2 Theoretical Background

2.1 OVERVIEW
In Chapter 1, we discussed various features, benefits, and metrics of multihazard (MH) consider-
ations in civil infrastructures. We also contended that the utilizations of such benefits have been fairly
limited. The primary reason for this limitation is the lack of adequate processes (e.g., analysis and
design modules), which can be reliably used to take advantage of many of the MH considerations. In
order to establish such processes, we will take a closer look at the subject of MH starting from form-
ing a theoretical basis. This will be our task in this chapter before we embark on more in-depth civil
infrastructure applications in later chapters based on the theoretical basis developed in this chapter.

2.2 THEORETICAL MH IN LITERATURE

There have been several studies on MH considerations in the literature. This section will briefly
describe some such studies. MH effects were studied using an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to
accommodate safety and stability attributes of bridges. The safety and stability assessment of bridges,
with unknown foundations over water, and to assure safety and uninterrupted mobility after a big
hydraulic event, such as flooding, or a seismic event is not easy, requiring considerable engineering
judgment supported by previous experience. In order to assist engineers in such situations, Zayed
et al. (2007) developed a model to assess risk factors of bridges with unknown foundations and to
evaluate and prioritize various courses of action for managing these bridges. Authors proposed a risk
index (R) based on factors affecting physical risk. These factors were divided into three major risk
parameters—remaining life, scour, and seismic vulnerability, with each of these comprising several
factors. The risk index was developed primarily to transfer the subjectivity of risk parameters into
quantitatively determined values using the AHP by Saaty (1980). The risk index (R) was a summation
of the product of weight of each factor along with its worth score (Zayed and Chang 2002, Zayed
and Halpin 2004). Weights of risk parameters were determined using AHP, and the worth score
was assessed using the utility function approach. If a bridge has a low R (0–0.2), routine or minor
investigations were recommended, advanced investigation or major rehabilitation and/or replacement
options for high risk (R > 0.6) and intermediate courses of action for intermediate value of R (0.3–0.6).
R values were estimated, as part of a case study, for 10 bridges from Florida, Indiana, and New
York using an abstract model and a detailed model to decide appropriate courses of action. The
model was validated using a holistic evaluation method. The bridge engineers holistically evaluated
each bridge in the 10-bridge case study on a scale from 0.00 to 1.00, using their experience, knowl-
edge of the individual bridges, and input from inspection teams to develop their own diagnoses and
courses of action. These decisions were compared to the recommendations rendered by the model
and found to be in good agreement.
Looking at risk assessment and risk treatment for generic hazards, particularly hazards related to
safety, Jannadi and Almishari (2003) developed a computerized risk assessment model that deter-
mined risk scores for various construction activities that provides an acceptability level for the risks
and determines a quantitative justification that can be used for the proposed mitigation efforts. The
study was intended to assist management in identifying activities where there is a risk of injury or
loss and, hence, provide a basis for objective management decisions for the application of resources.
Authors defined risk assessment as a technique that aims to identify and estimate risks to person-
nel and property impacted upon by a project, and safety was defined as the adoption of attitudes
and the provision of resources within an organization to mitigate the risks involved in any activity

