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QUIETING OF TITLE

ART. 476 It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other
than the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafaels second wife. The
(1) CHUNG V. MONDRAGON land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he is not
FACTS: even named in OCT No. 22447.With greater reason may
it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who
Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and are Rafaels children by his first wife Eleuteria. Unless
Mansueto Maceda are descendants of Rafael Mondragon Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood such fact is
(Rafael) by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia (Eleuteria), not borne out by the record they could not be heirs to each
while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon (Jack Daniel) is other. Add to this is the fact that petitioners are not in
Rafaels descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos possession of the land. Petitioners do not possess legal or
(Andrea). equitable title to the land.
OCT No. 22447 is registered in the name of "Heirs of Petition is DENIED.
Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda" and
covers 16,177 square meters of land in Macrohon, (2) BAHA’IS VS. PASCUAL
Southern Leyte (the land). Chung, et al. claim that from
facts of the case
1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of the land in
its tax declaration, and that a free patent was issued in Nature of case: On December 11, 2000, petitioner filed a
1987 in the name of Andreas heirs upon application of complaint with RTC for quieting of title, injunction and
Teofila G.Maceda (Teofila), who is petitioners sister. other claims against Silverio Songcua, the secretary of
DENR and the regional executive director of DENR of
On the other hand, respondents Bourbon, et al. claim that
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Andrea is the exclusive owner of the land, having
inherited the same from her father and that after Andrea Claim of petitioner: Petitioner alleged that it is the lawful
died, his son Fortunato Mondragon inherited the land; and and absolute owner of two parcels of land, together with
when the latter died, his son Jack Daniel (herein the two-story building thereon, situatied in Santiago City.
respondent) came into possession and enjoyment thereof. It claims that the property originally belonged to
Sometime in the year 2000, Jack Daniel sold a 1,500- Marcelina Ordoño, who then sold it to the Spouses
square meter portion of the land to his co-respondent Valdez, who then sold it to them (petitioner). They allege
Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz). that they have been in possession of the land for 30 years.
On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion Alleged cloud on title: A cloud exists on the property’s
of the land and that the sale to Regis-Schmitz created a title because of an invalid 1985 decision of the Bureau of
cloud upon their title, Chung, Jr., et al. filed an action to Lands that rejected the sales applications of the
quiet title. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Chung, predecessors-in-interest for lots. This decision also
Jr., et al. The CA sustained the trial court. ordered all those in privity with them (specifically herein
petitioner) to vacate lots and remove improvements
ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should
thereon.
prosper?
DENR secretary affirmed this decision. Recourse
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
to the Office of the President had been unavailing, so
CIVIL LAW: quieting of title DENR issued writs of execution pursuant to the
President's decision.
The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple;
the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) Defense of Respondent: Pascual moved to dismiss the
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title complaint for failure to state cause of action. He argued
to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and that the petitioner had no legal right to file the complaint
(2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding since the final and executory Bureau of Lands’ decision
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to possess the
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie lots.
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
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RTC's Ruling: Denied the motion to dismiss. The decision the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or
of the Bureau of Lands was not yet final since the Office proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title.
of the President's ruling on the appeal was “unavailable”.
APPLIED: In this case, it is clear that the petitioner no
CA's Ruling: CA set aside the RTC .It ruled that the longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the
Bureau of Lands’ decision, being final and executory, is lots. The petitioner’s status as possessor and owner of the
binding and conclusive upon the petitioner. Even lots had been settled in the final and executory December
assuming that the OP’s ruling on the appeal was still 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR
“unavailable,” the RTC should have dismissed the Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the
complaint for prematurity; an action to quiet title is not petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership
the proper remedy from an adverse decision issued by an of the lots.
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
The decisions and orders of administrative agencies, such
function.
as the Bureau of Lands, rendered pursuant to their quasi-
ISSUE judicial authority, upon finality, have the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of
WoN the complaint of petitioner was premature for
the doctrine of res judicata. Thus, the petitioner is now
failing to state a cause of action YES. CA properly set
barred from challenging the validity of the final and
aside RTC Ruling. The action of petitioner was indeed
executory Bureau of Lands’ December 4, 1985 decision.
premature because it was clear that it no longer had any
legal or equitable title over the lots. (3) ANASTACIA VDA DE AVILA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
RATIO
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be
1) The SC first discussed the concept of a cause of action.
brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
Definition: A cause of action is the act or omission by
FACTS:
which a party violates a right of another.
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the
Three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the
bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands
plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises;
from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect
amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo
such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio
violates the right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements
Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the
is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion
area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square
to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
meters more or less.
action.
Defendant’s land composed of the riceland portion of his
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency
land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500
of allegation in the pleading. In resolving a motion to
square meters and the residential portion is 680 square
dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action only
meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.
the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The
test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish
the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant
asked for. Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern
portion of the property with an area of approximately
2) The SC the essential requisites in an action to quiet
1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence
title.
(thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby
Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, there are molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the
two (2) indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title: plaintiffs over said portion.
(1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
encroach to their property but the defendant said that he
merely reconstructed the same.
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Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint
thus this case. for quieting of title, stating that he had been in the actual
possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action
developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes of
RULING: the land.

No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a RTC rendered judgment in favor of Lim. RTC ordered the
boundary dispute and as such the action must fail. Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the land in favor of
Luisa Lim. The lower court found that Lim had been in
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real peaceful possession of the land since 1937; that the
property or any interest therein, by reason of any possession had never been disturbed by Ono; that Lim
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding declared the lot in their name for taxation purposes; that
which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and Lim paid the tax related to it; and that the signature of
in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, Antonio Ono on confirmation of sale document was
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be genuine.
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
On the appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC. CA
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a
being cast upon a title to real property or any interest collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that Lim’s
therein. undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right
Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a adverse claim of a third party and its effect on their own
“cloud” to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant title. The CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the
admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new
June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area duplicate certificate of title in the name of Luisa,
was allotted to them and that the only controversy is considering that the owners duplicate was still intact in
whether these lands were properly measured. the possession of the Ono.

A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper ISSUES:
remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that 1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be
petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to
instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted quiet title;
by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of
possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, 2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land
may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse
the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out. possession;

(4) TEOFISTO ONO ET AL VS. VICENTE LIM 3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by
Spouses Ono in favor of Luisa and whether or not said
FACTS: deed was lost during World War II;
Vicente Lim filed an action in the RTC a petition for the 4. Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by
reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and
alleging it has been lost during the World War II by his
mother, Luisa. The land was sold to Luisa by the spouses RULING:
Diego Ono and Estefania Apas. The deed evidencing the
The Court ruled in favor of Lim and declared that the
sale had been lost without being registered. Antonio Ono,
petition has no merit.
the only legitimate heir of the spouses, executed a
notarized confirmation of sale in favor of Luisa. Zosimo Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title.
Ono and Teofisto Ono opposed Lim’s petition contending The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set
that they had the certificate of title in their possession as aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
the successors-in-interest of the Spouses Ono. Lim other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an

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action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the (6) DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORP. VS. CA, ET.
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Lim AL.
was asserting only that the existing title registered in the
name of the petitioners predecessors had become FACTS:
inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lim’s Dare Adventure Farm Corporation (Dare Adventure)
mother, and resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not purchased a parcel of land located in Cebu from
thereby assail the validity of OCT or challenge the respondent Agripina Goc-ong (Agripina), Porferio Goc-
judgment by which the title of the lot involved had been ong, Diosdado Goc-ong, Crisostomo Goc-ong,
decreed. Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-ong and Avelino
Goc-ong (collectively, the Goc-ongs). This was
Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.Later-on, Dare
a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real
Adventure discovered that the subject property was used
rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under
as a security for Goc-ongs obligation by mortgaging it to
the conditions laid down by law. However, prescription
Felix Ng, married to Nenita N. Ng, and Martin T. Ng,
was not relevant to the determination of the dispute
married to Azucena S. Ng (collectively, the Ngs).
herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of
Subsequently, the Goc-ongs apparently failing to pay
ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period.
their obligation, the Ngs filed a complaint for recovery of
He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been sum of money or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure of
voluntarily transferred by the registered owners mortgage only against Agripina.
themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest. Lim
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Ngs.
showed that his mother had derived a just title to the
Thereafter, Dare Adventure commenced in the CA an
property by virtue of sale; that from the time Luisa had
action for the annulment of the RTCs decision. The CA
acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over its
dismissed the petition.
possession in the concept of an owner, and had performed
her obligation by paying real property taxes on the ISSUE:
property, as evidenced by tax declarations issued in her
name; and that in view of the delivery of the property, Whether or not the action for annulment of judgment was
coupled with Luisa’s actual occupation of it, all that a proper recourse for Dare Adventure to set aside the
remained to be done was the issuance of a new transfer decision of the RTC.
certificate of title in her name. HELD:
(5) MANUEL P. NEY ET AL VS. SPS. QUIJANO The petition is denied.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer REMEDIAL LAW: petition for annulment of judgment;
property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful doctrine of immutability of final judgments
and legal owner. Indeed, reconveyance is an action
distinct from an action for quieting of title, which is Fled A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of
interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, invalid, annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be through extrinsic fraud.
prejudicial to said title for purposes of removing such
Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not
cloud or to quiet title. However, we Find nothing
allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties
erroneous in the CA’s ruling treating respondents’ action
aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions.
for reconveyance as an action to quiet title.
The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the
grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 110 of Rule
47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
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relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer Registry of Deeds, while the second Deed of Pacto de
available through no fault of the petitioner. Retro was registered.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment Issue:
of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
Whether the transactions between the parties were simple
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-
loan?
honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of
final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation Held: No. The transactions were not simple loan.
of justice by the courts.
Under article 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a was a necessary requisite for the validity of a mortgage
two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the even as between the parties, but under article 2125 of the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make new Civil Code (in effect since August 30,1950), this is
orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put no longer so.
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.
We agree with the CA’s suggestion that the petitioners If the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is
proper recourse was either an action for quieting of title nonetheless binding between the parties. (Article 2125,
or an action for reconveyance of the property. 2nd sentence).

The Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.


The Valdehuezas having remained in possession of the
land and the realty taxes having been paid by them, the
ART. 477 contracts which purported to be pacto de retro
transactions are presumed to be equitable mortgages, 5
(1) TAN VS. VALDEHUEZA
whether registered or not, there being no third parties
Facts: involved.
A parcel of land described in a cause of action was the (2) PHIL.- VILLE DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING
subject matter of the public auction sale CORP. VS. CHRISTINA GOCO, ET. AL, (full)
wherein the plaintiff, Lucia Tan was the highest bidder
and as such a Certificate of Sale was executed in favor of
herein plaintiff. Due to the failure of defendant Arador RUINOUS BUILDINGS
Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the period of ART. 482
one year as being provided by law, an Absolute Deed of
Sale in favor of the plaintiff was executed. The defendants (1) SPS. RICARDO HIPOLITO JR VS CARLOTA
Valdeheuza have executed two documents of Deed of BALDE CINCO ET. AL
Pacto de Retro Sale in favor of the plaintiff of two FACTS:
portions of a parcel of land which is described in the
second cause of action with the total amount of P1,500. Petitioner-spouses allege that on June 15, 1989,
From the execution of the Deed of Sale with right to Edeltrudis entered into an agreement with Francisco
repurchase mentioned in the second cause of action, Villena (now deceased) to rent a portion of the property
defendants remained in the possession of the land. located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila
and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to
A complaint for injunction was filed by Tan to enjoin the the existing house thereon. The contract was for a period
Valdehuezas "from entering the parcel of land and of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a
gathering the nuts therein ". The complaint and the three-storey apartment building. Petitioners inherited the
counterclaim were later on dismissed for failure of the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis.
parties to seek for immediate trial, thus evincing lack of
interest on their part to proceed with the case. The Deed In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement,
of Pacto de Retro referred to was not registered in the petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena, all residing
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in the property, were informed that respondent Atty. ISSUE: (1) Whether OBO can render the challenged
Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject issuances, (2) Whether the CA erred in relying on OBOs
property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976. report when it rendered the assailed decision.
Respondents filed with the OBO a verified request for HELD: The petition lacks merit.
structural inspection.
OBO CAN RENDER THE CHALLENGED
In his memorandum, Engr. Rico reported that two old and ISSUANCES
dilapidated buildings made of wooden materials were
The Building Official was authorized to issue the
found in the premises and recommended that the matter
questioned Demolition Order in view of his finding that
be referred to the Committee on Buildings (Committee)
the disputed structures are dangerous and ruinous
for further appropriate action and disposition.
buildings within the purview of P.D. No. 1096.
Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which
pursuant to the National Building Code (NBC), the the resolution and demolition order were issued is
verified request of the respondents was referred to the evident. The records show that the OBO issued the
Committee for Hearing/ Investigation. resolution and Demolition Order only after ocular
inspections and hearings. The Inspectorate Team of the
With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, hearings
DPWH came up with the same conclusion when it
were subsequently held for purposes of resolving the focal
conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises.
issue of "the structural stability, architectural
presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to CAS RELIANCE ON OBO REPORT
determine [whether] or not the subject buildings are still
The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon
safe for continued occupancy."
petition validly received, on reported dangerous and
A report based on another ocular inspection conducted ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the
was submitted through a Memorandum which states the life, health and well-being of the inhabitants, and the
subject buildings are structurally unsafe as well as fire and general public.Otherwise stated, respondents motive in
electrical hazard thereby endangering the life, safety, initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the
health and welfare [of] the general public specifically the challenged OBO Resolution and Demolition Order is
tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly recommended that the immaterial as far as the OBO is concerned, so long as it is
subject building be declared dangerous and ruinous. satisfied that a building or structure is dangerous and
ruinous. Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found
The OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous,
no irregularities in the manner that officials of the OBO
and recommended their demolition. A Demolition Order
performed their duties and in coming up with its
addressed to the respondents.
Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was
Petitioners thus appealed to the DPWH. affirmed by the CA when it resolved the petition before
it. We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied
On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a on the findings of fact of the OBO and the other
Resolution dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for administrative bodies.
lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and
the issuance of the Demolition Order.
Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal with the OP but the
same was denied. An MR was also denied.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the
CA which dismissed their petition. An MR was likewise
denied.
Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this
Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45.

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CO-OWNERSHIP The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of
subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
ART. 485 indivision, which means that there is a single object which
(1) AURORA TECSON, ET AL. VS. MINERVA is not materially divided, and which is the element which
FAUSTO (full) binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares,
which determines the rights and obligations of the co-
(2) SANCHEZ VS. CA owners.
Facts: In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76- other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-
was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner
Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he
Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-
married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.[1] On owners.
20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the
289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-
been executed on 23 June 1995[2] by all six (6) co-owners ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
in her favor. Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her trustee for the others.
signature on the document and subsequently refused to
vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia Before the partition of a land or thing held in common,
Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite
aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
Caloocan City sometime in September 1995, abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or
subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court. thing.

Issue: WON the sale is valid given that one of the co Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an
owners did not consent thereto undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell
and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may
Held: validly lease his undivided interest to a third party
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right
civil law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part
from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co- of the thing owned in common because his right over the
ownership was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without
address this controversy in the interest of substantial any physical adjudication.
justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the
grave abuse of discretion. property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of
common dominion which two or more persons have in a Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected.
divided. Manresa defines it as the “manifestation of the Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her
private right of ownership, which instead of being definite share and determine the boundaries of her
exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the property. Such partition must be done without prejudice
things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer
and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
and the same.”

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ART. 486 ruled that it would necessarily follow that none of the
coowners can, without the consent of the other co-owners,
(1) BORBAJO VS. HIDDEN VIEW HOMEOWNERS validly give consent to the making of an alteration by
(full) another person, such as Catapang in this case, in the thing
(2) CRUZ VS. CATAPANG owned in common.

