Republic of the Philippines helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire
Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION,respondents.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of
Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or
POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the
facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed
and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino
landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying
such Hong Kong-bound workers.
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily
suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound
for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.
In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices
are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic
helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated
July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic
domestic helpers.
Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to
Hong Kong.
Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary
government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the
temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the
following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy.
I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)
An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall
take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:
The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities
concerned:
1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies
2. Manpower Pooling
3. Worker Training and Briefing
4. Processing and Deployment
5. Welfare Programs
II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies
or Principals
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with
the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.
xxx xxx xxx
X. Interim Arrangement
All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991
under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the
HWPU.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of
their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July
31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of
their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on
the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and
deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which have been
attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA
Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit
under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache,
Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who
failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers
Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off
period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed
processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned
DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority
in issuing said circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register
were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and
placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulatethe
recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive
Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board,
the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment
Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the
power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation
in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis
supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to
government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p.
13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring
of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract
seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional,
unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society"
(Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to
help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them,
they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment
and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the
challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing
powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79
SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of
police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or
stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility
and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area
of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic
helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for
Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against
excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by
private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are
reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment
and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is
merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the
tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by
private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspendedeffective July 1, 1991."
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to
Hongkong only.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong SO ORDERED.
resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous
practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon
Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65,Rollo.) and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive
branch of Government.
epublic of the Philippines
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing Supreme Court
in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of Manila
the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
provide: SECOND DIVISION

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT G.R. No. 179579
Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.) COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC,

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with Petitioners,
the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary Present:
implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15)
days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor
Code, as amended.)
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are BRION,
not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or - versus -
persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) PEREZ,

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with SERENO, and
this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless
REYES, JJ.
a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety
and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency
shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION,
(Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Promulgated:
Respondent.
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
February 1, 2012
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so- DECISION
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.) SERENO, J.:

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and
implemented.
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,[1] assailing the Decision[2] and the Resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003[4] on the tariff
classification of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum,
Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country
is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under of origin; and (3) port of discharge.[5] The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of
the aforementioned laws of the land. discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for
feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review
Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. [6]
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief[7] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. It anticipated the implementation of
the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. [8] Respondent
contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative
Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was
proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when
the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days
from notice.[9]
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.[10] They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the
classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal
administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and
premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondents products. They likewise
opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any
injury through the issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that
administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary
injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March
2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[11] without having to resolve the application for preliminary injunction
and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs Memorandum
Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs,
the District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from
enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent
concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief
was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that
respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the
regulation in future transactions.
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the
basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that
petitioners had substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative
predetermination.[13] The lower court pointed out that a classification based on importers and ports of
discharge were violative of the due process rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same
allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.[14] The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that,
since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have
observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be
ripe for judicial determination.[15] We find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court
meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,[16] we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes
the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)

Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, [17] we
said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii)whether it is reasonable;
and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its
judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of
administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial
judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness
or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free
to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment;
or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily
imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-
2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has
actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003.
Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the
imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged
that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food
grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which
would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and
every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result into(sic) delays in the delivery,
setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is
easy to see that business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved
are not minimal is shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings
filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the
Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get
its refund with the said agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the
outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this petition. [18] (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is
inevitable[19] for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration
of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file
a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the
case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained
above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII,
Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against
any party of persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their
views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden
of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be
heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. [20]
Likewise, in Taada v. Tuvera,[21] we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records no
such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis
supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus,
the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a
classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally
to all members of the same class.[22]
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat
is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat,
the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On
the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they
would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore,
does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent
their misclassification. A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but
results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations
that are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that
those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are unnecessarily
burdened to prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that
burden.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs
officers duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:
Section 1403. Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. The
customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articlesshall determine whether the
packages designated for examination and their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the
entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate
whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity,
measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples
to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper
classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the Philippines of imported articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and
sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.
Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties
prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the
article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of
Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation
when it no longer required the customs officers prior examination and assessment of the proper
classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.[23]
In summary, petitioners violated respondents right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when
they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise
violated respondents right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond
his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to
examine and assess imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO
BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as
Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis
Occidental, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution3dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed
and set aside the Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch
2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental
organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and
conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its
objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square
meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016 which it rented out to the public and became the
source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and
Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its
failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1096,8otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all
illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the
issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents
against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still the same remained unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance
No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; 11 and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government. 12 On July 12,
2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter.
Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises
as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto. 13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A
similar notice was also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
injunction and damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging
that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the
issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood.
Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted
without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province
as required by Republic Act No.7160,16otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined. 17
In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are
not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property
belonging to the public domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication
and hearing requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by
operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As
such, it is valid and enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void
based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the subject ordinance
was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not
suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the
national government, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 20 Based on
the foregoing, respondents were ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the
public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without valid
building permits22 since they were found to have no title over the disputed property. 23
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP
to declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. 25 It
also gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in
conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were
conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed. 27 The CA further ruled that the
Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject
ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that
could create and administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a
municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject
ordinance is valid.30
On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the
Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper. 31
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9,
2009. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.34
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved
ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none,
to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall,
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
writing his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power
conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in
the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere
passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the
time the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB; 36 hence, it should be deemed
approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word,
"action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes
of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is
invalid in whole or in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of a
statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not
be construed as contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that
apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being
had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not
published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own
evidence reveals that a public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance.
Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no
publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have
complied with the publication and posting requirements. 40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit
any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of
proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v.
CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein
despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public hearings
were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the
local government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local
government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any
evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in
question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed
conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence
to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v.
Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not
been submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In
rejecting this contention, the Court held:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that
the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore
unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause
showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law
that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal
councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the
law has been complied with.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence
of positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in
the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner
failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of
proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to
uphold their constitutionality or legality. 43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject
ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title 44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its
possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on Capayas
Island without building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and
conclusive upon them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March
9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which
modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said court and held:
that the contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents,
then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with
their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-
petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free
from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to the defendant-petitioner the sum
of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-
respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-
petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title
No. 325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of
title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal
parts, free of all liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by law, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid civil
case to the end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements
granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931,
with certificate of title No. 325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor,
under section 122 of Act No. 496, which land was surveyed and identified in the cadastre of the
municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the petitioner pay to them the sum of P650
being the approximate value of the fruits which he received from the land; that the petitioner sign all the
necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to the respondents; that he petitioner be
restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or encumbering the land and its
improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu
thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special
defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue
of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932,
which was duly ratified by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the
sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest per annum which the deceased owed him and that, should the
respondents be declared to have a better right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay
him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the improvements which he introduced upon the land.lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public deed:
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between Emiliana Ambrosio,
Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the party of the first part,
and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street,
Manila, P.L., hereinafter called party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with each other as follows:
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of
Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by homestead
certificate of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of
the Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and described as
follows:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N. 66º 35'
E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point
"5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point
of beginning, "Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes;
points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by property claimed by Maria
Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South, by Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la
Cruz; and on the West, by property claimed by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E.
"Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of
the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927 and approved on February
25, 1931.
ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the following:
Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and six
(6) boñga trees.
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value of the improvements is
P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency,
paid by the party of second part to the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the
party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements
described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute
owner.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the first part shall well and truly
pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th
day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution of this instrument, the
aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage
shall be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and effect,
and subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with
costs and also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.lawphil.net
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments which are or may become
due on the above described land and improvements during the term of this agreement.
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement, the party of the first part
shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of
Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a
certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.
ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of time (4½) years stipulated in this
mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale
of the property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage, including all unpaid interests at
the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not approved by the
Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated
under Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.
In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first herein before
written.
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by reason of her sex, to me
known and known to me to be the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me
that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this page of the acknowledgment
and that each page thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and the witnesses in their presence
and in the presence of each other, and that the land treated in this instrument consists of only one parcel.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.
(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
Notary Public
My commission expires December 31, 1933.
Doc. No. 178
Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana
Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements.
For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the
latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner entered upon the possession of the
land, gathered the products thereof, did not collect the interest on the loan, introduced improvements
upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred
in his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so held
that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of
absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and
without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the
parties, ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and severally, the loan of
P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of
error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an
absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting
parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil
Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the
words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.
The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof
are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its
clauses. The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to enter into
the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the
accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the parties
having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties
entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure
the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. In clause V the parties
stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a half years, or until November 16, 1936, the
debt with interest thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI the parties
agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid
by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the
contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that
certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the parties agreed that
should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years and a half,
she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the
same amount of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case
the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, the contract of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its
force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to
the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be
separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are
independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa,
commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his
views as follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but
should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal
obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence,
a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to
the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established connection or by
manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically
speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code,
Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do
several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or
the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise
made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same
time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a
statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract
void. . . . (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v.
Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1
Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.)
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that
the principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the
land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not
against the law. The second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116
of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not
be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to
redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the loan together
with interest, she would execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000,
including the interest stipulated and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after
the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would
benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan
and he would attend to the payment of the land tax. These pacts made by the parties independently were
calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of
antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance
burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of error is well-founded
and that error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between the parties was one of
absolute sale of the land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment
of error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the
Public Land Act because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague and not
specific. If it attempts to show that the said document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because
we have already said that certain pacts thereof are illegal because they are prohibited by section 116 of Act
No. 2874, as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal agreement
entered into between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of Appeals; and
in the fourth and last assignment of error the same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that he acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits
thereof, resulting in the denial of his right to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements introduced
by him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties entered into another
verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to receive the fruits
thereof and to introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of
stipulated interest and he would assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his
receipt of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal
and void agreements because, as already stated, the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly
prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted
in bad faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana
Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is
prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section
433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition,
by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides further, that
"Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith". Article 1950 of the same Code,
covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights, provides, in turn, that
"Good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto." We do not have before us a case of
prescription of ownership, hence, the last article is not squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a
person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of
its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should be
deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule.
From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the
petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon
ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the preceding article,
sustains the affirmative. He says:
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law.
When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed
upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and
administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under
such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public
documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are
called upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly
unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing
is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of
conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is
possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with
certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of
doubtful doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but
possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the
laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-
grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that
the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter,
as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to
the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis
of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in
making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a
sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we have
stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the
petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and having
introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same Code are
applicable; wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon
indemnifying the petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the
respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be fixed by
the court of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay them the sum of
P650, being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the
same opinion as the trial court that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the respondents have not established
such damages. Under the verbal contract between the petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio,
during the latter's lifetime, the former would take possession of the land and would receive the fruits of
the mortgaged improvements on condition that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that
he would attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is tantamount to the
stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land to the payment of stipulated
interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the elements characterizing the contract of
antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not possible for the parties to stipulate further that
the value of the fruits be also applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing
remained after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per
annum, whereas the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached said amount in
view of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements was, according to the decision, P860. To this
should be added the fact that, under the verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be taken a
certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We mention these data here to show that the petitioner is also
not bound to render an accounting of the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason
stated that said value hardly covers the interest earned by the secured indebtednes.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the
contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the contract of
antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such,
is a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may
elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000,
or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by
paying them its market value to be filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the
respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and (6)
that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within
three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits
of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the petitioner may ask
for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment
of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances. So ordered.
Diaz, J., concur.
Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
According to the contract entered into May 16, 1932, between Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the
petitioner Marcial Kasilag, the first, in consideration of the sum of P1,000 given to her by the second,
constituted a mortgage on the improvements only of the land which she acquired by way of homestead.
The improvements which she mortgaged consisted of four fruit bearing mango trees, one hundred ten hills
of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind tree and 6 betelnut trees, the assessed value of which was P660. The
condition of the loan were that if the mortgagor should pay the mortgage on November 16, 1936, that is,
four and a half years after the execution of the deed, said sum of P1,000 with interest thereon at 12% per
annum, the aforesaid mortgage would become null and void, otherwise it would remain in full force and
effect and would b subject to foreclosure in the manner provided by law; that the mortgagor would pay all
the land tax on the land and its improvements during the duration of the contract; and that if after the
expiration of the said period of four and a half years the mortgagor should fail to redeem the mortgage,
she would execute in favor of the mortgage an absolute deed of sale of the property described in the
contract for the same sum of P1,000 plus interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.
The principal rule in the interpretation of contracts is that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed. If
the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall
prevail" (article 1281, Civil Cod). "In order to judge as to the intention of the contracting parties, attention
must be paid principally to their conduct at the time of making the contract and subsequently thereto."
(Article 1282.)
Now, then what is the true nature of the contract entered into between the parties by virtue of the deed of
sale executed by them on May 16, 1932? The Court of Appeals held that it is an absolute deed of sale of a
land with a homestead certificate of title, under the guise of a loan secured by a mortgage upon its
improvements in order to go around the prohibition contained in section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended
by section 23 of Act No. 3517.
Closely examined, the only clauses of the contract which may lead to the conclusion that it is one of the
sale are those which state that if at the expiration of the period of four years and a half the mortgagor
should fail to pay the amount of the loan plus interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum, she would execute in favor of the mortgagee a deed of absolute sale of the land whose
improvements were mortgaged for the amount of the loan and the interest owing. It will be seen that the
sale would not be made until after the lapse of four and a half years from the execution of the deed, if the
mortgagor should fail or should not wish to redeem the mortgaged improvements. Consequently, the
obligation contracted by said mortgagor was no more than a conditional promise to sell. Now, then, is this
a promise to sell valid? Like any other onerous, consensual and mutually binding contract, that of promise
to sell requires for its legal existence and validity the concurrence of consent, consideration and subject-
matter. The contract before us dos not show what is the cause or consideration for such promise to sell.
Assuming that it was the economic impotence of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged improvements,
before she could be compelled to comply with her obligation to sell, there is need to wait until she should
fail of funds or to abandonment. The cause will come into being only upon the happening of said event
after the four and half years and only then will the said contract of promise to sell have juridical existence.
The P1,000 and its interest, should the mortgagor fail to redeem the improvements upon the maturity of
the indebtedness, would be the consideration of the sale; because the promise to sell is a contract different
and distinct from that of sale and each requires a consideration for its existence and validity.
The terms of the contract are clear and explicit and do not leave room for doubt that the intention of the
contracting parties was to constitute a mortgage on the improvements of the land in litigation to secure
the payment of the loan for P1,000, within interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum. It cannot be said
that this contract is simulated because the assessed value of the improvements is P860 only. It is well
known that rural properties are valued for assessment purposes not less than half of their market value.
The true value of the said improvements may therefore be P1,720, and the mortgagee may have
considered that adequate. Moreover, the petitioner could not have the property whose improvements
were mortgaged to him the property whose improvements were mortgaged to him even should the
mortgagor default in the payment of interest. He could only have the mortgaged improvements in case of
foreclosure should he bid therefor at the sale. Neither could the mortgagor sell the same property to the
mortgagee, even after the expiration of five years from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title,
for then the sale would be in satisfaction of an obligation contracted during the five years, which is
prohibited by the oft-mentioned section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517.
The fact that after one year the contracting parties had novated the contract of loan secured by a
mortgagee, converting the same into a contract of anti-chresis because of the mortgagor's failure to pay
the accrued interest, does not show that they intended to enter into a contract of sale, because the
conversion in this case of the contract of loan secured by a mortgage into one of antichresis was accidental,
due to the mortgagor's default in the payment of unpaid interest for the first year. if the parties' intention
from the beginning had been to sell the property, the mortgagee would have immediately entered upon
the possession of the land instead of waiting until after the expiration of one year. The transfer of the
Torrens certificate of title to the homestead by the original owner to the mortgagee in 1934 was only a
consequence of the conversion of the mortgage loan into an anti-chretic loan, the parties having such a
transfer. The setting off of the interest on the debt against the fruits of the property given in antichresis
finds authority in article 1885 of the of the Civil Code. There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the terms of the
contract warranting the search outside its four corners for the true intention of the contracting parties
other than that of entering into a contract of loan secured by the said improvements. If the true intention
of the contracting parties, as clearly gathered from the terms of the contract, was to enter into a contract,
was to enter into a contract of loan secured by a mortgage upon the improvements, although they should
convert it into a contract of antichresis after one year and although after the maturity of the loan with
interest they may wish to convert it into one of absolute sale — both conversions being illegal and, hence,
void, — 8 the original intention of entering into a contract of loan secured by a mortgagee upon the
improvements would prevail, the said contract of loan being the only one legal and valid, and the petitioner
having acted in good faith in making it.
The verbal contract of antichresis, entered into by the petitioner Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio,
being null and void ab initio and without any legal effect because it is in violation of the express prohibition
of section 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, (article 4 of the Civil Code), the
contracting parties should restore to each other the things which have been the subject-matter of the
contract, together with their fruits, and the price paid therefor, together with interest, pursuant to Article
1303 of the same Code. Marcial Kasilag, therefore, should return to Emiliana Ambrosio or to her heirs the
possession of the homestead and the improvements thereon with its fruits, and Emiliana Ambrosio or her
heirs should pay him the sum of P1,000, being the amount of the loan, plus interest due and unpaid.
As to the improvements introduced upon the land by the petitioner, having done so with the knowledge
and consent of its owner Emiliana Ambrosio, the former acted in good faith, and under article 361 of the
Civil Code, the owner of the land may have the said improvements upon paying the indemnity provided in
articles 453 and 454, or may compel the said Marcial Kasilag, who introduced the said improvements, to
pay the price of the land. If the herein respondents, as heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio, do not wish or are
unable to pay for said improvements, and Marcial Kasilag does not wish or is unable to pay the land, said
petitioner would lose his right of intention over the same (Bernardo vs. Batalan, 37 Off. G., No. 74, p. 1382),
provided that he may remove the improvements which he had introduced in good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I concur in the majority opinion except insofar as it holds that the interest is set off
against the fruits of the mortgaged improvements, because as a result of the nullity of the contract of
antichresis the petitioner should return to the respondents the products of the mortgaged improvements,
and the latter should pay to the petitioner the amount of the loan plus interest due and unpaid at the rate
of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the contract until fully paid.
LAUREL, J., concurring in the result:
On August 27, 1918, Emiliana Ambrosio put in a homestead application for lot No. 285 of the Limay
cadastre, Province of Bataan. After complying with the requisite legal formalities, she obtained therefor
homestead patent No. 16074, the same having been recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on Juner
26, 1931. On May 16, 1932, she entered with the herein petitioner, Marcial Kasilag, into a contract, Exhibit
1, inserted in the foregoing majority opinion.
Sometime in 1933, or a year after the execution of the aforequoted and land taxes, whereupon, the
mortgage, Marcial Kasilag, and the mortgagor, Emiliana Ambrosio, verbally agreed that the former would
pay the land taxes and waive the unpaid interest, enter into the possession of the property in question,
introducing improvements thereon, and thereafter be reimbursed for the value of such improvements.
Under this verbal pact, Kasilag went into possession of the property, planted it with the fruit trees allegedly
valued at P5,000, and on May 22, 1934, declared the same for taxation purposes. In 1934 the original
homesteader, Emiliana Rodriguez, Severo Mapilisan, Ignacio del Rosario and Gavino Rodriguez.
On May 16, 1936, the said heirs, with the exception Gavino Rodriguez who testified for the defendant, sued
Marcial Kasilag in the Court of First Instance of Bataan to recover the possession of the aforesaid property
belonging to their mother. For answer, the defendant put in as was in good faith with the knowledge and
tolerance of the plaintiffs, a counterclaim for P1,000 representing the loan to the deceased homesteader
with stipulated interest there on, and a recoupment for P5,000 allegedly the value of the improvements he
had introduced upon the land. On the issues thus joined, the trial court gave judgment for the defendant
couched in the following language:
Resuming all that has been said above, the court find and declares that the deed of combined mortgage
and sale executed by Emiliana Ambrosio in favor of the defendant Marcial Kasilag and dated May 16, 1932,
is null and void as a contract for a future conveyance or sale of the homestead, but valid as an equitable
mortgage on the improvements for the sum of P1,000; and that the possession of the homestead by the
defendant Marcial Kasilag by virtue of said contract or by virtue of any other agreement is null and void,
but that the making of the improvements thereon by him, which the court finds to be valued at P3,000, by
virtue of the verbal agreement entered into after the executing of the original instrument of mortgage, was
in good faith, entitling the said Marcial Kasilag to be reimbursed of their actual value, the above-mentioned
amount. Wherefore, let judgment be entered declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession as
owners of the homestead subject of the present suit, lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey, subject to
an encumbrance of the improvements for the sum of P1,000 in favor of the defendant, ordering the
defendant deliver unto the plaintiffs in turn to pay unto the defendant jointly and severally, as heirs of their
deceased mother Rafaela Rodriguez the sum of P3,000, value of the improvements introduced on said
homestead by defendant. Let there be no pronouncement as to costs." On appeal by the plaintiffs, the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals reached a different result and modified the judgment of the trial
court as follows:
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the contract, Exhibit "1", is entirely
null and void; that the plaintiffs and appellants are the owners of the lot in question together with all the
improvements thereon in common with their brother, Gavino Rodriguez, and are, therefore, entitled to the
possession thereof; ordering the defendant and appellee to vacate and deliver the possession of the
aforementioned plaintiffs and appellants free from any encumbrance; requiring latter, however, to pay
jointly and severally to the said appellee the sum of P1,000 with the interest thereon at the rate of 6 per
cent per annum from and including the date this decision becomes final; and absolving the said plaintiffs
and appellants from the cross-complaint with respect to the value of the improvements claimed by the
appellee.
It is further ordered that the register of deeds of Bataan cancel the certificate of title No. 325 in the name
of the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, and issue in lieu thereof anew certificate of title in favor of the herein
plaintiffs and appellants and their brother, Gavino Rodriguez, as owners pro indiviso and in equal shares
free from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided by law.
Without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The case is before us on petition for certiorari which was given due course, filed by defendant-appellee,
Marcial Kasilag, now petitioner, against plaintiffs-appellants, Rafaela Rodriguez and others, now
respondents. The burden of petitioner's case is condensed in the following assignments of error:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred:
I. In having interpreted that document Exhibit "1" is an absolute sale and declared it entirely null and void,
and in not having interpreted and declared that it is a deed of combined mortgage and future sale which, if
void as a contract for future conveyance of the homestead in question is, however, valid as an equitable
mortgage on the improvements thereof for the sum of P1,000 loaned by petitioner Marcial Kasilag to the
homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio.
II. In holding that the petitioner was guilty of the violation of the public land law for having entered into
said contract Exhibit "1".
III. In not giving probative value to the uncontradicted testimony of the petitioner Marcial Kasilag that he
was expressly authorized by the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio to introduction by him of
improvements therein by virtue of the verbal agreement entered into after the execution of the original
instrument of mortgage was in good faith, entitling him to reimbursed of the actual value of improvements
he introduced.
Boiled down to the fundamentals, there are only two propositions which stands to be resolved in this
appeal: (1) What is the legal nature of the agreement, Exhibit 1, entered into by and between the parties?
and (2) Is Marcial Kasilag guilty of bad faith in entering upon the possession of the homestead, paying the
land tax and introducing improvements thereon?
The numerous adjudications in controversies of this nature will show that each case must be decided in the
light of the attendant circumstances and the situation of the parties which, upon the whole, mark its
character. However, for the purpose of ascertaining the manner and extent to which persons have
intended to be found by their written agreements, the safe criterion, the time honored test, is their
contention which is intimately woven into the instrument itself. It is true that resort to extrinsic evidence is
imperative when the contract is ambiguos and is susceptible of divergent interpretations; nevertheless, the
primary obligation of the courts is to discover the intention of the contracting parties, as it is expressed by
the language of the document itself. We are not authorized to make a contract for the parties.
In the trial court as in the Court of Appeals, the discussion centered on the nature and validity of the
document, Exhibit 1. This is the correct approach. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the conclusion
of the trial court that it is an absolute deed of sale which is null and void in its entirely because it is banned
by section 116, as amended of the Public land Act. The ruling is now assailed by the petitioner. I share
petitioner's view that the deed is not what it was construed to be by the Court of Appeals.
From Article I to III thereof is a description of the homestead and the improvements existing thereon. By its
Article IV the homesteader, Emiliana Ambrosio, "encumbers and hipothecates, by way of mortgage, only
the improvements described in Articles II and III" under the conditions set out in Articles V, VI and VII. Its
closing Articles VIII and IX, particularly relied upon by the Court of Appeals, speak, not of a present deed of
absolute sale, but of one to be executed "upon the expiration of the period of time (4½ years) stipulated in
the mortgage" if "the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage". In other words, the redemption of
the mortgage by the payment of the loan may bring about the frustration of contemplated sale, hence, to
hold unqualifiedly that the whole of Exhibit 1, or even a part thereof, is an absolute deed of sale would be
to do violence to the terms of the document it self.
Still other tokens drive home the same conviction. The intimation by the Court of Appeals that the
petitioner "know, therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express
prohibition of law," is an argument that the petitioner could not have brazenly disregarded the law by
intending Exhibit 1 to be an absolute deed of sale. Its further observation that "the stipulation under article
VIII of the contract, Exhibit '1' . . . clearly indicates that there was nothing left to be done except the
execution of the deed of absolute sale," is a concession that no such sale has yet been executed. Finally it
will be recalled that under Article VII of Exhibit 1, "within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this
agreement the party of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance of Balanga,
Bataan, P.I., requesting cancellation of homestead certificate of title No. 325 referred to in Article 1 hereof
and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act 496,
as amended by Act 3901." And by its Article IX it provides "That in the event the contemplated motion
under Article VII hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically
become null and void." (Underlining is mine.) We have nothing in the record to show that the required
motion was filed within thirty days or thereafter, by Emiliana Ambrosio in life, or by her successors-in-
interest after her death. Indeed, Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325, sought to be substituted by
another through the said motion, still stands. It is, evident, therefore, that the projected sale has and may
never come into being, because under Article IX of Exhibit 1, it became automatically null and void. This
view, incidentally, precludes further consideration of the validity or invalidity of the sale clause of Exhibit 1,
as it will purely academic to dwell upon the nature and effect of a contract that has passed out of existence
in the contemplation of the parties.
Having reached the conclusion, upon its plain language and unequivocal import, that Exhibit 1 is essentially
and fundamentally a mortgage upon the improvements found on the questioned homestead, with a
conditional clause for the future sale of said homestead and improvements which has become a "dead
twig" still attached to a living tree because the condition has never been performed, I would, under Articles
1281 and 1283 of the Civil Code, be otherwise content in resting our decision of this aspect of the case on
this interpretation. But I do not propose to so limit my inquiry in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals
points to contemporaneous and subsequent circumstances, beyond the four corners of the document,
Exhibit 1, allegedly revelatory of petitioner's concealed but evident intention to circumvent the law. I may
state, at the outset, that these circumstances are fairly susceptible of legitimate explanations. The
appealed decision could not conceive of a man, of petitioner's intelligence, who "would accept
improvements valued at only P860 as security for the payment of a larger amount of P1,000." But we are
concerned with an assessed valuation which is not always nor even frequently the value that it can
command in the market. To ignore this is to live in monastic seclusion. The appealed decision would imply
from the fact that petitioner subsequently paid the land taxes and from the further fact that Emiliana never
paid stipulated interest on the one thousand-peso loan, that Exhibit 1 was meant to vest absolute title
irretrievably in the petitioner. It could hardly be supposed at the time of the execution of Exhibit 1 that the
homesteader would fail to make these payments, nor does it seem just to draw from these circumstances,
induced by Emiliana's own neglect, deductions unfavorable to the petitioner. That the petitioner went
upon the possession of the questioned property is not proof that he was even already the would-be owner
thereof, for as elsewhere stated, the said possession came practically at the suggestion of or at least with
the consent of Emiliana Ambrosio as a result of her failure to live up to her part of the bargain. Finally, the
Court of Appeals asked: "If the real purpose was to mortgage the improvements only as specified in article
IV of the contract, why is it that in article VIII thereof it was provided that in case of failure to redeem the
alleged mortgage the grantor would be required to execute a de of absolute sale of the property described
therein for the same amount of the mortgage in favor of the grantee, and not of" the improvements
only'?" The precaution which the petitioner took to have the sale clause of Exhibit I so phrased that the said
sale would not be affected until after the expiration of the five-year period prohibited by law, at which time
the alienation of the homestead would then have been perfectly legitimate, may not be without
significance to show petitioner's respect for and intention to be on the side of the law. The very mention of
the word "sale" in the document in question argues against any attempt at concealment, for if the said
document was intended as a cover and cloak of an illegal alienation, then the reference to the contract of
sale therein was illtimed and foolhardy.
The question next at hand is whether or not the mortgage constituted upon the improvement's of the
homestead is valid. It is, under express provisions of section 116 of the Public Land Act, before and after its
amendment, reading pertinently that "the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations." I find no occasion to dispute this legislative
policy however mistaken it may be. It is sufficient to observe that what the law permits may be done. Upon
the other hand, I find no occasion to test the legality of the sale provisions of Exhibit 1, as I have heretofore
said, this question is, in my opinion, moot. Moreover, the petitioner, technically, is barred from raising this
question, as he did not appeal from and, therefore, abided by the decision of the trial court which outlawed
this sale clause as violative of the provisions of section 116 of the Public Land Act. This part of the decision
of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals when the latter struck down Exhibit 1 in its entirety
and, even now, petitioner does not complain against the destruction of Exhibit 1 with respect to its sale
clause. In other words, counsel for petitioner concedes all along that the said sale clause may be properly
legislated out. As the mortgage provisions of Exhibit 1 are independent of and severable from the rest
thereof, the same are perfectly enforceable. Where a part of the contract is perfectly valid and separable
from the rest, the valid portion should not be avoided. (Ollendorf vs. Abrahamson, 38 Phil., 585.)
The question yet to be answered is whether the petitioner's possession of the question homestead was in
good faith so as to entitle him to reimbursement for improvements introduced upon the land. The basis of
petitioner's possession was a verbal agreement with the original homesteader whereby, for failure of the
latter to comply with her obligations to pay land taxes and stipulated interest on the loan, the former
assumed the said obligations for the privilege of going into possession of the property, introducing
improvements thereon, and thereafter being reimbursed for the value of such improvements. The
petitioner did enter upon such possession, planted the land to fruit trees valued at P5,000, according to
him, and P3,000, according to the trial judge. It should be stated, in passing, that the Court of Appeals was
unable to belie this verbal agreement, although it was of the opinion "that the trial court erred in giving
probative value to the testimony of the appellee with reference to the alleged verbal agreement". Its
reason for the opinion is not because the testimony is untrue, but because even if it were true, "it only
tends to corroborate the allegation that he acted in bad faith when he took possession of the property and
made improvements thereon, because then he knew full well that the homestead owner could not enter
into an agreement involving the future final and absolute alienation of the homestead in his favor." As the
said opinion and the reason back of it does not involve a question of strict fact, it is in our power to inquire
into its soundness. The weakness of the argument lies, first, in its, (a) inconsistency and (b) in the
misconception of the legal principle involved: inconsistency, because it considers entry of possession,
payment of land tax as facts tending to show the real character of the transaction and as evidencing bad
faith on the part of the petitioner, but at the same time it improperly rejects the verbal agreement by
which such facts are established. It is clear that we cannot directly reject the verbal agreement between
the parties in so fat as it is favorable to the petitioner. The misconception proceeds from the erroneous
legal conclusion that, upon the facts, the good faith is attributable to the petitioner alone and that
Ambrosio was not to be blamed for the prohibited alienation of the homestead, as I shall presently proceed
to discuss.
In holding that the petitioner was a possessor in bad faith, the decision sought to be reviewed first laid
down the premise that such possession is banned by law at least for five years from the issuance of patent
(section 116, Public Land Act), assumed that the petitioner had knowledge of such law, and then drew the
conclusion that the petitioner was aware of the illegality of his possession. We think that the assumption
and conclusion are precipitate. As observed in the foregoing majority opinion-citing Manresa-knowledge of
a legal provision does not necessarily mean knowledge of its true meaning and scope, or of the
interpretation which the courts may place upon it. In this particular case, what section 116 of the Public
Land Act prohibits is the "incumbrance or alienation" of land acquired thereunder within the period
prescribed therein. We may concede, as assumed by the appealed decision, that the petitioner was
cognizant of said section 116, but this is not saying that petitioner knew that his possession came under the
phrase "incumbrance or alienation" prohibited by law, and that the petitioner, therefore, knew that his
possession was illegal. The import of the phrase "incumbrance or alienation" is a subject upon which "men
of reason may reasonably differ," in the same way that we ourselves have differed in the deliberation of
this case. It is not correct to assume that the petitioner had knowledge of the illegality of his possession.
The contrary assumption, namely, that petitioner had no idea of such illegality, would have been more in
accord with the experience of everyday, for petitioner would not have invested money and labor in the
land and assumed obligations incumbent upon the homesteader if he had even the least suspicion that all
his efforts would count for nothing and would in the end entangle him in a mild scandal. As possession in
bad faith does not necessarily mean possession illegal under the law, it being necessary that the possessor
be aware of such illegality, it follows that the petitioner's possession of the homestead of the respondents
was in good faith. (Art. 433, Civil Code.) "Good faith is always presumed, and the burden of proving bad
faith on the part of the possessor rests upon the person alleging it" (article 434, Civil Code.) As a bona
fide possessor, and it being unquestioned that the improvements introduced by him upon the land
redounded to its benefit, the petitioner is by law entitled to be paid for the value of such improvements in
the amount of P3,000, as found by the trial judge. "Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in his possession having the option
of refunding the amount of such expenditures or paying him the increase in value which the thing has
acquired by reason thereof." ( Article 453, 2nd par., Civil Code). The reimbursement in this particular case is
the more in order in view of the express undertaking of respondent's predecessor-in-interest to pay
therefor.
Even the equities of the case militate against the respondents and in favor of the petitioner. There is a
concession that the petitioner's possession was neither imposed upon nor wrested from the homesteader;
on the contrary, it came about by virtue of a mutual agreement whereby the said homesteader and the
herein respondents were spared the burden of paying for land taxes and stipulated interest and extended
the benefit of having their land improved on condition that they pay the value of such improvements upon
redeeming the land. We also have uncontradicted fact that P400 of the one thousand-peso loan were given
to the herein respondents and the balance kept by their mother. They may not reap and retain these
benefits at the same time repudiate and go back upon contractual obligations solemnly entered into.
But let grant that the contract, Exhibit 1, is one of absolute sale, as found by the Court of Appeals, what
then? As the land could not be alienated for five years from the date of the issuance of the patent, the sale
was illegal and void because it was entered into in violation of section 116 of the Public Land Act, as
amended. By whom was the law violated? Certainly, not by Kasilag alone but by Ambrosio as well. Both are
presumed to know the law, and we cannot justly charge Kasilag alone with that knowledge on the alleged
reason that Kasilag is rich and Ambrosio is poor. Neither can we proceed on the bare assumption that
because Exhibit 1 was written in English it was prepared by Kasilag as if he were the only English-speaking
person in the Province of Bataan where the document was executed. Are we already living in the midst of a
communistic society that we shall have to incline invariably the balance in favor of a litigant who happens
to be well-to-do, regardless of the merits of the case? And to this end, shall we, by a series of assumptions
and deductions, impute to a party malice aforethought dishonesty and bad faith, in entering into a
transaction made in the open sun, publicly recorded and whose effectiveness was even conditioned by the
approval of a court of justice? If so, then I dare say that we have not profited by the admonition of Aristotle
in his Metaphysics centuries ago that "justice is a virtue of the soul which discards party, friendship
and sentiment and is therefore always represented as blind." There is a charm in rhetoric but its value in
cool judicial reasoning is nil.
And if — as we are confidently told — we should relax the legal principle with reference to Ambrosio,
because she was "poor and ignorant," I am reluctant to believe that she was ignorant of the condition
against the alienation inserted in all homestead patents, and my knowledge of the Public Land Law, of the
activities of the Department and bureau charged with the administration of public lands, gives me just the
contrary impression. Every homestead patent contains that condition. Circulars and instructions and
general information have been issued in pursuance with law. (Sec. 5, Act No. 2874; see also sec. 5,
Comonwealth Act No. 141.) I must presume that the Government and its officials charged with the
administration of public lands have complied with the law and their duties in this connection, and I cannot
believe that Ambrosio, when she alienated the property, was unaware of the legal prohibition. Under the
circumstances, then, it is reasonable to conclude that on the hypothesis that the document, Exhibit 1, was a
contract of absolute sale between Kasilag and Ambrosio, both of them were guilty of infraction of the law.
If this is correct, what is the legal situation of the parties?
Justinian, who, by his Corpus Juris Civiles, still speaks through practically all the civil codes of Continental
Europe, considers both as having acted in good faith. "Realmente," bluntly observes Manresa, "si los dos
que se encuentran en lucha sobre la propiedad han provocado el conflicto por su voluntad; a ciencia y
paciencia del dueno del suelo, ante cuya vista las obras se han ejecutado, y con conciencia, por parte del
que edifica o planta, de que el terreno no es suyo, no hay razon alguna que abone derecho preferente en
favor de ninguno de los dos; deben, por tanto, tratarse como si los dos hubiesen obrado de buena fe; la
mala fe del uno extingue y neutraliza, en justa reciprocidad, la del otro." (Manresa, Codigo Civil segunda
edicion Tomo III pag. 203.) Article 364 of our Civil Code then comes into play. "Where there has been bad
faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sewed, or planted on another's land, but also on the
part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. Bad
faith on the part of the owner is deemed to exist whenever the act has been done in his presence, with his
knowledge and tolerance, and without opposition on his part." ( Article 364, Civil Code; see also arts. 1303,
1306 ibid.) The codal section is evidently based upon the vulnerable maxim of equity that one who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. A court which seeks to enforce on the part of the defendant
uprightness, fairness, and conscientiousness also insists that, if relief is to be granted, it must be to a
plaintiff whose conduct is not inconsistent with the standards he seeks to have applied to his adversary.
Fundamenta justitiae sunt, ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi serviatur. I therefore concur in the
result.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
In view of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are final according to law, I dissent from the
majority opinion as to the legal denomination of the contract really entered into by the petitioners and the
now deceased Emiliana Ambrosio.
The facts according to the decision of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On August 27, 1918, the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio applied for the land in question as a homestead, now
known as lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was approved on
September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on November 10, 1927 which was approved on October
17, 1929. The homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No. 325 were issued in favor
of the applicant on June 11, 1931 which were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of registrar of deeds
in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of Act 496.
"On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner, Emiliana Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the
defendant and appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title found that it was a homestead
patent and knew, therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express
prohibition of law, so he devised a means by which the proposed sale might not appear in any document
and had the patentee, Emiliana Ambrosio, execute a public instrument, Exhibit '1', purporting to be a mere
mortgage of the improvements thereon consisting of four mango trees, fruit bearing; 110 hills of bamboo
trees, 1 tamarind, and 6 boñga trees, with the assessed value of P860, in consideration of the sum of
P1,000 alleged to have been loaned by the said Kasilag to the said patentee, Emiliana Ambrosio. It was
expressly stipulated in that document that the aforementioned amount should be paid within four and a
half years from the date of the instrument (May 16, 1932), the condition being that if she would fail to
redeem the alleged mortgage at the expiration of the stipulated period, she would execute a deed of
absolute sale of the property therein described for the same amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000)
including all unpaid interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the alleged mortgagee. It was
further stipulated therein that the said Emiliana should pay all the taxes and assessment which might
become due on the land and improvements during the term of the agreement and that within thirty days
after the date of the execution thereof she should file a motion before the Court of First Instance of Bataan
requesting the cancellation of the homestead certificate No. 325 above referred to and the issuance in lieu
thereof a certificate of title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act 496, as amended by Act 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in the name of the homestead (owner)
Emiliana Ambrosio, and assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was
raised to P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or paid taxes on the land since the
execution of the contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellant entered upon the actual possession of the land and had
been holding the same up to the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued according
to him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for his own exclusive benefit.
Relying upon the foregoing facts, the majority contends that the contract executed by the parties was one
of mortgage, as per Exhibit 1, with a promise to sell the land in question. I cannot hold to these rulings of
the majority, because the nature of the contract of mortgage is inconsistent with the idea that the creditor
should immediately enter upon a possession of the mortgaged land; that he should pay the land tax; that
he should accept as security something whose values does not cover the amount of the loan sought to be
secured, for in this case the supposed loan was P1,000, and what were mortgaged were only the
improvements consisting of 4 mango trees, 110 hills of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind tree and 6 betelnut trees,
assessed at P860.
I believe that the contract which the parties intended to execute is a promise to sell the land, for which
reason Ambrosio retained the right of ownership of the land and its improvements while the deed of the
promised sale had not been executed. Under the terms of the deed Exhibit 1, Kasilag could not be
considered the owner of the land, nor could he execute any act promised upon the assumption of
ownership, nor could he alienate the same as he had no title to it. But the parties, in consideration of the
fact that Kasilag paid in advance the price of the land and assumed the obligation to pay the tax thereon,
which Ambrosio could not pay, agreed that Kasilag may enter upon the enjoyment of the land until the
promise to sell is converted in fact into an absolute sale by the execution of the corresponding deed by
Ambrosio. It was stipulated, however, that if the sale is not approved by the Court, Kasilag would collect
the amount of P1,000 paid him as a mortgage credit, with all the interest due and payable.
Under these circumstances, the conclusion of law that Kasilag acted in bad faith is not supported by the
established facts.
Wherefore, the plaintiffs are bound to comply with the contract as heirs of Ambrosio, by executing in favor
of Kasilag the deed of sale of the land, but should the sale, for any reason, be not approved, Kasilag may
collect the amount of P1,000 with all the interest thereon, and may execute the judgment obtained by him
upon the land and all its improvements, deducting, however, in his favor the value of the improvements
which he introduced upon the land in good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed
and that another should be entered against the respondents, requiring them to execute the deed of sale of
the land in favor of the petitioner, provided that if the sale, for any reason, be not approved by the court,
the petitioner may execute his credit upon the land and all its improvements, after deducting the value of
the improvements introduced by him upon the land.
MORAN, J., dissenting:
According to section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, "lands acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of
the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period."
About June 11, 1931, homestead patent No. 16074 was issued to Emiliana Ambrosio, now deceased. On
May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio offered the sale of the said homestead to the herein petitioner, Marcial
Kasilag, and in view of the above-quoted legal prohibition, the parties executed the document Exhibit 1,
copied in the majority decision. The heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio filed a complaint for the annulment of the
contract in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and from the judgment rendered by said court an appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals, which held that the true contract between the parties is one of absolute
sale, wherefore, it is null and void under the already cited legal prohibition. Marcial Kasilag comes to this
court on certiorari, and this court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The only question is as to the true contract between the parties at the time of the execution of the deed
Exhibit 1; Kasilag contends that the contract is that set out in the document Exhibit 1, that is, a mortgage of
the improvements of the homestead to secure a loan of one thousand pesos given to Emiliana Ambrosio;
and the latter's heirs, in turn, contend that the contract is one of the absolute sale of the homestead,
wherefore, it is null and void. The findings of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The pertinent facts as disclosed by the evidence of record are as follows:
On August 27, 1918 the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, applied for the land in question as a homestead, not
known as Lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was approved on
September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on November 10, 1927 which was approved on October
17, 1929. The homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No. 325 were issued in favor
of the applicant on June 11, 1931 which were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of the register of
deeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496.
On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the
defendant and appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title found that it was a homestead
patent and knew, therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express
prohibition of law, so he devised means by which the proposed sale might not appear in any document and
had the patentee, Emiliana Ambrosio, execute a public instrument, Exhibit 1, purporting to be a mere
mortgage of the improvements thereon consisting of four mango trees, fruit bearing; one hundred ten hills
of bamboo trees, one thousand and six boñga trees, with the assessed value of P860, in consideration of
the sum of P1,000 alleged to have been loaned by the said Kasilag to the said patentee Emiliana Ambrosio.
It was expressly stipulated in that document that the aforementioned amount should be paid within four
and a half years from the date of the instrument (May 16, 1932), the condition being that if she failed to
redeem the alleged mortgage at the expiration of the stipulated period, she would execute a deed of
absolute sale of the property therein described for the same amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000)
including all unpaid interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the alleged mortgagee. It was
further stipulated therein that the said Emiliana should pay all the taxes and assessment which might
become due on the land and improvements during the term of the agreement and that within thirty days
after the date of the execution thereof she should file a motion before the Court of First Instance of Bataan
requesting the cancellation of the homestead certificate No. 325 above referred to and the issuance in lieu
thereof of a certificate of title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act
No. 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in the name of the homestead owner,
Emiliana Ambrosio, and assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was
raised to P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or paid taxes on the land since the
execution of the contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellee entered upon the actual possession of the land and had
been holding the same up to the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued according
to him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for his own exclusive benefit.
Construing the contract, Exhibit 1, in the light of all the foregoing facts and circumstances under which it
was executed in relation to the subsequent acts of the contracting parties, we are led to the inescapable
conclusion that their real intention was to execute an agreement of absolute sale of the homestead
together with the improvements thereon. The stipulation concerning an alleged mortgage in the
instrument is a mere devise to circumvent the law which expressly prohibits the alienation or encumbrance
of the homestead during the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the homestead patent.
(Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No. 3517.)
It is inconceivable, and, therefore, we refuse to believe that the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, being an
intelligent man far above the average, would accept improvements valued at only P860 as security for the
payment of a larger amount of P1,000, the alleged loan. We entertain no doubt that at the time the
execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the appellee knew that the homestead owner, Emiliana Ambrosio, a
poor ignorant woman, was badly in need of money and that she was determined to dispose of and alienate
definitely her homestead, as evidenced by the fact testified to by Gavino Rodriguez as witness for the said
appellee that she actually offered to sell the land to the latter. He also knew that she would not be able to
pay back to him such a large amount with interest of 12 per cent per annum because she had no other
income except what she would derive from the homestead. Under such circumstances, there is reason to
believe that she was no longer concerned with the form in which the contract would be drawn, as long as
could obtain the amount of P1,000 which was agreeable to her as the price of the homestead she offered
to sell to the appellee. This conclusion is supported in part by the subsequent action of Emiliana in not
paying any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or the land taxes thereon since the execution of the
contract and by the action of the appellee in declaring the land for tax purposes in his own name as owner
thereof, notwithstanding that he had no interest in the land, as he alleged, except in the improvements
only.
The contract of absolute sale was consummated, because the grantor, Emiliana, received full payment of
the purchase price disguised as a loan of P1,000 and placed the grantee, Marcial Kasilag, in absolute
possession and control of the land conveyed to him with all the improvements thereon. The stipulation
under article VIII of the contract, Exhibit I, to the effect that the grantor would execute a deed of absolute
sale of the property herein described for the said amount of this mortgage including all unpaid interest at
the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the mortgagee', clearly indicates that there was nothing left
to be done except the execution of the deed of absolute sale, which is merely a matter of form in contracts
of this nature, which was postponed until after the expiration of four and a half years because by that time
the period of five years within which the property could not be alienated nor encumbered in any way, as
provided by section 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No. 3517, supra, would have already expired. If
the real purpose was to mortgage the improvements only as specified in article VIII thereof it was provided
that in case of failure to redeem the alleged mortgage the grantor would be required to execute a deed of
absolute sale of the property described therein for the same amount of the mortgage in favor of the
grantee, and not of 'the improvements only'? It is clear, therefore, that the real contract under Exhibit 1,
was one of absolute sale and not a mortgage with future sale.
In other words, although the document Exhibit 1 states that it is a mortgage of the improvements, with a
stipulation regarding a future sale of the land in case of failure to comply with the mortgage obligations, in
reality the true contract between the parties is one of absolute sale in the light of the circumstances of the
case, among them the following:
First, Emiliana Ambrosio offered the sale, not the mortgage, of her homestead to Marcial Kasilag, and it is a
fact found established by the Court of Appeals that she was agreeable to the sum of one thousand pesos as
the price of the sale offered by her. If this is so, it is unlikely that Kasilag would refuse the offer of sale of
the homestead and would accept in lieu thereof a simple mortgage of the improvements, for the same sum
of one thousand pesos;
Second. In the deed it is stipulated that, if at the expiration of the period of four and a half years, the
debtor should fail to redeem the mortgage, she would execute in favor of the creditor, Marcial Kasilag, a
deed of absolute sale not only of the mortgaged improvements but also of the land for the same amount of
the loan of one thousand pesos. This magic conversion of the mortgage of the improvements into an
absolute sale of the land at the expiration of four and a half years and without any additional consideration
can only mean that the two contracts are one and the same thing, and that the first has been availed of to
go around the legal prohibition. The scheme is very obvious, and to make any attempt to reconcile it with
good faith is simply to fall into it.
The mortgage of the improvements could not have been intended because the supposed loan which it
guaranteed was the same price of the stipulated sale to be later executed, and further because Kasilag
knew, according to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, that Emiliana Ambrosio was a poor and
ignorant woman who was not in a position to return to one thousand pesos;
Third. Kasilag had always considered the contract as one of sale of the land and not as a mortgage of the
improvements, because he put the tax declaration of the land in his name, paid the corresponding land tax,
took possession of the land, received the fruits thereof for his exclusive use, and introduced thereon
permanent improvements, one of them being a summer house, all of which were valued at about five
thousand pesos. It is not an attribute of a contract of mortgage that the creditor should take possession of
the mortgaged property, or that he should pay the taxes thereon. Kasilag would not spend five thousand
pesos for permanent improvements if he knew that his possession was precarious.
Fourth. In the document it is stipulated that the debtor would pay interest, but she did not pay any, and the
alleged mortgage was not foreclosed thereby, which shows that the stipulation was nothing but a ruse.
Fifth. The deed Exhibit 1 was drawn by Kasilag, because it is in English, and the other party is a poor and
ignorant woman, wherefore, all doubts and uncertainties arising therefrom should be resolved against
Kasilag. It is to noted that in this document are phrases indicative of the real contract between the parties.
For instance: in clause IV the word paid and not loaned is used in referring to the loan of one thousand
pesos; and clause IX of the document states "the foregoing contract of sale."
Under all these circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that the real contract between the parties is an
absolute sale, and that the contract of mortgage was made to appear in the document Exhibit 1 for the sole
purpose of defeating the legal prohibition. Nevertheless, the majority of this Court, brushing aside the
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals without stating its reasons therefor, holds as to the
document Exhibit 1, that "as the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be
interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses." I have already shown in speaking of the second
circumstance, that the context itself of the document Exhibit 1 discloses strong tokens that the contract
between the parties was one of the sale and not of mortgage. Moreover, the rule relied upon by the
majority is only applicable in the absence of any allegation that the document does not express the real
contract between the parties. Under section 285, No. 1, of Act No. 190, a document, however clear its
conditions may be, may and should be rejected when it is alleged and shown by evidence aliunde that it
does not express the true intent of the parties. We have often considered as document, by its terms a
contract of absolute sale, as one of mortgage because it has been so alleged and established by convincing
oral evidence. (Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil., 100; Villa vs. Santiago, 38 Phil., 157; Laureano vs. Kilayco, 34
Phil., 148; Cuyugan vs. Santos, 39 Phil., 970; Rodriguez vs. Pamintuan, 37 Phil., 876; see also Manalovs.
Gueco, 42 Phil., 925; Gatmaitan vs. Nepumuceno, 42 Phil., 295.)
The majority decision does not only pass over the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, but
further, gives weight to certain facts which said court finds not to have been established. For instance, we
have the following passages the majority decision:
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana
Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For
this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the
latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon. . . . .
. . . This stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense
that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition
that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the
land tax. . . . .
These two paragraphs state as an established fact the supposed verbal contract between the parties which
Kasilag tried to prove by his testimony. However, the Court of Appeals expressly held: "We believe,
however, that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of the appellee (Marcial
Kasilag) with reference to the alleged verbal agreement with the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, and based
thereon the conclusion that the appellee acted in good faith," (Words in parenthesis are mine.)
Rule 47, paragraph (b), of our Rules, provides expressly that in appeals to this court on certiorari, "only
questions of law may be raised and must be distinctly set forth." And we have held in various decisions that
in passing upon the legal conclusions of the Court of Appeals, we shall abide by the findings of fact of said
court.
I, moreover, find certain ambiguities in the majority decision, for while it states on the one hand that the
verbal contract had for its purpose the "alteration of the mortgage contract clearly entered
into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis," (underscoring mine) thereby implying that the
mortgage contract was abandoned by the parties and ceased to exist, in the dispositive part of its decision,
the majority holds that the mortgage of the improvements is valid and binding, and gives to the
respondents the right to "redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within
three months the amount of P1,000 . . . ." It, therefore, requires compliance with a contract that has ceased
to exist.
While on the one hand the majority states that the aforesaid verbal contract is one of antichresis and that
it is void, on the other hand, it gives force thereto by holding that the interest on the loan of one thousand
pesos is sufficiently "set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which the petitioner
received." And, furthermore, why should the interest be set off against the fruits of the improvements only
and not against those of the entire land? And if the verbal contract of antichresis is void, why is Kasilag not
required to render an accounting of the fruits of the land received by him which may exceed the total
amount of interest, taxes and even the principal itself?
The majority states that Kasilag, in taking possessions of the homestead, receiving its fruits and introducing
improvements thereon, did so under the void contract of antichresis, and did so in good faith as he was
excusably unaware of the legal provision which prohibits the incumbrance of the homestead within the
period of five years. Whether Kasilag was aware or unaware of the legal prohibition is again a factual
question resolved by the Court of Appeals as follows: "the appellee ( Marcial Kasilag) was also aware of
these provisions which were incorporated in the homestead patent shown to him at the beginning of the
transaction" (Words in parenthesis are mine). I do not understand how we can disturb this factual finding.
I found, moreover, that in the majority decision it is ordered that, if the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio cannot
pay the value of the permanent improvements introduced by Marcial Kasilag, the latter may have the
homestead by paying to them its price in the market. The improvements were appraised by the trial court
at three thousand pesos, and as the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio probably inherited nothing from the latter
but poverty, they will eventually be unable to pay the said amount and, in the last analysis, will lose the
homestead of their mother. The practical effect, therefore, of the majority decision is that the heirs of
Emiliana Ambrosio will be deprived of the homestead by virtue of a void antichretic obligation contracted
by her within the period of five years from the granting of the homestead. And this, at least, is in violation
of the spirit of section 116 of the Homestead Act.
I have other reasons which I need not set out to bring this dissent to a close. But before I conclude, I should
like to state that the Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law
gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant
what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to
their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a
right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the
welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. Moreover,
a man with a home and a means of subsistence is a lover of peace and order and will profess affection for
his country, whereas one without a home and in penury is not only a social parasite but also a dangerous
element in the social order. The Homestead Act at once aims at the promotion of wholesome and happy
citizenship and the wiping out of the germs of social discontent found everywhere.
Considering the social and economic ends of the Homestead Act, the courts should exercise supreme care
and strict vigilance towards faithful compliance with all its benign provisions and against the defeat,
directly or indirectly, of its highly commendable purposes. And it is my firm conviction that where, as in the
present case, a rich and clever man attempts to wrest a homestead granted to a poor and ignorant woman,
the slightest tokens of illegality should be enough to move the courts to apply the strong arm of the law.
I dissent from the majority decision and vote for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989
ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR
GRAHAM, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE respondents.
Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners.
The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
What the petitioner presents as a rather complicated problem is in reality a very simple question from the
viewpoint of the Solicitor General. We agree with the latter. There is actually only one issue to be resolved
in this action. That issue is whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the
petitioner's appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of a cause of action.
Appeal from what? That indeed is the question.
But first the facts.
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident in the Philippines, died
in Oregon, U.S.A. 1 As he left certain shares of stock in the Philippines, his son, Ward Graham, filed an
estate tax return on September 16, 1976, with the Philippine Revenue Representative in San Francisco,
U.S.A. 2
On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's
estate an estate tax in the amount of P96,509.35 on February 9, 1978. 3 This assessment was protested on
March 7, 1978, by the law firm of Bump, Young and Walker on behalf of the estate . 4 The protest was
denied by the Commissioner on July 7, 1978. 5 No further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of that
protest.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of
Oregon6 Ward Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the herein petitioner,
as his attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines. 7
Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal.8 The will was allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary administrator. 9 As such,
he filed a second estate tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on June 4, 1980. 10
On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate in the amount
of P72,948.87. 11 This was protested on behalf of the estate by the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law Office on
August 13, 1980. 12
While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the
allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35 as assessed on February 9, 1978. 13 He said that this liability
had not yet been paid although the assessment had long become final and executory.
The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest filed on August 13, 1980, against
the second assessment of P72,948.87. 14 On this understanding, he filed on September 15, 1981, a petition
for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. 15
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the petitioner stressed, no answer was filed
during a delay of 195 days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment in a letter to the
decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982. 16 This cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic. 17
The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25, 1984. 18 The petitioner then came to this
Court oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises three basic questions, to wit, (1) whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent
should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property; (2) whether the said stocks should be
assessed as of the time of the owner's death or six months thereafter; and (3) whether the appeal filed
with the respondent court should be considered moot and academic.
We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.
In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote
as follows:
Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O. ELEGADO Ancillary Administrator Philex Building cor.
Brixton & Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila
Sir:
This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, who died a resident of Oregon,
U.S.A. on March 14, 1976. It appears that two (2) letters of demand were issued by this Bureau. One is for
the amount of P96,509.35 based on the first return filed, and the other in the amount of P72,948.87, based
on the second return filed.
It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was issued on February 9, 1978 on the basis of the estate
tax return filed on September 16, 1976. The said assessment was, however, protested in a letter dated
March 7, 1978 but was denied on July 7, 1978. Since no appeal was made within the regulatory period, the
same has become final.
In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid assessment for P96,509.35 within fifteen (15)
days upon receipt hereof to the Receivable Accounts Division, this Bureau, BIR National Office Building,
Diliman, Quezon City. The assessment for P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to above is hereby
cancelled.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner 19
It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment for P72,948.87 that the petitioner had
been deprived of a cause of action as it was precisely from this assessment that he was appealing.
In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals said that the petition questioning the assessment of July 3, 1980,
was "premature" since the protest to the assessment had not yet been resolved. 20 As a matter of fact it
had: the said assessment had been cancelled by virtue of the above-quoted letter. The respondent court
was on surer ground, however, when it followed with the finding that the said cancellation had rendered
the petition moot and academic. There was really no more assessment to review.
The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second assessment on July 3, 1980, had the effect of
canceling the first assessment of February 9, 1978, and that the subsequent cancellation of the second
assessment did not have the effect of automatically reviving the first. Moreover, the first assessment is not
binding on him because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax
laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals.
The petitioner is clutching at straws.
It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second assessment of P72,948.87, the
Commissioner made it clear that "the aforesaid amount is considered provisional only based on the estate
tax return filed subject to investigation by this Office for final determination of the correct estate tax due
from the estate. Any amount that may be found due after said investigation will be assessed and collected
later." 21 It is illogical to suggest that aprovisional assessment can supersede an earlier assessment which
had clearly become final and executory.
The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first
assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based were not
familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from
compliance therewith because of their ignorance?
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a
like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our own
country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult
to find.
But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first assessment is already final and
executory and can no longer be questioned at this late hour. The assessment was made on February 9,
1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978. The protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was
taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question that the assessment has become final and
executory.
In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to have accepted its denial. In his motion with the
probate court, the respondent Commissioner stressed that "in a letter dated January 29, 1980, the Estate
of Warren Taylor Graham thru the aforesaid foreign law firm informed claimant that they have paid said
tax liability thru the Agrava, Velarde, Lucero and Puno, Philippine law firm of 313 Buendia Avenue Ext.,
Makati, Metro Manila that initiated the instant ancillary proceedings" although he added that such
payment had not yet been received. 22This letter was an acknowledgment by the estate of the validity and Promulgated:
finality of the first assessment. Significantly, it has not been denied by the petitioner.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the question of its validity
before this Court any more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals. What the estate of Respondent. February 23, 2011
the decedent should have done earlier, following the denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was to appeal to
the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days after it received notice of said denial. It
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
was in such appeal that the petitioner could then have raised the first two issues he now raises without
basis in the present petition.