17
18 Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure

necessary for the achievement of organizational aims. A risk score associated with an activity was
calculated as a product of the severity of the hazard, degree of exposure, and probability of the haz-
ard occurring. The program will calculate the risk score for a particular activity based on user input.
Depending on the risk score, the model will suggest a recommended action. If a corrective action is
required, the model will calculate a justification factor by dividing the risk score with the product
of cost factor and degree of correction. The cost factor was determined from the cost of correction,
which is a measure of the estimated dollar cost of the proposed corrective action. The degree of
correction was an estimate of the degree to which the proposed corrective action will eliminate the
hazard. Authors provided some guidance for these factors but prudently suggested that a competent
risk analyst conduct the risk assessment.
Ensuring consistent design for all hazards subjected by a structure is important in improving
safety and optimizing cost-effectiveness. The performance-based engineering paradigm requires
satisfying structural performance objectives at various hazard levels while addressing competing
hazards to achieve overall building performance goals. Realizing this, Li and Ellingwood (2009)
presented a comparative assessment of hurricane and earthquake risks to residential construction
as these two hazards are commonly experienced by structures in several parts of the United States.
Two typical one-story residences designated with different levels of wind and earthquake protec-
tion were selected to illustrate some of the fundamental notions of this comparative risk assess-
ment—one was designed for historically accepted standards and the other for enhanced standards
to comply with modern codes (PATH 2000, WFCM 2001). They considered three qualitative dam-
age states—minor or light, moderate, and severe for wind and earthquake hazards, while risks
associated with these two hazards were compared using hazard return period as a common control
variable. Then they evaluated probabilities of various damage levels associated with design basis
events and determined the annual probabilities of various levels of damage due to a hurricane or
earthquake. Based on their assessment, they concluded that adopting enhanced construction stan-
dards reduces the probability of moderate to severe damage under design basis events more notice-
ably than the probability of only minor or surficial damage for most cities.
Durability, including thermal cracking as well as wear and tear, is an integral issue for any MH
considerations in civil infrastructures. Specifically, structural concrete cracking has been an issue
that has been around since the invention of concrete, and there has been considerable research in the
past with more research ongoing. Emborg and Benander (1994) describe their laboratory research
and theoretical modeling on thermal stresses and thermal cracking in maturing concrete. They
conclude, among others, that crack criteria that are purely based on temperature differentials offer
a poor basis for crack prediction in hardening concrete and are only justified in specific situations.
Many important factors other than temperature should be considered, such as varying degrees of
axial and rotational restraint in different elements of the structure and the influence of transient
mechanical properties of the young concrete, as well as the practical implications of the different
nature of transient cracks and permanent through cracks on the durability and function of concrete
structures. These other factors should be considered when defining criteria for the risk of cracking.
Finally, recognizing that the application of true MH principles requires multidisciplinary
approach, Potra and Simiu (2009) illustrate the use of the optimization theory based on nonlinear
programming principles and apply it to a simple case. Their formulation of the design problem
intends to optimize all the constraints related to all the hazards considered in the design to achieve
the most economical solution.

2.3 THIS CHAPTER

We discuss some of the theoretical MH basics in the rest of this chapter (Figure 2.1). First, we intro-
duce two MH-related theories, multihazard physical theory (MPT) and multihazard decision theory
(MDT), that will set the tone for the rest of the chapters in this book. The following two sections
will discuss the subjective and objective faces of MH considerations. We argue that even though
Theoretical Background 19

MH theoretical considerations

Multihazard decision Multihazard physical

theory (MDT) theory (MPT)

Qualitative
Objective basis How do hazards
descriptions
for MH process interact?
of MH process

FIGURE 2.1 Composition of this chapter.

subjective considerations of MH are important, as well as simple, there is still a need for objective
MH considerations if we are to realize the MH benefits. We close this chapter with an exhaustive,
yet not complete, list of the different ways hazards interact both through the physical system (MPT)
and through MH-related decisions (MDT).

2.4 MULTIHAZARD PHYSICAL THEORY

As noted earlier, an MH outlook to civil infrastructures such as buildings and bridges would provide
great benefits, but such an outlook is hindered by the lack of a perspective that presents a concise
and systematic view of the subject matter. Upon reflection on how physical structures behave, we
introduce this MPT that was proposed first by Ettouney et al. (2005).
For a given system that is exposed to multihazard, there exists an inherent multihazard resiliency within
the system. This multihazard resiliency implies an interrelationship between the manners in which the
system responds to different hazards.

This theory would help in giving perspective, which is concise and systematic. The theory of
MHs offers two doctrines for systems: inherent resilience for all hazards and the interrelation-
ships between the manners in which the system responds to those hazards. By utilizing these two
doctrines, the potential benefits, as summarized in Chapter 1, would be achieved during structural
analysis and structural design. Actually, MPT has potential benefits that span all components of risk-
based management and resilience-based management as we will demonstrate in the later chapters.

2.5 MULTIHAZARD DECISION THEORY

The MPT as represented earlier relates to the physical behavior of the systems as they relate to dif-
ferent hazards. Even though it has numerous applications and associated benefits as stated earlier,
MPT is not broad enough for applications related to risk (or resilience) treatment. Hence, we pro-
pose a different theory that is closely related to the MPT. We call it “Multihazard Decision Theory”
(MDT) and define it as:
Any civil infrastructure-related decision made regarding a hazard will have an effect on how the infra-
structure under consideration will respond to any other hazard.

