In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon On July 23, 2007, the RTC
e RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:
G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
which seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated November
29, 2011 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The
CA affirmed the orders and decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary and
permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said
temporary protection order (TPO).
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of
protection order under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A.
Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army
who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were
married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but
respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:
Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be
sufficient in form and substance and to prevent great and irreparable
injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER is
forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON
directing him to do the following acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or
committing further acts of physical abuse and violence
against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from
petitioner, her residence or her place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating,
contacting or communicating with petitioner; 4.
Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any
firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to his
job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the
petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the
Chairman in the area where the petitioner and respondent live at
Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for
assistance from the petitioner for the implementation of this order.
They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal
abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her
personal belongings in order to insure the safety of the petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) upon the respondent personally
and to seek and obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents, if
needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this
order.
the respondent for him to file an OPPOSITION within a period of five
(5) days from receipt hereof and let a Preliminary Conference and
hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondent’s
retirement and other benefits, the following agencies thru their heads
are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other
benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp
Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the
court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St.,
Cagayan de Oro City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE
DATE OF THE PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON
THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT
PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE
OR POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND
HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE
RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID
HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS
DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL ALLOW EX-
PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER
AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS
AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO,
appeared during the scheduled pre-trial but informed the court that he
did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his own
counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or
answer to the petition. Because of his failure to appear in the
subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte
presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt.
Yahon deliberately refused to give her spousal support as directed in
the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of livelihood since he
had told her to resign from her job and concentrate on keeping their
house), the RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give
respondent spousal support in the amount of ₱4,000.00 per month
and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be
automatically deducted and given directly to respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never
complied with the TPO as he continued making threats and inflicting
physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her spousal support
as ordered by the court.
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this
case, this court finds that there is a need to permanently protect the
applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of violence that might be
committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed that
respondent who was a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista,
Cagayan de Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal,
emotional and economic abuse and violence upon the petitioner.
Respondent in several instances had slapped, mauled and punched
petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical
certificates showing physical injuries suffered by petitioner inflicted by
the respondent at instances of their marital altercations. Respondent
at the height of his anger often poked a gun on petitioner and
threatened to massacre her and her child causing them to flee for
their lives and sought refuge from other people. He had demanded
sex from petitioner at an unreasonable time when she was sick and
chilling and when refused poked a gun at her. Several police blotters
were offered as evidence by petitioner documenting the incidents
when she was subjected to respondent’s ill temper and ill treatment.
Verbally, petitioner was not spared from respondent’s abuses by
shouting at her that he was wishing she would die and he would
celebrate if it happens and by calling and sending her threatening text
messages. These incidents had caused petitioner great psychological
trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and these forced her to seek
refuge from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner was also
deprived by respondent of her spousal support despite order of the
court directing him to give a monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view
of the foregoing, this court finds a need to protect the life of the
petitioner not only physically but also emotionally and psychologically.
Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and
there being no controverting evidence presented by respondent, this
Court finds that the applicant has established her case by
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING the petition, thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-
1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued
immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES A.YAHON is ordered
to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal
support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007,
respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner
50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be
due or released to him from the government and the said share of
petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondent’s benefits
and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer
of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-
IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict
compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFPFC), assisted by the Office of the Judge Advocate General
(OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To
Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP)8 dated November
10, 2008. Stating that it was making a limited and special
1|Page
appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it
furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center
(PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC, on
September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary
withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to
S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a
letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action
on the TPO, and requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of
releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC
that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check representing his 36 MLS had been
processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date said
check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its
obligation under the TPO, the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over
the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence the AFPFC
cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally, petitioner
contended that the AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete
stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of
TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that
it was not afforded due process and it was thus improper to issue
execution against the AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner emphasized
its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply with the
TPO without violating its right to procedural due process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid
motion for having been filed out of time. It noted that the September
28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become final and
executory.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the
RTC’s Order10 dated March 6, 2009.
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
praying for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision
insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt.
Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same
to respondent as spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent filed her
Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction,
manifesting that there is no information as to whether S/Sgt. Yahon
already received his retirement benefit and that the latter has
repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the provision of spousal
support.
After due hearing, the CA‘s Twenty-Second Division issued a
Resolution11 granting respondent’s application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the
Court finds meritorious private respondent’s application for the
issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been
given to him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly pension
after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been released to
him. It appears that the release of such pension could render
ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION issue enjoining the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Finance Center, its employees, agents, representatives, and any all
persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension
that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.
12
SO ORDERED.
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for
certiorari and affirmed the assailed orders and decision of the RTC.
The CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner
military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a
percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and
to give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife as spousal support
in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to
R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further
acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose
is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life.13 The protection orders issued by the court
may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be issued
by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order
(BPO).14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be
included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another, any
of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the
residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights
are violated, and if respondent must remove personal
effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his
things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner
and any designated family or household member at a
distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the
residence, school, place of employment, or any specified
place frequented by the petitioner and any designated
family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an
automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law
enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is
safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the
petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of personal
belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a
child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the
woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall
order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary
of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically
remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or
withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the
woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or
possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate
disposition by the court, including revocation of license
and disqualification to apply for any license to use or
possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement
agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his
firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to
investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on
matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence
inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,
medical expenses, child care expenses and loss of
income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to
provide petitioner temporary shelter and other social
services that the petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court
deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of
the petitioner and any designated family or household
member, provided petitioner and any designated family or
household member consents to such relief. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s directive for
the automatic deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement
benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the
retirement and separation of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1638,15 which states: Section 31. The benefits authorized under this
Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man
who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money
and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active service,
not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other
payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such
accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the
benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or
other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or
administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members,
2|Page
including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or
duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work
except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in
favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court
order directing the Philippine National Bank to refrain from releasing
to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of such
monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter’s conjugal share is illegal
and improper, as it violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law)
which exempts retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, which governs execution of
judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those
properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall
be exempt from execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained
as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the
Government;(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the
more recent expression of legislative will.17 Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be
harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The
later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.19
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment,
should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule
above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the
employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to
segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits was illegal
because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the case of
Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA
when it held that the garnishment of the amount of ₱10,500 payable
to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the
Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and
void. The CA therein relied on the previous rulings in Director of
Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion21 and Avendano v. Alikpala,
et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the garnishment of
the salaries of government employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific
Products:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in
the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.
Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it.23 2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
We disagree. conjugal, community or property owned in common;
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," 3. Destroying household property;
which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s
employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not 4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or
solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.28
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether
private or government. The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of
restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child
support, is a support enforcement legislation.1âwphi1 In the United and provide them continued protection against threats to their
personal safety and security.
States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act24 allow
garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has "The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that
failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to
were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard
that "moneys payable by the Government to any individual are the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly designated family or household member safety in the family
intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables
agencies attaching funds in their possession."25 the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator
does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon26 the and to ensure their financial support."29
issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the
of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN
R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between
women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be No costs.
victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against
SO ORDERED.
women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose
of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women
and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the State
values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect
for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and children, from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.27
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support
specifically address one form of violence committed against women –
economic abuse.
G.R. No. 214880
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a
woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
following: vs.
AMANTE PADLAN y LEONES, Accused-Appellant
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim
from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, DECISION
3|Page
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the appeal filed by the appellant Amante Padlan y
Leones (Padlan) assailing the April 15, 2014 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05517 which affirmed with
modifications the November 10, 2011 Joint Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos.
2755-M- 2005, 2756-M-2005, and 2757-M-2005, finding Padlan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and one count of acts
of lasciviousness, respectively.
Three Informations were filed against Padlan charging him with two
counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
in relation to Republic Act No. 76103 (RA 7610), and one count of
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to RA
7610, allegedly committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 2755-M-2005
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Amante Padlan
y Leones @ Butog of the crime of Rape penalized under the
provisions of Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 8353 in relation to R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 2005, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with
lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
by means of force and intimidation, have [sic] carnal knowledge of
"AAA," 9 years old, against her will and without her consent and after
having carnal knowledge of said "AAA" inserted his finger into her
genital, thereby affecting badly the latter's emotional and
psychological well being and development.
Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. 2756-M-2005
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Amante Padlan
y Leones @ Butog of the crime of Rape penalized under the
provisions of Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 8353 in relation to R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of September, 2005, in the municipality
of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with
lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of "AAA,"
9 years old, against her will and without her consent and after having
carnal knowledge of said "AAA" inserted his finger into her genital,
thereby affecting badly the latter's emotional and psychological well
being and development.
Contrary to law.5
Criminal Case No. 2757-M-2005
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Amante Padlan
y Leones @ Butog of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness penalized
under the provisions of Art. 3 3 6 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to R.A. 7610, Sec. 5 (b), committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of September, 2005, in the municipality
of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and with in the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force ad intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with lewd designs, commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of "AAA," a nine (9) year old minor, by touching her
vagina and against her will, thereby badly afecting the psychological
and emotional well being of said "AAA".
