminal Case No. Q-04-128370

575
 That on or about the 26th day of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there,
willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, They waited until appellant arrived at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon. Upon appellants arrival, the confidential informant
zero point twelve (0.12) gram of white crystalline substance containing of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[4] introduced PO1 Manaol to him as an interested buyer of shabu. PO1 Manaol handed the two marked One Hundred Peso bills
to appellant, who, in turn, handed one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to him. The transaction having
Criminal Case No. Q-04-128371
been consummated, PO1 Manaol executed their pre-arranged signal and scratched his head. When the other members of the
That on or about the 26th
day of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being team saw PO1 Manaol execute the pre-arranged signal, they immediately proceeded to their location and arrested appellant.
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his/her/their possession and control, zero point twenty seven (0.27) gram of white crystalline
substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[5]
PO1 Manaol recovered the suspected shabu subject of the sale from appellant and placed his initials JAM thereon. PO1 Bagay
was also able to retrieve the buy-bust money from appellants right hand. A follow-up frisk on appellant resulted in the
Sembrano was arraigned on 19 April 2005 and with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges.[6] Pre-trial
confiscation of two other plastic sachets of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, from the right hand pocket of
proceedings having been terminated, trial on the merits ensued.
his shorts. Immediately after retrieving the evidence, PO1 Bagay marked the confiscated sachets with his initials KJB.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jomar Manaol;
and (2) Police Officer 1 (PO1) Kingly James Bagay.
After his arrest, the police officers took appellant to the police station where he was turned over to the desk officer and to the
on-duty investigator. PO1 Bagay, who had custody of the confiscated evidence, turned over the seized three (3) plastic sachets
The combined testimonies of PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay sought to establish that at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of
of white crystalline substance to the investigator. PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest and signed
26 July 2004, an informant of the police arrived at the SAID of the Novaliches Police Station. The confidential informant relayed
the Inventory of Seized Drugs/Item prepared by SPO1 Cesar Futol.
information regarding illicit drugs trade operations conducted by a certain Michael Sembrano alias Takol in the area of Gulod
in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The confiscated items were transmitted on the same day by the investigator on-duty, through PO1 Salonga, PO1 Manaol and
PO1 Bagay to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.
Superintendent (Supt.) Ramon Perez, head of SAID, formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Jomar Manaol, SPO1 Cesar
Futol, PO1 Kingly James Bagay, PO1 Neil John Dumlao, and PO1 Fernando Salonga. SPO1 Futol prepared the pre-operation
A forensic examination of the contents of the seized sachets as conducted by Police Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Leonard T.
report for the team. The group then proceeded to Ignacio Street corner Villareal Street in Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City for
Arban, Forensic Chemical Officer yielded the following results in Chemistry Report No. D-698-04:
the entrapment operation.
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing white crystalline substance with the
The group arrived at the designated area at around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. PO1 Manaol was designated poseur-buyer. He following markings and recorded net weights:
was handed two (2) One Hundred Peso bills which he marked with his initials JAM on the lower right side thereof, right below A (JAM - MCS) = 0.12 gram
B (KJB MCS1) = 0.10 gram
the image of the Philippine Flag. PO1 Manaol, together with the confidential informant, then proceeded to the target site. The C (KJB MCS2) = 0.17 gram
other members of the team, including witness PO1 Bagay, acted as back-up and positioned themselves about twenty-five
FINDINGS:
meters away from where PO1 Manaol and the confidential informant were.
576
 Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the tests for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[7] illegality of appellants arrest. The defense also attacked the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, claiming their stories are

Expectedly, the defense had an entirely different version, with Sembrano testifying on the witness stand. He narrated that unbelievable
at and should have led to the dismissal of the charges.

around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of 26 July 2004; he was buying lumber somewhere along Quirino Highway in
According credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on 18 June 2008, where
Novaliches, Quezon City, when a maroon Tamaraw FX stopped in front of him. The occupants thereof, PO1 Bagay and PO1
Manaol, alighted from the vehicle and arrested him. After being arrested, the police officers took him to Station 4 whereupon the appellate court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial court, but reduced the penalty imposed in the illegal

he was required to sign a document. Sembrano learned later on that the police officers filed a case against him for violation possession
of case to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[9]
Republic Act No. 9165. When asked on the witness stand if he knew the two police officers, Sembrano answered in the
affirmative, having met the two since he had been their police asset since 23 April 2003. In support of his claim, Sembrano
Appellant is now appealing his conviction to this Court, as a final recourse, praying that he be absolved of the charges. Instead
presented a copy of an Oath of Loyalty and Agents Agreement to prove he was indeed a police asset. On cross examination,
of filing supplemental briefs, the defense and the prosecution adopted the arguments in their respective appellate briefs
however, he testified that the police officers he mentioned were not signatories to the Oath of Loyalty and Agents Agreement
submitted before the Court of Appeals.
he presented in court.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-04-128370 and Q-04-128371. Weighing the Thus, this Court is tasked to resolve the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS
body of evidence submitted by both parties, the trial court gave little credence to appellants unsubstantiated claim that he was ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE SACHETS OF SHABU ALLEGEDLY
RECOVERED FROM HIM WERE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
a police asset and ascertained that the prosecution established all the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of a
dangerous or prohibited drug. II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