FACTS: In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states each co-
owner may use the thing owned in common provided he
Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
exclusive use to the prejudice of the coownership. intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of
Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
are the co-owners of a parcel of land covering an area of using it according to their rights.
1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang
Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. Sometime in 1992, Teofila The Court ruled that, to give consent to a third person to
Catapang, with the consent of Norma Maligaya as one of construct a house on the co-owned property would be to
the aforementioned co-owners, built a house on a lot injure the interest of the co-ownership and would prevent
adjacent to the subject parcel of land. The house built by other co-owners from using the property in accordance
Catapang intruded on a portion of the coowned property. with their rights. In this case, the consent of only one co-
In September 1995, Cruz learned about the intrusion and owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
made several demands for Catapang to demolish and forcible entry filed against the respondent Catapang.
vacate the part of the structure encroaching upon their
The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of
property. However, Catapang refused and disregarded the
the consent of her other co-owners did not grant Catapang
demands of Cruz. Cruz then filed a complaint for forcible
any right to enter and even build upon the co-owned
entry against Catapang before the MCTC of Taal,
property. According to the Supreme Court, the respondent
Batangas.
Catapang’s act of getting only the consent of one co-
The MCTC decided in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter
of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered
defendant’s construction of the house and possession of as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the
the portion of the lot in question. On appeal, the RTC co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute
affirmed the decision of the MCTC. Catapang filed a forcible entry. The petition was GRANTED.
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which
(3) ALEJANDRINO VS. CA
reversed the RTC’s decision and ruled in favor of her.
Facts: The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children
The Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action
named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia
for forcible entry in this case because respondent’s entry
and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of the
into the property, considering the consent given by co-
spouses, the property should have been divided among
owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one
their children, however, the estate of the Alejandrino
made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a
spouses was not settled in accordance with the
cause of action for forcible entry. Thus, the case went to
procedures.
the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly
ISSUE: 1. Whether the consent given by one of the co-
purchased portion of the lots from her brothers,
owners is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of a
Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out,
complaint for forcible entry.
however, that a third party named Nique, the private
DECISION: No, Co-owners cannot devote common respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the
property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
co-ownership. In this case, the act of Norma Maligaya is
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later
tantamount to devoting the property to her exclusive use.
questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and
Under Article 491 of the Civil Code, none of the co-
damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in
owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
favor of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots.
alterations in the thing owned in common. The Court
8
Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle
but later withdrew the same. the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is
no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of
The partition of inherited property need not be embodied
the property that had been declared by the trial court
in a public document to be valid between the parties.
(Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase.
The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and
Laurencia. ART. 487

Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made (1) RESUENA VS. CA
CASE DOCTRINES: Co-owner’s right to file an action
Held: Yes.
for ejectment; occupation by tolerance. Respondent’s
1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be
decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property
fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to since petitioners were not able to prove that they are
exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. authorized to occupy the same. Petitioners’ lack of
authority to occupy the properties, coupled with
Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her
respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly settles
pro indiviso share. The legality of Laurencia's alienation
respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No.
of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was
2587.Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons
upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become
who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance
final and executory by Laurencia's withdrawal of her
or permission, without any contract between them,
appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the
are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
segregation of the portions of the property that were
vacate the same upon demand, failing in which
adjudged in his favor, he was in effect calling for the
a summary action for ejectment is the proper
partition of the property. However, under the law,
remedy against them
partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected
by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the FACTS:
court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course
Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule45.
of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself,
Juanito Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and oversee of
and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay,Cebu,
2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-
Laurentia became the basis for the segregation of the Manglanilla Estate. He owned six-eighths (6/8) of
property in favor of Nique LotNo.2587 while the Sps. Bascon owned two-
eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No.
However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of
2592 is owned in common by Borromeo and the
estate was offered before the trial court and it became the
heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the
basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to
proportion of their undivided shares was not
Nique. Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution
determined a quo. Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay,
of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She
Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima
only questions its validity on account of the absence of
Resuena resided in theupper portion of LotNo. 2587,
notarization of the document and the non-publication
allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses
thereof.
Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand,
3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot
instrument. No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of
Nicolas Maneja, one of the original co-owners of
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial Lot No. 2587. Borromeo claimed that they have
settlement of the estate reflected the intention of both occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his
Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. own liberality
Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and
9
Borromeo developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 vacate the same upon demand, failing in which
and2592 occupied by him into a resort known as a summary action for ejectment is the proper
the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and remedy against them.
extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the
HELD: Petition is DENIED.
subject properties, respondent demanded that
petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners, however, (2) BALOLOY VS. HULAR
refused to vacate their homes. On 16 February
1994, Borromeo filed a Complaint for ejectment with the (Note: This case have several issues but only the issue
MTC against the petitioners. MTC decision (summary about co-ownership was presented in this digest)
proceeding): dismissed the complaint. Borromeo had no FACTS:
right to evict the petitioners because the area was owned
in common and there was no partition yet. Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original
owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran,
RTC decision: reversed the MTC decision. It held that Juban, Sorsogon ( Lot No. 3347 ) of the Juban Cadastre.
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one A major portion of the property was agricultural, while
of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment, the rest was residential. November 11 and 25, 1961:
may successfully be invoked by the respondent When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana
because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner and Lagata, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on over the
possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347, ( 15,906 sqm) and
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co- the residential portion of the property (287 sqm) to
owners.CA decision: affirmed the RTC decision Astrologo Hular.
ISSUE: WON Borromeo can lawfully evict the In 1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado asked Hular’s
petitioners. permission to construct a house on a portion of Lot No.
RULING: 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed.

Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land (north
“any one of the co-owners may bring an action in of the residential portion of Lot 3347 Lot No. 3353 (9302
ejectment,” is a categorical and an unqualified authority sqm) and registered the same. Iluminado constructed his
in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the house on a portion of Lot No. 3353. He and his family,
portions of Lot. No. 2587.This provision is a including his children, forthwith resided in said house.
departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an In 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near
action for ejectment must be brought by all the the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however,
co-owners. occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353.
Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to exercise Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His
and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought widow and their children continued residing in the
by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of
decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision Iluminado’s children, later constructed his house near that
cannot prejudice their rights. of his deceased father.
Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is When Astrologo died, he was survived by his children,
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the
the property since petitioners were not able to prove that respondent, among others, who continued to reside in
they are authorized to occupy the same. Petitioners’ lack their house.
of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with
respondent’s right under Article 487,clearly settles Sometime in l991 the respondent had Lot No. 3353
respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. surveyed and discovered that the residential area deeded
2587.Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons by Lagata to Astrologo Hular had an area of 1,405 square
who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance meters, instead of 287 square meters only.
or permission, without any contract between them,
are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
10
Respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting father to occupy the property provided that they vacate
of title of real property against the children and heirs of when asked. Time came when he demanded that they
Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit
petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. against them.
He prayed among others that he be declared the absolute
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and
owner of the property in question.
Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that the said
ISSUE: Whether all the indispensable parties had been lot was registered in their parents name and they had been
impleaded by the respondent in the trial court (NO) living in the said house and lot since birth. The only
reason why the said house and lot was transferred in
RULING: Respondent adduced evidence that when his
Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need
parents died intestate, they were survived by their
of money for renovating their house, their parents were
children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose,
not qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was
Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita.
the only one who had a college education, they executed
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador.
are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s
before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject
filiation and the settlement of the estate are conditions
to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under Article
precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since
487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may
Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal
bring an action in ejectment.
heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the
possession, including an accion publiciana and a lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution
reinvidicatory action. If the action is for the benefit of which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana
the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and who claim that they have a share in the lot.
entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that
prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are
Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he
indispensable parties.
cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, Thus the case at bar.
claiming sole ownership over the subject property and
ISSUE:
praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There
is no proof that the other co- owners had waived their Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the
rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to ejectment suit
the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case
in the trial court. HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would
(3) ADLAWAN VS. ADLAWAN
prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he
A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and
action without necessity of including all the co-owners as Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death,
plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus
if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be making them co-owners as well.
dismissed.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the
FACTS: instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of
may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the
Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito
co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be
Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of
instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the
Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He
benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be
then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to
dismissed.
himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his
11
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his Petitioner’s argument:
benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of the
• That the action of respondents, whether it be one for
other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.
quieting of title or an accion reinvindicatoria, had
(4) IGLESIA NI KRISTO VS. PONFERRADA prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 24,
2001. Petitioner asserts that this is because when
Facts: respondents filed their complaint, they were not in actual
•Respondent filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or or physical possession of the property, as it (petitioner)
Accion Reinvindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court has been in actual possession of the property since
(RTC) of Quezon City against the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) 1984when TCT No. 321744 was issued to it by the
Register of Deeds
• Heirs of Santos alleged therein that, during his lifetime,
Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-square-meter Ruling:
parcel of land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City
• As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
action of respondents was one for quieting of title under
57272.He had been in possession of the owner’s duplicate
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 476
of said title and had been in continuous, open, adverse and
of the New Civil Code. The latter provision reads:
peaceful possession of the property. He died on February
9, 1970 and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
other plaintiffs, who were their children. Thereafter, property or any interest therein, by reason of any
plaintiffs took peaceful and adverse possession of the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
property, and of the owner’s duplicate of said title. which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and
in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
• Sometime in February 1996, heirs of santos learned that
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
iglesia ni cristo was claiming ownership over the
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An
property. They alleged that Enrique Santos, during his
action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
lifetime, and his heirs, after his death, never encumbered
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
or disposed the property. In 1996, Santos had the property
fenced but Iglesia ni Cristo deprived them of the final use • A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal
and enjoyment of their property. Thus, Santos filed for the or equitable, or a cloud of an interest in land appearing in
quieting the title of plaintiffs over and/or recover some legal form but which is, in fact, unfounded, or which
possession of their said property in the name of deceased it would be inequitable to enforce. An action for quieting
Enrique Santos. of title is imprescriptible until the claimant is ousted of his
possession.
• Petitioner argues that the action (either Quieting of Title
or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had prescribed, the same • Petitioner’s claim that it had been in actual or material
having been filed only on October 24, 2001 beyond the possession of the property since 1984 when TCT No.
statutory ten-year period therefor 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations
in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and
• Trial court and CA later ruled in favor of Private
material possession of the property since 1961 up to the
Respondents. CA stated that as to the issue of
time they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.
prescription, the appellate court held that the prescriptive
period should be reckoned from 1996, when petitioner • Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative
claimed ownership and barred respondents from fencing reinvindicatory action against petitioner. It bears stressing
the property. Hence this petition. that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the
recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus
Issue:
utendi , and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a
• Whether or not respondent judge gravely erred and party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
abused her discretion when she held that the action for recovery of its full possession.
quieting of title and/or accion reinvindicatoria (civil case
Thus, the owner of real property in actualand material
no. Q-01-45415) has not yet prescribed
possession thereof may file an accion reinvindicatoria
against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land
12
including jus vindicandi , or the right to exclude in favor of petitioners-spouses Cuizon. Prior tempore,
defendants from the possession thereof. potior jure.
• Since respondents were in actual or physical possession It simply means, “He who is first in time is preferred in
of the property when they filed their complaint against right.” The only essential requisite of this rule is priority
petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for in time, and the only one who can invoke this is the first
the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to vendee. Records bear the fact that when Placida sold her
run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No.321744 one-fourth portion of the property in 1968, the 1983
over the property in 1984. Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale was still inexistent,
and more importantly, said portion was yet to be
• Thus, petition is denied. CAs decision is affirmed
transferred by succession to Placida’s heirs.
(5) SANTOS VS. HEIRS OF LUSTRE (full) The records also show that after Placida sold her portion
(6) FERNANDEZ VS. VILLEGAS (full) to Angel, the latter immediately took possession of the
same. The defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title
does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of
ART. 488 title with notice of a flaw in his title.

(1) JALANDONI VS. GUANZON (full) The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where
there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free
patents and titles. Petitioners knew of the existence of the
1968 Deed of Sale as the Remotos showed it to them in
THE CONDOMINIUM ACT
1982. It cannot be said that petitioners are transferees in
ART. 493 good faith.

(1) DE LA CRUZ VS. NOLASCO (full) (7) CARO VS. CA

(6) CUIZON VS. REMOTO FACTS:

FACTS: The parties in this case are vying for ownership Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were
of a 4,300 square meter-land located Agusan del Norte. the original co-owners of two parcels of land.
Petitioners-spouses Encarnacion and Salvador Cuizon
Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving
rely on TCT issued by the Registry of Deeds of Agusan
wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito,
del Norte pursuant to a notarized 1983 Extra-Judicial
were appointed in Special Proceeding No. 508 of the
Settlement with Sale executed by the heirs of Placida
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint administrators
wherein they adjudicated unto themselves the one-fourth
of Mario's estate.
share of Placida, and, at the same time, sold said portion
to their co-heir, Encarnacion L. Cuizon. Benjamin Benito, one of the co-owners,executed a deed
of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over
On the other hand, respondents have in their favor a 1968
said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz
Deed of Sale involving a portion of the same property
Caro. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Caro
executed by Placida in favor of Angel husband of
was issued TCT No. T-4978 over LOT I-C upon consent
respondent Mercedes C. Remoto, and father of the other
by Saturnino and Alfredo Benito.
respondents. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and
ordered that the property be reconveyed to them. On Luz Caro made an allegation in a pleading
appeal by petitioners, the CA affirmed the findings and presented in Spec. Pro No. 508 that she acquired by
conclusion of the trial court. Petitioners filed a motion for purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third
reconsideration but the CA denied it. undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. Basilia
Lahorra Vda. De Benito a written offer to redeem to
ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property in dispute?
redeem the said one-third undivided share.
RULING: The 1968 Deed of Sale executed by Placida in
Caro ignored the offer, thus Basilia sought to
favor of Angel should prevail over the 1983 Extra-
intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled "Rosa Amador
Judicial Settlement with Sale made by the heirs of Placida
13
Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and Even assuming that redemption exists, private
mortgage and cancellation of the annotation of the sale respondent as administratrix, has no personality to
and mortgage involving the same parcels of land. exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate
of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-
The main case was dismissed. Basilia then filed the
administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's
present case as an independent one and in the trial sought
consent to the sale of the one-third portion to petitioner
to prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario
cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the
Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required
ground that the right of redemption was not within the
by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the
powers of administration, in the same manner, private
New Civil Code.
respondent as co-administrator has no power exercise the
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds right of redemption — the very power which the Court of
that: (a) private respondent, as administratrix of the Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of
intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power administration.
to exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b)
Basilia cannot be considered to have brought this action
Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his
in her behalf and in behalf of the heirs of Mario Benito
obligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his
because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint
one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners.
specifically stated that she brought the action in her
MR was denied, thus she appealed to CA which ruled that
capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario
since the right of the co-owner to redeem in case his share
Benito.
be sold to a stranger arose after the death of Mario Benito,
such right did not form part of the hereditary estate of (8) TORRES JR. ET AL VS. LAPINID AND VELEZ
Mario but instead was the personal right of the heirs, one
FACTS:
of whom is Mario's widow.
The petitioners filed a complaint for the nullification of
Thus, it behooved either the vendor, Benjamin, or his
the sale of real property by respondent in favor of Lapinid;
vendee, Luz Caro, to have made a written notice of the
the recovery of possession and ownership of the property;
intended or consummated sale under Article 1620 of the
and the payment of damages. The petitioners were co-
Civil Code. CA reversed the appealed judgment; MR was
owners, with Jesus, who filed an action for partition of the
denied. Thus, this present petition.
parcels of land against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether Basilia, as administrator of Mario’s
The judgment was that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were
estate, could exercise the right of redemption.
jointly authorized to sell the said properties and receive
RESOLUTION: the proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-
owners which was later amended to exclude Jesus co-
NO.
owner but during inspection, it was found out that Lapinid
Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator was occupying a portion the lot by virtue of a deed of sale
has the right to the possession of the real and personal executed by Jesus.
estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of
The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale to be null and
the expenses of administration, and the administrator may
void. Further, the complainants prayed for payment of
bring and defend action for the recovery or protection of
rental fees. Jesus said that there was a partition case
the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88),
between him and the petitioners filed in 1993 involving
such right of possession and administration do not include
several parcels of land.
the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold
to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of Then, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered
another, because in such case, the right of legal into between him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of land.
redemption only came into existence when the sale to the However, he insisted on the validity of sale since Jesus
stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of showed him several deeds of sale making him a majority
the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be owner of the lot. He explained that Jesus permitted him to
transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters
vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526). conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-owners.

14
It was ruled that the buyers, including Lapinid, were held a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila, each
buyers in good faith since a proof of ownership was owning an undivided 1/3 portion.
shown to them by Jesus before buying the property. A
2. Nieves wanted and asked for the partition of the
partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the
common property, but failing in this, she offered
petitioners but it was denied. Moreover, the Court of
to sell her 1/3 portion.
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court that the
compromise agreement did not affect the validity of the 3. The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her
sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid. sister and her brother but both declined to buy it.
It was offered to their mother but the mother
ISSUE:
declined to buy, saying that if the property
Whether or not Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a increased in value, she might be suspected of
portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another having taking advantage of her daughter.
person.
4. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio
HELD: Araneta Inc., domestic corporation and a new
certificate was issued covering the same property.
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole
he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same 5. The three owners agreed to have the whole parcel
time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Jesus subdivided into small lots and then sold, the
can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of proceeds of the sale to be later divided among
Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. them. (Agreement is embodied in the
Lapinid validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the Memorandum of Agreement).
date of the execution of a valid sale.
6. Atty. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-
in-fact and lawyer of Angela Tuason and Antonio
Tuason and at the same time was the member of
ART. 494 the Board of Director of the third co-owner,
(1) SALVADOR VS COURT OF APPEALS (full) Araneta Inc.

(2) TUASON VS TUASON 7. Contract stated that “ the three co-owners agreed
to improve the property by filling it and
Topic: XXII. Partition And Distribution Of Estate constructing roads and curbs on the same and
Doctrine: SC found no valid ground for the partition then subdivided it into small lots for sale.
insisted upon the appellant. Supreme Court find from 8. ARANETA INC’S DUTIES
the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the
64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held  It was to finance the whole development and
in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire subdivision
area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year
 It was to prepare a schedule of prices and
1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already
conditions of sale, subject to the approval of the
been sold. As well observed by the court below, the
two other co-owners
partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is
about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of  It was invested with authority to sell the lots into
the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties which the property was to be subdivided
by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a
period not exceeding 10 yrs, there should be no fear that  Execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of
the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within sale
the four yrs left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.
 It was also to pay the real estate taxes
Facts:
 To furnish each of the two co-owners copies of
1. The sisters Angela Tuason and Nieves Tuason de the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and
Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., rents and collections made thereon

15
9. Angela Tuason revoked the powers conferred on 11. The Brother Antonio Tuason did not agree to the
her lawyer J. Antonio Araneta. suit and its purpose for he evidently did not agree
to the suit and its purpose for he joined Araneta
 Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of Inc. as a co defendant
alleged breach of the terms of the Memorandum
and abuse of powers granted to it in the 12. TRIAL COURT ruled that the complaint be
document. dismissed

 Thus, she had decided to rescind said contract and ISSUE:


asked that the property held in common be
1. Whether or not the 2 contracts are different which
partitioned.
may lead to rescission?
10. Angela filed a complain asking the court to order
2. Whether there is a ground for partition of
the partition of the property in question and she
property?
be given 1/3 of the same including rents.
HELD: No. Both contracts are similar and practically the
 She had been tricked into signing it
same.
 She was given to understand by Antonio RATIONALE:
Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and
legal adviser that said contract would be The Supreme Court ruled that the copies of both contracts
similar to another contract of subdivision of a were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a
parcel into lots and the sale entered into broker and both had every opportunity to go over and
Gregorio Araneta and the heirs of D. Tuason compare them and decide on the advisability of or
disadvantage in entering into the contract; that although
 But it turned out that the contracts were Atty. Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.,
widely different from each other from the being a member of the Board of Directors of the Company
first contract. at the time that contract was executed, he was not the
 FIRST CONTRACT: The terms of contract party with which Angela contracted and that he
is more favorable to the owners therein and committed no breach of trust. The act of Atty. Antonio
less favorable to the Araneta Inc. Araneta in giving the plaintiff a copy of the contract
before the same was executed, constitutes a full disclosure
 Atty. Araneta was more or less disqualified of the facts.
to act as her legal adviser as he did because
he was one of the officials of Araneta Inc., With respect to the charged that the defendant corporation
failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivisions
 That the defendant company did not plans x x x the Court ruled that it has no basis. The
previously show the plans of subdivision, the evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted
schedule of prices and conditions of sale to the plaintiff periodically all the data relative to prices
and conditions of the sale of the subdivided lots, together
 Gregorio Araneta, Inc. infringed the terms of with the amount corresponding to her but without
the contract for: justifiable reason, refused to accept them because of that
 It failed to make the necessary improvements attitude the company thought it was useless for the
on the property corporation to continue sending her statement of
accounts, checks and other things.
 It failed to submit to the plaintiff from time to
time schedule of prices and conditions under So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with
which the subdivided lots are to be sold the sale of the subdivided lots without the approval of the
plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct
 To furnish the plaintiff a copy of the impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision
subdivision plants of the majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.