Contrary to law.6
When arraigned on October 24, 2005, Padlan pleaded not guilty to all
the offenses charged against him. After the pre-trial conference, trial
on the merits followed. During trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of "AAA" and her mother, "BBB," while the defense
presented Padlan.
Version of the Prosecution
"AAA" is a nine-year old girl from Meycauayan, Bulacan. She testified
that on August 7, 2005, at about 1 :00 p.m., while she was sleeping
inside their house, she was surprised when Padlan woke her up and
asked her to stand up. "AAA" stood up as she was told. Padlan then
touched her vagina and continued caressing it until he was fully
aroused. Thereafter, Padlan took "AAA's" clothes off and undressed
himself as well. He told "AAA" to lie down. Padlan then inserted his
penis inside "AAA's" vagina. According to "AAA," the insertion of
appellant's penis was only for a short time but the insertion was so
painful that it caused her to shout 'Aray!' Padlan withdrew his penis
and inserted his finger inside "AAA's" vagina instead. "AAA" again
exclaimed in pain, which caused Padlan to remove his finger.
Thereafter, "AAA" put her clothes back on. She did not report the
incident to her mother because of Padlan' s threat to kill her mother if
she did.
The second incident occurred in the evening of September 27, 2005
when Padlan called "AAA" and told her that her mother, "BBB,"
wanted her to go to a certain Ate Sharon to borrow money. Padlan
warned "AAA" that "BBB" would spank her if she did not obey her
order. Consequently, "AAA" followed Padlan to Ate Sharon's house.
When they reached an aratiles tree along the way, Padlan stopped
"AAA" and told her to lie down on the ground. Padlan then removed
'"AAA's" shorts and underwear and inserted his penis inside her
vagina. After Padlan was finished satisfying his lust, "AAA" went
home by herself. The following day on September 28, 2005, "'AAA"
was sleeping in her sister's bedroom while her mother was gathering
kangkong outs "AAA" was again roused from her sleep when she felt
Padlan touching and rubbing her vagina. "AAA" quickly ran towards
her mother to prevent Padlan from going any further with his
advances.
The next day, "AAA" complained to "BBB" about the pain she felt in
her vagina. "BBB" examined "AAA's" vagina and saw that it was
swollen and had pus. When asked who was responsible for her
swollen vagina, "AAA" told her mother about what Padlan had done
to her. "BBB" then confronted Padlan about "AAA's" claims.
According to "BBB," Padlan admitted that he raped "AAA" twice.
"AAA's" older brother reported the rape incidents to the police.
Padlan was then apprehended by the police authorities while "AAA"
was brought to Camp Crame for a medical examination.
"BBB" testified that she knew Padlan because their neighbor, Alvin
Padlan (Alvin), adopted him. When Alvin left for Masbate, he left
Padlan under her care with a promise that he would get him upon his
return. As such, Padlan lived with "BBB' s" family since August 15,
2003 until September 28, 2005 when he was arrested.
Version of the Defense
For his defense, Padlan denied the charge of rape against him and
put up the defense of alibi. He claimed that on August 7, 2005, at
around 12:00 noon, he went to Nueva Ecija with his employer to buy
vegetables to be resold at a public market in Bulacan. Padlan claimed
that he returned to the Bulacan public market at about 2:00 a.m. the
following morning.
On September 27, 2005 at around 12:00 noon, Padlan claimed that
he was resting inside the house of "AAA" after selling vegetables at
the public market. After about an hour, he took a bath and went back
to the market to collect payments from the buyer of his vegetables.
He claimed that he collected payments until 12:00 midnight.
On September 28, 2005, at around 11 :00 a.m., Padlan rested at
home after selling vegetables. He took a bath, ate, and watched
television. He claimed that he did not have any encounter with "AAA"
and that he was surprised to learn that he was being accused of rape.
After being confronted by "BBB," Padlan insisted that he did not know
anything about the accusations of rape against him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 10, 2011, the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 18
rendered judgment finding Padlan guilty as charged. The RTC was
convinced that the prosecution, through the testimonies of "AAA" and
her mother, was able to establish the guilt of Padlan beyond
reasonable doubt.
The dispositive part of the RTC's Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Amante L. Padlan, as his guilt in these three
cases has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, is hereby
sentenced:
a) In Criminal Case No. 2755-M-2005, to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay private victim civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
b) In Criminal Case No. 2756-M-2005, to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay private victim civil indemnity in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00; and
c) In Criminal Case No. 2757-M-2005, to suffer the imprisonment five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC's Joint Decision, Padlan appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On April 15, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's Joint Decision and held
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENED for lack of merit. With the
MODIFICATION increasing the award of civil indemnity and moral
damages to P75,000.00 each, and awarding P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in Criminal Case Nos. 2755-M-2005 and 2756-
M-2005, the Joint Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court ofMalolos City, Bulacan, Branch 18, is AFFIRMED in all
other respects. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.8
Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, Padlan, through his counsel, filed
a Notice of Appeal9 dated May 13, 2014 manifesting his intention to
appeal the CA Decision to this Court.
4|Page
In a Resolution10 dated January 12, 2015, this Court directed the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desired. In its Manifestation11 dated April 15, 2015, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court that it was adopting all
arguments adduced in its Appellee's Brief dated May 21, 2013 in lieu
of filing a Supplemental Brief.
Likewise, Padlan filed a Manifestation12 dated May 6, 2015, indicating
that he would no longer file a Supplemental Brief since he had
already argued all the relevant issues in his Appellant's Brief.
Issue
The lone issue raised by Padlan in his Appellant's Brief is whether the
trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crimes imputed against him
despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. According to Padlan, the prosecution failed to overcome the
presumption of his innocence. Padlan challenges the credibility of
"AAA" and insists that he was in a different place at the time the
alleged crimes were committed. Padlan thus prays for his acquittal.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the RTC and CA
that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The Court affirms the Decision of the CA finding Pad]
an guilty of two counts of rape and one count of acts of
lasciviousness, but with modifications on the penalty imposed and
amount of damages awarded.
Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force, threat, or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
In People v. Gutierrez,13 the Court held that there is statutory rape
when: "(1) the offended party is under [twelve] years of age[;] and (2)
the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether
there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was
deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through
fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the
victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse."
In the present case, all the elements of statutory rape have been
sufficiently established in Criminal Case Nos. 2755-M-2005 and
2756-M- 2005 since the prosecution's evidence showed that on two
separate occasions, Padlan had carnal knowledge of"AAA," a woman
under 12 years of age. The defense did not dispute the fact that
"AAA" was nine years old at the time of the incident. Her birth
certificate, which was presented during trial before the RTC, clearly
stated that her date of birth is August 20, 1996.14
During her direct examination, "AAA" categorically stated that Padlan
inserted his penis into her vagina on August 7, 2005 and again on
September 27, 2005. The relevant portions of her testimony reveal On September 27, 2005 Padlan again succeeded in having sexual
the following incident on August 7, 2005: intercourse with AAA. She narrated her ordeal as follows:
FISCAL VITUG FISCAL LAGROSA
xxxx xxxx
Q: On August 7, 2005, from 1 :00 p.m. onwards, where were you? Q: Now do you know what [sic] the incident that happened on
September 27?
A: I was in our house, ma'am.
A: Yes, ma'am.
xxxx
xxxx
Q: You said you were sleeping at that time, was there any unusual
Q: And where did you go?
incident that took place, if any?
A: We went to the tree of "Aratiles," Ma'am.
A: There was, ma'am.
Q: And what happened at the "Aratiles" tree?
Q: What is this incident you are referring to?
A: We stopped there, Ma'am.
A: He woke me up and asked me to stand up, ma'am.
Q: And what did you do when you stopped?
xxxx
A: He removed my panty and my shorts, Ma'am.
Q: You said "Ginising po nya ako at pinatayo ako," who are you
Q: And after he removed your panty and your shorts, what happened
referring to? next?
A: Amante Padlan, ma'am. A: He drew out his penis, Ma'am.
xxxx Q: After he drew out his penis, what happened?
Q: Do you know Amante Padlan? A: He inserted his penis into my private part, Ma' am.17
A: Yes, ma'am. Further, "AAA" testified that on September 28, 2005, while she was
asleep, she felt someone touching her vagina.1avvphi1Upon opening
Q: How long have you known him?
her eyes, "AAA" saw that it was Padlan who was touching her
A: When he lived in our house, ma'am. vagina.18
xxxx As shown by "AAA's" testimony, she was able to narrate in a clear
and candid manner how Padlan raped and molested her. Being a 9-
Q: Then what happened next, if any?
year old rape victim, her testimony deserves full weight and
A: He asked me to stand up and touched my vagina, ma'am. credence. "[A] girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and
sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape,
xxxx if what she claims is not true."19 Moreover, the defense did not
present any improper motive on "AAA" why she would impute a
Q: Aside from touching your vagina, what else did he do next, if any?
serious charge of rape against Padlan. Verily, we affirm the CA that
A: He asked me to remove my dress then he put out his penis and all the elements of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness had been
asked me to lie down and tried to insert his penis into my vagina, proven in the case at bar.
ma'am.