Thus, in its Decision dated 14 February 2007, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows: III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

The defense challenges the RTC and Court of Appeals rulings, anchored on its claim that the warrantless arrest against
a) Re: Criminal Case No. Q-0-4128370, accused MICHAEL SEMBRANO is hereby found guilty beyond appellant was unlawful. Consequently, applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, any evidence allegedly obtained during
reasonable doubt a (sic) of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of such unlawful warrantless arrest cannot be used as evidence. The defense proffers that the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) PESOS;
appellant during the buy-bust operation should have been declared inadmissible. Alleging he is a victim of frame-up by the
b) Re: Criminal Case No. Q-04-128371, said accused is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt police officers, appellant attacks the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In sum, appellant seeks acquittal on the ground
of violation of Section 11, Article II of the same Act and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and one (1) DAY as MINIMUM to that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as MAXIMUM and to pay a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS.[8] Coming from an entirely different perspective, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the prosecution, disagrees
Seeking recourse from his conviction by the trial court, the appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Notice with
of the aforementioned contentions from the defense side. It counters that the sachets of shabu were seized from appellant
Appeal. Insisting on his innocence, the defense questioned the admissibility of the confiscated evidence on the ground during
of a buy-bust operation. Thus, any opposition thereto with respect to its admissibility on the ground that said sachets were
577
seized during an illegal arrest is unfounded. As for the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the testimony of the poseur-
by appellant was marked by PO2 Manaol with his initials, while the other two sachets were marked by PO1 Bagay with his
buyer, in particular, was corroborated by the police operatives on material points.
initials. PO1 Bagay, who had custody of the seized evidence, brought confiscated three plastic sachets of white crystalline

substance to the police station and turned over to the investigator. At the police station, an Inventory of Seized Drugs/Item was
We find no merit in the appeal.
prepared by SPO1 Cesar Futol and signed by PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay. The investigator on duty, to whom the seized

evidence were encrusted by PO1 Bagay, through PO1 Salonga, PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay, turned over the evidence to the
Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs if the following elements
PNP-Crime Laboratory for forensic examination on the same day he received the items. In a Chemistry Report released by
are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
P/S Insp. Leonard T. Arban, the white crystalline substance taken from the three sachets proved positive for shabu.
and the payment thereto.[10] What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the

presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug.[11] We reiterate the meaning of the term corpus delicti which is the
PO1 Manaol, the poseur-buyer, positively identified Sembrano as the person who sold and handed him the sachet
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.[12]
containing white crystalline substance, proven to be shabu.[13]

Having weighed the arguments and evidence propounded by the defense and the prosecution, this Court is satisfied
On the legality of the warrantless arrest, We reiterate that appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation
that the prosecution discharged its burden of establishing all the elements of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs and
where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu.When an arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not
proved appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
required that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court

allowing warrantless arrests, to wit:

The collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence offered in court, provide

a detailed picture of the sequence of events leading to the consummation of the transaction, the very moment PO1 Manaol
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
received the drug from accused-appellant, the seller. The foregoing is the very corpus delicti of the offense. a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
Whatever doubt concerning appellants culpability is now beyond question after he was caught in a buy-bust operation

conducted by the operatives of the Novaliches Police Station in the afternoon of 26 July 2004 along Villareal Street. xxx

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto delivering 0.12 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to PO2 A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode

Manaol, the poseur-buyer, for a consideration of P200.00. Upon frisking after his arrest, another 0.27 gram of
of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation,
[14]

such as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search
methamphetamine hydrochloride were recovered from him. It is clear from the evidence on record that the sachet of shabu sold

578
and seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1)

arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity.[15] Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during the
the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not

legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were properly admitted in evidence against him. [16] authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.[20] All the aforesaid elements were

established. Incident to his lawful arrest resulting from the buy-bust operation, appellant was likewise found to have in his

Appellants defenses of denial and frame-up are both self-serving and uncorroborated, and must fail in light possession
of 0.27 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, the same kind of dangerous drug he was caught selling in

straightforward and positive testimony of poseur-buyer identifying him as the seller of shabu. The twin defenses of denial and
flagrante delicto. There is nothing on record to show that he had legal authority to possess the same. Finally, this Court held in

frame-up hold little weight vis--vis the strong evidence gathered by the prosecution in proving his complicity to the offenses. To
a number of cases, as in People v. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, 15 January 2010, citing People v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521, 551 (2003),

recall, PO1 Manaols testimony was corroborated on material points by PO1 Bagay, who identified appellant as the one who
mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to

handed the sachet of shabu to PO1 Manaol after being handed two (2) One Hundred Peso bills. Contrary to the defenses
convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain

claim, it is not impossible for a buy-bust operation to be conducted in broad daylight, as in the case at bar. Frame-up, like
the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

denial, is viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted.[17] We now determine the imposable penalties.