16
The Court feels that recission of the contract Ten years later, the heirs of Flores’ sisters, Dolores R.
exhibit 6 is not minor violations of the terms of the Cichon, et. al. (Heirs of Cichon) filed a Complaint against
agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be Flores’ heirs for “partition of the lot, declaration of nullity
permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary
but only for such breaches as are so substantial and injunction” before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in Aklan alleging that the widow Esmenia appealed to them
making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian- to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education
Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821). of her children, to which they agreed on the condition that
after the children had finished their education, it would be
PARTITION: Supreme Court found no valid ground divided into eight equal parts; and upon their demand for
for the partition insisted upon the appellant. Supreme
partition of the lot, the defendants Flores‘ heirs refused,
Court find from the evidence as was done by the trial court
they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as
that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the
they had inherited it from Flores. Flores‘ heirs claimed
parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent
that they had been in possession of the lot in
of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial
the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and
in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had
have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial.
already been sold. As well observed by the court below,
And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the
the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is
produce of the lot or that upon Flores’ death in 1989,
about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of
Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to
the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties
it to finance her children’s education, they contending
by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a
that by 1977, the children had already finished their
period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that
respective courses.
the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within
the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. The RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores and his heirs
400. had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of
the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a lot by prescription. The Court of Appeals reversed the
party to the community. Each may, at any time, demand decision finding that there was no adequate notice by
the partition of the thing held in common.Nevertheless, Flores to his co-heirs of the repudiation of the co-
an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a ownership and neither was there a categorical assertion by
specified length of time, not exceeding ten years, shall the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that
be valid. This period may be a new agreement. barred the plaintiffs’ claim of ownership.
ISSUE:
(3) HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR VS HEIRS OF Whether or not Heirs of Flores acquired ownership over
DOLORES CICHON the lot by extraordinary prescription
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of HELD:
things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten
years while extraordinary acquisitive prescription only Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights
requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
years. prescription requires possession of things in good faith
and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good
Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children- faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
compulsory heirs. Restar’s eldest child, Flores, on extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted
the basis of a Joint Affidavit he executed with Helen adverse possession for thirty years.
Restar, causedthe cancellation of Tax Declaration in
Restar’s name. The same covers a 5,918 square meter When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro
parcel of land in Aklan which was among the properties indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession.
left by Restar. Flores thereafter sought the issuance of Heirs of Chichon never possessed the lot, however, much
another Tax Declaration in his name. Flores later on died. less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999
when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the
17
present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the being already married, their relationship developed.
lot after Restar’s death and exercised acts of dominion During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent,
thereon — tilling and cultivating the land, introducing together with three more incorporators, were able to
improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof. Flores’ establish a manpower services company.Five parcels of
possession thus ripened into ownership through land were also acquired during the said period and were
acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly
in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the as husband and wife.
New Civil Code.
Heirs of Cichon did not deny that aside from the verbal Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and
partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan they decidedto part ways sometime in 1991.In 1998, both
way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate
the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga their business partnership by executing a Partition
Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit “20”). If they were Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners
able to demand the partition, why then did they not proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the
settle once and for all the inheritance from their father ownership over the three other properties will go to
Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all respondent.However, when petitioner wanted additional
of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio demands to be included in the partition agreement,
Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a
the extra-judicial partition? complaint for judicial partition of the said properties
before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession
adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision
declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved,
another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she
stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the
is thepro indivisoowner of one-half of the properties in
exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and
dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision
irrigation fees without respondents having ever
subjected the certificates of title over the said properties
contributed any share therein; and
to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence.
continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to
Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out
the exclusion of respondents. And Flores’ adverse
the issue on ownership in an action for partition. Her
possession was continued by his heirs.
appeal was denied.
The trial court’s finding and conclusion that Flores and
his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the land in ISSUES:
open, adverse and continuous possession in 1. Whether an action for partition precludes a
the concept of owner — which length of possession had settlement on ownership;
never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of the 2. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed
heirs of Cichon, being thus duly supported by substantial properties was collaterally attacked in the action for
evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot partition
by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that 3. Whether respondent is estopped from contesting
respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex. the Partition Agreement

HELD:
ART. 496 The petition is bereft of merit.
CIVIL LAW: Existence of co-ownership in an action
(1) BETTY LACBAYAN VS BAYANI SAMOY for partition.
First issue: In Municipality of Bin v. Garcia, the Court
FACTS:
explained that the determination as to the existence of co-
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a
ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent
partition. While it is true that the complaint involved here
18
is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence ART. 499
or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five (1) LOPEZ VS LUSTRE (full)
real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of
title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and TRADEMARKS AND TRADENAMES
unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally ART. 520
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will (1) COFFEE PARTNERS INC VS SAN FRANCISCO
not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does COFFEE & ROASTERY INC
not even have any rightful interest over the subject
Facts:
properties.
Petitioner Coffee Partners entered into a franchise
Second issue: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate agreement with Coffee Partners Ltd. to operate coffee
of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not shops in the country using the trademark ‘San Francisco
material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally Coffee.’ Respondent on the other hand, is a local
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. corporation engaged in the wholesale and retail sale of
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the coffee and uses the business name ‘San Francisco Coffee
Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title & Roastery’ registered with the DTI. Later, respondent
referred to by law means ownership which is, more often filed an infringement and/or unfair competition complaint
than not, represented by that document. Petitioner against petitioner alleging that the latter was about to open
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title a coffee shop under the name ‘San Francisco Coffee’
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the causing confusion in the minds of the public as it bore a
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although similar name and is engaged also in selling of coffee.
both are interchangeably used Petitioner contended no infringement would arise because
respondent’s tradename was not registered.
REMEDIAL LAW: Admissions.
Third issue: An admission is any statement of fact made Issue:
by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the Whether or not petitioner’s trademark would infringe
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with respondent’s tradename.
the facts alleged by him. To be admissible, an admission
must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be Ruling: YES.
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily
In Prosource International, Inc. v. Horphag Research
made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests,
Management SA, this Court laid down what constitutes
otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.
infringement of an unregistered trade name, thus:
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition (1) The trademark being infringed is registered in the
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters Intellectual Property Office; however, in infringement of
which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, trade name, the same need not be registered;
basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide among themselves the (2) The trademark or trade name is reproduced,
subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners counterfeited, copied, or colorably imitated by the
argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit infringer;
against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as (3) The infringing mark or trade name is used in
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising
over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law of any goods, business or services; or the infringing mark
to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on or trade name is applied to labels, signs, prints, packages,
the disputed properties. wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements intended to be
used upon or in connection with such goods, business, or
services;
19
(4) The use or application of the infringing mark or trade amounting to P20 M. SM refused to pay damages though
name is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive they removed the light boxes. Pearl & Dean eventually
purchasers or others as to the goods or services sued SM. SM argued that it did not infringe on Pearl
themselves or as to the source or origin of such goods or & Dean’s trademark because Pearl & Dean’s trademark is
services or the identity of such business; and only applicable to envelopes and stationeries and not to
the type of ad spaces owned by SM. SM also averred that
(5) It is without the consent of the trademark or trade
“Poster Ads” is a generic term hence it is not subject to
name owner or the assignee thereof.
trademark registration. SM also averred that the actual
RA 8293, which took effect on 1 January 1998, has light boxes are not copyrightable. The RTC ruled in favor
dispensed with the registration requirement. Section of Pearl & Dean. But the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
165.2 of RA 8293 categorically states that trade names of SM.
shall be protected, even prior to or without registration
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
with the IPO, against any unlawful act including any
subsequent use of the trade name by a third party, whether HELD: Yes. The light boxes cannot, by any stretch of the
as a trade name or a trademark likely to mislead the imagination, be considered as either prints, pictorial
public. illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags or box wraps,
to be properly classified as a copyrightable; what was
It is the likelihood of confusion that is the gravamen of
copyrighted were the technical drawings only, and not the
infringement. Applying the dominancy test or the holistic
light boxes themselves. In other cases, it was held that
test, petitioner’s “SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE”
there is no copyright infringement when one who, without
trademark is a clear infringement of respondent’s “SAN
being authorized, uses a copyrighted architectural plan to
FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC.” trade
construct a structure. This is because the copyright does
name. The descriptive words “SAN FRANCISCO
not extend to the structures themselves.
COFFEE” are precisely the dominant features of
respondent’s trade name. Petitioner and respondent are On the trademark infringement allegation, the words
engaged in the same business of selling coffee, whether “Poster Ads” are a simple contraction of the generic term
wholesale or retail. The likelihood of confusion is higher poster advertising. In the absence of any convincing
in cases where the business of one corporation is the same proof that “Poster Ads” has acquired a secondary meaning
or substantially the same as that of another corporation. In in this jurisdiction, Pearl & Dean’s exclusive right to the
this case, the consuming public will likely be confused as use of “Poster Ads” is limited to what is written in its
to the source of the coffee being sold at petitioner’s coffee certificate of registration, namely, stationeries.
shops.
(3) LYCEUM OF THE PHLS VS CA
(2) PEARL & DEAN PHIL INC VS SM
Facts:
FACTS: Pearl & Dean (Phil), Inc. is a corporation
 Lyceum of the Philippines, Inc. is an educational
engaged in the manufacture of advertising display units
institution duly registered with Securities and
called light boxes. In January 1981, Pearl & Dean was
Exchange Commission since 1950. (Sept)
able to acquire copyrights over the designs of the display
units. In 1988, their trademark application for “Poster  In 1984, it instituted proceedings before SEC to
Ads” was approved; they used the same trademark to compel several education institutions to delete the
advertise their light boxes. word “Lyceum” from their corporate names and
to permanently enjoin them from using the said
In 1985, Pearl & Dean negotiated with Shoemart, Inc.
word.
(SM) so that the former may be contracted to install light
boxes in the ad spaces of SM. Eventually, SM rejected  Their action is based on a SEC Resolution
Pearl & Dean’s proposal. wherein SEC ordered the Lyceum of Baguio to
change its corporate name as it is identical to the
Two years later, Pearl & Dean received report that light
Lyceum of the Philippines which was able to
boxes, exactly the same as theirs, were being used by SM
register first.
in their ad spaces. They demanded SM to stop using the
light boxes and at the same time asked for damages

20
 SEC En Banc ruled that the attaching of the and that the said name has come to mean that it is referred
geographical names after the word “Lyceum” to as that corporation.
sufficiently distinguishes one from the other.
Western Pangasinan Lyceum — 27 October 1950
 However, the CA ruled otherwise.
Lyceum of Cabagan — 31 October 1962
Issue No.1: WON the corporate names of the parties are
Lyceum of Lallo, Inc. — 26 March 1972
identical with or deceptively similar to that of the
petitioner. NO Lyceum of Aparri — 28 March 1972
Held: The corporate names of the parties carry the word Lyceum of Tuao, Inc. — 28 March 1972
“Lyceum” but confusion and deception are precluded by
the appending of geographic names. Lyceum generally Lyceum of Camalaniugan — 28 March 1972
refers to a school or an institution of learning and it is Etymologically, the word "Lyceum" is the Latin word for
natural to use this word to designate an entity which is the Greek lykeion which in turn referred to a locality on
organized and operating as an educational institution. the river Ilissius in ancient Athens "comprising an
Thus, we do not believe that the "Lyceum of Aparri" can enclosure dedicated to Apollo and adorned with fountains
be mistaken by the general public for the Lyceum of the and buildings erected by Pisistratus, Pericles and
Philippines, or that the "Lyceum of Camalaniugan" would Lycurgus frequented by the youth for exercise and by the
be confused with the Lyceum of the Philippines. philosopher Aristotle and his followers for teaching."

Issue No. 2: WON the use by the Lyceum of the Lyceum" is in fact as generic in character as the word
Philippines of the word Lyceum in its corporate name has "university." In the name of the petitioner, "Lyceum"
been for such length of time and with such exclusivity as appears to be a substitute for "university;" in other places,
to have become associated or identified with the petitioner however, "Lyceum," or "Liceo" or "Lycee" frequently
institution in the mind of the general public. (Doctrine of denotes a secondary school or a college.
Secondary meaning). NO (4) PHILIPS EXPORT VS CA
Held: Doctrine of Secondary meaning is a word of phrase A corporation’s right to use its corporate and trade name
originally incapable of exclusive appropriation, might is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and
nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by protect against the whole world.
one producer with reference to his article that, in trade and
to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase FACTS:
has come to mean that the article was his product.
Philips Export B.V. (PEBV) filed with the SEC for the
Lyceum of the Philippines has not gained exclusive use cancellation of the word “Philips” the corporate name of
of “Lyceum” by long passage of time. The number alone Standard Philips Corporation in view of its prior
of the private respondents suggests strongly that the use registration with the Bureau of Patents and the SEC.
of Lyceum has not been attended with the exclusivity However, Standard Philips refused to amend its Articles
essential for the applicability of the doctrine. It may be of Incorporation so PEBV filed with the SEC a petition
noted that one of the respondents – Western Pangasinan for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
Lyceum used such term 17 years before the petitioner however this was denied ruling that it can only be done
registered with the SEC. Moreover, there may be other when the corporate names are identical and they have at
schools using the name but not registered with the SEC least 2 words different. This was affirmed by the SEC en
because they have not adopted the corporate form of banc and the Court of Appeals thus the case at bar.
organization.
ISSUE:
DOCTRINE:
Whether or not Standard Philips can be enjoined from
Doctrine of secondary meaning can be extended to using Philips in its corporate name
corporation name but must comply with the requirement
RULING: YES
that it has been used so long and so exclusively by one

21
A corporation’s right to use its corporate and trade name Issues:
is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and
(1) Whether or not the words ‘pale pilsen’ may be
protect against the whole world. According to Sec. 18 of
exclusively appropriated and used by SMC;
the Corporation Code, no corporate name may be allowed
if the proposed name is identical or deceptively (2) Whether or not there is confusing similarity between
confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or the two trademarks.
to any other name already protected by law or is patently
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law. Ruling:
(1) NO. The fact that the words ‘pale pilsen’ are part of
For the prohibition to apply, 2 requisites must be present: ABI’s trademark does not constitute an infringement of
(1) the complainant corporation must have acquired a SMC’s trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN, for
prior right over the use of such corporate name and “pale pilsen” are generic words descriptive of the color
(“pale”), of a type of beer (“pilsen”), which is a light
(2) the proposed name is either identical or deceptively or bohemian beer with a strong hops flavor that originated in
confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or the City of Pilsen in Czechoslovakia and became famous
to any other name already protected by law or patently in the Middle Ages. “Pilsen” is a “primarily
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law. geographically descriptive word,” hence, non-registrable
and not appropriable by any beer manufacturer. The
With regard to the 1st requisite, PEBV adopted the name
words “pale pilsen” may not be appropriated by SMC for
“Philips” part of its name 26 years before Standard
its exclusive use even if they are part of its registered
Philips. As regards the 2nd, the test for the existence of
trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No one may
confusing similarity is whether the similarity is such as to
appropriate generic or descriptive words. They belong to
mislead a person using ordinary care and discrimination.
the public domain.
Standard Philips only contains one word, “Standard”,
different from that of PEBV. The 2 companies’ products (2) NO. There is hardly any dispute that the dominant
are also the same, or cover the same line of products. feature of SMC’s trademark is the name of the product:
Although PEBV primarily deals with electrical products, SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN, written in white Gothic
it has also shipped to its subsidiaries machines and parts letters with elaborate serifs at the beginning and end of
which fall under the classification of “chains, rollers, the letters “S” and “M” on an amber background across
belts, bearings and cutting saw”, the goods which the upper portion of the rectangular design. On the other
Standard Philips also produce. Also, among Standard hand, the dominant feature of ABI’s trademark is the
Philips’ primary purposes are to buy, sell trade x x x name: BEER PALE PILSEN, with the word “Beer”
electrical wiring devices, electrical component, electrical written in large amber letters, larger than any of the letters
supplies. Given these, there is nothing to prevent Standard found in the SMC label.
Philips from dealing in the same line of business of
electrical devices. The use of “Philips” by Standard The trial court perceptively observed that the word
Philips tends to show its intention to ride on the popularity “BEER” does not appear in SMC’s trademark, just as the
and established goodwill of PEBV. words “SAN MIGUEL” do not appear in ABI’s
trademark. Hence, there is absolutely no similarity in the
(5) ASIA BREWERY VS CA dominant features of both trademarks. Neither in sound,
spelling or appearance can BEER PALE PILSEN be said
Facts:
to be confusingly similar to SAN MIGUEL PALE
Respondent San Miguel Corporation filed a complaint PILSEN. No one who purchases BEER PALE PILSEN
against petitioner Asia Brewery for trademark can possibly be deceived that it is SAN MIGUEL PALE
infringement and unfair competition on account of the PILSEN. No evidence whatsoever was presented by SMC
latter’s BEER PALE PILSEN or BEER NA BEER proving otherwise. There is no confusing similarity
product which has been competing with petitioner’s SAN between the competing beers for the name of one is “SAN
MIGUEL PALE PILSEN for a share of the local beer MIGUEL” while the competitor is plain “BEER” and the
market. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On points of dissimilarity between the two outnumber their
appeal, CA found petitioner guilty of trademark points of similarity.
infringement.
22
(6) DEL MONTE VS SUNSHINE SAUCE Sunshine alleged that its logo was substantially different
from the Del Monte logo and would not confuse the
In making the comparison to determine similarity, the
buying public to the detriment of the petitioners.
question is NOT whether the two articles are
distinguishable by their label when set side by side but ISSUE:
whether the general confusion made by the article upon
Whether or not there was infringement of trademark and
the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and
unfair competition.
off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding
it with the original. The court therefore should be guided RULING: YES.
by its first impression because the imitator will always try
to create enough differences to confuse the Court but Section 22 of R.A. No. 166, otherwise known as the
enough similarity to confuse the public. Trademark Law, provides:

FACTS: Any person who shall use, without the consent of the
registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company colorable imitation of any registered mark or tradename
organized under the laws of the United States and not in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or
engaged in business in the Philippines. Both the advertising of any goods, business or services on or in
Philippines and the United States are signatories to the connection with which such use is likely to cause
Convention of Paris of September 27, 1965, which grants confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as
to the nationals of the parties rights and advantages which to the source or origin of such goods or services or identity
their own nationals enjoy for the repression of acts of of such business...
infringement and unfair competition.
Sec. 29 of the same law states as follows:
Petitioner Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) is a
domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Any person who shall employ deception or any other
Philippines. Del Monte granted Philpack the right to means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off
manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines various the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or
agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del his business, or services for those of the one having
Monte trademark and logo. Del Monte authorized established such goodwill...
Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the To arrive at a proper resolution of this case, it is
Del Monte catsup bottle configuration, for which it was important to bear in mind the following distinctions
granted Certificate of Trademark Registration No. SR- between infringement of trademark and unfair
913 by the Philippine Patent Office under the competition.
Supplemental Register. Del Monte also obtained two (1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of
registration certificates for its trademark "DEL MONTE" a trademark, whereas unfair competition is the passing off
and its logo. Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing of one's goods as those of another.
Industries was issued a Certificate of Registration by the (2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is
Bureau of Domestic Trade to engage in the manufacture, unnecessary whereas in unfair competition fraudulent
packing, distribution and sale of various kinds of sauce, intent is essential.
identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. The product (3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of
itself was contained in various kinds of bottles, including the trademark is a prerequisite to the action, whereas in
the Del Monte bottle, which the private respondent unfair competition registration is not necessary.
bought from the junk shops for recycling.
In determining whether two trademarks are confusingly
Having received reports that the private respondent was similar, the two marks in their entirety as they appear in
using its exclusively designed bottles and a logo the respective labels must be considered in relation to the
confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack and Del goods to which they are attached; the discerning eye of
Monte filed a complaint against the private respondent for the observer must focus not only on the predorninant
infringement of trademark and unfair competition. words but also on the other features appearing on both
labels.