Besides, the RTC found that "AAA's" testimony was credible since it
xxxx was given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
manner despite her young age.20 We find no compelling reason to
Q: How long did he insert his penis into your vagina?
deviate from these findings especially since the CA affirmed the
A: 1 1/2, ma'am. same. The finding of credibility should not be overturned since the
trial court judge had the opportunity to personally examine the
COURT demeanor of the witnesses when they testified on the stand. The
finding of credibility may be overturned only when certain facts or
Q: 1 1/2 what, in tem1s of minutes or hours?
circumstances are overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, and the
A: Oras po, Your Honor.15 same could have materially affected the outcome of the case. No
such circumstance is present in the case at bar. Thus, the finding for
xxxx "AAA's" credibility stands.
Q: Now after you said "aray" and he stopped. What else happened?
For his defense, Padlan denied the charges against him and
A: He inserted his finger, ma'am. presented an alibi. He contended that on the dates when the rape
and acts of lasciviousness were alleged to have been committed, he
Q: Where did he insert his finger? was either in Nueva Ecija buying vegetables for resale in Bulacan,
collecting payments from his buyers at the market and resting at
A: He inserted his finger into my vagina, ma'am.16
home thereafter, or watching television at home. These are all
uncorroborated self-serving statements. Time and again, the Court
5|Page
has held that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and
identification of the complainant.21 Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it is
insufficient that the accused prove that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed; he must likewise establish that it was
physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.
In this case, while Padlan alleged that on August 7, 2005 he was in
Nueva Ecija with his employer buying vegetables, Padlan failed to
present the testimony of such employer. Consequently, his claim
remained uncorroborated and unsubstantiated. As such, in the face
of the accusation against him, his alibi cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of "AAA." Moreover, the distance alone from
Meycauayan, Bulacan to Nueva Ecija does not conclusively prove
that it was physically impossible for Padlan to go to Nueva Ecija and
still return to Bulacan to commit the crime of rape. "Physical
impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the
place where the accused was and the place where the crime was
committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the
facility of access between the two places."22
Further, Padlan testified that on September 27-28, 2005, he was
resting inside the house of "AAA's" family after selling vegetables at
the public market. Instead of removing himself from the locus
criminis, his testimony placed him squarely at the very scene of the
crime or its immediate vicinity. Thus, in the face of "AAA's" positive
identification of Padlan as her rapist, we reject Padlan's defense of
alibi.
The Court, however, disagrees with the RTC and the CA with regard
to the imposition of penalty for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. 2757-M-2005. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
imposed the penalty of imprisonment of five (5) months and eleven
(11) days of arresto mayor as minimum and two (2) years, .four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum
pursuant to the provisions of Art. 336 of the RPC. The RTC did not
apply the penalty prescribed by Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 since
according to the RTC, "the informations did not particularly allege
what particular Section of R.A. 7610 ha[d] been violated by the
accused."23
We disagree with the RTC.
A plain reading of the accusatory portion of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 2757-M-2005 reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Amante Padlan
y Leones @ Butog of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness penalized
under the provisions of Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to R.A. 7610, Sec. 5 (b), committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of September, 2005, in the municipality
of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a nine (9) year old minor, by
touching her vagina and against her will, thereby badly affecting the
psychological and emotional well being of said AAA.
24
Contrary to law. (Emphasis supplied)
To be held liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA
7610, the following elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336
of the RPC must be me
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.1âwphi1
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.25 In
addition to the elements under Art. 336 of the RPC, the following
requisites for sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610, must
also be established to wit:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 26
In the present case, the Infonnation in Criminal Case No. 2757-M-
2005 specifically stated: (1) that "AAA" was a nine-year old minor at
the time of the incident; and (2) that Padlan committed acts of
lasciviousness against "AAA" by touching her vagina. Contrary to the
ruling of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA, we find that the
elements of lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
have been sufficiently alleged in the Information and duly proven
during trial.
Sec. 2(h), of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610
defines lascivious conduct as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person. (Emphasis supplied)
More importantly, Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 specifically states the
following:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or. any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexua:l abuse.
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; x x x
In People v. Aycardo,27 the Court explained that a child need not be
exploited in prostitution for the provisions of RA 7 610 to apply:
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 punishes sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but
also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one -
through coercion, intimidation or influence - engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. Thus, a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.
It is clear from the above that "AAA" need not be a child exploited in
prostitution for money or profit in order for the provisions of RA 7160
to apply. As long as a child is subjected to sexual abuse, either by
engaging in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, the penalty
under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of RA 7610 shall be the proper imposable
penalty.
In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court held:
Thus a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of
any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she
was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious
conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred on once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A.
7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that
Article III of R.A. 7 610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover a situation
where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law
covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual
abuse. x x x
Accordingly, a modification of the penalty imposed by the RTCin
Criminal Case No. 2757-M-2005 is in order.
The proper imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under the
circumstances is reclusion temporal in its medium period which
ranges from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) provides that if the offense is
punished under a special law, as in this case, the maximum term
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. 29 Nonetheless, the Court had already held in People v.
Simon30 that when an offense is defined in a special law but the
penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC,
the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code
would necessarily apply to the special law. Thus, in People v.
Santos,31 which also involved a case of acts of lasciviousness under
Sec. 5 (b ), Art. III of RA 7610, the Court held that in the absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the minimum term shall be
taken from the penalty one degree lower to the prescribed penalty of
reclusion temporal medium, that is reclusion temporal minimum,
which ranges from twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one
(21) days to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, while the
maximum shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable
penalty, that is reclusion temporal medium, which ranges from fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days to sixteen (16) years,
five (5) months and nine (9) days.
6|Page
Applying the foregoing, in Criminal Case No. 2757-M-2005, Padlan is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Furthermore, Padlan is ordered to pay the victim, "AAA," the amounts
of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱15,000.00 as moral damages;
₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and a fine of ₱15,000.00 in line
with prevailing jurisprudence.32
Finally, as to the award of damages in Criminal Case Nos. 2755-M-
2005 and 2756-M-2005 for the crime of rape, the Court increases the
same in line with the rule enunciated in People v. Jugueta,33 where
the Court held that in the crime of rape where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of damages should be
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Hence in Criminal Case Nos.
2755-M-2005 and 2756-M-2005, where Padlan was convicted of two
(2) counts of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the Court
further modifies the award of exemplary damages to ₱75,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the April 15, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05517 is AFFIRMED with FURTHER
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 2755-M-2005 and 2756-M-2005,
appellant Amante Padlan is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape as defined under
Article 266-A (l)(d) and penalized under Article 266- B of
the Revised Penal Code. Appellant Amante Padlan is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay the victim,
"AAA," the increased amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 2757-M-2005, appellant Amante
Padlan is found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness as
defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to, and penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610. Appellant Amante Padlan is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered
to pay the victim, "AAA," the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as
civil indemnity; ₱15,000.00 as moral damages;
₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and a fine of
₱15,000.00, all with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 228887, August 02, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINADOR
UDTOHAN Y JOSE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
On appeal is the May 30, 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06944, which affirmed the June 26, 2014
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Taguig City (RTC)
in Criminal Case Nos. 146314-15, finding accused-appellant
Dominador Udtohan y Jose (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A
(1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Violation of Section 5
(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610.
In two (2) Informations,3 dated September 13, 2011, accused-
appellant was charged as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 146314
That, in the month of April 2011, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the paternal uncle of AAA, a minor, 11 years old,
by means of violence and intimidation and with lewd designs and
intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said victim
against her will and consent, to her damages and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 146315
That, on or about the 11th day of September 2011, in the City of
Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being then the paternal uncle of AAA, a
minor, 11 years old, by means of violence and intimidation and with
lewd designs and with intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious conduct
with said victim, against her will and consent, by then and there
inserting his finger inside her vagina, which are acts prejudicial to the
normal growth and development as a child.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On October 18, 2011, accused-appellant was arraigned and he
pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses tended to establish
that AAA, who was then eleven (11) years old, together with her
mother, BBB, and two (2) siblings, stayed for free in the house of her
paternal uncle, accused-appellant herein, located at Block 5, XXX
Street, Sitio XXX, Western XXX, XXX. Because AAA's father, DDD,
was in jail for murder, accused-appellant helped BBB in taking care of
her children.
Sometime in April 2011, AAA went with accused-appellant, whom she
called CCC, to the YYY Camp, Sitio XXX, to buy some bananas.
Accused-appellant would buy bananas everyday and AAA helped him
in selling banana cue as she was still on vacation from school.
