Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Army
enemy actions. Critically, the process produces identify the links between the physical environ-
metrics that can help validate an adopted course of ment and the people. In other words, we move
action (COA). Altogether, COIN IPB/COIN COG from the what to the who. The human element is
analysis is an integrated, comprehensive process the important part here. The ASCOPE assessment
that flows from the perspectives of the population helps the counterinsurgent understand the people
and the insurgent. and the cultural, social, and physical environment
in which they live.
The People Are the Environment
Because the population is the key to success in Addressing the Root Causes
a counterinsurgency, COIN IPB must start with of Conflict
the people and their issues. Both insurgents and In COIN, the counterinsurgent’s main thrust must
counterinsurgents employ strategies to separate be directed at eliminating the root causes of conflict.
each other from the population while drawing the These root causes preexist the insurgent’s arrival,
population’s active or passive support to themselves. and determining what they are is the essence of step
The people need to make choices in support of 2 in COIN IPB. To use a medical metaphor, the root
one side or the other; controlling their will is more cause is a wound, the insurgency an infection stem-
important than controlling terrain. According to ming from the wound. The counterinsurgent must
Clausewitz, a center of gravity is “the point against treat the infection to heal the wound, and then find
which all the energies should be directed.”1 For the and remove whatever caused the wound.
counterinsurgent, all energies should be directed at COIN doctrine prescribes general treatment for
gaining and maintaining control over the population the ills that cause insurgency, but the medicine
and winning its support. Power emanates from the prescribed for a particular illness must be more
people; without their support, neither the insurgent specific: the counterinsurgent must address the root
nor the counterinsurgent can win. causes indigenous to each area, ideally before an
In step 1 of COIN IPB, we assess the area, insurgency materializes. A counterinsurgent needs
structures, capabilities, organizations, people, to do more than defeat an insurgent group to be
and events (ASCOPE) in an area of operation to successful; if he eliminates root causes that could
Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy Enemy
COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG
Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly Friendly
COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG COG
Friendly Enemy
COG COG IA: Iraqi Army
PSD: Personal Security Detachment
See figure 3 * = Purchase material
from local merchants
Enemy COIN ** = Purchase services
Center of Gravity Al-Dulaim Tribe in Vicinity MSR LANCERO from locals
Tribal Leader Sheik Mohammad Imam Iban Hanifa of the I/O Theme: Merchants
Al-Bari Mosque “Crusaders helping local Shi’a” (Business council)
Provide Bribe Hire sons Threaten Make mosque Provide food Pass info tea Graffiti grids Use Pass info at Extortion:
generator (Rashad and to kill his improvements for internally shop grid 17S12304560 technicians to market where provide
Fiasa) family displaced 17S12345678 and make DVDs merchants “protection”
as auxiliary people (IDPs) 17S87654321 and web site smoke and merchant’s
cell leaders
. talk vehicles
Friendly Counter Facilitators
*Provide Ensure area **Start **Help **Hire */**Hire *HN provides Arrest **Post */**Hire */**Hire */**Build Arrest Provide
better gets equal construction sons sons’ Sheik’s food, medicine, insurgent ‘help wanted’ sheik’s imam to business for techs insurgent police
generators electricity business start PSD PSD construction school supplies, mouthpiece notices in construction paint (internet café). mouthpiece protection
business business company to etc. to imam tea shop company to Qur’anic Use sheik’s for vehicles/
improve for IDPs (PSD and beautify walls/ verses construction **Use sons’
Mosque construction keep eyes-on on walls company and PSD for
companies” for insurgents sons’ PSD added
to repaint for security security
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA
Figure 2. Enemy COIN COG Analysis: Culmination of steps 1 through 3 of COIN IPB.
facilitator. Defining effective counter facilitators consideration of specific counter actions to take for
is a part of the ongoing analysis and not a COA; it each threat action or reaction. It enables the coun-
addresses what to do about the insurgent’s attempt terinsurgent to develop more than just COAs that
to coerce a COG enabler, not how to preempt the counter current insurgent operations; its emphasis
insurgent. And finally, the counterinsurgent arrives on the root causes of conflict allows the counterin-
at his friendly force COA. Each counter facilitator surgent to get ahead of the insurgent by conducting
should elicit several possible COAs. Ideally, the operations that build relationships with the local
different COAs will help build cooperation and community across the logical lines of operation.
interoperability between the counterinsurgents and Instead of focusing only on the IED or the network
the demographic cluster. that emplaced it, enemy COIN COG analysis also
Enemy COIN COG analysis examines how to considers the environment that enabled the network
separate the insurgents physically and psychologi- to arise and flourish in the first place.
cally from the population. It proceeds like a war-
gaming sequence, with consideration and assess- Friendly Forces COIN
ment of actions, reactions, and counter-actions. The COG Analysis
process helps planners grasp the complexities of In COIN warfare, COG analysis doesn’t stop with
the environment, effects, and threat, and it prompts the enemy; it also has a friendly forces component.