Finally, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident

by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a The sale of shabu is punishable under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:

regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.[18] In this regard, the defense failed to show any ill motive or odious
intent on the part of the police operatives to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an
innocent person, such as in the case of appellant. Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up charges against him, it remains
a question why no administrative charges were brought against the police operatives. Moreover, in weighing the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses vis--vis those of the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions. x x x

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed
Under the provisions of said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, e.g. shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity,
on appeal.[19] carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).[21] With the effectivity, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been
On the merits of allegations of illegal possession of shabu, We find, likewise, against appellant and sustain the
proscribed. In this regard, the penalty applicable to Sembrano shall only be life imprisonment and fine without eligibility for
findings of the RTC and Court of Appeals.
parole. This Court thus sustains the penalty imposed by the RTC and later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-128370.
579
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the 18 June 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No.
On the other hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs is penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
02762, finding appellant MICHAEL SEMBRANO y CASTRO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal sale and
No. 9165, to wit: illegal possession of dangerous drugs is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-128371, for illegal
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, of Republic Act No. 9165. The penalties imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
04-128370, for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 15, of Republic Act No. 9165, is sustained.
x x x Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:
SO ORDERED.
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities PEOPLE VS RACHO
of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
DECISION
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
NACHURA, J.:
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of
marijuana x x x.

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the
The foregoing provision specifically states that illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of said dangerous drug
Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Joint Decision[3]dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).[22] The evidence adduced by the prosecution
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-128371 established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, without any legal authority, had in his
possession 0.27 gram of shabu or less than five (5) grams of dangerous drug.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall below the
minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law. Taking the
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase
foregoing into consideration, We find that the Court of Appeals erred in imposing the penalty of Three Hundred Thousand
of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed
Pesos (P300,000.00) fine and imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years only. Thus, the penalty of twelve
of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) imposed by the
local police force to apprehend the appellant.[4] The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical
RTC is proper.
description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.

580
 On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day,
a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the
person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a
tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached
him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation,
but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,
yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.[5]
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to
Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test
and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[6]
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or
delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions
of which read:
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously
and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as Shabu, a regulated drug without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the
said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering
dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper
authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about
their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As
to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was
riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought
him to the police station for investigation.[9]
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment[10] convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted
him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. [11]
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,[12] appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the
specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his
arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet
on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled
to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed
such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case.[13]
581
 3. Search of a moving vehicle;
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and, 4. Consented warrantless search;
consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were 5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. This Court is clothed
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with
searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]
the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[14]
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act of actually
committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find that appellant
Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as
can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless
it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search;
fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the
generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[21] Thus, given
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing
the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant.
whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. [15]
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[22]
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.[16]
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the
established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any
formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the
purpose in any proceeding.[17] Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at
2. Search of evidence in plain view;
582
around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he
pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small
sachet containing the suspected drug.[23] The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and
the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on
the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant
that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether
that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.[24] We find no cogent reason to
depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v. Tudtud,[26] and People v. Nuevas.[27]
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving
from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team
and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory
Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to
the team members the woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached
her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending
officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.[28]
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City, received a
report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted
surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On
August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later
that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted
themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded
marijuana leaves.[29]
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 54 in height,
25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would
make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and
informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag
contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused
disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male
persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced
themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag
turned out to be marijuana leaves.[30]
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate
probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did
the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus
and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were
583
it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary
have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the
law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information sufficient to justify a search were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement.
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers
Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v. Lising,[34] People v. Montilla,[35] People v. to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish
Valdez,[36] and People v. Gonzales.[37] In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.
Truly, the end never justifies the means.[42]
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had
committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-
in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches.[38]
H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite
evidence.
warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
tipped information on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless
description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19),
the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons
there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity
for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
to apply for a warrant.[39]

No costs.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible
SO ORDERED
in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. PEOPLE vs BIYOC

DECISION
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus,
an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only
The February 28, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry
of San Mateo, Rizal[2] convicting appellant Rodolfo Biyoc y Wenceslao for qualified rape is on final review before this
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. [40]
Court.
The accusatory portion of the Information charging appellant with qualified rape reads:
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,[41] That on or about the 5th day of December, 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
584
 named accused, having moral ascendancy over the complainant, [AAA], [3] the latter being
his daughter by means of force, coercion and intimidation, with lewd design and with intent to PO1 Javier, together with AAA and CCC thereafter proceeded to the family home, and on their way, they
cause, gratify his sexual desire or abuse and maltreat complainant [AAA], a minor, 11 years old, met appellant. PO1 Javier at once informed him of his rights, arrested him, and brought him to the police
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said
complainant against her will and without her consent which debases, degrades or demeans the station.[8] AAAs and CCCs statements were thereupon taken.[9]
intrinsic worth and dignity of said child as a human being.