While on their way to the YYY Camp, accused-appellant suddenly
dragged AAA towards the grassy portion of a vacant lot. Then and
there, he had carnal knowledge with AAA by inserting his penis inside
her vagina. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant pushed AAA
out of the road and proceeded to buy some bananas. He threatened
AAA that should she tell anyone about the incident, he would eject
her family from his house and he would not feed them. Subsequently,
accused-appellant would sexually abuse AAA almost every day at the
same place.
Later, on September 11, 2011, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, at the house of accused-appellant, he molested AAA by
caressing and touching her vagina. AAA did not tell anyone about
accused-appellant's bestial acts against her because she was afraid
that the latter would evict them and kill her.
On the following day, when AAA was at school, she revealed her
ordeal to her teacher who was then suspicious of her odd behavior.
On that same day, accused-appellant's live-in-partner disclosed to
BBB that she saw him insert his finger into AAA's vagina. BBB
immediately went to AAA's school to verify the information. Thereat,
BBB sought the help of AAA's teacher and they went to
the barangay to lodge a complaint. The barangay referred them to the
police station.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame wherein PCI Shane Lore Detaballi (PCI Detaballi) conducted a
genital examination and found the presence of deep-healed
lacerations at the 3, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in AAA's hymen,
showing blunt penetrating trauma. AAA then gave her sworn
statement before the Women and Children Protection Desk to confirm
the veracity of her allegations.
Evidence of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant as its
sole witness. He vehemently denied the accusations against him.
Instead, he claimed that the charges were fabricated by BBB, AAA's
mother, because she was mad and angry at DDD, her husband and
brother of accused-appellant. He also added that BBB was coaching
her children to testify against him and that she threatened to
physically harm them should they refuse to follow her.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision, dated June 26, 2014, the RTC found accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape under
Article 266-A (1) (d) of the RPC and violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610. It found that AAA was born on October 7, 1999, as shown
by in her birth certificate, and that she was eleven (11) years old
when the two separate sexual abuses occurred. The trial court held
that the testimony of AAA was clear, candid, straightforward, and
convincing regarding the sexual abuses she suffered at the hands of
her uncle. The RTC also ruled that the medico-legal certificate
corroborated the testimony of AAA. The RTC disposed the case in
this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding Dominador Udtohan y Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape and violation of Sec. 5(b) R.A.
7610, this court hereby sentences him as follows:
7|Page

In Crim. Case No. 146314 to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay AAA Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as
moral damages and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
In Crim. Case No. 146315 to suffer the penalty of 12 years and 1 day
of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to 15
years and 6 months of Reclusion Temporal in its medium period, as
maximum; and to pay AAA Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated an appeal to the CA. He
argued that the testimony of AAA was not credible because there
were diverging statements regarding the number of incidents of rape
he allegedly committed.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, dated May 30, 2016, the CA denied the
appeal. It held that the testimony of AAA regarding the two sexual
abuses was clear and convincing. The CA underscored that AAA was
able to describe each incident of rape and sexual abuse committed
by her uncle, accused-appellant. Also, it did not give weight to the
self-serving denial of accused-appellant and his claim that AAA's
mother, who was mad at his brother, initiated the charges. The CA
added that accused-appellant miserably failed to establish the ill-will
or motive of AAA or her mother.
The fallo reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 26,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of XXX City, Branch 69, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that, interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum, shall be imposed on the
total monetary awards in the appealed decision until the same are
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
I After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court finds that accused-
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S TESTIMONY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.7
In a Resolution,8 dated February 27, 2017, the Court required the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desired. In his Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,9 dated
April 5, 2017, accused-appellant manifested that he was adopting his
appellant's brief filed before the CA as his supplemental brief. In its
Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,10 dated April 12, 2017,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that it was no longer
filing a supplemental brief, there being no significant transaction,
occurrence or event that happened since the filing of the appellee's A: Kasi po ni-rape po niya ako.
brief.
Q: You said you were rape (sic), how many times?
A: Two po.
The Court's Ruling
Q: AAA, when was the first time?
The appeal lacks merit.
A: April 2011, Sir.
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: About what time?
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious
A: 3:00 P.M.
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years
Q: Where did this happen?
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
A: At the YYY Camp, Sir.
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
Q: What were you doing at YYY Camp, Sitio XXX at that time?
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
A: We were about to buy bananas, Sir.
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;[Emphasis
Q: You said "kami" who was with you?
supplied]
A: Tito CCC, sir.
As stated above, when the victim of rape or acts of lasciviousness is
below twelve (12) years old, the offender shall be prosecuted under
Q: So what happened while you were going out to buy bananas?
the RPC, provided that the penalty for lascivious conduct shall
A: He pulled me in the grassy portion, Sir.
be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman
below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to
Q: AAA you said that you were rape? (sic)
the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary
A:Opo
as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the
absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is
Q: What happened to your private parts if any?
below the age of 12.11 Moreover, under Article 266-B of the RPC,
A: Nasira po.
there is qualified rape when the victim is below 18 years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
Q: Ipinakita ko sa iyo ito ay...ano ang tingin mo dito manika?
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
A: Opo.
law spouse of the parent of the victim.12
Q: Ngayon, ito ay manika at ang nirerepresent ng manika na ito
On the other hand, acts of lasciviousness under the RPC has the
ay...ano ba ang tingin mo dito mukha ba siyang lalaki or babae?
following elements: that the offender commits any act of
A: Lalaki po.
lasciviousness or lewdness; that it is done by using force or
intimidation, or when the offended party is deprived of reason or
Q: So itong lalaki na ito may mukha, may kamay at paa, meron ding
otherwise unconscious; or when the offended party is under 12 years
siyang katulad noong nasa lalaki...maari mo bang ituro sa amin kung
of age; and that the offended party is another person of either sex.13
ano ang ginamit niya?
AAA pointed to the private part of the anatomically correct doll.
appellant is guilty of qualified rape and acts of lasciviousness under
the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
PROSECUTOR DE DIOS:
The testimony of AAA showed that the she was able to establish with
Your Honor, can I unbare?
clear and candid detail her age at the time of the incident, the identity
of accused-appellant, her relationship with him, and the specific
COURT:
bestial acts committed by him, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Who are you complaining against?
Yes pero dahan-dahan lang baka magulat si AAA.
A: Tito CCC, Sir.
Q: AAA, this doll is representing a male person. Now a male person
Q: Do you see Tito CCC in the premises?
has its own private parts. I'd like to show to you a depiction of such
A: None, Sir.
private part, is that okay with you?
A: Opo.
Q: If you will go out, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: I'd like to show to you this portion of the doll, now what do you
know about this portion? Ano ito?
Q: Please go out?
A: Witness pointed to a male man wearing yellow t-shirt when asked
COURT:
for his name, he answered CCC.
Q: Ano ba ang alam mo na tawag sa ganyan? Alam mo ba?
A: Opo.
Q: AAA, why are you suing Tito CCC?
8|Page
Q: Ano ang tawag diyan, alam mo ba? Qualified Rape
A: Witness just pointed the private parts of the anatomical (sic)
correct doll It is apparent from the testimony of AAA that she suffered sexual
abuses at the hands of accused-appellant, her own uncle. The first
PROSECUTOR DE DIOS: instance occurred in April 2011, on their way to Camp YYY to buy
bananas when accused-appellant pushed AAA to the grassy portion
Q: AAA, am I correct to say that this was the part of the body used by and raped her. Despite her tender age and traumatizing experience,
Tito CCC in raping you? AAA was able to describe in open court, through an anatomically
A: Opo. correct doll, that accused-appellant used and inserted his penis in her
vagina which caused her tremendous pain and injuries.
Q: Now, on September 11, 2011, you also said that you were
molested by Tito CCC, what time? After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant warned her not to relate
A: 10:00 P.M. the incident to anybody, otherwise, he would evict her family and he
would kill her. Evidently, accused-appellant used threats and
Q: Where did this happen? intimidation against AAA, which caused her to suffer silently in fear
A: Sa bahay po. until she finally disclosed her ordeal to her teacher. Further, AAA was
only eleven (11) years old at the time of the rape incident, as
Q: Now, AAA you said that you were molested, how were you evidenced by her birth certificate.
molested by Tito CCC exactly?
The Court does not give credence to accused-appellant's argument
COURT: that AAA's testimony was incredible because there were inconsistent
statements regarding the frequency of the abuses. Inconsistencies in
Q: Gusto mo bang gamitin ulit or ituro...bibigay ko ulit ang doll kay the testimony of the victim do not necessarily render such testimony
Prosec.dito mo na lang ituro kung ano ang ginamit sa iyo o may incredible. In fact, minor inconsistencies strengthen the credibility of
ginamit o anong parte ng katawan? the witness and the testimony, because of a showing that such
charges are not fabricated. What is decisive in a charge of rape is the
PROSECUTOR DE DIOS: complainant's positive identification of the accused as the
malefactor.15
Q: May ginamit ba si Tito CCC anong parte ng...katawan?