The MDT is simply a resultant of MPT but can have major effects in providing optimal decisions in
the risk treatment phase, as well as other phases of risk-based management practices.
20 Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure

2.6 QUALITATIVE OUTLOOK TO MH INTERACTIONS

MPT theorizes that all hazards interact through the physical system of the infrastructure. On the other
hand, MDT submits that a decision relating to one hazard will have an effect on how the system responds
to other hazards. Such interactions, whether physical or decision based, can be realized objectively or
subjectively. For example, we can expand on Chapter 1 by describing the types of MH interactions
between the hazards in a qualitative manner. Tables 2.1 through 2.9 show examples of these qualita-
tive descriptions. These descriptions can be of great help to decision-makers, but it is fairly difficult to
realize steady benefits without further measures of objectivity that will be discussed in the next section.

2.7 NEEDS FOR OBJECTIVE BASIS OF MH PROCESS

Infrastructure stakeholders have always dealt with the MH environment. The fact that design load-
ing combinations exist is a proof of it (see ASCE 7 [2013]). However, the interactions, as per MPT
and MDT, have usually been largely ignored, or when recognized, been dealt with in a subjective
manner. One of the reasons for that is the lack of objective tools and procedures that identify, quan-
tify, and resolve or take advantage of these interactions.
An example of such a situation is the potential interaction between earthquake and bomb blast
hazards. It has long been felt by different researchers and practitioners that there is, somehow, a
deep relationship between the two hazards requiring some kind of integration, or at least recogni-
tion, in design of systems when subjected to both hazards; see, for example, ASCE/SEI 59-11 (2011)
and ASCE/SEI 7-10 (2013).* Even with this subjective belief, there are, as of the writing of this
book, limited MH methods available for such objective MH treatment (DHS 2011a,b,c).
An objective way of identifying MH treatment between earthquakes and blast hazards is the con-
siderations of risks from both hazards to a bridge bent as shown in Figure 2.2. The original design
of the bent properly considered the postulated earthquake hazard. Generally speaking, the main
natural mode that resists the earthquake hazard is generally the first mode as shown in Figure 2.2.
After performing a blast risk assessment, the bridge stakeholders identified that the bridge bent is
susceptible to blast hazard. Based on this assessment, a blast retrofit effort was performed, which
consisted of stiffening the first level of the bent. Of course, such a stiffening resulted in changes in
how the bent would respond to earthquakes. The modal characteristics of the structure changed,
resulting in changes to the main mode shifting most of the earthquake deformation into the second
level of the bent, which was not originally detailed properly for such a behavior.
The risk assessment results of the scenarios mentioned earlier can be expressed quantitatively.
The risk assessor’s estimates of threats T, vulnerability V, and consequences C on a scale from
0  to  10 of both blast and earthquake hazards before and after retrofits are given in Table 2.10.
The procedure of such assessments can be similar to the procedures outlined in DHS (2011a,b,c).
The resulting hazards risks, Ri, for both earthquake and blast before and after the retrofits can be
computed in a simple manner using the following equation:
Ri = C × T × V (2.1)

The resulting assessed risks before and after retrofits are also shown in Table 2.10. We note that
while the earthquake risk was fairly acceptable at 12.6% before blast retrofits, the blast risk was
medium at 43.2%, which required some kind of blast retrofit. The blast risk after retrofit decreased
to 21.6%, which indicates a successful blast retrofit effort. Unfortunately, due to the changes in
the modal behavior of the structure that resulted from the blast retrofit, the earthquake risk has
increased now from the original 12.6% to 50.4%. The interaction between the two hazards, through

* It is also widely accepted that such interactions do not mean a simultaneous occurrence of both hazards. There is no load-
ing design condition that requires the placement of both hazards simultaneously, even at a reduced load factor, ASCE/
SEI 59-11 (2011).
 Theoretical Background

TABLE 2.1
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Fatigue
Corrosion Scour Fire Wind Seismic Impact Overload Wear and Tear Gravity
Stress corrosion Fatigue of Response of Wind-induced Seismic-induced Response of Repeated over or Repeated Gravity-generated live
and hydrogen chemical gels systems to high-cyclic high-cyclic systems to illegal loading- environmental loads (such as traffic
embitterment (in Chapter 1 severe fires stresses have stresses have demands of induced cyclic demands (thermal, loads on highway
(in Chapter 4 by Ettouney can be affected direct effects direct effects high-impact higher stresses freeze–thaw, bridges or rail traffic
by Ettouney and Alampalli by reduced on fatigue. on fatigue. amplitudes can have direct etc.)–induced cyclic on railroad bridges)
and Alampalli 2012) has a fatigue be affected by effects on fatigue. stresses have direct are the primary
2012) can both direct effect capacity of reduced fatigue effects on fatigue. source of fatigue.
have an effect on scour. systems. capacity of
on fatigue systems.
behavior of
high-strength
cables.
21
22 Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure

TABLE 2.2
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Corrosion
Scour Fire Wind Seismic Impact Overload Gravity Wear and Tear
Corrosion in Limited Loss of strength or ductility due to corrosion (e.g., There is a direct
submerged interactions high-strength cables, susceptibility to stress corrosion, interrelation between
foundation can might occur or hydrogen embitterment) can affect long-term corrosion damage
be affected by between resistance to high-wind, seismic, impact, overload, or and wear and tear
soil erosion that corrosion and gravity hazards. (see Ettouney and
might happen fire. Generally, Alampalli 2012).
due to scouring. not applicable.

TABLE 2.3
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Scour
Wear
Fire Wind Seismic Impact Overload and Tear Gravity
Limited Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of
interactions foundation foundation foundation foundation foundation foundation
might occur support due support due support due support due support due support due
between scour to scour to scour to scour to scour to scour to scour
and fire. might have might have might have might have might might have
an effect on an effect on an effect on an effect on accelerate an effect on
global wind global global global deterioration a structure’s
resistance. seismic impact overload of affected gravity load
resistance. resistance. resistance. foundations. resistance.

TABLE 2.4
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Fire
Wind Seismic Impact Overload Wear and Tear Gravity
Fire damage, if Fire damage, if not Fire damage, if Fire damage, if Fire damage, if Fire damage, if
not retrofitted retrofitted properly, not retrofitted not retrofitted not retrofitted not retrofitted
properly, can can reduce properly, can properly, can properly, can properly, can
reduce resistance to reduce reduce accelerate reduce resistance
resistance to earthquake effects. resistance to resistance to wear and tear to gravity loads.
high wind. impact hazard. overloads. deterioration.

the physical system (natural modes), have caused such a conflicting behavior. Note that this is a
direct result of the MPT.
Upon further reflection of this simple MH exhibit, we can reveal many other issues and questions
of importance such as the following:

• Is risk the only possible management paradigm for which MH can manifest itself in?
• What are the different methods of addressing MH interactions and quantifying them, in
addition to the just prescribed process that resulted in Table 2.10?
• We stated that the blast risk level, in an MH environment, of 43.2% was not acceptable,
while the earthquake level, again in an MH environment, of 12.6% was acceptable. Are the
Theoretical Background 23

TABLE 2.5
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Wind
Seismic Impact Overload Wear and Tear Gravity
Wind and seismic Local nature of impact Differences in Wear and tear Gravity load demands
loads have many loads makes their temporal and losses can affect will reduce available
similarities interaction with wind spatial distributions wind resistance. capacity to resist
(including the global loads less likely. On of wind and wind demands.
nature of both the other hand, overload make
loads). Thus, there is damages of impact interaction less
a high degree of loads, if not treated likely.
interactions between properly, can reduce
the two hazards. wind resistance.

TABLE 2.6
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Seismic
Impact Overload Wear and Tear Gravity
The local nature of impact Differences in temporal and Wear and tear losses can There are interactions
loads makes their interaction spatial distributions of affect seismic resistance. between gravity loads
with seismic loads less seismic and overload make and seismic loads.
likely. On the other hand, interaction less likely.
damages of impact loads, if
not treated properly, can
reduce seismic resistance.

TABLE 2.7
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Impact
Overload Wear and Tear Gravity
Impact effects can reduce Wear and tear losses can Gravity load demands will reduce available
resistance to overloads. affect impact resistance. capacity to resist impact demands.

TABLE 2.8
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Overload
Wear and Tear Gravity
Wear and tear losses can affect overload resistance. There are interactions between gravity loads and overload.

TABLE 2.9
Multihazard Table: Interaction with Wear and Tear
Gravity
There are interactions between gravity loads and wear and tear. Wear
and tear can reduce the capacity to resist to gravity loads.
24 Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure

Original seismic design

calls for certain seismic
behavior of frame

Blast pressure retrofit

produces changes in
frame properties
including mass, stiffness,
and strength

The blast retrofit

changes result in
seismic behavior that is
different from the
obehavior that was
intended by the original
seismic design

FIGURE 2.2 Earthquake and blast risk for a bridge bent.