Contrary to law.[4] (Underscoring supplied) On the same day, December 6, 2000, AAA was examined by Dr. Winston Tan, a medico-legal officer
at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The examination revealed the following findings:
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is culled: FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
PHYSICAL BUILT: Light built
At four in the afternoon of December 5, 2000, private complainant AAA was in a room on the second floor of the MENTAL STATUS: Coherent female child
family house at Nawasa Pipeline, Guitnagbayan I, San Mateo, Rizal taking care of her one-year-old sister. Her father, BREAST: Undeveloped
ABDOMEN: Flat and soft
herein appellant, entered the room and touched her genitals, after which he told her to lie down on the floor. PHYSICAL INJURIES: No external signs of application of any form of trauma

GENITAL:
Overcome by fear, AAA did lie down on the floor as told. Appellant at once pulled her short pants down PUBLIC HAIR: Lanugo-type growth
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and coaptated
and touched her genitals again, after which he went on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her LABIA MINORA: Pinkish brown
vagina. Appellant was not able to fully penetrate AAAs vagina, however, as her elder sister BBB went up the second HYMEN: Presence of deep healed laceration at
7 oclock position
floor and saw appellant sitting in front of AAA who was lying down, face up. Appellant immediately warned BBB not
to tell their mother about what she just saw.[5] After BBB left, appellant inserted his penis inside AAAs vagina. POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: Sharp
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE:
VAGINAL CANAL:
BBB lost no time to report that same day to her mother CCC, live-in partner of appellant, what she CERVIX:
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: NEGATIVE for spermatozoa and for
saw.[6] CCC thus immediately confronted AAA who did confirm that appellant had inserted his penis inside her vagina gram-negative diplococci.
that afternoon, and that appellant had been doing the same act to her since she was nine years old.Incensed, CCC
CONCLUSION: Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
accompanied AAA the following day, December 6, 2000, to the Department of Social Welfare and Development There are no external signs [sic] of application of any form of physical
trauma.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
(DSWD) to report the incident.[7]

From the DSWD, AAA and her mother, accompanied by a social worker, proceeded to the police station of San
Mateo, Rizal where they lodged a complaint against appellant. At the police station, AAA and CCC were interviewed
by PO1 Florescita S. Javier.
Upon the other hand, appellant gave the following version:
In the afternoon of December 5, 2000, appellant slept on the second floor of their house with his common-
law wife CCC, AAA, and two other younger children.On waking up at four, CCC and one of the younger children were
gone, leaving AAA and a younger sister whom she was taking care of. At five p.m., BBB arrived.Appellant and BBB
585
had an altercation over her and her husband being unemployed and their continued stay in the family house, causing
financial difficulties to the family. BBB had thus a grudge against him on account of which he surmised that she gave
a false report to her mother.
Appellant added that CCC and AAA filed the charge against him because he was jobless, and constantly
inebriated and when in that state, he would quarrel with CCC and scold his children.
Appellant finally proffered that even if he was aware of the gravity of the offense lodged against him, he
made no attempt to escape which is indicative of his innocence.[11]
By Decision dated June 18, 2002, the trial court found appellant guilty, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Rodolfo Biyoc y Wenceslao GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Rape
(Violation of par. 1 (d), Art. 266-A in relation to Art. 266-B 6th par., (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 8353 and further in relation to Sec. 5 (j) of R.A. 8369) and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the private complainant [AAA] in the amount
of P75,000.00 and P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[12] (Underscoring supplied)
In his Brief,[13] appellant raised only one assignment of error ─ THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE,[14] in support of which, he argued that:
1. The trial court disregarded the fact that the prosecution failed to establish the exact
age of the victim and her relationship to the accused.[15]
2. The trial court did not give weight and credence to the accuseds testimony thereby
depriving him of the presumption of innocence.[16]
3. The trial court did not meet the test of moral certainty required for the conviction of
the accused.[17]
4. The trial court failed to consider the fact that the accuseds arrest was legally
objectionable.[18] (Underscoring supplied)
In his Supplemental Brief which was received by the Court on November 10, 2005, appellant raised
additional assignments of error which may be summarized as follows:
1. The trial court erred in appreciating AAAs testimony that she had long been sexually molested by
appellant, it being hearsay and, in any event, no criminal charges were filed therefor, and
2. The findings in the medico-legal report did not support the claim of the prosecution that AAA was raped
on December 5, 2000.[19]
Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the age of AAA in accordance with the
guidelines laid down by this Court in People v. Pruna, viz:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice
to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost
or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
586
 c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved Q What is the name of your eldest?
is that she is less than 18 years old. A. BBB and [DDD] because they are twins, sir.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of Q. Who is your second?
the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will A. [EEE], [AAA], [FFF], [GGG], [HHH] and [III], sir.
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
xxxx
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken Q. And who were with you at the second floor at the time you slept at 1:30?
against him. A. My wife and my children, sir.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the Q. Who among your children?
victim. [20] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) A. My two (2) youngest children, [AAA] and my wife, sir.[21] (Emphasis supplied)