A: Kamay po. Testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are
credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was
Q: So what did he do with his hands to your persons? abused deserves full credence.16 It is a well-settled rule that factual
A: Hinipo niya ako. findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape
victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
Q: AAA, with the use of Tito CCC's hands, where did he touch you? disturbed on appeal.17
A: Sa ari ko po.
Moreover, the medico-legal report corroborated the testimony of AAA.
xxxx It showed the presence of deep-healed lacerations at the 3, 6 and 9
o'clock positions in AAA's hymen, showing blunt penetrating trauma.
Q: Do you have any proof AAA to show us that you were indeed born Time and again, the Court held that the slightest penetration of the
on October 7, 1999? labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of
A: Opo. rape.18
Q: I'd like to show to you certificate of live birth, is this your certificate Nevertheless, the crime committed by accused-appellant must be
of live birth? qualified under Article 266-B of the RPC. It was indicated in the
A: Opo. Informations that accused-appellant was the paternal uncle of AAA.
Also, during trial, AAA positively identified accused-appellant as her
xxxx uncle and she established that it was her uncle who raped her. There
is qualified rape when the victim is below 18 years of age and the
Q: I noticed the first molestation was on (sic) April 2011 and the offender is an ascendant or relative by consanguinity or affinity within
second was on (sic) September 2011, from April up to September the third civil degree. In this case, accused-appellant, the paternal
why did you not tell anyone that you were subject of the molestation? uncle of AAA, was a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
A: Natakot po ako. degree. Hence, the crime of qualified rape was committed by
accused-appellant.
Q: Who are you afraid of?
A: Kay Tito CCC po. Acts of Lasciviousness
Q: So why are you afraid of Tito CCC? Aside from the qualified rape committed by accused-appellant, AAA
A: Baka po kasi palayasin kami at patayin ako. testified positively that he also sexually molested her. She stated that
on September 11, 2011, at his house, around 10:00 o'clock in the
Q: You said "baka" why did you say that you might be evicted or evening, the accused-appellant touched and caressed her genitals.
killed? Why do you say that? This was confirmed by his live-in-partner when she reported the
A: Kasi iyon po ang sinabi niya sa akin. x x x14 incident to BBB.
Section 5 Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides that when the victim is
under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under the
RPC, but the penalty shall be that provided in R.A. No.
7610.19 Lascivious conduct is defined as "[t]he intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person."20
In this case, the conduct of accused-appellant in intentionally
touching and caressing the genitals of AAA constituted an act of
lasciviousness. He must be punished under the prescribed penalty of
R.A. No. 7610 as AAA was below 12 years of age at the time of the
incident. The aggravating circumstance of relationship must also be
taken into consideration.
Denial is a weak defense
Accused-appellant interposed a defense of denial by vehemently
denying the accusations against him. It is an established rule,
however, that denial is an inherently weak defense and constitutes
self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible
witness.21
Indeed, the positive testimony of AAA outweighs the denial proffered
by accused-appellant. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the
child-victim of the identity of the accused and his involvement in the
crime attributed to him.22
Moreover, accused-appellant's assertion that the charges were
merely instituted by BBB because she was mad or angry with DDD,
his brother, was utterly unsubstantiated. Motives such as resentment,
hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim.23 Evidently, no
woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or
ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to
seek justice for the wrong done to her being.24
Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 146314, the crime committed was qualified rape
under Paragraph 6(1), Article 266-B of the RPC and the imposable
penalty is death. With the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, however, the
imposition of the death penalty is prohibited and the proper penalty
would be reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole.
In Criminal Case No. 146315, the crime committed was acts of
lasciviousness. As the victim was below 12 years of age, the penalty
provided under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, reclusion temporal in
its medium period, must be imposed. Further, the aggravating
circumstance of relationship between the accused-appellant and AAA
is present. Thus, the Court finds that the proper imposable penalty is
12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as
minimum, to 16 years, 5 months and 10 days of reclusion temporal in
its medium period, as maximum.25
As to the awards of damages in qualified rape, People v.
Jugueta26 provides the following awards of damages: P100,000.00 as
9|Page
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In acts of lasciviousness, People v.
Aycardo27 enumerates the following awards of damages: P20,000.00
as civil indemnity; P15,000 as moral damages; and P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages. As properly held by the CA, the amounts of
damages awarded shall earn an interest of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the June 26, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 69, Taguig City, in Criminal Case Nos. 146314-15,
is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 146314, finding accused
Dominador Udtohan y Jose GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of QUALIFIED RAPE under Article 266-A (1) (d) and penalized under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole;
and to pay AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
In Criminal Case No. 146315, finding accused Dominador Udtohan y
Jose GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court
sentences him to suffer the penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months
and 10 days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum;
and to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P15,000.00 as moral damages, and P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
In both cases, the amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULITO
DIVINAGRACIA, SR., Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
1 unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness against
"Pa, don't do that[,] Pa."
Child victims of rape by their very own fathers usually continue to live
in an environment where the perpetrators consistently underscore the
weakness and worthlessness of their victims. In addition to the
continued economic dependence of the child victims, this ensures
enormous difficulty to find a safe space for them to reveal their ordeal
and ensure protection. The animosity and intolerable indignity that
child victims experience often lead them to find the courage to seek
succor from someone who appears to have moral ascendancy over
their perpetrator. This is often their mother, although at times, it may
also be a relative.
This case is the story of the courage of AAA and BBB, sisters who
were sexually molested by their father.
This resolves the appeal, through Rule 124, Section 13, paragraph
(c)2 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Matter No.
00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, of the October 7, 2009 Joint
Judgment3 of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City in
Criminal Case Nos. DU-8072 and DU-8074. The trial court found
accused Julito Divinagracia, Sr. (Divinagracia) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of rape in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610 and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610. The Court of Appeals,4 upon intermediate
review, affirmed the trial court's Decision.
This Court restates the facts as found by the lower courts.
Divinagracia and CCC were husband and wife with seven (7)
children.5 The family lived in a one (1)-room house at Jagobiao,
Mandaue City near the boundary of Riverside, Consolacion.6
Sometime in November 1996,7 Divinagracia and CCC quarrelled,
prompting CCC to leave and spend the night at her sibling's house.
Their daughters AAA and BBB were then left by themselves8 since
their other siblings were either at their grandmother's house or with
their friends.9
Later that evening, while AAA and BBB were sleeping side by side
inside their house, BBB suddenly woke up to her father's tight
embrace from behind and felt him roughly running his hand over her
leg and breasts. BBB then felt her father poking his hard penis
against her buttocks. BBB begged her father to stop, saying that she
still had to go to school the following day. Divinagracia moved away
from BBB and went out of the house.10
BBB was nine (9) years old at that time.11
A few minutes later, Divinagracia went back inside the house and lay
down beside AAA.12 AAA woke up and asked her father where her
mother was. Divinagracia pinched her ear and ordered her to keep
quiet.13
AAA noticed that BBB, who was then lying beside her, slowly moved
away. AAA tried to follow BBB, but Divinagracia pulled AAA towards
him and made her face him. Divinagracia pulled down AAA's shorts
and put his finger inside her vagina. Afterwards, Divinagracia got on
top of AAA and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA's father
then continued to molest her.14
AAA cried to her sister for help but BBB could do nothing but weep
and cover her ears.15 AAA was eight (8) years old at that time.16
The following day, AAA was shocked and scared to find blood stains
on her shorts. Divinagracia merely laughed when he saw AAA's
distress.17
When CCC arrived later that day, AAA told her that she was molested
by Divinagracia. AAA did not say that she was raped because she
was afraid that her parents would only quarrel again. However, CCC
did not believe her daughter. AAA claimed that CCC told Elvira
Aburido (Aburido), Divinagracia's sister, about the molestation.18
On January 19, 1999, or a little over two (2) years after the incident,
Sister Mary Ann Abuna (Sister Mary Ann), CCC's sister and a
nun,19 visited her family in Cebu.20
That same day, AAA told Sister Mary Ann that she wanted to stop her
schooling and begged to go with her back to Manila because she did
not want to see her father anymore. Sister Mary Ann asked AAA's
sisters if their father had changed his ways. BBB and their other sister
responded that he had not reformed and even almost raped them.21
Sister Mary Ann asked the sisters to leave Cebu and go back with her
to Manila to prevent their father from further molesting them. She
brought AAA, BBB, their other sister, and CCC back with her to
Manila. A few days later they all went to Pampanga where Sister
Mary Ann was a missionary.22
While in Pampanga, AAA saw CCC crying because she wanted to go
back to Cebu. AAA then went to Sister Mary Ann and declared that if
CCC would return to Cebu, she would not go back with her. It was at
this point that AAA opened up to Sister Mary Ann about the sexual
abuse she suffered from her father.23
Sister Mary Ann brought AAA to the Hospital Ning in Angeles City to
be examined by a doctor.24 After examining AAA, Dr. Lauro C. Biag
(Dr. Biag) issued a medical certificate,25 a portion of which read:
Genitalia: labia majora/minora - well coaptated.