The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the decedent should be considered conjugal DECISION
property or belonging to him alone is immaterial in these proceedings. So too is the time at which the
assessment of these shares of stock should have been made by the BIR. These questions were not resolved
by the Court of Tax Appeals because it had no jurisdiction to act on the petitioner's appeal from an
assessment that had already been cancelled. The assessment being no longer controversial or reviewable, BERSAMIN, J.:
there was no justification for the respondent court to rule on the petition except to dismiss it.
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded
If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an error in the computation of the estate tax, check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22(BP 22).
as the petitioner insists, that error can no longer be rectified because the original assessment has long
become final and executory. If that assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance with the Antecedents
prescribed procedure, that error — for error it was — was committed not by the respondents but by the
decedent's estate itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he now complain. On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered, Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:

Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value
Supreme Court Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of P336,000.00 said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
Manila the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
THIRD DIVISION
for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan
the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days
HEIRS OF EDUARDO G.R. No. 157547 after receiving said notice.

SIMON,

Petitioners, Present: CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

BRION, Acting Chairperson,**

BERSAMIN, More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC
in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount ofP336,000.00, coupled with an
-versus - ABAD,*** application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).[2] He alleged in his
complaint the following:
VILLARAMA, JR., and
xxx
SERENO, JJ.
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a
check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the
check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy
of the said check is hereto attached as Annex A;
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground that the
account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his
representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly funded
and will be honored when presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of the check,
xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex B, but despite such demand defendant
refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has
been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorneys fees
the amount of P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which
this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action which fraud
consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and sufficient funds to
cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section 1, sub-
paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is
as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages should it
be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. [3]
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. [4]
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages,[5] pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant
action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case
No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is
the herein plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon presentment for
payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount
of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy
of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex 1.
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged pendency of
another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency
of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon renders this case
dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of
the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the submission of the
plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact
that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any
allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this
the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution
evidence was not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the
prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an
effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and conveniently
failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on
fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file a
separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to
enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments
law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as
payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo,
as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check
and such negotiation was valid and effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check
was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said check was payable
to bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a
reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case since the
liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the negotiable
instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint the application for damages against the bond is
totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright. [6]
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,[7] dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the
application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2)
cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as Sum of Money and the criminal case for violation
of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being
asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of P336,000.00.
In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts, are identical.
Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact
that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during
the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal
Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the
offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless
in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the
said provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this
must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to
pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the
considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred.
The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs submission that the herein case for sum of money is one
based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the
Rules, to wit:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis pendentia;
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages
sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendants physical
possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,[8] viz:
Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and
which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of
the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the
plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint,
disposing:[9]
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,[10] challenging
the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged
civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and
that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[12] overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the
second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated
through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in
the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately
instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1,
2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability
arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include
recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation.
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In
no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which
became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed
against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there
was no reservation as to its filing.
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought
on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance
of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal
case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000,
the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since
procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by
petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration.[13]
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the
assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v.
Velez[14] stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding
the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[15]
In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners
used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil
action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of
his separate civil action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case
No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability
in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party
may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act
of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v.
Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of
the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is
entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving
her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit.
To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,effective December 1, 2000, which
relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information,
the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.[18]
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case
No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or
arise from, procedural laws.[19] Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of
their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure,[20] except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require
a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution.[21]
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right,
because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1,
1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines
shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.[22]
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended
party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the
amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure
outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect
on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation
v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,[23] thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section
1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to
file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions
(a) xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the
complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing
fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This
rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use
the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages,
the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes,
upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection
based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and
tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of
the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one
can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed
that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would
only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the
final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be
fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.[24]
The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez[25] to give due course to the civil action of
Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI
Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution
for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in
two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,[26] the procedures for the recovery of the
civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions
of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an
independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,[27] as DMPI Employees has
allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the
reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the
bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for
the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97
and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud
and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381)
bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in PasayCity on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of
the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil. [28]
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements
of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No.
275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in
Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued
Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other
by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground
of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in
affirming the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered
on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA;
ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO
FRANCISCO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate court's decision 1 promulgated
on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court which ruled, 2 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties described in paragraph
eight (8) of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage.
Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio
by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the
following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S.
Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until
he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to
administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to
sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot
together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of
attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix
of the properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during
the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner.
Hence, the court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158, UNDER TITLE VI OF THE (NEW) CIVIL
CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS, HAVE (SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE
253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE. 3
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue "whether or not Article 116 of the Family Code applies to
this case because Article 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil
Code" 4
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court committed reversible
error in affirming the trial court's ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal
but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Indeed, Articles 158 5 and 160 6 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the
Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New
Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article 254 7 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her
petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without
impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 8 in relation to Article 105 9 (second paragraph) of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in
force. 10 Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their
repeal. 11 We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer these on account
of the incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the assets in
controversy claimed by petitioner as "conjugal" are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were
acquired by the latter either through inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage.
Moreover, they stress that Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner's allegation.
We find petitioner's contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife".
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. 12Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 13 The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. 14 Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses.15
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to
be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of
Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio
brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet
registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential.
The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 16 of the
New Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is
considered his or her separate property. 17 Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired
gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy,
or donation. 18 Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place
during his second marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him,
"during the marriage, by lucrative title." 19
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these properties were
either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner
insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the
building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of
Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were
acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative
of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly noted:
. . . . And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the licensee of the sari-sari store
(Exhibit "F-3"; Exhibit "G", pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed applicant for a building permit does not
establish that these improvements were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio Francisco, especially so
when her exhibits ("D-1", "E", "E-I", "T", "T-1", "T-2", "U", "U-l" and "U-2"; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record; TSN,
January 17, 1989, page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all described Eusebio
Francisco as the owner of the structures (Article 1431, New Civil Code;Section 4. Rule 129, Revised Rules on
Evidence).
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio Francisco has
thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the
expense of their partnership (second paragraph, Article 158, New Civil Code). Normally, this absence of
evidence on the source of funding will call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of the
New Civil Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular case again, by reason of
the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841; 9
Manresa; cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1, 1983 Edition, page
421). 20
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that their father
purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property
in as much as the title thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco."
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The
fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no
proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. 21 It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing. 22 The phrase "married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is merely descriptive of the
civil status of Eusebio Francisco. 23
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have been without valid
basis in affirming the lower court's ruling that the properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it follows that Eusebio shall
retain control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. 24 Even assuming for the sake
of argument that the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer themn inasmuch as Eusebio is
not incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not
suffering from serious illness so as to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped
due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the
ground in one of their occasional quarrels, did not render him, in the Court's view, incapacitated to perform
acts of administration over his own properties.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV.
No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which
has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an
inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975.
Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a
seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six
months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build
their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during
the two months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union
begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
"psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning.
When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At
one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the
children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of
her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner
decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay,
things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an
hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical
examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and
abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against
respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City
and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister.
Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought
the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal
service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the
reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between
the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found
no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although
filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with
petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint
which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was
psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred,
particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his
motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that
his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." 1
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis
that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as
the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 3 promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied
retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in
nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is
absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has
been so defined inSantos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court,
in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity'
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith in accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our
statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped
jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the
term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the
parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family6that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her
unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not
necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should
we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed
by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application 3 (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General
of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a
Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that
the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute
had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to
indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which
held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant
indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure
a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against
the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied
upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between
those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship
before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 63 11(CA 63). Since the crime for
which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before
he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his
application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is
academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six
months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a
warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A.
9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already
consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was
long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy or
recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his
defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has
disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by
re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction “deemed not to have
lost” it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to
have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to surrender or
allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine
citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his wife and
counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is
implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process. 18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the retroactivity of
R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it
will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved,
that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the
Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public document,
it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to petitioner’s
defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full-
blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in
seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his
voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the
parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s
motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into
law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country
shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the
conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for
both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before
and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine
Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe
the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from
the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is
one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by
doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, 21 and also
provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts
that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is
consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant
when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a
non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated
January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born
Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear in
the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720
and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the
query of Representative Exequiel Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, “Any
provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of their
naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who acquired
foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But
natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to
have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who became,
let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the effectivity
of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want
to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The
reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act
63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure
amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired
their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So that’s the
distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between natural-
born citizens. Because this is very important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born
citizens are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But just for
purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who
previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary
to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225
itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section
2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that
such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on
the particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before
and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts
adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal
statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however,
is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents
under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of
his official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document. 26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying
petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for
bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the
distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
in Santiago v. Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by
filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused,
as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law andjurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but
not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of
a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the
will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general
rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As
we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over
his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes
of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable
cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is herebyAFFIRMED
and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any
temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain,
prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether
public or private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the
right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or
project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating
any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking
or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.