TABLE 2.10
Simple MH Risk Assessment Results
Consequences
State Hazard Threat (0–10 Scale) Vulnerability (0–10 Scale) (0–10 Scale) Risk (%)
Before retrofit Blast 6 8 9 43.2
Earthquake 7 2 9 12.6
After retrofit Blast 6 4 9 21.6
Earthquake 7 8 9 50.4
Theoretical Background 25

existing models properly accounting for interaction of hazards in addressing acceptance

thresholds in an MH environment?
• The exhibit, if we reflect a bit harder, is really a decision-making and retrofit exhibit. This
brings the question of decision-making in an MH environment. Are there processes that
can accommodate MH interplays for decision-makers, who may be retrofitting their sys-
tems in an MH environment?
• How about structural health monitoring (SHM) in an MH environment? Are there specific
issues that the SHM community needs to address that are different from the issues relating
to one-hazard-at-a-time monitoring processes?
• How would all of these questions apply to a network of assets in an MH environment?

Even though the exhibit mentioned earlier, and perhaps other similarly simple MH situations, might
be possible to address in a subjective manner, it is clear that addressing these questions satisfactorily
will need objective approaches. It is also clear that all of the issues mentioned are related in the end
to the basic issue of interest to the civil infrastructure community: adequate performance at reason-
able costs. Based on this, we will aim the remainder of this chapter to MH studies, discussions, and
solutions of the issues mentioned earlier.

2.8 HOW DO HAZARDS INTERACT?

We discussed MH interactions through two theories and a specific exhibit so far. In this section, we
give an overview of the methods that can be used in measuring MH interactions. These methods
will be discussed in detail in upcoming chapters with examples on how to use and apply the differ-
ent methods to practical situations (see Tables 2.11 and 2.12).

TABLE 2.11
MH Interaction Processes
MH Interaction Process
Analysis
Design
Design and analysis
Decision-making
Decision-making, life-cycle
analysis (LCA)
Modeling, decision-making,
system performance
LCA
Objective MH Definitions and Processes Metric Chapter(s)
Measure of relative response levels at a Any system response, e.g., 3
particular region of the system due to two displacement, stress, force,
hazards. The region can be as limited as a velocity, or safety margins.
single node or as large as the whole
system of interest.
Account for all design limit states during Reliability; capacity to 4
the design process, in parallel, so as to demand ratios
optimize acceptance ratios.
MH interactions are defined as the rate of Exposure 4
change of exposure of the system to a
hazard due to a change in another hazard.
MH interactions are defined as the rate of Risk; resilience 5 and 6
change of risk (or resilience) of the system to
a hazard due to a change in another hazard.
The effects of a decision that are made Risk; resilience; LCA 6 through 8
regarding one hazard on the behavior of
the system subjected to another hazard.
Effects of including more than one hazard Risk, exposure, reliability 9 and 10
while modeling performance metrics such
as risk, reliability, or exposure.
Effects of accommodating hazards in parallel, LCA 9
not in series, while computing LCA.
26 Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure

TABLE 2.12
Details of MH Interaction Metrics and Processes in Different Case Studies
Physical Decision
Case Study # Metrics MH Method and/or Process Theory of MH Theory of MH
3.1 Displacements MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed displacements due to
different static hazards relate to
each other.
3.2 Forces MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how a
computed force due to different
static hazards relates to each other.
3.3 Displacements MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed displacements due to
different dynamic hazards relate to
each other (building frame).
3.4 Displacements MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed displacements due to
different dynamic hazards relate to
each other (truss bridge).
3.5 Displacements MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed displacements due to
static (wind) and dynamic (seismic)
hazards relate to each other
(building frame).
3.6 Displacements MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed displacements due to
static (wind) and dynamic (seismic
and blast) hazards relate to each
other (building frame).
3.7 Displacements MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed displacements due to
static (live load) and dynamic
(seismic) hazards relate to each
other (truss bridge).
3.8 Ductility MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed displacement ductility
due to different hazards relate to
each other.
4.1 Vulnerability MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed vulnerability due to
different hazards relate to each other
(mass transit stations).
(Continued)
Theoretical Background 27

