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R.M.

Richard Hare is a prominent contemporary ethicist who defends


an unusual and surprising mix of Kant and preference
Har utilitarianism. Like Kant, his account begins from the logic of the
moral "ought." He claims, however, that the universalizability of
e moral judgements, coupled with general facts about human
beings and the human condition, implies a two-level form of
utilitarianism. He claims that this version answers the standard
1919- objections to utilitarianism better than any other version, and
prese that it explains a lot of the reactions people have to the Bloggs-
nt type cases from which we began.

The best place to read an overview of Hare's position as described


here is his book Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford
University Press, 1981).

Hare's basic argument:

1. The plus 2. Facts lead C. A two level


logic of about to version of
moral human utilitarianism
terms nature
like and the
"ought" human
condition

1. The universalizability of moral judgments implies preference


utilitarianism.

A. It is a logical feature of natural language that moral


judgments (expressed in terms of "ought" claims, or
claims about what is "right") are both (1) universalizable
and (2) overriding.
B. By this he means that, in order to sincerely assent to the
judgement that "A ought to do X to B and C," one must
sincerely assent to the judgements that "B ought to do X
to A and C" and "C ought to do X to A and B," were their
various roles switched, and one must assent to this
irrespective of what one's individual preferences are (that
is, whether one is A rather than B or C).
C. And this means, according to Hare, that Kantian
universalizability implies preference utilitarianism. For to
sincerely assent to an ought claim is to prefer that the
thing in question be done, even if one had to occupy,
successively, the positions of each and every one of the
persons involved.
D. Hare's criterion of universalizability thus combines the
intuitiveness of the traditional Golden Rule (do unto
others what you would have them do unto you -- you
imagine yourself in the others' shoes) with the precision
of the philosophers' condition of universalizability (when
doing so, you are to imagine yourself having the others'
preferences rather than your own). So one way to think
of Hare's view is as providing a secular defense of the
Golden Rule (one based on the logic of moral judgments
rather than divine authority) and an argument to the
conclusion that the Golden Rule, properly understood,
implies preference utilitarianism.

2. However, human beings need both "intuitive level moral


principles" and "critical thinking."

A. Humans' basic preferences are pretty uniform, but


B. Humans vary in their ability to think critically and to act on
what they determine to be correct moral principles, and
across time and varying circumstances, the same
individual varies in these same ways.

C. This implies that one should embrace a two-level version of


utilitarianism:

"Intuitive Acceptance Prima facie principles governing


utility general types of cases commonly
level" based encountered by people, for use:
thinking 1. when either (a) there isn't the
rule
need for critical thinking or (b)
utilitarianism there isn't the time for it, and

2. when one can't trust one's


critical thinking.

"Critical Act utilitarianism For use:


1. when prima facie principles
level" or conflict,
thinking 2. in unusual cases, and
"specific rule
3. when both (a) it is clear that
utilitarianism"
utility can be maximized a
certain way and (b) one can
trust one's judgment that this is
so.

Hare uses the images of "the archangel" and "the prole" to help
us understand why humans need both kinds of thinking by
contrasting us with a being who would have no need for
intuitive level principles (the archangel) and one who would be
incapable of critical thinking (the prole).

"The archangel" & "the prole"

super-human knowledge ignorant, uninformed

super-human powers of incapable of critical thinking


critical thinking

no human weaknesses weaknesses in the extreme


degree

Three kinds of intuitive level principles:


1. Common morality: Insofar as members of a society face similar
problems, we would expect agreement to emerge on basic
standards which everyone in the society will be expected to live
up to. Moreover, given the kind of universal features of the
human condition mentioned in an earlier lecture, we would
expect there to be many similarities between the common
moralities of various cultures at different times and places.
2. Professional ethics: Insofar as those in certain roles face
similar kinds of situations repeatedly, we would expect
agreement to emerge on basic standards for the conduct of
various professionals and others in special roles.
3. Personal morality: And insofar as individuals differ in their
abilities to reason critically under various circumstances, critical
thinking will lead different individuals to train themselves to
adhere to different sets of intuitive level rules, including
"metaprinciples" for deciding when to engage in critical thinking
and when to stick unquestioningly to one's intuitive level
priniciples.

ISTINGUISHING FACTUAL AND MORAL ISSUES


Note: Unless indicated otherwise, quotations and page references are to the textbook,
Harris, Pritchard and Rabins, Engineering Ethics, second edition (Wadsworth 2000).