Supreme Court

Baguio City Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or project acts
FIRST DIVISION contrary to law.

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 167057 Antecedents

Petitioner,

Present: The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated
on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:

- versus - CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000)
pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural
* BRION, Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or
woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, BERSAMIN, and and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were
and required to submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the same time,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. they were informed that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to
ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards submit their financial bids.
Committee,

Respondents. Promulgated:
Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including
private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the
qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest
bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of
private respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier
April 11, 2012 in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEAs requirements.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and
Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III
recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all
schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive
and complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and
$0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to the
government. The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and
Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms
are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and specified in the bid
documents and as based on the pre-award inspection conducted.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the
material requirements for IBP No. 80 given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and
with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching. In turn, it resolved to award the four (4)
schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin]
protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint,
citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to the
award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the
Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private
respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but
the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the
award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations
with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a
complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive
application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy,
issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for
its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil
action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v.
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee,
alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB
No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the
wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no cause
of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs,
contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no
authority to sign and file the complaint. [3]
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil
Case No. 03106921.[4]
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this Court:
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from appearing
as counsel for the defendants;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman
of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon
the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which
the defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final
determination of the issue in this case by this Court.
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount
of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is enjoined.
Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set aside the order of
default and to admit their answer to the complaint.
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside order of
default, and to admit answer.[6]
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP
No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in
blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default;
and in disqualifying respondents counsel from representing them. [7]
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and December 29, 2003 are
hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondents complaint for
issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February 9, 2005.[9]
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the
issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme
Court, on government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975
which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of
the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No.
03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judges issuance of a
preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary
injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining petitioners
sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved
on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated
July 20 and December 29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but
not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such
contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable
injury will arise. xxx
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored
the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in
an administrative case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same embodied in
its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary
Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the
ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the
Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term
infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, (c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and
sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings
and other related construction projects that form part of the government capital investment.
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would justify
respondent Judges blatant disregard of a simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818)
prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects. Respondent
Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single (e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving
a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but
not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such
contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he should constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable
not have given due course to private respondents complaint for injunction.Indubitably, the assailed orders injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to
the relief sought.

Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered by petitioners. [10]
The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained
the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the
express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding
out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a
rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and
effect.

Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do
except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been
unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all
judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and
respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory
injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national
government project;
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of
Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already
found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his
issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him in
the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening retirement from the service. That
sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated:

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-
stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D.
No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the rural electrification
project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Courts various circulars enjoining
courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects in line with the
proscription under R.A. No. 8975.Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National Housing Authority v.
Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a
judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus:
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting a
contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of
the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to
his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge to evade
administrative liability.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the
applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the
circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them.
Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of
their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this
presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in
disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges are expected to know and apply
properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are serious charges
under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He having retired from the service, a fine in the amount
of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative
sanction to dismissal or suspension.[12]
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of Nerwins other
submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the
real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this
decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance
of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts.
Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be avoided.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment
or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts.[13] It is
an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests
during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. [14]
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. In City Government of
Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses
sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the
applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of
the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute
a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the
injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be
enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is
merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action;
or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by
injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. [16]
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, however, for, as the Court
has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is enough that:
xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is directly
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary,
its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a
sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction
pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves
only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial
court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it
has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.[18]
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that conflicting
claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual
determination that is not the function of the appellate courts. [19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such
discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law. [20] When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by the
issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse. [21]
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently or
unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or before trial.
Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is
never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case, [23] or to decide
controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened
wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be
settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render
a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances
that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits. [30] It is well worth
remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened
continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied
and adjudicated.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the
same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with
Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the
14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel)
measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the
victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction
thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety
lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses,
the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic] IS
APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT
UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The
CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay
rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. 4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he
merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. 5 This is known as
the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence
applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to
light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that
cannot be tested by cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section
44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
areprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated
the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is
not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court.
InRodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the
fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the
purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it
constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the
portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties
based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been
included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be
considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation
and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain
utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned
Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of
the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and
makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained
in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the officials
would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers
are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official sources.
Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part
of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer
in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents,
which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several
trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty may be
given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report.
In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this
Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the
aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of
Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no showing that, at the very least,
they were under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3
Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal
knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva
had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also
conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident 13 and saw the
platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3
Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon
inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt. 17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the
platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony
is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible. 19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the
CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator
was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquituris peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. 20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or
injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under
the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in
the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper
care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. 21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the
theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of
the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence
is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it
must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the
accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for
explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a building to the basement
while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is
within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project
superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The
circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the
accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,]
the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased
husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x
x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but
argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain. 26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome
by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care
or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into
play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the
police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted
rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and
the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that
private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same
statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as
evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 28 The
inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the
adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an
affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. 29 Petitioner,
therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it
to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to
rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to
establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages
under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred
sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System
or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided
that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under
the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca
vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the
Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and
regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the
deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon
motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief
from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En
Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a
right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled thatan
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the
Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The
Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968
before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr.,
Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional
Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967,
except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the
lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the
Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of
government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress
under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was
not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may
be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime
Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In
the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue
under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants
may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of
compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other
remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the
police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against
petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the
complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in
nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as
November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her sworn
statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim,
and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case
and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for
police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is
mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6,
1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the
public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents
who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was
no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence
cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the
first payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9,
1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that:
"The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as
shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We
are more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after
she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall
under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational
attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her husband; and
that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her
complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake
of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate
that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as
November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months
before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that,
although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature."
These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and
every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and
yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. 37 Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the
moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not
to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. 38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an
ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to
have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to
assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights
or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis
upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception
in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her
complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden
private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead
waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore,
perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when
petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the
rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact"
that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private
respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil
liability. InFloresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules
and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is
not a fact, but aconclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no
one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of
fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash
when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police
investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner
filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim
before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her
rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part
of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this
Court’s ruling inFloresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. 42 This
may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not
excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of
remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against
her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total
amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K" 43 that she
received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March
1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total
monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less
than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the
case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is
greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall
be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this
adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the
award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be
greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the
Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the November 12, 2009 Decision 1 and
July 28, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107233 entitled “Hypte R. Aujero v.
National Labor Relations Commission and Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation.”

SECOND DIVISION In its November 12, 2009 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court from the National Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC) July 4, 2008 and September 29,
2008 Resolutions, the dispositive portion of which states:

HYPTE R. AUJERO, G.R. No. 193484

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions dated July 4, 2008 and September 29,
Petitioner, 2008 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-08921-2004
[NLRC NCR CA No. 049644-06] are AFFIRMED.
Present:

SO ORDERED.3
CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - PEREZ, The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the above Decision but this was likewise denied by
the CA in its July 28, 2010 Resolution.
SERENO,

REYES, and
The Antecedent Facts

BERNABE, JJ. 

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latter's Finance Department. On August 15, 2001 or after
Respondent. Promulgated: thirty-four (34) years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for retirement
was approved, effective September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate
equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner was
Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of Two Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Five Pesos (P274,805.00).4
January 18, 2012

On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim5 in Philcomsat’s favor,
following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of Nine Million Four Hundred Thirty-Nine
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Seven and 91/100 Pesos (P9,439,327.91). 6

DECISION
Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming
that the actual amount of his retirement pay is Fourteen Million Fifteen Thousand and Fifty-Five Pesos
(P14,015,055.00) and the P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his
REYES, J: claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void.
According to the petitioner, he had no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof
and was all set to return to his hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency
as no single centavo would be released to him if he did not execute a release and waiver in Philcomsat's
favor.7
The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his retirement benefits, which is equivalent
to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is provided under the Retirement Plan that
Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees. 8 On November 3, 1997, Philcomsat
and the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) executed a Trust Agreement, where UCPB, as trustee, shall
hold, administer and manage the respective contributions of Philcomsat and its employees, as well as the
income derived from the investment thereof, for and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Retirement Plan. 9
The petitioner claims that Philcomsat has no right to withhold any portion of his retirement benefits as the
trust fund created pursuant to the Retirement Plan is for the exclusive benefit of Philcomsat employees
and Philcomsat had expressly recognized that it has no right or claim over the trust fund even on the
portion pertaining to its contributions. 10 As Section 4 of the Trust Agreement provides:
Section 4 – The Companies, in accordance with the provisions of the Plan, hereby waive all their rights to
their contributions in money or property which are and will be paid or transferred to the Trust Fund, and
no person shall have any right in, or with respect to, the Trust Fund or any part thereof except as expressly
provided herein or in the Plan. At no time, prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to the
participants and their beneficiaries under the Plan, shall any part of the corpus or income of the Fund be
used for or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of Plan participants and their
beneficiaries.11
The petitioner calls attention to the August 15, 2001 letter of Philcomsat's Chairman and President, Mr.
Carmelo Africa, addressed to UCPB for the release of P9,439,327.91 to the petitioner and P4,575,727.09 to
Philcomsat, which predated the execution of his quitclaim on September 12, 2001. 12 According to the
petitioner, this indicates Philcomsat’s pre-conceived plans to deprive him of a significant portion of his
retirement pay.
On May 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria (LA Lustria) issued a Decision 13 in the petitioner’s favor,
directing Philcomsat to pay him the amount of P4,575,727.09 andP274,805.00, representing the balance of
his retirement benefits and salary for the period from August 15 to September 15, 2001, respectively. LA
Lustria found it hard to believe that the petitioner would voluntary waive a significant portion of his
retirement pay. He found the consideration supporting the subject quitclaim unconscionable and ruled that
the respondent failed to substantiate its claim that the amount received by the petitioner was a product of
negotiations between the parties. Thus:
It would appear from the tenor of the letter that, rather that the alleged agreement, between complainant
and respondent, respondent is claiming payment for an “outstanding due to Philcomsat” out of the
retirement benefits of complainant. This could hardly be considered as proof of an agreement to reduce
complainant’s retirement benefits. Absent any showing of any agreement or authorization, the deductions
from complainant’s retirement benefits should be considered as improper and illegal.
If we were to give credence to the claim of respondent, it would appear that complainant has voluntarily
waived a total amount of [P]4,575,727.09. Given the purpose of retirement benefits to provide for a retiree
a source of income for the remainder of his years, it defies understanding how complainant could accept
such an arrangement and lose more than [P]4.5 million in the process. One can readily see the
unreasonableness of such a proposition. By the same token, the Quitclaim and Waiver over benefits worth
millions is apparently unconscionable and unacceptable under normal circumstances. The Supreme Court
has consistently ruled that waivers must be fair, reasonable, and just and must not be unconscionable on
its face. The explanation of the complainant that he was presented with a lower amount on pain that the
entire benefits will not be released is more believable and consistent with evidence. We, therefore, rule
against the effectivity of the waiver and quitclaim, thus, complainant is entitled to the balance of his
retirement benefits in the amount of [P]4,575,727.09. 14
In its July 4, 2008 Resolution,15 the NLRC granted Philcomsat’s appeal and reversed and set aside LA
Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision. The NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for unpaid retirement
benefits and salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he executed in September 12,
2001 following his receipt from Philcomsat of the amount of P9,439,327.91, which constitutes the full
settlement of all his claims against Philcomsat. According to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to allege, much
less, adduce evidence that Philcomsat employed means to vitiate his consent to the quitclaim. The
petitioner is well-educated, a licensed accountant and was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President prior to his
retirement; he cannot therefore claim that he signed the quitclaim without understanding the
consequences and implications thereof. The relevant portions of the NLRC’s July 4, 2008 Resolution states:
After analyzing the antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent facts surrounding the alleged
underpayment of retirement benefits, We rule that respondent-appellant have no more obligation to the
complainant-appellee.
The complainant-appellee willingly received the check for the said amount, without having filed any
objections nor reservations thereto, and even executed and signed a Release and Quitclaim in favor of the
respondent-appellant. Undoubtedly, the quitclaim the complainant-appellee signed is valid. Complainant-
appellee has not denied at any time its due execution and authenticity. He never imputed claims of
coercion, undue influence, or fraud against the respondent-appellant. His statement in his reply to the
respondent-appellant’s position paper that the quitclaim is void alleging that it was obtained through
duress is only an afterthought to make his claim appear to be convincing. If it were true, complainant-
appellee should have asserted such fact from the very beginning. Also, there was no convincing proof
shown by the complainant-appellee to prove existence of duress exerted against him. His stature and
educational attainment would both negate that he can be forced into something against his will.
It should be stressed that complainant-appellee even waited for a period of almost three (3) years before
he filed the complaint. If he really felt aggrieved by the amount he received, prudence dictates that he
immediately would call the respondent-appellant’s attention and at the earliest opportune shout his
objections, rather than wait for years, before deciding to claim his supposed benefits, [e]specially that his
alleged entitlement is a large sum of money. Thus, it is evident that the filing of the instant case is a clear
case of afterthought, and that complainant-appellee simply had a change of mind. This We cannot allow.
xxxx
In the instant case, having willingly signed the Deed of Release and Quitclaim dated September 12, 2001, it
is hard to conclude that the complainant-appellee was merely forced by the necessity to execute the
quitclaim. Complainant-appellee is not a gullible or unsuspecting person who can easily be tricked or
inveigled and, thus, needs the extra protection of law. He is well-educated and a highly experienced man.
The release and quitclaim executed by the complainant-appellee is therefore considered valid and binding
on him and the respondent-appellant. He is already estopped from questioning the same.16
Philcomsat’s appeal to the NLRC from LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision was filed and its surety bond
posted beyond the prescribed period of ten (10) days. On June 20, 2006, a copy of LA Lustria’s Decision was
served on Maritess Querubin (Querubin), one of Philcomsat’s executive assistants, as Philcomsat’s counsel
and the executive assistant assigned to her were both out of the office. It was only the following day that
Querubin gave a copy of the said Decision to the executive assistant of Philcomsat’s counsel, leading the
latter to believe that it was only then that the said Decision had been served. In turn, this led Philcomsat’s
counsel to believe that it was on June 21, 2006 that the ten (10) day-period started to run.
Having in mind that the delay was only one (1) day and the explanation offered by Philcomsat’s counsel,
the NLRC disregarded Philcomsat’s procedural lapse and proceeded to decide the appeal on its merits.
Thus:
It appears that on June 20[,] 2006[,] copy of the Decision was received by one (Maritess) who is not the
Secretary of respondents-appellants’ counsel and therefore not authorized to receive such document. It
was only the following day, June 21, 2006, that respondents-appellants[’] counsel actually received the
Decision which was stamped received on said date. Verily, counsel has until July 3, 2006 within which to
perfect the appeal, which he did. In PLDT vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 60250, March 26, 1984, the Honorable
Supreme Court held that: “where notice of the Decision was served on the receiving station at the ground
floor of the defendant’s company building, and received much later at the office of the legal counsel on the
ninth floor of said building, which was his address of record, service of said decision has taken effect from
said later receipt at the aforesaid office of its legal counsel.”
Be that as it may, the provisions of Section 10, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, states, that:
“SECTION 10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of
law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x”
Additionally, the Supreme Court has allowed appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, even
if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. Moreover, under Article 218 (c) of the
Labor Code, the NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers, correct, amend or waive any error,
defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form. Further, Article 221 of the same provides that: In any
proceedings before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission
and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use in each case speedily and objectively and without regard
to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. 17
In his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the CA, the petitioner accused the NLRC
of grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondent’s belated appeal by relaxing the
application of one of the fundamental requirements of appeal. An appeal, being a mere statutory right,
should be exercised in a manner that strictly conforms to the prescribed procedure. As of July 3, 2006, or
when Philcomsat filed its appeal and posted its surety bond, LA Lustria’s Decision had become final and
executory and Philcomsat’s counsel’s failure to verify when the copy of said Decision was actually received
does not constitute excusable negligence.
The petitioner likewise anchored his allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the NLRC on the latter's
refusal to strike as invalid the quitclaim he executed in Philcomsat’s favor. According to the petitioner, his
retirement pay amounts to P14,015,055.00 and P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed
settlement for all his claims against it is unconscionable and this is more than enough reason to declare his
quitclaim as null and void.
By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the petitioner’s claims, holding that the NLRC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondent’s appeal.
The Supreme Court has ruled that where a copy of the decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk
nor one in charge of the attorney’s office, such service is invalid. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
Maritess Querubin, the person who received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, was neither a clerk of
Atty. Yanzon, private respondent’s counsel, nor a person in charge of Atty. Yanzon’s office. Hence, her
receipt of said decision on June 20, 2006 cannot be considered as notice to Atty. Yanzon. Since a copy of
the decision was actually delivered by Maritess to Atty. Yanzon’s secretary only on June 21, 2006, it was
only on this date that the ten-day period for the filing of private respondent’s appeal commenced to run.
Thus, private respondent’s July 3, 2006 appeal to the NLRC was seasonably filed.
Similarly, the provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the posting of a bond for the perfection of
an appeal of a monetary award must be given liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of
resolving controversies on the merits. If only to achieve substantial justice, strict observance of the
reglementary periods may be relaxed if warranted. However, this liberal interpretation must be justified by
substantial compliance with the rule. As the Supreme Court ruled in Buenaobra v. Lim King Guan:
xxxx
We note that in the instant case, private respondent substantially complied with the filing of its appeal and
the required appeal bond on July 3, 2006 – the next working day after July 1, 2006, the intervening days
between the said two dates being a Saturday and a Sunday. Substantial justice dictates that the present
case be decided on the merits, especially since there was a mere one-day delay in the filing by private
respondent of its appeal and appeal bond with the NLRC. x x x. 18 (citation omitted)
The CA further ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s quitclaim. Thus:
In the same vein, this Court finds that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid the Deed of Release and Quitclaim dated September 12,
2001 – absolving private respondent from liability arising from any and all suits, claims, demands or other
causes of action of whatever nature in consideration of the amount petitioner received in connection with
his retirement – signed by petitioner. x x x
xxxx
The assertion of petitioner that the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he signed should be struck down for
embodying unconscionable terms is simply untenable. Petitioner himself admits that he has received the
amount of [P]9,327,000.00 – representing his retirement pay and other benefits – from private respondent.
By no stretch of the imagination could the said amount be considered unconscionably low or shocking to
the conscience, so as to warrant the invalidation of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim. Granting that the
source of the retirement pay of petitioner is the trust fund maintained by private respondent at the UCPB
for the payment of the retirement pay of private-respondent’s employees, the said circumstance would still
not justify the invalidation of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim, for petitioner clearly understood the
contents thereof at the time of its execution but still choose to sign the deed. The terms thereof being
reasonable and there being no showing that private respondent employed coercion, fraud or undue
influence upon petitioner to compel him to sign the same, the subject Deed of Release and
Quitclaim signed by petitioner shall be upheld as valid.19 (citations omitted)
The petitioner ascribes several errors on the part of the CA. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the CA
erred in not dismissing the respondent’s appeal to the NLRC, which was filed beyond the prescribed period.
There is no dispute that Querubin was authorized to receive mails and correspondences on behalf of
Philcomsat’s counsel and her receipt of LA Lustria’s Decision on June 20, 2006 is binding on Philcomsat.
Also, the failure of Philcomsat’s counsel to ascertain when exactly the copy of LA Lustria’s Decision was
received by Querubin is inexcusable negligence. Since the perfection of an appeal within the ten (10)-day
period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement, Philcomsat’s failure to justify its delay should have
been reason enough to dismiss its appeal.
The petitioner also claims that the CA erred in upholding the validity of the subject quitclaim. The
respondent has no right to retain a portion of his retirement pay and the consideration for the execution of
the quitclaim is simply unconscionable. The petitioner submits that the CA should have taken into account
that Philcomsat’s retirement plan was for the exclusive benefit of its employees and to allow Philcomsat to
appropriate a significant portion of his retirement pay is a clear case of unjust enrichment.
On the other hand, Philcomsat alleges that the petitioner willfully and knowingly executed the subject
quitclaim in consideration of his receipt of his retirement pay. Albeit his retirement pay was in the reduced
amount of P9,439,327.91, Philcomsat alleges that this was arrived at following its negotiations with the
petitioner and the latter participated in the computation thereof, taking into account his accountabilities to
Philcomsat and the latter’s financial debacles.
Philcomsat likewise alleges that the NLRC is clothed with ample authority to set aside technical rules;
hence, the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining Philcomsat’s appeal in
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the late filing thereof and the amount subject of the
dispute.
Issues
In view of the conflicting positions adopted by the parties, this Court is confronted with two (2) issues that
are far from being novel, to wit:
a. Whether the delay in the filing of Philcomsat’s appeal and posting of surety bond is inexcusable; and
b. Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his
right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.
Our Ruling
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined to the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and will not issue absent a showing of a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Not every error in a proceeding, or every erroneous conclusion of law or
of fact, is an act in excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion.20 The prerogative of writ
of certiorari does not lie except to correct, not every misstep, but a grave abuse of discretion. 21
Procedural rules may be relaxed to give way to the full determination of a case on its merits.
Confronted with the task of determining whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion in
the NLRC's decision to give due course to Philcomsat's appeal despite its being belatedly filed, this Court
rules in Philcomsat's favor.
Procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in absolutely meritorious cases. A review of the cases
cited by the petitioner, Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System22and Videogram Regulatory Board v.
Court of Appeals,23 where this Court adhered to the strict implementation of the rules and considered them
inviolable, shows that the patent lack of merit of the appeals render liberal interpretation pointless and
naught. The contrary obtains in this case as Philcomsat's case is not entirely unmeritorious. Specifically,
Philcomsat alleged that the petitioner's execution of the subject quitclaim was voluntary and he made no
claim that he did so. Philcomsat likewise argued that the petitioner's educational attainment and the
position he occupied in Philcomsat's hierarchy militate against his claim that he was pressured or coerced
into signing the quitclaim.
The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities. 24 Far from having
gravely abused its discretion, the NLRC correctly prioritized substantial justice over the rigid and stringent
application of procedural rules. This, by all means, is not a case of grave abuse of discretion calling for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari.
Absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present and considering the petitioner’s position
and education, the quitclaim executed by the petitioner constitutes a valid and binding agreement.
In Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation, v. Ativo,25 this Court reiterated the standards that must be
observed in determining whether a waiver and quitclaim has been validly executed:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered
into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned
simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that
the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking.26 (emphasis supplied)
In Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 this Court ruled that:
It is highly unlikely and incredible for a man of petitioner’s position and educational attainment to so easily
succumb to private respondent company’s alleged pressures without even defending himself nor
demanding a final audit report before signing any resignation letter. Assuming that pressure was indeed
exerted against him, there was no urgency for petitioner to sign the resignation letter. He knew the nature
of the letter that he was signing, for as argued by respondent company, petitioner being "a man of high
educational attainment and qualification, x x x he is expected to know the import of everything that he
executes, whether written or oral.”28
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a
legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the
courts as the law between the parties.29 Considering the petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against
Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release and waiver, his
failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the same. That no
portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does not constitute the
pressure or coercion contemplated by law.
That the petitioner was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would likewise not
qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. "Dire necessity" may be an acceptable
ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into
accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the
employee has been forced to execute it.30 While it is our duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it
also behooves us to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws. 31
The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and educated with a college degree, who
cannot be easily duped or tricked into performing an act against his will. As no proof was presented that
the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception, misrepresentation, the same is valid and
binding. The petitioner is estopped from questioning the said quitclaim and cannot renege after accepting
the benefits thereunder. This Court will never satisfy itself with surmises, conjectures or speculations for
the purpose of giving imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate from his obligations under a valid
and binding release and waiver.
The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was
pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the
petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding
thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to lapse before filing a complaint
to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable
conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
The CA and the NLRC were unanimous in holding that the petitioner voluntarily executed the subject
quitclaim. The Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor
cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve and whether the petitioner voluntarily
executed the subject quitclaim is a question of fact. In this case, the factual issues have already been
determined by the NLRC and its findings were affirmed by the CA. Judicial review by this Court does not
extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based
its determination.32
Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
respective jurisdictions are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are binding on the
SC. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when supported by
substantial evidence. Consequently, the SC is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual
findings, in the absence of a clear showing that the same were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis. 33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed November 12, 2009
Decision and July 28, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107233 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201931 February 11, 2015
DOÑA ADELA1 EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS (BPI), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Decision2 dated November 15, 2011 and the Order3 dated May 14, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 in SEC Case No. MC06-103 for Voluntary
Insolvency. The RTC approved the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement filed by respondents Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI). Respondents stipulated in their agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality
under the provisions of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and the General Banking Law of 2000.
The facts follow:
On August 23, 2006, petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., (petitioner, for brevity) filed a Petition
for Voluntary Insolvency.4 The case was docketed as SEC Case No. MC06-103 and raffled off to the RTC of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 211.
On August 28, 2006, the RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an order
declaring petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings against petitioner. In the same order, the
RTC set the initial hearing on October 19, 2006.5
Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales
proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof of
their respective claims.
On October 22, 2010, Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise a. That the remaining assets of the Petitioner mentioned under 1 above be assigned and applied to their
Agreement6incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise, the pertinent portion of which respective claims in the following manner:
reads:
a.1. The real estate property mentioned under 1.1 and 1.2 above with real estate mortgage (REM) to
1. The remaining assets of the Petitioner Dona Adela Export Int’l., Inc., (Dona Adela) consists of the Technology Resource Center (TRC) be assigned and applied to its credit. All costs and expenses for the
following: transfer of the registration of the said property, including its unpaid real estate taxes due to the City of
Mandaluyong, and cost for cancellation of real estate mortgage shall be borne by TRC.
Asset Appraised Value Remarks
a.2. For TRC to assign and waive its rights over the sewing machines and equipments under chattel
mortgage to it mentioned under 1.3 above as its share for the administrative costs of this proceedings.
1.1 Land P5,616,000 w/ REM to TRC a.3. To assign to BPI and TIDCORP the sewing machines and equipments mentioned under 1.3 and 1.4
above in proportion with their credits.

1.2 Building 6,480,000 w/ REM to TRC a.4. All other remaining assets of Petitioner under 1.5 above be assigned to the Court-appointed receiver,
Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales for payment of receiver’s fees.

1.3 Sewing machines 942,000 w/o chattel mortgage to TRC (sic) a.5. All other administrative expenses, if any, shall be for the account of TRC, BPI and TIDCORP, in
proportion to their respective credits.