From the accusatory portion of the information quoted above, AAA was alleged to be 11 years old at the
time of the alleged rape. The certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents were not presented. There is no
showing that the prosecution claimed that the said documents had been lost, destroyed or were otherwise
unavailable, hence, CCCs testifying on AAAs age does not suffice to prove that AAA was below the age of 12.
Since age was not adequately proven, it cannot be used to qualify the offense of rape in this case.
As for appellants relationship to AAA, contrary to his claim that it was not proven, he himself admitted in
open court that she is his daughter.
ATTY. GARILLO:
Q. Mr. Biyoc, where did you reside on December 5, 2000?
A. At Nawasa Pipeline, sir.
Admission in open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and hence conclusive . . . to prove
relationship with the victim.[22]
Respecting appellants claim that his testimony was not credited to thereby deprive him of the presumption
of innocence, the same fails.
Appellants attribution of the filing of the case to his having berated AAAs sister BBB is too shallow to merit
credence. Even assuming that BBB nursed a grudge against him and that CCC was partly responsible in filing the
case, it is contrary to the caring and protective instincts of a daughter and a wife to subject a younger sister and
daughter, respectively, to the rigors of a trial for rape. But even if the two have the unimaginable capacity to subject
AAA to an ordeal as a trial for rape, it would be difficult to even imagine how AAA, a child of tender years, would
subject herself to the psychological stress and humiliation of pursuing the case. More so when the case is against

Q. With whom were you residing in that place? her own father, even if he often scolded her and her siblings. Thus, in a similar case, this Court held:
A. My family sir.
No woman would openly admit that she was raped and consequently subject herself
Q. What is the name of your wife? to an examination of her private parts, undergo the trauma and humiliation of a public trial and
A. [CCC], sir. embarrass herself with the need to narrate in detail how she was raped unless she was in fact
raped. This is especially true when the accusing words are directed against a close
Q. You have sons and daughters? relative, especially the father, as in this case. A young unmarried lass does not ordinarily file a
A. Yes, sir. rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it is not true.

Q. How many are they? xxxx

A. Nine (9) sir.
Parental punishment is not a good reason for a daughter to falsely accuse her father
of rape. Filipino children's reverence and respect for elders is too deeply ingrained in Filipino
587
 children and families. Thus, it would take depravity for a young daughter to concoct such a story
of defloration against her own father unless she had really been aggrieved.
Similarly, the imputation by CASTRO of ill-motive on the part of his wife and mother-
in-law does not persuade us. It is unnatural for a parent, more so for a mother, to use her offspring
as an engine of malice especially if it will subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and even
stigma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to
incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
ba niyang muli ang kanyang ari sa iyong ari, and your answer is like
this. Opo, naipasok na po niya ng kaunti ang kanyang ari sa aking ari, hindi lang
po ito naituloy dahil bigla pong dumating ang aking Ate [BBB] kayat bigla na po
siyang tumayo,[] is that your answer to the question?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, you are telling me that your father was not able to insert his private part into yours
because of the arrival of your Ate [BBB]?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: When your Ate [BBB] arrived, was your father still naked or not?
As for appellants argument that the trial court disregarded the fact that no one actually saw appellant A: No, more sir.
abusing [AAA],[24] the same does not persuade. This Court has consistently pronounced that the lone testimony of
Q: So, you are telling us that your father had dressed up at the time your Ate [BBB] arrived?
the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, suffices to sustain a verdict of conviction,[25] A: He was not naked because he just put out his penis (hindi po nakahubad dahil inilabas lang
niya ang kanyang ari), sir.
. . . the rationale being that owing to the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can
oftentimes be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is the offended party's testimony
(People v. Lor, L-47440-42, September 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 41). Hence, if the testimony of the
offended party is not improbable, a defendant may be convicted on the lone testimony of the
victim.[26]

On appellants not fleeing after his indictment, he needs only to be reminded that
. . . non-flight by itself does not necessarily indicate a clear conscience. It is true that in a good
number of cases, flight of the accused has been taken as an admission of guilt. However, as held
in an equally good number of cases, the non-flight of the accused per se is not proof, much less
a conclusive one, of the accuseds innocence[27]
Respecting the trial courts crediting of AAAs testimony that she had long been sexually molested by
appellant which testimony appellant alleges is hearsay, the same is mere obiter dictum. It neither augments nor
denigrates the trial courts finding that appellant raped AAA beyond reasonable doubt on December 5, 2000.
Q: But you were naked?
A: Only my shorts were removed (shorts lang po and nakatanggal sa akin), sir.
Q: Your shorts was totally taken out of your body?
A: It was lowered up to my knees, sir.
Q: So, it is not true that your father was still on top of your (sic) for quiet some time
because as you claimed, naipasok na po niya ng kaunti and kanyang ari, hindi
lang po ito naituloy dahil bigla pong dumating ang aking Ate [BBB] kayat bigla
napo siyang tumayo?
A: Pagkatapos lumabas ng Ate [BBB] ko, ipinagpatuloy po niya and kanyang ginagawa,
sir.

Q: You did not mention that fact in your statement, Ms. Witness, and not in any part of your
On the alleged inconsistency, attention to which appellant draws, between AAAs claim that appellant had
statement which you narrated to the police officers?
successfully inserted his penis into her vagina and another claim that he was only able to slightly insert it due to BBBs A: Yes, sir, I did not mention it.
arrival, appellant loses sight of the fact that there were two instances on the same occasion in which he was alleged Q: Why?
to have inserted his penis ─ before and after BBBs arrival. A: It was not asked of me (hindi po itinanong sa akin), sir.

