Entries in the CIVIL REGISTER

Barreto v. Local Civil Registrar

The Solicitor General appealed on a question of law from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated March 4, 1968, directing the local civil registrar of Manila to correct
the entry under "sex" in the record of birth of Rosario Barretto by substituting the word "male"
for the word "female" (Special Proceeding No. 70833). The facts are as follows:

According to Register No. 1167(f44) in the record of births of the civil register of Manila, a
female child named Rosario Barretto was born on June 29, 1944 to the spouses Faustino
Barretto and King Lian, both natives of Amoy, China. (Exh. A).

On the other hand, according to the Book No. IV, Folio 83 of the record of baptisms of
the Parroquia de Chinos in Manila, a child born on June 29, 1944 to the spouses Faustino Sy
Barretto and Diana King Luan Ty was baptized on May 21, 1950. The name of the baptized child
is Domingo Sy Barretto. (Exh. F).

Domingo Barretto was registered as an alien in the Bureau of Immigration on June 23, 1958
(Exh. D). On that date, a native-born certificate of residence was issued to him. It is stated in
that certificate that he "is lawfully entitled to remain in the Philippines." (Exh. E).

In 1967 Domingo Barretto requested the local civil registrar of Manila to issue a certified copy
of his birth record which he needed in connection with his application for a marriage license. He
discovered that his name in the record of birth is Rosario, a female. Because of that
discrepancy, he was not able to secure a license.

On May 26, 1967 he filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the correction of
the alleged erroneous entries in his birth record regarding his name and sex (Civil Case No.
69639). The petition was dismissed on July 14, 1967. His motion to reinstate the case was
denied on September 25, 1967.

On September 23, 1967 Domingo Barretto filed a second petition for correction in the same
court. On December 21, 1967 he amended his petition by limiting it to the correction of the
entry in his birth record as to his sex.

The Solicitor General filed motions to dismiss the original and amended petitions. With respect
to the amended petition, he contended that the alleged error in the entry as to the sex of the
petitioner is not clerical and that its correction involves a substantial change which may affect
his identity.

Domingo Barretto testified that he is the same person known as Rosario Barretto in the birth
certificate, Exhibit A; that his father, Faustino Barretto, who died in April, 1967, was allowed to
change his Chinese name Sy Sun Chit to Faustino Barretto in a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated February 9, 1951, Exhibit B; that Exhibit C is the marriage contract of
his parents, Faustino Barretto and King Lian; that it was only in 1967 that he came to know that
in his record of birth his name is Rosario Barretto and his sex is female; that he used in school
the name Domingo Barretto; that the five children in his family in the order of their births are
Pacita, Ramon, Domingo, Francisco and Alfonso, all surnamed Barretto, and that he has always
been known at home and in the neighborhood as Domingo, that being his baptismal name.

King Lian testified that her son, Domingo Barretto, was born on June 29, 1944; that his father
was Faustino Barretto or Sy Sun Chit; that Vicenta Royo rendered assistance during the birth of
Domingo; that a midwife was present at the delivery; that she told the midwife that the name
of the child was Domingo Barretto; that she came to know that his name is Rosario when he
showed her his birth certificate, and that she has five children.

Vicente Royo testified that she was a neighbor of the spouses Faustino Barretto and King Lian;
that she was present at the birth of Domingo Barretto at four o'clock in the afternoon of June
29, 1944; that she held the baby and she knew he was a boy because she saw his male organ;
that she has known the child Domingo since birth and up to the time he became a binatillo, and
that she lost contact with him when his family transferred to another house in 1964.

The trial court granted the amended petition. It reasoned out that the error sought to be
corrected was "merely typographical or clerical, and not controversial". It observed that there
was an erroneous entry as to petitioner's sex because "the name Rosario is commonly used for
both male and female persons."

In this appeal, the Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred in characterizing the
writing of the word "female" in the record of birth of Rosario Barretto as a clerical error. He
argues that the change of the sex in that birth record is a substantial alteration. He surmises
that petitioner Domingo Barretto's motive in filing the petition for correction is to strengthen
his claim that he is a native-born Chinese as stated in his certificate of residence, Exhibit E.