1.4 Sewing machines 755,000 w/chattel mortgage b. That for the abovementioned purpose mentioned under 3.a. above, the appraisal value of the property
(as appraised by Royal Asia Appraisers which was previously submitted to the Honorable Court) be made as
the basis in determining the value of the properties; and the amount of the claims that will be approved by
1.5 Furnitures and Fixtures w/o appraised value this Honorable Court be made as the basis in the determination of the amount of credits due to the
respective creditors.
The detailed list of the abovementioned assets and the corresponding appraised value is attached hereto
c. Furthermore, that the Compromise Agreement being proposed herein shall be without prejudice to
as Annex A;
rights of the creditors to enforce actions against other debtors who are jointly and solidarily liable with the
2. The claims of the creditors of Petitioner previously submitted with their respective proofs of claim are petitioner.
shown below:
d. Finally, that the petitioner, Dona Adela Int’l., Inc., be discharged from its debts to the party-creditors by
virtue of the Compromise Agreement as being proposed herein. 7
NAME OF CREDITOR AMOUNT
On May 26, 2011, petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center
(TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pagoby Compromise Agreement8 wherein petitioner agreed to transfer a
Technology Resource Center 29,546,342.45 351-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10027 with existing improvements situated in the
Barrio of Jolo, Mandaluyong City, in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s obligation. The agreement
bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver. TRC filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance, Manifestation
BPI 11,069,575.82 and Motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement. 9

On August 11, 2011, creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement 10 which
*TIDCORP contained the following terms:

1. OBLIGATION OF PETITIONER.– The parties agree that the outstanding principal obligation of petitioner to
City of Mandaluyong as of 3/25/09 1,061,370.12 TIDCORP shall be in the amount of NINE MILLION FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHT &
15/100 PESOS (P9,044,708.15), while to BPI in the amount of ELEVEN MILLION SIXTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDREDSEVENTY FIVE & 82/100 PESOS (P11,069,575.82).
*TIDCORP has not yet submitted its peso amount of claim
2. SETTLEMENT.– TIDCORP and BPI both hereby agree to accept all the machineries in petitioner’s
inventory set aside pursuant to the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement dated 18
xxxx October 2010 filed by the Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales. The said machineries valued at THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P350,000.00)shall be divided equally between TIDCORP and BPI.
WHEREFORE, undersigned receiver respectfully proposed for the concerned parties of this (sic) proceedings
to enter into a compromise Agreement under the following terms and conditions: 3. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. – TIDCORP and BPI hereby agree that acceptance of the abovementioned
settlement shall constitute payment of petitioner’s aforesaid obligation pursuant to Act No. 1956
(Insolvency Act). However, the benefit of payment under the said Insolvency Act shall only be in favor of
petitioner and shall not in any manner affect the claims of TIDCORP and BPI as against its sureties and/or
guarantors.
4. EXPENSES AND TAXES.– All necessary expenses, including but not limited to, fees of the Receiver,
documentation and notarization, as well as all fees incurred or to be incurred in connection to the full
implementation of this Agreement shall be for the account of Mr. Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr.
All taxes and fees incurred or to be incurred including but not limited to gross receipts tax shall be for the
account of the petitioner.
5. WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY. – The petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors shall waive all
rights to confidentiality provided under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, otherwise
known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, and Republic Act No. 8791, otherwise known as The
General Banking Law of 2000. Accordingly, the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors by
these presents grant TIDCORP and BPI access to any deposit or other accounts maintained by them with
any bank.
For this purpose, the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors shall authorize TIDCORP and BPI
to make, sign, execute and deliver any document of whatever kind or nature which may be necessary or
proper to allow them access to such deposits or other accounts.
TIDCORP and BPI shall be further authorized to delegate to any person, who may exercise in their stead,
any or all of the powers and authority herein granted to them or substitute any person in their place to do
and perform said powers and authority.
18. HOLD FREE AND HARMLESS. – The petitioner shall indemnify and hold TIDCORP and BPI, their
respective Board of Directors, and officers free and harmless against any liability or claim of whatever kind
or nature which may arise from, or in connection with, or in relation to this Agreement. 11 (Underscoring
supplied)
Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the Proposed Compromise Agreement 12 of
TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that petitioner has a personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders and officers. He argued that he cannot be held liable for the expenses and taxes as a
consequence of the auction or distribution/payment of said machineries to the creditors; hence, his name
should be deleted as a party to the Compromise Agreement.
Likewise, Atty. Gonzales filed a Manifestation and Comment (On Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) with Motion for
Payment of Administrative Expenses and Receiver’s Fees. 13 Atty. Gonzales manifested that she is entitled to
payment of administrative expenses and receiver’s fees in the total amount of P740,200.00. She further
stated that it is just and fair for her to ask her due for services rendered as officer of the Court from TRC
who benefitted the most from the insolvency proceedings; and, that she is waiving the administrative
expenses and receiver’s fees due from TIDCORP and BPI.
In its Comment,14 TRC requested that the receiver’s fee be reduced to P106,000.00. In her Reply,15 Atty.
Gonzales said that she will accept the amount of P106,000.00 being offered by TRC.
On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En Pagoby
Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered based on the foregoing exchange of pleadings, as follows:
1. Finding the aforequoted Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement dated May 26, 2011 executed by
and between Dona Adela Export International, Inc., represented by its president Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and
Technology Resource Center, represented by its Director General Dennis L. Cunanan, to be in order and not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-Appointed
Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to the Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement, the same is hereby APPROVED and is made the basis of this judgment;
2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, with the
exception of paragraph 4 thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes, the same is likewise APPROVED, for the
same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the
Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement;
3. Pursuant to its Comment filed on October 19, 2011, Technology Resource Center is hereby ordered to
pay the Court-Appointed Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales the sum of P106,000.00, representing its
proportionate share of the administrative expenses incurred by the receiver with legal interest from date of
termination of this insolvency proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission who is directed to
cause the removal of petitioner Dona Adela Export International, Inc., from the list of registered legal
entities and to make a report to this Court of its Compliance within fifteen (15) days from said elimination
so that the Court could terminate the instant insolvency proceedings and release the Court-Appointed
receiver from her duties and responsibilities.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration17 and claimed that TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement
imposes on it several obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and waiver of confidentiality of its
bank deposits but it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
In its Order18 dated May 14, 2012, the RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s silence and
acquiescence to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement while it was set for hearing by
creditors BPI and TIDCORP is tantamount to admission and acquiescence thereto. There was no objection
filed by petitioner to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement prior to its approval, said the
RTC. The RTC also noted that petitioner’s President attended every hearing of the case but did not
interpose any objection to the said motion when its conditions were being discussed and formulated by the
parties and Atty. Gonzales.19
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that express and written waiver from the depositor concerned is required by law before
any third person or entity is allowed to examine bank deposits or bank records. According to petitioner, it is
not a party to the compromise agreement between BPI and TIDCORP and its silence or acquiescence is not
tantamount to an admission that binds it to the compromise agreement of the creditors especially the
waiver of confidentiality of bank deposits. Petitioner cites the rule on relativity of contracts which states
that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person,
even if he is aware of such contract and has knowledge thereof. Petitioner also maintains that waivers are
not presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting
no other reasonable explanation.
Respondent BPI counters that petitioner is estopped from questioning the BPI-TIDCORP compromise
agreement because petitioner and its counsel participated in all the proceedings involving the subject
compromise agreement and did not object when the compromise agreement was considered by the RTC.
Respondent TIDCORP contends that the waiver of confidentiality under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 1405 and
8791 does not require the express or written consent of the depositor. It is TIDCORP’s position that upon
declaration of insolvency, the insolvency court obtains complete jurisdiction over the insolvent’s property
which includes the authority to issue orders to look into the insolvent’s bank deposits. Since bank deposits
are considered debts owed by the banks to the petitioner, the receiver is empowered to recover them even
without petitioner’s express or written consent, said TIDCORP.
TIDCORP further avers that the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement approved by the RTC is binding on
petitioner and its Board of Directors by reason of estoppel. The compromise agreement is not an ordinary
contract. Since it was approved by the insolvency court, the compromise agreement has the force and
effect of judgment; it is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery,
TIDCORP concluded.
The main issue for our consideration is whether the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP
Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank
deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and
R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000.
The petition is meritorious.
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the parties in a civil case is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory. 20
However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through fraud, mistake, or duress, he
must file a motion with the trial court that approved the compromise agreement to reconsider the
judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the said grounds for annulment of contract within
15 days from notice of judgment. Under Rule 37, said party can either file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. A party can file a motion for new trial based on fraud, accident or mistake, excusable
negligence, or newly discovered evidence. On the other hand, a party may decide to seek the recall or
modification of the judgment by means of a motion for reconsideration on the ground that "the decision or
final order is contrary to law" if the consent was procured through fraud, mistake, or duress. Thus, the
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration is the readily available remedy for a party to challenge
a judgment if the 15-day period from receipt of judgment for taking an appeal has not yet expired. 21
In this case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision based on compromise agreement
assailing the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between its two creditors, TIDCORP and
BPI, in which petitioner was not a party. After the trial court denied the motion on the ground of estoppel,
petitioner sought a direct recourse to this Court.
We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC
may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand,
there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. 22 Petitioner submits the lone question of law on whether
the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI is valid despite
petitioner not being a party and signatory to the same. According to petitioner, R.A. No. 1405requires the
express and written consent of the depositor to make the waiver effective.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405, the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits enacted in 1955, was first amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1792 in 1981 and further amended by R.A. No. 7653 in 1993. It now reads:
SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except when the examination
is made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank and is specifically authorized by the
Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious
irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish
such fraud or irregularity, or when the examination is made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to
conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof
shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, or upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed. These are under any of
the following instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon
order of a competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d) when the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Council may inquire into a bank account upon order of
any competent court.23
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only. There was no
written consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner is waiving the
confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank
deposits was merely inserted in the agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said
provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the
said agreement.
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to interpose its objection during
the proceedings.1âwphi1 It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively
demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must
not only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right should not be construed
as a surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and
validity of such waiver.24
In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its property, assets
and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in the order of the RTC
appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was directed to assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all its
real and personal property, monies, estate and effects with all the deeds, books and papers relating
thereto,25pursuant to Section 3226 of the Insolvency Law.27 Such assignment shall operate to vest in the
assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. 28 Corollarily, the
stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement that petitioner waives its right to
confidentiality of its bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver since
all the property, money, estate and effects of petitioner have been assigned and conveyed to her 29 and she
has the right to recover all the estate, assets, debts and claims belonging to or due to the insolvent
debtor.30
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement, she did
not sign or approve the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted by TIDCORP and BPI. In her
Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) there is no showing that Atty. Gonzales signified her conformity
to the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits. Atty. Gonzales stated thus:
13. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT OF TIDCORP AND BPI
The undersigned receiver is in conformity with the compromise agreement of TIDCORP and BPI, attached
hereto as Annex C, which they submitted to this Honorable Court under the abovementioned Joint Motion
in so far as the sharing scheme of the sewing machine inventories of Dona Adela is concerned. However,
the undersigned receiver has the following comments on the other provisions of the said compromise IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598
agreement:
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
xxxx
HABEAS CORPUS Present:
13.2. The undersigned receiver reiterates that Dona Adela has no cash or other assets to source payment
for expenses and taxes provided under no. 4 of the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. In fact, except for
the amount of P5,000.00 she initially asked for administrative expenses and the appraisal fees for the
assets of Dona Adela advanced by MR. EPIFANIO RAMOS, she has been shouldering all the administrative RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,
expenses of this insolvency proceedings.
and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
xxxx
child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER CORONA and
21. As also mentioned under 13.2. above, Dona Adela has no cash to source payment for the
abovementioned administrative expenses and receiver’s fees, and its assets, which should have been the DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ.
source for payment for administrative expenses and receiver’s fees before the distribution to the creditors,
have already been assigned to the creditors by compromise agreement. Petitioner,

22. After considering its savings from foreclosure expenses, sheriff’s fees and other related expenses had it
pursued foreclosure proceedings, it is just fair for the undersigned receiver to ask her due for services
rendered as officer of this Honorable Court from TRC who benefitted the most from the insolvency
proceedings.31(Emphasis ours)
- versus -
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and conformity of the receiver. We,
thus, hold that petitioner is not bound by the said provision.

It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON,
compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.32 The rule is based on
Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their
Respondent. Promulgated:
assigns and heirs x x x."33The sound reason for the exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the absence
of a vinculum or juridical tie which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an obligation. 34 Consistent
August 16, 2004
with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to
the compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties who did not take part in the compromise
agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a
court judgment made solely on the basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement. 35

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The second paragraph of the
November 15, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, in SEC Case No. DECISION
MC06-103 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, with the CORONA, J.:
exception of paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes and Waiver of
Confidentiality, the same is likewise APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October
24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution[1] of the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the
No costs. grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion[2] read:

SO ORDERED.

HIRD DIVISION WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic
Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl
whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return
to her old job as a guest relations officer in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact,
whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her
daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan
Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification [3] that respondent was no
longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed
another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of
jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This
jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this
Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it
did, because there is no other meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute the Family Court as the
sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same
competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation
is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving
custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by
just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial
jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring
such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that
matter to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the
legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but
only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has
rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in
the Supreme Court,[4] Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[5]
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which
can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word exclusive apparently cannot be construed
any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like
petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to protect the rights and promote
the welfare of children. The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues
regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The
legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid
further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature
of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case
remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369
did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor
child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the
legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of
habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being;
whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the
legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive as not foreclosing resort to another
jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the heirs
of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over
such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioners submission
that the word exclusive in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the
jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the
remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in
the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its
territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of
the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable
throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and
at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court
or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any
time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for
damages, this Court, in the sameFloresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil
Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter,
of the law:
Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented
by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering
obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense.
Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a
statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice
and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children [8] under the Constitution
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence,
all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.[9]
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing
writs of habeas corpus in cases involvingthe custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members
and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where
the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the
petition. As explained by the Solicitor General: [10]
That the serving officer will have to search for the child all over the country does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the
duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere
within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED andREMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
KIDA V SENATE GR 196271, FEB 2012
DECISION
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the
second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular
national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their
validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this
Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these
autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure
of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of
which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA
No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially
assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first
regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90
days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law
provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first
regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001. It likewise set the
plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No.
9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the
postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756),
on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of
Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No.
196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity
of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No.
9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of
Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok
Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;
and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral
the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus [9] against the
COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153.
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity
Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in- II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution,
the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB
No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed
to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days. A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article
XVIII of RA No. 9054?

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of
RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011. Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable
laws?

The Arguments
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph
2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No.
9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective. IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds
are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to
the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM.
Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Constitution.

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

The Issues

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members
of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall
serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years. [12] This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. [13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and
local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[14]we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have
been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is
used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their
Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections
to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec.
2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5,
Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that
they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. [15] As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language should be understood in
the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a
particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the
ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region
of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions
are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local
Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in
Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and
the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the
regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our
discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and
must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to
comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution[18]which provides that before bills passed by either
the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
[i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For
example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate
version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. [20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since
there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling
in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial
law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary
powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves
doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members
of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full
recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances,
nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of
action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the
President's certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our
powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand. [22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for
three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other
parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to
Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them
notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.[23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of
the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to
nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply
with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised
by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by
a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty
(60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these
laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the
date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No.
10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered
amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely
filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic
Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific
date of the first ARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No. 8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all
enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any
part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no
need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first
elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9140[30] to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA
No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM regional
elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3)
voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [32] has to be struck down for giving
RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and
hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively
amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for
the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the
laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the
basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability
to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal
footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals
of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may
modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the
same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot
declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon
existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly
constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.
votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as
a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that
Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an
existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166
already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional
elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception
ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is
technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality
local elections by express constitutional recognition.[37]

III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well
the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the
supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section
18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in
the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with
the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35] questions on the extent of the matters
requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and
the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular
elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of
the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this
problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office;[38](2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to
appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power
to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous
regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the
Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that A. Basic Underlying Premises
relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e.,
the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the
legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36] To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully
understood. The first is the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; thesecond is the constitutional
mandate for the synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized
and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically
mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. [39] The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[40]Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. [42]
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are
generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in
the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their
own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in view and
the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of
organic law.[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution
constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its
parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance
of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic
structure of government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative
assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article
X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not granted by this
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe
in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections
leave no doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the
power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under
these provisions are the permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In other words, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio[45] in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are
recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their
compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects
the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect
although its national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA
No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize
the regional elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save
for barangay and sangguniang kabataanelections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM
with governance in the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August
2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the
Constitution and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of
autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the
old constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the
adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly
into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present
problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In
the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to
appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these
positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of
provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified. [50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the
transition of a local government from a sub-province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does
not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice
of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our
discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the
synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is
under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional
objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or
violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the
adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in
the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover
violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put
in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over
until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication
prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is
no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office
the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as
limited by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates
that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so
determined or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or
repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three
branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself
may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the
constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other
hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for. [54]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no
room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three
(3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like
the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. [55] Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional
appointment power of the President.[56] Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought
before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly
from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v.
Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec,[59]where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on
to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office
are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local
elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond
the term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to
immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified
by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall
be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions
of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another
Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the
power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. [63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without
the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been
exercised in grave abuse of discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the
petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the
power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. [65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for
the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did
grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date.
However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances
provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but have to be postponedbecause of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c)
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in
any political subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be
restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections.
These analogous causes are further defined by the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly
and honest election should become impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled
but do not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b)violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do
not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpectedand unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and
is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronizationof national and local elections. By no stretch
of the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of
elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor
include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. [66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6
of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC
to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment
by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections
3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, which states:

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections,
no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the
ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the
Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, [68] and
extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress
was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be
changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the
authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally
mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
as we ruled in Osmena.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of
an express provision of the Constitution.
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM
elections instead of acting on their term (where the term means the time during which the officer may Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [74]
claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another, while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office). [72] As
with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the
tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group
discretion if they do so. of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA
No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials
to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real
and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to bemistakenly read as a law that changes the elective
and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend
what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA
No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated
term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the
legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is
how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms.[75] Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding
to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for
Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more
concrete terms and based on the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for
a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of
the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific
period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of
appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a
government that is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to
govern them may be said to besystemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative governance
requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153
where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has
previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance
with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections
requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a
situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted
and used in the creation of local government units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of
provinces.[77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization
of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other
words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one
of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given
circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the
appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective
aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to
address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law,
concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their
Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not
violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under
the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to
cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for
Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the
exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose
the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of
elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any
other localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the
power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the
expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the
Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or
close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and
the time the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history
past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the
countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past. [78] Thus, it would be
reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully
functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our mind, the
appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our
earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the
President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy
that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However,
in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public
service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing
power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments
as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no
problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the
constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people
of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in
the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context,
allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint
OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to
defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner,
one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut
magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate
should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear.[82] We refer to the Courts declaration inAng-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution
must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are
interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153
which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the
interests that must be respected.Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being
sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very
temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national
and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral
processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity
thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for
regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions
on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather an
efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as
an effective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the
nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the
Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall
be within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing
it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in
order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous
government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national government[.][85] Of note
is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished
all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the
entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the
ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region
from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national
and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which
Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts
about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a
legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will
be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress. [89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to
venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a
republican and democratic government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in
enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. [90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an
array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any
evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the
petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that
every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its
acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint
act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to
be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153,
we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No.
10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary
restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015
YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior to
November 15, 1935 are vested rights that cannot be impaired.cralawred
Antecedents
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc.
(PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMI’s portion (known as the PIMI Larap
Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BDO).1chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In 1976, the Gold Mining Development Project Team, Mining Technology Division, The Mining Group of
the Bureau of Mines prepared a so-called Technical Feasibility Study on the Possible Re-Opening of the
CPMI Project of PIM (Mining Aspect) and the Exploration Program (Uranium Project) at Larap, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, which discussed in detail, among others, an evaluation of the ore reserve
and a plan of operation to restore the mine to normal commercial mining production and budgetary
estimate should the Bureau of Mines take over and run the PIMI Larap Mines. The Government then
opened the area for exploration. In November 1978, the Benguet Corporation-Getty Oil Consortium
began exploration for uranium under an Exploration Permit of the area, but withdrew in 1982 after four
years of sustained and earnest exploration.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area from 1986
onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with Philex Mining Corporation over the area,
their agreement being duly registered by the Mining Recorder Section of Regional Office No. V of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an application for
the approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)3 over the area in that Regional Office of
the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The application, which
was amended in 1999, was granted on July 28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia
was given the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the portion of the
mineral lands.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had
acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale, stating that the
areas covered by its mining patents were within the areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA. Based on the
documents submitted by Yinlu, four of the six transfer certificates of title (TCTs) it held covered four
mining claims under Patent Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18 respectively named as Busser, Superior,
Bussamerand Rescue Placer Claims, with an aggregate area of 192 hectares. The areas covered occupied
more than half of the MPSA area of Trans-Asia.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On September 14, 2007, Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it would commence exploration works
in Yinlu’s areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested Yinlu to allow its personnel to access the areas for
the works to be undertaken. On September 23, 2007, Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia could proceed with its
exploration works on its own private property in the Calambayungan area, not in the areas covered by its
(Yinlu) mining patents.6 This response of Yinlu compelled Trans-Asia to seek the assistance of the MGB
Regional Office V in resolving the issues between the parties. It was at that point that Trans-Asia learned
that the registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlu’s request to register the deed of
absolute sale in its favor.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The matter was ultimately referred to the DENR Secretary, who directed the MGB Regional Office V to
verify the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu. On November 29, 2007, the MGB Regional Office V
informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that there was no record on file showing the existence of the
mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly, the parties were required to submit their respective position
papers.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The issues presented for consideration and resolution by the DENR Secretary were: (1) whether the
mining patents held by Yinlu were issued prior to the grant of the MPSA; and (2) whether the mining
patents were still valid and subsisting.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On May 21, 2009, DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. issued his order resolving the issues in Yinlu’s
favor,10 finding that the mining patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930 as evidenced by and indicated in
PIMI’s certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents were validly transferred to and were
now owned by Yinlu.11 He rejected Trans-Asia’s argument that Yinlu’s patents had no effect and were
deemed abandoned because Yinlu had failed to register them pursuant to Section 101 of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended. He declared that the DENR did not issue any specific order cancelling such
patents. He refuted Trans-Asia’s contention that there was a continuing requirement under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining patent holder to undertake improvements in order to have the
patents subsist, and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to undertake the
improvement, observing that the requirement was not an absolute imposition. He noted that the
suspension of PIMI’s operation in 1974 due to financial losses and the foreclosure of its mortgaged
properties by the creditor banks (MBC/PCIB) constituted force majeure that justified PIMI’s failure in
1974 to comply with the registration requirement under P.D. No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of 1902,
which was the basis for issuing the patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals, rendering the
minerals covered by the patents to be segregated from the public domain and be considered private
property; and that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all natural resources, was
adopted only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Consequently, DENR Secretary Atienza, Jr. ordered the amendment of Trans-Asia’s MPSA by excluding
therefrom the mineral lands covered by Yinlu’s mining patents, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement No. 252-2007-V is hereby
ordered amended, to excise therefrom the areas covered by the mining patents of Yinlu Bicol Mining
Corporation as described and defined in the Transfer Certificates of Title concerned: Provided, That the
consequent conduct of mining operations in the said mining patents shall be undertaken in accordance
with all the pertinent requirements of Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and its
implementing rules and regulations.
SO ORDERED.13
Trans-Asia moved for reconsideration,,14 but the DENR Secretary denied the motion on November 27,
2009, holding in its resolution that the arguments raised by the motion only rehashed matters already
decided.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Trans-Asia appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
On May 4, 2010, the OP rendered its decision in O.P. Case No. 09-L-638 affirming in toto the assailed
order and resolution of the DENR Secretary,16 to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first contention of appellee is untenable. It is conceded that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 463,
otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree, prescribed requirements for the
registration of all mining patents with the Director of Mines within a certain period, among others. The
existence of the mining claims were in fact registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Camarines Norte prior to the issuance of PD 463, as found in the 4 TCT’s issued to PIMI that were
foreclosed by MBC, and eventually purchased by appellee through an Absolute Deed of Sale. The
existence of the mining patents, therefore, subsists. Under the Philippine Constitution, there is an
absolute prohibition against alienation of natural resources. Mining locations may only be subject to
concession or lease. The only exception is where a location of a mining claim was perfected prior to
November 15, 1935, when the government under the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated, and according
to the laws existing at that time a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain, and the locator is entitled to a grant of the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
patent therefore (Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259). The right of the locator to
the mining patent is a vested right, and the Constitution recognizes such right as an exception to the
prohibition against alienation of natural resources. The right of the appellee as the beneficial owner of
the subject mining patents in this case, therefore, is superior to the claims of appellant.
The existence of the TCT’s in the name of appellee further bolsters the existence of the mining patents.
Under PD 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, once a title is cleared of all claims or
where none exists, the ownership over the real property covered by the Torrens title becomes conclusive
and indefeasible even as against the government. Noteworthy is the fact that the title trace backs of the
said TCTs show that the titles were executed in favour of the appellee’s predecessors-in-interest
pursuant to Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act of 1902, in relation to the
Philippine Bill of 1902, which govern the registration of mineral patents.
xxxx
After a careful and thorough evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Office agrees with the
DENR, as the assailed decisions are in accord with facts, law and jurisprudence relevant to the
case.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order and Resolution of the DENR dated May 21, 2009
and November 27, 2009, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.17
Trans-Asia filed a first and a second motion for reconsideration.
Trans-Asia stated in its first motion for reconsideration that the OP erred: (1) in resurrecting Yinlu’s
mining patents despite failure to comply with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 463; (2) in
holding that Yinlu’s predecessors-in-interest had continued to assert their rights to the mining patents;
and (3) in not holding that the mining patent had been abandoned due to laches. The OP denied the first
motion through the resolution dated June 29, 2010,18 emphasizing that there was no cogent reason to
disturb the decision because the grounds were mere reiterations of arguments already passed upon and
resolved.
Nothing daunted, Trans-Asia presented its second motion for reconsideration, but this motion was
similarly denied in the resolution of March 31, 2011,19 the OP disposing
thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
After a second thorough evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Office finds no cogent
reason to disturb its earlier Decision. The second paragraph of Section 7, Administrative Order No. 18
dated February 12, 1987 provides that “[o]nly one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.” This second motion is clearly
unmeritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
this Office dated May 4, 2010 and June 29, 2010, respectively, affirming the DENR decisions, are hereby
declared final. Let the records of the case be transmitted to the DENR for its appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.20
Trans-Asia then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On October 30, 2012, the CA promulgated the assailed decision reversing and setting aside the rulings of
the DENR Secretary and the OP.21 It agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held mining
patents over the disputed mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to register the patents under
PD No. 463 in order for the patents to be recognized in its favor. It found that Yinlu and its predecessors-
in-interest did not register the patents pursuant to PD No. 463; hence, the patents lapsed and had no
more effect,22viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 4, 2010, as
well as the Resolutions dated June 29, 2010 and March 31, 2011, respectively, rendered by the Office of
the President in OP Case No. 09-L-638, and the Order dated May 21, 2009 as well as the Resolution dated
November 27, 2009 issued by the DENR Secretary in DENR Case No. 8766 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Yinlu sought reconsideration of the decision. On June 27, 2013, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issues
In its appeal, Yinlu raises the following issues, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FILED
BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.cralawred
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S MINING PATENTS ARE VALID, EXISTING AND IMPERVIOUS TO
THE MINERAL PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED TO THE RESPONDENT
TRANS-ASIA.cralawred
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S TITLES BASED ON “PATENTS” WERE MINING PATENTS OR SOME
OTHER PATENT.cralawred
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S PURCHASE OF ITS TITLES INCLUDED PURCHASE OF THE MINERALS
FOUND THEREIN.cralawred
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER
YINLU THAT IT’S PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION.cralawred
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES APPLY TO TITLED PROPERTY.cralawred
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SHARE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ITS NATURAL RESOURCES WAS
AFFECTED BY THE MINING PATENTS OF PETITIONER YINLU.25
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.cralawred
I day appeal period was until July 29, 2010. The filing of the petition for review only on May 11, 2011 was
Procedural Issue:
Tardiness of Trans-Asia’s Appeal
Yinlu contends that the CA should have outrightly dismissed Trans-Asia’s appeal for being taken beyond
the required period for appealing; and that Trans-Asia’s filing of the second motion for reconsideration
was improper inasmuch as the motion did not cite any exceptional circumstances or reasons as required
by Section 7 of the OP’s Administrative Order No. 18 Series of 1987.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The contention of Yinlu is correct.
Section 1,27 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment rendered by the OP in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the CA. Section 428 of the Rule states that the appeal must be
taken within 15 days “from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of
its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x.”
Trans-Asia received a copy of the OP resolution dated June 29, 2010 denying the first motion for
reconsideration on July 14, 2010.29 Hence, it had until July 29, 2010 to appeal to the CA by petition for
review. However, it filed the petition for review only on May 11, 2011, 30 or nearly 10 months from its
receipt of the denial. Under the circumstances, its petition for review was filed way beyond the
prescribed 15-day period.
The CA opined that Trans-Asia’s petition for review was timely filed, citing the fact that Trans-Asia filed
its second motion for reconsideration dated July 20, 2010 which the OP denied through the resolution
dated March 31, 2011. It pointed out that Trans-Asia received a copy of the resolution dated March 31,
2011 on April 26, 2011; hence, the 15-day appeal period should be reckoned from April 26, 2011,
rendering its filing of the petition for review in the CA on May 11, 2011 timely and within the required
period. It observed that Trans-Asia’s filing of the second motion for reconsideration was allowed under
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 of the OP Rules on Appeal because the second motion was
exceptionally meritorious, not pro forma, for, even if the motion reiterated issues already passed upon
by the OP, that alone did not render the motion pro forma if it otherwise complied with the
rules.31chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is true that Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 of the OP Rules on Appeal authorizes the filing of
a second motion for reconsideration. But that authority is conditioned upon the second motion being
upon a highly meritorious ground.32 The rule remains to be only one motion for reconsideration is
allowed. In that regard, the Court stresses that the determination of whether or not the ground raised in
the second motion for reconsideration was exceptionally meritorious lies solely belonged to the OP.33The
CA could not usurp the OP’s determination in order to make its own.
As earlier indicated, the OP found and declared the second motion for reconsideration of Trans-Asia
“clearly unmeritorious” when it denied the motion on March 31, 2011. Consequently, the filing of the
second motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2010 did not stop the running of the appeal period that
had commenced on July 14, 2010, the date of receipt by Trans-Asia of the OP resolution denying the first
motion for reconsideration. The decision of the OP inevitably became final and immutable as a matter of
law by July 29, 2010, the last day of the reglementary period under Section 4 of Rule 43.
In taking cognizance of Trans-Asia’s appeal despite its tardiness, therefore, the CA gravely erred. Under
Section 4 of Rule 43, the reckoning of the 15-day period to perfect the appeal starts from the receipt of
the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Section 4 specifically allows only one motion for
reconsideration to an appealing party; as such, the reckoning is from the date of notice of the denial of
the first motion for reconsideration.34 With Trans-Asia having received the denial on July 14, 2010, its 15-
too late.
Verily, an appeal should be taken in accordance with the manner and within the period set by the law
establishing the right to appeal. To allow Trans-Asia to transgress the law would be to set at naught
procedural rules that were generally mandatory and inviolable. This is because appeal, being neither a
constitutional right nor part of due process, is a mere statutory privilege to be enjoyed by litigants who
comply with the law allowing the appeal. Failure to comply will cause the loss of the privilege.
Moreover, procedural rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. Among such rules is that regulating the perfection of an appeal, which is mandatory as well as
jurisdictional. The consequence of the failure to perfect an appeal within the limited time allowed is to
preclude the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case in order to review and revise the
judgment that meanwhile became final and immutable by operation of
law.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, there are no reasons to
relax them in Trans-Asia’s favor. As noted, the OP found the ground for the second motion for
reconsideration “clearly unmeritorious.” To ignore such finding without justification is to unduly deprive
the OP of its authority and autonomy to enforce its own rules of procedure. On the other hand, Trans-
Asia could have easily avoided its dire situation by appealing within the period instead of rehashing its
already-discarded arguments in the OP.cralawred
II
Substantive Issues:
Yinlu’s mining patents constituted
vested rights that could not be disregarded
The finality and immutability of the decision of the OP are not the only reasons for turning down Trans-
Asia’s appeal. Trans-Asia’s cause also failed the tests of substance and validity.
Yinlu claims that its mining patents, being evidenced by its TCTs that were registered pursuant to Act No.
496 (Land Registration Act of 1902) in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 ,
1902), the governing law on the registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and indefeasible;
that it was the absolute owner of the lands the TCTs covered; that the TCTs were issued pursuant to
mineral patents based on Placer Claims36 named Busser, Superior, Bussamer and Rescue; that the TCTs
were presented to and confirmed by the DENR and the OP; that Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
allowed citizens of the United States and of the Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and purchase
mineral lands; that after the exploration and claim of the mineral land, the owner of the claim and of the
mineral patents was entitled to all the minerals found in the area subject of the claim as stated in Section
27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902; that the person holding even a mere mineral claim was already entitled
to all the minerals found in such area; that, as such, the mineral claims that had been patented and
perfected by registration still enjoyed the same privilege of exclusivity in exploiting the minerals within
the patent; that aside from being entitled to the minerals found within the mineral claim and patent, it
was also entitled to the exclusive possession of the land covered by the claim; that its mining patents are
property rights that the Government should not appropriate for itself or for others; that its registered
mineral patents, being valid and existing, could not be defeated by adverse, open and notorious
possession and prescription; that its substantive rights over mineral claims perfected under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 subsisted despite the changes of the Philippine Constitution and of the mining
laws; that the Constitution could not impair vested rights; that Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463
would impair its vested rights under its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it; and that
Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of Section 100 and Section 101 to vested
rights.37chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Yinlu asserts that contrary to the claim of Trans-Asia, the titles issued to it were mining patents, not
homestead patents.38 It stresses that the TCTs from which it derived its own TCTs were issued pursuant
to Patents 15, 16, 17 and 18; that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there was no mineral patent separate
from the original certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; that the mineral patent applied for under
the procedure outlined in the Philippine Bill of 1902 resulted to an original certificate of title issued
under Act No. 496; that the beginning statements mentioned in Yinlu’s title stated “pursuant to Patent
No._____,________Placer Claim;” that as such, its mineral patents were part of its actual titles; that
Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 allowed the titling of the land and the exploration of both the
surface and the minerals beneath the surface; and that its TCTs were already inclusive of the minerals
located in the properties by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902, and thus could not be separately sold or
mortgaged from each other.39chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The decision of the OP was actually unassailable in point of law and history.
During the period of Spanish colonization, the disposition and exploration of mineral lands in the
Philippines were governed by the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867, 40 otherwise known as The Spanish
Mining Law.41 The Regalian doctrine was observed, to the effect that minerals belonged to the State
wherever they could be found, whether in public or private lands. During the American occupation, the
fundamental law on mining was incorporated in the Philippine Bill of 1902, whose Section
2142declared: That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed
and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation, and purchase, and
the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands. Its Section 27 provided that a holder of the mineral claim so located was entitled to all the
minerals that lie within his claim, but he could not mine outside the boundary lines of his claim. Pursuant
to the Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, once a mining claim was made or a mining patent was issued
over a parcel of land in accordance with the relative provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such land
was considered private property and no longer part of the public domain. The claimant or patent holder
was the owner of both the surface of the land and of the minerals found underneath.
The term mining claim connotes a parcel of land containing a precious metal in its soil or rock. It is
usually used in mining jargon as synonymous with the term location, which means the act of
appropriating a mining claim on the public domain according to the established law or rules. 43 A
miningpatent pertains to a title granted by the government for the said mining claim.
Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935, the alienation of natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, was expressly prohibited. The natural resources
being referred therein included mineral lands of public domain, but not mineral lands that at the time
the 1935 Constitution took effect no longer formed part of the public domain.
Consequently, such prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not apply to a mining
claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935. Jurisprudence has enlightened us on this point.
In McDaniel v. Apacible,44 the petitioner sought to prohibit the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from leasing a parcel of petroleum land in San Narciso in Province of Tayabas. He claimed that
on June 7, 1916 he entered an unoccupied land in San Narciso and located therein three petroleum
mineral claims in accordance with the Philippine Bill of 1902; that on July 15, 1916, he recorded the three
mineral claims with the mining office of the Municipality of Lucena through notices of location under the
names Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 2, and Maglihi No. 3; that he had been in open and continuous
possession of the claims since June 7, 1916; that in 1918, he drilled five wells on said claims and made
discoveries of petroleum on them; that on June 18, 1921, respondent Juan Cuisia applied with
respondent Galicano Apacible, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, for the lease of a
land whose boundaries included his three claims; that he protested in writing to Secretary Apacible the
inclusion in the Cuisia lease application of his three mineral claims; that Secretary Apacible denied his
protest, and was about to grant the lease application by virtue of Act No. 2932; that said law, in so far as
it purported to declare open to lease lands containing petroleum oil on which mineral claims had been
validly located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil had been made, was void and
unconstitutional for it deprived him of his property without due process of law and without
compensation; and that Secretary Apacible was without jurisdiction to lease to Cuisia his mining claims.
The Court granted the petition, ruling as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Mr. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on Mining Law, has discussed extensively the question now
before us. (Lindlay on Mines, vol. I, sections 322, 539.)
The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operatesas
a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remains
valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A mining claim perfected
under the law is property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent.
It has the effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession
of the lands located. And even though the locator may obtain a patent to such lands, his patent adds but
little to his security. (18 Ruling Case Law, p. 1152 and cases cited.)
The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the exclusive
possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the Government itself. Where there is a valid and
perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator.
It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, "The Government itself cannot abridge the
rights of the miner to a perfected valid location of public mineral land. The Government may not destroy
the locator's right by withdrawing the land from entry or placing it in a state of reservation." (Belk vs.
Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431.)
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of
the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and
exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues
during the entire life of the location. There is no provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior termination
thereof. (Gwillim vs. Donnellan, 115 U. S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U. S.,
220.)
There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with all the requirements of
the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims in question, or that the claims in question
were ever abandoned or forfeited by him. The respondents may claim, however, that inasmuch as a
patent has not been issued to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims.
But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co, vs. Smith (249 U. S., 337), and
St. Louis Mining & Milling Co, vs. Montana Mining Co. (171 U. S., 650), held that even without a patent,
the possessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the
fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the United States. There is
no conflict in the rulings of the Court upon that question. With one voice they affirm that when the right
to a patent exists, the full equitable title has passed to the purchaser or to the locator with all the
benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no third party can acquire from the
Government any interest as against him. (Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 504, and cases cited.)
Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the
claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is
in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil Co. vs.
Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Forbes vs. Jarcey, 94 U. 4S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Del Monte
Mining Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S., 55; Elver vs. Wood, 208 U. S., 226, 232.)
Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery, is not essential to the
preservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by nonperformance of the
annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Farrell vs. Lockhart, 210 U. S., 142;
Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389.)
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and
his location not only against third persons, but also against the Government. A mining claim perfected
under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may be sold and conveyed, and will
pass by descent, and is not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government. (Belk vs. Meagher, 104
U. S., 279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431; Consolidated Mutual Oil Co. vs. United
States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131, 136, 137.)
The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his
location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become
mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The
reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of
course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a reservation, such
inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government.
(Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc, 546.)
From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude that, inasmuch as the petitioner
had located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands in question, and had actually discovered
petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims; that said Act No. 2932, which
deprives him of such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and
is therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is hereby overruled, and it is
hereby ordered and decreed that, unless the respondents answer the petition herein within a period of
five days from notice hereof, that a final judgment be entered, granting the remedy prayed for in the
petition. So ordered.45
In Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 46 the petitioner prayed that Eulogio Rodriguez as the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, as the Director of the Bureau of Mines, be
compelled to approve its application for patent on a certain mining claim. It alleged that it owned the
Nob Fraction mineral claim situated in Itogon, Mountain Province, and located on public lands by C. L.
O’Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902; that said claim was located on
January 1, 1929, and was registered in the office of the mining recorder of Mountain Province on January
7, 1929; that by itself and its predecessor-in-interest it had been in continuous and exclusive possession
of the claim from the date of location thereof; and that prior to November 15, 1935, it filed an
application for patent but both respondents failed and refused to grant the application despite its having
complied with all the requirements of the law for the issuance of such patent. On the other hand, the
respondents contended that the petitioner was not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to said
mineral claim because the 1935 Constitution provided that “natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated.” The Court ordered the respondents to dispose of the
application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources provided in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137,
explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an interpretation, a determination of
the meaning and scope, of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims.
The cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to determining the status, under the
Constitution and the Mining Act (Commonwealth Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining
claims which were located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended.
In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the public interest to meet squarely
the fundamental question presented, disregarding for that purpose certain discrepancies found in the
pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the view expressed by the Solicitor-General in his
memorandum where he says that "the statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be
accepted for the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of the allegations in the petitions and
allege new ones in our answers, but these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as should
necessitate introduction of evidence before the cases are submitted for decision. From our view of the
cases, these may be submitted on the facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the difference
between the allegations in the pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties later, which, we are
confident, can be accomplished without much difficulty.
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:
“Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.”
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is
embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. It is clear that the foregoing
constitutional provision prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural resources," as used therein, includes
mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no
longer formed part of the public domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the
provision itself. It first declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of thepublic domain, etc.,
and other natural resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that "their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of
natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such
natural resources as were declared to be the property of the State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that
mineral lands which at the time the constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the
public domain, do not come within the prohibition.
This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the present proceeding formed part
of the public domain on November 15, 1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution
became effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof. In deciding this point, it should be
borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the
light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon
the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption." (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N. D., 181; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to
November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to
the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia
(42 Phil., 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the
court in that case: "The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located,
and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the
lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a
reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the
Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.)"
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public
domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid
location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the
locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law. ed., 320,
322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of
the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface
ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral
rights of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location, made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues” (18 R. C. L.,
1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S., 348, 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the court said:
"There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not comply-with all the requirements of
the 1aw in making the location of the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim, or that the claim was ever
abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim. They marked its boundaries by stakes,
so that they could be readily traced. They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in
compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done all that was necessary under the law
for the acquisition of an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The claim was
thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of the United States to render their title perfect,
and that they could obtain at any time upon proof what they had done in locating the claim, and of
subsequent expenditures to a specified amount in developing it. Until the patent issued the government
held the title in trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself was not afterwards open to
sale."
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was said:
"The rule is established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of state and lower Federal courts,
that when the location of a mining claim is perfected under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense
of that term; and may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title
of the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is 'real property,' subject to the
lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or territorial court. (Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S.,
279, 283; 26 L. ed., 735, 737; 1 Mor. Min. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed.,
532-534; 14, Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18 Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs. Wood, 208 U. S., 226, 317 232; 52 L. ed.,
464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
349.) The owner is not required to purchase the claim or secure patent from the United States; but so
long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all practical purposes
of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent." (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.
S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445.)
The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in the McDaniel case is determinative,
of the fundamental question involved in the instant case. But he maintains "that this decision is based on
a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court relied," and that it "is not well founded and
should be abandoned." We do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well-founded or not,
the decision in that case was the law when section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution became effective;
and even if we were disposed to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect rights already
fixed under it.
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public
domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within
the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this case. In Wilbur vs. United
States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "mandamus will lie to
compel the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a patent for a mining claim on its
merits, where his refusal to do so is based on his misinterpretation of a statute." In the course of its
decision the court said: "While the decisions of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a writ of
mandamus against an executive officer, they recognize the duty to do so by settled principles of law in
some cases. (Lane vs. Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed., 1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and case
cited.) In Roberts vs. United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed., 443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred
to and quoted in the Hoglund case, this court said:
" 'Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public officer whose duties may be defined
therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in order to
form a judgment from its language what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not
necessarily and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If
the law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and which,
upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a
statute which requires, in some degree a construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be so, the
value of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon
him by a statute might refuse to perform it, and when his refusal is brought before the court he might
successfully plead that the performance of the duty involved the construction of a statute by him, and
therefore it was not ministerial, and the court would on that account be powerless to give relief. Such a
limitation of the powers of the court, we think, would be most unfortunate, as it would relieve from
judicial supervision all executive officers in the performance of their duties, whenever they should plead
that the duty required of them arose upon the construction of a statute, no matter how plain its
language, nor how plainly they violated their duty in refusing to perform the act required.' "
In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the
petitioner. Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a
patent on its merits was due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional and statutory provisions,
following the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United
States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to dispose of
the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So
ordered.47
The foregoing rulings were applied and cited in Salacot Mining Company v. Rodriguez,48Republic v. Court
of Appeals49 and Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Here, the records show that TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98 involved six parcels of land with an area of
248.342 hectares situated in Barrio Larap and Santa Elena, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte.51 The TCTs were transferred to the MBC and PCIB after PIMI’s properties were sold in the
foreclosure sale conducted on December 20, 1975.52 Consequently, new TCTs, namely: TCT Nos. 14565,
14566, 14567, 14568, 14569 and 14570, were issued to MBC and PCIB cancelling TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96,
97 and 98.53 MBC and BDO, as registered owners of said lands, subsequently sold the same to Yinlu by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.54 Hence, TCT Nos. 72336, 72337, 72338, 72339, 72340 and 72341 were
issued to Yinlu as the new registered owner.55chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It also appears that TCT Nos. 94, 95, 96 and 97 covered mining lands with an aggregate area of 192
hectares. The lands were originally registered in 1925, and the TCTs were issued to PIMI in 1930. These
TCTs of PIMI corresponded to more than half of the areas involved in Trans-Asia’s MPSA. However, the
TCTs of PIMI constituted mining patents and mining claims of the lands they covered. TCT No. 94 was
issued pursuant to Patent No. 15 under the Busser Placer Claim; TCT No. 95, Patent No. 16 under the
Superior Placer Claim; TCT No. 96, Patent No. 17 under the Bussemer Placer Claim; and TCT No. 97,
Patent No. 18 under the Rescue Placer Claim.56 Considering that these TCTs were validly transferred to
Yinlu by virtue of the deed of absolute sale, and with the consequent issuance of TCT Nos. 72336, 72337,
72338 and 72339 in its name, Yinlu was the owner and holder of the mining patents entitled not only to
whatever was on the surface but also to the minerals found underneath the surface.
The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties. The Government,
whether through the DENR or the MGB, could not alienate or dispose of the lands or mineral through the
MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the exclusive right to explore,
develop and utilize the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or assign such exclusive right. We
uphold the rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP to exclude the disputed areas that had been
established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered owner to be taken out of the coverage of Trans-
Asia’s MPSA.
Still, Trans-Asia insists that Yinlu’s mining patents should no longer be recognized because they were not
registered pursuant to Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463, which
read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 100. Old Valid Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree. Holders of valid and subsisting mining
locations and other rights under other laws, irrespective of the areas covered, may avail of the rights and
privileges granted under this Decree by making the necessary application therefor and approval thereof
by the Director within a period of two (2) years from the date of approval of this Decree.
Section 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims. All mining grants patents, locations,
leases and permits subsisting at the time of the approval of this Decree shall be recognized if registered
pursuant to Section 100 hereof: Provided, That Spanish Royal Grants and unpatented mining claims
located and registered under the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Philippine Bill", as shall be surveyed within one (1) year from the approval of
this Decree: Provided, further, That no such mining rights shall be recognized if there is failure to comply
with the fundamental requirements of the respective grants: And provided, finally, That such grants,
patents, locations, leases or permits as may be recognized by the Director after proper investigation shall
comply with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with the annual work obligations,
submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and other obligations.
Trans-Asia submits that because MBC/BDO did not comply with the requirement for the registration of
the patents, Yinlu’s mining rights should now be deemed abandoned because no title or right was passed
to it. In that sense, Trans-Asia maintains that Yinlu had no vested right.
We disagree with Trans-Asia.
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require registration and annual work obligations,
Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly provides that the provisions of PD No. 463 shall not
apply if their application will impair vested rights under other mining
laws, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired Substantive Rights. Changes made and new provisions
and rules laid down by this Decree which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with order mining laws previously in force shall have no retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions
of this Decree which are procedural in nature shall prevail.
The concept of a vested right was discussed and applied in Ayog v. Cusi Jr. 57 Therein, the Director of
Lands awarded on January 21, 1953 to Biñan Development Co, Inc. (BDCI) a parcel of land on the basis of
its 1951 Sales Application. BDCI filed an ejectment suit against the occupants of the land who had
refused to vacate. In its judgment, the trial court ordered the occupants to vacate the land. The judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. BDCI then moved for the execution of the trial
court’s judgment, but the occupants opposed on the ground that the adoption of the 1973 Constitution,
which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening event that rendered it legally impossible to
execute the trial court’s judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition that “no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in the area.” The Court rejected the invocation, and ruled that BDCI had a vested
right in the land, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of conduct its mining operations in accordance with Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995)
Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time and its implementing rules and regulations.chanrobleslaw
the 1973 Constitution took effect.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 30, 2012 by the Court of
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Appeals; REINSTATE the decision issued on May 4, 2010 and resolutions dated June 29, 2010 and March
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporation to purchase public lands not exceeding 31, 2011 by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 09-L-638; and DIRECT the respondents to pay the
one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners’ prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of costs of suit.
vested rights in constitutional law.
SO ORDERED.
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest.’ (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is “the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to Republic of the Philippines
enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law” (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. SUPREME COURT
6) or “some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to Baguio City
doubt or controversy” (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
EN BANC
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. ‘A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power’ (16 C.J.S.
1177-78). ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
It has been observed that, generally, the term “vested right” expresses the concept of present fixed JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or
an innately just an imperative right which an enlightened free society, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing G.R. No. 191032
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).58
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,59 we stated that mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be impaired even
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
by the Government. Indeed, the mining patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its
G.R. No. 191057
predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and
should not be impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,
and annual work obligations.
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
Relevantly, we advert to the DENR’s finding that PIMI’s failure to register the patents in 1974 pursuant to
PD No. 463 was excusable because of its suffering financial losses at that time, which eventually led to x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
the foreclosure of the mortgages on its assets by the MBC and PCIB as its creditors. 60 The failure of
Yinlu’s predecessors-in-interest to register and perform annual work obligations did not automatically A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
mean that they had already abandoned their mining rights, and that such rights had already lapsed. For
one, the DENR itself declared that it had not issued any specific order cancelling the mining IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE
patents.61 Also, the tenets of due process required that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest be given JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
written notice of their non-compliance with PD No. 463 and the ample opportunity to comply. If they still
failed to comply despite such notice and opportunity, then written notice must further be given x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
informing them of the cancellation of their mining patents. In the absence of any showing that the DENR
had provided the written notice and opportunity to Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest to that effect, G.R. No. 191149
it would really be inequitable to consider them to have abandoned their patents, or to consider the
patents as having lapsed. Verily, as held in McDaniel and Gold Creek, supra, a mining patent obtained JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was a protected private property. The protection should be basic and vs.
guaranteed, for no less than Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution decrees that no person shall be JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
deprived of property without due process of law. PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF
PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
Nonetheless, we deem it significant to remind that Yinlu has been directed by the DENR to henceforth CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in
his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG
ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS;
TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES
MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP)
CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE
ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA.
CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL
LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA;
BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA;
MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR.;Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
(IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the
petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or
before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and
submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342),
and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang
Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the
Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P.
Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for
reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the
aforegiven order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate
the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.
2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and
did not involve a justiciable controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice
sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to
participate as a Member of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions
when none exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an
executive, not a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the
terms of the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has
raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to
be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal
composition of the JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should
not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case.
2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply
it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the
President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any
qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight
appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight
appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the
other, for the Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the
Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on
statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that
on temporary appointments to executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates
to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to
submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The
Constitution grants the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the
JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case
assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Court’s directing the JBC to comply
with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election
offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by
the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is
indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the
outgoing President’s powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the
next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to
the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional
Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the
appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15,
and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of
the Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in
all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and
to other appointments to the Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII
against midnight appointments in the Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight
appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and
Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have
obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any
ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political
partisanship in all branches of the Government, should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization
and physical arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should
yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the
Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of
the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list
of nominees to the President.
2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice
Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the
principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a
whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no
conflict between the provisions; they complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little
weight in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes
interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and
interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual
vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in
conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one
exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish,
because the law itself makes no distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of
Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any
vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next President has
roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and
study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to
examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The
directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc,
even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to
the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the
candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law
or the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes
to reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction
to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that
we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already
provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation
2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of
its provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of
the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010
at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the
vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the
temporary appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make
appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the
appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief
Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.
3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare
decisis.
Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is
prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the
Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial
appointments.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act
not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy.
Pimentel
1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general
intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection
of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the
interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority
to its representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to
republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution
without proper authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments,
thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief
Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.
3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on
midnight appointments.1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related
matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet
decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the
new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short
list to the President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the
President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The
statement undermines the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its
implementing rules and regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and
the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration
were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate
opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC as provided
by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Court’s adjudicatory power under
Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required, which was
whyValenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a
position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the
exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice
Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15,
Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and
argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist
that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. 1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to
precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the
decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same
court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed
or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly
those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and
for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations,
not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts,
but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself,
being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. 4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the
Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it
determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. 5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid
in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of
Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and
rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case
accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for
the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and
that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and
foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of
the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en
banc or in division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional
Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in
Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13,
Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during
his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the
Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication," 8 such that the final version of the
second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not
during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles
of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed epublic of the Philippines
reliance on the principles of statutory construction. SUPREME COURT
Manila
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the
ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of SECOND DIVISION
verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
G.R. No. 158866 September 9, 2013
Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of
Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Petitioner,
therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for vs.
doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER, PILAR D.
Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, ONGKING, ELIZABETH H. PALMA, DOLLY W. LIM RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO, ADD INTERNATIONAL
and no words can be interpolated in them. 9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more SERVICES, INCORPORATED, and NANCY L. TY, Respondents.
than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new
words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear x-----------------------x
and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the
primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law itself. 10 G.R. No. 181933

Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: NANCY L. TY, Petitioner,
vs.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made x-----------------------x
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not G.R. No. 187551
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Petitioner,
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, NANCY L. TY, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit A. DUPASQUIER, PILAR D. ONGKING, ELIZABETH H. PALMA, DOLLY W. LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO,
the purposes of any quarter. and ADD INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Respondents.

Final Word RESOLUTION

It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because
all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are
now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in there consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 are the separate issuances of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in relation to several complaint for reconveyance filed by Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank (Banco Filipino).

The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim
to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present
Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the
Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the
Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements
were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies
created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must
comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.
In particular, the petition in G.R. No. 158866 filed by Banco Filipino assails the CA’s Decision 2 dated June 23,
2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43550 which affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
La Union, Branch 66 (RTC-La Union) dated November 25, 19963 and January 22, 1997,4 dismissing Banco
Filipino’s complaint for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 4992.
Meanwhile, the petition in G.R. No. 181933 filed by Nancy L. Ty (Nancy) assails the CA’s Decision 5 dated
June 19, 2007 and Resolution6 dated February 20, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78241 which affirmed the Orders
of the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 274 (RTC-Parañaque City)dated January 13, 20037 and May 16,
2003,8 denying Nancy’s motion to dismiss Banco Filipino’s complaint for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 95-
0230.

SO ORDERED. Lastly, the petition in G.R. No. 187551 filed by Banco Filipino assails the CA’s Decision9 dated December 12,
2008 and Resolution10 dated April3, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85159 which affirmed the Orders of the RTC of
Las Piñas City, Branch 255 (RTC-Las Piñas City) dated August 31, 200411 and May 27, 2005,12 dismissing
Banco Filipino’s complaint for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 96-0036.
The Facts
Sometime in 1979, in the course of the expansion of its operations, Banco Filipino found the necessity of
acquiring real properties in order to open new branch sites. In view, however, of the restriction imposed by
Sections 25(a) and 3413 of Republic Act No. 33714 limiting a bank’s real estate investments to only 50% of its
capital assets, Banco Filipino, through its board of directors, decided to "warehouse" several of its
properties.15
Upon her behest and initiative, Nancy, together with Tomas B.Aguirre (Tomas) and his brother Pedro B.
Aguirre (Pedro) – all major stockholders of Banco Filipino – organized and incorporated Tala Realty Services
Corporation (Tala Realty) to purchase and hold the real properties owned by Banco Filipino in
trust.16 Subsequently, Tomas, upon the insistence of his sister Remedios A. Dupasquier (Remedios),
endorsed to the latter his shares in Tala Realty, which she eventually registered in the name of her own
corporation, Add International Services, Inc. (Add International). 17 As a result, Remedios, together with
Nancy and Pedro, had control of Tala Realty: Remedios exercised control through Add International and her
nominee Elizabeth H. Palma (Elizabeth); Nancy through her nominees Pilar D. Ongking (Pilar), Dolly W. Lim
(Dolly), and a certain Cynthia E. Mesina (Cynthia); 18 and Pedro through Tala Realty’s President, Rubencito
M. del Mundo (Rubencito).19
Banco Filipino entered into and, thereafter, proceeded to implement a certain trust agreement (trust
agreement) with Tala Realty by selling to the latter some of its properties located in various cities and
provinces nationwide. In turn, Tala Realty leased these properties to Banco Filipino. 20
In August 1992, however, Tala Realty repudiated the trust agreement, asserted ownership and claimed full
title over the properties, prompting Banco Filipino to institute a total of 17 complaints for the
reconveyance of the said properties against Tala Realty and Add International, as well as Nancy, Tomas,
Pedro, Remedios, Pilar, Dolly, Elizabeth, and Rubencito (defendants) in the various RTCs where the subject
properties are found.21
The present consolidated petitions22 stemmed from three of these reconveyance cases, in particular: (a)
G.R. No. 158866 originated from Civil Case No. 499223 which involved two parcels of land situated in La
Union;24 (b) G.R. No. 181933 was derived from Civil Case No. 95-023025 which involved a total of 12
properties located in Parañaque City;26 and (c) G.R. No. 187551 originated from Civil Case No. 96-
003627 which involved one property found in Las Piñas City. 28
Tala Realty, Add International, and the individual defendants, with the exception of Nancy, moved 29 for the
dismissal of these complaints on the common grounds of forum shopping, lack of cause of action, in pari
delicto and the unenforceability of the trust agreement. On the other hand, Nancy separately filed motions
to dismiss30the three complaints, raising the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lis pendens, lack of cause of
action as against her and prescription.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 158866
In anOrder31 dated November 25, 1996, the RTC-La Union granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on
the ground of forum shopping. Taking into consideration the various complaints for reconveyance filed by
Banco Filipino which were all hinged upon the same trust agreement executed with Tala Realty, the RTC-La
Union ratiocinated that the cause of action as well as the evidence to be presented in the case before it are
the same as the cause of action and evidence in the other reconveyance cases, thereby falling under the
prohibition against forum shopping.
Banco Filipino’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the same court in an Order dated January 22,
1997,32hence, the recourse to the CA via a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 33 docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No.43550.
In the said petition, Banco Filipino insisted that there could be no forum shopping when the reconveyance
cases that it filed involved various sets of real properties found in different locations and covered by
separate contracts of sale and lease, thus, giving rise to different causes of action.34
After due proceedings, the CA, through the assailed Decision35 dated June 23, 2003, dismissed Banco
Filipino’s petition, finding that there conveyance suits filed by the latter were all based on the same trust
agreement with Tala Realty.1âwphi1 In this regard, the CA held that all of the said cases are anchored upon
an identical cause of action and would necessarily involve the same evidence. 36
Dissatisfied, Banco Filipino filed the instant petition for review on certiorari before the Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 158866, maintaining its stance that it did not engage in forum shopping.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 181933
In an Order37 dated January 13, 2003, the RTC-Parañaque City denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss
the complaint, finding no concurrence of the elements of litis pendentia. 38
Thus, it held that Banco Filipino committed no forum shopping in the filing of the reconveyance cases. The
R Parañaque City likewise found that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently state a cause of action,
and disregarded the question of in paridelicto, not being a proper ground in a motion to dismiss. 39
The motions for reconsideration separately filed by the defendants were denied in the RTC-Parañaque
City’s May 16, 2003 Order.40 However, only Nancy elevated the case to the CA via petition for
certiorari,41 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78241. In her petition, she ascribed grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC-Parañaque City in denying her motion to dismiss, insisting that Banco Filipino had only
one cause of action and therefore, violated the rule on forum shopping when it split a single cause of
action. She also reiterated that the complaint stated no cause of action as against her, and that Banco
Filipino’s claim had already prescribed.42
In the assailed Decision43 dated June 19, 2007, the CA dismissed Nancy’s petition, concurring with Banco
Filipino’s posturing that while there may be similarities in the factual antecedents of the reconveyance
cases it had simultaneously instituted, the differences in the property locations, as well as in the manner by
which the trusts were repudiated, gave rise to a distinct cause of action in all the 17 reconveyance cases. 44
Nancy’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in a Resolution dated February 20,
2008,45 hence, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 181933, imputing error upon the CA for not
finding that the allegations in Banco Filipino’s complaint were insufficient to establish a cause of action as
against her. She also maintained that Banco Filipino’s action had already prescribed and that the trust
insisted upon by the latter was void due to the principle of in pari delicto, thus, no recovery can be made
thereunder.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 187551
In an Order46 dated August 31, 2004, the RTC-Las Piñas City granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss,
finding that all the elements of litis pendentia exist in the case before it: there was an identity of parties in
the 17reconveyance cases filed by Banco Filipino and pending in different identity of rights or causes of
action founded on the same transaction and identity of reliefs sought, which is the recovery of its
properties.47
Banco Filipino’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied in the RTC-Las Piñas City’s May 27,
2005 Order,48 hence, Banco Filipino appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85159.
In a Decision49 dated December 12, 2008, the CA dismissed Banco Filipino’s appeal not on the ground of
forum shopping but for lack of cause of action. In ruling that Banco Filipino committed no forum shopping
when it filed 17 reconveyance cases based on the same trust agreement, the CA considered the rulings of
the Court in G.R. No. 130184,50 G.R. No. 13916651 and in G.R. No. 14470552 finding that the elements of litis
pendentia are not present.
Nonetheless, the CA dismissed Banco Filipino’s complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, taking
into account the Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 13753353 wherein it was pronounced that the implied trust
between Banco Filipino and Tala Realty was "in existent and void for being contrary to
law."54 Consequently, Banco Filipino cannot demand there conveyance of its properties based on the said
implied trust, effectively depriving it of any cause of action in these cases.
Aggrieved, Banco Filipino filed before the Court its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 187551,
raising the same issues that it had priorly advanced before the appellate court.
The Issue Before the Court
At the core of the consolidated petitions is the essential and imperative question of whether the
reconveyance complaints filed by Banco Filipino before the courts a quo can be allowed to prosper.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, the basic facts as well as the issues raised in these petitions have already been passed upon
by the Court in its Decision55 dated April 7, 2009 in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and 166608
aswell as its more recent Decision56 dated June 27, 2012 in G.R. No. 188302.Pertinently, in these cases, the
Court applied the earlier case of Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage
Bank, docketed as G.R. No. 137533,57 wherein it declared, in no uncertain terms, that the implied trust
agreement between Banco Filipino and Tala Realty is "in existent and void for being contrary to law." As
such, Banco Filipino cannot demand the reconveyance of the subject properties in the present cases;
neither can any affirmative relief be accorded to one party against the other since they have been found to
have acted in pari delicto,58 viz:
An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as this Court has held that "where
the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud." x x x.
xxxx
x x x The Bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since
its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala
to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in
Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a)and 34 of the
General Banking Act which it had already reached. x x x
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking
Act and that its "ware housing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the
Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to
reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer
price." This arrangement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while we
find the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties, we cannot enforce
the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. x x x "The courts will not assist the pay or
in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the ‘clean
hands’ doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied
trust relationship with Tala. x x x.
xxxx
The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto, thus, no affirmative relief should be given to one against the other.
The Bank should not be allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to Tala nor should Tala be allowed to further
collect rent from the Bank. The clean hands doctrine will not allow the creation or the use of a juridical
relation such as a trust to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. Neither the Bank nor Tala came to court
with clean hands; neither will obtain relief from the court as one who seeks equity and justice must come
to court with clean hands. By not allowing Tala to collect from the Bank rent for the period during which
the latter was arbitrarily closed, both Tala and the Bank will be left where they are, each paying the price
for its deception.59 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Dictated by the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere,60 which enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents, the Court therefore enforces its ruling in G.R. No. 137533, as duly applied in the succeeding
cases, i.e., G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and 166608; and G.R. No.188302, as the controlling
and binding doctrine in the resolution of these consolidated petitions. In view of the nullity of the trust
agreement, Banco Filipino has no cause of action against Tala Realty, thereby validating the dismissal of the
former’s reconveyance complaints filed before the courts aquo. For these reasons, the Court denies the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 158866and 187551 given that they both seek the reversal of the CA’s Decision
granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. On the contrary, the Court grants the petition in G.R. No. 181933
since it properly seeks to reverse the CA’s denial of Nancy’s motions to dismiss the reconveyance cases.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 158866 and 187551 are DENIED and the Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated June 23, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43550 and the Decision dated December 12, 2008 and Resolution
dated April 3, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85159 are hereby
AFFIRMED; while the petition in G.R. No. 181933 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated
June 19, 2007 and Resolution dated February 20, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78241 are hereby REVERSED SET
ASIDE. The complaint for reconveyance filed by Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank before the
courts a quo are the DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187451 August 29, 2012
JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,**
PEREZ,***
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the February 25, 2009
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 72613, reversing and setting aside the February
19, 2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Isabela, Basi Ian (RTC), in Civil Case No. 685-627, an
action for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction."
The Facts
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application No. V-33203 (E-V-49150) for a 24-
hectare tract of unsurveyed land situated in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. His application was
approved on January 23, 1952.3 In 1955, however, the land was subdivided into three (3) lots – Lot Nos.
138,139 and 140, Pls-19 - as a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano
Custodio (Custodio), who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4493 (E-18-2958). Lot 140 was allocated to
petitioner Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio), who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4421 (E-18-2924).4
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved
application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140. 5
On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision denying Alegarbes' protest and amending
the latter's application to exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course. The applications of
Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140, respectively, were likewise given due course. 6
Alegarbes then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who dismissed his appeal
on July 28, 1967. He then sought relief from the Office of the President (OP), which, however, affirmed the
dismissal order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in a decision, dated October 25, 1974.
Alegarbes moved for a reconsideration, but the motion was subsequently denied. 7
On May 11, 1989, an order of execution8 was issued by the Lands Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered Alegarbes and all those
acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused.
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint9 for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC.
In his Answer,10 Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was void ab initio considering
that the Acting Director of Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of the Public
Land Act. Alegarbes argued that the said decision conferred no rights and imposed no duties and left the
parties in the same position as they were before its issuance. He further alleged that the patent issued in
favor of Virtucio was procured through fraud and deceit, thus, void ab initio.
Alegarbes further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative defenses, that the approval of his
homestead application on January 23, 1952 by the Bureau of Lands had already attained finality and could
not be reversed, modified or set aside. His possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open,
continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and had
acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription.
In his Amended and Supplemental Answer, 11 Alegarbes also averred that his now deceased brother,
Alejandro Alegarbes, and the latter's family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955. Alejandro and his family,
as well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been permanently occupying the said lot and, introducing
permanent improvements thereon since 1960.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring Virtucio. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the merit of this case, this court finds for the plaintiff and against the defendant by:
1. Ordering the defendant and all those acting in his behalf to vacate Lot No. 140, Pls-19, located at Lower
Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan and surrender the possession and ownership thereof to plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P 15,000.00) as
attorney's fees and another Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) as expenses for litigation; and
3. To pay the cost of the suit in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00).
SO ORDERED.12
Not in conformity, Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 25, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision declaring Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140,
Pls-19, thereby reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Alegarbes became
ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain possession of it.
Consequently, the awards of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit were deleted.
In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to approve Virtucio's homestead application over Lot
140 had become final, Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription. The decisions on
the issues of the approval of Virtucio's homestead application and its validity were impertinent as
Alegarbes had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claimed by virtue of adverse
possession.
The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in disregarding the evidence before it and relying
entirely upon the decisions of the administrative bodies, none of which touched upon the issue of
Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. The CA
held that the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the OP did not
determine whether Alegarbes' possession of the subject property had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from
the mass of public land and, thus, was beyond their jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
ISSUES
Virtucio assigned the following errors in seeking the reversal of the assailed decision of the CA, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the judgment of the trial court, which awarded the lot in
question to the respondent by virtue of acquisitive prescription and ordered herein petitioner to
surrender the ownership and possession of the same to them.13
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the decision in CA-G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, Custodio vs. Alegarbes which contains same factual circumstances as in this
case and ruled against JOSE ALEGARBES.14
3. The Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees to the petitioner. 15
The lone issue in this case is whether or not Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by
acquisitive prescription.
Ruling of the Court
The petition must fail.
Indeed, it is fundamental that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Only questions of law distinctly set forth shall be raised in
the petition.16
Here, the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by Alegarbes through acquisitive prescription
and the character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of controversy is a
factual issue.17 The Court, however, is not precluded from reviewing facts when the case falls within the
recognized exceptions, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 18 [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the findings and conclusions of the CA are apparently contrary to those of the RTC,
hence, the need to review the facts in order to arrive at the proper conclusion.
On Acquisitive Prescription
Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in 1954
when Alegarbes filed the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due course to his
homestead application and that of Ulpiano Custodio. Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several
extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot. Those demands
constitute the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive
prescription.19
Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of
acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or
extraordinary.20 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for a period of ten years,21 while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse
possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. 22
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a
right by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive prescription are
adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are
lost by the lapse of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139. Another name for extinctive
prescription is litigation of action.23 These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.
Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions. Interruption of
acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code. Thus,
Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of acquisitive prescription is misplaced.
The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil
interruption.24
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. 25 When no action is
filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of
acquisitive prescription continues to run.
In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead application
interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence,
however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said period.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,26 the Court ruled that a mere Notice of
Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession. In the case of Heirs of Bienvenido
and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel,27 which also cited the Rañon Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaring
again the property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's name cannot defeat
another's right of ownership acquired through acquisitive prescription. 28
In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision resulting from it
cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an instance, no civil
interruption can take place. Only in cases filed before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus,
interrupt possession. Records show that it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC. The
CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbesbecame ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain
possession of it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of
alienable public land.Virtucio emphasizes that the CA erred in disregarding the decisions of the
administrative agencies which amended Alegarbes' homestead application excluding Lot 140 and gave due
course to his own application for the said lot, which decisions were affirmed by the RTC.
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on
appeal and, in fact, are accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record. 29 It
appears, however, that the conclusion made by the RTC was not substantially supported. Even the RTC
itself noted in its decision:
The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the applicant to take possession of the land so
that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his
favor – what divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of a patent and its subsequent
registration with the Register of Deeds.30
A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of any patent in favor of either parties.
This simply means that the land subject of the controversy remains to be in the name of the State. Hence,
neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership. There was, therefore, no substantial and legal basis for
the RTC to declare that Virtucio was entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140.
It can be argued that the lower court had the decisions of the administrative agencies, which ultimately
attained finality, as legal bases in ruling that Virtucio had the right of possession and ownership. In fact, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) even issued the Order of Execution31 on May
11, 1989 ordering Alegarbes to vacate Lot 140 and place Virtucio in peaceful possession of it. The CA,
however, was correct in finding that:
But appellant had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claims by virtue of
adverse possession. On this issue, the cited decisions are impertinent. Even if the decision to approve
appellee's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final, appellant could still acquire the said lot
by acquisitive prescription.32
In the case of Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando,33 the Court ruled that the mere application for a patent,
coupled with the fact of exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession for the required period, is
sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for. 34 It likewise cited the cases of Susi v. Razon35 and
Pineda v. CA,36 where the Court ruled that the possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public
domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property. 37
In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as 1949. He had been in exclusive, open,
continuous and notorious possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR issued its order
of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his possession for more than 30 years. Even more so when
Virtucio filed the complaint before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in possession of the subject
property for forty-eight (48) years.
The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely
upon the decisions of the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the OP,
which never touched the issue of whether Alegarbes’ open, continuous and exclusive possession of over
thirty (30) years of alienable land had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and beyond
the jurisdiction of these agencies.38
When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the abovementioned decisions, it merely
recognized the primary jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. It was of the view that the RTC was
not correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and
entitled to retain possession of it. There is no reason for the Court to disturb these findings of the CA as
they were supported by substantial evidence, hence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court. 39
On the CA Decision involving a similar case
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV
26286, for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, which involved the same factual circumstances and
ruled against Alegarbes.
It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and that
Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment
may have had just because it involved similar factual circumstances. The Court also found from the records
that the period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a
complaint, which is wanting in this case.
Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. 40 "The principle
of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument. "41
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was erroneous for the
CA to disregard its earlier decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to adhere to that
decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which is not legally possible because only final decisions of
this Court are considered precedents.42
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not dwell on the complaint of Virtucio with regard to the deletion
of the award of attorney's fees in his favor. It is ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay attorney's
fees, as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding him to have acquired ownership over the property
by acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199310 February 19, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503.
The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69,
in Land Registration Case No. N-11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application 4 with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square
meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondent’s application for registration
sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The scheduled initial
hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette,
April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-16337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of People’s
Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise
posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the bulletin
board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA,
which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for
registration.10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s application for registration, asserting
that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the
other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its
Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie
Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for
registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957;
and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a
topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and
Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said
parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from
Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were
originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of
crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold
the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were
purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; 13 (2)
survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; 15 (4) Geodetic
Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; 17 and (6) certifications
dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist
of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied
since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it
pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850 19 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding
the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that,
upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was
prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in
April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon
actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that
the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic
survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the
subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that
Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges
from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the respondent’s application for
registration of title to the subject properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman
Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and
20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769
respectively and ordering their registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman
Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are
very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna
Lake. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is
hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey
on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on
March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the
elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial
survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted
the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties, pointing out
that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s witness merely
compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the
said portion of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters
and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference
point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was DPWH
or the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal
knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or
reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF
Cruz.22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined
that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water
when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels
of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that
are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject
properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and
waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the
respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16,
2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its name.
Appellee’s witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the subject lots,
ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its
highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion
of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are
higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of
R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map dated
March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land
are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial
photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due
execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr.
Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be
considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his admission that his findings were based
merely on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR,
attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to prove,
through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May
16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s application for
registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below the
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the
bed of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact
by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-standing policy of this Court
that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed
conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower
courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. 25
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean
that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent
upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are
indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower
courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court
nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the
subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable."26
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927, which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public
land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications 30 issued
by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January
3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 31 the Court
clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land
is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do
so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the
land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the
status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that
she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.34 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration
are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a
true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the
failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on
June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of
the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent
points out that its application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by
the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to
present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the
denial of its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to
the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present
case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is
elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was
originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the interpreted law carried into effect. 35 "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a
new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that
the applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of
T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on
October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the
application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted
by the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for
registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this
Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for registration on the
ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the
subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same
since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn,
sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the
subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of
the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject
properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of
such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of
the subject properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that
are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly
planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed
planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have
been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops
in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession
and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years." 40
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent
were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject
properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership."41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that
year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact
belies the claim that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony,
have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's
application for registration should be denied.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision
dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-
11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in
Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had
been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one
Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal
canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of
her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie
Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete,
(6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne
Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos,
(16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City
Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio
and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich
S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6)
Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are
summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter
brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel
along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch of street
children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was
the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While
Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up
young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a
table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these objects
the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which
turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other
objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in
Bangkok when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay
down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and also guided the
boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked,
and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to
remove her clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two
(2) children and accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He looked, and he
saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina
but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and
fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid
Ramirez alias"Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the American left,
they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But they
could not do anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they report the
matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object
was already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the
evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan
asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein
Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to
Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he
already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the
primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of
the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by
people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody
helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an
unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one who gave the
personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and
Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room.
Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her
to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty.
Limos testified that it was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives
more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness,
for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987,
he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to
the house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl
by the name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with
their mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's
testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So the Court
can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at his brother's
house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his
testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely
be concluded that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a
characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as
"Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending to her
since she is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good
samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and
Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone
with no relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her.
After a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up about her
residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the medicine she needed during her
confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to get the name and age of
Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of
Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their program assisted only indigent patients from infants
up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting,
which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a
massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the
physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and
she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the
doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object
by means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object was deeply embedded in the
vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of
peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on May 19,
1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr.
Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete
himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her
condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's
operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by
making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus
and so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder
and kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were
traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-
vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a
portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object
was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping
and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo
Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr.
Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The
following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the
afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein
that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign object
lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled
"Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her under
proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially Rosario's case, and
afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr.
Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating
the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and
informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs.
Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if
she was interested in filing a case against the person who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of
course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her
house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had only
P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to pay damages
anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her case. By this
time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no
longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told
her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she went with her
nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they
were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the
bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are
willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the
understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and she was
asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she and the lawyer's
messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city
fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of
Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the
Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos,
Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot.
On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be
an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation headed by criminal investigator
Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a
street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them they
learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign
object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They
found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American,
who brought them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City
and took his statement. Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the
description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were
distributed to the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American
servicemen who had resemblance to the composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to
Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution has established the
appearance of the suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual. GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and
penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so- penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND
called American may be European or Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees
Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a
hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo- The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:
sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00
p.m., while they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian who I
looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson.
Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
so the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did, and when WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought him and
Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard while the II
one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved
it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS
upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING
Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner
was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first III
went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his
personal belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police Department. At the said THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT
police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and his small REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND
shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars and travellers ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the
learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of
accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to
Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time
examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that
Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who died
case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary
after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla
because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12,
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not Rosario
1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was filed, the
Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986.
father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was
The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised
already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the death of
Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age, in
his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.
which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state do not have to be present.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the accused
because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the
and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the commission of
the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother and
certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on
father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were admitted
December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the
pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth certificate, the
Baptismal Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but
act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a member
admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein. Likewise, the
of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the admission of hearsay
defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of
evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was
due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because her
who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116) brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to
attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22, 1975
(T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was
baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death
certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General
Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the
hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also
testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as adequate
evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was
born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years
old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other
independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel and
Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any probative or
evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of
evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of
Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must as a
general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall
within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the trial
court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court. Their declarations
were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other witnesses who
testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's relatives
must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what happened and not as hearsay
evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down
in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the mother that her
daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because the child
was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one who
had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness. (People v.
Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never
established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's
declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had direct
knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the
time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis shown
to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar Alcantara's
incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her
only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the circumstances of Rosario's
birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based on the clinical records. It is even
less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at
the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less offset a
documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being
hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing
Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief.
(See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James
Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that he is
the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin
term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the name of
Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are
Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only
sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23
SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it
does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the
relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be
admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of
business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded
in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the
certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25,
1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified that
he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one presented in court. However, no
other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different from that brought by the official
custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is
therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on December 22, 1975. She could not have
been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the
declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1)
year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as
stated in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was
below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as to
Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore,
she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the
prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in a charge
of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual
violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was force
of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that
Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented
to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00
(T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies and
evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a
prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex at such a
young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict
for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was Ritter
guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the insertion
of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led to
her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances
are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither
could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the appellant was
holding at that time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang
daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa
kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya
ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay
bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na
may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin
kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng
Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas
ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti?
(Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny
having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo
kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the witness'
testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he answered on
additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same object
being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110,
January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he did not actually
see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner inserted
something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res gestae. In a strained
effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of admissibility on the
lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old, the insertion of a
mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is undoubtedly startling. For
Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show that the statement, given after a night's
sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the event was so startling Res gestae does not apply.
(Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is
still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically admitted to you that
she was already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you
met her when you asked her and when she told you that she was already able to remove that object from
her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And she answered,
"Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of
her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words against me as
she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by the
foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so we can just
imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the appellant caused
the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort until May, 1987,
seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the
defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State University in
1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of
Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a
graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan
1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He
became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at
present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a
Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU
Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13 conferences
abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his
impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the
pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a
part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what
would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as such be
considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign
body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions that maybe
manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the foreign body with human
tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and changes in the
area where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all over the body,
we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as shown to me is already not
complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is mechanism to cause
the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from within and that power must be a dry
cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any
substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances are irritants including areas of the container
and as such, the primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory
changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would be a supervening
infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased process causing
her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-
15, October 19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an infection would set
in, how many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion
has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in
ashorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually
developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on
October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7
months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any adverse infection
could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women usually, there
are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object has a shorter
time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein infection
sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more than
10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is facing a
penalty ofreclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities which are less
likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the body. An
examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988,
signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic
(see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no
actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end portion
which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis'
testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object was
inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with a
very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to
infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no reason
why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and binding upon the Court
in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17,
1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior
to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was brought to the
delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to
walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she was fairly
nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time and examination deals more
on the abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over,
with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index finger and
middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a
speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw
purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the
posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the said foreign
object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second instance,
Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the foreign object on
her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled that it
is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on
the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital,
she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because there
were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to her
operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal
Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits indigent children in the hospital every
Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In
fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25,
1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope John
23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario
Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on
the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was too hot in the
bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was
conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought her to
the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer questions
asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention given to
her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is
massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in
the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the
peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis
supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it
fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant faces
the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner
of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important,
therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the
accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p.
592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and
preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof that
the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death seven
(7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances which
were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. While circumstantial
evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should
concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
(Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime
(People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the
appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified
starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in order to survive. At
an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its most
heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying their young
minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to dramatize
the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street children. It would
have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be brought to justice
so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and implementation of
meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the
perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the
accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years
old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution is to be believed, she was
not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove
force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the
evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez.
This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was only told by
Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was able to remove
the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning
because of pain in her stomach. She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it
is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active properties to
cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal.
Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident happened in December
of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows that the appellant was not here in
the Philippines that December. As per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report,
Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never
returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in
October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for
seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she told him
"Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident.
Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to
admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she
could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or
vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders the
evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral
certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign
object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could
be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities.
Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused.
(People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into
account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores
of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The strongest
suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As
stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal
cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls
for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the court,
keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that
which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong,
that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of
those who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes,
3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of
the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and
Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced that he
comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures
but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked him
and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown
pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show that the
appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined
pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have sexual
intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio,
cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual
between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself.
Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the state to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13,
1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill
seeking aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only to
Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state has expressly
committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV, Section
3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago,supra). The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money.
The appellant should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC,
supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt,
only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily
exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of
the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,
and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of
the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads
thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also
be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved
only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances
forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who
have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as
reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional
presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which
saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that
he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have
caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the
records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them
with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines,
including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should
not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages
to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from
exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of
young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the
relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments
of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies
deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the
Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino
street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill
of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street
children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by
way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings against the appellant and
to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the country.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law
or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the
law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of
law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our
Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of
their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners
for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his
sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale,"
for the sum of P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-
fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same
with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house
on a part of the enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the
spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen . 5 On
May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption claimed by her brother.6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs,
including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the
portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same
house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the
private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they
alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia.
In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the
petitioners had been purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection
thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done without
objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent
law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article
1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
by the vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article
was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De
Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was
required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a
copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written
notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized
that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar
requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular
method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws"
as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by
the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion,
to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less
expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to
err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these
words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless
have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not
read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give
effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within
the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if
within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the
sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption.
Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date
it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or
two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in
1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the
petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the
running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be
necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any
question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance,
thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was
sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do
say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the
other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and
ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of
the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed
her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise
had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential
that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were
such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon
inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known
the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among
them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act
of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to
ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to
claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which
the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted
properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases.
In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle
doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between
the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render DECISION
every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in
every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of
the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case. PEREZ, J.:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial
court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari[1] from the Decision[2] of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67702 dated 26 February 2004, granting the petition of Dolores Baas,
herein respondent, to reverse and set aside the Decision[3] of the lower court.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

