UNISOURCE VS JOSEPH
There having been an agreement between the original parties for the
G.R. No. 173252 July 17, 2009
Petitioner: UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Respondents: JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO CHUNG
Ruling: The instant petition is DENIED.
Doctrine: The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements; The fact that an easement by grant may
have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
Dominant Estate Owner: Unisource (Bought from Sandico)
Servient Estate Owner: Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung, and Kleto Chung (Bought from Hidalgo)
FACTS
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of
a parcel of land. The title contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement
which has been carried over from the OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico.
As Sandico’s property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of
a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of
every title covering Sandicos property until TCT was issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other
hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung
and Cleto Chung.
On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary
Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access
to a public road which is Matienza Street.
RTC Ruling: dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land registration case.
Petitioner: filed an MR
RTC: conducted an ocular inspection of the property.
RTC Ruling: granted the motion because the dominant estate is a property enclosed with
a concrete fence with no less than three (3) doors in it, opening to an alley belonging to the
servient estate owned by the petitioner. The alley is leading to Matienza St. The dominant
estate has a house built thereon and said house has a very wide door accessible
to Matienza St. without any obstruction. Said street is perpendicular to J.P. Laurel St. It is
therefore found that the dominant estate has an egress to Matienza St. and does not have
to use the servient estate.
Respondents’ Contention: countered that the extinguishment of the easement will be of
great prejudice to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15
years from acquisition of the property to file the petition.
RTC Ruling: ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of
way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the dominant estate
has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road
which is Matienza Street.
CA Ruling: reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the petition to cancel the
encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way. RTC erred in canceling the
encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way. The appellate court ruled that Article
631(3) of the Civil Code is inapplicable since the presence of an adequate outlet to a
highway extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like
in the instant case.
provision of an easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate, the same can be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant
estate.
Petitioner’s Contention
Contends that the fact that Sandico and Hidalgo resorted to judicial intervention only shows
that they contested the existence of the requisite factors establishing a legal
easement. Besides, the annotation itself provides that the easement is exclusively confined
to the parties mentioned therein, i.e., Sandico and Hidalgo. It was not meant to bind their
heirs or assigns; otherwise, they would have expressly provided for it. Petitioner adds that
it would be an unjust enrichment on respondents’ part to continue enjoying the easement
without adequate compensation to petitioner. Petitioner also avers that to say that the
easement has attached to Hidalgos property is erroneous since such property no longer
exists after it has been subdivided and registered in respondents’ respective names.
Petitioner further argues that even if it is bound by the easement, the same can be cancelled
or revoked since the dominant estate has an adequate outlet without having to pass through
the servient estate.
ISSUE: W/N there was a voluntary easement between the parties
RULING: YES. Petition DENIED.
RATIO
Definition of Easement
As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or
tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former
are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.
Petitioner’s Admission
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in
favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
right of way, petitioner alleged that [t]he easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted
in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as Lot
No. 2, Block 2650. It further stated that the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor
of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the
parties. It was not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by such
court order because [the] Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by
the parties. In its Memorandum[20] dated September 27, 2001, before the trial court,
petitioner reiterated that [t]he annotation found at the back of the TCT of Unisource is a
voluntary easement.
Because of the Admission
Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal
easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an
enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza
Street. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract
from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A
voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished
only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
 Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since
the annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or
assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does
not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is
like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their
heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law.