According to the Solicitor General, Exhibit E has no basis because there is no record in the civil
registry of Manila that Domingo Barretto was born in this country. The record of birth (Exh. A)
refers to Rosario Barretto. The Solicitor General observes that official records should not be
altered if in doing so there is danger that the Government would become a party to a scheme
to circumvent the laws regarding the residence of aliens in this country.

In reply, Domingo Barretto counters that there is no doubt that he is the same person who is
registered as Rosario Barretto in the record of birth, Exhibit A; that the correction of the entry
as to his sex would affect him only and would not enable him to exercise the rights which only
citizens can exercise; that he had to amend his petition because in Manila it is the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court that has jurisdiction over petitions for change of name (Sec. 38-A[e],
Rep. Act No. 1401), and that the Solicitor General's gratuitous insinuations as to his Identity and
as to his motive in filing the petition are empty speculations.
The issue is whether the supposed erroneous entry as to the sex of Rosario Barretto, as
indicated in the birth record, is a clerical error that may be changed by means of a petition for
correction filed by one Domingo Barrettowho claims to be the same person as Rosario Barretto.

We hold that the petition for correction is not warranted because under the facts of this case
the alleged error is not clerical in nature. If the name in that record of birth were Domingo
Barretto and his sex was indicated therein as female, it might be argued that the error would be
clerical. But that is not the fact in this case. The situation is more complicated. A person named
Domingo Barretto claims that he is Rosario Barretto and that the word "female" in the latter's
birth record is a mistake.

It is settled that the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under
article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to "innocuous or
clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding" (Baybayan vs. Republic, L-20717, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 403, 405) or
corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence (Tiong vs.
Republic, L-20715, November 27, 1965, 15 SCRA 262; Lim vs. Republic, 101 Phil. 1235).

A clerical error "is one made by a clerk in transcribing or otherwise and, of course, must be
apparent on the face of the record, and capable of being corrected by reference to the record
only" (7A Words and Phrases, page 8, quoting Trott vs. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., 39
So. 716, 717, 144 Ala. 383).

The alleged error in this case cannot be corrected by reference to the record. There is a need to
determine whether Rosario Barretto and Domingo Barretto are one and the same person and
to ascertain why Domingo was registered in the record of birth as Rosario. The petition involves
a controversial matter. Petitioner's evidence is not indubitable.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of March 4, 1968 is reversed and set aside. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

REPUBLIC vs. VALENCIA

FACTS:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children filed with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for
correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary
proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes
such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and
not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are
substantial and controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu
Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week
for three (3)consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that
the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or
citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records
involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1)
the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of
the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these
requirements by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that they
have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have
also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate",
and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the corrections
sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and
status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper suit or appropriate action was filed by the respondent?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the
respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the
recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative
relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true
that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while
questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an
appropriate proceeding.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by respondent
Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated
February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice
thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The
order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other
respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose corrections were
sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was
consequently filed by the Republic on February 26,1970. Thereafter a full blown trial
followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary
evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined
respondent Leonor Valencia.

Republic v. Marcos

FACTS:
 Pang Cha Quen, a Chinese National, was previous married to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a
citizen of Nationalist China, and she gave birth to a daughter named May Sia alias Manman
Huang born on January 28, 1958.
 On January 12, 1959, Pang Cha Quen caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under
the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the father had
abandoned them.
 Mary Pang had always used this name at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School
where she studied.
 On August 16, 1966, Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen.
 Mary Pang has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo, as her own father, and
she desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang"
so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz.
 On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen praying that her
daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary Pang
De la Cruz.
 The petition was based on the following: (1) desire of Mary Pang to use the last name of her
stepfather, (2) to provide her stability, and (3) conformity of Alfredo Dela Cruz to the
petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading.
 Pang Cha Quen further asserted that the petition was neither made for the purpose of
concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not committed any nor to evade the
execution of a judgment as she has never been sued in court. The petition is not intended
to cause damage or prejudice to any third person.
 The RTC granted the petition but the Government through the Solicitor General appealed to
the Supreme Court alleging the petition is against the law based on the grounds that: (1) her
other alias “Mary Pang” was not stated in the title of the petition when it was published,
and (2) for failure to state the proper/reasonable cause for changing the name.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Pang Cha Quen presented proper/reasonable cause to justify her petition to
change the surname of her daughter.
2) Whether or not the publication of the petition is valid since it omitted her other alias “Mary
Pang.”
HELD:
1) No, Pang Cha Quen did not present proper/reasonable cause to justify her petition to
change the surname of her daughter.
2) No, the publication of the petition is not valid since it omitted her other alias “Mary Pang.”