SECOND DIVISION WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the court a quo
is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and in its stead another one is rendered GRANTING to petitioner-
appellants the right to redeem the subject property for the amount of Php 60,000.00 within thirty (30) days
from the finality of this decision.

The facts as gathered by the court follow:

ARMANDO BARCELLANO, G.R. No. 165287
Respondent Baas is an heir of Bartolome Baas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in
Petitioner, Present: Hindi, Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina (Medina), covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. VH-9094, with an area of 1,877 square meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina
offered his lot for sale to the adjoining owners of the property, the heirs of Bartolome Baas, including
herein respondent Dolores Baas, Crispino Bermillo (Bermillo) and Isabela Bermillo-Beruela
-versus- CARPIO, J., (Beruela)[4]Crispino Bermillo, as the representative of his family, agreed to the offer of Medina, the sale to
take place after the harvest season.[5]
Chairperson,
On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando Barcellano for P60,000.00. The
DOLORES BAAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact BRION, following day, the heirs of Baas learned about the sale and went to the house of Medina to inquire about
CRISPINO BERMILLO, it.[6] Medina confirmed that the lot was sold to Barcellano. The heirs conveyed their intention to redeem
ABAD,* the property but Medina replied that there was already a deed of sale executed between the
Respondent. parties.[7] Also, the Baas heirs failed to tender the P60,000.00 redemption amount to Medina. [8]
PEREZ, and

SERENO, JJ.
Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5 April 1997.[9] Medina sent only his
tenant to attend the proceeding. On 9 April 1997, the Baas heirs and Barcellano, with neither Medina nor
his tenant in attendance, went to the Office of the Barangay Council to settle the dispute. According to one
Promulgated: of the Baas heirs, Barcellano told them that he would be willing to sell the property but for a higher price
of P90,000.00.[10] Because the parties could not agree on the price and for failure to settle the dispute,
the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action.[11]
September 14, 2011

On 24 October 1997, Dolores Baas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the Regional Trial
Court. However, on 5 February 1998, the petition was withdrawn on the ground that:

xxx considering the present worse economic situation in the country, petitioner opted that the amount
they are supposed to pay for the redemption be readily available for their immediate and emergency
x-------------------------------------------------x needs.

On 11 March 1998, Dolores Baas, as represented by Bermillo, filed another action [12] for Legal
Redemption. It was opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with the provisions of Art. 1623 of the
New Civil Code but Baas failed to exercise her right within the period provided by law.
Trial ensued. On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Baas heirs for their failure to
comply with the condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for failure to file an action in
court together with the consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period of 30
days.[13] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court and granted the heirs
the right to redeem the subject property. The appellate court ruled that the filing of a complaint before
the Katarungang Pambarangay should be considered as a notice to Barcellano and Medina that the heirs
were exercising their right of redemption over the subject property; and as having set in motion the judicial
process of legal redemption.[14] Further, the appellate court ruled that a formal offer to redeem, coupled
with a tender of payment of the redemption price, and consignation are proper only if the redemptioner
wishes to avail himself of his right of redemption in the future. The tender of payment and consignation
become inconsequential when the redemptioner files a case to redeem the property within the 30-day
period.[15]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In this petition, Barcellano questions the ruling of the appellate court for being contrary to the admitted
facts on record and applicable jurisprudence.
The Courts Ruling
Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art. 1623 to be given to adjoining owner was
no longer necessary because there was already actual notice. Further, he asserts that the appellate court
erred in ruling that the tender of payment of the redemption price and consignation are not required in
this case, effectively affirming that the respondents had validly exercised their right of redemption. Lastly,
he questions as erroneous the application of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known
as Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level, thereby ruling that the filing
by the heirs of the complaint before the Barangay was an exercise of right of redemption.
We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that:
The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be.The deed of sale shall not
be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was a written notice sent
to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-
emption may be exercised, does not start.
The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case of Conejero v. Court of
Appeals,[16] penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is indispensable, and that, in
view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of the sale,
acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was
obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The statute not having provided for any alternative,
the method of notification prescribed remains exclusive.
This is the same ruling in Verdad v. Court of Appeals:[17]
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in
order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Lately, in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. the Court of Appeals,[18] this Court again emphasized the mandatory
character of a written notice in legal redemption:
From these premises, we ruled that [P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence
of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run. These
premises and conclusion leave no doubt about the thrust of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to
exercise their right of legal redemption exists, and the running of the period for its exercise has not even
been triggered because they have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code is to ensure that the
owner of the adjoining land is actually notified of the intention of the owner to sell his property. To
advance their argument, they cited Destrito v. Court of Appeals as cited in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[19] where this Court pronounced that written notice is no longer necessary in case of actual notice of
the sale of property.
The Alonzo case does not apply to this case. There, we pronounced that the disregard of the mandatory
written rule was an exception due to the peculiar circumstance of the case. Thus:
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance,
thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was
sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do
say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the
other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and
ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of
the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed
her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise
had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential
that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were
such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon
inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known
the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among
them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act
of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to
ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to
claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late. [20]
xxxx
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between
the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
The Court clarified that:
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law,
which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court
acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-
cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero
and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
Without the peculiar circumstances in the present case, Alonzo cannot find application. The impossibility
in Alonzo of the parties not knowing about the sale of a portion of the property they were actually
occupying is not presented in this case. The strict letter of the law must apply. That a departure from the
strict letter should only be for extraordinary reasons is clear from the second sentence of Art. 1623
that The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in his commentaries on
the New Civil Code that despite actual knowledge, the person having the right to redeem is STILL entitled
to the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to
widen the scope of the written notice by including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral one, or
by registration. If the intent of the law has been to include verbal notice or any other means of information
as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, there would have been no necessity or reason to specify in the
article that said notice be in writing, for under the old law, a verbal notice or mere information was already
deemed sufficient.[22]
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. [23] Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice. The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the
family of Baas.
Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is
required.[24]
We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner. The respondent Baas has a perfect
right of redemption and was never in danger of losing such right even if there was no redemption
complaint filed with the barangay, no tender of payment or no consignation.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 26 February 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67702, granting to petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for the amount of
Php60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata
on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going,
when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the
defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to
that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's
carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close
to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon
an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by
making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe
and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle
Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee
tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the
wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the
act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some
other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver
was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the
horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in
which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him
for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908,
and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code. The
provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a
trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of
such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the
ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in
Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is
determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law
determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of
Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7
February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907;
18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and
tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in
the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that
time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in
unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all
cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of
the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1
Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who suffered a
cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the
horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is
that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It can
not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to
leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under the
observation and control of some person all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse,
be determined by the jury from the facts of each case. the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.

In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial court to
refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and
otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods
on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite and gentle,
and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and
that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge
as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury was convinced
that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse and
wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse
unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and
having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a
matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was
then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents
or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to
reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and
assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of
a people? We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise
reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or EN BANC
inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues.
(Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing,
292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63;
Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or SULTAN YAHYA JERRY M. G.R. No. 182434
imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be TOMAWIS,
held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted
Petitioner, Present:
by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries
result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that,
because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The
fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any
PUNO, C.J.,
sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case, and
that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed.
CARPIO,
It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa CORONA,
loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139
U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554): - versus - CARPIO MORALES,

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the VELASCO, JR.,
steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly built,
as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the NACHURA,
part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima
facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
control of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case
was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might BRION,
properly be so instructed.
HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. PERALTA,*
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR,
accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those conditions
Respondents. BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, In his answer, Tomawis debunked the sisters claim of ownership and raised, as one of his affirmative
defenses treated by the court as a motion to dismiss, SDCs lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
ABAD, the case.[2] As argued, the regular civil court, not SDC, had such jurisdiction pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.[3]
VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ.
Following the hearing on the affirmative defenses, respondent Judge Rasad Balindong, by Order of April 1,
2003, denied the motion. Apropos the jurisdiction aspect of the motion, respondent judge asserted the
SDCs original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by force of Article
Promulgated: 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines.
March 5, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On June 16, 2005, Tomawis filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Correct the Name of
Defendants to Read Sultan Yahya Jerry M. Tomawis & Mangoda M. Radia.[4] In it, he alleged that title to or
possession of real property or interest in it was clearly the subject matter of the complaint which, thus,
DECISION brought it within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts in consonance with existing
law. [5] On July 13, 2005, the SDC denied this motion to dismiss.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Orders dated July
13, 2005, September 6, 2005, and February 6, 2008 issued by respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the
Sharia District Court (SDC), Fourth Judicial District in Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 102-97 entitled Amna A.
Pumbaya, et al. v. Jerry Tomawis, et al.
The Facts
Unsatisfied, Tomawis later interposed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Cancel and
Reset the Continuation of Trial Until After the Resolution of the Pending Incident.[6] Per
Order[7] dated September 6, 2005, the SDC denied Tomawis urgent motion for reconsideration and ordered
the continuation of trial.
Forthwith, Tomawis repaired to the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, on a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify, on jurisdictional grounds, the aforesaid SDC July 13,
2005 and September 6, 2005 Orders.

By Resolution[8] of February 8, 2006, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the CA
Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A. Musor are the daughters of
was not empowered to resolve decisions, orders or final judgments of the [SDCs]. Justifying its disposition,
the late Acraman Radia. On February 21, 1997, private respondents filed with the SDC an action for
the CA held that, pursuant to Art. 145[9] of PD 1083, in relation to Art. VIII, Section 9[10] of Republic Act No.
quieting of title of a parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City, against petitioner Sultan Jerry
(RA) 9054,[11] the new organic law of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, final decisions of the
Tomawis and one Mangoda Radia. In their complaint, styled as Petition [1] and docketed as Civil Case No.
SDC are reviewable by the yet to be established Sharia Appellate Court. Pending the reorganization of the
102-97, private respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, alleged the following:
Sharia Appellate Court, the CA ruled that such intermediate appellate jurisdiction rests with the Supreme
Court.

(1) They were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint, being the legal heirs of Acraman
Radia, who had always been in peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property; (2) Tomawis
Undeterred by the foregoing setback before the CA, Tomawis interposed, on January 29, 2008, before the
assumed ownership of the said property on the claim that he bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who,
SDC another motion to dismiss on the same grounds as his previous motions to dismiss. The motion was
in turn, claimed that he inherited it from his late father; (3) in 1996, they were informed that their land
rejected by respondent Judge Balindong per his order of February 6, 2008, denying the motion with finality.
[was] leveled and the small houses [built] thereon with their permission were removed upon the orders of
Tomawis; and (4) they had been unlawfully deprived of their possession of the land, and Tomawis actions
had cast a cloud of doubt on their title.
Hence, this recourse on the sole issue of: insofar as it granted the SDC concurrent jurisdiction over certain real actions, was repealed by the BP 129
provisions adverted to.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION SEEKING RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING HIS MOTION TO DISMISS.
Simply put, the issue is whether or not the SDC can validly take cognizance of Civil Case No. 102-97.
Disagreeing as to be expected, private respondents balk at the notion of the implied repeal petitioner
espouses, arguing that PD 1083, being a special, albeit a prior, law, has not been repealed by BP 129.
Putting private respondents contention in a narrower perspective, Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 is of specific
applicability and, hence, cannot, under the rules of legal hermeneutics, be superseded by laws of general
application, absent an express repeal.

Petitioners claim has no basis.

The Courts Ruling

The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of the cloud of doubts
on the title of ownership[19] on the subject land, are within the SDCs jurisdiction to grant.

Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the enactment in 1989 of the
law[12] creating the Sharia Appellate Court and after the Court, per Resolution of June 8, 1999, [13] authorized
its creation, the Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice A brief background. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) was enacted on June 17, 1948. It vested the Courts
and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Sharia Appellate Court shall have been organized, of First Instance with original jurisdiction:
however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred
to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA
Justices.
(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the
legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts. [20] x x x
For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the
Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.

To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and resolved petitions and cases emanating
from Sharia courts. Among these was one involving the issue of whether or not grave abuse of discretion
attended the denial of a motion to implement a writ of execution.[14] Still another involved the Sharia
courts jurisdiction in custody and guardianship proceedings,[15] nullity of marriage and divorce when the
parties were both married in civil and Muslim rites,[16] and settlement of estate proceedings where the
deceased was alleged to be not a Muslim,[17] or where the estate covered properties situated in different
provinces.[18]
Subsequently, PD 1083, dated February 4, 1977, created the Sharia courts, i.e., the SDC and the Sharia
Circuit Court, both of limited jurisdiction. In Republic v. Asuncion,[21] the Court, citing the Administrative
Code of 1987,[22] classified Sharia courts as regular courts, meaning they are part of the judicial department.
Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain cases, with exclusive original jurisdiction and with concurrent
original jurisdiction over certain causes of action. As far as relevant, Art. 143 reads as follows:

The instant petition, involving only a question of law on the jurisdiction of the SDC over a complaint for ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Sharia District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
quieting of title, was properly instituted before the Court.

xxxx
Petitioner asserts that Sec. 19(2), in relation to Sec. 33(3) of BP 129, as amendedby vesting original
exclusive jurisdiction to the RTCs or Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), as the case may be, over civil actions
that involve the title to, or possession of, real propertyeffectively removed the concurrent jurisdiction once
pertaining to the SDC under Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083. In fine, petitioner contends that Art. 143 of PD 1083, d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified
which law shall govern their relations; and

xxxx
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Sharia District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. (Emphasis added.)
On August 14, 1981, BP 129 took effect. Sec. 19 of BP 129, as later amended by RA 7691, [23] defining the
jurisdiction of the RTCs, provides:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As things stood prior to the effectivity date of BP 129, the SDC had, by virtue of PD 1083, original
jurisdiction, concurrently with the RTCs and MTCs, over all personal and real actions outside the purview of
Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties involved were Muslims, except those for ejectment. Personal
action is one that is founded on privity of contracts between the parties; [24] and in which the plaintiff
usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or recovery of
damages.[25] Real action, on the other hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate,[26] where the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of real property or interest in it. [27]
On the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the RTC or the municipal trial court with exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest in it, and
the value of the property subject of the case or the jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case
comes within the jurisdictional competence of the RTC or the MTC. Orbeta v. Orbeta[28] differentiated
personal action from real action in the following wise:
A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All other
actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from the averments in the underlying complaint, is basically a suit for
recovery of possession and eventual reconveyance of real property which, under BP 129, as amended, falls
within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC or MTC. In an action for reconveyance, all that must be
alleged in the complaint are two facts that, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover
title to the disputed land, namely: (1) that the plaintiff is the owner of the land or has possessed the land in
the concept of owner; and (2) that the defendant has illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the land. [29] A
cursory perusal of private respondents complaint readily shows that that these requisites have been met:
they alleged absolute ownership of the subject parcel of land, and they were illegally dispossessed of their
land by petitioner. The allegations in the complaint, thus, make a case for an action for reconveyance.
Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is whether the jurisdiction of the RTC or
MTC is to the exclusion of the SDC.
Petitioners version of the law would effectively remove the concurrent original jurisdiction granted by Art.
143, par. 2(b) of PD 1083 to civil courts and Sharia courts over, among others:
All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. x x x
Petitioners interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought. One must bear in mind that even if
Sharia courts are considered regular courts, these are courts of limited jurisdiction. As we have observed
in Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih,[30] the Code of Muslim Personal Laws creating said courts was promulgated to
fulfill the aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced in their communities. It is
a special law intended for Filipino Muslims, as clearly stated in the purpose of PD 1083:
ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides that The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national
cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies, this Code:
(a) Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land and seeks to
make Islamic institutions more effective;
(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and
(c) Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims.
A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of general
application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a
special law, which only refers to Sharia courts.
A look at the scope of BP 129 clearly shows that Sharia courts were not included in the reorganization of
courts that were formerly organized under RA 296. The pertinent provision in BP 129 states:
SECTION 2. Scope. The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the Court of
First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.
As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment,[31] BP 129 was enacted to reorganize
only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special
law that only applies to Sharia courts.
We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and
should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. [32] In the instant
case, we apply the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special
law. The general law will yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the
latter.[33] We must read and construe BP 129 and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception
to the general law to reconcile the two laws. This is so since the legislature has not made any express
repeal or modification of PD 1083, and it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored.[34] Implied repeals will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Laws are
assumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating
to the same subject matter.[35]
In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction
enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the
answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the
complaint.[36] Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. [37] In the instant case, private respondents
petition[38] in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the concurrent original jurisdiction of the SDC.
While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with respect to cases involving
only Muslims, the SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to
Muslims[39] to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional conferment, found in Art.
143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to
the prejudice of a non-Muslim,[40] who may be the opposing party against a Muslim.
Given petitioners flawed arguments, we hold that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is an arbitrary exercise of power owing from
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to a shirking from or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross for the act to be held as one made
with grave abuse of discretion.[41] We find respondent courts issuance of the assailed orders justified and
with no abuse of discretion. Its reliance on the provisions of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound
and unassailable.
We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only errors of law, but also the errors of a
litigant and his lawyer. As may have been noted, petitioner Tomawis counsel veritably filed two (2) motions
to dismiss, each predicated on the sole issue of jurisdiction. The first may have been understandable. But
the second motion was something else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution, denied Tomawis
petition for certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court to review judgments or
orders of the SDC. The CA stated the observation, however, that Tomawis and his counsel may repair to
this Court while the Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two years after the
CA issued its denial before filing what virtually turned out to be his second motion to dismiss, coming finally
to this Court after the same motion was denied. The Court must express disapproval of the cunning effort
of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural rules to the hilt to prolong the final disposition of this case.
From Alonso v. Villamor,[42] almost a century-old decision, the Court has left no doubt that it frowns on such
unsporting practice. The rule is settled that a question of jurisdiction, as here, may be raised at any time,
even on appeal, provided its application does not result in a mockery of the basic tenets of fair
play.[43] Petitioners action at the later stages of the proceedings below, doubtless taken upon counsels
advice, is less than fair and constitutes censurable conduct. Lawyers and litigants must be brought to
account for their improper conduct, which trenches on the efficient dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner Yahya Jerry Tomawis and Atty. Edgar A.
Masorong are ADMONISHED to refrain from engaging in activities tending to frustrate the orderly and
speedy administration of justice, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts may result in the
imposition of a more severe sanction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

IRST DIVISION CORONA, J.:

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R. No. 162155

REVENUE and ARTURO V. This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration. [3]
PARCERO in his official

capacity as Revenue District

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the
Officer of Revenue District refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer
Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), [4] he
No. 049 (Makati), explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for
projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown. [5] As a consequence, while
Petitioners, Present: business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228
that year.[6]

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. [7] Nevertheless,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real
estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32.[8] Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax
- v e r s u s - CORONA, refund or tax credit.[9]
AZCUNA and

GARCIA, JJ. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents
to support its claim.[10] Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it
filed a petition for review[11] in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY

GROUP, INC., On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive
period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. [12] It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal
Respondent. Promulgated:
Revenue Code (NIRC):
August 28, 2007

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of
any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or
x-----------------------------------------x
credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether
or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

DECISION In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit
any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to
have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a
refund or credit commenced on that date.[13]
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from
sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of
judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition,
which was filed 731 days[14] after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.[15]
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. [16] Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.[17]
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. [18] It ruled that Article 13 of the
Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year. [19]
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14,
1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A
statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.[20]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. [21] Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed
against claimants.[22] Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly appliedagainst respondent inasmuch as it
has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins
to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns.[23] Hence, the claim should have been filed on
or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return.[24] But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood
to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,[25] we ruled that a year is
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. [26]
However, in 1987, EO[27] 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; month of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of
days the specific month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four hours and; night from sunrise to sunset.
(emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain.[28] It is the period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not
including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of
days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month. [29] To illustrate, one calendar
month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month
from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.[30]
 3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by 4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the
previous one).[31] Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states: 5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent 8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the laws to be abolished.[32] Thus, the provision above onlyimpliedly repealed all laws Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably
intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject 16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled. [33]
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
deal with the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is 19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year
prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return [34] on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is
ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

DECISION

No costs.