Hymen: orifice 0.7 cm old healed complete laceration on 11, 8, 2
o'clock.
old healed incomplete laceration 5 & 10 o'clock.
(-) abrasion, (-) hematoma, (-) discharge26
Sister Mary Ann helped the girls file their respective
complaints27 against their father. At first, BBB was hesitant to file a
complaint but she finally agreed because AAA would not stop crying
and was always afraid.28
On November 13, 2000, Divinagracia was charged with rape and acts
of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.29 Pertinent
portions of the Information for rape read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the month of November 1996 in the Municipality of
Consolacion, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with deliberate
intent, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his own
daughter an [8-year-old] girl at that time, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.30
The Information for acts of lasciviousness
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the month of November 1996 in the Municipality of
Consolacion, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully,
[BBB], his own daughter, a [12-year-old] girl by embracing her,
pressing his penis against her buttocks and touching her breasts,
against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.31
Divinagracia, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge of
rape against him.32 During pre-trial, defense admitted the following
facts and stipulations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
10 | P a g e
1. The existence of a birth certificate of the private offended party.
Her birth certificate shows that she was born in Consolacion, Cebu on
October 29, 1988;
2. The accused is the father of the private offended party;
3. On November 1996 and prior thereto, the accused had been living
together with his wife and children at Riverside, Consolacion, Cebu;
4. The existence of a medical certificate of the private offended party
signed by a certain Dr. Lauro Biag, Medical Officer III of Hospital Ning
Angeles City[.]33
The prosecution, in turn, admitted the following facts and
stipulations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The house where the family of the accused stays at Riverside,
Consolacion, Cebu is a one room affair, is about 6x8 meters which is
more or less half of the area of this courtroom;
2. The whole family which includes seven (7) children, the accused
and his wife slept in the same house;
3. The next door neighbor is about four (4) feet away from the house
of the accused;
4. Elvira Divinagracia Aburido, sister of the accused, also lives at
Riverside, Consolacion, Cebu;
5. The complaint against the accused was filed at the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office on July 31, 2000.34
The complaints for rape and acts of lasciviousness against
Divinagracia were eventually consolidated for trial.35
Divinagracia, assisted by counsel, also pleaded not guilty to the
charge of acts of lasciviousness against him.36 Defense then admitted
the following facts and stipulations during pre-
trial:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The accused is the father of the complaining witness;
2. The accused and the private complainant (his daughter) were
residing at Riverside, Consolacion, Cebu at the time this incident
occurred in November 1996 and prior thereto. As a matter of fact,
according to Atty. Rodriguez, all the members of the family of the
accused lived together at this place at this given time;
3. The existence of a Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate of the complaining witness.37
On the other hand, the prosecution admitted the following
stipulations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. All the seven (7) children including the father and the mother lived
together in a one-room house at Riverside, Consolacion, Cebu;
2. The mother of the complaining witness is a housewife;
3. The uncles and aunties of the complaining witness also live in
Consolacion, Cebu;
4. The next door neighbor of the family of the complaining witness at
Riverside, Consolacion, Cebu is about 4 feet away from their house;
5. The records show a [Si]numpaang Salaysay executed by the
complaining witness and subscribed before the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City on November 1999.38
The prosecution presented the following as witnesses: AAA, BBB,
Sister Mary Ann, and Dr. Naomi Poca (Dr. Poca).
Dr. Poca, a pediatrician who was also a child protection
specialist,39 interpreted the medical findings of Dr. Biag, who failed to
attend the hearings due to the distance of Angeles City, Pampanga
from Mandaue City, Cebu.40
Dr. Poca testified that the healed lacerations at 11:00, 2:00, and
10:00 positions are "more likely congenital rather than
acquired".41 However, the lacerations at 8:00 and 5:00 positions
could have only been caused by penetration into the
vagina.42 Moreover, given AAA's disclosure, Dr. Poca opined that the
healed laceration at 8:00 position suggested sexual abuse.43
The defense presented the following as its witnesses: Divinagracia,
his neighbors Pamela Sison (Sison), Alvin Ho (Ho), Darwin Isok
(Isok), and his sister Aburido.
Divinagracia denied abusing his daughters44 and claimed that they
had a happy45 family life. He further claimed that he only found out
about the complaints for molestation against him when he was
arrested in 2001.46 Divinagracia then accused his wife's family of
plotting against him.47
Sison testified that Divinagracia and his family had been her
neighbors as far back as the 1980s. Sison claimed that CCC used to
go to her house all the time to complain about her financial problems
and quarrels with Divinagracia.48 Sison further averred that despite
beating his wife, Divinagracia appeared to be a loving father because
he was very affectionate and sent his children to school, even if he
was financially hard-up most of the time.49
Ho, who had been Divinagracia's neighbor since 1992, attested that
Divinagracia would often quarrel with and hit CCC.50 He claimed that
it was impossible for Divinagracia to abuse his children because they
were always playful.51 He added that he had never seen the children
look weak and tired or heard them complain.52
Isok claimed that he was friends with some of Divinagracia's children
as they all lived in the same neighborhood.53 Isok testified that he
was close with and fond of Divinagracia's family, yet he never heard
of any problems between Divinagracia and his children.54
Aburido testified to being Divinagracia's sister and aunt to AAA and
BBB.55 She claimed that she was not close to Divinagracia and his
family but that her nieces and nephews would sometimes ask her for
rice. Her brother would also go to her whenever he had any financial
problem. Aburido claimed that she first found out about her brother's
supposed abuse of AAA and BBB when he was arrested.56
In its Joint Judgment57 dated October 7, 2009, Branch 28, Regional
Trial Court, Mandaue City found Divinagracia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges of rape and acts of lasciviousness
against him.
In DU-8072, the Regional Trial Court ruled that AAA's testimony was
direct, candid, and convincing, clearly proving that Divinagracia had
carnal knowledge of AAA when she was only eight (8) years old. The
Regional Trial Court also held that Dr. Poca's testimony corroborated
AAA's version of the abuse she experienced.58
In DU-8074, the Regional Trial Court found BBB's testimony to be
clear and convincing on the acts of lasciviousness committed by her
father. The Regional Trial Court held that BBB was direct and
remained consistent and steadfast during her testimony.59
The Regional Trial Court further held that Sister Mary Ann's testimony
corroborated both the testimonies of AAA and BBB.60
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court's Joint Judgment
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in DU-8072, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Julito Divinagracia, Sr., guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape. The Court hereby imposes upon him the indeterminate
sentence of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties
of the law.
In DU-8074, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Julito
Divinagracia, Sr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of
lasciviousness. The Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of 14
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as the minimum term to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as the maximum term
together with the accessory penalties of the law.
The accused shall be given credit of his preventive detention but he
shall not be eligible for parole.
With costs against the accused.
IT IS SO ORDERED.61
On March 8, 2010, after Divinagracia filed an appeal from the Joint
Judgment, the Regional Trial Court transmitted the records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.62
On July 30, 2012, the Court of Appeals 63 denied Divinagracia's
appeal.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial Court that AAA's
testimony on her father's rape was clear, candid, and deserving of
belief. Additionally, her testimony was corroborated by BBB.64 The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this appeal is DENIED.
The Joint Judgment dated October 7, 2009 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28, Mandaue City, in Criminal Case Nos.
DU-8072 and DU-8074 finding him guilty for Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness, respectively, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.65
Divinagracia filed a Notice of Appeal66 with the Court of Appeals. On
August 28, 2013, this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court
of Appeals and informed the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs. This Court also required the Chief
Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison to confirm Divinagracia's
confinement therein.67
On November 12, 2013, Divinagracia manifested68 that he would be
adopting in toto the contents of his brief69 filed before the Court of
Appeals.
On November 15, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General also
manifested70 that it would be adopting its brief71 filed before the Court
of Appeals.
In his Appellant's Brief, Divinagracia points to several inconsistencies
in the testimonies of AAA and BBB that purportedly lessen their
credibility as witnesses.
11 | P a g e
First, he claims that it was not clear when AAA told Sister Mary Ann
about her rape. AAA claimed that she confided to her aunt Sister
Mary Ann when she visited them in Cebu in 1996. However, Sister
Mary Ann testified that AAA only told her about the rape when they
were in Pampanga in 1999.72
Second, AAA testified that she told her mother about the rape the
following day after it happened. This contradicts Sister Mary Ann's
testimony that AAA's mother only learned of the rape after AAA was
physically examined in Pampanga. Furthermore, AAA said that after
she told her mother, CCC disclosed what happened to Aburido.
