SEC.

5 and 6, RULE 2 1) On July 3, 1996, petitioners filed with the RTC a The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a
ADA v. BAYLON Complaint4 for partition, accounting and multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject
damages against Florante, Rita and Panfila matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a
FACTS: 2) Answer,8 Florante, Rita and Panfila complete determination of all matters in controversy and
 Herein petitioners filed two separate, distinct 3) the petitioners filed a Supplemental litigation between the parties involving one subject
and independent actions. Pleading17 dated February 6, 2002, praying that matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at
the said donation in favor of the respondent be minimum cost.
(1) Original Case Filed: Partition of the estate rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of
of Sps. Florentino and Maximina Baylon; and the Civil Code. Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one
4) On October 20, 2005, the RTC rendered a pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes
CAUSE OF ACTION: Decision. of action as they may have against an opposing party,
a) Petitioners, as co-owners of the 43 5) Florante sought reconsideration of the Decision such joinder of causes of action is subject to the
parcels of land owned by the dated October 20, 2005 of the RTC insofar as it condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include
spouses Baylon during their lifetime rescinded the donation of Lot No. 4709 and half special civil actions governed by special rules.
sought for partition of the same. of Lot No. 4706 in his favor.
b) Rita to give consent as to the 6) On July 28, 2006, the RTC issued an Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The
partition of the properties. Order23 which denied the motion for
action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be
c) Rita took possession of the 43 reconsideration filed by Florante. joined with the action for the rescission of the said
parcels of land owned by Spouses CA donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be
Baylon during their lifetime and overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action
appropriated for herself the 1) CA rendered a Decision24 dated October 26, 2007 governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action
income from the same and refused 2) The petitioners sought reconsideration27 of the for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the
to effect a partition of the said Decision dated October 26, 2007 ordinary rules of civil procedure.
parcels of land. 3) denied by the CA in its Resolution28 dated March
6, 2008. 2. A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon
(2) Supplemental Pleading: Rescission of the motion of a party or by the court sua sponte, may be
donation inter vivos made by Rita Baylon in SC adjudicated by the court together with the other cause
favor of Florante Baylon. of action.
1) petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
CAUSE OF ACTION: of the Rules of Court Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a
a) Plaintiffs’ have the right to ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power,
succeed to the estate of Rita ISSUE: acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua
Baylon in case of death. sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of
b) Florante to respect the right of Whether the joinder of the causes of action was proper. action to be proceeded with separately.
plaintiffs’ to succeed the estate of
Rita Baylon in case of her death. RULING: However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder
c) Florante’s acceptance of subject or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance,
property when Rita executed a No. then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication
Deed of Donation inter vivos in his of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
favor to the prejudice of the 1. The actions of partition and rescission cannot be
plaintiffs’ right to succeed the joined in a single action. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve
estate in case of her death. a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of proceed with the case. They are not even accepted
 The RTC ruled for the partition of the subject causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of
properties, and rescinded the donation inter demands or rights of action in one action, the statement Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties
vivos. of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction. It
the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the
FLOWCHART: which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to
same complaint, declaration or petition. order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to
RTC be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the
severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also Decision dated October 26, 2007 issued by the Court of
to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01746 is MODIFIED in that the RTC
parties). Decision dated October 20, 2005 issued by the Regional 1) Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City
Trial Court, Tanjay City, Negros Oriental, Branch 43 in the above-stated petition for mandamus against
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only Civil Case No. 11657, insofar as it decreed the rescission respondent Empleo or his successor in office for
applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over of the Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997 is him to issue a certification of availability of
all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the herebyREINSTATED. The case is REMANDED to the trial funds for the payment of the salaries and wages
misjoinder of the same. court for the determination of the ownership of Lot No. of petitioners, and for his co-respondents or
4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in accordance with this their successors in office to sign the position
If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a Decision. description forms.
misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of 2) Branch 3 of the Iligan RTC denied petitioners’
action has to be severed from the other causes of action, petition for mandamus.
and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the G.R. NO. 180986 3) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 7 in
court with respect to the same would be a nullity. ALTRES VS EMPLEO which they maintained only their prayer for a
writ of mandamus for respondent Empleo or his
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the CAUSE OF ACTION: successor in office to issue a certification of
RTC direct the severance of the petitioners’ action for availability of funds for the payment of their
rescission from their action for partition. While this a) Petitioners were appointed to numerous vacant salaries and wages.
may be a patent omission on the part of the RTC, this career positions in the city government of Iligan. 4) The trial court denied the motion by Order of
does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and b) Pursuant to Resolution No. 04-266 issued by the October 22, 2007
correctness of its decision. The RTC validly adjudicated Sangguniang Panglungsod in view of its stated
the issues raised in the actions for partition and policy against "midnight appointments," SC
rescission filed by the petitioners. respondents are directed to hold in abeyance
the transmission of all appointments signed or to 1) Petition for review on certiorari
3. A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of be signed by the incumbent mayor in order to
action as long as it has some relation to the original ascertain whether these had been hurriedly ISSUE:
cause of action set forth in the original complaint. prepared or carefully considered and whether
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads: the matters of promotion and/or qualifications Whether the certification against forum shopping should
had been properly addressed and enjoined to be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. – Upon motion of a party put off the transmission of all appointments to that the signing by only one of them is insufficient as the
the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such the CSC, therein making it clear that non- attestation requires personal knowledge by the party
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental compliance therewith would be met with executing the same.
pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events administrative action.
which have happened since the date of the pleading c) Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus RULING:
sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead issue a certification as to availability of funds for
thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order the payment of salaries and wages of Yes.
admitting the supplemental pleading. petitioners, as required by Section 1(e)(ii), Rule While the rule is mandatory in nature, substantial
V of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40 and the compliance under justifiable circumstances is enough. It
Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter other respondents did not sign petitioners’ is a far better and more prudent course of action to
vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by position description forms resulting in the excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review
Rita in favor of Florante is a new cause of action that disapproval of the appointments issued to of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
occurred after the filing of the original complaint. petitioners invariably due to lack of certification dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
However, the petitioners’ prayer for the rescission of the of availability of funds. injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of
said donation inter vivos in their supplemental pleading is speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more
germane to, and is in fact, intertwined with the cause of FLOWCHART: delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
action in the partition case. Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has already
No. 4706 are included among the properties that were CSC REGIONAL OFFICE allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification
sought to be partitioned. and certification so that the ends of justice may be
1) On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office better served. Verification is simply intended to secure
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing No. XII in Cotabato City, by Decision of July 30, an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
disquisitions, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 2004,5dismissed the appeal, and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid
certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum
shopping.
In the present case, the signing of the verification by only
11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures
the Court that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation; that the pleading is filed in good
faith; and that the signatories are unquestionably real
parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient
knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the petition.
On the requirement of a certification of non-forum
shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners
must sign the certification of non-forum shopping. The
reason for this is that the persons who have signed the
certification cannot be presumed to have the personal
knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with
respect to the filing or non-filing of any action or claim
the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule,
however, admits of an exception and that is when the
petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be
able to convince the court that the outright dismissal of
the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
With respect to petitioners’ certification against forum
shopping, the failure of the other petitioners to sign as
they could no longer be contacted or are no longer
interested in pursuing the case need not merit the
outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the
administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners
are, however, dropped as parties to the case.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates
in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements
already reflected above respecting non-compliance with
the requirements on, or submission of defective,
verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order its submission or
correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need
to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only
one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must
be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney34 designating his counsel of record to
sign on his behalf.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The CAUSE OF ACTION:
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim
for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously field therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there
is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall
not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. – The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of
the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof.
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the
petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit,
or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
BALBASTRO VS CA
a) Francisco E. Fernandez and Angela M. Butte,
each of whom was claiming ownership over the
aforementioned 10-door apartment and of the
right to collect the rents therefrom. Francisco E.