SO ORDERED. PERALTA, J.:

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated September 21, 2007[1] and May
19, 2008 [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. CR No.00410 which dismissed the petition for
Manila review filed by petitioner Alfredo Jaca Montajes for being filed out of time, and denied reconsideration
thereof, respectively.

THIRD DIVISION
In an Information[3] dated June 5, 2003, petitioner was charged with the crime of Direct Assault before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, the accusatory portion of which reads:

ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, G.R. No. 183449 That on or about the 8th day of December, 2002, at 1:00 early morning, more or less, in Purok 10, Barangay
Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Petitioner, accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and hack one JOSE B.
RELLON, an elected Punong Barangay, while in the performance of his duties, and accused fully know that
Present: Jose B. Rellon is a Barangay Official, to the damage and prejudice of said Jose B. Rellon.

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 148 of the revised Penal Code.[4]

PERALTA,

- versus - ABAD, When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.[5]

MENDOZA, and Thereafter, trial ensued.

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. The evidence of the prosecution and the defense is summarized by the MTC as follows:

Promulgated: To substantiate the alleged commission of the crime of direct assault by the accused, complaining witness
Jose B. Rellon declared inter alia, that he has been the Barangay Captain of Barangay Abilan, Buenavista,
March 12, 2012 Agusan del Norte since the year 2002. On December 8, 2002, at about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning, he
was at the benefit dance sponsored by the Sangguniang Kabataan at Purok 4, Barangay Abilan, Buenavista,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Agusan del Norte. He met accused Alfredo Montajes who uttered to him the words YOU'RE A USELESS
CAPTAIN. Other words of similar import were likewise uttered by the accused against him which he could
Respondent. no longer recall. After uttering the said words, the accused then drew his bolo locally known as lagaraw and
approached him. He then moved backward, but the accused came near to him and struck him once with
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
the lagaraw. Luckily, complainant was not hit as he managed to move backward. Complainant's daughter
named Vilma Dector and his wife, approached him and brought him home. Many people, including two (2)
CVO (Rodelio Laureto and Victorio Trinquite), witnessed the incident.
During the mediation in the barangay hall, an investigation was conducted. The accused, according to the
complainant, asked for forgiveness from him which he declined, as he was of the impression that the law
must be applied and the accused should instead ask for forgiveness in court.
As proof that the accused asked for forgiveness, complainant presented a document (Exh. B) to that effect.
Complainant had the incident blottered at the police station as evidenced by an extract thereof.
On cross-examination, complainant testified that he went to the benefit dance to stop it since it was
already 1:00 o'clock in the early morning and the benefit dance was still going on when it was supposed to
end at 12:00 o'clock midnight as the permit he gave was only up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. As a result of
the stoppage of the benefit dance, many persons got angry, and he heard that the house of the accused
was stoned which made the accused angry. In fact, he saw the accused murmuring as his house was stoned
by unknown persons. When the accused came near to him, the former did not ask for assistance from him.
Prosecution witness Rodelio Laureto corroborated the declaration of the complainant that it was the
accused who hacked the complainant with the use of a lagaraw, but failed to hit him.
Accused Alfredo Montajes testified that in the evening of December 7, 2002, he was at home listening to
the disco as there was a benefit dance near their house. The benefit dance started at 7 o'clock in the
evening and ended at 1 o'clock in the early morning of December 8, 2002 when it was stopped by Barangay
Captain Jose Rellon. It was then that trouble started because many of those who have paid but were not
anymore allowed to dance complained to the Barangay Captain and requested that they be given one more
music so that they could avail for what they have paid for on that benefit dance, as they were not refunded
with their payments. When this protest went on, the CVO's reacted by clubbing them using their jackets.
Then a stoning incident followed. One of those hit by stones was his house. This made him wild prompting
him to get his lagaraw to look for the people responsible for stoning his house. While looking for these
persons along the road, he saw Barangay Captain Jose Rellon who was then two (2) meters away from him,
and he responded by telling him that he was looking for those persons responsible for the stoning of his
house. The complainant wanted to get the lagaraw from him but he refused.
The accused explained, when confronted with a document (Exh. B) wherein it was stated that he asked for
apology from the Barangay Captain during the barangay level conciliation, that it was for the sole purpose
of not elevating this case and that they would settle amicably.
The accused also vehemently denied the accusation that he attacked the barangay captain.
Defense witness Luis A. Cajeles, Jr., a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte,
testified that at about 1:00 o'clock in the early dawn of December 8, 2002, he heard of stoning and
shouting, in fact the window grill of his house was hit and he heard the people in panic. As a barangay
kagawad assigned to the Peace and Order Committee, he went out immediately from his house and went
to the road across the basketball court where the stoning was. He then saw accused Alfredo Montajes
holding a bolo. The accused was shouting that he was looking for the persons who stoned his house. He
also witnessed that the barangay captain asked the accused why he was bringing a bolo and the accused
replied that he was looking for the persons who stoned his house. He did not know what else happened
because he tried to drive the teenagers to their homes, because it was already very late in the evening.
On cross-examination, he declared that the accused asked for forgiveness during the confrontation at the
Barangay because of the disturbance he made to the barangay captain and to the community because
some people were in panic as he was bringing a bolo, and not for attacking the Barangay Captain.
Anatolio Lozada Bangahon, another defense witness, testified that he saw the accused coming out from his
house carrying a bolo, and when he asked him why he was bringing a bolo, the accused replied that he was
going to look for the persons who stoned his house. The accused was roaming around to look for the
persons who stoned his house, but he was not looking after the Barangay Captain. [6]
On December 29, 2005, the MTC issued its Judgment[7] finding petitioner guilty of the crime of direct
assault. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ALFREDO MONTAJES y JACA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Direct Assault as defined and penalized under Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer an indefinite prison term of FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE DAY of arresto mayor in
its maximum period, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of prision
correccional in its medium period, as maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
attending the commission of the offense charged. The accused is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) Philippine Currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.[8]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Butuan City, rendered its Decision[9] dated January 23,
2007 affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Order [10] dated May 4, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition (should be motion) for extension of time to file petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days from May 21, 2007,
or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for review
on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition outright for being filed
out of time. In so ruling, the CA said:
As borne by the records, the petitioner received the copy of the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration on May 4, 2007, Thus, the 15-day reglementary period within which to file a petition for
review expired on May 21, 2007 (Monday) considering that the last day fell on a Saturday, May 19, 2007. It
appears that petitioner reckoned the extension from May 21, 2007(Monday) and not from May 19,
2007 (Saturday). Petitioner should have reckoned the 15-day extension from May 19, 2007 and not
from May 21, 2007. It is well settled that when the day of the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday, and a party is granted an extension of time, the extension should be counted from the last day
which is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.[11]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May 19, 2008.
Petitioner is now before us on the issue of whether the CA erred in denying due course to his petition for
review for being filed out of time.
Petitioner argues that he filed the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the CA
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court; that based on such provision, if the last day to file a
petition falls on a Saturday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last day of the
reglementary period within which to file the said petition for review with the CA fell on a Saturday, thus,
the last day to file the petition was moved to the next working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday.
Hence, he was not wrong in asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to file the petition and
not from May 19, 2007, Saturday. Nonetheless, petitioner asks for liberality in the interest of justice taking
into consideration the merit of his petition claiming that his conviction was not supported by the evidence
on record. Moreover, he claims that his petition for review was filed with the CA on June 5, 2007, which
was long before the CA dismissed the same on September 21, 2007 for being filed out of time. He prays
that the CA resolutions be reversed and set aside and the CA be directed to give due course to his petition
and to resolve the case on the merits.
We grant the petition.
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or
by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated
period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day.
We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29,
2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a
Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) which reads:
xxxx
Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies in the matter of filing of
pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing
of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day
immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so that
when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next
working day and not from the original expiration of the period.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1,
Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is
granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension
of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,[12] we said:
Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a party desire to file any pleading, even a
motion for extension of time to file a pleading, and the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal
holiday, he may do so on the next working day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar.
However, according to the same circular, the petition for review on certiorari was indeed filed out of time.
The provision states that in case a motion for extension is granted, the due date for the extended period
shall be counted from the original due date, not from the next working day on which the motion for
extension was filed. In Luz v. National Amnesty Commission, we had occasion to expound on the matter. In
that case, we held that the extension granted by the court should be tacked to the original period and
commences immediately after the expiration of such period.
In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for extension was within the period provided by
law, the filing of the petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an additional period of 30 days
within which to file the petition. Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006.
Instead, he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late. [13]
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period for doing any act
required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
shall not run until the next working day. In this case, the original period for filing the petition for review
with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioner's filing of his motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day for filing which fell
on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his motion for extension that he be
granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed his
petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the motion for extension, but instead issued a
Resolution dated September 21, 2007dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time.
We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time based on our
clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked to the
original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. [14] Thus, counting 15 days
from the expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was
already two days late. However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal
application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, which was long before the CA issued its
Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. There
was no showing that respondent suffered any material injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason of such
delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was sought to be reversed in the petition for review filed in the
CA had affirmed the MTC judgment convicting petitioner of direct assault, hence, the petitioninvolved no
less than petitioners liberty.[15] We do not find anything on record that shows petitioner's deliberate intent
to delay the final disposition of the case as he had filed the petition for review within the extended period
sought, although erroneously computed. These circumstances should have been taken into consideration
for the CA not to dismiss the petition outright.
We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does not automatically
warrant the dismissal thereof.[16] And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late,
where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may relax the stringent
application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. [17]

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration
of justice.[18] After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the substantive rights of the
parties are protected.[19] Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. [20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The
Court of Appeals is ORDERED to reinstate the Petition for Review filed by petitioner in CA-G.R. CR No.
00410.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in
its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees,
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where
she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises
Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital
future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy
bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for
his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which
was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize
because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the
intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted
that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought
priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid
marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish
priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because
on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not
remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar
Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in
Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as
endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with
Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to
escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition,
drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5").
The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application
that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she
intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage
(Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with
him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband,
and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present
husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and
Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta
Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the
record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both
consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the
presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil
law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State
but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties
and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not
essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which
provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or
one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered
to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442,
448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu.
Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing
for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even
granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was
vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done,
and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for
non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce
that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe
County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in
force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii;
and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in
contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in
view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give
rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties
(Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort
cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise,
that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a
person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez
to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord
with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered
under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As
a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710
became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect
merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the
Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision
in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be
rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo
Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the
proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine
law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced
or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the
Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late
Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her
husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own
letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In
these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great
unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff
was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that
he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners
and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such
unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically
defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto
Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek
to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they
abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that
Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not
wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27
Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original
suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age,
she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so
doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in
such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own
malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is
not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable
where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest
of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in,
and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate,
although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in
good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his
or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married
daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by
actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court
actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos
in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity
or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is
evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise
was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry
under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered
into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of
the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño,
by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have
wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously
injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in
present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is
that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence
of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife,
the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN,respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA
T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and
WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa
in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from
commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent
William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated
September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with
the deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further
acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over
his person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The
Court considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners'
comment as answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana
Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian
testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian,
Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William
and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof,
William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August
16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among
those cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in
the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among
others, respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was
issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become
final and executory (Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or
July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein
this Court sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been
promulgated on July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against
them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the
warrant of arrest issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of
exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45
(c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940
(Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner
of Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation *issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18",
counter-petition). The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released
on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the
motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others,
that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings
against William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order
restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being
vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted
with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to
hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also
his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised
in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby
disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962
decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent
judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on
record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the
deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners
can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case
because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to
be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the
Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in
equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpusand injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the
RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic
Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the
Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural
Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall
continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent
with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment of the Court of
Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two,
also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration
Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the
Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or
questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals,
the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes.
Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and
executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of
appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court,
and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the
Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and
stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are
directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal
from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC),
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be
considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the
latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law
whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its
decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987
Administrative Code, which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this
chapter and applicable laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in
any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the
latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review
by the court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of
competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except
those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal
rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action
for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try
and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs.
Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board
of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation
proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory?
Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court
answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is
entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a
deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by
a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a
citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his
undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this
much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has unjustly
trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155
[1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the
remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua
Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the
records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention
should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted
by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in
view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition
concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this
Court in Chua Hiong and Cocases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at
bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented,
We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without
precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the
Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc.
vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37
[1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA
703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et
al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia,
92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of
appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in
the form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato
Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau
of Immigration already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the
deportation charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha
vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial
determination of respondent's citizenship specially so where the latter is not seeking admission, but is
already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation
Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivocases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein
was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e.,
whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date)
"20" was erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the
one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did
not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in
the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21,
1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a
case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing,
said decision did not make any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly,
the doctrine of res judicatadoes not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections
(supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a
court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with
the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive
proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will
a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case
or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof,
and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in
the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even
a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with
the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940,
reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act
insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of
arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant
of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po
Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua
Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should
one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable
that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of
constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition)
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of
investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs
the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962
warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no
mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent,
respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a
motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing,
submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition)
recommending 1 the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners
which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the
warrants of arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of
Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by
the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong
authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f
at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a
passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered
illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which
affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian
and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification
Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the
basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the
present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino
citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI
order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order
states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated
July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they
are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino
was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex
"1" to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being
the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was
born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on
November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961
(Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his
petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L;
and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued
Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr.,
proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is
not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show
that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision
that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago
Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and
addressed for determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight
(28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five
(5) years after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid
down the consequences of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she
gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than
that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation
proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note
that the above irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an
spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with
the landing of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration
authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to
another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at
P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must have considered
the irregularity not serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a
properly documented preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two
years later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute
deportation proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the mother would
be condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire
permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having
allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus
allowing the period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late
hour would be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving
him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or
oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of
equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in
1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August
15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by
their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian.
Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification
certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting
Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC
decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be
applicable to respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also
opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where
the deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12
and that no period of limitation is applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation
proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions
for violations of the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and
imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who—
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name;
fictitious name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by law to
receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration clearance
certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense,
and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not
more than two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code);
correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for
those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a
special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of
exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a
period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute
the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by
the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal
Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty
of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the
date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be enforced only by a separate action subject to the
statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation or exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12
and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37,
the prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before
they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990.
Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or
enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in
the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has
four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He
holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a
registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage
(Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the
director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes,
"13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000
dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as
such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
How could one who has helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000
people be considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive
to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in
the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his deportation under the circumstances
is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is
diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners
point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of
Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any
evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China
were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it
should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted.
There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence,
Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside
of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated,
William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at
bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the
same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to
marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony
subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago
Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding
their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as
statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule
130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See
also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned
are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now
Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as
to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is
answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption"
enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears
the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of
his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino
being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1,
Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The
ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties
therein testified to have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those
authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED
and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently
enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of
jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90
pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as
an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated
on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision
rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City. 2 The CA thereby
denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law
books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna,
Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony
conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a
church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli
Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar
Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to
live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"
dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be
partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD
be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the
heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing
thusly:

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil
and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St.,
Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for
36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON.
After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983,
and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100
share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which
a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas
Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry
in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport
and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of
ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit
as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR
THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture
and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA,
Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to
WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS
Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY.
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644.
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF
became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA
which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA
through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE
144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF
ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
(HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL. 8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The
absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior
marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch
138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the
heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole
funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds
ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are
hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s approval of the
Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law
books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100
pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved
the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the
petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. 15 Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, 16 even if either or both of
the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws
have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages
have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. 18 Conformably
with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It
affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either
spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late
Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before
the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was
enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered
into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when
the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval
of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may
protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
(1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient
in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident
ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their
execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce.21 With the
divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the
lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void
for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been
dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had
subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab
initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-
ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v.
Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-
ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without
basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of
the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of
coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The
law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the
plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions
ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to
almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00
of the unit’s purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid
for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that
she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not
acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions
through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used
to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that
was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases
where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not
married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a
void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without
impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was
filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares
were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution
was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of
credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage
was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by
the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA
355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4)
checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January
27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed.
Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco
Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was
for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The
fourth check, Exhibit "M", forP4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that
the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit.
The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no
basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial
court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna,
together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the
spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners
and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA,
married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L.
Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in
the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to
contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It
is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from
his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of
the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were substantiated
by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the
petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna
acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of
his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who
pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife,
Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00
to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00
each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna
Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia,
the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant
to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven
equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by
the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April
30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of
the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by
this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would
arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when
they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have
been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a
new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and
the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would
not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's
will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that
Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM,Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. 6
According to petitioner, respondentmade a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). 7 However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since
then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. 10 To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. 13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against
herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally
due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also filed
a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending
the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. 19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved
the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. 20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the respondent who is analien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty ishereby
cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001
and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate
the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of
the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and
mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment
contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and
RUST to pay respondent’s money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 6 Respondent
elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named
as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the
labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project
which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner
itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or
paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose
of assuming the alleged obligation of the said companies. 9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision
which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as
"Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut.10Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure
to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative
Defenses and for Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum non
conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the resolution of
the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General
in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court held
that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial
court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was
inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which motion was opposed by respondent. 17 In
an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65
Petition19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction
to set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the
trial court from conducting further proceedings. 20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision 21 denying the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution
issued on 10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined itself to the allegations in
the complaint and should have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner’s omnibus motion,
it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient for
purposes of determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court also
stated that it could not rule one way or the other on the issue of whether the corporations, including
petitioner, named as defendants in the case had indeed merged together based solely on the evidence
presented by respondent. Thus, it held that the issue should be threshed out during trial. 23 Moreover, the
appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to desist from
assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office,
counsel on record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag,
had severed relations with the law firm even before the filing of the instant petition and that it could no
longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a
Resolution25 dated 20 November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of
law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are
American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines –
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the
dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial
resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances 27 where the Court held that the local judicial machinery
was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine
Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision. 28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court
and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed
to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed. 29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for
damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount
of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as
party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. 32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties.33The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the
instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on
its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are
not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties
involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after
vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance. 35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it
can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the
Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause of action
against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. 37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as one company.
Petitioner contends that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On this score, the
resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as other documents produced in
the hearing shows that these evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and conclusive proofs that Raytheon
Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of defendant Rust International in
the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after Rust International ceased to exist after being absorbed
by REC. Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise meager to preponderantly conclude
that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined
into one company, so much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be
held liable for the obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these
documents clearly speak otherwise.38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST
merged together requires the presentation of further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the merits
can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998]
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon
City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals of
30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89,
Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Estrellita J. Tamano.
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his
death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner
Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single,
respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contractfalse and fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single when
she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became
final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could
file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse,[1] hence, it was only Tamano who could
file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and
Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case
was vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the
Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 [2] or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court
seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City,
denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.
In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consolidation
with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the Court of Appeals
granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated
cases.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts
only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts, like
Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the sharia court and not the Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,[3] Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.[4] Personal actions, such as the instant complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.[5] There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an
action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by
the plaintiff in this case.[6] In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private
respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws or PD No. 1083.Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and
Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was
first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case
despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married
in Muslim rites. This is because a courts jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the
answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the
complaint.[7] Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the
complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
causes of action.[8]
Petitioner argues that the sharia courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II,
PD No. 1083,[9] which provides -
Art. 13. Application. - (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to
marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance,
claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration
of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the
property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim
laws.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence,
contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed
petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the
general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with original andexclusive jurisdiction when it
comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts
are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July
1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to
dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO,Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no
vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita
Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws
and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. 4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil
status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his
death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children
with Zorayda,5filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil
Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent
marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted
the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared
as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in
his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the
provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that
the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have
been one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased
and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law; 7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an
extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, 8 and again, another 15 days9 or
until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted. 10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995
where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim
rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano. 12 Estrellita argued that
the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083,
or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving
Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity.13Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial
of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA 14 which was docketed
thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be no
default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer.
Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When
it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 were postponed mostly at
her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in view of the CA’s
temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case. 17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30,
1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on
June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997. 21 The day
before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement. 22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for
decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that
she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603. 24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as one of the reasons that
as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated
under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from
assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998, 26 we denied Estrellita’s
motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment
declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. 28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen.
Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the
Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the late
Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This
renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his
civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in
this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil
Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of
her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and
subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of
legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be
allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking
for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period
longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending
petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not
interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab
initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil
Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under
civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the
CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the
senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the
allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s
judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion.
Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s
refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously
rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R.
No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity
of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the
RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and
to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that
Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer
suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings
while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She
maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the
proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition
questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse
judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on
November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a
party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was
already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim
law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the
affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the husband
or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses that
Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does
not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this
is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the
lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of
Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack
directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are
the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the latter was rendered
prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final
resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was
denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was
collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending
petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher
courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer and of
the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her
Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the
CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the
complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until
said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to
suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order
denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said
Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x 41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to
suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above
excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed
to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and
resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file
an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to
dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension
of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the
resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in
upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend
the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not
part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of." 42 Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
public respondent from further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s
temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to
present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when
it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603.
Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and
she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans
her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed
Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for
the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be
remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and
not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is
collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The
parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a
copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall
be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T.
Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no collusion
between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the
private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report
of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is
to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is
not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court. 48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil
and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any
given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No.
126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the
contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly,
every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited
enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly
upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment. 54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-
Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their
mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one
contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano
will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in
effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as
void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of
marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for
nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a
bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) 56 thereof, only the husband or the
wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she
and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of
compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or
injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing
an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured
spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.
The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the
prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for
nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is
prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003. 58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While
the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has
taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who
has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his
mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. 60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that
would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the
CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, G.R. No. 193902
Petitioner,
- versus - June 1, 2011

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., DECISION

Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x NACHURA, J.:

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, G.R. No. 193908 These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN,
Petitioner, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R.
No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.

- versus -

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,

Respondent. On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30,
x--------------------------------------------------x 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon
City.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., G.R. No. 194075

Petitioner
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The
- versus - Present: dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia CircuitDistrict Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District,
Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows:
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,

Respondent. CARPIO, J.,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Chairperson,
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman
NACHURA, against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife, herein complainant, was
previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with
PERALTA, Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ. When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus (Mohamad)
de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they have freely entered into on
December 18, 1983.
Promulgated:
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both the
complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim
wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues
this decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the marriage betweenMarietta (Mariam) D.
Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.
Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.
(signed)
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Presiding Judge[3]
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in
her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the
Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on
December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed
their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike
in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny,
namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998,
the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a
bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum
arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the
latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos, to wit:
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one
for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her
marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first
marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of
the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was
bigamous and void ab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her
minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community
property in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25,
2004.
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and disbarment before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue
Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed in due
course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of
the administrative case was still pending resolution.
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a second
marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004. [4]
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor
Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, findingprima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable
for Bigamy.[5] Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos
before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.[6]
Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February 2, 2005 resolution. As a
result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were temporarily suspended. On April 29,
2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a
resolution granting Zamoranos motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against
Zamoranos.[7]
Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the City
Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005. [8]Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition
for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for
Bigamy against Zamoranos.[9]
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a resolution granting
Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City
Prosecutor.[10] Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus
Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in
Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before
the Secretary of Justice.[11] Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of
Justice in a resolution dated May 17, 2006. [12]
Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was likewise denied. Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, xxxx
the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of
Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are 2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married in accordance
Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
thePhilippines: a) Marriage;

b) Divorce recognized under this Code;

From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to the effect that xxxx
his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting
previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts or other courts of
between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and
fact that divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance with PD sufficient divorce proceedings.
1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-
marry. Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de
Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not
modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083. Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against [Zamoranos] such as
complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of
facts. A pure and simple harassment.
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on December 28, 1992 under
the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the validity of the first marriage on December
20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to
Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this Court has no
by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD
the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between the 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.
parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore,
the divorce by Talaqdissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,]
being governed by PD 1083, x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is
hereby granted.

Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:

Application The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims[,] or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
SO ORDERED.[13]
this Code in any part of the Philippines.
On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. [14]
Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings shall be properly within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an
Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[15]
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in
the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her
and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of
the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No.
06-12305 ought to be dismissed.[16]
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos Motion to Quash the Information.
Zamoranos motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. [17]
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the December 21,
2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos
petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash
the Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined
to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to
keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be
imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a
petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited
to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts
complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
xxxx
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash Information and the
action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may
constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated
December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously
explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We
find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and
taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even
assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioners motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst,
an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.[18]
Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of Zamoranos petition for certiorari.
Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision. However, upon motion of
counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her
petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites;
2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio did not remove
their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their marriage ties;
4. Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus
de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings properly within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.
5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and
6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the
Sharia Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos petition, raises a quarrel with
the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who
was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him,
likewise under Islamic rites.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim
are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [19]
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve
parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform. [20]
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which
cannot be the subject of an appeal.[21]
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse
interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to
continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
in the manner authorized by law.[22]
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is considered
an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We
have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of
a more enlightened and substantial justice; [23] (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; [24] and (e)
when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof.[25] The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction,
not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash.
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by
the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the
decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts.
The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Sharia Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of
the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of
the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facieevidence of the death of the testator or intestate.
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.[26]
The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to state that the
judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply
dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia Circuit Court had
jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance
of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first
marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same
court further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart
from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage
of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the marriages
among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are believers of Islam, I
solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance
with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to see me
and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce
became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Sharia
Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I
accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim personal laws,
the Clerk of Court registered their documents;
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the
ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court
were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may serve.

2. Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement
between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the
time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usmans
affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;
2. The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985,
with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the
Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;
3. The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old Capitol Building, in
the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;
4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam)
Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that gutted
down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is
evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites.
Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC.
Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of
Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited
jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised
Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and
decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case. [30]
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that
Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far
from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a
prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it
had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was already in
jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in
the formulation and implementation of its policies.
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense
defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition
bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the former shall
prevail.
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local application,
the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to
operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of
the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon:
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this Code and
laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision on
bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on (1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an idda of three monthly
subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may
solemnized in accordance with the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will remarry only after delivery.
not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special
law and another special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out xxxx
the provision of the Muslim Code.[31]
Chapter Three
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Section 1. Nature and Form

Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with
Chapter One this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the
spouses. It may be effected by:
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
Article 13. Application.
xxxx
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her non-
menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of
repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim after the expiration of the prescribed idda.
law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

xxxx
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to take her
back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a new contract of
marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).
Chapter Two
xxxx
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall
have the following effects:

Section 1. Requisites of Marriage. (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with
this Code;

(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;

xxxx
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this Code;

(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the talaq has been
Section 3. Subsequent Marriages effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;

xxxx (e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67;
and
Article 29. By divorcee.
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated.