During her testimony, Aburido denied that she knew about the rape
and claimed that she only found out about it when her brother was
arrested.73
Third, Divinagracia emphasizes that BBB never actually saw him
having sexual intercourse with AAA since BBB only testified to seeing
him on top of AAA. Divinagracia also insists that BBB's accusation of
acts of lasciviousness against him was uncorroborated, even by AAA
who was in the same room when it supposedly happened.74
Finally, Divinagracia asserts that the charges of rape and acts of
lasciviousness against him were unfounded and that his guilt was
never established beyond reasonable doubt.75
The prosecution, in turn, avers that it was able to prove Divinagracia's
guilt on both charges beyond reasonable doubt.76
The prosecution posits that the straightforward and candid
testimonies of AAA and BBB, with the medical certificate issued by
Dr. Biag corroborating AAA's testimony, sufficiently proved the
elements of the charges against their father.77
The prosecution contends that the supposed inconsistencies on when
AAA told Sister Mary Ann of the abuse or when CCC and Aburido
learned of the ordeal she underwent are trivial matters, which have
no bearing on the crimes committed.78
The issue for resolution before this Court is whether the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt Divinagracia's guilt for the crimes of
rape and acts of lasciviousness against his minor daughters.
This Court affirms Divinagracia's conviction with some modifications.
I
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, and
Sister Mary Ann are immaterial as these are not elements of the
crime and do not detract from the credibility of the witnesses. In fact,
minor inconsistencies may even be expected from AAA and BBB who
are not accustomed to public trial and were only eight (8) and nine (9)
years old, respectively, at the time of their father's sexual abuse.79
The rule cited in People v. Pacala80 that inconsistencies on minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity, substance, or
weight of the witness' testimony finds application in the case at bar.81
Divinagracia insists on inconsistencies on when AAA and BBB told
Sister Mary Ann about their father's attack. AAA claims that she told
her aunt sometime in 1996,82 contradicting Sister Mary Ann's
testimony that AAA told her about the rape in 1999.83
The records show that AAA admitted that she could no longer recall
when she told her aunt of the rape, but AAA was consistent in her
testimony that she eventually told her aunt about the rape when they
left Cebu.84 This corroborates Sister Mary Ann's testimony that she
only learned of AAA's rape in 1999, when they were no longer in
Cebu. As found by the Court of Appeals:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Stress is made that per the victim's testimony, when Sister [Mary]
Ann visited their family here in Cebu in 1996, she (AAA) did not say
that she was raped but was molested. She only divulged the real
incident when they were already in Manila and even then, her
relatives required that she undergo a medical examination, which
could have been an avenue for them to verify and ascertain that what
she was telling, that is, about being raped by her father, was the truth.
Moreover, it was BBB who was adamant that they told Sister Mary
Anne [sic] about the incident in 1999 while they were already in
Manila. Sister Mary Anne [sic] herself even testified that she was told
that the children were abused while still in Cebu and was told about
the rape only in Manila. She even asked her niece AAA to undergo a
medical examination in order to confirm if AAA was really
raped.85 (Citations omitted)
These supposed discrepancies, not being elements of the crime, do
not diminish the credibility of AAA's declarations. Jurisprudence has
held "youth and immaturity [to be] badges of truth and sincerity"86 and
has generally given leeway to minor witnesses when relating
traumatic incidents of the past.87
II
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provides the
elements for the crime of rape:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. — Rape is
committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
Rape becomes qualified when committed by a parent against his
child less than 18 years of age. This is provided for under paragraph
1, Article 266-B:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
....
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
The elements of qualified rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a
woman; (3) [done] by force and without consent; ... (4) the victim is
under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and (5) the
offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the
victim."88
It was not disputed that AAA was eight (8) years old in November
1996. The medical findings of Dr. Biag, as interpreted and testified to
by Dr. Poca, also corroborate AAA's allegations of her father's abuse.
Dr. Poca testified that while some of the healed lacerations could still
be considered as normal variant finding rather than acquired, the
lacerations at 8:00 and 5:00 positions could have only been caused
by the insertion of a penis, object, or finger into the
vagina:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At 11, 8 and 2 - the findings at 11 and 2 o'clock are still considered,
based on studies, more likely congenital rather than acquired,
whereas the 8 o'clock finding is more likely an acquired condition and
that could have been caused by penetration of the vagina. Then the
old healed incomplete laceration ... at 5 and 10 o'clock, again the 10
o'clock might still be a normal finding or a normal variant finding, but
the 5 o'clock is more probably the result of an acquired condition like
trauma.89
Dr. Poca likewise testified that given AAA's revelation of her ordeal
caused by her father, "the complete healed laceration at 8:00 o'clock"
is indicative of sexual abuse.90
People v. Noveras91 emphasized that when a rape victim's allegation
is corroborated by a physician's finding of penetration, "there is
sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge."92
It is well-established that "[p]hysical evidence is evidence of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses."93 The physical evidence of the healed lacerations in
AAA's vagina strongly corroborates AAA and BBB's testimonies that
AAA was raped by their father.
Nonetheless, this Court notes that even if AAA was only physically
examined almost three (3) years after she was sexually abused by
her father, the defense never questioned the credibility of the expert
witness, nor was Dr. Poca's testimony impeached.
The trial court, as upheld by the Court of Appeals, also ruled that
AAA's testimony was credible and competent, sufficiently proving the
charge of rape against her father, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The private complainant categorically stated that the accused (her
father) had sexual intercourse with her. The private complainant
clearly described the rape incident. "After he pulled my waist, he had
me face him and he pulled down my shorts and. at that time I was not
wearing any panty then he inserted his penis into my vagina but first
he inserted his finger." This candid description of the molestations is
a direct statement that undoubtedly shows carnal knowledge by the
accused with his daughter.94 (Emphasis in the original)
It is likewise immaterial that it took AAA more than two (2) years
before divulging the sexual abuse she experienced at her father's
hands.
The records show that the day following her abuse, AAA immediately
told her mother but CCC did not believe her. This lack of support from
the very person she was expecting it from naturally made AAA wary
of whom she could trust. It was only when she became close to and
felt safe with Sister Mary Ann and after she was no longer in Cebu
12 | P a g e
under her father's control that she found the courage to reveal her
traumatic experience. This is consistent with the normal reaction of a
child raped by her father.
Dr. Poca, a child protection specialist, also confirmed that AAA's
failure to immediately disclose her abuse is a normal reaction of
children:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Given her disclosure or her revelation that her father inserted his
finger and later his penis into her vagina but not having disclosed
immediately because of fear which is a normal reaction of children,
and then having disclosed only to an aunt about 3 years later, which
again is a normal reaction of children especially if they do find a
person whom they can trust and whom they can feel safe with,
between 1996 and 1999 if there were any injuries at that point in
1996, that could have healed and giving us these results in
1999.95(Emphasis supplied)
This Court also notes that AAA asked, "Pa, where is Nanay?"96 when
she woke up to find her father lying beside her. Her question was
telling. At that moment, she perhaps already entertained a fear that
something so wrong was about to happen to her. At the same time,
she was trying to tell him that her mother would not approve of what
he was about to do.
Furthermore, BBB testified that her father groped her and poked his
penis against her buttocks but that he stopped and left the house
after she pleaded with him. However, she saw him go back a few
minutes later and she tried to warn AAA by pinching her, but AAA did
not wake up. When AAA did wake up, Divinagracia was already
beside her.97
BBB testified that she saw her father get on top of AAA, who could
not repel his advances. BBB admitted that AAA was crying and
calling out for help the whole time their father was on top of her, but
BBB lamented that she was unable to go to her sister because she
could not move due to fear.98
BBB's reaction is consistent with the normal, expected actuations of a
child seeing her father doing despicable acts on her younger sister,
especially after she herself had fallen victim to his acts of
lasciviousness. Her action is a mixture of denial and fear—denial that
the father whom she trusted could do these acts and fear, not so
much for her physical safety, but more for her economic and financial
support.
The rule is settled that the factual findings and the evaluation of
witnesses' credibility and testimony made by the trial court should be
entitled to great respect, unless it is shown that the trial court may
have "overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or
circumstance of weight and substance."99
Aside from the supposed inconsistencies in AAA's and Sister Mary
Ann's testimonies, Divinagracia only managed to present a defense
of denial, which must fail in light of AAA's categorical and competent
testimony as well as the undisputed findings of healed lacerations in
her vagina. This Court is not swayed by Divinagracia's argument that
his daughters were manipulated by his in-laws into filing these
charges against him. People v. Venturing100 aptly stated that "[n]ot
even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own
father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation
against him is true."101
Even the well-meaning testimonies of the other defense
witnesses102 did not disprove AAA's account of the rape since they
only managed to prove that Divinagracia and his wife constantly
quarrelled. What their testimonies inadvertently revealed, though, penalty of reclusion perpetua if the rape victim is below 12 years old
was Divinagracia's proclivity towards violence, particularly when while the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is
dealing with his wife. His sister and neighbors testified that they imposed if the victim of lascivious conduct is also below 12 years
would regularly hear and see Divinagracia quarrelling with CCC, with old:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Divinagracia usually hitting CCC in the course of their arguments. Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. —
Divinagracia's violent nature frames an inference of a lack of
appreciation of the humanity of every member of the family and ....
highlights his attitude of impunity.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
This Court sees no reason to reverse the findings of the Regional conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that Divinagracia was guilty sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12)
beyond reasonable doubt of rape in relation to Republic Act No. years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
7610. paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
IV
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On the charge of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No.