Fernandez alleged that pending determination of
the conflicting claims involved in the case he
was granted an ad interim authority to collect
and deposit with the court the rentals due on
the subject property which authority was
allegedly upheld by the Court of Appeals in its
 decision of July 17, 1970 in CA-G.R. No. 44341-R
entitled Angela M. Butte vs. Francisco E.
Fernandez. On the other hand, Angela M. Butte
claims that being the owner of the 10-door
apartment in question, she has every right to
collect the rents of the property.
b) Chiu Keng Iong, Lim Bun Kong and Rajindar
Singh, lessees of three doors, as well as Arturo
Balbastro, Jose Perez, Edgardo de la Cruz,
Leonardo Villanueva and Consorcia Halili as
third-party defendants (petitioners herein) who
are the lessees of the remaining doors of the 10-
door apartment have the obligation to pay rent
to the owner of the 10-door apartment in
question.
c) Refusal of herein petitioners to recognize the
authority of private respondent Francisco E.
Fernandez to collect the rents on the doors
leased by them.
FLOWCHART:
RTC
1) Chiu Keng Iong, Lim Bun Kong and Rajindar
Singh, lessees of three doors of a 10-door
apartment situated at E. Rodriguez St., Quezon
City, filed a complaint for interpleader and
consignation with the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-13297 against
private respondent Francisco E. Fernandez and
Angela M. Butte, each of whom was claiming
ownership over the aforementioned 10-door
apartment and of the right to collect the rents
therefrom.
2) Answer to plaintiffs' complaint
3) On October 29, 1969, private respondent
Francisco E. Fernandez filed a Third-Party
Complaint against the third-party defendants
(petitioners herein) who are the lessees of the
remaining doors of the 10-door apartment
because of their refusal to recognize the
authority of private respondent Francisco E.
Fernandez to collect the rents on the doors
leased by them.
4) On October 29, 1969, private respondent
Francisco E. Fernandez filed a Third-Party
Complaint against the third-party defendants
(petitioners herein) who are the lessees of the
remaining doors of the 10-door apartment
because of their refusal to recognize the
authority of private respondent Francisco E.
Fernandez to collect the rents on the doors
leased by them.
5) The third-party defendants who are now the
petitioners herein filed with the respondent
court a "Motion To Strike Out And/Or To Dismiss
The Third-Party Complaint" filed by Francisco E.
Fernandez on the ground that the filing of said
Third-Party Complaint against them is in
violation of the express provisions of Section 12,
Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court and not in
accord with established jurisprudence on the
matter and on the further ground that said
Third-Party Complaint does not state any cause
of action.
6) On November 14, 1969 private respondent
Francisco E. Fernandez filed his opposition to
petitioners' Motion To Strike And/Or To Dismiss
The Third-Party Complaint.
7) The motion of petitioners To Strike Out And/Or
To Dismiss the third-party complaint, was denied
by the Court a quo on November 17, 1969.
8) Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the same.
9) This motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on May 18, 1970.
CA
1) Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
2) On January 20, 1971, the respondent Court of
Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the
petition and dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued.
3) A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
was denied on February 16, 1971 by respondent
Appellate Court.
SC
1) Appeal by Certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Rules authorizes a
defendant to bring into the case any person not a party
to the action, who is not secondarily liable to said
defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief in respect to the claim of the plaintiff
against the defendant, the answer appears plain.
RULING:
Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of
Court 1 authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit any
person "not a party to the action ... for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of
his opponent's claim." From its explicit language it does
not compel the defendant to bring the third-parties into
the litigation, rather it simply permits the inclusion of
anyone who meets the standard set forth in the rule. The
secondary or derivative liability of the third-party is
central whether the basis is indemnity, subrogation,
contribution, express or implied warranty or some other
theory. The impleader of new parties under this rule is
proper only when a right to relief exists under the
applicable substantive law. 2This rule is merely a
procedural mechanism, and cannot be utilized unless
there is some substantive basis under applicable law.
Apart from the requirement that the third-party
complainant should assert a derivative or secondary claim
for relief from the third-party defendant, there are other
limitations on said party's ability to implead. The rule
requires that the third-party defendant is "not a party to
the action" for otherwise the proper procedure for
asserting a claim against one who is already a party to
the suit is by means of counterclaim or
cross-claim under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 6. In addition
to the aforecited requirement, the claim against the
third-party defendant must be based upon plaintiff's
claim against the original defendant (third-party
claimant). 3 The crucial characteristic of a claim under
section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original "defendant is
attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the
liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
In Capayas v. Court of First Instance 5 this Court
enunciated the same principle, when the court ruled: "...
when the law says that a third-party complaint may be
filed with leave of court, it refers to a complaint that
alleges facts which prima facieshow that the defendant is
entitled against the third-party defendant to
contribution, etc., etc. Otherwise the court can not
legally grant leave to a defendant to file it, because it
would not be a third-party complaint... The test to
determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-
party complaint, "in respect to plaintiff's claim" is,
whether it arises out of the same transaction on which
the plaintiff's claim is based, or the third-party's claim, unsettled, the barangay x x x issued x x x a certification
although arising out of another or different contract or to file [an] action in court, now the subject of
transaction, is connected with the plaintiff's claim."
As aptly stressed by the Appellate Tribunal, "it is FLOWCHART:
admitted that both the plaintiffs and the third-party
defendants ... are the common lessees of the 10-door RTC
apartment the ownership of which is being litigated
between defendant Angela M. Butte and third-party
plaintiff Francisco E. Fernandez. As such lessees they
have the same problem of determining the right person
to whom they should pay the corresponding rents of the
particular doors they are occupying. Because of the
raging conflict between the defendant Angela M. Butte
and third-party plaintiff ultimately they would resort to
an action for interpleader against the conflicting
claimants of the subject property. To require each of the
petitioner to file an action for interpleader against the
conflicting claimants of the subject property will
undoubtedly go against the rule on multiplicity of suits...
In our assessment of the facts and circumstances, We are
convinced that the respondent court did what it
considered was necessary to shorten the litigation
between the parties by allowing them in one single
proceeding and avoiding multiplicity of actions."
CRUZ VS CRUZ
CAUSE OF ACTION:
Memoracion claimed that during her union with her
common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M.
Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora
corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila and that
the said lot was registered in her name under TCT No.
63467 at the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to
the said property was transferred by Oswaldo Z. Cruz and
the latter’s wife in their names in August 1991 under TCT
No. 0-199377 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February
12, 1973 through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and
simulation, hence, null and void; that she, with the help
of her husband’s relatives, asked appellee to settle the
problem; that despite repeated pleas and demands,
appellee refused to reconvey to her the said property;
that she filed a complaint against appellee before the
office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the
subject property; and that since the matter was
a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
controversy. 2. On 20 December 2005, the CA rendered
judgment affirming with modification the RTC
decision.
SC
1. On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed 1. Petition for review
with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a
Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee ISSUE:
Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages." Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
2. Through a Manifestation, Memoracion’s counsel, Memoracion Z. Cruz’s Petition for Annulment of Deed of
Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal
January 13, 1997 of the fact of Memoracion’s action which did not survive her death.
death, evidenced by a certificate thereof.
3. appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz filed a Motion to RULING:
Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff’s
reconveyance action is a personal action which The criterion for determining whether an action survives
does not survive a party’s death, pursuant to the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, Barcena,7 to wit:
and (2) to allow the case to continue would
result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is The question as to whether an action survives or not
representing the defendant [and is a] co- depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
plaintiff in this case. for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong
4. On June 2, 1997, the trial court dismissed the complained [of] affects primarily and principally property
case without prejudice to the prosecution and property rights, the injuries to the person being
thereof in the proper estate proceedings. merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do
5. On October 17, 1997, Memoracion’s son-heir, not survive, the injury complained of is to the person,
Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial court the property and rights of property affected being
that he is retaining the services of Atty. Neri for incidental.8
the plaintiff. Simultaneously, Atty. Neri filed a If the case affects primarily and principally property and
Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2, 1997 property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff
Order. However, the said motion was or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato,9 we held that a
subsequently denied by Acting Presiding Judge Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real
Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla [on October 31, 2000]. Property is one relating to property and property rights,
6. Edgardo Cruz, as an heir of Memoracion Cruz, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner.
filed a notice of appeal in behalf of the Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of
deceased plaintiff, signed by Atty. Neri, but the real property merits survival despite the death of
appeal was dismissed by Judge Mindaro-Grulla, petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
[stating that] the proper remedy being certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section
appellant’s motion for reconsideration, Judge 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
Lucia Pena Purugganan granted the same, necessarily applies, viz:
stating that the remedy under the circumstances
is ordinary appeal. Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
CA thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
1. Petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz, represented by to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
Edgardo Z. Cruz, filed with the Court of Appeals death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to August 19, 1975, plaintiff’s counsel received a copy of
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a the succession are transmitted from the moment of the the order dismissing the complaint and on the 23rd of the
ground for disciplinary action. death of the decedent." From the moment of the death same month; he moved to set aside the said order. The
of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners court denied the MR filed by the plaintiff’s counsel which
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the counsel later on filed a written manifestation
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights allowing the minor petitioners to be allowed to substitute
appointment of an executor or administrator and the thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The their deceased mother. From the order, the plaintiff’s
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor moment of death is the determining factor when the counsel filed a second MR of the order dismissing the
heirs. heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether complaint but the same was denied. Hence, this present
such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to petition for review.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative the property of the deceased vests in them even before
or representatives to appear and be substituted within a judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or FLOWCHART:
period of thirty (30) days from notice. intestate proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore,
died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x x was RTC
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired 1. On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of
appear within the specified period, the court may order interest in the properties in litigation and became parties minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and
the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action
the appointment of an executor or administrator for the the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet
estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.10 title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the 2. On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. deceased, or the legal representative fails to appear motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the
within a specified period, it is the duty of the court hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for
The foregoing section is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of where the case is pending to order the opposing party to the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in
the old Rules of Court: procure the appointment of an executor or administrator order to include certain allegations therein. The
for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is motion to amend the complaint was granted and
SEC. 17. Death of party. - After a party dies and the to protect all concerned who may be affected by the on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, intervening death, particularly the deceased and his complaint.
upon proper notice, the legal representative of the estate.
deceased to appear and to be substituted for the 3. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
such time as may be granted. If the legal representative ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore,
fails to appear within said time, the court may order the minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who has no legal capacity to sue.
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal represents the minors, petitioners, vs.
representative of the deceased within a time to be LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA 4. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14,
specified by the court, and the representative shall BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and
the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring the Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents. asked for substitution by her minor children and
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976 her husband, the petitioners herein; but the
may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased court after the hearing immediately dismissed
may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of the case on the ground that a dead person
without requiring the appointment of an executor or minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of cannot be a real party in interest and has no
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of legal personality to sue.
litem for the minor heirs. First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels 5. On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff
of land located in Abra. The herein defendants then filed
If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the received a copy of the order dismissing the
duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform the court of hearing of the said motion, the plaintiff’s counsel moved complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to
such death, and to give the names and addresses of the to amend the complaint which was granted. The set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to
deceased’s legal representatives. The deceased may be defendants again filed another motion to dismiss the Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
substituted by his heirs in the pending action. complaint. The said motion to dismiss was then heard. On Court. 2
 respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear
6. On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent
for reconsideration filed by counsel for the the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the
plaintiff for lack of merit. allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to
ground that a dead person has no legal personality to dismiss the complaint.
7. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased sue.
plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying This should not have been done for under the same
that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the
Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased provides "that the rights to the succession are duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to
mother, but the court denied the counsel's transmitted from the moment of the death of the appear, to order the opposing party to procure the
prayer for lack of merit. decedent." From the moment of the death of the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his the instant case the respondent Court did not have to
8. From the order, counsel for the deceased property, subject to the rights and obligations of the bother ordering the opposing party to procure the
plaintiff filed a second motion for decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
reconsideration of the order dismissing the thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The because her counsel has not only asked that the minor
complaint claiming that the same is in violation moment of death is the determining factor when the children be substituted for her but also suggested that
of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them
Court but the same was denied. such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for
to the property of the deceased vests in them even the family. But the respondent Court refused the request
SC before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the for substitution on the ground that the children were still
testate or intestate proceedings. 5 minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave
1. petition for review error because the respondent Court ought to have known
When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
ISSUE: right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad
Whether the action survives even after the death of a 856, was not extinguished by her death but was litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case,
party during the pendency of the case. transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to
thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be
RULING: became parties in interest in the case. There is, appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them.
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to
Yes. allow their substitution as parties in interest for the
deceased plaintiff. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in
court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a Regardless of the type of action — whether it is in
the case up to its completion. The records of this case party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the personam, in rem or quasi in rem — the preferred mode
show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal of service of summons is personal service. To avail
July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, representative of the deceased to appear and be themselves of substituted service, courts must rely on a
1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and a
March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and granted ... ." The question as to whether an action showing that the defendant cannot be served despite
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her survives or not depends on the nature of the action and diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriff’s return,
person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption
prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died survive the wrong complained affects primarily and of regularity, and on this basis, the court may allow
during the pendency of the proceeding can be principally property and property rights, the injuries to substituted service. Should the sheriff’s return be
substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of wanting of these details, substituted service will be
Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall action which do not survive the injury complained of is to irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serves
be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly the person, the property and rights of property affected ummons was presented.
of such death ... and to give the name and residence of being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the
his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed
representatives." title over the parcels of land in litigation affects to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
primarily and principally property and property rights and However, the filing of a motion for new trial or
This duty was complied with by the counsel for the therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance.
deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the
CAUSE OF ACTION:
Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its
complaints that it was the owner and possessor of a
parcel of land in Antipolo City. The land was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 236044.
Aurora De Pedro showed title and documents evidencing
her ownership. Upon checking with the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office-Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), it was
discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering
portions of Romasan Development Corporation’s
property.
Romasan Development Corporation’s representative, Mr.
Rodrigo Ko, discovered sometime in November 1996 that
De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its Antipolo
property.
FLOWCHART:
RTC
This case originated from separate complaints for
nullification of free patent and original certificates of
title, filed against several defendants.[1] One of the
defendants is petitioner Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro).[2]
The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan
Development Corporation before the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo City on July 7, 1998.
service of summons
Attempts to personally servesummons on De Pedro
failed.[
Respondent filed a motion to servesummons and the
complaint by publication.
On August 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court granted the
motion.
On July 15, 1999, respondent moved to declare all
defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in
default for failure to file their answers.
Respondent also moved to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
The Regional Trial Court granted the motions on August
19, 1999.
On January 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court issued an
order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents
issued to all defendants in respondent’s complaint,
including the free patent issued to De Pedro
On March 30, 2000, De Pedro, through counsel, filed
before the Regional Trial Court a motion for new trial
On September 30, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued them.Trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The
an order denying De Pedro’s motion for new trial. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order$contending it was premature for the court to
CA dismiss the complaintwithout affording them the right to
adduce their evidence on their claim for damages.
De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court Petition was denied. The C& affirmed the decisionof the
of Appeals trial court. The C& held that the petitioners had
On March 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the everyopportunity to 'uestion and o!ject to the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed the composition of the surveyteam !efore the trial court
denial of De Pedro’s motion for new trial. since they failed to do so$ they cannotnow !e allowed to
De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the do the same on appeal. &ccording to the C&$ itcould not
Court of Appeals resolution dated August 24, 2006 ta(e judicial notice of the alleged cases filed against
thechairman of the survey team since this was not one of
SC the matterswhich the courts could ta(e judicial notice of$
whether mandatory or directory. The )C in denying the
Rule 45 petition petition held that a certificate of title$once registered$
should not thereafter !e impugned$ altered$changed$
ISSUE I: modified$ enlarged or diminished e*cept in a
Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of directproceeding permitted !y law. The resolution of the
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of issue is$ thus$ notdependent on the report of the survey
petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro. team filed in the trial court. Theaction of the petitioners
against the respondents$ !ased on thematerial allegations
RULING: of the complaint$ is one for recovery of possession of the
su!ject property and damages. +owever$ suchaction is
No. not a direct$ !ut a collateral attac( of the TCT. ,either
didthe respondents directly attac( the -CT in their answer
to thecomplaint.