23
The ordinary buyer does not usually make such scrutiny respondent, alleging that:
nor does he usually have the time to do so. The question a. The latter’s trademark is confusingly similar to the
is NOT whether the two articles are distinguishable by former’s, both trademarks being used in women’s panties
their label when set side by side but whether the general and other textile products.
confusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual b. That the hang tags used by private respondent is a
purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such colorable imitation of those of the petitioner.
as to likely result in his confounding it with the
5. Private respondent alleged that there was no confusing
original.The court therefore should be guided by its first
similarity between the trademarks.
impression because the imitator will always try to create
enough differences to confuse the Court but enough 6. At the pre-trial, the following admissions were made:
similarity to confuse the public. Here, although there are
particular differences, such are only manifest when you a. That the registered trademark Fruit for Eve bears the
conduct a thorough comparison. notice “Reg. Phil. Pat. Off.” while that of Fruit of the
Loom does not.
We also note that the respondent court failed to take into b. That at the time of its registration, the plaintiff filed no
consideration several factors which should have affected opposition thereto.
its conclusion, to wit: age, training and education of the
usual purchaser, the nature and cost of the article, whether 7. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the
the article is bought for immediate consumption and also petitioner, permanently enjoining private respondent from
the conditions under which it is usually purchased. It has using the trademark Fruit for Eve.
been aptly observed that the ultimate ratio in cases of 8. Both parties appealed to the former Court of Appeals:
grave doubt is the rule that any doubt should be resolved a. Petitioner questioned the lower court’s failure to
against the newcomer inasmuch as the field from which award damages in its favor.
he can select a desirable trademark to indicate the origin b. Private respondent sought the reversal of the lower
of his product is obviously a large one. As Sunshine's court’s decision.
label is an infringement of the Del Monte's trademark, law
and equity call for the cancellation of the private 9. The former Court of Appeals rendered a decision
respondent's registration and withdrawal of all its reversing the lower court’s decision and dismissing the
products bearing the questioned label from the market. petitioner’s complaint. The petitioner’s motion for
With regard to the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same reconsideration was denied.
constitutes unfair competition; hence, the respondent
HELD:
should be permanently enjoined from the use of such
bottles. In cases involving infringement of trademark brought
before this Court, it has been consistently held that there
(7) FRUIT OF THE LOOM VS CA
is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark
FACTS: involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistake in
the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the
1. Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing origin or source of the commodity. The discerning eye of
under the laws of the State of Rhode Island, USA. It is the the observer must focus not only on the predominant
registrant of the trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOM in the words but also on the other features appearing in both
Philippine Patent Office and was issued two Certificates labels in order that he may draw his conclusion where one
of Registration, one of which was in 1957 and the other in is confusingly similar to the other. The similarities of the
1958. competing trademarks in this case are completely lost in
2. Private Respondent, a domestic corporation, is the the substantial differences in the design and general
registrant of the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE in the appearance of their respective hang tags. We have
Philippine Patent Office. examined the two trademarks as they appear in the hang
tags submitted by the parties and We are impressed more
3. Both are involved in the merchandise of garments. by the dissimilarities than by the similarities appearing
therein. We hold that the trademarks Fruit of the Loom
4. Petitioner filed a complaint for infringement of
and Fruit for Eve do not resemble each other as to confuse
trademark and unfair competition against private
or deceive an ordinary purchaser. The ordinary purchaser
24
must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a advances secured from petitioner’s father had been
modicum of intelligence to be able to see the obvious settled, as evidenced by the fact that petitioner did not
differences between the two trademarks in question. negotiate further or encash the checks; the latter could
have done so, if the obligation was still extant.
Respondent points out that he paid for that obligation with
POSSESSION the coprax he had previously delivered to the father.

ART. 523 Issue: Whether the agreement entered into by the parties
was one for equitable mortgage or for absolute sale.
(1) GO VS BACARON
Held: Yes. An equitable mortgage has been defined “as
Facts: Respondent Bacaron alleged that in the middle one which although lacking in some formality, or form or
part of 1993, he suffered business reversals which words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
prompted him, being in urgent need of funds, to borrow nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge
P20,000.00 from the petitioner. He however averred that real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing
prior to extending said loan to him, the petitioner required impossible or contrary to law. In the present case, three of
him to execute a document purporting to be a Transfer of the instances enumerated in Article 1602 — grossly
Rights but was told that the same would only be a inadequate consideration, possession of the property, and
formality as he could redeem the unregistered land the payment of realty taxes — attended the assailed
moment he pays the loan. transaction and thus showed that it was indeed an
Admitting that he signed the instrument despite knowing equitable mortgage.
that the same did not express the true intention of the Checks have the character of negotiability. At the same
parties’ agreement, i.e., that the transaction was a mere time, they may constitute evidence of indebtedness.
equitable mortgage, the respondent explained that he did Those presented by petitioner may indeed evince
so only because he was in a very tight financial situation respondent’s indebtedness to him in the amounts stated on
and because he was assured by the petitioner that he could the faces of those instruments. He, however,
redeem his property. acknowledges (1) that respondent paid some of the
To support this claim, respondent stressed the fact that the obligations through the coprax delivered to petitioner’s
consideration in the instrument was merely P20,000.00, father; and (2) that petitioner owed and subsequently paid
which is grossly inadequate as the selling price of a 15- respondent P214,000.
hectare land considering that, at that time, the market (2) FELICIANO GAITERO VS GENEROSO
value of land in Davao City amounts to P100,000.00 per ALMERIA
hectare. Respondent narrated that a year thereafter, or in
a middle part of 1994, he was able to raise the P20,000.00 FACTS: By virtue of a relocation survey of the lot owned
and went to the petitioner to pay his loan but the latter by the respondents Almeria spouses, it was found out that
refused to accept his payment, insisting that the petitioner Feliciano Gaitero (Gaitero), who owned
transaction entered into by the parties was not an equitable adjoining Lot 9960-A, intruded into the formers’ lot by as
mortgage, as the respondent insists, but a real transfer of much as 737 sq m (the disputed area).
right over the property. Petitioner continued to refuse to
When both parties failed to settle the dispute, Gaitero filed
recognize the ‘equitable mortgage’, prompting
an action for recovery of possession against the Almerias
respondent to consign the P20,000.00 with the Clerk of
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court for the return of
Court of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 12. The trial
the possession of the disputed property plus damages. He
court ruled in favor of the respondent. The CA reversed.
claimed that he was the registered owner of the disputed
Petitioner relies on the trial court’s finding that property through succession. He further claimed that the
respondent knowingly and intentionally entered into a survey was erroneous.
contract of sale, not an equitable mortgage. On the other
In their answer, Almerias alleged that they bought the lot
hand, Respondent Bacaron argues that the value of the
by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and
property at the time of the alleged sale was P120,000 per
Sale and it was Gaitero who unlawfully encroached on the
hectare, and that the indicated sale amount of P20,000 was
disputed property.
thus grossly iniquitous. Allegedly, the previous cash
25
The MCTC held that the Almerias were entitled to the  CFI dismissed the complaint because of another case
possession of the disputed area considering that it is pending between the same parties over the same
included in the technical description of their registered property (Land Registration Case). MR was denied.
title. Further, the MCTC held that Gaitero acknowledged
the true boundaries of his lot when it was subdivided. ISSUE: Will the pendency of a land registration case bar
Indeed, the subdivision plan clearly shows that the the institution of an action for the recovery of possession?
disputed area is excluded from his lot. On appeal, the RTC HELD: The nature of this case is one for RECOVERY
reversed the decision of the MCTC on the reason that OF POSSESSION brought before the CFI by the alleged
laches prevented the Almerias from asserting their right owners of a piece of land against the defendants who were
over the same since it took them 15 years before they did supposed to have unlawfully continued in possession
so. On review, the CA reversed the RTC decision holding since 1969 when they were supposed to return it to
that that the Almerias owned the disputed area since, plaintiffs, plus damages.
between a registered title and a verbal claim of ownership,
the former must prevail. The defendants withheld possession from the plaintiffs
since 1969, more than the one year period contemplated
ISSUE: Whether or not the Almerias are entitled to the in unlawful detainer cases at the time the complaint was
possession of the disputed area as against Gaitero. filed in 1973.
HELD: Yes. Between the Almerias’ registered title of Not all cases of dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of
ownership and Gaitero’s verbal claim to the same, the the Rules of Court (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
former’s title is far superior. Since Gaitero was unable to cases) because whenever the owner of property is
prove that fraud attended the titling of the disputed area, dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned in
the Almerias’ right over the same became indefeasible the said rule, he may initiate and maintain a plenary
and incontrovertible a year from registration. action to recover possession in the Court of First
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the
Necessarily, whoever owns the property has the right to expiration of one year before commencing such action.
possess it. It may also be brought after the expiration of said period
(3) MEDINA VS VALDELLON of one year, if no action had been initiated for forcible
entry and detainer during that time in the inferior court.
FACTS: ACCION PUBLICIANA must be instituted in the CFI.
 The complaint alleges that petitioners are the owners RE CFI’s ACTION: The respondent court's action in
of a parcel of land in Hagonoy, Bulacan purchased dismissing this case is precipitate, there is sufficient merit
(April 1967) for P800 in petitioners' contention that the rights sought to be
enforced and the reliefs prayed (recovery of possession
 Defendants are family friends of the petitioners, and and damages) are entirely separate and distinct from that
were allowed to remain in the premises and to sought in L. R. C. Case.
construct their residential house, subject to the
condition that defendants will return unto the It is a fundamental principle in the law governing
plaintiffs the premises upon demand, this info was UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES (including recovery
amended to state that they defendants will return to of possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership
the plaintiffs the premises in 1969; On demand, over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as
defendants refused to surrender the property in a sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recovery
question. of possession because an action for recovery of
possession can be maintained even against the very
 Thus, plaintiffs had to institute action praying that owner of the property.
defendants be ordered: (1) to vacate the premises and
surrender the said property; (2) to pay plaintiffs P500 In this case, there is not even a plea of title on the part of
as incidental expenses ; and, (3) to pay P100 a month private respondents over the disputed property but a mere
from the filing of this action to the time they surrender allegation that there is another action for registration
its possession to the plaintiffs. of title to that land the possession of which is being
recovered by petitioners in the Civil Case.
26
An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct - After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extra-
and different from an action for recovery of title or judicially partitioned the subject property and
ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case of declared it in their names
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the
- On 5 July 1966, they executed a "Deed of Sale
question of possession and NOT THAT OF
With Mortgage" deeding the subject property to
OWNERSHIP. It does not in any way bind the title or
petitioner-appellee, the payment of which was
affect the ownership of the land or building.
secured by a mortgage on the property
Thus, the Civil Case was arbitrarily and erroneously
- After the sale, petitioner-appellee took possession
dismissed on the basis of the alleged pendency of another
of the subject property and paid the taxes due
action, because while identity of parties may be
thereon
established in both cases, there is no identity of cause of
action or of rights asserted and relief prayed for, so that - Due to losses, the property in question was
judgment which may be rendered in one case would not cultivated only for a while
necessarily result in res judicata for the other case.
- On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee filed
RE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL AND LAND CASES: a petition, which was amended on 17 July 1987,
No sufficient reason for any of the parties in this case to for the registration and confirmation of his title
object to the consolidation of the trial of both cases, since over the subject property
the evidence that may be presented by the parties
involving possession and ownership of the disputed - Oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the
parcel of land may facilitate an expeditious termination Philippines (Republic, for brevity), filed its
of both cases. The evidence involving the issues of opposition
possession and ownership over the same land must be o Petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-
related and its presentation before one court of justice in-interest have not been in open,
would redound to a speedy disposition of this litigation. continuous, exclusive and notorious
WHEREFORE, the respondent court's orders are hereby possession and occupation of the land in
declared null and void and set aside; the complaint and question since 12 June 1945 or prior
amended complaint in Civil Case revived; both the thereto
respondent Judge and the Presiding Judge, Branch VI, of - The Heirs of de la Cruz and Kadakilaan Estate
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, being directed to likewise filed their opposition
consolidate the trial of L. R. C. No. 2814 and Civil Case
No. 4353-M in one branch of that court. o Their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de
la Cruz, is the "primitive owner" of the
subject lot
ART. 525 o He, his heirs, and upon their tolerance,
(1) REPUBLIC VS CA some other persons have been in open,
peaceful, notorious and continuous
- The subject property was first owned by Santos possession of the land in question since
de la Cruz who declared the same in his name time immemorial
under Tax Declaration
- The Kadakilaan Estate contends
- Subsequently, the subject property was
successively bought or acquired by Pedro o By reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de
Cristobal Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree 01-4,
with approved plans registered under the
o They presented Tax Declarations as Torrens System in compliance with, and
proof as a consequence of, P.D. 872, it is the
owner of the subject property