RATIONALE:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the RTC.

General rules on name change:

(1) Change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family
relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October
30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June
26, 1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not
authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow
them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in
confusion of their paternity.

(2) The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her
name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. If minor, as
in this case, when she reached the age of majority, she may file the petition to change her
name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new
name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one
else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may
not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her
mother.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide:
SECTION 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to
the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila,
to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf,
and shall set forth:
 (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition
is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.

(3) A change of name is a privilege and not a right (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L-8035,
November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L-22040, November 29, 1965) and therefore, it must
be supported by valid grounds.

The following are the valid grounds for a change of name:

(1) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(3) When the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April 29, 1966; Chiu
Hap Chiu vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tañada, et al., L-31563, November
29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, L-51201, May 29, 1980);
(4) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of
his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
(5) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).

Reason why all aliases must be stated in the title of the petition for publication:
In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court explained the reason for
the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other names or
aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published order. It is
that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title
of the petition in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the title
strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to
read the contents of the order. The probability is great that he will not notice the other names
or aliases of the applicant if they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
Moreso, it defeats the purpose of publication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic

Facts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (petitioner) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the
civil registry with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. She asked the court to order the
Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of
her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name
which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil status and
date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with the
year appearing "1953 Bulan."
 At the hearing, petitioner testified that her nickname is Beatriz and Emperatriz J. Labayo
is her real name; that the entry in Victoria Miclat's birth certificate stating her civil status as
"married" is not correct because she was never married to Vicente Miclat, the father of her
child; that the date and place of marriage appearing in the said birth certificate as 1953-Bulan is
not true as they were never married; that the questioned entries were reported by Vicente
Miclat; and that she is at present married to an American by the name of William Rowe.

Finding merit in the petition, the presiding judge issued an order directing the local civil
registrar to correct the entries. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga appearing for the
Son. Gen. filed a notice of appeal questioning the propriety of the lower court's order to correct
the civil status and the date and place of marriage of the petitioner below as appearing in the
birth certificate of Victoria Miclat. In its Resolution, the appellate court ordered the certification
and elevation of the case to this Court inasmuch as the appeal involves a pure question of law.

Issue: Whether or not correction of entries in the civil registry involving the correct spelling of
the surname as well as the civil status of the mother at the time of the birth of her child may be
made under a summary procedure thus making the order of the CFI proper?

Ruling: No. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that "(n)o entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without judicial order." It has been held that the corrections
contemplated in Article 412 include only corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature.
In Go vs. Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Malabon, this Court ruled that the clerical errors
which might be corrected through judicial sanction under the said article should be those
harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of names clearly misspelled, occupation
of parents, errors that are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, errors made by a
clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing.

If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an
order for the correction of the mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. This opinion is predicated upon
the theory that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature which does not
cover cases involving controversial issues. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of
a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending
upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of
the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.

The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry does not only involve the
correction of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status
from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the
status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The change of petitioner's
name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration
wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate. The Republic, however, is appealing the part of
the questioned Order which directed as well the change of the petitioner's status from
"married" to "not married" and Victoria Miclat's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."

In David vs. Republic, this Court held that where the petition for correction of entries in
the civil registry, if granted, will have the effect of changing not only the civil status of the
petitioner but as well as her child's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," the same cannot
be granted except in an adversary proceeding. The matter should be threshed out in an
appropriate action as the corrections involve substantial alterations, and not mere clerical
errors. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be
made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the case before Us, aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby All other persons who may be affected
by the change should be notified or represented.

Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitutionwhich directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections
of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier
mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of
the Civil Code.

Zapanta v. Registrar

GENERAL RULE: Rule 108, Rules of Court justifies the correction of innocuous or clerical
errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere reference to it.

EXCEPTION: Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.