ISSUE II:
G.R. No. 169122 February 2, 2010
Whether filing a motion for new trial and petition for MARCELINO DOMINGO, Petitioner,
certiorari is a bar from filing a petition for annulment of vs.
judgment. COURT OF APPEALS
De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation
Petitioner spouses de Pedro filed a Complaint for Heirs of Sps Mesina vs Heirs of Fian, Sr
Damages withPrayer for Preliminary Injunction against
respondents RomasanDevelopment Corporation and
Manuel Ko. The complaint stated thatthe spouses De Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso Sr., v. CA (2011)
Pedro were the registered owners of a parcel of
land that the respondents started putting up a Doctrine:
!ar!ed"wire fence on theperimeter of the adjacent A reiteration of the more liberal Sun Insurance case.
property. The respondents allege that theywere owners Where theparty does not deliberately intend to defraud
of the land as evidenced !y a TCT. The trial courtissued the court in payment of docketfees, and manifests its
an order to have a relocation survey of the property in willingness to abide by the rules by paying
order toverify its location. #ased on the report$ the additionaldocket fees when required by the court, the
respondents filed aManifestation%Motion to Dismiss$ liberal doctrine enunciated in
averring that there was no legal or factual !asis for the Sun Insurance Ofce, Ltd.
complaint as shown !y the findings of the surveyteam , and not the strict regulations set in
hence$ the petitioners had no cause of action against Manchester
,will apply. Far rty’s knowledge and
Facts: belief produces no legal effect, subject to the
• Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be
In 19 9, !uben !einoso was a passenger in a "eepney • remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the
tra#ersing $. !odrigue% A#e. &he "eepney owned by RTC decision was reinstated exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the
&apales, collided with a truck owned by 'uballa. deficiency in the Verification to
• be remedied, by denying NOPA’s motion for
!einoso died as a result of the collision. (is heirs )led the Negros Oriental Planters Association vs. Presiding Judge reconsideration with attached amended petition for
instant case for *amages against &apales and 'uballa of Negros certiorari
• G.R. No. 179878 | December 24, 2008 . As ruled in
I+ 19 , !&- found the &ruck liable and held 'uballa liable Lino Luna v. Arcenas
for damagessustained by the (eirs of !einoso and the Facts: , decisions of a trial court which "lie in discretion" will
"eepney owner Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or
• denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos criminal at law or in equity. Where such rulings have to
-ase litigated before the !&- which rendered a decision allegedly paid in full, but was only able to receive a do with minor matters, not affecting the substantial
• partial delivery of the molasses because of a rights of the parties, the prohibition of review in
In 199 , -A motu propio dismissed the petition on the disagreement as to the quality of the products being appellate proceedings is made absolute by the express
ground of nonpayment of docket fees pursuant to the delivered. More than six years after NOPA filed its terms of the statute; but it would be a monstrous
19 /anchester ruling answer, NOPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of travesty on justice to declare that where the exercise of
• an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee. discretionary power by an inferior court affects
!einoso0s defense /anchester should not be made to According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his adversely the substantial legal rights of a litigant, it is
apply retroacti#ely to their case as the case was )led complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting not subject to review on appeal in any case wherein a
prior to the promulgation of /anchester ruling to estimate the value of the unwithdrawn molasses in clear and affirmative showing is made of an abuse of
!": order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees. discretion, or of a total lack of its exercise, or of conduct
&he dismissal by the -A was proper due to the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA dismissed petition amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as its improper
nonpayment of docket fees2 +34 for certiorari ruling that there was no substantial exercise under a misapprehension of the law applicable
H#LD: compliance with the procedural requirements because to the facts upon which the ruling is based. In its very
• petitioner failed to allege in its verification that the nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial
&he -ourt reiterates the ruling in Sun Insurance #. allegations therein are true and correct of his personal judge over the proceedings had before him implies the
Asuncion knowledge or based on authentic records and failure to absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be
• attach the necessary documents on its pleadings as exercised, and in accordance with which it may be
the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 required by Section 1, Rule 65, Rules in Civil Procedure. reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is
years and the records thereof are already before this Issue: not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled
Court, a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) Whether or not CA committed error? discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which should
would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution Ruling: always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the
• No. Clearly, the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00- parties and the demands of equity and justice.
In 2-10 to Sec. 4, Rule 7 was in order to make the
Manchester v. Court of Appeals verification requirement stricter, such that the party
,it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any cannot now merely state under oath that he jacinto vs gumaru
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. believes
The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even
two (2) years after in the case of merely state under oath that he
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion has knowledge
• Katon vs. Palanca 437 SCRA
that such statements are true and correct. His
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be
was filed before the Facts:
either Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey
Manchester personal knowledge
ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied of lands located in Sombrero Island in Palawan for the
or at least purpose of its re-classification from forest to agricultural
retroactively,liberality should be accorded to the based on authentic records
petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. land and, thereafter for him to apply for a homestead
. A pleading, therefore, wherein the verification is patent. In 1965, the Director of Lands favourably
Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases of merely based on the pa declared the land as agricultural land. "Records show that
on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a
homestead patent application for a portion of the island
comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that
[R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead
application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca,
Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No.
G-7089 on March 3, 1977
5 time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any
with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. In
1999, Petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the
homestead patents and original certificates of title issued
in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of
the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the
whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he
has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was he
who requested for its conversion from forest land to
agricultural land. Respondents filed their Answer with
Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in
due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the
ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial
court’s Order to amend his
Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the
legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The
Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order
dated July 29, 1999. A MR was filed but was denied , for
being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that
the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. The CA dismissed
the complaint because of prescription invoking its
residual prerogative. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged
‘residual prerogative’ under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the
Petition?
Held: Yes.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis
pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are
evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In
the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio
dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin
11
we explained thus:
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was
traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of
order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right
of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and
expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of
the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under
the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim
when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record
that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when
there is another cause of action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or where the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x
x x."
12
(Italics supplied)
On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in
Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The "residual
jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which
the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction
over the case or the subject matter involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the
original records or the records on appeal.
13
In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-
called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint
could not have been based,
therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41.
Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the
CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general
residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu
proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule
9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2
of Rule 1
14
of the same rules. To be sure, the CA had the excepted
instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint
motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly
bearing on the lower court’s lack of
jurisdiction"
15
and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only
power it has is to dismiss the action. (Note: the action
was more of an action for reversion and not annulment of
title nor reconveyance; dismissal was proper because,
the action being one for reversion, it is only the Sol Gen
who can bring said action, thus, the
complaint state’s cause of action)
RESIDUAL JURISDICTION VS. RESIDUAL PREROGATIVES
GEORGE KATON vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR.
G.R. No. 151149, 9/7/2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state
a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed
with the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu
proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has
been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily,
the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless
litigations.
Facts:
On August 2, 1963, a parcel of land located in Sombrero
Island, Puerto Princessa, Palawan was reclassified from
forest to agricultural land upon the request by the above-
named petitioner. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz,
Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan
Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-
applicants of the petitioner.
Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead
Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977
with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents
and original certificates of title covering certain portions
of Sombrero Island issued in favor of Manuel Palanca and
the other respondents on the ground that the same were
obtained through fraud.
 reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an
Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in
in his favor. Resolution, as follows: Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under
authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
On the other hand, Palanca said that petitioner never "Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes
filed any homestead application for the island and that it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind
insisted that they already had their respective occupancy the variety, complexity and seeming importance of the when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more
and improvements on the island. Respondents aver that interests and issues involved in the case below, the fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower
they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the court’s lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of the
respective portions and have declared said portions for case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the
taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
paying taxes thereon for twenty years. corrected. action.

Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal That explanation should have been enough to settle the
capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because issue. The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered
an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the petitioner’s issue moot. Hence, there is no need to
owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate
petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to court indeed acted ultra jurisdiction in ruling on the
assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and merits of the case when the only issue that could have
unexplained period of time. been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse
of discretion committed by the trial court in denying
In the instant case, petitioner claims that he has the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the
exclusive right to file an application for homestead doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the
patent over the whole island since it was he who correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not
requested for its conversion from forest land to include a review of the evidence,more so when no
agricultural land. determination of the merits has yet been made by the
trial court, as in this case.
The assailed Resolution by the CA, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTC’s Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction
dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on
the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of 2. No. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is
prescription and lack of jurisdiction. available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
Issue: 1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties
merits of the case) in the Petition? or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
to the transmittal of the original records or the records
2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains
residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
issue not raised in the Petition? litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint
Ruling: could not have been based, therefore, on residual
jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits. dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the
1.Yes.This is not the first time that petitioner has taken case on appeal.
issue with the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits.
He raised it with the appellate court when he moved for What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were
Nonetheless, In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held
that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly
that the action has prescribed, such action may be
dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not
been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,we
also explained thus:
"x x x Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss
an action on the ground of prescription when the parties'
pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed
time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v.
McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961;
Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC,
Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to
dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer
which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec.
5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after
judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if
the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no
statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v.
Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House,
27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821);
or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB
v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat,
is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the
prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence."45 (Italics supplied)
Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present
case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts
must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them
to prevent future litigations.
Asia United Bank vs Goodland Company, Inc
G.R. No. 155173 November 23, 2004
LAFARGE CEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., (formerly Lafarge MeTC
Philippines, Inc.), LUZON CONTINENTAL LAND
CORPORATION, CONTINENTAL OPERATING 1)
CORPORATION and PHILIP ROSEBERG, petitioners,
vs.
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, GREGORY T. LIM
and ANTHONY A. MARIANO, respondents.
CAUSE OF ACTION:
Petitioner Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. (Lafarge) --
on behalf of its affiliates and other qualified entities,
including Petitioner Luzon Continental Land Corporation
(LCLC) -- agreed and entered into a Sale and Purchase
Agreement (SPA) to purchase the cement business of
Respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC)
which had a case pending with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether defendants in civil cases may implead in their
counterclaims persons who were not parties to the
original complaints.
VICTORINA (VICTORIA) ALICE LIM LAZARO vs.
BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL, INC.
CAUSE OF ACTION:
a) Petitioner obtained from respondent beer and
other products in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TWO PESOS AND NINETY TWO CA
CENTAVOS (Php 138,502.92) on credit,
evidenced by sales invoices photocopies
b) Respondent promised to pay the aforesaid
amount for the goods received from plaintiff.
c) Despite repeated demands, petitioner have
failed and refused, and up to now, still fail and
refuse to pay the aforesaid obligation to
petitioner in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWO SC
PESOS AND NINETY TWO CENTAVOS (Php
138,502.92) as evidenced by the demand letters
dated 21 April 2003, 12 May 2003, 5 August 2003
and 17 August 2005
FLOWCHART:
Respondent, Brewmaster International, Inc., is a
marketing company engaged in selling and
distributing beer and other products of Asia
Brewery, Inc. On November 9, 2005, it filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money against Prescillo G.
Lazaro (Prescillo) and petitioner, Victorina (also
known as Victoria) Alice Lazaro, with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City.
2) Prescillo filed an answer with counterclaim,
denying any knowledge of the obligation sued
upon.
3) Petitioner, in her own answer with
counterclaims, likewise denied having
transacted with respondent, and averred that
the documents attached to the complaint
showed that it was Total which purchased goods
from respondent.
4) MeTC declared the case submitted for decision
due to non-appearance of petitioner and her co-
defendant.
5) On August 22, 2006, the MeTC dismissed the
complaint, ratiocinating that respondent, as
plaintiff, failed to meet the burden of proof
required to establish its claim by preponderance
of evidence.
RTC
1) Respondent elevated the case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) through a notice of appeal.
2) RTC affirmed the assailed decision in toto.
1) Respondent then went to the CA through a
petition for review.
2) CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
3) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said Decision but the same was denied by
the CA in its January 31, 2008 Resolution.
1) Petition for review on certiorari of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 4, 2007
and Resolution dated January 31, 2008, which
awarded the amount sought by respondent in its
Complaint
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s complaint fails to state a
cause of action.
RULING:
Yes.
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, we find that the
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of
action.1âwphi1 The following allegations in the complaint
adequately make up a cause of action for collection of
sum of money against petitioner: (1) that petitioner and
her husband obtained beer and other products worth a
total of P138,502.92 on credit from respondent; and (2)
that they refused to pay the said amount despite
demand.
Petitioner is correct in saying that no relief can be
awarded to respondent if its complaint does not state a
cause of action. Indeed, if the complaint does not state a
cause of action, then no relief can be granted to the
plaintiff and it would necessarily follow that the
allegations in the complaint would not warrant a
judgment favorable to the plaintiff.
The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is
that a complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff
relies for his claim.15 Ultimate facts mean the important
and substantial facts which either directly form the basis
of the plaintiff’s primary right and duty or directly make
up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant.16 They refer to the principal, determinative,
constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause
of action rests. The term does not refer to details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence which
establish the material elements.17
The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint
to constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
petition or complaint.18 To determine whether the
complaint states a cause of action, all documents
attached thereto may, in fact, be considered,
particularly when referred to in the complaint.19 We
emphasize, however, that the inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations in
the complaint.20 Thus, consideration of the annexed
documents should only be taken in the context of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint.
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., v. ZUELLIG PHARMA
CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS,
G.R. No. 193494Date: March 07, 2014
Petitioner: Lui Enterprises
Respondent: Zuellig Pharma
CAUSE OF ACTION:
a) Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma
Corporation entered into a 10–year contract of
lease over a parcel of land registered under Eli
L. Lui.
b) Zuellig Pharma has the obligation to pay rent.
c) Claiming to be the new owner of the leased
property, the the Philippine Bank of
Communications asked Zuellig Pharma to pay
rent directly to it. When Zuellig Pharma
promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the
Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim, Lui
Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and CA
insisted on its right to collect the leased
property’s rent. 1)
FLOWCHART:
RTC
1) Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint10 for
interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati.
2) The Philippine Bank of Communications filed
its answer12 to the complaint. SC
3) Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss13 on
the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged
representative did not have authority to file
the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the
corporation.
4) Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition22 to the
motion to dismiss on the ground of late filing.
5) Considering that Lui Enterprises filed its
motion to dismiss beyond the 15–day period to
file an answer, Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui ISSUE I: Whether or not Lui Enterprises failed to
Enterprises be declared in default. comply with the rules on the contents of the
6) Philippine Bank of Communications “[joined appellant’s brief.
Zuellig Pharma] in moving to declare [Lui
Enterprises] in default, and in [moving for] the RULING:
denial of [Lui Enterprises’] motion to dismiss.”
7) In its order34 dated October 6, 2003, the trial Yes.
court denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to
dismiss and declared it in default. Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997
8) Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation with Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on
prayer36 dated April 15, 2004. its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an
9) It was only on October 21, 2004, or one year appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific
after the issuance of the order of default, that requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs
Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside (a), (c), (d), and (f)
order of default40 in the Makati trial court on
the ground of excusable negligence. Except for cases provided in the Constitution,70 appeal
10) Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition44 to the is a “purely statutory right.”71 The right to appeal
motion to set aside order of default. “must be exercised in the manner prescribed by
11) Without resolving the motion to set aside law”72 and requires strict compliance with the Rules of
order of default, the Makati trial court denied Court on appeals.73 Otherwise, the appeal shall be
the manifestation with motion to dismiss dated dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation
April 21, 2005 on the ground that Lui of due process of law.