Tribal Leader Sheik Mohammad Dr. Rashad Zidan I/O Theme: Police Chief Hussein
“MSR needed for economic stability”
Include in Show respect; Ensure electricity Make Provide Hand out IO Help IA to Help Fortify Provide Establish
local credit and input reaches area. improvements vaccinations products at start local IA cdr start police station. training outposts
council on projects; Credit IA/IP and on clinic to locals and tea shop grid newspaper. newspaper; Contract: and in city
meetings column in tribal leader meds to 17S12345678 Hand out IO use merchants Tribal leader advise
newspaper clinic product for labor/ + Merchants
started by IA (newspaper) materials
at TCPs
Enemy Counter Facilitators
Pressure Threaten to Attack Destroy Attack clinic Hire Put out Attack Threaten Target TCP Attack Attack Infiltrate Attack Attack
tribal leader use photos convoys electric under technically that the tea tea shop while merchant police police to micro- vehicles
to denounce taken with w/SAF from lines, construction skilled vaccinations shop owner passing out who provides station kill MNF-I FOBs resupplying
MNF-I in MNF-I to village to blame people for will make newspapers printing and before advisors outposts
meetings state he is invite MNF-I MNF-I clinic the people materials station is
puppet of retaliation sterile for paper fortified
infidels
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA COA
TCP: Traffic Control Point, SAF: Small Arms Fire, MNF-I: Multi-National Forces-Iraq
● Underlines the links between insurgents, crimi- the road to deployment, is part of the curriculum
nal organizations, and local support. at the COIN Center for Excellence in Iraq, and
● Promotes interoperability between U.S./coali- is among regular lecture topics at the U.S. Army
tion military/political efforts and host-nation gov- Command and General Staff College. It has also
ernment elements, as this cooperation is necessary been shared with training centers, allied militaries,
for the method to work. and curriculum developers for various professional
COIN COG analysis stands in contrast to the military education programs. COIN COG analysis
“carrot and stick” approach, which focuses on short- may not be a silver bullet, but it is a useful tool,
term solutions to long-term issues and actually pro- one developed in the field to help overcome the
vides incentives for future violence.5 COIN COG challenges of the unconventional environment we
analysis maximizes resources, synergizes the staff, find ourselves operating in today. MR
and improves interoperability. It provides specific
messages tailored to the people’s unique concerns
NOTES
through ways they normally communicate. Examin-
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
ing the COIN problem through the population and (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595-96.
2. Field Manual (FM) 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations (Washington, DC: U.S.
enemy perspectives, it enables the counterinsurgent Government Printing Office [GPO] August 1986), Section II, 1-4.
to tailor resources to each specific area, and in a 3. The COIN campaigner should also take care not to pigeon-hole the insurgent
group according to some historical precedent it seems to be following. Insurgents
balanced and measured fashion. might begin with or borrow from one or more specific doctrinal models or theories (e.g.,
those of Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, Abd el-Krim, Carlos Marighella, Frantz Fanon),
Critically, by conducting COIN COG analysis but in time they will evolve into whole new manifestations of insurgency.
4. FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, February
within COIN IPB, we use the enemy’s LOOs to 2003), A-2.
5. The carrot and stick approach, whereby a commander offers an insurgent or
shape our campaign to control the population and community leader an incentive (say, a well for his village) in exchange for neutrality
or support (e.g., not allowing insurgents to fire mortars from his village into a coali-
gain its support. To get in front of the enemy’s tion operating base) can actually invite violence: the leader might figure that once
decision cycle, we must understand how he plans he gets his well, another outbreak of insurgent mortar fire might yield an irrigation
project, more kilowatts, or a new school. Coalition unit rotations that neglect good
on pursuing his operational goals. If we only think battle handover are particular targets for such stratagems.