Q: And you were asked this question, and I will quote: and panghahalay niya sa iyo xxxx
kahapon petsa 5 ng Disyembre humigit kumulang alas 4:00 ng hapon, naipasok
588
 Q: And you claimed that after your Ate [BBB] went down and after your Ate [BBB] had seen you
and your father upstairs, your father still continued raping you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it took your father quite some time before he was finished raping you?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x[28] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, by AAAs account, appellant at first naipasok . . . po niya kaunti his penis inside her vagina hindi lang
. . . ito naituloy due to the arrival of BBB, but that after BBB left, he successfully inserted his penis inside her vagina.
Respecting the alleged inconsistency, attention to which appellant likewise draws, between AAAs
testimony that he was able to successfully insert his penis inside her vagina to thus cause her pain, and the medico-
legal experts testimony, viz:
Q: Aside from that mere touching, are there any other circumstance or circumstances wherein
you cannot determine contusion, abrasion and hematoma for that matter?
A: Possible that the act was not consummated.,[29] (Underscoring supplied)
the same does not dent his guilt.
The Medico-legal officers finding that [t]here is no external signs [sic] of application of any form of physical
trauma (underscoring supplied) and his above-quoted testimony about the possibility that the act was not
consummated do not rule out the commission of rape. For mere penetration of the labia by the penis is enough to
consummate rape.[30]
In another vein, appellant claims that his arrest was illegal because a warrantless arrest was effected even before
the statement of the private complainant was taken.[31]Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be made
prior to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are considered waived.[32]
We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of
his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court as what was done by the appellants in the instant
case. Not only did they enter their pleas during arraignment, but they also actively participated
during the trial which constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in their arrest. [33] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his arrest before entering his plea, hence, he is
deemed to have waived the same.
In fine, appellant is guilty of Simple Rape, aggravated by relationship.[34]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant, Rodolfo Biyoc Wenceslao, is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under par.1 (a),
Art. 266-A in relation to par. 1, Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to pay private complainant AAA the amounts of P50,000 in civil indemnity, P50,000 in moral
damages and P25,000 in exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
VALDEZ vs PEOPLE
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously
safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[1] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
589
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.[2]
On appeal is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment[4] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) [5] and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum
to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.[6]
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an
Information[7] which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of
La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control
and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing
more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or
prescription from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting
the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor
Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoo (Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along
the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they
noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly
attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house
of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to
open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station
for further investigation.[9]
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas
admitted that he himself brought out the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado.[10] Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents
of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to
open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the purported contents thereof.[11]
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who conducted
the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted
to him for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag, tested positive
of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was
taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose
marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.[12]
590

The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30
p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the
bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brothers
house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly approached him and
asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brothers house. Ordoo then purportedly
requested to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined
them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to
the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination.[13]
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself.
They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied
ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the
prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he
was brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he
who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his friends house, he averred that it was one of the tanodwho
did so at Mercados house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time. [14]
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of no
moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited
drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a
newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the
marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdezs own
testimony.[16]
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected
against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise
contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in
evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of
weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied.[17]

Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and so holds
(1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and
that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.
ordered him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.[15]

II.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. On 28 July 2005, the appellate court
affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of
regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial
court that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. It observed further:
591
 (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[18] Petitioners arrested has committed it; and

warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without
xxx
a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as
earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances
was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the
at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. [20] The tanod did not have
contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the barangay captain. On
probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his
bag and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay captains house.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest stands out just the same.
the arresting officer.[21] Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was
finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is
irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person
had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly,
may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

592
 Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the start, the
conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after
being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. [22] Of
persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz[23] that [f]light alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous.Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a
nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,[24] [t]he phrase in his presence therein, connot[es] penal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable
searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one,
the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application
cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.[25]
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as
sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. [26] If at all, the search most
permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any
suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation,
following Terry v. Ohio,[27] must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be
grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.[28]
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves
allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful.[29] As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following
searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles
(2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a
rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.[30]
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a
crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless
search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless search being
incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained
in Caballes v. Court of Appeals[31]
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search
is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics
of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
593
 presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it
will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the being the very corpus delicti of the crime.[36]
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[32]

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused.[37] There can be no crime
of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.[38] As we discussed in People v. Orteza[39], where we
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when
deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal
petitioners bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public
sale of shabu
officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to
prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken
by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the
proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any
asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within the after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the
presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign
contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.[33] As a result, petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with
is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and
presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official
seizure.[34]
duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
III.
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity
of the corpus delicti.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful
search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to
convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners bag. The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives
failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to
observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur: (1) proof
that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.[35] The
594
 More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies
with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory
on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court
thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of
the shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records only show that he was
taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police station. The Joint Affidavit [40] executed by
the tanod merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to the police station together
with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt[41] issued by the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the
suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioners bag was opened, they
also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The prosecution, despite these material
inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the admission by Laya,
the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police
authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without
justifiable reason, of the police officers who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such
was the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial link in the chain of custody
of the seized marijuana leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for
examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody
over the seized marijuana as such [f]inds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is
denied.[42] We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioners testimony that the marijuana was
taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full context.[43] Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings, although
petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied ownership
thereof.[44] Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of
chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law
enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs.
The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from
the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes possession of the
specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to
prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against
an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon
by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[45] Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used
to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[46] Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two or
more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of
guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty
and is inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.[47]
595

Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as an especially vicious crime,[48] and one of the most
pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society, [49] for those who become addicted to it not only slide into the
ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding members of
society,[50] whereas peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction.[51] Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous
effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully
vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted
to run roughshod over an accuseds right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk
from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of innocence
which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable
doubt must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the highest degree of
diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of
the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious consideration to
certain material issues in the determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some
instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even harass civilians.
Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be [e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[52] In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police
officers and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence,
righteousness and respect for the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of
his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs SANTOS
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2006 in CA-G.R. C.R.-
HC No. 01291 which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 70, in Criminal
Cases No. 12193-D and No. 12194-D, finding accused-appellants Jerry Santos y Macol and Ramon Catoc y Picayo
guilty of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, and finding accused-
appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo guilty of illegal possession of the said prohibited drug, respectively.
On 10 March 2003, two Informations were filed against appellants Jerry Santos y Macol and Ramon Catoc
y Picayo before the RTC of Pasig City, for violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In Criminal Case No. 12193-D, appellants Santos and Catoc allegedly violated Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165[3] in the following manner:
596

On or about March 8, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO3 Carlo Luna, a police
poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3)
centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the
test for methylamphethamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.[4] (Emphasis ours).
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12194-D, appellant Catoc was additionally charged with violation
of Section 11, Article II of the same law,[5] committed as follows:
On or about March 8 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3)
centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the
test for methylamphethamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.[6] (Emphasis ours).
During their arraignment on 19 May 2003, appellants Santos and Catoc pleaded not guilty to the above-
mentioned charges.[7]
On 3 June 2003, the Pre-Trial Conference of the cases was terminated without the prosecution and the
defense agreeing to any stipulation of facts.[8]
On 5 August 2003, the parties, however, agreed to re-open the Pre-Trial Conference and they entered into
a stipulation of facts as to the testimony to be given by the first prosecution witness, Forensic Chemist Police
Inspector (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza Cejes.[9] As contained in the Pre-Trial Order dated 5 August 2003, the parties stipulated
on: (1) the due execution and genuineness of the Request for Laboratory Examination dated 8 March 2003, and the
stamp showing receipt thereof by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) the due execution,
genuineness and truth of the contents of Physical Science Report No. D-405-03E issued by Forensic Chemist P/Insp.
Lourdeliza Cejes, the finding or conclusion appearing on the report, and the signature of the forensic chemist over
her typewritten name appearing therein; and (3) the existence of the plastic sachets, but not their source or origin,
contained in a brown envelope, the contents of which were the subject of the Request for Laboratory Examination.[10]
Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.[11]
The prosecution presented two witnesses: (1) Police Officer (PO)3 Carlo Luna [12] and (2) Senior Police
Officer (SPO)3 Leneal Matias,[13] both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU)[14] of the Pasig City
Police Station.
The defense, on the other hand, presented (1) appellant Jerry Santos y Macol [15]; (2) appellant Ramon
Catoc y Picayo[16]; (3) Maria Violeta Catoc,[17] sister of appellant Catoc; and (4) Eric Santos,[18] brother of appellant
Santos.
The Peoples version of the facts shows that on 8 March 2003, the SDEU operatives of the Pasig City Police
conducted a buy-bust operation in a residential area along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City, on
the basis of reports that a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal drugs in the said locality.[19]Accompanied
by a confidential informant, the police team composed of PO3 Carlo Luna, SPO3 Leneal Matias, PO1 Michael
Espares and PO1 Michael Familara, proceeded to the target area at around 1:15 to 1:20 a.m. on the above-
mentioned date. PO3 Carlo Luna was to act as the poseur-buyer, whereas the other members of the team were to
serve as his backup.[20]
Upon reaching the designated place, PO3 Luna and the informant alighted from their vehicle, while the rest
of the team were left inside.[21] The informant then pointed to two persons standing along the target area, one of
whom was Monching Labo, later identified as appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo.[22] After approaching, the informant
introduced PO3 Luna as a shabu customer to one of the persons, later identified as appellant Jerry Santos y
597
Macol. Appellant Santos then asked PO3 Luna how much worth of shabu he was buying and asked for the
money. PO3 Luna gave appellant Santos the buy-bust money consisting of a pre-marked P100.00
bill.[23]Appellant Santos handed this money to appellant Catoc, who took out from his pocket a sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance,[24]which he handed back to appellant Santos. When
appellant Santos gave the plastic sachet to PO3 Luna, the latter nabbed the former and introduced himself as a
policeman.[25]