27
o Petitioner-appellee or his predecessors- - We have found that petitioner-appellee has
in-interest have not been in open, proven his claim of ownership over the subject
continuous, exclusive and notorious property
possession and occupation of the land in
o This does not contravene or negate the
question since 12 June 1945 or earlier
intention of the proclamation
- On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was
- Petition is DISMISSED
issued by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines withdrawing the subject property
from sale or settlement
ART. 526
- LC rendered judgment
(1) LIU VS LOY
o Confirmed Democrito Plaza’s title over
Relocation Plan 1059 FACTS: Teodoro Vaño (Teodoro), as attorney-in-fact of
Jose Vaño, sold seven lots to Benito Liu, through
- CA affirmed the decision of LC petitioner Frank Liu (Frank), and to Cirilo Pangalo. The
lots sold to Benito Liu were Lot Nos. 5, 6, 13, 14, and 15
- Hence this petition
while the lots sold to Cirilo Pangalo were Lot Nos. 14 and
o According to petitioner, aside from mere 15. When Jose Vaño passed away Benito Liu stopped
tax declarations all of which are of recent further payments but after the Supreme Court declared
vintage, private respondent has not valid the will of his father, Teodoro informed Frank that
established actual possession of the he could already transfer the titles to the buyers’ names
property upon payment of the balance of the purchase price. It was
only after nine years that Frank responded that he was
o Petitioner also alleges that the land in
ready to pay the balance of the purchase price of the seven
question had been withdrawn from the
lots after he had purchased the lots formerly sold to Benito
alienable portion of the public domain
Liu and Cirilo Panglao. He requested for the execution of
pursuant to Presidential Proclamation
a deed of sale of the lots in his name and the delivery of
No. 679
the titles to him.
- Proof that petitioner-appellee and his
Despite repeated demands by Frank, Teodoro
predecessors-in-interest have acquired and have
sold Lot No. 6 to respondent Teresita Loy. Frank then
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
filed a complaint against Teodoro for specific
possession of the subject property for a period of
performance, execution of deed of absolute sale, issuance
30 years under a bona fide claim of ownership are
of certificates of title and construction of subdivision
the tax declarations of petitioner-appellee's
roads, before the Court of First Instance and a notice of lis
predecessors-in-interest, the deed of sale, tax
pendens on the seven lots was filed before the Register of
payment receipts and petitioner-appellee's tax
Deeds. A year after, Teodoro sold Lot No. 5 to respondent
declarations
Alfredo Loy.
- They constitute at least proof that the holder has
When the complaint filed by Frank was
a claim of title over the property
dismissed, he filed his claim to the probate court which
- The proclamation did not prohibit the registration was subsequently granted. Milagros Vaño, who
of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the succeeded as administratrix of the Estate of Jose Vaño,
owner thereof executed a deed of conveyance covering the seven lots in
favor of Frank. The probate court, however, also approved
o Merely withdrew it from sale but still the sale to respondents Teresita and Alfredo Loy upon
subject to actual survey and existing their motion and new titles were issued under their name.
private rights
As a result, Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance
o Registration does not vest title; merely or annulment of title of Lot Nos. 5 and 6. The trial court
evidence of title confirmed the unilateral extrajudicial rescission of the
28
contract by the late Teodoro Vaño and it was later on In his Answer, respondent alleged that the land was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been
publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in
ISSUE: Whether the registration by the Loys of their
possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover,
contracts of sale made them the first registrants in good
he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment
faith to defeat petitioner’s claim as prior buyers.
in the special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties
HELD: No, registration by the Loys of their contracts of of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court
sale did not defeat the right of petitioner as prior buyers decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of
because the person who signed the Loys’ contracts was properties of the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor
not the registered owner. The registered owner of Lot of the petitioner, while the Court of Appeals reversed the
Nos. 5 and 6 was the “Estate of Jose Vaño.” Teodoro trial court's decision.
Vaño was the seller in the contract of sale with Alfredo
ISSUE:
Loy, Jr., while the Estate of Jose Vaño was the seller in
the contract of sale with Teresita Loy. Teodoro Vaño Whether or not the donation is valid.
signed both contracts of sale. The rule is well-settled that
“one who buys from a person who is not the registered HELD:
owner is not a purchaser in good faith. This is because The trial court found the donation of the land
purchasers were under notice to inquire why the land was void because Fermina was not the owner thereof,
not registered in the name of the person who executed the considering that it was inherited by Sixto Calicdan from
contracts of sale. In this case, the Loys were under notice his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal
that the lots belonged to the “Estate of Jose Vaño” and property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan,
any sale of the lots required court approval. because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable
when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right
Moreover, the contracts of the Loys did not
of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse.
convey ownership of the lots to them as against third
Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from
persons because there was no approval of the sale by the
Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the
probate court and registration with the Register of Deeds.
only right which the latter could convey.
The Court ruled that registration of the contracts without
court approval would be ineffective to bind third persons, After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the
especially creditors of the estate. Otherwise, this will Court of Appeals’ ruling that the donation was valid was
open the door to fraud on creditors of the estate. not supported by convincing proof. Respondent admitted
during the cross examination that he had no personal
(2) CALICDAN VS CENDANA
knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased
FACTS: the subject land from Felomino Bautista.
On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan
executed a deed of donation whereby she conveyed a
parcel of land to respondent Silverio Cendaña, who ART. 527
immediately entered into possession of the land, built a (1) LORETO BOTE VS SPS VELOSO
fence around the land and constructed a two-storey
residential house thereon. He occupied the land from SUMMARY: NHA was the agency in charge of the
1949 until his death in 1998. On June 1992, petitioner, Dagat-Dagatan project. It awarded disputed land
through her legal guardian, filed a complaint for (allegedly belonging to the heirs of Baello and Rodriguez
"Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages" and NHA lost in an earlier case) to Gloria Veloso who
against the respondent, alleging that the donation was then leased it to Bote. Bote undertook to pay the spouses
void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence Veloso Php 850k as purchase price for said property. Bote
in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated failed to pay purchase price and the spouses Veloso filed
respondent’s possession of the land as well as the a case with the RTC for a collection of sum of money. At
construction of his house thereon. a Pre-Trial Conference, the parties agreed that the issue
would only be for a sum of money collection. In the
appeal, the spouses alleged that they were builders in GF
29
and thus are entitled to possession. Bote alleges that the trial court.
spouses are precluded from raising this issue on appeal.  The case was elevated to the SC which denied due
SC agrees. course to the petition in a Resolution dated May 3,
1993.
o The Resolution attained finality in an Entry
of Judgment dated July 7, 1993.
DOCTRINE: (does not appear on the case but this is the
 Unperturbed, the NHA filed another complaint
topic) No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
against the Baello and Rodriguez heirs with another
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or RTC of Caloocan, this time for the declaration of
in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of nullity of OCT of Lot A.
the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting  The case was eventually dismissed on the grounds of
aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or estoppel and res judicata. The NHA appealed the case
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at SC denied NHA’s appeal of the CA decision
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or  In the meantime, one Gloria Veloso (Gloria) was
defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the awarded a residential lot at the Dagat-Dagatan Project
parties for the price of PhP 37,600 as evidenced by an
Individual Notice of Award
FACTS: o The award was subject to the conditions that
Gloria commence construction of a
 Pedro T. Baello (Baello) and his sister, Nicanora residential house on the property within six
Baello-Rodrgiuez (Rodriguez), filed an application (6) months from the date of allocation and
for registration of their property in Caloocan City complete the same within one (1) year from
with the CFI. the commencement of construction, and that
o The land was successfully registered under she occupy the house also within one (1) year
their names from allocation
 The lot was subdivided into Lot A covering 98,648  Thus, Gloria constructed a two (2)-storey house on
square meters in favor of Baello and Lot B covering the property awarded to her and resided therein until
49,324 square meters in favor of Rodriguez. 1991.
 Baello died intestate leaving 32 surviving heirs while  In 1995, Gloria leased the house to Loreto Bote (Bote)
Rodriguez died intestate without issue. from October to December.
 The subject property was included in the Dagat-  On February 5, 1996, Bote executed a Promissory
Dagatan Project launched in 1976 by the then First Note undertaking to pay Gloria Veloso and her
Lady Imelda R. Marcos. husband Robert Veloso (spouses Veloso) the amount
 Sometime thereafter, armed military personnel of PhP 850,000 as purchase price for property.
forcibly evicted the caretaker of the heirs of Baello  The Promissory Note effectively assigned to the
and Rodriguez from the property, destroying the spouses Veloso, Bote’s credit with a certain Carlos
residential structure and the fishponds thereon. De Leon who indicated his conforme in the note.
 National Housing Authority (NHA), as the  Bote failed to pay the purchase price indicated in the
government agency tasked to undertake the Dagat- Promissory Note. Thus, the spouses Veloso, through
Dagatan Project, took possession of the property counsel, issued a Demand Letter demanding the
preparatory to its subdivision and awarded the lots to payment of the purchase price of PhP 850,000.
chosen beneficiaries.  Despite such demand letter, Bote still failed to pay the
 After the fall of the Marcos regime, the heirs of Baello purchase price.
executed an extrajudicial partition of their share of the  Thus, the spouses Veloso filed a Complaint against
property. Bote for Sum of Money and/or Recovery of
 Then NHA filed a complaint with the RTC for the Possession of Real Property with Damages.
expropriation of the subject land. o Notably, the case was filed at the Marikina
o In the meantime, Lot was subdivided RTC.
 Thereafter, the Baello and Rodriguez heirs filed  Bote alleged, as Special/Affirmative Defenses, that
separate MTDs which the RTC granted on the the Marikina RTC had no territorial jurisdiction to try
grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action. a case for recovery of possession of real property
 The NHA appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA located in Caloocan City and that the subject property
which rendered a Decision affirming the ruling of the is not owned by the spouses Veloso but by Cynthia T.
30
Baello (Cynthia) an alleged heir of Pedro Baello. before the trial court; thus, they are precluded from
 He further alleged that he purchased the property raising the issue for the first time on appeal.
from Cynthia as evidenced by a Contract to Sell  Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court limits the
 It is noteworthy that, at the Pre-Trial Conference, and questions that may be raised on appeal:
as reflected in the Pre-Trial Order: the parties agreed o Section 15. Questions that may be raised on
that the complaint would only be one for sum of appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has
money and no longer for recovery of possession of the filed a motion for new trial in the court below,
subject property. he may include in his assignment of errors
 RTC: dismissed any question of law or fact that has been
o Spouses Veloso failed to adduce evidence to raised in the court below and which is within
show a rightful claim over the subject the issues framed by the parties. (Emphasis
property. supplied.)
o Further, the spouses Veloso’s reliance on the  In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
award made by the NHA is misplaced, the the Court clarified this provision of the Rules of Court
expropriation case filed by the NHA having stating that, "It is settled jurisprudence that an issue
been dismissed by the CA in a Decision dated which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised
August 21, 1992 during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for
o This Court denied the petition for review on the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
certiorari filed by the NHA from the CA basic rules of fair play, justice and due process."
Decision in a Resolution dated May 3, 1993.  This principle forbids the parties from changing their
This Resolution, in turn, attained finality as theory of the case.
evidenced by an Entry of Judgment dated  The "theory of the case" is defined in Black’s Law
July 7, 1993. The trial court, thus, concluded Dictionary as:
that because the NHA failed to expropriate o A comprehensive and orderly mental
the property, the spouses Veloso could not arrangement of principle and facts, conceived
derive any right from the award. and constructed for the purpose of securing a
 Thereafter, the spouses Veloso appealed the RTC judgment or decree of a court in favor of a
Decision to the CA. In their Appellant’s Brief, they litigant; the particular line of reasoning of
interposed for the first time their status as builders in either party to a suit, the purpose being to
good faith and are, thus, entitled to possession of the bring together certain facts of the case in a
house that Gloria built. logical sequence and to correlate them in a
 CA: partly granted petition way that produces in the decision maker’s
o Ordered that a proper determination of the mind a definite result or conclusion favored
value of the controverted residential house by the advocate.
constructed by the plaintiff-appellant Gloria  It is the legal basis of the cause of action or defense,
in the lot, now owned by the defendant- which a party is not permitted to change on appeal.
appellee shall be made.  In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Whether or not the spouses Veloso are allowed to Pagbilao Corporation: the Court reiterated the thrust
allege for the first time their status as builders in good of the theory-of-the-case principle in this wise:
faith and thus are entitled to possession of the house— o It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction
NO that a party may not change his theory of the
case on appeal. Such a rule has been
 Bote: although the original Complaint is entitled: expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of
"For: Sum of Money and/or Recovery of Possession the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
of Real Property With Damages" – the allegations and provides –SEC. 15. Questions that may be
the prayer both do not sustain the Recovery part of the raised on appeal. – Whether or not the
title. It should, therefore, be ignored. The allegations appellant has filed a motion for new trial in
and the prayer of the Complaint only support the Sum the court below, he may include in his
of Money case. assignment of errors any question of law or
 Additionally, during the pre-trial of the case before fact that has been raised in the court below
the RTC – the parties stipulated to treat the case and which is within the issues framed by the
purely as a sum of money. parties.
 In essence, Bote claims that the spouses Veloso did  Carantes v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized
not raise the issue of their being builders in good faith that –The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in
31
the answer may not be raised for the first time on ART. 531
appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change
fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. (1) BUNYI VS FACTOR
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and
Facts:
the case is decided upon that theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change the same on Respondent Fe S. Factor and Gloria Factor-Labao are co-
appeal, because to permit him to do so would be owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in Almanza,
unfair to the adverse party. Las Piñas City. The ownership of the land originated from
 Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and respondent’s paternal grandparents Constantino Factor
purports to adjudicate something on which the court and Maura Mayuga-Factor who had been in actual,
did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also
continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive
extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the
possession and occupation of the land even before 1906.
fundamental tenets of fair play.
 Exception: when the factual bases thereof would not Gloria Factor-Labao who was married to Ruben Labao
require presentation of any further evidence by the died thus the administration and management of the
adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the Factor compound including the subject rest house, passed
issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the on to respondent Fe S. Factor as co-owner of the property.
Court may give due course to the petition and resolve
As an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that
the principal issues raised therein.
Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income,
 The instant case does not fall under this exception.
respondent allowed him to stay at the rest house for brief,
 To stress, the issue of whether or not the spouses
Veloso were builders in good faith is a factual transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor
question that was never alleged, let alone proven. family.
 And as aptly stated by the spouses Veloso themselves Ruben Lobao married petitioner Precy Bunyi, tenant in
in their Appellant’s Brief "under Article 527 of the one of the houses inside the compound, particularly in No.
Civil Code, good faith is even always presumed and
8 Antioch St., Pilar Village, Almanza, Las Piñas City
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof." since 1999. Eventually Ruben died. Petitioners forcibly
 Thus, in order to refute the spouses Veloso’s opened the doors of the rest house and stole all the
contention that they are builders in good faith, it is personal properties owned by the Factor family and then
necessary that Bote present evidence that they acted audaciously occupied the premises. Respondent alleged
in bad faith. that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor
 Understandably, Bote did not present such evidence family of the subject property’s lawful use and
before the trial court because good faith was not an possession. Respondent also added that when she tried to
issue then. enter the rest house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified
 It was only on appeal that the spouses Veloso person who claimed to have been authorized by
belatedly raised the issue that they were builders in petitioners to occupy the premises, barred, threatened and
good faith. Justice and fair play dictate that the chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on September 12,
spouses Veloso’s change of their theory of the case 2003 respondent Fe S. Factor filed a complaint for
on appeal be disallowed and the instant petition forcible entry against herein petitioners Precy Bunyi and
granted.
Mila Bunyi.
NOTES
Issue:
The Pre-Trial Order reads:
WON the petioner has a better right of physical and
STIPULATION OF FACTS
material possesion of the subject property.
1) That the present action shall be treated as one for
Held:
Sum of Money and not for Recovery of
Possession of Lot; The resolution thereof boils down to a determination of
2) That defendant Loreto Bote is the one presently who, between petitioners and respondent, would be
occupying the house and lot; and entitled to the physical possession of the subject property.
3) That plaintiffs are not the registered owners of the
subject lot.

32
Both parties anchor their right of material possession of Considering that her husband was never a resident of the
the disputed property on their respective claims of subject property, petitioner Precy failed to explain
ownership. Petitioners insist that petitioner Precy has a convincingly how she was able to move in with Ruben
better right of possession over the subject property since Labao in the subject property during their marriage.
she inherited the subject property as the surviving spouse
The right of respondent’s predecessors over the subject
and sole heir of Ruben Labao, who owned the property
property is more than sufficient to uphold respondent’s
before his death.
right to possession over the same. Respondent’s right to
Respondent, on the other hand, hinges her claim of the property was vested in her along with her siblings
possession on the fact that her predecessor-in-interest had from the moment of their father’s death. As heir,
prior possession of the property as early as 1975. respondent had the right to the possession of the property,
which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is
are enforced and protected from encroachments made or
entitled to the physical or material possession of the
attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration
set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can
in testate or intestate proceedings.
prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself. Possession de (2) SOLEDAD VS PEOPLE (full)
facto is the physical possession of real property.
Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only
issue in a forcible entry case. This rule holds true USUFRUCT
regardless of the character of a party’s possession,
provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which ART. 565, 601, 605
entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully (1) NHA VS COURT OF APPEALS (full)
ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have ART. 566
actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the
(1) BACHRACH VS SEIFERT & ELIANOFF
property at all times.18 Possession can be acquired not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a FACTS: The will of E. M. Bachrach provided for the
thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper distribution of the considerable property which he had
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such left. The sixth and eighth paragraphs of the provisions of
right.19 Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. the will provide as follows:
These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and devise
execution and registration of public instruments, and the to my beloved wife Mary McDonald Bachrach for life all
inscription of possessory information titles. the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all my estate
after payment of the legacies, bequests and gifts provided
While petitioners claim that respondent never physically for above; and she may enjoy such usufruct and use or
occupied the subject property, they failed to prove that spend such fruits as she may in any manner wish.
they had prior possession of the subject property. On
record, petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria Eighth: It is my wish that upon the death of my beloved
Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in wife, Mary McDonald Bachrach, all my estate, personal,
Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used the subject real and otherwise, and all the fruits and usufruct thereof
property whenever they visit the same. Likewise, as which during her life pertained to her, shall be divided as
pointed out by the MeTC and the RTC, Ruben and follows:
petitioner Precy’s marriage certificate revealed that at the One-half thereof shall be given to such charitable
time of their marriage, Ruben was residing at 123 A. Lake hospitals in the Philippines as she may designate; in case
St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Even Ruben’s death she fails to designate, then said sum shall be given to the
certificate showed that his place of death and residence Chief Executive of these Islands who shall distribute it,
was at #4 Labao St., Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila. share and share alike to all charitable hospitals in the
33
Philippines excluding those belonging to the governments of assessment of real estate tax to the company, who
of the Philippines or of the United States; appealed the same to the Board of Assessment Appeals,
which in turn upheld the assessment. The company
One-half thereof shall be divided, share and share alike by
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which took
and between my legal heirs, to the exclusion of my
cognizance of the case and decided in favor of the
brothers.
company. The tax authorities appealed to the SC. The SC
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares affirmed the CTA decision and reiterated earlier case
of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., law which held that a private party who introduces
received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50% integral improvements on public land subject to a
stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. Mary lease is only a partial usufructuary of the road and
McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the therefore cannot be made to pay real estate tax on
estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples those improvements; because in such cases ownership
Bank and Trust Company as administrator of the estate of ultimately remains with the Government and the
E. M. Bachrach, to her the said 54,000 share of stock improvements remain open to public use.
dividend by endorsing and delivering to her the
FACTS: Samar Mining (Samico) owned a mine and mill
corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said
in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. To connect them to the pier
dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit
in Pamintayan, Zamboanga del Sur, the company built the
or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary
42-km gravel pit Samico Road, construction of which was
or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs
finished in 1959. Since the road traversed public lands,
of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that
Samico filed miscellaneous lease applications for right of
the stock dividend in question was not income but formed
way with the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry
part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
in 1958 and 1959, respectively. Temporary permits were
usufructuary but to the remainderman. And they have
granted, and eventually the lease applications were
appealed from the order granting the petition and
granted on Oct. 7, 1965; but the lease contracts were never
overruling their objection.
executed.
ISSUE: On June 5, 1964, Samico received an assessment letter
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs from the petitioner Provincial Assessor, charging them
to the usufructuary, or is it capital or part of the corpus of P1,117,900.00 as real estate tax on the taxable portion of
the estate, which pertains to the remainderman? Samico Road. Samico appealed the assessment to
petitioner BAA on the ground that the road was not a
HELD: taxable improvement because it was constructed entirely
The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the on public land within the meaning of Sec. 2 of CA 470
property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock dividend and the decision of the SC in Bislig Bay Lumber Co. v.
are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent Surigao. The BAA upheld the assessment but held it
profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock unenforceable until the lease contracts were executed.
covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of Samico moved for reconsideration, but the BAA, in a
said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the decision dated Aug. 3, 1965, not only denied the appeal
original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal but made the assessment immediately enforceable, with
may be sold independently of its mother. the amount due accruing from the date of completion of
the road in 1959. Upon second denial by the BAA,
Samico elevated its case to the Court of Tax Appeals.
ART. 596 The Provincial Assessor and the BAA assailed the CTA’s
jurisdiction over the case on the ground that Samico
(1) BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF
should have paid the tax under protest first before
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR VS SAMAR MINING CO
appealing. On June 28, 1967, the CTA ruled that it has
SUMMARY: By virtue of a government lease, a mining jurisdiction over the case and then decided in favor of
company built a road on alienable public land in Samico. The CTA held that since the road was
Zamboanga del Sur. The provincial assessor sent a letter constructed on public lands such that it is an integral part
of the lands and not an independent improvement thereon,
34
and that upon the termination of the lease the national of the Assessment Law which states that: “No court shall
government will acquire ownership of the road, Samico entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax
should be exempted from paying. Hence this appeal to the assessment under this Act until the taxpayer shall have
SC. paid under protest the taxes assessed against him, nor
shall any court declare any tax invalid by reason....”
ISSUE(HELD): W/N the road constructed on alienable
public land leased to Samico is taxable. (NO) SC: Sec. 54 of the Assessment Law is inconsistent with
the express provision and legislative intent of RA 1125
ARGUMENTS/RATIO (the Law creating the Court of Tax Appeals), and should
1) BAA and the Provincial Assessor argue that the road is be deemed impliedly repealed insofar as it sets the
an improvement and, therefore, taxable under Section 2 payment of tax under protest as a prerequisite for appeals
of the Assessment Law (Commonwealth Act No. 470) to the CTA. The SC quotes with approval the decision of
which provides as follows: "Sec. 2. Incidence of real the CTA, thus: “To require the taxpayer, as contended by
property tax. - Except in chartered cities, there shall be respondents, to pay first the disputed real property tax
levied, assessed, and collected, an annual ad valorem tax before he can file an appeal assailing the legality and
on real property including land, buildings, machinery, validity of the realty tax assessment will render nugatory
and other improvements not hereinafter specifically the appellate jurisdictional power of the Court of Tax
exempted." Appeals as envisioned in Section 7(3), in relation to
Section 11, of Republic Act No. 1125. If we follow the
SC: The road is indeed an improvement, but it is not contention of respondents to its logical conclusion, we
taxable under Sec. 2 of the Assessment Law pursuant to cannot conceive of a case involving the legality and
the ruling in Bislig Bay Lumber Co. v. Prov’l. Gov’t. of validity of real property tax assessment, decided by the
Surigao (100 Phil 303), which held that a private party Board of Assessment Appeals, which can be appealed to
who introduces improvements on public land subject to a the Court of Tax Appeals.”
lease is only a partial usufructuary of the road and
therefore cannot be made to pay real estate tax; because The Court further says: “We agree with the foregoing view
in such cases ownership ultimately remains with the of the Court of Tax Appeals. It should be noted that what
Government and the improvements remain open to public is involved in the present case is simply an assessment of
use. In Municipality of Cotabato, et al. v. Santos, (105 realty tax, as fixed by the Provincial Assessor of
Phil 963), it was held that improvements which form an Zamboanga del Sur, which was disputed by Samar before
integral part (such as dikes and gates) of a publicly-owned the Board of Assessment Appeals of said province. There
immovable (such as swampland converted into fishponds) was no demand yet for payment of the realty tax. In fact
are tax-exempt. the letter of the Provincial Assessor, of June 5, 1964,
notifying Samar of the assessment, states as follows:
2) BAA and the Provincial Assessor argue that Bislig Bay ‘Should you find the same to be not in accordance with
does not apply because the road in that case was built on law or its valuation to be not satisfactory, you may appeal
inalienable timberland. Samico Road was built on this assessment under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act
alienable lands of the public domain and is therefore 470 to the Board of Assessment Appeals, through the
taxable. Municipal Treasurer of Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, within
SC: The argument is untenable. The road in issue in the 60 days from the date of your receipt hereof.’ Accordingly
Bislig Bay case was exempted not because it was built on Samar appealed to the Board questioning the validity of
inalienable lands but because it formed an integral part the assessment. The Board rendered a resolution over-
of the public land upon which it was built; and because ruling the contention of Samar that the assessment was
it was owned by the Government through accession. illegal. Then Samar availed of its right to appeal from the
Section 3(a) of the Assessment Law does not decision of the Board to the Court of Tax Appeals as
distinguish between alienable or inalienable lands; as provided in Section 11 of Republic Act 1125. Section 11
long as the land is of public domain, it is tax-exempt. does not require that before an appeal from the decision
of the Board of Assessment Appeals can be brought to
3) BAA and the Provincial Assessor argue that the CTA the Court of Tax Appeals, it must first be shown that the
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because Samico party disputing the assessment had paid under protest
failed to pay the tax under protest as required by Sec. 54 the realty tax assessed. In the absence of such a