FACTS:

Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. When Florencio died, the local
civil registrar of Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found that the name
appearing therein was “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” albeit the date of death and all other
circumstances and information reflected therein clearly and conclusively revealed that the person
referred to therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria, therefore, filed a
petition for correction of entry in the register of death. The trial court dismissed the petition on
the ground that the correction of the name “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” to “Florencio B. Zapanta”
was not merely clerical but substantial in nature.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.

The general perception was that the judicial proceeding under Art. 412 of the Civil Code,
implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or
clerical errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere
reference to it, such as misspellings and obvious mistakes.

However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

Adversary Proceeding, defined

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it...”

Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the
suit or proceeding is “appropriate.”

Leonor v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Virginia A. Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor,
Jr., Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond abroad. This induced
petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation and alimony.
Private respondent counter-sued for divorce. The lower Cantonal Civil Court of Switzerland
pronounced the divorce of the spouses Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the
matrimonial partnership. The said Swiss Court denied alimony to petitioner. Meanwhile,
Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines, Justice of the Peace Mabini
Katalbas, failed to send a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos
City for registration. Hence, on July 11, 1991, Virginia applied for the late registration of her
marriage. The Civil Registrar, finding said application in order, granted the same. On May
22, 1992, Mauricio, represented by his brother Teodoro Leonor, filed a petition for the
cancellation of the late registration of marriage in the civil registry of San Carlos City with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, San Carlos City (Special Proceeding No. RTC- 144).
Given as grounds for the cancellation were the tardiness of the registration and the nullity
of his marriage with Virginia “due to the non-observance of the legal requirements for a
valid marriage.” Mauricio’s petition was filed pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. TC
rendered judgment5 declaring said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious.

Issue: Is a judgment voiding a marriage and rendered by the regional trial court under Rule
108 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court valid and proper?

Issue: May its validity be challenged by the wife in a petition for certiorari against the
husband who abandoned her and who is now living abroad with a foreign woman?

Held: The only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity
or nullity of a marriage. “A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing
(Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such
as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a mis-statement of the occupation of
the parent. Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of
petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted
except only in an adversarial proceeding.

The summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the Civil
Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to
single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial
court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage null and void and as
a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil
registry. Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and seriously abused his discretion in
unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear evidence
on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage under the Civil Code and/or Family
Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings under the Rules.

A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void; “x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”
Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 949 (1918).

PROACTIVE ROLE OF SUPREME COURT. - The Supreme Court is not just a toothless promoter
of procedural niceties which are understood and appreciated only by lawyers and jurists. It
cannot shrink from its quintessential role as the fountain of speedy, adequate and substantial
justice. If the Court, as the head and guardian of the judicial branch, must continuously merit
the force of public trust and confidence - which ultimately is the real source of its sovereign
power, possessing neither the purse nor the sword - and if it must decisively discharge its
sacred duty as the last sanctuary of the oppressed and the weak, it must, in appropriate cases
like the one before us, pro-actively provide weary litigants with immediate legal and equitable
relief, free from the delays and legalistic contortions that oftentimes result from applying
purely formal and procedural approaches to judicial dispensations. Pursuant to the foregoing
principle and considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case which are patent on
the basis of the admitted facts, as well as the undisputed copies of the pleadings presented by
the parties, and especially the verified copy of the trial court’s decision which loudly speaks for
itself, the Court therefore resolved to make an exception to the normal procedures and to
delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the trial court’s proceedings
and judgment. Happily, both parties had expressed a desire to have this case resolved soonest.
Upon the other hand, remanding the case back to the trial court for the perfection of the
appeal and requiring the parties to re-litigate in the Court of Appeals with the use of probably
the same documents and arguments ventilated in the kilometric pleadings filed here would
just unnecessarily clog the court’s dockets’; besides, in all likelihood the parties would
eventually come before this Court anyway.

Silverio v. Republic

FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”
and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and
equality. The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no
law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid
confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all,
and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court
denied the petition.

Republic v. Cagandahan
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital,
who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court
including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the
statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.

Dela Cruz v. Gracia

FACTS: Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document
attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography,"
did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of
wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity to the child.”

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against
Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the
unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition
of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to
use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his
offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the
putative father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.

Braza v. Registrar

Ma. Cristina and Pablo Braza were married on Jan. 4, 1978. They had three children
namely Josef, Janelle and Gian. However Pablo died on April 2002 in a vehicular accident in
Indonesia. During his wake, the respondent Lucille introduced her son Patrick as Pablo’s
child.