Enterprises already lost its standing in court.
12) In its decision50 dated July 4, 2006, the In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially
Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled that Lui comply with the rules on the contents of the
Enterprises “[was] barred from any claim in appellant’s brief. It admitted that its appellant’s brief
respect of the [rental payments]”51 since it lacked the required subject index, page references to
was declared in default. the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes
cited. However, it did not even correct its admitted
“technical omissions”82 by filing an amended
appellant’s brief with the required contents.83 Thus,
Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The
Appeals. Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui
2) The Court of Appeals found Lui Enterprises’ Enterprises’ appeal.
appellant’s brief insufficient.
3)
Lui Enterprises filed a motion for Rules on appeal “are designed for the proper and
reconsideration. prompt disposition of cases before the Court of
4) The Court of Appeals denied Lui Enterprises’ Appeals.”84 With respect to the appellant’s brief, its
motion for reconsideration in its resolution required contents are designed “to minimize the
promulgated on August 13, 2010. [Court of Appeals’] labor in [examining] the record
upon which the appeal is heard and determined.”85
The subject index serves as the brief’s table of
1) petition for review on certiorari of the Court contents.86 Instead of “[thumbing] through the
of Appeals’ decision1 dated May 24, 2010 and [appellant’s brief]”87 every time the Court of Appeals
resolution dated August 13, 2010 in CA–G.R. Justice encounters an argument or citation, the
CV No. 88023. The Court of Appeals Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the
affirmed in totothe Regional Trial Court of subject index for the argument or citation he or she
Makati’s decision3 dated July 4, 2006. needs.88 This saves the Court of Appeals time in
reviewing the appealed case. Efficiency allows the
justices of the appellate court to substantially attend
to this case as well as other cases. “receive notice of subsequent proceedings.”108 Also, filed in the Davao trial court.
the plaintiff must still present evidence supporting his
Page references to the record guarantee that the facts or her allegations “despite the default of [the There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
stated in the appellant’s brief are supported by the defendant].”1 prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to nullify
record.89 A statement of fact without a page reference the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of
to the record creates the presumption that it is The basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph the Philippine Bank of Communications. Zuellig Pharma
unsupported by the record and, thus, “may be stricken (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must first be subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in
or disregarded altogether.”90 complied with.131 The defendant’s motion to set aside court the rental payments and extinguish its obligation
order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and was
As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, the time element. The defendant must challenge the not instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or the
this is required so that the Court of Appeals can easily default order before judgment. Second, the defendant Philippine Bank of Communications.
verify the authorities cited “for accuracy and must have been prevented from filing his answer due
aptness.” to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Third, he must have a meritorious defense. Manchester Development vs Court of Appeals
ISSUE II: Whether or not Lui Enterprises failed to show
that its failure to answer the complaint within the 149 SCRA 562 – Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Payment
required period was due to excusable negligence. ISSUE III: Whether or not the annulment of deed of of Docket Fees – Claimed Damages must be Stated in the
dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court BODY and PRAYER of pleadings
RULING: of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the
interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. A complaint for specific performance was filed by
No. Manchester Development Corporation against City Land
Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute
When a defendant is served with summons and a copy RULING: a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also
of the complaint, he or she is required to answer alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of
within 15 days from the day he or she was served with No. payment for a certain transaction thereby causing
summons.95 The defendant may also move to dismiss damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00.
the complaint “[w]ithin the time for but before filing Litis pendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.”140 It exists This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint
the answer.” Thus, a defendant who fails to answer when “another action is pending between the same but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same
within 15 days from service of summons either parties for the same cause of action x x x.”141 The complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only.
presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations subsequent action is “unnecessary and Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of
in the complaint or was prevented from filing his or vexatious”142 and is instituted to “harass the Manchester that their action is primarily for specific
her answer within the required period due to fraud, respondent [in the subsequent action].”143 performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In either estimation. The court ruled that there is an under
case, the court may declare the defendant in default The requisites of litis pendentia are: assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester
on plaintiff’s motion and notice to defendant.98 The (1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it
court shall then try the case until judgment without same interest in both actions; did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to
defendant’s participation99 and grant the plaintiff such P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
relief as his or her complaint may warrant. PRAYER.
the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be
A defendant declared in default loses his or her (3) The identity in the two cases should be such that admitted.
standing in court.101 He or she is “deprived of the right the judgment that may be rendered in one would, HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be
to take part in the trial and forfeits his [or her] rights regardless of which party is successful, amount based on the original complaint. A case is deemed filed
as a party litigant,”102 has no right “to present to res judicata in the other.144 only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee
evidence [supporting his or her] allegations,”103 and regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here,
has no right to “control the proceedings [or] cross– All of the requisites must be present.145 Absent one since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original
examine witnesses.”104 Moreover, he or she “has no requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146 complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As
right to expect that [the court] would [act] upon [his a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed
or her pleadings]”105 or that he or she “may [oppose] In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding
motions filed against him [or her].”106 However, the no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
defendant declared in default “does not [waive] all of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action
[his or her] rights.”107 He or she still has the right to Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case for specific performance is not merited. The Supreme
Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer In the case of Trajano vs. Manotoc for wrongful that the summons was not sent in the petitioner’s
of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and death of the deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by dwelling, The said caretaker was not a person of
for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of Military Intelligence under the command of Ma. Imelda M. suitable age and discretion and was not resided in the
pecuniary estimation. Manotoc. Based upon the complaint the Regional Trial said address. Hence the requisites of substituted
Further, the amount for damages in the original Court issued a summons at the house of Manotoc. The summons was not followed, therefore the RTC did not
complaint was already provided in the body of the said Mackey de la Cruz (caretaker) received the acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner at the first place.
complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes summons. Manotoc was declared in default for failure to
an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing answer.
fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in
the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case ISSUE: Sps Manuel vs. Ong
on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being Whether or not the RTC acquire a valid jurisdiction for
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the service of summons over the petitioner.
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the MVRS Publications v. Islamic
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading HELD:
that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib  An article was published in Bulgar, a tabloid, about how
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction Muslims do not eat pigs and other animals and treat such
from the record. over the petitioner, because the substituted service of animals as gods.
summons was defective in nature or invalid at the first  The Islamic Council filed with RTC-Manila a complaint
place. The main fact for damages against MRVS et al saying the article alluded
Manchester Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals that the summons was not sent in the petitioner’s to the pig as the god of the Muslims.
GR No. 75919 May 7, 1987 dwelling, The said caretaker was not a person of o The complaint alleges that the libellous statement was
suitable age and discretion and was not resided in the insulting.
Facts: This was originally a case of an action for torts and said address. Hence the requisites of substituted o They also say it was published with the intent to hurt
damages and specific performance with a prayer for summons was not followed, therefore the RTC did not their feelings and disparage the Muslims and Islam in this
temporary restraining order. The damages were not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner at the first place. country.
specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the  MVRS et al says that the article did not mention anyone
complaint assessed a P78.75M damages suffered by the to be the object of the article and so the complainants
petitioner. The amount of docket fees paid was only G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006 (the Muslims) are not entitled to damages
P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC , Petitioner vs. o They also say that the article was an expression of
reduced the damages to P10M only. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and belief or opinion
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of o Says it was published without malice
Issues: When does a court acquire jurisdiction? Does an ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents  RTC dismissed the complaint.
amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?  CA reversed.
FACTS:
Ruling: The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only In the case of Trajano vs. Manotoc for wrongful Issue: Are Muslims entitled to the damages?