At that point, the other members of the team arrived and likewise held and arrested appellant Catoc. SPO3
Matias then ordered appellant Catoc to empty the contents of his pockets. After having done so, another plastic
sachet containing a similar crystalline substance[26] was recovered from appellant Catoc, together with the
marked P100.00 buy-bust money.[27] Immediately thereafter, the policemen marked the two plastic sachets.[28] The
sachet handed by appellant Santos to PO3 Luna was marked with the latters initials CEL, his signature, and
appellant Santoss initials JMS.[29] On the other hand, the sachet recovered from appellant Catoc by SPO3 Matias
was marked with the latters initials LTM, his signature and appellant Catocs initials RPC. [30] The policemen then
informed the appellants of their violations and apprised them of their constitutional rights. [31] Afterwards,
appellants Santos and Catoc were brought to the Pasig City Police Station at Pariancillo Park, Pasig City, for proper
investigation.
PO3 Luna submitted the two plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Eastern Police District in Mandaluyong City for an examination of the contents thereof.[32] The
laboratory test results as contained in Chemistry Report No. D-405-03E[33] stated the following:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings CEL/JMS 030803 and
RPC/LTM 030803 containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance and marked as A and B
respectively.
xxxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave [a]
POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A and B contains (sic) Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
As expected, the appellants offered a version of the facts that was diametrically opposed to that of the
prosecution. According to them, there was no buy-bust operation to speak of and that prior to their arrests, they were
literally strangers to each other.
Appellant Jerry Santos y Macol testified that on 8 March 2003, at around 12:00 midnight to 1:00 a.m., while
he was watching television at their house at 151 Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Barangay (Brgy.) Rosario, Pasig City,
and was about to sleep, five male persons in civilian clothing suddenly entered and handcuffed him.[34]Santos claimed
that he voluntarily went with the men when they tried to arrest him because his ailing mother, who was then
awakened, was already becoming nervous.[35] Santos was brought outside and placed in a tricycle, and the entire
group left for the police station. There, Santos was detained and questioned about the marked money, which he said
he knew nothing about. Santos was then charged with the offense of selling illegal drugs in violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.[36] It was also at that time in the police station where he first met appellant Catoc.[37]
For his part, appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo narrated that on 8 March 2003, between the hours of 11:00
p.m. and 12:00 midnight, he awoke to a loud sound at the door of their house at 125 Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue,
Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City.[38] When Catoc opened the door, five male persons with guns entered their house.[39]The
men frisked Catoc and searched his house. After being likewise awakened, Catocs mother asked the men what his
sons fault was. They replied that they were looking for the drugs that Catoc was selling.[40] When their search yielded
nothing, the men mauled Catoc. Afterwards, Catoc was placed in a tricycle and the group headed for a gasoline
598
station along J. E. Manalo Street. There, Catoc was transferred to a parked van; inside the vehicle was appellant
Jerry Santos y Macol, whom the former saw for the first time.[41] The men took the appellants to the police station
in Pariancillo Park where they were again mauled. The policemen who arrested the appellants produced two plastic
sachets of shabu and a P100.00 bill and alleged that the same were taken from Catocs possession. The appellants
were then charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.[42]
On 4 May 2005, the trial court rendered its decision, the pertinent portion of which states:
The Court is more inclined to give credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses given the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to
them by law and jurisprudence vis--vis the self-serving disclaimers of the herein accused whose
version of the incident as narrated above hardly inspires belief.
It has been clearly established from the evidence adduced by the State that at around
1:00 in the morning of March 8, 2003, accused Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc, in conspiracy
with one another, sold or traded and delivered, to PO3 Carlo Luna, in a buy-bust operation, one
transparent plastic sachet of shabu containing white crystalline substance (Exh. C-1) in
consideration of the amount of PHP 100.00 (Exh. D). x x x
That there was [a] conspiracy between the two accused as alleged in the information
in Criminal Case No. 12193-D, is evident. The transaction was successfully consummated
between the poseur buyer PO3 Luna, on the one hand, and the accused Ramon Catoc, together
with his co-accused, Jerry Santos, on the other, with accused Santos receiving the marked
money from the poseur buyer and thereafter handing the same to his co-accused Catoc who,
thereafter, took out from his right pocket a plastic sachet of shabu which he gave to Santos, and
which the latter in turn handed to PO3 Luna. There can be no other conclusion that can be
of the same law, subject of Criminal Case No. 12194-D, which penalizes the mere possession
of dangerous drugs w/o (sic) being authorized by law.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 12193-D, both accused, JERRY SANTOS y
MACOL and RAMON CATOC y PICAYO are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act [No.] 9165 (illegal sale of shabu)
and are hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to solidarily pay a Fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 12194-D, accused RAMON CATOC y PICAYO is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II,
Republic Act [No.] 9165 (illegal possession of shabu) and is hereby sentenced to Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (PHP 300,000.00).
Considering the penalty imposed by the Court, [t]he immediate commitment of
accused Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc to the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City is hereby ordered.
Pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act [No.] 9165, the amount of PHP 100.00
recovered from accused Ramon Catoc