The Regional Trial Court correctly set the penalty of reclusion
7610, Article 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
perpetua for rape. However, since the victim was under twelve (12)
Republic Act No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct
years of age at the time of the crime, the imposable penalty for
as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
lascivious conduct should have been within the range of 14 years, 8
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
months, and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months, or reclusion
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
temporal in its medium period, as mandated by Republic Act No.
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
7610. Instead, the Regional Trial Court imposed the range of 14
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
years and 4 months to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
Indeterminate Sentence Law107 and with the presence of the
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
alternative aggravating circumstance108of relationship, the maximum
genitals or pubic area of a person[.]
term of the sentence to be imposed should be taken from the
As with the rape case, the parties in the case for acts of
maximum period of the imposable penalty, that is reclusion
lasciviousness also affirmed BBB's minority at the time of the assault
temporal maximum, which ranges from 17 years, 4 months, and 1
and her relationship with Divinagracia.
day to 20 years.109 The minimum term under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law shall be within the range of one (1) degree lower
The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals likewise found that
than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor with a total range of
there was clear and convincing evidence to hold Divinagracia guilty of
six (6) years and one (1) day to 12 years.110
committing sexual violence against his daughter BBB. The lower
courts also found BBB's testimony to be candid, credible, and
There is also a need to review the lack of civil indemnity and other
competent; thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
damages in the decisions of the lower courts. The Regional Trial
Such finding of lasciviousness is solely attributable to the testimony of
Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held that since
the private complainant BBB whom the court considers credible and
Divinagracia, as the father of AAA and BBB, stood to benefit from the
competent. BBB categorically stated that the accused (her father) lay
monetary award, it would not be proper to award civil
down beside her, embraced her and poked his penis to her buttocks.
indemnity:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
BBB clearly recalled the manner the lascivious acts by demonstrating
The Court shall not award civil indemnity to the private complainant.
these in the court. "He embraced me tightly this way (witness
The accused as the father of the private complainants stands to
demonstrating by closing her arms in front of her fist), the (sic) after
benefit from the monetary award if adjudicated to his daughters since
that he slipped his hand from here up to here, touching my body
he is a compulsory heir. The concept of indemnification is not served
(witness demonstrating by tracing her palm from the left thigh upward
if the very person made to pay for his crime shall benefit from it.111
towards the left side of her body under her armpit." This candid
The lower courts are mistaken.
description of the molestation is a direct statement that undoubtedly
proves the crime committed by the accused with his
Civil indemnity ex delicto, as a form of monetary restitution or
daughter.103 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
compensation to the victim, attaches upon a finding of criminal liability
Compared to his daughter's candid and categorical testimony,
because "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
Divinagracia's defense of denial must fail. Imbo v.
liable."112
People104 emphasized that the self-serving defense of denial falters
against the "positive identification by, and straightforward narration of
On the other hand, moral damages are treated as "compensatory
the victim."105
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish
resulting from a wrong."113 The award of moral damages is meant to
This Court has repeatedly held that the lone yet credible testimony of
restore the status quo ante; thus, it must be commensurate to the
the offended party is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.106
suffering and anguish experienced by the victim.114
V Finally, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed as an example
to the public,115 serving as a deterrent to the commission of similar
Despite upholding the findings of fact and appreciation of the acts. Exemplary damages are also awarded as a part of the civil
evidence by the lower courts, there is a need to modify the penalties liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or
awarded. Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 provides for the more aggravating circumstances.116
13 | P a g e

In view of the depravity of the acts committed by Divinagracia against
his minor daughters, this Court imposes the following monetary
awards, in accordance with jurisprudence:
For rape against AAA, Divinagracia is directed to pay AAA
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.117
For acts of lasciviousness against BBB, this Court adopts the ruling
in People v. Santos118 and directs Divinagracia to pay BBB
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
However, in light of the heinous nature of the crime committed,
exemplary damages are increased from P2,000.00 to P20,000.00.
In addition, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.119
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CEB CR-
H.C. No. 01134 dated July 30, 2012 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Julito Divinagracia, Sr. is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of a) reclusion perpetua for the crime
of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610; and b) the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Furthermore, he
is ordered to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00
as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. He is
also ordered to pay BBB P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00
as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. All the
awarded damages shall earn the legal interest rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis
and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y Barretto,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, in its Civil Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of
appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the
defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties
receivea by his deceasea wife under the terms of the will of the late
Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and
Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as
follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the
fishpond, located in the barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the
share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased
Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of
said minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo.
During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real
properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285,
6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of
Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto,
mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small
portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa
Barretto and his nephew anä nieces® The usufruct oæ the fishponä
situateä iî barrio Saî Roque¬ Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned,
however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî the
meantime¬ Maria Gerardo was appointeä administratrix. By virtue
thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her
in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto.
Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance
of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and
the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a
consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share
and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the
issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of
any irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow,
Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was
discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she
instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs;
and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties
in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed
and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso
Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court
held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo
by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.1
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo,
as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the
remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was
given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for
the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right
of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the
other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a
spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano
Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project
of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud
acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto
did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not
acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then
a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower
court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629
of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab
initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto,
predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the
spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the
project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the
Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,
without being so, has been included, shall be null and
void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs
that since Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of
his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud
Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And
it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of
Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from
the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her
from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the
new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that property acquired
by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real
owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a
quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to
return the properties received under the project of partition previously
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mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's
counterclaim. However, it denied defendant's prayer for damages.
Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old
Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court
below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been
instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be
an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said
article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or
descendants, but of heirs(without distinction between forced,
voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to
be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the
heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at
liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he
chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the
legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir,
since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced
heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by
appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance of
preterition or omission of children of the testator's former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a
compromise on the civil status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of
the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous, since a compromise
presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual
concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as
daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while untrue, was at no time
disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can
be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a
compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a
settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a
claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own
name implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that
the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the
distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto
and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil.
629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91,
Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution,
once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was
erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same
should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had
become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in
rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of
distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity
or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's
distribution of the estate of the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated
on the project of partition executed by Salud Barretto and the widow,
Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the minor
Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of
the heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of
distribution can have no greater validity than that of the basic
partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature of a
judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata,
92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of the proposition. That case is
authority for the proposition that a judgment by compromise may be
set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due
time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise
agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In
the case before us, however, the agreement of partition was not only
ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually
consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased
were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long
before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not
apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it
were shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the
project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could
stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano
Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had been made.
In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force
in 1939, provided: .
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is
thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or
letters of administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such
estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if
any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of
estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate
court distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that
the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of
distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did
not formally intervene, still they would be concluded by
the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil
status but as the distribution of the estate as well. As this
Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The
proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and
the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,
through the publication of the notice prescribed by section
630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is
binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of distribution of the
estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is
no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines
should not apply to intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same
case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
instead of an independent action the effect of which, if
successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another
court or judge to throw out a decision or order already
final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared
in Reyes vs. Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156,
157), that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor
when she signed the partition, and that Maria Gerardo
was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not
true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor.
(Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere
statement in the project of partion that the guardianship
proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are
pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian had
not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship
proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a
guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a
guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already
appointed when she signed the project of partition. There
is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project
of partition, apparent on the record of the testate
proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no
power or authority to sign the project of partition as
guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and,
consequently, no ground for the contention that the order
approving the project of partition is absolutely null and
void and may be attacked collaterally in these
proceedings.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not
only made a party by publication but actually appeared and
participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore,
can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance
which settled her father's estate.
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian
(Maria Gerardo) could not have ignored that the distributee Salud
was not her child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited
partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees rights and entitles
her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the
estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed
appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she
was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was committed, it was the
widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud
nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor.
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In the second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief
therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and
the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago.

Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16

years old (Exhibit 24), she became of age five years later, in 1944.
On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of
fraud the court decree distributing her father's estate and the four-
year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43,
Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the
true facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became
extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was already barred
when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this case
contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.

In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto

introduced evidence that appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to
delay filing action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties
received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence
of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions
of Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no
mention of such promise in the decision under appeal. Even more:
granting arguendo that the promise was made, the same can not bind
the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the real parties in
interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being
null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court
(Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).

In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and
Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being
contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2)
that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of
distribution is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her
claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and
should account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by
Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the
plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint
should have been given due course.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now

under appeal is reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-
appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the
properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is affirmed in
so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the
records be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed
with the action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-
4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits thereof, as
prayed for in the complaint No costs.

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