35
requirement under the law, all that is necessary for a owners as well as the usufructuary sign the agreement of
party aggrieved by the decision of the Board of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the
Assessment Appeals is to file his notice of appeal to the exclusive right to cede the property by lease and to receive
Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days after receipt of the the full rental value by virtue of her right to usufruct while
decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals, as provided on the other hand the naked owners maintain that the right
in Section 11 of Republic Act 1125.” of usufruct was extinguished when the building was
destroyed, the right of the usufructory being limited to the
In conclusion, the Court held: “From the aforequoted
legal interest on the value of the lot and the materials, in
portion of the decision of this Court, We gather that the
order that the agreement of lease may be affected, the
only question that may be brought before the City or
parties agreed on a temporary compromise whereby the
Provincial Board of Assessment Appeals is the question
naked owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the
which relates to the reasonableness or legality of the
monthly rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the
realty tax that is assessed against a taxpayer. Such being
balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was
the case, it would be unjust to require the realty owner likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title to the
to first pay the tax, that he precisely questions, before he
building to be constructed would accrue to the land upon
can lodge an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. We it completion as an integral part of the lot covered by the
believe that it is not the intendment of the law that in transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the naked
questioning before the Court of Tax Appeals the validity owners but subject to the right of usufruct of Josefa Fabie.
or reasonableness of the assessment approved by the
The parties expressly reserved the right to litigate their
Board of Assessment Appeals the taxpayer should first respective claims after the termination of the contract of
pay the questioned tax. It is Our view that in so far as
lease to determine which of said claims was legally
appeals from the decision or resolution of the Board of
correct.
Assessment Appeals, Section 54 of Commonwealth Act
470 does not apply, and said section can be considered as By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin
impliedly repealed by Sections 7, 11 and 21 of Republic property, the United States War Damage Commission
Act 1125.” approved the claim that was presented for the damage
caused to the property, paid to and received by the naked
DISPOSITION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, appealed from, is
estate taxes due on the property at Ongpin for the years
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
1945 to 1952.
ISSUE:
ART. 607 Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the
(1) ALBAR VS CARANGDANG land? W/N the usufructuary (FABIE) or naked owner
(VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction?
FACTS: W/N the usufructuary should pay the real estate taxes?
Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the HELD:
City of Manila with a building and improvements, and by
a will left by her upon her death which was duly probated The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building.
she devised the naked ownership of the whole property to From the above, it is clear that when the deceased
Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas
Josefa Fabie for life. situadas" in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo streets, she meant to
impose the encumbrance both the building and the land
During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted on which it is erected for indeed the building cannot exist
the building in many portions of Manila, the building on without the land. And as this Court well said, "The land,
the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and being an indispensable part of the rented premises cannot
other improvements that were not destroyed by the fire. be considered as having no rental value whatsoever."
One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for Moreover, in the Spanish language, the term "fincas" has
a period of five years, at the same time agreeing to a broad scope; it includes not only building but land as
construct on the lot a new building provided the naked well. (Diccionario Ingles-Español, por Martines Amador)

36
Since only the building was destroyed and the usufruct is that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The
constituted not only on the building but on the land as said water facility has been the only source of water of the
well, then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished by the residents for thirty (30) years.
destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5
extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of
to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of
the encumbrance (Article 603, old Civil Code).
Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct
2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes,
the building. Of course, this is addressed to the wisdom
subsequently wrote to the respondent Association
and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and
demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over
purposes is deemed as the administrator of the property.
the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case
This has been clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
David, 75 Phil., 536, which was litigated between the
against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and
same parties and wherein the scope of the same provision
the surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
of the will has been the subject of interpretation.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent
The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however,
Association. One of the things it affirmed was the
merit in the contention that the real estate taxes paid by
existence of an easement for water system/facility or open
respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for several
space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein
years previous to the present litigation should be paid by
the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However,
her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because
on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners,
she bound herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement
the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open
approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court
space
of First Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David,
supra). In the case, which involved the same parties and ISSUE
the same properties subject to usufruct, the parties
submitted an amicable agreement which was approved by Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop
the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, is considered an “open space” as defined in P. D. 1216.
bound herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special RULING
assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the
necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is
usufruct and in accordance with said agreement, considered an “open space.” The Court used the basic
respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954. statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to
determine whether the area falls under “other similar
facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no
EASEMENT specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.

ART. 613 Ejusdem generis states that where a general word


or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
(1) EMETERIA LIWAG VS HAPPY GLEN LOOP specific words of the same class, the general word or
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC phrase is to be construed to include – or to be restricted to
– things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class
FACTS
as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle,
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas
Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner reserved for the common welfare of the community.
of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and
settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights amenities” should be interpreted in like manner.
to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision
It is without a doubt that the facility was used for
including the receivables from the lots already sold.
the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity,
As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented without which, survival in the community would be
to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and impossible.
the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
37
(2) SPS DELA CRUZ VS RAMISCAL distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway be the shortest. The first three
Facts: requirements are not present in the instant
Respondent Ramiscal is the registered owner of a case.
parcel of land located at the corner of 18th Avenue and
(2) Respondent is not barred by laches from
Boni Serano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioner-
closing the right of way being used by
spouses are occupants of a parcel of land located at the
petitioners. Laches is not applicable here
back of Ramiscal’s property owned by Concepcion de la
since there was no knowledge on the part of
Pena, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. The
the respondent’s act for it was only in 1995
subject matter of this case is a 1.10m wide by 12.60m long
that she found out that the pathway being
strip of land owned by respondent which is being used by
used by the petitioners was part of her
petitioners as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the
property. Further, delay in the filing of suit
nearest public highway from their property. Petitioner
is not a valid contention in this case for
had enclosed the same with a gate, fence and roof. In
respondent immediately demanded
1995, a relocation survey and location plan for the
petitioners to demolish their property and
respondent’s properties were prepared and it was only
reasonably filed in complaint.
then that respondent discovered that the pathway being
occupied by petitioners is part of her property. (3) PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORP OF THE
Respondent immediately demanded that the petitioners PHILIPPINES VS CA (full)
demolish the structure constructed by them on said
pathway without her consent but such demand was
unheeded. ART. 614
Issues: (1) ALCANTARA VS RETA
(1) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to Construction of a house on the lot of another to facilitate
a voluntary or legal easement of right of way. the utilization of usufruct may constitute as personal
easement pursuant to Article 614.
(2) Whether or not respondent is barred by laches
from closing the right of way being used by FACTS:
petitioners.
Edilberto Alcantara et. al. filed with the RTC, Davao City
Held: a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the exercise
of the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No.
(1) Petitioners are entitled neither to a voluntary
1517, injunction with preliminary injunction, attorney's
nor legal easement of right of way.
fees and nullity of amicable settlement.
Petitioners failed to show by competent
evidence other than their bare claim that they Alcantara et. al. claimed that they were tenants or lessees
and their tenants entered into an argument of the land; that the land has been converted by Reta into
with the respondent. Likewise futile are a commercial center; and that Reta is threatening to eject
petitioners attempt to show that they are them from the land. They assert that they have the right of
legally entitled to the pathway under Art. 649 first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with
of the Civil Code. The conferment of a legal Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they
easement of right of way under this article is are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.
subject to proof of the following: 1) It is
surrounded by other immovables and has no They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab initio for
payment of proper indemnity; 3) the isolation being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.
is not the result of its own acts; 4) the right of ISSUE:
way claim is at the point that least prejudicial
to the servient estate; and 5) to the extent Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under
consistent with the foregoing rule where the Presidential Decree No. 1517.

38
HELD: ART. 617
No right of first refusal. The area involved has not been (1) VELASCO VS CUSI
proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact,
FACTS: Petitioner filed in the CFI of Davao an action
Alcantara et. al. filed a petition with the National Housing
against Davao City to quiet title to her Lot 77-B-2, a
Authority requesting that the land they were occupying be
portion of which she claims to having been occupied
declared as an ULRZ. On May 27, 1986, the request was
illegally as part of Bolton Street, Davao City.
referred to Mr. Jose L. Atienza, General Manager,
National Housing Authority, for appropriate action. The On a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, on the
request was further referred to acting mayor Zafiro ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the
Respicio, Davao City, as per 2nd Indorsement dated July Court, presided over by respondent Judge Cusi Jr.,
1, 1986. Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed dismissed the case. The allegations in the complaint that
as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was the Bolton Street encroached on the lot of the plaintiff and
an ULRZ. that the defendant had continuously occupied the portion
so encroached upon do not, contrary to the conclusion of
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The
the plaintiff found in the complaint, cast ‘ . . a cloud of
Urban Land Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as
doubt on the title of the plaintiff over said portion which
Urban Land Reform Zones.11 Consequently, petitioners
would justify this action.
cannot claim any right under the said law since the land
involved is not an ULRZ. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking a review of the
Order of dismissal
To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and
privileges granted by the said decree, one must be: (1) a ISSUE: WON Boston st. is an easement and a legal
legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; encumbrance on petitioner’s lot.
(2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and,
(3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. HELD: WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been
Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category found in the Order complained of, the same is hereby
cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, AFFIRMED, and the instant petition, dismissed
not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the YES
property should the owner of the land decide to sell the
same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. Section 39 of Act 496:

Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance
sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he of a decree or registration, and every subsequent
gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a purchasers of registered land who takes a certificate of
usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
the property of another with the obligation of preserving encumbrances, except those noted on said certificate,
its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or and any of the following encumbrances which may be
the law otherwise provides. subsisting namely:

Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the xxx xxx xxx
land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This
Third. Any public highway, way, private way, … or
would be in the nature of a personal easement under
any government irrigation
Article 614 of the Civil Code.
XX
Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the
conclusion would still be the same since the agreement It appears on the face of the complaint that Bolton Street
was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner has been where it is from time immemorial. Bolton Street
Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by Presidential constituted an easement of public highway on subject Lot
Decree No. 1517. No. 77, from which petitioner’s lot was taken, when the
said bigger lot was original registered. It remained as such
legal encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly
noted , or notwithstanding the lack of an annotation, on
39
the certificate of title, by virtue of the clear and express In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his
provision of Section 39 of Act 496, it being admitted that own expense because his need for water to irrigate his
at the time of the registration of Lot 77, the public watermelon fields was urgent.
highway was already in existence or subsisting
Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC
NOTES: claiming that he suffered damages when he failed to plant
his fields that yearfor lack of irrigation water, and when
Bolton Street cannot be a discontinuous easement as she
he reconstructed the canal.
claims it to be, which may not be acquired by prescription.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and
Nonetheless, whether the mode of acquisition of the
Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by
easement that Bolton Street is, would be only by virtue of
issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint.
title, as petitioner contends, this is not material or of any
The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights
consequence. The action is to quiet title and damages; but
which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by
the complaint does not allege any cloud or doubt on the
him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed.
title
His non-use of the water right since then for a period of
(2) VALISNO VS ADRIANO more than five years extinguished the grant by operation
of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of themselves.
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The ISSUE:
purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the easement of
running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even
water over Respondent’s land.
if the water is supplied by a third person.
RULING: Yes.
FACTS:
The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondent’s land
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a
for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT No. NT-16281. He bought
Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of
the land from the respondent’s sister, Honorata Adriano
Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for
Francisco. The land which is planted with watermelon,
the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in
peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that
Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of Apparent
of the respondent Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga
Sign):
River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
Honorata and Felipe from their father. At the time of the Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of
sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water easement between two estates, established or maintained
from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of
(70) meters long, traversing the Respondent's land. them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may
In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation continue actively and passively, unless at the time,
canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of the irrigation water theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land. should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and
execution of the deed.
Communications a complaint for deprivation of water
rights. The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the
"conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property.
the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the irrigation
According to the Plaintiff, the water right was the primary
canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case
consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for
by the Bureau of Public Works and Communications. A
without it the property would be unproductive.
reinvestigation was granted.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of
40
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance
purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc.
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party
water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the
easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet
of necessity does detract from its permanency as property to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU
right, which survives the determination of the necessity. has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of
been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from way?
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as
RULING: YES.
the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to
deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River. There was a voluntary easement of right of way which
was acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and
Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the
ART. 619 Tuasons but I don’t think I can find the details regarding
it in the case… I just saw the one regarding
LAVISTA ASSOCIATION VS. COURT OF “acknowledgement” between admu and the Tuasons.)
APPEALS Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement
Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary need not be met. And like any other contractual
easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or voluntary recession of the contract establishing the
renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant
lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of
FACTS: both parties recognized the existence of such easement
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The
in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road abutting free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by
Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.
Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an
Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. easement but merely declaring one (there no such thing as
The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons sold a judicial easement)
a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation.
Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the
Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, ART. 620
with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed
ABELLANA, SR. VS. CA (full)
of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo
later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land.
Tuason developed their land which is now known as La
Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista ART. 624
acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right (1) TANEDO VS. BERNAD
of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use
their half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use FACTS: The private respondent Antonio Cardenas was
AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated
other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property in Cebu City which he had inherited from
wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Lourdes Cardenas. On Lot 7501-A is constructed an
Villas, was the highest bidder. apartment building, while the improvements on Lot 7501-
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the B consist of one four-door apartment of concrete and
right to negotiate the easement on the road. However, La strong materials; one two-storey house of strong
Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they materials; a bodega of strong materials; and a septic tank

41
for the common use of the occupants of Lots 7501-A and In answer to the cross-claim, the spouses Romeo and
7501-B. A small portion of the apartment building on Lot Pacita Sim insisted that the sale executed by
7501-A also stands on Lot 7501-B. Antonio Cardenas of Lot 7501-B in their favor was an
absolute one.
On 5 February 1982, said Antonio Cardenas sold Lot
7501-A to herein petitioner Eduardo C. Tañedo. ISSUE: WON the easement of septic tank is extinguish
by the sale of the lot to the respondent spouses.
Antonio Cardenas, on that same day, also mortgaged Lot
NEGATIVE. In the deed of sale it it was not stated that
7501-B to said Eduardo C. Tañedo as a security for the
the easement was abolished nor did
payment of a loan in the amount of P10,000.00.
Antonio Cardenas stopped its use. Its use continued by
Antonio Cardenas further agreed that he would sell Lot operation of law even after the sale
7501-B only to Eduardo Tañedo in case he should decide
RATIO DICIDENDI:
to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot 7501-B services Lot
7501-A and the apartment building on Lot 7501-A has a As can be seen from the above provisions,
part standing on Lot 7501-B. This was confirmed in a the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to
letter, dated 26 February 1982, wherein different persons is not one of the grounds for the
Antonio Cardenas asked Tañedo not to deduct the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of
mortgage loan of P10,000.00 from the purchase price of the easement is continued by operation of law. Article 624
Lot 7501-A "because as we have previously agreed, I will of the Civil Code provides:
sell to you Lot 7501-B."
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement
Antonio Cardenas, however, sold Lot 7501-B to the between two estates, established or maintained by the
herein respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. 4 Upon owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them
learning of the sale, Eduardo Tañedo offered be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may
to redeem the property from Romeo Sim. But the latter continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the
refused. Instead, Romeo Sim blocked the sewage pipe ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
Tañedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in
on Lot 7501-B. As a result, Eduardo Tañedo, invoking the case of the division of a thing owned in common by two
provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code, filed an action or more persons.
for legal redemption and damages, with a prayer for the
n the instant case, no statement abolishing or
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, before
extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, docketed therein as
the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor
Civil Case No. CEB-994, against the spouses Romeo and
did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and
Pacita Sim, Antonio Cardenas and his wife Mae
septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold
Linda Cardenas, the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, and
said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic
Banco Cebuano, Cebu City Development Bank.
tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the
Answering, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim claimed spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the
that they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any
Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be
redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo. (2) VALISNO VS. ADRIANO
Antonio Cardenas, upon the other hand, admitted that he FACTS: Valisno bought the land from the defendant-
had agreed to sell Lot 7501-B to Eduardo Tañedo and appellees sister, Honorata The land adjoins that of the
claimed by way of cross-claim against the spouses Romeo appellee Felipe on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both
and Pacita Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed in parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe,
favor of said spouses was only intended as an equitable from their father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of the sale
mortgage, to secure the payment of amounts received by of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water
him from said spouses as petty loans .