Naturally Ma. Cristina inquired as to the veracity of Lucille’s claim. She acquired a copy
of Patrick’s birth certificate from the Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City. It reflects that the
child was born on Jan. 1, 1996 but was registered late a year after. It has an annotation
wherein Pablo acknowledge the child as his, and that the child was legitimated by a
subsequent marriage of his parents on April 1998.

Because of her findings, she filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth record
of Patrick with RTC of Himamaylan Negros Occidental. Her contention is that Patrick
could not have been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Lucille and Pablo because
such is bigamous (their marriage was subsisting at that time). She prayed for the correction
of Patrick’s legitimation, acknowledgment of the father, and use of Braza as last name. She
also asked that Patrick be submitted to DNA testing and to declare Lucille and Pablo’s
marriage as bigamous.

Respondent filed MTD alleging that a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court does not have jurisdiction to annul her marriage, impugn legitimacy and order DNA
testing. Why? Because the court is not acting as a family court. These should be ventilated
in an ordinary action.

RTC granted MTD. Petitioners filed MR but was denied so they filed this present action.

ISSUE:
WON RTC has jurisdiction to annul the marriage of respondent and impugn legitimacy of
respondent’s child in a petition to correct entries in local civil register?

HELD: NO.

Petitioners: the court may pass upon the validity of marriage and legitimacy of child in an
action to correct entries in civil registrar. As basis, they cited Cariño v. Carino, Lee v.
CA and Republic v. Kho, alleging that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.

SC: Nope. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.Under these
rules, only correction of clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry may be allowed.

A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an
error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only
in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process
is properly observed.

As applied: the petitioners seek to nullify the marriage of respondent and Pablo and
impugn their child’s filiation and to subject him to DNA testing. They contend that these are
merely incidental to the main petition which is correction of entry under Rule 108.
However the court held that the applicable rule is under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Art. 171 of
the Family Code, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in
said Code.

Petitioners: How about the cases in support of my theory?

SC: Nope. They don’t apply. Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack. The cases cited are not applicable.
 Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the
return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the
husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latter’s
marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two
marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death
benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the
petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of
Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the
latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the
cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution
thereof with “Tiu Chuan” who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was
allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of
the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that
their citizenship is “Filipino,” not Chinese, because their parents were never legally
married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not
merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in
nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.

Iwasawa vs Gangan, , G.R. No. 204169, SEP 11 2013

DOCTRINE: The testimony of the records custodian of the NSO on the authenticity and due
execution of public documents is not necessary before such documents could be accorded
evidentiary weight, since under Article 410 of the Civil Code, “the books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.”

FACTS:

 Iwasawa is a Japanese national and he met Felisa in 2002 in one of his visits to the
Philippines. Felisa introduced herself as "single" and has never married before. Since
then, the two became close to each other.
 Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married Felisa on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.
 In July 2009, Iwasa noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something
might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it and to his
 shock, Felisa confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed
away.
 Iwasawa sought to confirm the truth and discovered that she indeed was married to
one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.
 This prompted petitioner to file a petitionfor the declaration of his marriage to private
respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based
on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
 During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner offered the pieces of documentary
evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO) –
(1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and Felisa, as proof of the fact of
marriage between the parties;
(2) Certificate of Marriage between Felisa and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo, proving
fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of the latter’s
death on July 14, 2009; and
(4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office pertaining to Felisa marked, to prove that Felisa in fact
contracted two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June
20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
 The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the OSG admitted the authenticity and due
execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.
 However, the RTC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private
respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. That while petitioner
offered the certificate of marriage of Felisa to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who
testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable
because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of
Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate
between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further
ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since
he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.

ISSUE: Is the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight? – NO

RULING:

The documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. Under Article
410 of the Civil Code, “the books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained.”

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents
on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who
issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity
and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain
unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary.

The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code
of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely
establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that
their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private
respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private
respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002
in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private
respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on
July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage with
Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private
respondent to petitioner is bigamous hence null and void, since the first marriage was still
valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted

Republic v Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she
revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while
she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was
used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC held in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract
is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity
was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be
feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not
one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.