TABLE 2.12 (Continued)

Details of MH Interaction Metrics and Processes in Different Case Studies
Physical Decision
Case Study # Metrics MH Method and/or Process Theory of MH Theory of MH
4.2 Vulnerability MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed vulnerability due to
different hazards relate to each other
(tunnels).
4.3 Capacity/demand MH interaction matrix shows how Y
(reliability) different design loading conditions
interact with each other in current
practice.
4.4 Capacity/demand MH interaction matrix shows how Y
(reliability) different design equations interact
with each other in current practice
(simple example).
4.5 Capacity/demand MH interaction matrix shows how Y
(reliability) different design equations interact
with each other in current practice
(analytical example).
4.6 Exposure MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed exposure due to different
hazards relate to each other (mass
transit stations).
4.7 Exposure MH interaction matrix shows a Y Y
subjective measure of how
computed exposure due to different
hazards relate to each other
(tunnels) and also how such
interactions can affect different
retrofit decisions in a subjective
manner.
6.1 Risk MH interaction matrix shows a Y
subjective measure of how
computed risk due to different
hazards relate to each other (mass
transit stations).
6.2 Risk MH interaction matrix shows a Y Y
subjective measure of how
computed risk due to different
hazards relate to each other
(tunnels) and also how such
interactions can affect different
retrofit decisions in a subjective
manner.
6.3 Risk The model, objectively shows MH Y
interaction sources for seismic and
blast hazards (asset mass,
consequences).
(Continued)
28 Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure

TABLE 2.12 (Continued)

Details of MH Interaction Metrics and Processes in Different Case Studies
Physical Decision
Case Study # Metrics MH Method and/or Process Theory of MH Theory of MH
6.4 Single-asset resilience The model, objectively show MH Y
interaction sources for two generic
hazards (robustness,
resourcefulness, recovery, and
redundancy).
6.5 Single-asset resilience In the model, objectively show MH Y
Community resilience interaction sources for two generic
hazards (robustness,
resourcefulness, recovery, and
redundancy).
7.1 Risk Common consequences result in MH Y
interaction between component’s
risk.
7.2 Risk Different risk thresholds for different Y
hazards offer an indirect, but
important, interaction in risk
mitigation processes.
7.3 Risk Different risk thresholds for different Y
hazards offer an indirect, but
important, interaction in risk
mitigation processes.
7.4 Risk MH risk acceptance interactions Y
through common consequences.
7.5 Risk Risk acceptance thresholds at lower Y
limit states.
7.6 Risk Risk acceptance thresholds at lower Y
limit states: advanced concepts.
7.7 Risk Total difference MH risk acceptance Y
threshold process.
7.8 Risk MH objective target risk acceptance Y
threshold process (network).
8.1 Risk Using decision matrix for multiple Y
hazards through exposure and
consequences.
8.2 Risk Risk mitigation for two Y
hazards - interaction through
utilities.
8.3 Risk, exposure Risk mitigation for two hazards (blast Y Y
and seismic) through exposure and
utilities.
8.4 Community resilience Resilience treatment of assets Y
Asset resilience subjected to two hazards (flooding
and wind)
8.5 Community resilience Cascading costs as a results of Y
Asset resilience cascading hazards.
8.6 Community resilience Cascading costs as a result of Y
Asset resilience cascading hazards.
(Continued)
Theoretical Background 29

TABLE 2.12 (Continued)

Details of MH Interaction Metrics and Processes in Different Case Studies
Physical Decision
Case Study # Metrics MH Method and/or Process Theory of MH Theory of MH
9.1 Visual inspection (V.I.) Inferring individual hazard’s effects Y
via single observation. Snapshot
monitoring.
9.2 V.I. Inferring individual hazard’s effects Y
via single observation. Time
marching/forecasting.
9.3 V.I. Inferring individual hazard’s effects Y
Structural health via multiple types of observations.
monitoring Snapshot monitoring.
Nondestructive testing
9.4 Risk Monitoring MH risk via multiple Y
types of observations. Snapshot in
time.
9.5 Risk Monitoring MH risk via multiple Y
Life-cycle risk types of observations. Snapshot in
time.
10.1 Risk Changes in risk due to hazard, Y
vulnerability, or total consequences.
10.2 Risk Interaction of between hazards Y
through system.
10.3 Risk Long-term risk due to slow and Y
sudden hazards.

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