Philosophy of

language
first meeting
Overview:
The course provides an introduction to analytic
philosophy of language by focusing on
semantic projects based on a pragmatist view
of language (intentional, conceptual role and
inferential theories) and their relations to the
speech act theory. Among the thinkers we will
study are H. P. Grice, Saul Kripke, G. Harman,
P. Horwich, Robert B. Brandom, J. L. Austin,
John R. Searle and Wilfried Sellars.
Course objective:
The course aims to help students develop
research and writing skills within the discipline.
Since this is a course for graduate students,
participants will be expected to engage in
discussions during class meetings and also to
do high-level, independent research in the field
of philosophy.
Course Requirements:
Class attendance is necessary. Students should do, however,
more than just attend the class. They are expected to show up
having read the assignment for the day and ready to talk about it.
Each student is required to write a short research paper (4-6
pages) in at least two versions – one to be discussed with the
instructor during office hours and a final version to be submitted
at the end of the semester. Grades will be determined on the
basis of the participation in class discussions (30%), evaluation
of papers (50%) and a final colloquium during which we will
discuss the submitted papers (20%). The course specifics –
including course requirements, grading and the schedule of
assignments – are subject to change and will be announced in
class and online.
Topics and readings:
1) The critique of ideational theories of meaning
● H. Putnam, 'Language and Philosophy', in H. Putnam, Mind, language and
Reality, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1979, p. 1-32.

2) Intention-based accounts of meaning

● H. P. Grice, 'Meaning', Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), pp. 377-388 (in
A. P. Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of Language (3rd edition), Oxford
University Press, Oxford, New York, 1996, pp. 85-91)

3) Rule-following considerations
● S. Kripke, On Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1982 (selection).
4) Conceptual role semantics
● G. Harman, 'Conceptual role semantics', Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, vol. 23 (1982), pp. 242-257.
● P. Horwich, 'What It Is Like to be a Deflationary Theory of Meaning', in
Philosophical Issues 5: Truth and Rationality (1994), edited by E.
Villanueva, Ridgeview. pp.133-154.

5) Inferentialism
● Robert B. Brandom, 'Inferentialism and some of its challenges',
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3) (2007), pp. 651-676.
● Robert B. Brandom, Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic
Pragmatism, Oxford University Press, 2008, Chapter 1 - 'Extending the
Project of Analysis', pp. 1-31.
6) Speech acts
● J. L. Austin, 'Performative Utterances', from J. O. Urmson and G. J.
Warnock (eds.), Philosophical Papers, 3rd edition, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 233-252 (in A. P. Martinich, pp. 120-129)
● John R. Searle, 'What Is a Speech Act?', from Max Black (ed.),
Philosophy in America, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1965, pp. 221-
239 (in A. P. Martinich, pp. 130-140).
● John R. Searle, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, from John R. Searle,
Expression and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979,
pp. 1-29 (in A. P. Martinich, pp. 141-155).
● John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, from Peter Cole and Jerry L.
Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, volume 3, Academic Press, New
York, 1975, pp. 59-82 (in A. P. Martinich, pp. 168-182).
● John R. Searle and Daniel Vanderveken, Foundations of illocutionary
logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, Chapter 1 –
'Introduction to the theory of speech acts', pp. 1-26.
7) Language and communication
● H. P. Grice, 'Logic and Conversation', in H. P. Grice, Studies
in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
MA, 1989, pp. 22-40 (in A. P. Martinich (ed.), The
Philosophy of Language (3rd edition), Oxford University
Press, Oxford, New York, 1996, pp. 156-167).
● Wilfrid Sellars, 'Language as Thought and as
Communication', Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1969), pp. 506-527.
Required texts:
● W. G. Lycan, Philosophy of Language,
Routledge, London & New York, 2000.
● A. P. Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of
Language (3rd edition), Oxford University Press,
Oxford, New York, 1996.
Philosophy of language (in
a few questions):
● How can something have a meaning? (In particular:
how can something false have a meaning?)
● What is meaning?
● How can we formulate a theory of meaning?
● What is the relation between language and reality?
● Does language have a (logical) structure? What is
it?
● Are there some limits of language (limits to
communication)?
● What do we do when we speak?
● etc.
Psycholinguistics,
Cognitive science, A. I. etc.
● How did language appear?
● How does a language evolve?
● How does a child learn to speak?
● How are our linguistic abilities linked to other kinds of
cognitive abilities?
● Are there innate linguistic abilities?
● Types of languages, signs etc.
● How can we build machines able to process natural
language?
● How is language understanding/production processed in
our brains?
● What functions does language play in our society?
Philosophical vs. non-philosophical
questions concerning language
● How could we distinguish between them?
● Philosophy (phil. of language included) is not
bad science (i. e. scientific research based
on insufficient information)
● Philosophical problems concern justification
(of communication, of the language-world
relation, of translation etc.) and the way in
which we should think about language.
● Semantic theories as conceptual proposals
Why should we be interested in
philosophy of language?
● Philosophy of language is a propaedeutic to
other philosophical topics (in the same way in
which epistemology was a propaedeutic to
metaphysics for Kant, but philosophy of
language also trumps epistemology).
● Philosophy of language is the new metaphysics.
The structure of reality is the structure of
language.
● Philosophy is conceptual analysis. Conceptual
analysis is applied philosophy of language.
An example:
The (Naive) Referential Theory of Meaning
● linguistic expressions have a meaning because they
refer to something, so they mean what they refer to;
● for instance, "Băsescu" refers to the man named Traian
Băsescu, "dog" refers to the entire class of dogs, "to
have" refers to the relation of possession (an abstract
object), "Băsescu has a dog" stands for a possible or
actual state of affairs;
● the link between words and their respective meanings
(which is actually their reference) is arbitrary;
Some objections:
● Some words do not refer:
○ Pegasus, Harry Potter
○ nobody
○ general terms (qualities)
○ "for his sake", "on my behalf" etc.
○ "thus", "allegedly", "hey"
● A list of words (referring to concrete or abstract objects) is not a
sentence:
"Băsescu, to have, dog"
● Some coreferring terms are not synonymous:
"Klaus Johannis", "the Romanian president"
"creature (naturally endowed) with a heart", "creature (naturally
endowed) with kidneys"
Some useful reminders:
● syntax: What is a well-formed (or grammatical)
sentence (or linguistic expression)?
● semantics: What is meaning? What is a meaningful
expression? (applied semantics: what is the meaning of
"X") What is truth? What is the relation between
language and world?
● pragmatics: What do speakers do with language? What
does the context of utterance contribute to the meaning
of an expression? Semantic pragmatics (indexicals) vs.
pragmatic pragmatics (speech acts).
● language vs. metalanguage (compare to first
vs. second order logic);
● use vs. mention;
● type vs. token;
● sentence vs. proposition;
● sentence vs. utterance;
● meaning vs. reference.
References:
● W. G. Lycan, Philosophy of Language,
Routledge, London & New York, 2000, pp. 2-
8.
● A. P. Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of
Language (3rd edition), Oxford University
Press, Oxford, New York, 1996, pp. 3-19.