42
from the Pampanga River through a canal traversing the The Valisno’s MR of the decision was denied by the trial
Felipe’s land. court. The plaintiff appealed to the CA which certified the
case to Us upon the legal question of whether the
Later on, Felipe levelled a portion of the irrigation canal
provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those
so that the Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water
of the Civil Code should apply to this case.
and prevented from cultivating his land.
ISSUE: WON Valiano has water rights over the irrigation
The Valisno filed in the Bureau of Public Works and
canal
Communications a complaint for deprivation of water
rights. A decision was rendered Felipe to reconstruct the HELD: The appealed decision is SET ASIDE.
irrigation canal, Instead of restoring the irrigation canal,
YES
the Felipe asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the
same Bureau. A reinvestigation was granted. The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land
for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation
Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of the sale of
canal at his own expense because his need for water to
Honorata’s land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title
irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.
for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided
He later filed a complaint for damages in the CFI of in Article 624 of the Civil Code:
Nueva Ecija claiming that he suffered damages when he
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of
failed to plant his fields that year (1960) for lack of
easement between two estates, established or maintained
irrigation water.
by the owner of both shall be considered,should either of
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may
reversed the Bureau’s decision by issuing a final continue actively and passively, unless at the time, the
resolution dismissing Valisno’s complaint. The Secretary ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
held that Eladio Adriano’s water rights which had been should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of execution of the deed.
the water right since then for a period of more than five
This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a
years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence
thing owned in common on by two or more persons (Civil
the water rights did not form part of his hereditary
Code)
estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves.
Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish
from her father’s estate did not acquire any water rights Law of Waters which provided:
with the land purchased.
Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated land which
In his answer to the damage suit, Felipe admitted that he previously received its waters from a single point is
levelled the irrigation canal on his land, but he averred: divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some
that neither his late father nor his sister Honorata other title, between two or more owners, the owners of the
possessed water rights for the land which she sold to the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to
appellant. He set up a counterclaim for damages. the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of
the lower estates, and without right to any compensation
The trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to pass
therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of
through the defendant’s land to draw water from the
conveyance. (Art. 122, Spanish Law of Waters of August
Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the
3, 1866.)
Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a
right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the
the Secretary of Public Works and his decision on the “conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper improvements” appurtenant to Honorata’s property. By
court within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor
validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and
collaterally.. It dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all“rights, title, interest
43
and participations over the parcel of land above- (3) WON there exists a cause of action for alleged
described, together with [irrigation equipment]” and the fraudulent reduction of Caridad’s share.
water rights and such other improvements appertaining to
the property subject of this sale. According to the Valisno, HELD:
the water right was the primary consideration for his (1) No, the donation was not effectively revoked.
purchase of Honorata’s property, for without it the
property would be unproductive. (2) No more cause of action because it had already
prescribed.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of (3) No, action had already prescribed.
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although RATIO:
not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The
purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water ditch running (1)
across the grantor’s land cannot be defeated even if the
 In order to set aside the donation, the revocation
water is supplied by a third person
will only be effective upon court judgment or
As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been consent of the donee. In this case, there was
established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, neither a court judgment ordering the revocation,
disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the Felipe’s nor was there a consent of Ramon & Emilia.
act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the
(2)
use of water from the Pampanga River.
 The legal easement of water is classified as
continuous, therefore subject to prescription by
ART. 631 non-user for the period required by law. Under
CC 631, easements are extinguished by non-user
ONGSIACO VS. ONGSIACO
for 10 years, which in the case of continuous
FACTS: easements, shall be counted from the day on
which an act contrary to the same took place.
 Mother of Caridad & Emilia Ongsiako executed
a deed of donation inter vivos, donating to her  In this case, the dike was constructed in
children a piece of land. 1937/1938 (before the war) and the action was
only brought on 1951, way beyond the
 According to the mother, when she made the prescription period.
donation, a greater area was allotted to Ramon &
Emilia because their shares were low lands  Furthermore, Caridad cannot argue that the dams
through which flowed the excess water from constitute a nuisance and by virtue of CC 698,
higher estates. Later on, she learned that Ramon lapse of time does not legalize any nuisance,
& Emilia started constructing dikes which therefore, her action does not prescribe.
impeded the natural flow of water coming from
o First, the complaint does not set forth any
the higher estates. Hence, she executed a
fact which shows that the dam is a
document revoking the donation in favor of
nuisance.
Ramon and Emilia and adjudicated their revoked
shares to Caridad as mojera and the rest in equal o Even assuming arguendo that it is indeed
shares. nuisance, CC 631 which is a more
particular law which applies to
ISSUE (the 3 issues in this case relate to the 3 causes of
easements in particular will prevail over
action):
CC 698 which applied to nuisances in
(1) WON the donation was effectively revoked by general (simple rule in stat con: apply
virtue of the document drawn by the mother. particular provisions over general ones).
In such a case, action had already
(2) (TOPICAL) WON there exists a cause of action prescribed
for violation of right of legal easement of water.
44
(3) In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court
praying for a right of way through Anastacia’s property.
 Prescribed because more than 20 years had The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of
elapsed since the partition (prescription: 10 years Anastacia’s property facing the public highway, starting
after partition only). from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward
JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT FOR ALL 3 CAUSES OF by 1m to her property and turning left for about 5m to
ACTION ARE DISMISSED. avoid the store in order to reach the municipal road. The
way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing
in the middle.
ART. 649/650 The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
of action, explaining that the right of way through the
(1) QUIMEN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
brother’s property was a straight path and to allow a
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE detour by cutting through Anastacia’s property would no
When the easement may be established on any of several longer make the path straight. They held that it was more
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as
should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these that was the shortest route to the public road and the least
two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through
the way which will cause the least damage should be used, Anastacia’s property.
even if it will not be the shortest.
CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right
FACTS: of way on Anastacia’s property. The court, however, did
not award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not
Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister,
in bad faith when she resisted the claim.
inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to
subdivide the property equally among themselves. The Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be
shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the considered as a servient estate despite the fact that it does
municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the extreme left of the not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She
road while the lots on the right were sold by her brothers denies ever promising Yolonda a right of way.
to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind
Anastacia’s were sold by her (as her brother’s Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the
adminstratix) brother to Yolanda. second lot, the easement of right of way she provided was
ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of
Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one
because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia person so that there was no longer any compelling reason
prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her to provide private respondent with a right of way as there
a right of way on her adjoining property (which was in are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.
front) for p200 per square meter.
She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way
Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using is not the shortest access to the public road because of the
as her passageway to the public highway a portion of detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most
anastacia’s property. But when yolanda finally offered to damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year
pay for the use of the pathway anastacia refused to accept from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and
the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by considering that an avocado has an average life span of
Anastacia from passing through her property. seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from
it.
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the
Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the property ISSUE:
of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore
between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of 1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement
Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and 2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda
Anastacia’s perimeter fence. is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the parties

45
HELD: YES to both which will cause the least damage should be used, even if
it will not be the shortest.
1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted
by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of TC’s findings:
persons to pass over another’s property when his > Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her
tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others father’s property and held that there existed an available
without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve
owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way as a right of way between the boundary line and the house
through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the of Yolanda’ s father
owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property. > The vacant space ended at the left back of the store
which was made of strong materials
The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the
way are:
lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the
immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
public highway.
highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper CA’s finding:
indemnity; > The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant wide and 5m long at the extreme right of Anastacia’s
estate; and, property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least compared to the suggested passage through the property
prejudicial to the servient estate. of Yolanda’ s father which would mean destroying the
sari-sari store made of strong materials.
These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly
shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion
in by the estates of other persons including that of are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so
petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As
meter for her right of way as agreed between her and between a right of way that would demolish a store of
petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her strong materials to provide egress to a public highway,
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to and another right of way which although longer will only
the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the alternative should be preferred.
trial court itself declared that “[t]he said properties of
Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff (2) CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., ET AL. VS.
Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the PATOCINIO MARCOS
public highway and there appears an imperative need for FACTS:
an easement of right of way to the public highway. On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Easement of Right of Way against respondent Patrocinio
2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the
L. Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they
easement of right of way shall be established at the point
are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as
of Laoag City; while respondent is the owner of Lot No.
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
1. As petitioners had no access to a public road to and
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.”
from their property, they claimed to have used a portion
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970.
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles
is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement of sand. Though petitioners have been granted another
may be established on any of several tenements passageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way (Spouses Arce), the owners of another adjacent lot, the
is shortest and will cause the least damage should be former instituted the complaint before the RTC and
chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) prayed that they be granted a right of way over an area of
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way 54 sqm of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the amount

46
ofP54,000.00, and that the right be annotated on with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
defendant’s title. In addition to that, the defendant will to a public highway may be the shortest.
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as damages for
In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the above-
In the defendant’s answer, he denied that he allowed enumerated requirements. Admittedly, they had been
anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway. Moreover, he granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot
stated that petitioners’ claim of right of way is only due to owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use
expediency and not necessity for there already is an the said outlet in going to and coming from the public
existing easement of right of way available to petitioners highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from
granted by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to the public road.
establish another easement over respondent’s property.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners circuitous, and they have to pass through other lots owned
by finding that they had adequately established the by different owners before they could get to the highway.
requisites to justify an easement of right of way in We find petitioners’ concept of what is “adequate outlet”
accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that
Also, the trial court declared petitioners in good faith as in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right
they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity. of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial,
however, the he CA reversed and set aside the RTC necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate
decision ruling that a right of way had already been is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a
granted by the sevient estate. Thus, there is no need to compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it
establish an easement over the respondent’s property. can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same
should not be imposed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a
grant of legal easement of right of way from their The convenience of the dominant estate has never been
landlocked property through the property of private the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be
respondent which is the shortest route in going to and sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
from their property to the public street. “adequacy.” Hence, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
HELD: highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up
The petition is without merit. another servitude is entirely unjustified.
CIVIL LAW : Easement
Therefore, the petition is denied. The Court affirms the
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the ruling of the CA.
property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a
(3) VDA. DE BALTAZAR VS. CA
charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is
incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way,
establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence 4 requisites must be present: (1) the estate must be
of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
right of way may be granted. outlet to a public highway (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietor’s
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the
own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point
following requisites should be met: first, the dominant
least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
adequate outlet to a public highway; second, there is
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
payment of proper indemnity; third, the isolation is not
due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; FACTS:
and fourth, the right of way claimed is at the point least
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent
bounded on the north by Sta. Ana River, on the south by
the land of vda. de Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028
47
and on the east by Lot 1025. Directly in front of 1026, FACTS:
1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the
Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124, in
establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of Bulacan.
right of way for him to have access to the provincial road.
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a
The RTC dismissed the complaint for it found 2 other
fishpond, on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126,
passageways. The CA reversed the decision for it found
owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by
that there was a strip of land used by Panganiban and his
Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by
grandfather as a right of way for 30 years until it was
Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta.
closed and that the 2 other passageways were only
Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the
temporary and was granted to Panganiban when the right
Jacinto family, on the northwest.
of way was closed. Thus the case at bar.
On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against
ISSUE:
defendants Sta. Maria for the establishment of an
Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an easement of easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot,
right of way Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other
persons, including those of the defendants; that since
RULING: YES
plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road,
It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an an easement of a right of way passing through either of
easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present. (1) the alternative defendants' properties which are directly
the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is abutting the provincial road would be plaintiffs' only
without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the
payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest
due to the propietor’s own acts and (4) the right of way have been passing through the properties of defendants in
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even
and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the promised plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged
may be the shortest. the absence of an access from their property to the road;
and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs' request
Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the
requisite, his land is bounded on all sides by immovables, barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement.
the lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an easement of right of way
river. The 2nd requisite is settled by a remand to the lower on the lots of defendants be established in their favor.
court for the determination of the proper indemnity. As They also prayed for damages, attorney's fees and costs of
regards the 3rd requisite, it was found that Panganiban suit.
bought the land from the Baltazars therefore its isolation
was not due to his own acts. And with regard to the 4th RTC and CA both found for Fajardo and granted the
requisite, the passage claimed is the shortest distance easement of right of way. On appeal, the Sta. Maria's
from his lot to Braulio Street. Panganiban was established allege that Fajardo failed to prove that it was not their own
all 4 requisites therefore is entitled to the easement. actions which caused their lot to be enclosed or cut-off
from the road.
ISSUE:
(4) STA. MARIA VS. CA
Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove the third
Requirements of compulsory servitude of right of way: 1) requisite or that the isolation was not caused by the
surrounded by immovables and no adequate outlet to a plaintiffs themselves?
public highway; 2) payment of indemnity; 3) isolation is
not due to the owner of the dominant estate; 4) least HELD:
prejudicial (and shortest if possible)
The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by
themselves cause the isolation.
48
As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus: ‐easement of party wall is presumed unless there is title or
"Neither have the private respondents been able to show exterior marks or proof to the contrary. 660
that the isolation of their property was not due to their
esterior signs which conflicts the easement of party wall.
personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts." In
the instant case, the Court of Appeals have found the ‐In this case it was proven that:
existence of the requisites. The petitioners, however,
insist that private respondents' predecessors-in-interest a.) the wall is higher than the building of the Alburo’s
have, through their own acts of constructing concrete b.) on the top of the wall, there is a gutter which catches
fences at the back and on the right side of the property, the water rain from the roof of the bldg. of sps lao.
isolated their property from the public highway. The
contention does not impress because even without the c.) there is a pipe connected from the gutter and attached
fences private respondents' property remains landlocked from the wall, it carries the water rain to the street.
by neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
d.) the roof of the bldg. of sps lao covered the ½ portion
Again, for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory of the top of the wall.
servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
e.) the supports of the wall were positioned on the lot of
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
sps. Lao f.)STONE
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649,
par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of ART. 668
the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and (1) CORTEZ VS. YU-TIBO
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this Facts:
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
The house No.65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of
public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
the plaintiff, has certain windows therein, through which
(5) SPS. MEJORADA VS. GLORIFICATION it receives light and air, said windows opening on the
VERTUZADO, ET AL. (full) adjacent house, No. 63 of the same street; that these
windows have been in existence since the year 1843, and
that the defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has
ART. 660 commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof
of the house in such a manner that one-half of one of the
LAO VS. HEIRS OF ALBURO windows in said house No. 65 has been covered, thus
depriving the building of a large part of the air and light
FACTS:
formerly received through the window. The court
‐Sps Lao owned 4parcels of land(Lot1‐4) practically finds the preceding facts, and further finds that
the plaintiff has not proven that he has, by any formal
‐Sps Lao filed an application for the registration of the act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63 from making
4 lots. improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the
‐Heirs of Alburo objected the application with respect to complaint.
the lot no. 2, which they alleged that the registration of lot The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and
no. 2 included the wall which according to them belonged uninterrupted use of the windows during a period of fifty-
to Lorenza Alburo. nine years he acquired by prescription an easement of
ISSUE: WON the wall is a party wall? light in favor of the house No.65, and as a servitude upon
house No.63, and, consequently, has acquired the right to
RULING: The wall in question is NOT a party wall. restrain the making of any improvements in the latter
house which might in any manner be prejudicial to the
‐The SC cited articles 572&573 of the old CC(now article
enjoyment of the easement. He contends that the easement
659&660) 659
of light is positive; and that therefore the period of
possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a
49
prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the property of the one opening the window, it does not in
enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, itself establish any easement, because the property is used
applying the doctrine to this case, from the time that said by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the
windows were opened with theknowledge of the owner of exercise of an easement. It is that the use if the windows
the house No.63, and without opposition on his part. opened in a wall on one’s own property, in the absence of
However, the defendant contends that the easement is some covenant or express agreement to the contrary, is
negative, and that therefore the time for the prescriptive regarded as an act of mere tolerance on the part of the
acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which the owner of the abutting property and does not create any
owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of the
formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing latter. The mere toleration of such an act does not imply
something which would be lawful but for the existence of on the part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to
the easement. freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor
does it avail the owner of the windows for the effects of
The court ruled that the easement of light is negative.
possession according to Art.1942 of the Civil Code,
Issue: because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it
follows that the easement of light with respect to the
Whether or not the easement of light in the case of openings made in one’s own edifice does not consist
windows opened in one’s own wall is negative. precisely in the fact of opening them or using them. The
Held: easement really consists in prohibiting or restraining the
adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to
Yes. The Supreme Court said that the case involves cut off or interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the
windows opened in a wall belonging to the wife of the obligation of not impeding the light.
plaintiff and it is of their opinion that the windows opened
in one’s own wall is of negative character, and, as such, (2) FABIE VS. LICHAUCO
can not be acquired by prescription under Art.538 of the Facts:
Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate Petitioner Miguel Fabie applied for the registration of his
may, by a formal act, have prohibited the owner of the property in Manila free from any encumbrances except
servient estate from doing something which it would be the easement of right of way in favor of respondents Julita
lawful for him to do were it not for the easement. That, in Lichauco and Hijos de Roxas. In addition to the said right
consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed of way, respondents also claim that of light and view and
any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of drainage. However, the claim was later reduce only to that
house No.63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is of the light and view.
tenant), to make therein improvements which might
Lichauco cliamed that when Juan Bautista Coloma, the
obstruct the light of house No.65 of the same street, the
original owner of both estates, established not only an
property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to
easement of right of way but also that of light and view
the complaint, as found by the court below in the
and that when both the properties were alienated, the
judgment assigned as error, he has not acquired, nor could
apparent signs were not removed. The apparent sign
he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no
allegedly consists of a gallery with windows through
matter how long a time might have elapsed since the
which light is admitted. It was supported on columns
windows were opened in the wall of the said house no.65,
erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner and the
because the period which the law demands for such
balcony on Lichauco’s property is supported by uprights
prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to
erected on the land by petitioner. The parties admitted the
run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not
existence of such gallery. The house was now a frontage
having been performed.
of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of which 16 meters and
When a person open windows in his own building he does 60 centimeters correspond to the main part of the same,
nothing more than exercise an act of ownership inherent and 1 meter and 90 centimeters to the gallery in question.
in the right of property with no limitations other than It results, therefore, that at the present day, the house has
those established by law. By reason of the fact that such nearly 2 meters more frontage than when it was alienated
an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the by Coloma. Therefore, at the present day the house is
50
erected partly on the land belonging to the owner and cannot have prescribed in favor of the property of the
partly, the gallery, over a lot belonging to another; that is, respondents in the absence of any act of opposition,
over that of the petitioner. When it was sold in October, according to the agreement, by which they or their
1848, no portion of the house occupied the lot last principals would have prohibited the petitioner or his
mentioned, but the entire building was erected over a lot principals to do any work which obstruct the balconies in
belonging to the owner as set forth in the instrument of question, inasmuch as said act of opposition is what
sale. constitutes the necessary and indispensable point of
departure for computing the time required by law for the
The lower court held that the right of way and drainage
prescription of negative easements. Thus, the judgment
exist in favor of the respondents’ respective properties.
appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court.
The claim as to the easement of light and view was
dismissed by the court.
Issue: ART. 684
Whether or not Respondents are entitled to the easement MARGARITA F. CASTRO VS. NAPOLEON A.
of light and view. MONSOD
Held: FACTS:
No. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land
time the gallery in controversy was constructed inasmuch
located on Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Piñas City,
as he limits himself to sustaining and defending the
and covered by TCT No. T-36071, with an area of 130
freedom of his property, denying the easement o flight
sq.m. Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the
and view of the respondent pretends to impose over it. A
property adjoining the lot of petitioner, located at
property is assumed to be from all encumbrance unless
Moonwalk Village, Las Piñas City. There is a concrete
the contrary is proved. Respondent who claims the said
fence, more or less two (2) meters high, dividing Manuela
easement is obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery,
Homes from Moonwalk Village.
in which the apparent sign of the easement is made to
consist in the present case, existed at the time of On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation
ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the
separated. And inasmuch as this issue has not been property of petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The
proved, the claim of the respondents as to the easements adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership
of the light and view which the petitioner does not admit, over the property. Respondent was merely asserting the
must of necessity be dismissed. existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at
the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from
Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement of the
collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated
parties that the respondents has balconies over the land of
plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level
the petitioner; and as it is, since it has
of petitioner's property.
been positively shown that the said balconies exceed the
limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim
invade the atmospheric area of the lot belonging to the was for the annotation of the lateral and subjacent
latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory easement of his property over the property of petitioner,
maintained by the respondents with which on account of in view of the latter's manifest determination to remove
its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal herein the embankment left by the developer of Manuela Homes.
as to its other aspect, the easement of view, which
might result in such case from the existence of the The RTC ordered, among others, the cancellation of
balconies alluded to, would be negative and not respondent’s adverse claim at the back of TCT No. T-
a positiveone, because the erection of the same would not 36071. It ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent
constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim
of the right of another, but the lawful exercise of the right was an easement and not an interest adverse to the
inherent to the dominion of the respondents to construct registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of
within their own lot. And as said easement is negative, it petitioner.
51
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and adjoining landowner would come to court or have the
ordered the retention of the annotation at the back of the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in
TCT 36071, not as an adverse claim but a recognition of order for it to be recognized and respected.
the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral
support.
ART. 688
SUPREME COURT RULING:
TRIAS VS. ARANETA
The issue in this case is whether the easement of lateral
and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable easements
properties and, if it does, whether the same may be and restrictions as conditions for contracts of sales; the
annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate. same may not be overturned by courts merely on the
ground that it impacts dominical rights.
Article 437 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a
parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything FACTS:
under it, and he can construct thereon any works, or make JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part
any plantations and excavations which he may deem of a subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc (of Araneta
proper. However, such right of the owner is not absolute Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land
and is subject to the following limitations: (1) servitudes to Mr Lopez with the condition that said lot should never
or easements, 18 (2) special laws, 19 (3) ordinances, 20 be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated
(4) reasonable requirements of aerial navigation, 21 and to the TCT.
(5) rights of third persons.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor up in the hands of the gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias. She was
shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive dismayed with the annotation that stated “5. That no
any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or factories be permitted in this section.”
subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface
right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical
subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any rights and therefore illegal and existed as mere surplusage
adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent since existing zoning regulations already prevented the
support. erection of factories in the vicinity. Worse, the annotation
possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She
In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral accordingly raised the issue to the court and received
support exists in favor of respondent. It was established relief.
that the properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin
each other. The residential house and lot of respondent is Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration
located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above stating that the imposition resulted from a valid sales
the level of petitioner's property. Unless restrained, the transaction between her predecessors in interest. He
continued excavation of the embankment could cause the alleged that the court held no authority to overrule such
foundation of the rear portion of the house of respondent valid easement and impaired the right to contract.
to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of
ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition was valid.
the family dwelling.
HELD:
We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent
injunction on the part of petitioner from making injurious The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement
excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of validly imposed under art 594 which provides that “every
respondent. However, an annotation of the existence of owner of a piece of land may establish easements he
the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It deems suitable xxx and not in contravention to the law,
exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the public policy and public order”
registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same
already binds the property and the owner of the same, The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the
including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every peace and quiet of neighboring residents. The intention is