HELD:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure
to be adopted is adversary.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it
also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long
as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.Lee v. CA
419 Phil. 392
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi
Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
of the National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak
of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Onde v. Office Of The Local Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 197174, September 10, 2014

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders1 dated October 7, 2010 and
March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special
Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P.
Onde for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.

The antecedent facts follow:

Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the
R TC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole
respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A.
Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were
married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his
first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be
corrected as follows:

Entry From To

1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married

2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde

3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries
on the ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings
must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect
petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the first
name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of
First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending
for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as
it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.

Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the
correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry
on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings; (3)
whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and (4) whether
the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on
December 23, 1983.

Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of
entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil
registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof
that his parents were not married will be presented during the trial, not during the filing of
the petition for correction of entries.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of
petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No.
9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were
married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction
affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all
interested parties are impleaded.

We deny the petition.

On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as
appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No.
9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. 4 Indeed,
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil
register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No.
10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a person where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and
effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan,7 we
said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The
law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt the correction of clerical or
typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mother’s first name.

On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol
to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said
correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate
child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we held that corrections of entries in the civil
register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings.9

On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of
entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he
sought on his and his mother’s first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the
circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of
entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the correction he
sought on his and his mother’s first name.

We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner
can avail ofthe administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first
name.1âwphi1 He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged
erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23,
1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City:10

x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the
Rules of Court]provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x

xxxx

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the
marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son,
Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided that the appropriate
procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register
must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner
did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as
the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule
108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy,12 we have similarly ruled that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is
mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and
mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as
petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on
December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and
March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pifias City, in Special
Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is,
however, declared to be without prejudice.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic v De la Vega, GR 195873, Feb. 23, 2015

Felipe Almojuela vs. Republic, G.R. No. 211724, August 24, 2016

FACTS: For almost 60 years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela." However,
when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the NSO, he discovered that he was
registered as "Felipe Condeno". He filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in his NSO birth
certificate before the RTC.

Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan, Catanduanes and is the
acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela, former governor of the said province, and
Francisca B. Condeno, both deceased. His parents did not marry each other, he has been known
to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said surname in all of his
official and legal documents. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth
certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes
showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.

RTC initially dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner's recourse to Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court was improper, as the petition did not involve mere correction of clerical errors
but a matter of filiation which should, thus, be filed in accordance with Rule 103 of the same
Rules. Moreover, it found that a similar petition docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 1229 had already
been ruled upon and dismissed by the court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, maintaining that the issue of filiation is immaterial since
he was only seeking a correction of entry by including the surname "Almojuela" to "Felipe
Condeno," his first and middle names appearing on his birth certificate with the NSO. He
likewise insisted that the name "Jorge V. Almojuela" was clearly indicated thereon as the name
of his father. Finding merit in petitioner's arguments, the RTC, and allowed petitioner to
present his evidence. During the proceedings, it was discovered that petitioner's name as
registered in the Book of Births in the custody of the

Municipal Civil Registar of Pandan, Catanduanes is "Felipe Condeno" and not "Felipe C.
Almojuela," contrary to petitioner's allegation.

In so ruling, the RTC found that the change in petitioner's surname would cause no prejudice to
the Almojuela family nor would they be the object of future mischief. Instead, petitioner has
shown that he was accepted and acknowledged by his half-siblings. Moreover, allowing
petitioner to retain the surname that he has been using for over 60 years would avoid
confusion in his personal undertakings.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, moved for reconsideration, citing lack of
jurisdiction due to defective publication and contending that the caption or title of a petition
for change of name should state: (a) the alias or other name of petitioner; (b) the name he
seeks to adopt; and ( c) the cause for the change of name, all of which were lacking in the
petition filed before the RTC.

CA reversed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE: W/N CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth certificate on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: NO. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. An
adversary proceeding is defined as one "having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished
from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it."

A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential
oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry
should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other.

In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil
Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and
accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in
the interest of fair play and due process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses.

Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the subsequent
publication of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings; ( c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of
the interested parties; or, ( d) when a party is inadvertently left out, these exceptions are,
unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule I 08 of the
Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and
controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.

Republic v Sali, G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017