Recall the definitions of common morality,


personal morality, and professional ethics
(These specific definitions were distilled from pp. 13-14, and 33-34)

 Common morality refers to the set of moral standards shared


by virtually all members of a culture or society.
 Personal morality refers to the set of one's own ethical
commitments, not all of which are a part of the common
morality of one's culture or society.
 Professional ethics refers to those moral standards and
principles that apply especially to one's role as a professional.

Now note regarding them:


1. "[W]e usually experience moral disagreement and controversy
within a context of agreement" (31), because common morality
includes agreement on a broad range of duties to:
a. not harm others (duties of non-maleficence),
b. make reparations for harms done,
c. not lie or cheat,
d. keep promises,
e. not interfere with others' rational self-determination,
f. help those in need (duties of beneficence),
g. etc.
2. "[M]any of the standard provisions of engineering codes are
simply specific applications of common morality to the
engineering profession" (34), including these common
standards of professional ethics (34-35):

i. hold paramount the health and safety of the public (cf. [a]
above: duty not to harm others),
ii. be honest (cf. [c] above: duty not to lie or cheat),
iii. be faithful agents of their employers (cf. [d] and [e]
above: duties to keep promises and not to interfere with
others' rational self-determination),
iv. etc.?
2. In common morality, priority is usually given to duties of non-
maleficence over duties of beneficence, and also "priority is
usually given to negative duties -- duties not to cause harm, not
to break promises, not to be dishonest, and so on" (34).
3. Common morality, personal morality, and professional ethics
are all "subject to criticism and change, but they may or may
not change at the same time or in the same way" (34).
4. The authors speculate that the reason for this wide-spread
agreement about the principles of common morality is that
humans have these features in common (32-33):

 "Vulnerability: We are susceptible to pain, suffering,


unhappiness, disability, and ultimately death."
 "Autonomy: We are, to at least some degree, capable of
thinking for ourselves and making our own decisions."
 "Interdependency: We depend on others helping us to
get what we want, through cooperative endeavor and the
division of labor; and our well-being also depends on
others refraining from harming us."
 "Shared expectations and goals: Beyond wanting things
for ourselves as individuals, we may want things
together, as groups working toward shared ends."
 "Common moral traits: Fair-mindedness, self-respect,
respect for others, compassion, and benevolence toward
others are common traits; despite individual differences
in their strength, scope, and constancy, these traits can
be found to some degree in virtually all human beings."

Two key concepts: universalizability and


reversibility
The authors emphasize that "two basic moral concepts that are
especially important to keep in mind in all efforts to justify our moral
judgments" (37):

1. Universalizability: "whatever is right (or wrong) in one situation


is right (or wrong) in any relevantly similar situation."
2. Reversibility: thinking about treating others as you would have
them treat you.

I would add:
Universalizability as described above is a basic logical feature of all
moral discourse. That is, in making a distinctively moral judgment,
you commit yourself to its universalizability. If in making a judgment
you refuse to recognize its universalizability, then you are actually
refusing to make a moral judgment.

Determining relevant factual and moral


considerations
In describing the universalizability of moral judgments above, we
employed the concept of a "relevantly similar situation."

But how do we determine which factual and moral considerations are


relevant? The question of which facts are relevant is closely related
to the question of how we define and apply key moral concepts.

In most situations, there is universal agreement about the irrelevance


of some facts, e.g.:

 what day it is,


 what color a person's eyes are,
 what the people involved are wearing,
 etc.

and about the relevance of some facts, e.g.:

 that serious injury could be prevented,


 that lying would be involved,
 that bribery would be involved,
 etc.

But notice that although the fact that lying or bribery would be
involved seems obviously morally relevant, it may not be crystal clear
what counts as bribery.

The authors illustrate how we can get more clear about what facts
are relevant by analyzing key concepts, such as bribery. The aim is to
get more clear about how to define and apply them, and in the
process we get more clear about which facts of a case are morally
relevant.

Recall how our earlier discussion of the concept of a profession


began by considering the distinguishing features of paradigm cases
(like law and medicine):
Features of a profession Paradigm Instances

Intellectual training Yes


Skills vital to society Yes
Monopoly on professional services Yes
Autonomy in the workplace High
Claim to be regulated by ethical
Yes
standards

The authors do the same thing for bribery:

Features of bribery Paradigm Case

Gift size Large (>$10,000)


Timing Before decision
Reason Personal gain
Responsibility for decision Sole
Product quality Worst in industry
Product cost Highest in market

Figure 2.3
Paradigm Case of Bribery with Features

Then they show how we can consider particular cases and score
them on a chart in terms of how well they match the paradigm and in
which respects.