52
noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash
with public policy, the easement may not be eroded. 1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local
ordinance
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning
2. civil action
regulations may be repealed anytime, allowing the
3. abatement without judicial proceedings In the present
erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very
case, the municipality chose to file a civil action for the
least, the original intent to bar factories remains binding
recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by
the PR. Under the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before
NUISANCE summarily abate a public nuisance.
ART. 694 Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ
(1) TAMIN VS. CA of possession and writ of demolition would have been
justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient
FACTS: to eject the private respondent.
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real (2) CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO VS. MUN. OF
filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of MALAY, AKLAN
respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a
parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga del Sur NATURE:
and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the
under PD 365 and that during the mayor, the municipality Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The
leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino’s Petition for
that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to question the
public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10,
religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his
land despite the efforts of the government since money is hotel establishment
allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium
within the public plaza and such construction could not FACTS:
continue because of the presence of the buildings
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc.
constructed by the defendants.
applied for a building permit covering the construction of
ISSUE: a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan,
which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for
Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of
the abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The
Civil Code. Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s
Held: application on the ground that the proposed construction
site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in
Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
the CC which states that “Art. 694. A nuisance is any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the
or anything else which: … hinders or impairs the use of Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by
the property.” Article 695. Nuisance is either public or the respondent mayor.
private. A public nuisance affects a community or A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
upon individuals may be equal.” issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Article 699 provides for the following remedies against
public nuisance: EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011.
Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
53
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
Boracay West Cove. the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order was
orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers
issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion
to order the closing and demolition of establishments.
Contentions of West Cove:
(3) HIDALGO ENTERPRISES VS. BALANDAN
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not
Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable
a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth
to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well as
of capital infused in the venture.
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured artificial feature other than the mere water and its
a court order before proceeding with the demolition. location.

Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court FACTS:


order because the municipal mayor has the express power
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the
the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario.
removal of illegally constructed buildings
Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their
The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory
ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising because the gates were always open and there was no
judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didn’t have
of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and
functions, certiorari will not lie. began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing,
Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out
ISSUE: later, already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor
conducted before the LGU can order the closure and of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for
demolition of the property in question. damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

HELD: ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance


is applicable in this case?
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be
classified as a nuisance per sewhich can therefore be RULING: NO.
summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who
incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been appliances of a character likely to attract children in play,
constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children
could have secured the necessary permits without issue. from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a
As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the
a nuisance per accidens child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance
thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may condition or artificial feature other than the mere water
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves
because, in the exercise cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot
ofpolice power and the general welfare clause, be held liable for Mario’s death.
property rights of individuals may be subjected to
54
(4) JARCO MARKETING, ET AL. VS. CA wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the
Facts: person to whom it happens." On the other hand,
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, negligence is the omission to do something which a
Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure
and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. to observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip other person suffers injury." The test in determining the
when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the
beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
after 14 days. She was 6 years old. We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and attributed to negligence.
wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. (2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of
Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are
respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they generally considered declarations and admissions. All
sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence
and an unspecified amount for loss of income and of a startling event before the declarant had the time to
exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person
complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus
the counter was Zhieneth’s act of clinging to it. The Court described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of
of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It found such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore
structurally dangerous counter. The counter was accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e.,
defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic
child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision. omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
Issues: Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed
attributable to negligence by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete
action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as
defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to
failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a
the store premises family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we
apply the conclusive presumption that favors children
Held:
below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory
no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we
happening without any human agency, or if happening accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and

55
sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could (2) Whether the said document can be considered a deed
not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical of sale in favor of private respondent
analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of
Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal Held:
otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over
inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is
laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer not per sesufficient to give rise to ownership over the res.
waiting area and its base was not secured. CRISELDA That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain
too, should be absolved from any contributory conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real
negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is
momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise over a thing in question.
moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to
let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a
four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other
distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights
mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to operates as a public instrument when filed with the
impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate
treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the and divide the estate left by the decedent among
counter just fell on her. themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial
settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. Hence, there is a marked difference between
a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or
ART. 712 deed of sale between the parties. The second is,
technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership
(1) ACAP VS. COURT OF APPEALS where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment
Facts: of a known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who
Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being
which land is rented by petitioner Teodoro Acap. When then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot
Cosme died intestate, his heirs executed a “Declaration of conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
Heirship and Waiver of Rights” in favor of private sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites
respondent Edy delos Reyes. Respondent informed the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other
petitioner of his claim over the land, and petitioner paid derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
the rental to him in 1982. However in subsequent years,
petitioner refused to pay the rental, which prompted A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a
respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of
possession and damages. Petitioner averred that he which is yet to be established in court at some future date,
continues to recognize Pido as the owner of the land, and and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a
that he will pay the accumulated rentals to Pido’s widow notice of a case already pending in court. It is to be noted
upon her return from abroad. The lower court ruled in that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly
favor of private respondent. proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale
was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private
Issues: respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the
(1) Whether the “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent's
Rights” is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an
private respondent adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to
56
cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private 3. Macario’s affidavit is void (no public document of
respondent's name. Consequently, while the transaction donation)
between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be
4. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire said shares by
binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a
prescription.5. Partially declared the nullity of the Deed
registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily
of Absolute Sale by Macario, Betty and Saida to Roger as
forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's
itaffects the portion or the share belonging to Salvacion
ownership without the corresponding proof thereof.
CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioner’s
(2) CELERINO MERCADO VS. BELEN
complaint on the ground that extraordinary acquisitive
ESPINOCILLA
prescription has already set in in favor of respondents
Facts: since petitioner’s complaint was filed only on July 13,
2000.
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552,
(570 sq. m.) at Sorsogon. After he died,his five children, Issue:
Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided
Whether or not the petitioner’s action to recover the
it equally among themselves. Later, Dionisia died (no
subject portion is barred by prescription. Petitioner
descendants) and Macario took possession of Dionisia’s
concludes that if a person obtains legal title to property by
share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property dated
fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon
November 1948, Macario claimed thatDionisia had
the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the
donated her share to him in May 1945.
defrauded party.
August 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty and Saida
sold 225 sq. m. to his son Roger, husband ofrespondent Held:
Belen and father of respondent Ferdinand. March 1985, We affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioner’s
Roger Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. toCaridad Atienza. (So complaint on the ground of prescription. Prescription, as
in Lot No. 552: Belen Espinocilla= 109 sq. m., Caridad a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
Atienza = 120 sq. m., Caroline Yu= 209 sq. m., and immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in
petitioner, Salvacion’s son = 132 sq. m). the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions:
an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse.
an area of 28.58 sq. m. which he bought from Aspren and
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but
extraordinary. In extraordinary prescription, ownership
was. He claims it must be returned to him. He avers that
and other real rights over immovable property are
he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. having
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for
inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion
30years without need of title or of good faith.
(Doroteo= 114sq m + Dionisia 28.5 sq m) and bought 28.5
sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. He occupies only 132 sq. Respondents’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55
m., he claims that respondents encroach on his share years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was established.
by 39 sq. m. Macario occupied Dionisia’s share in 1945 although his
claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only
Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land
made in a 1948 affidavit. We also agree with the CA that
they occupy by virtue of acquisitive prescription and that
Macario’s possession of Dionisia’s share was public and
there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of encroachment.
adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters,
RTC: also occupied portions of Lot No. 552.Indeed, the 1977
sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of
1. Petitioner entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC computed
his son Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macario’s
that Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and Macario eachinherited
possession because said sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of
114 sq. m. from Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia.
ownership. Roger also exercised an act of ownership
2. Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only
Thus, respondents must return 39 sq. m. to petitioner who in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer
occupiesonly 132 sq. m.13 petitioner’s complaint, that respondents’ peaceful

57
possession of the remaining portion was interrupted. By adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and
then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has registered it to the RD a year after.
already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning,
Macario’s 1948 affidavit void is of no moment.
transferring and conveying her ½ share of the properties
Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with Macario’s
to David. But since it was not registered, she executed
title or good faith.
another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.
Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished
respondents’ possession with his assertion that Macario’s
it with documents showing that David’s ownership of ½
fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share created a
of the estate was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the
constructive trust. Prescription may supervene even if the
Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands
trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Moreover, the
in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may
CA correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint as an
acquire private property are by hereditary succession and
action for reconveyance based on an implied or
if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from thetime the
Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds
right of action accrues( extinctive prescription), where
of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really donations
rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. Petitioner’s
inter vivos.
action for recovery of possession having been filed 55
years after Macario occupied Dionisia’s share, it is also Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying
barred by extinctive prescription. The CA while that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC
condemning Macario’s fraudulent act of depriving his dismissed. CA affirmed.
three sisters of their shares in Dionisia’s share, equally
emphasized the fact that Macario’s sisters wasted their ISSUE: Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
opportunity to question his acts. HELD: NO.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer
DONATION of the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted
in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2)
ART. 725 consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of
(1) REPUBLIC VS. GUZMAN
liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently
Three essential elements of a donation: established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended
1. Reduction in the patrimony of the donor to convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-
2. Increase in the patrimony of the donee affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her
3. Intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the
It is also required that the donation be made in a public
lands in favor of David, not a donation. She was also
document and that its acceptance be made in the same
aware that donation was not possible.
deed of donation or in a separate public document, which
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the
has to be recorded as well.
proper form and registration to make the donation valid is
FACTS: lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty.
Abela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is that David owns the property referred to and that he
the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name.
American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he
citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen indeed accept the donation.
and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land
in Bulacan. However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the
repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. There is NO
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together

58
with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the property. Respondent came to know of the assailed
of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating between them all contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the
the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the properties Philippines upon the death of his father.
were registered in their names and for 11 years, they
The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent.
possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2
Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen still On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court
owns ½ of the property and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and
Memorandum of Agreement.
(2) SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. ROQUE ISSUE: W/N there was valid donation to respondent?
FACTS: Petitioner Shopper’s Paradise Realty & HELD: YES. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the
Development Corporation, represented by its president, donation in favor of respondent is undisputed. The trial
Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that
with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of the non-registration of a deed of donation does not affect
land in the name of Roque. Petitioner issued to Dr. Roque its validity. As being itself a mode of acquiring
a check for P250,000.00 by way of “reservation ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title
payment.” Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque over the property from the donor to the donee. In
likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the donations of immovable property, the law requires for its
construction, development and operation of a commercial validity that it should be contained in a public document,
building complex on the property. Conformably with the specifying therein the property donated and the value of
agreement, petitioner issued a check for another the charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code
P250,000.00 “downpayment” to Dr. Roque. provides, however, that “titles of ownership, or other
rights over immovable property, which are not duly
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement,
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now
both notarized,were never annotated on the Certificate of
Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice
title because of the untimely demise of Roque. Roque’s
third persons.” It is enough, between the parties to a
death constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren
donation of an immovable property, that the donation be
P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr.
made in a public document but, in order to bind third
Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some
persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of
disagreements. In a letter, respondent advised petitioner
Property (Registry of Land Titles and Deeds)
“to desist from any attempt to enforce the aforementioned
contract of lease and memorandum of agreement”. On 15
February 1995, respondent filed a case for annulment of
the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, ART. 728
with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction MANUEL ECHAVEZ VS. DOZEN
before the RTC alleging that he had long been the CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP,
absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed ET. AL.
of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his
parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, and that the Petioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of
late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter into the Donation Mortis Causa which the latter accepted. In
assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the
made in a public instrument duly acknowledged by the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and
donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation).
on the same day by respondent before the notary public in
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig,
the same instrument of donation. The title to the property,
Vicente’s nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of
however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque,
Vicente’s intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed
and it was only transferred to and in the name of
a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa in
respondent sixteen years later.
his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale
Respondent, while he resided in the United States of Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These
America, delegated to his father the mere administration cases were jointly heard.
59
RTC dismissed Manuel’s petition. The RTC found that
the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen
Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to
Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation.
CA affirmed and held that since the donation in favor
of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with
the formalities for the validity of wills should have been
observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not
contain an attestation clause and was therefore void. He
argues that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion
of the deed of donation, which contains the "import and
purpose" of the attestation clause required in the
execution of wills.
Issue: Whether or not granting that the Acknowledgment
embodies what the attestation clause requires, an
attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged
in one statement
Held: NO. The requirements of attestation and
acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions
of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively)
indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that
serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by
one executing a deed, declaring before a competent
officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other
hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of
the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the
execution of the instrument before them and to the manner
of its execution.8Although the witnesses in the present
case acknowledged the execution of the Deed
of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this
is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental
witnesses to the execution of a decedents will. An
attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of
Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required
avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause
can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

60

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