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An death of the deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not Military Intelligence under the command of Ma. Imelda M. Held: No.
thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the Manotoc. Based upon the complaint the Regional Trial
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought Court issued a summons at the house of Manotoc. The Ratio:
in the amended pleading. said Mackey de la Cruz (caretaker) received the  Defamation, which includes slander and libel, means
summons. Manotoc was declared in default for failure to the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame, or
answer. reputation through false and malicious statements.
G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006 ISSUE: o It is that which tends to injure reputation or diminish
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC , Petitioner vs. Whether or not the RTC acquire a valid jurisdiction for esteem, respect, or confidence in the person claiming to
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the service of summons over the petitioner. have been defamed.
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of HELD: o Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since
ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction it involves the opinion which others in the community
over the petitioner, because the substituted service of may have or tend to have of the person claiming to
FACTS: summons was defective in nature or invalid at the first have been defamed.
place. The main fact  Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as
libel or slander. public policies: whom the defamatory charge has been made
 Declarations made about a large group of people cannot o 1st: where the group referred to is large, the courts Contrary view:
be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable presume that no reasonable reader would take the  What is involved here is intentional tortious act causing
individual. statementas so literally applying to each individual mental distress and not an action for libel.
o Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding member  This contrary view invokes:
to a particular member of a class, no member of such o 2nd: the limitation on liability would satisfactorily o Chaplinksy case: words intended to merely incite
class has a right of action without impairing the equally safeguard freedom of speech, expression, and of the hostility have no social value and do not enjoy
demandable right of free speech, expression, and of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the constitutional protection
press. conflicting o Beauharnais case: hate speech which denigrates a
 In Newsweek v. IAC, SC said: Where the defamation is fundamental interests involved in libel cases group of persons identified by their religion, race, or
alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is  Some authorites have noted that in cases permitting ethnic origin, defames that group and the law may validly
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or recovery, the group generally has 25 or fewer members. prohibit such s[eech on the same ground as the
allembracing as to apply to every individual in that But there is not articulated limit on size. Suits have been defamation of an individual.
group, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in permitted by members of fairly large groups when some SC:
the class or group can prove that the defamatory distinguishing characteristic of the individual or group  Does not agree with the contrary view
statement increases the likelihood that the statement could be  An “emotional distress” tort action is personal in
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the interpreted nature. It is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage
action separately, if need be. to apply individually. the injuries to his emotional tranquillity due to personal
 In the current case, there is no identifiable person who o A prime consideration is the public perception of the attacks on
was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the size of the group his character.
persons allegedly defames could not be identifiable, the o It has no application in this case since no particular
respondents (the Muslims) have no individual cause of  In this case, the Muslim community is too vast as to individual was identified in the article of Bulgar.
action. readily ascertain who among the Muslims were  Also, the purported damage (if there was any) falls
o Hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly particularly defamed. “Muslim” is a name which under the principle of relational harm – which includes
disparaged. describes only a general hard to social relationships in the community in the form
o Respondents (the Muslims) must have a cause of action segment of the Philippine population, comprising of of
in common with the class to which they belong in order heterogenous body whose construction is not so well defamation; as distinguished from the principle of
for the case to prosper. defined as to render it impossible for any representative reactive harm – which includes injuries to individual
 There is no injury to the reputation of the individual identification emotional tranquillity in the form of an infliction of
Muslims who constitute the class that can give rise to an  The statements published in this case did not emotional distress.
action for group libel. Each reputation is personal. specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals  In the complaint, the respondents (the Muslims) clearly
Together, the who were reportedly the subject of the allegedly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of the Muslims
Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will libellous publication. in the community. Therefore, it means that this case falls
give them a common or general interest in the subject  Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and within the application of relational harm principle of tort
matter of the controversy. slander. Although the gist of an action for defamation is actions for defamation, rather than reactive harm
 The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American an injury to reputation, the focus of a defamation action principle. Emotional distress properly belongs in reactive
case, the Court held that there could be no libel against is upon harm.
an extensive community in common law. the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its Therefore emotional distress tort is not applicable.
 Accdg to Wittenberg in his book: there are groupings predictable effect on 3rd persons.  Moreover, to recover for intentional infliction of
which may be finite enough so that a description of the  Defamatory statement is one that tends to harm the emotional distress, the person must show that:
body is a description of the members. So there is a reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation o 1. The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in
question, is of the community or to deter 3rd persons from reckless disregard of the plaintiff
the description of the member implicit in the description associating or o 2. The conduct was extreme and outrageous
of the body, or is there a possibility that a description of dealing with him. o 3. There was a causal connection between the
the body may consist of a variety of persons, those  As a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s mental distress
included plaintiff to prove as part of his prima facie case that the o 4. The mental distress was extreme and severe
within the charge, and those excluded from it? defendant  “Extreme and outrageous” menas conduct that is so
 As the size of the groups increases, the chances for o 1. Published a statement that was outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of
members of such to recover damages on tortious libel o 2. Defamatory decency.
become elusive. This principle is said to embrace 2 o 3. Of and concerning the plaintiff o Conduct will be actionable where the recitation of the
important  Action for libel must be brought by the person against facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to harm to plaintiff’s mental and emotional state. FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
exclaim “outrageous!” as his reaction. Austria-Martinez, J. dissents: PHILIPPINES
Re: Brandenburg  In libel cases, its 4 elements must be established by G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991
 Brandenburg recognized a narrower set of permissible mere preponderance of evidence. However, these
grounds for restricting speech than Beauharnais elements are not essential in a cause of action based on FACTS:
 In Brandenburg, SC held that advocacy of illegal action tort under Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as
becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to NCC 26, where one is liable for personal injury whether defendant in civil case entitled "Republic of the
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely done intentionally, wantonly, or by negligence. Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for
to  Personal injury here refers not only to reputation but reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
incite or produce such action. also encompases character, conduct, manner, and habit damages on the theory that:
 Brandenburg overruled Beauharnais. of a person. (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal
 Brandenburg is considered as one of the lynchpins of  NCC 26 (4) which makes one liable for vexing or defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public
the modern doctrine of free speech, which seeks to give humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion,
special protection to politically relevant speech. finds proper application here. blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of
In conclusion, SC says:  The freedom of speech does not require a journalist to corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of
 Court has no power to determine which is proper guarantee the truth but it does prohibit publishing power;
religious conduct or belief. statements in a reckless disregard without any effort to (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing
ascertain the himself to be incorporator, director, board member
 Courts must be viewpoint neutral when it comes to truth. and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held
religious matters if only to affirm the neautrality  The freedom of speech and of the press cannot be and/or controlled by the principal defendants;
principle of free speech rights under modern availed of to broadcast lies nor may it be used to insult (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful
jurisprudence where “all others for such would be contrary to the mandate of the concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public
ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the first NCC for trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers,
amendment – even those universaly condemned and run each person to respect the dignity, personality, privacy, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and
counter to constitutional principles.” and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the
 Under the right of free speech, there is no such thing as Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to
a false idea. accumulate ill-gotten wealth ;
Petition granted. (4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position
OGAWA vs minegishi as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave
Vitug, J. concurs
Carpio, J. dissents: failure to perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E.
 This case is not about a libel which requires the
G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013 Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made
identification of the plaintiff in the libellous statement.
REBECCA PACAÑA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAÑA, possible the withdrawals, disbursements and
 If this were a libel case under NCC 30, which authorizes Petitioners, questionable use of government funds; and
a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising vs. (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by
from a criminal offense, Carpio agrees that case will not ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC. allowing himself to be used as instrument in
prosper
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
for want of identification of the libelled persons. But this
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to
case is not anchored on NCC 30.
G.R. No. 173840 April 25, 2012 plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member of
 Respondents (the Muslims) insist that the case is about corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by
tortious conduct under NCC 26. SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND
ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
 Unlike actions in NCC 30 which must arise from a Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in
criminal offense, the action under NCC 26 may not composed of DEBORAH T. MARCO (Immediate Past
President), ATTY. MEDINO L. ACUBA, order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
constitute a criminal offense. obtained.
ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL
 NCC (4), which refers to acts humiliating another for his
DE GUZMAN and PONCIANO R.
religious beliefs, is embraced in the tort known as On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and
ROSALES (General Manager and Ex Officio Director),
intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. inspection of documents was denied by respondent court
Petitioners,
 This case must be decided on whther there was such in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a
vs.
tortious conduct or not. Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that he
ANANIAS D. SELUDO
 In intentional infliction of mental distress, the opinion is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a
of the community is immaterial. What is material is the public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b)
as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a
complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of
particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal
basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and
know with certainty the particular acts allegedly
committed by him and which he is now charged with
culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the
particulars sought therein.
In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks
to annul and set aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion
for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29
May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration;
to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill
of particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to
exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035
should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and
to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from further
proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars
is submitted, claiming that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the
aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the
ordinary course of law other than the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed
resolutions.
HELD:
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate
and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and
fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural
reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which
are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or
traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause
of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will
prove, and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts.
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how
petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be, a
dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the
complaint how petitioner allowed himself to be used as
instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what
the concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to
plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what
petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or
formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies.
Moreover, the complaint does not state which
corporations petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder,
director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More
significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear
in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the
alleged "Positions and Participations of Some
Defendants". The allegations in the complaint, above-
referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore,
deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of
law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises.
Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's
motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the
petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive
pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved,
a specification of property for identification purposes,
the particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts
as would support the conclusions and inferences in the
complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the
contrary, those particulars are material facts that should
be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in
order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of
the claims made against him to the end that he may be
prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned
resolutions. The petition is granted and the resolutions in
question are annulled and set aside. The respondents are
ordered to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars
containing the facts prayed for by petitioner, or
otherwise, respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to
exclude the herein petitioner as defendant in the above-
mentioned civil case.
Villagracia vs. Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court, G.R.
No. 188832, April 23, 2014
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; SHARI'A COURTS: Shari' a
District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions
where one of the parties is not a Muslim. All told, Shari’a
District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only
when the parties involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of Roldan E. Mala’s action for recovery of
possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a
Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings in SDC Special
Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment
rendered, are void.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CONFERRED BY LAW:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong." This power is conferred
by law, which may either be the Constitution or a
statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of
law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to
what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a
court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has
no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
judgment rendered, are void.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT: To determine whether a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the
material allegations of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are examined.
VILLAGRACIA vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI' A DISTRICT COURT
G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
FACTS: On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased
a 300-square-meterparcel of land located in Poblacion,
Parang, Maguindanao, from one Ceres Cañete. On March
3, 1996, a TCT No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land
was issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of the
purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of
land. By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal
na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration
Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. It
was only on October 30, 2006, when Roldan had the
parcel of land surveyed, found out that Vivencio occupied
the said parcel of land. Failing to settle with Vivencio at
the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the
possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court. In its decision dated June 11, 2008,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan,
as registered owner, had the better right to possess the
parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the
property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay damages as well
as attorney’s fees. A notice of writ of execution was sent
to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice
to comply with the decision. Meanwhile, Vivencio filed a
petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction. He cited Article 155,
paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts may
only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are
Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, hence the
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land. However, respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief
from judgment for lack of merit. Hence this petition for
certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the
writ of execution issued against Vivencio. Roldan argued
that since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had
jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of
possession, he argued that the proceedings before it were
valid. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on
him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer,
he “effectively waived his right to participate in the
proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District Court]” and
he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a Shari’a District Court has
jurisdiction over a real action where one of the
parties is not a Muslim.
2. Whether or not proceedings before respondent
Shari’a District Court were valid since the latter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Vivencio.
RULING:
1. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a
District Courts is the Code of the Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article
143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts
have concurrent original jurisdiction with
“existing civil courts” over real actions not
arising from customary contracts wherein the
parties involved are Muslims.
When ownership is acquired over a particular property,
the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it. If the
owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she
has a right of action to recover its possession from the
dispossessor. When the property involved is real, such as
land, the action to recover it is a real action; otherwise,
the action is a personal action. In such actions, the
parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District
Courts to validly take cognizance of them. In this case,
the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of
possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When
Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment
that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu
proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based
on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court
shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority
under the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all
of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it
had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings
Case No. 07-200 are void.
2. In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal
obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property,
restore to him the possession of his property,
and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his
property. Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession is an action in personam. This action
being in personam, service of summons on
Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over
Vivencio’s person. However, as discussed,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim.
Therefore, all the proceedings before
respondent Shari’a District Court, including the
service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
G.R. No. 195477
SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA, III. THE RULING
Petitioners,
vs. [The Supreme Court GRANTED the
SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO DISMISSED the case without prejudice.]
Limitation of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy Doctrine
(Jurisdiction Through Estoppel by Laches) : Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide Case Erroneously
Filed With the RTC, Figueroa vs. People, G.R. No.
147406, July 14, 2008
DECISION
(3rd Division)
I. THE FACTS
On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner
before the RTC of Bulacan. Trial on the merits ensued
and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the
petitioner as charged.
In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned,
among others, for the first time, the trial court's
jurisdiction. The appellate court, however, in the
challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have
actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly
attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already
estopped by laches from asserting the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial
court's decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner's
conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the
damages awarded.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
Does the failure of the petitioner to raise the issue of
[lack of] jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which
was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before
the wrong court [the respondent RTC], constitute laches
in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was
immediately raised in petitioner's appeal to the
Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active
participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case,
which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public
prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
petition and
NO, the failure of the petitioner to raise the issue of
[lack of] jurisdiction during the trial of this case DOES
NOT constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid
down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy; NO, the active
participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case
DOES NOT amount to estoppel.
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction
of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. In this case, at the time the criminal information
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with
violation of the Automobile Law (now Land
Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2)
of B.P. 129 had already been amended by R.A. 7691. The
said provision reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. -- Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 6 years, jurisdiction to hear and try the same is
conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly,
therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
The general rule [is] that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by
laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court's
absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts
to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not
estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction
over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must
arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This
is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby
secure any advantage or the adverse party does not
suffer any harm.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the
petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the
lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At
that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for
laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of “estoppel
by laches” unless it further appears that the party,
knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until
the condition of the party pleading laches has in good
faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to
his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to
loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of
equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of
estoppel by laches in the exceptional case
of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent
and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after
more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not
obtain in the instant case.
jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and
86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15
years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until
the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction
of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals
certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the
records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus
we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.

While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General
acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the
position that the principle of estoppel by laches has
already precluded the petitioner from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC--the trial went on for 4 years with
the petitioner actively participating therein and without
him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The
petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be
raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As
undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968 unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
FACTS: unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum or asserted.
of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of
interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog It has been held that a party can not invoke the
against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against
was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean
complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party
is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can
not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-
Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St.
Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And
in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three
cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals
of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown
upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et
al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et
al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092;
Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia
vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed
to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in
the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
not only patent but revolting. that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
the entire record, We have become persuaded that We submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice"
x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the of a party submitting his case for decision and then
surety x x x accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking
it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc. raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved
Serafin Tijam, et al. vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy - Case which, according to the law then in force, was within the
Digest G.R. No. L-2145,April 15, 1968 original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed
to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in
Facts: On July 19, 1948 - the spouses Serafin Tijam and the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest, plus costs. decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
A writ of attachment was issued by the court against finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered judgment in 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of execution Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is
against the defendants. Surety moved to quash the writ not only patent but revolting.
but the same was denied.
Surety appealed to the CA without raising issue of lack of
jurisdiction. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of
the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before
the filing of the petition for recovery. Same Act placed
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of
interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the
case to SC.
Issue: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu?
Held: Yes. A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel
by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a