MMDA v.

Jancom
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

Facts of the case: After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a contract for the MMDA’s San Mateo
waste management project. A Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec 19, 1997,
between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through
DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.

The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President
Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San
Mateo residents for the closure of the dumpsite.

When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition
with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management contract.

On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
contract with Jancom was not binding because it was not signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the contract were not
complied with, and there was no valid notice of award.

The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal instead of for certiorari, because a certiorari would only
apply in cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained
only by an appeal from the final decision. Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become final and “gone beyond the
reach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect.”

Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the court took it up just the same, “if only to put the petitioner’s
mind to rest.”

The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the Civil Code.

In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract
does not bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in the contract were not complied with.

But the Court said that the lack of notice was the government’s fault; though the President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway
his signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its perfection; and that the two-month period within which
Jancom should comply with the conditions had not yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken effect, precisely because of
the absence of the President’s signature.

HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and Jancom.

The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still
ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.

Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.

Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be rendered only by the Supreme Court en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which says: A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when
concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of at least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Sec 4 (3), Article
VIII, 1987 Constitution
PROVINCE OF RIZAL VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Principles :
and Limits Its Powers over the Country's Natural Resources
r No. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures.
Facts: At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, the Office of the President, through Proclamation
No. 635 dated 28 August 1995 set aside parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste
disposal applications. The site extending to more or less 18 hectares, had already been in operation since 19 February 1990 for the
solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig.

On 24 November 1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented by former Senator
Jovita Salonga, sent a letter to President Fidel Ramos requesting him to reconsider Proclamation No. 635. Receiving no reply, they
sent another letter on 02 January 1996 reiterating their previous request. They filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction.

On 19 July 1999, President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the gravity of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood
that violence would erupt among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31 December
2000. Accordingly, on 20 July 1999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the
Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo, wherein the latter agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite until its
permanent closure on 31 December 2000.

On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Alfredo Lim and
MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite "in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro
Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic." Claiming the above events constituted a "clear and
present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas," the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January
2001.

On 24 January 2001, the Supreme Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for, "effective immediately and until further
orders." Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, President Estrada signed Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as "The Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act of2000," into law.

Lower Court's Ruling: The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Executive Secretary, et al. The CA denied, for lack of cause of action,
the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.

Issue:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San Mateo is needed before the
implementation of the project..

Held:
Yes. Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:

Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. In Lina , Jr. v. Pao,[49] we held that Section 2
(c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government projects affecting the
environmental or ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.

Rejecting the petitioners contention that Sections 2(c) and 27 of the Local Government Code applied mandatorily in the setting up of
lotto outlets around the country, we held that:
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be
implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable
institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is farfetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of
Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.

In the recent case of Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas,[50] where we held that there was no statutory requirement for the
sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a mooring facility, as Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to
projects which are not environmentally critical.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the
power to, among other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs,
smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a
comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent
provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject
to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the
construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;
[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for
under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection,
and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development
projects .and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks
system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance,
repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality
and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply
and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with
the water service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water. [Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province of Rizal, et al. and reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.

HENARES V. LTFRB
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.
Doctrines
The LTFRB and the DOTC cannot order owners of PUV to use CNG as an alternative to gasoline. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition
for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean
Air Act of 1999."

Issue: WON LTFRB CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIREPUVs TO USE CNG THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS?

Held: NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates
that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a
program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for
Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance
of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious
reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted
by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal
branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems
raised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the
destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In
Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is
"assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come."

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as
they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic
measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law
that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for
public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.