Victor is an engineer at a large construction firm. It is his job to


specify rivets for the construction of a large apartment building. After
some research and testing, he decides to use ACME rivets for the
job. On the day after Victor's order, an ACME representative visits
him and gives him a voucher for an all-expense paid trip to the ACME
Forum meeting in Jamaica. Paid expenses include day trips to the
beach and the rum factories. If Victor accepts, is this a bribe? (50-51)
Paradigm Paradigm
Feature (Bribery) Test case (Not bribery)

Gift size Large -----X------------------------- Small


Before
Timing ---------------------------X--- After decision
decision
Reason Personal gain ---------------X--------------- Educational
Responsibility Sole --X---------------------------- None
Product quality Worst ---------------------------X--- Best
Product cost Highest ---X--------------------------- Lowest

Figure 2.4
Line-Drawing Test of Concepts
Victor's case is an ambiguous one. It isn't clearly bribery, but it shares
enough features with the paradigm cases to raise concerns.

For present purposes, however, the things to note about this exercise
are:

1. It is possible to separate the questions of how to define a


concept and how to apply it. From the fact that there are some
(many even a whole lot of, maybe even a majority of) "grey-
area" cases, it does not follow that the concepts themselves
are muddled, confused, or meaningless.
2. Relatedly, sometimes it is impossible to "draw a line"
separating the acceptable cases from the unacceptable ones:
 compare a one-feature concept like "bald,"

Here, for possible use during lecture, are two links regarding
baldness: a BBC News article on a treatment and a site with
information on various treatments and various kinds of baldness

 note that some concepts (like bribery) have multiple


features across which particular cases will vary, and
 note that some features of a paradigm case may be more
morally salient than others. (For instance, from the bare
fact that on (say) three out of six features a case is like
the paradigm, and on two of six it is wholly unlike the
paradigm, it doesn't automatically follow that the test
case is "more like the paradigm" than not. Perhaps this is
true in Victor's case above.)
3. The questions of what issues are factual and which moral are
related, but the exercise of clarifying the factual features of
paradigm cases of a moral concept can sharpen our sense of
what are the morally relevant features of a situation.

Some final points about factual and moral issues

From pp. 41-43:


1. "Disagreements that appear to be about moral issues often
turn out to be about the relevant facts."
2. "Factual issues are sometimes very difficult to resolve."
3. "Once the factual issues are clearly isolated, moral
disagreement can reemerge on another and often more clearly
defined level."

And finally, note figures 2.2 on page 45 and 2.6 on page 56.
are's two-level utilitarianism, cont'd

Some further points about his view:


1. What our textbook calls common morality, professional ethics,
and personal morality, Hare probably would consider examples
of intuitive level principles, insofar as these three kinds of
standards are all expressed in terms of very general rules,
which can come into conflict and thus require critical thinking.
2. How do we decide what intuitive level principles or rules to
follow? Two answers:
A. Ideally, by engaging in the critical thinking which an
archangel would use to choose such principles for people
like us.
B. In practice, our default setting is an acceptance of
common morality and professional ethics, but each of us
adjusts these through life in light of critical thinking, to
arrive at a distinctive personal morality.
3. How do we decide when to override an intuitive level principle
or rule (whether it be of common morality, professional ethics,
or personal morality)? Again, two answers:
A. Ideally, by engaging in the kind of critical thinking am
archangel would do.
B. In practice, be skeptical of your own, sometimes flawed
critical thinking.

And in practice this means: do not override principles of


common morality or professional ethics, and do not
violate commonly invoked rights of individuals, except
when the aggregate harm to be prevented by doing so is
both clear and great.

Advantages Hare claims for his view:


1. It answers the standard objections to utilitarianism better than
any other version of utilitarianism, in part because, in order to
fulfill their function in human thinking about ethics, guilt must
accompany violations of the intuitive level principles of common
morality.
2. It explains a lot of the disagreement about and unease that
arises regarding the Bloggs-type cases with which we began
our discussion of ethics.
3. It incorporates some approximation of respect for persons into
utilitarianism.
4. It relies on linguistic intuitions (intuitions about the logic of the
moral terms) rather than intuitive moral judgments (as in the
method of reflective equilibrium), which, he emphasizes,
threatens to collapse into a form of relativism.

The method of reflective equilibrium

This is the label applied by prominent political philosopher John


Rawls to a very general method of evaluating complete ethical
theories (as opposed to more particular principles). It analogizes the
ways theories are accepted or rejected in ethical theory and in
science.

Candidate
Data or
scientific
observations
theories

Ptolemaic
"fit" Planetary
<=====> motion
Copernican

Candidate
"Considered
ethical
intuitions"
theories

Utilitarianism "fit" Human


<=====> slavery
Rights theories
is always
Kantian ethics wrong

Virtue theories

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