For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If
together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of
the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating
rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this
Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim
law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code
of thePhilippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code. [32]
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one
to remarry.[33]
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and
Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her
to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father Hadji Kalam T.
Mala, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court's decision 1 dated June 11, 2008 and
order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in Poblacion,
Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. 3 At the time of the
purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. 4
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration
Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. 5
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P.
Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title. 6
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation proceedings before the
Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio
at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.7
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of the
right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to
vacate his property.8
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However,
despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to
present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted in its order 9 dated
January 30, 2008.10
In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered
owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it
over to Roldan, and pay P10,000.00 as moderate damages and P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court issued the notice of writ of execution12 to
Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with the decision. He received a copy of
the notice on December 16, 2008.13
On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear
civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued
that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside
the decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake.16
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived] his right to defend
himself."17 It noted that he was duly served with summons and had notice of the following: Roldan’s
motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008,
and the writ of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right to assail the
decision via certiorari."18
According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law. Article 155,
paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of Shari’a
Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.19 It ruled that it had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights were not prejudiced since
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the case applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.20
Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition
for relief from judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a writ of execution
of the decision dated June 11, 2008.
Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief from judgment on June 17, 2009. 22
On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order with this court.23
In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without
jurisdiction in rendering the decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,24 Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance of real
actions where the parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s action. Thus,
all the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including the decision dated June 11,
2008, are void.25
In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment on Vivencio’s petition for
certiorari. This court subsequently issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of
the writ of execution against Vivencio.27
On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition for certiorari. He allegedly filed the
action for recovery of possession with the Shari’a District Court where "a more speedy disposition of the
case would be obtained":29
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was duly filed with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District
Court, Cotabato City at the option of herein private respondent (petitioner below) who believed that a
more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained when the action is filed with the Shariah District
Court than in the Regional Trial Courts considering the voluminous pending cases at the Regional Trial
Courts[.]30
On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to decide the action for
recovery of possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued that no provision in the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines prohibited non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings,
especially in actions where the Shari’a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court validly took cognizance of his action:
2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively for muslim litigants. No provision in the Code on
Muslim Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to participate in the proceedings in the
Shariah Courts, especially in actions which applies the civil code and not the Code on Muslim Personal
Laws;
3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for quieting of title filed by a muslim litigant since
the nature of the action involved mere removal of cloud of doubt upon one’s Certificate of Title. The laws
applied in this case is the Civil Code and other related laws, and not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[.] 31
Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession,
Roldan argued that the proceedings before it were valid. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his
answer, he "effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District
Court]"32 and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:
4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent below) was properly served with summons,
notices and other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th)
Shariah District Court, Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent below) intentionally or without known
reason, ignore the proceedings;
5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is whether or not herein petitioner (respondent
below) has effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings below and had lost his right to
appeal via Certiorari; and the issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court has jurisdiction
over an action where one of the parties is a non-muslim;
6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the
same Court had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent) intentionally waived his right to defend
himself including his right to appeal via certiorari;
7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District Court took cognizance of an action under its
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules applied is not the Code on Muslim
Personal Laws but the Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of Procedure, hence the same
would not prejudice the right of herein petitioner (respondent below)[.] 33
In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s comment. On
February 3, 2012, Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating that he would no longer file a reply to the
comment as he had "exhaustively discussed the issue presented for resolution in [his petition for
certiorari]."35
The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action
where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
We also resolve the following issues:
1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the parties is
a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and
2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a
non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.
We rule for petitioner Vivencio.
I
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which may either be the
Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose,
consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. 38 If a court hears, tries, and
decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are
void.39
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined. 40
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts 41 wherein the
parties involved are Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d) 42 wherein the parties involved are
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
xxxx
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it. 43 If
the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its possession
from the dispossessor.44 When the property involved is real,45 such as land, the action to recover it is a real
action;46otherwise, the action is a personal action.47 In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims
for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a
Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did
not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have
motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record,
the court shall dismiss the claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s action because
not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead of filing the action with the regular
courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition of the case."48 This would have been a valid argument had all
the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of
Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of
existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is applicable solely when both
parties are Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong. 50 When one of the parties is not a
Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code,
customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law. 51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply
Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District
Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of
general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking
cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real
actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims.
Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless
of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims
from participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when provisions in the Muslim
Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and
divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is
non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is
disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent. 55 However, by operation of law and regardless of
Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be entitled to one-
third of what he or she would have received without such disqualification." 56 In these instances, non-
Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings. 57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances. This case involves an action
for recovery of possession of real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts may only take
cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are Muslims."58 Considering that one of the
parties involved in this case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to
hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of possession of real property. The judgment against Vivencio
is void for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. 59 The reason is that
"jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
and to render judgment on the action."60
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa as
charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court to decide the case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal case despite the fact that Figueroa objected to the trial
court’s jurisdiction only on appeal.
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive dismissal
against Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation actively participated in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled against Metromedia Times, it appealed
to the National Labor Relations Commission, arguing for the first time that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the complaint. According to Metromedia Times, the case involved a grievance issue
"properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was
raised only on appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the
court to decide a case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 64 the Spouses Tijam sued the Spouses
Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover P1,908.00. At that time,
the court with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the amount demanded does not
exceed P2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace and municipal courts in chartered cities under
Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of
attachment against the Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance dissolved the writ of attachment.
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of execution
returned unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First Instance granted the motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. moved to quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First Instance denied. Thus, the
surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s decision. Five days after receiving the Court of
Appeals’ decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for the first time
that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
forwarded the case to this court for resolution.
This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
on the ground of estoppel by laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action if it took them an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to object
to the court’s jurisdiction.65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of parties in invoking the
jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only to repudiate the court’s jurisdiction after failing to
obtain the relief sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is
overlooked in favor of the public policy of discouraging such inequitable and unfair conduct.67
In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety company became a party to the case when it issued the counter-
bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by
seeking several affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of execution. The surety company
only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in 1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision. This court said:
x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect
be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.68
After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court observed that the "non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction"69 has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has become more the general rule
than the exception.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is
that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements
which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted,
however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. x x x.71
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted"72 rule that objections to a court’s jurisdiction over
the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This is because
jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law"73 and "may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties."74
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great care;" 76 otherwise, the
doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":77
x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely — only
from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and
the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
subject matter is void. x x x. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction x x x.78
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief from
judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over Roldan’s petition
for recovery of possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court over the action for recovery of possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s
action.
II
That respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio
Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the latter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons, he failed to
file his answer and waived his right to participate in the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court. Since Vivencio waived his right to participate in the proceedings, he cannot argue that his rights
were prejudiced.
Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a personal judgment or to subject the
parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action." 79 A court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she files the initiatory pleading. 80 As for the
defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her voluntary appearance
in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.82
Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam83 or actions based on a party’s personal
liability.84Since actions in personam "are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are properly impleaded and duly heard or given
an opportunity to be heard."86 With respect to the defendant, he or she must have been duly served with
summons to be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the proceedings in personam, including the
judgment rendered, are void.87
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly try and decide actions
in rem.88 Actions in rem are "directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."89 In actions in rem, the court trying the case
must have jurisdiction over the res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the case.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective."90 In actions in rem, summons must still be served on
the defendant but only to satisfy due process requirements. 91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is deemed waived. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."
In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to
him the possession of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property. 92 Thus,
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an action in personam. As this court explained in Ang Lam v.
Rosillosa and Santiago,93an action to recover the title to or possession of a parcel of land "is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing." 94 Also,
in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said that "a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a
property to another is in personam. It is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action."96
This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent Shari’a
District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
III
The Shari’a Appellate Court and the
Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines
We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court’s decision. Under the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054, 97 the Shari’a Appellate Court
has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He
should have filed his petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.
However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization of
the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our
country. After all, the Muslim legal system – a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal,
commercial, political, international, and religious laws 98 – is part of the law of the land,99 and Shari’a courts
are part of the Philippine judicial system.100
Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines shall continue to discharge their duties. 101 All cases tried in Shari’a Circuit Courts shall be
appealable to Shari’a District Courts.[[102]
The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
all cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts.103 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without
prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court. 105
This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall
have been organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
and "shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] stations
preferably composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s was
not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari on August 6, 2009, we take cognizance
of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. 109
Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult
in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an officer with authority to render legal opinions or "fatawa" 110 on any questions
relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be based on recognized authorities 112 and "must be
rendered in precise accordance with precedent."113 In the Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are
codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an and Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a
court judges in resolving disputes not involving Muslim personal laws.
All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the parties involved are
Muslims. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Roldan E.
Mala’s action for recovery of possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim.
Accordingly, the proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment
rendered, are void.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision
dated June 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are SET
ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan E. Mala of an action with the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151866 September 9, 2004
SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
69537,1promulgated on 17 January 2002.2 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision denying
respondent’s claim for damages against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay moral damages to the
former in the amount ofP100,000.00.
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to
the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several
persons were already there including the bride, the bride’s parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his
assistant, the official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those present was petitioner
Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding
rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the
reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to
the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that
petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan
ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner
then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to
attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort
room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set of diamond
earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of about one million pesos. The hotel security was called
in to help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched.
Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the
evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and
fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police
officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmonte’s car which was
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem her smeared
reputation as a result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus,
on 20 February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single
out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after the theft incident
was purely a police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000, dismissing Valmonte’s complaint for damages. It
ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her
right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added
that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in
pointing to her as the culprit. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety,
moral shock, social humiliation, or that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner’s wrongful act.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner
did not slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented.
The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled
out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the testimony of Serena
Manding, corroborating Valmonte’s claim that petitioner confronted her and uttered words to the effect
that she was the only one who went out of the room and that she was the one who took the jewelry. The
appellate court held that Valmonte’s claim for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was
subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but rather petitioner’s act of publicly accusing her
of taking the missing jewelry. It categorized petitioner’s utterance defamatory considering that it imputed
upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court concluded that petitioner’s verbal assault upon Valmonte was
done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid
proof except petitioner’s suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and embarrassed.
However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court’s conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not
conform to the evidence presented. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words
complained of, it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.
In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual conclusions reached by the appellate
court. The cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must raise only questions
of law,3 and judicial review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence
unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 4 This Court, while not a trier of
facts, may review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion based on the record
especially so when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court,
or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken.5
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, we find sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that petitioner’s
imputations against respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.
Petitioner’s testimony was shorn of substance and consists mainly of denials. She claimed not to have
uttered the words imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned the latter’s name to the
authorities as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in
law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.6
Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioner’s testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in
great detail her distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how rudely she was treated by
petitioner right after she returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the
words "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang
kumuha." Thereafter, her body was searched including her bag and her car. Worse, during the reception,
she was once more asked by the hotel security to go to the ladies room and she was again bodily
searched.7
Sereña Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondent’s testimony. She testified that petitioner
confronted respondent in the presence of all the people inside the suite accusing her of being the only one
who went out of the comfort room before the loss of the jewelry. Manding added that respondent was
embarrassed because everybody else in the room thought she was a thief. 8 If only to debunk petitioner’s
assertion that she did not utter the accusatory remarks in question publicly and with malice, Manding’s
testimony on the point deserves to be reproduced. Thus,
Q After that what did she do?
A Then Leo came out from the other room she said, she is (sic) the one I only saw from the comfort room.
Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs. Carpio on that matter?
A She said "siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R."
Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant referring to?
A Leo Valmonte.
Q Did she say anything else, the defendant?
A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she saw in the C.R. After that she get (sic) the paper bag
then the jewelry were already gone.
Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte regarding that fact?
A Yes.
Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs. Valmonte?
A "Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko."
Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte were there other people inside the
room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs. Valmonte?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs. Carpio said that to Mrs. Valmonte?
A "Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang magnanakaw siya. Kasi marami na kaming nandodoon,
dumating na yung couturier pati yung video man and we sir.
Q Who was the person you [were] alleging "na nakakahiya" whose (sic) being accused or being somebody
who stole those item of jewelry?
A "Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan siya. Sa dami namin doon siya yung napagbintangan."
Q And who is Leo, what is her full name?
A Leo Valmonte.
Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people inside the room?
A Yes, the mother of the bride.
Q And who else did she talk to?
A The father of the bride also.
Q And what did the defendant tell the mother regarding this matter?
A "Nawawala yung alahas ko." Sabi naman nung mother baka naman hindi mo dala tignan mo munang
mabuti.
Q Who was that other person that she talked to?
A Father of the bride.9
Significantly, petitioner’s counsel elected not to pursue her cross-examination of the witness on this point
following her terse and firm declaration that she remembered petitioner’s exact defamatory words in
answer to the counsel’s question.10
Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise contradicted petitioner’s allegation that she did
not suspect or mention the name of respondent as her suspect in the loss of the jewelry. 11
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action. 12
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury
he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral
precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience
and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. 13 First of these fundamental precepts is the
principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith." To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following
elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.14 When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these
norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
accountable.15 One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary
prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 16
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
which read, thus:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting
a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering
that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper
bag.17 This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not
merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went
out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that
she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner
had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof
that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is
impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals
and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind
but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals
which affirm those of the trial court,18 we sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that
respondent’s claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the
trial and must therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork. 19
Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury20 in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.21Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and
assess damages according to their discretion.22 Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to
penalize the defendant,23 or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant’s
culpable action. In any case, award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. 24
Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we rule that the appellate court did not err in
awarding moral damages. Considering respondent’s social standing, and the fact that her profession is
based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by
petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings
with her clients, the award ofP100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and reasonable
assessment of respondent’s damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY
BISAYA, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko) [1] and Ruby Lim
assail the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution [4] of the Court of Appeals
dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations
provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly
known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October
1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,[5] he was spotted by his friend of several
years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. [6] Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the
hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. [7] Mr.
Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: of course. [8] Mr. Reyes then went up with the
party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. [9] At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of
Dr. Filart.[10]After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet
table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim,
who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.[11] In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him
to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely
ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. [14] Not long after, while he was still recovering from
the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. [15] Like a
common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. [16] Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes
asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.[17]
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the
past twenty (20) years.[18] One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.[19] The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim
generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly. [20] The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes
was not one of those invited.[21] At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink.[22]Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller,
the captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. [23] Mr. Miller replied
that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with
another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart,
Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.[25] Ms. Lim then requested Ms.
Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. [26] Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting
Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. [27] When Ms. Lim turned
around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. [28] Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms.
Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. [29] Still, Mr. Reyes
lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there
were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.[30] However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to
the food, she decided to wait.[31] When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached
him and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin
na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.[32] She then turned around trusting that
Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big
scene, and even threatened to dump food on her. [33]
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the
story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.[34] According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who
volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the
elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. [35] When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr.
Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited.[36] All the while, she thought that
Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung. [37] Then there was a
commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.[38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39] She was embarrassed and did
not want the celebrant to think that she invited him. [40]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,[41] giving more credence to the testimony
of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated
that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday
celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by
the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the
violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because
he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the
party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. [42]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of
belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance
of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to
leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good
customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as
a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves
legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a
formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to
morals or good customs.[43]
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire
into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have
approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach
appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should
leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one
to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs.
Filarts invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally
liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.
Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages,
especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature
of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603). [44]
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3)
attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). [45] On motion for reconsideration, the Court
of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had been amply discussed and
passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. [46]
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in
I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS,
AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES
SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT
FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION
III.
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING
THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot
be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a gate-crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury[47]) refers
to self-inflicted injury[48] or to the consent to injury[49] which precludes the recovery of damages by one who
has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. [50] As
formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even
if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and
21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay
Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the
same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review
such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited
to reviewing and revising errors of law.[51] One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains
herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. [52] The lower court
ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely
and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she
needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing
distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that
brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,[53] for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels
former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the
celebrant)[54] and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor.
While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the
guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the
celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the gate-crasher in the
most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the
process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the
presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions of the
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the
burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any
satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the
contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim
talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How
close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang.
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. [55]
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to
ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim
having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be
emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed
incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party
was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and
there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to
the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.[56]
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule
in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his
story up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr.
Filart who invited him to the party.[57]
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither
can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. [58]
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, [59] is not a
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. [60] The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of
ones duties.[61] These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.[62] Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[63] When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law[64] which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
with intent to injure.[66]
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,[67] and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.[68]
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13
October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct
except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen.[69] The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint
based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but
innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts
declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity.[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount
to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs.
Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages[72] especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in life. This
has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought
by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission,
pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further commission of such
acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees. [73]
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case
and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was an
actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime
Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
humanitarian organizations of the Philippines.[74] During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes
stressed that he had income[75] and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are
bereft of any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. The Facts

SECOND DIVISION
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis (petitioners) filed with the trial
court a civil case for damages against respondent Jerome Jovanne Morales (respondent). Petitioners are
the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside
ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, G.R. No. 169467 the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent is the owner of the
gun store.
Petitioners,
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Present:
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year student at the Baguio Colleges
Foundation taking up BS Computer Science, died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained
while he was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, City. The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.

- versus - BRION, With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes Matibag and Jason Herbolario. They were sales
agents of the defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers of the gun store.
DEL CASTILLO,
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store
ABAD, and for repair.

PEREZ, JJ. The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with Serial No. SN-H34194 (Exhibit Q), was left by
defendant Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
JEROME JOVANNE MORALES,
Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the regular
Respondent. caretaker of the gun store was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales agents Matibag and
Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and defendant Morales were away. Jarnague entrusted to
Promulgated:
Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store which included the key to the drawer where
the fatal gun was kept.
February 25, 2010
It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of
the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same.
x--------------------------------------------------x Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It
went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before branch VII of this Court. Matibag, however,
was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12,
par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
DECISION
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was
reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case. [3]

CARPIO, J.: On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [Spouses Alfredo
The Case P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis] and against the defendant [Jerome Jovanne Morales] ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiffs

(1) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Alfred Pacis;

This petition for review[1] assails the 11 May 2005 Decision[2] and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. (2) P29,437.65 as actual damages for the hospitalization and burial
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs;
(3) P100,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(4) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(5) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision[5] dated 11 May 2005, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.[6]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19
August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code.[7] The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death
was partly due to the negligence of respondents employee Aristedes Matibag (Matibag). Matibag and Jason
Herbolario (Herbolario) were employees of respondent even if they were only paid on a commission basis.
Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused by Matibag on the occasion of the
performance of his duties, unless respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. The trial court held that respondentfailed to observe the required diligence
when he left the key to the drawer containing the loaded defective gun without instructing his employees
to be careful in handling the loaded gun.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there was no employer-
employee relationship between respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found that Matibag was not
under the control of respondent with respect to the means and methods in the performance of his work.
There can be no employer-employee relationship where the element of control is absent. Thus, Article
2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case and respondent cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if respondent is considered an employer of Matibag, still
respondent cannot be held liable since no negligence can be attributed to him. As explained by the Court of
Appeals:
Granting arguendo that an employer-employee relationship existed between Aristedes Matibag and the
defendant-appellant, we find that no negligence can be attributed to him.
Negligence is best exemplified in the case of Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809). The test of negligence is this:
x x x. Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes
a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or take precaution against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. x x x.
Defendant-appellant maintains that he is not guilty of negligence and lack of due care as he did not fail to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family. He submits that he kept the firearm in one of his table
drawers, which he locked and such is already an indication that he took the necessary diligence and care
that the said gun would not be accessible to anyone. He puts [sic] that his store is engaged in selling
firearms and ammunitions. Such items which are per se dangerous are kept in a place which is properly
secured in order that the persons coming into the gun store would not be able to take hold of it unless it is
done intentionally, such as when a customer is interested to purchase any of the firearms, ammunitions
and other related items, in which case, he may be allowed to handle the same.
We agree. Much as We sympathize with the family of the deceased, defendant-appellant is not to be
blamed. He exercised due diligence in keeping his loaded gun while he was on a business trip in Manila. He
placed it inside the drawer and locked it. It was taken away without his knowledge and authority. Whatever
happened to the deceased was purely accidental.[8]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION IN DISREGARD OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR, AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND
TESTIMONIES PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL WHICH NEGATE AND CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE, REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION BY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS THEREBY IGNORING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 59)
OF BAGUIO CITY SHOWING PETITIONERS CLEAR RIGHTS TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES. [9]
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition meritorious.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161[10] of the
Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime
under Article 100[11] of the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an independent civil action for
damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide
case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against
respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103[12] of the Revised Penal Code,[13] the liability
of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9,
entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of
a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. [14]
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person
in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to
prevent any injury being done thereby.[15] Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little
or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be
stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use.[16] With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely
because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in
a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another
person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely
unloaded.[17] For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes
him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.[18]
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him
from liability in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 11 May 2005 Decision and the 19 August 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE the trial courts Decision
dated 8 April 1998.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon
the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant
Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three
justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was
then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida,
she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three
met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the
sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages.
Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be
error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover
the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la
criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida
del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having
rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished
by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not
had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or
services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of thespes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as
to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages,
evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not
contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was
likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no
steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in
the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed
at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which
his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary;
and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy
member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press
either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of
a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical
necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely
condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality
or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have
no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners
for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may
warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre
Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and
another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint
it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations;
that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times
by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts
and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00
per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's
motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff
had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted
for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a
conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same
Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that
annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would
legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn,"
violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that
are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This
proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to
the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un
hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the
rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of
action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause
of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own
right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco,
infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar
Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a
marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by
him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per
month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a
decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for
him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this
judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief
sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize
Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three
years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable
property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo,
where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a
likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not
long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was
gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the
home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her
hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China
and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal
interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order
that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon.
The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the
defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made
arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where
she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at
No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all
household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however,
the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant
decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the
time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony,
caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in
connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an
acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this
point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal
rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of
being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of
rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different from that
presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only
the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral
evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us
are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our
opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two
constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would
thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of
Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to
acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and
J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom
the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good
appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before
the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is
whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made
in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by
the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by
putting together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in one
letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is
contained in the note to the padreand the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child
then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be
addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael
Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of
the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to
acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated
are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here
that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had acknowledged this child in
writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second
point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother,
in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until
Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status.
The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is
unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the
concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal
of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the
plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily
proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no
proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance
which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as
conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of
the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has
expressly acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and
secondly, that said child has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said
defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, justified by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as
follows:
Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931
Rev. PADRE:
La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.
(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA
Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-
appellee Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:
Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo
manches. A cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."
Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."
Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."
Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."
Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:
Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible admitir por otro
medio la prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es terminante y la
intencion de la ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la
paternidad sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que conste su voluntad
indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion
de estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.
No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo natural, aunque
solo se limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho por escrito,
en la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito
violacin, estupro o rapto. El escrito y la sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demandada, y no puede
admitirse otra prueba que la conducente a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el
reconozca su paternidad, o la relativa a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que demuestren
la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos podran utilizarse todos los
medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el juez rechazar la que por cualquier otro
concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la paternidad.
xxx xxx xxx
En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta hacerlo por
incidencia; es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del
padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la base
5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque
contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objecto el reconocimiento
deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que incidentalmente
haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el
titulo y tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un modo
suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la
posesion contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo a su numero 2.º
Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality
of Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are
those established in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of which is that the father may be
compelled to acknowledge his paternity, "When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly
acknowledge his paternity." The writing that is required by said provision must be complete in itself and by
itself, and must contain all the statements that are necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment
by a father of his paternity of a child, in order that it may serve as a basis for compelling him to
acknowledge said child should be afterwards deny his paternity. If several writings put together, each not
being complete in itself, should be necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of
acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity
would be violated.
By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein plaintiff-
appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June",
which the defendant- appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the priest is his, nor who
is the "junior" that he recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in
anyone of said letters from which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the time, that
the "junior" was the being she was carrying in her womb, and that it was the "creature that is coming in
June." To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with
Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth
to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said
child outside of the documents, which is prohibited by law.
Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to
constitute a "indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the
child Ismael Loanco," as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant
father, justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.
The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the
following facts, as found by the lower court in its decision:
Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a su
comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad de
Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus
acompañado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de
1931 asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.
Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con la
demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando a dicha
demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo
firmado el contrato para el suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has
enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth
of said child they can not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status of
natural child, as no human being can enjoy such possession until he be born with legal capacity for
acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated
September 9, 1929, not reported).
It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael when it
was baptized, so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.
The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the witnesses
during the trial, are not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco
as natural child of said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we find that he
visited the mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the support
of the plaintiff; that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son; that the plaintiff called him "Papa,"
and that Don Telesforo answered to this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed
his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters to him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and
secured him a position in a commercial house.
xxx xxx xxx
All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously the status of a
natural child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but that it
is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the child as his. By the express terms of article
135 that recognition must appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear in acts which - versus - Present:
show that the son has possessed continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the father of
the child which comes short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that
it was the intention of the father to recognize the child as to give him that status, and that the acts
performed by him were done with that intention. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR CARPIO, J.,
ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL Chairperson,
says: CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND CHICO-NAZARIO,
En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de hijo natural se REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
requiere que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la paternidad, VELASCO, JR.,
la voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no Respondents.
accidentalmente, sino continuedamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el NACHURA, and
reconocimiento expreso.lawphil.net
PERALTA, JJ.
En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el hecho de que dos
nodrizas criaron a otros tantos niños, sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de la
demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que
subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se
llamaba como el padre; y el de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado
Promulgated:
visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre
de los menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal confundir
actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o convencimiento en que una persona este de su
paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su proposito de poner a estos hijos en la
posesion de tal estado.

It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant Cesar
Syquia cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists October 13, 2009
not an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of said child, and
because the said child has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil
Code.

The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.

DECISION
Avanceña, C.J. and Imperial, J., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING G.R. No. 182836 Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
CORPORATION, G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits
Petitioner, to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and
a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for
Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any
employee in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and
sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to
the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the
employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this
benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a
premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38thweek of pregnancy.[5] According to the
Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. [6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and other
death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of
conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, [8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to
Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). [9] In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006,
the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano
was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13]and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to
the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited
cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer
Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose
wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to
receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union
and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to
Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound
as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their
respective employees unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the
existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations
and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the
death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the
entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case.Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code,
contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned
that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was
delivered dead could not be considered a dependent,since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the
parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee
for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the
latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK
Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the
separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the
grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn
child constituted company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered
employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must
be present: (1) there is death; (2) such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such dependent
must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present:
(a) there is death; (b) such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must be legitimate;
and (d) proper legal document to be presented. [18]
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus
was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question
that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner
Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19] under
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave
with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employeesdependent had occurred. The death of
a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was
contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire
any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that
the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could
only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the
conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits under
the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term death is used in the
CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of
bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with
[Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born
alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a death as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and
grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental
Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term death of a legitimate dependent as
condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steels]
theory, there can be no experience of death to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A
dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than loss of human life, especially for the
expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee
and the latters immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal
status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal
death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point. [20]
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel]. [21]
In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration [23] of
Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous,
so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die
and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are:
(1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an
employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and
accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister
of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA
are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave
and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and dependent
as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to
resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that
neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other
death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition
of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born,
and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions
on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired
any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the
childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly
to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while
the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,[25] that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself
defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is
a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA
provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or
the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental
Steel avers. Without such qualification, thenchild shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles
v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a legitimate child,viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element
of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the
Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family
Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted,
have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence,
making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to
death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA,
Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to,
and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It
cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in
this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be
interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,[30] we
pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the
pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in
favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall
be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a
contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State,
enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise,
sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated
that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier
influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9
May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November
2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-
Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded
on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez,
rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission
held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a
proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two
and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was
a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case
and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of
two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant
in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City",
subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of
the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy
with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate
the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him
that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P
35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would
certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His
transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and
continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence
before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of
Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not
lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right was
property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application, although
under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the
estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits
(page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate
as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by
complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his
estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the
option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special
consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would
have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of
failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the
conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire
the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the ice
plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to
maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public
convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions,
but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration
just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other
cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such
actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the
making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come
to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice
of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights(emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were
alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because
death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public
Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the
decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of
the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the
creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code,
respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other
things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus
line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every
species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or
executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the
State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the
man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to
defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after
the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the
information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The
Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a
decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person
in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term,
and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304;
Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds:
natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or
succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only
to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L.
Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the
authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn
vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in
cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and
this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in
avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest
in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have in
it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the
decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to
defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha
cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective
interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural
persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is
considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail
prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting
the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during
his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample
precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality
independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs.
Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro
Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and
Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of
a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by
virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor,
2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code
was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many
others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the
matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass
of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and
charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal
fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal
exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the
decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be
exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator,
to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for
indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court
of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons
recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having
rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be
considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as
amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the
commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity
"only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships,
associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and
the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong
entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which,
for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such
legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially
the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as
announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the
creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of
rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being
deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less
than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these
artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include
the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said
application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any
debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for
the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the
application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the
purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of
said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs.
Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could
have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such
extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as
the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of
subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment
amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses
occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its
provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for
reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no
justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of
this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record,
he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation
has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its
economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was
the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does
not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the
simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of
the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public
convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution which provides
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws
of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor
such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except under the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship
requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device by
which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They
inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites for
their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been
devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact,
intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to the
citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they are
Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are not, it
should be reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship
constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.
We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the
Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
question raised by the petitioner.
We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946, be set
aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual questions and
render a new decision accordingly.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino
Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the
legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to
pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment".
(Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the
principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their
undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the
lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and
the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's
land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths
hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was
confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's
death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the
bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf
and again signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs
in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of
the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T-
873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it
learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven
and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in
Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith
because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired
jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the
plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the validity of
the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was
never served with summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment
against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil.
97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He
had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section
23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-
defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the
judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that
corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was
unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662
against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT
No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro
City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA
VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-
appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the
respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and
void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the
petition but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers
and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition
for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly
deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that
Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ
was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August
1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the
Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the
Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner)
is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on
28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons
were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30
September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a
funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition
therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in
relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued,
is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live
person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to
amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988
(or after the filing of thehabeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner
Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases')
duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3the Vargases contended that, as the next of
kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange
of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court;
the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City,
viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government
pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November
1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second amended
petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this
Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or
burial of the body of said deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was
already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's
counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain
this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the
custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the
reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The authority
to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are
enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17
January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by
treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil
action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections
5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code
and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original petition as well
as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and if she
were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the
petition were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds
that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of
the dead body because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to
this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of
this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over
the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was
used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the
brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being
himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of
law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of
both cases.12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to
maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating
that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead
body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision
without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the
dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and
sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made
in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that
what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the
nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be
granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana
was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such
facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima
facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is
insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal
requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue
a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the
exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or
detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed
by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been dismissed. The
court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning the
continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer,
respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has
expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an
illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the technicality,
that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full
protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody to the
petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What
matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings,amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in
order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which
justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas
corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used
therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the
rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine
Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from
even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting
Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried
Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate
'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between
a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased
person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall
devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff, respectively, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
"people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of
the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of
television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and
the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard
an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to
the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their
followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power"
and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however,
stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major
players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and
civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they
conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian
supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the
mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid
followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in
Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set
up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually
free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power
from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have
they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the
nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic
recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the
poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into
exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the
short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following
issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the
Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning
to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the
grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political
question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family
is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents
established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-
236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to
travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that
effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines,
provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by
law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political
question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in
vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the
determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public
safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves
merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of
the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court
can not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish
their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish
their residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public
safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall
return to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this
Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President
of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In
support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the
Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of
the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of
Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of
Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their
governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for
Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its
limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties'
formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel
and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S.
116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which
affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free
to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of
which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of
abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of
effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material
insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue
before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations
on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate
case for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its
resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or
not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in
Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)],
"the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec.
11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law"
[Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only
to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626
(1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of
the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government."
[At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a
combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the
President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although
in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power,
the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or
guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit
the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se
enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert:
"The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion
unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind
the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem.
He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution
ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that
constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a
vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the
office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's
dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important
measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of
government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most
agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each
President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations,
Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The
executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality
of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from
President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal obligation to inform
and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to
the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At
212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the
consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the
1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than
the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the
parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the
President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987
Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides
that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum
of specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the
Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal
Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the
Governor-General to do so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee"
respectively, are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of
anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the
moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in
the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are
not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical
ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers of
government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find
reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision
and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far
from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve
and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has
to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the
national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is
also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people
forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are
the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom
billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees
they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech
and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707,
October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything
not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be
viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed
[see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of
discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion,
within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by
the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace,
and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been
recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House
of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to
the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of
our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power
to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court
to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through
a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a
presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor
can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the
power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question
doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination
to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law
is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling inLansang v.
Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of
checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but
only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine
whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check —
not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-
480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she
has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases
for the President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and
civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their
followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the
return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment
has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic
effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the
camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously
and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of
violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-
in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting
through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence
if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is
the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's
sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships
brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and
relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth
stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing
burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which
stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant
ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit
of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO,
VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision1 and the May 9, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the October 1, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to the
remains of the decedent.
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married
respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and
Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter,
Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-in-
fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as
husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and
their children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending
Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to
shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her
husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family
of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried
and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit
against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross
Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than twenty
(20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had
introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together, Valino
admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike
Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill.
She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the
United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino
family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents. Thus,
she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino after
it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it
was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left
for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did
not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and
responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried
in the Valino family mausoleum.4
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty. Adriano
to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not
serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected. 5 Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty.
Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to
transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park
in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the
custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the
surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband.
For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty.
Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to the good intentions
shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were in the United
States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty.
Adriano.
The Court’s Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996 of the Family Code, specifies the
persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance
with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better
right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving
spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner. In
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,7 a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late
Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined
her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the
deceased, as the common-law husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case
notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be
considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-law wife,
the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority
exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of
the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:
"Be it noted, however, that with respect to 'spouse,' the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not
common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between
a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of
the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. 8 [Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her
husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had,
in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any
other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. 9 While there was disaffection
between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that
human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member
joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic
pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of
December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino
and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307
of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is
being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such
claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the Adriano family
plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and
undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the
presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on
account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband when she
died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily
presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free
and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the
deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and
obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in
this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at
the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of
such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the
form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that
should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the
wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on
civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased
should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. 10 As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes
of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance
that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was
presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not
absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law. They
must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the
remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to
be observed.11 [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the Civil
Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right and
duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. As aptly explained by the
appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano that
he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions
of the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased to be interred at the
Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do with the remains to
the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to defendant-
appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that her
intentions may have been very commendable. The law does not even consider the emotional fact that
husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separated-in-fact and had been living apart for more
than 30 years.12
As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty. Adriano,
it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches
runs counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only violate their right provided by law, but it also
disrespects the family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his live-in
partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the
law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial,
and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-
property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to
take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to
even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This
is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.13
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. Adriano during his
final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual
or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who,
having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care
of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his remains when he
had died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages. Defendant-appellee Fe
Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife
and family were all in the United States and could not attend to his burial. Actual damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at
bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages.1âwphi1 Moral damages may
be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the
damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of because moral damages although incapable
of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and
actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was any intended by anyone in
this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his
right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither of the
requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately
established by plaintiffs-appellants.
As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of
damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a party
wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code
demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have searched but
found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the award of attorney's fees. 14
Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the funeral of a
deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and disturbed the proper solemnity which
should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such controversies that the Code
Commission saw it best to include the provisions on "Funerals."15
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of
states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro,
deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn
was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese
troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this
order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court
except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to
have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The
importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice
versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present
petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased
spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and
their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the
building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During
their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on
fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who
were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince
Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the
burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets.
Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the
shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino
Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and
his daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years
old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the
other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously
survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela
Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and
the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus
stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death of
only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had
already died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his father
and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but
there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the
mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to
dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt
when her son left her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after,
from a variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling
beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding
shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one
saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled
to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption
of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly
above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she and
her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only
guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of
Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded
as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and usually
do) operate in the source of combats. During the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from
gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an
overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met
their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela
Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin
Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69
(ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the
New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there
is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should,
under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr.,
necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (1)
shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 15 meters away from the building
survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, but I could see what was going on.
according to the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the shooting of
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor: Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions
like that, you know, you are confused.
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent
one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A. Possible, but not
absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights probable.
from one to the other shall take place.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be
available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which xxx xxx xxx
it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no
specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.
the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different
legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.) Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few minutes after we have
dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the
deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the xxx xxx xxx
California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact that Pilar,
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one died before Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive
the other it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other may evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually
be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her come out of that
would shown, or which would tend to show, probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge building so I presumed she died there.
A.O.W.W.vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to
prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to xxx xxx xxx
prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of
evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin
conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the statue of Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were
the presumption." shooting people outside, so we thought of running away rather than be roasted.

It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the xxx xxx xxx
evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion,
there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does
and Natividad, were already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.
not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship between
Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the entrance, because most of the
purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony,
people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can
which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as
remember they were among those killed.
"entitled to credence."
xxx xxx xxx
Lopez testified:
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left the place? —
A. That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those
trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — . There were many people shot
because they were trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you explain that? — A.
They were trying to escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of
the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference
can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it
was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and
15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and
unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have
perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had
tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son
from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time,
of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left
her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not
so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred
about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was
the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin
Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five
seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro
could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are
against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only
remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides, the
building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was
their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to
have been killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely
than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief
space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does
not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the
"particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as
tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for
"inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate,
4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge
Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is
sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general
rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate,supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author,
"according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not
directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency
of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the
primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a
case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an
animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal
also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration
leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory —
that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance
of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an
instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game
laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the
bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R.
468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which has been
discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well
considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions
are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those
conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As
was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one
thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is
not impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is
not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted
upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the
correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a
question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions
supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence
about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures come within the exception to the general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the decedents'
estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the
necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical
theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
CORAZON CATALAN, G.R. No. 159567
LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service. The
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military
EULOGIO CATALAN, service due to his schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of
mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech. [1]
MILA CATALAN-MILAN,
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. [2]
ZENAIDA CATALAN, Present:
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled Absolute Deed of Donation, [3] wherein Feliciano
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:

CATALAN, FLORIDA PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe
Basa; on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the West by Roman
CATALAN and GEMMA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less.

CATALAN, Heirs of the late CORONA,

FELICIANO CATALAN, AZCUNA, and The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 18080 [4] to Mercedes for the 400.50
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ. square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Felicianos name under Tax
Declaration No. 18081.[5]
- versus -
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings No. 4563 [6] before the
Promulgated: Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial
court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing
Allowance[7] of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company as
Felicianos guardian.[8] Peoples Bank and Trust Company has been subsequently renamed, and is presently
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA,
known as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA,
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan. [9]
JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
Basa.[10] The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February
20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents. [11]
CATALAN,
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property registered
Respondents. July 31, 2007
under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14,
x------------------------------------------------x 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio
and Florida Catalan.[12]

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership,[13] as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged
that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the
property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property
to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving
valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent
Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no
right to sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying
that its registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought
remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute his heirs in
lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed
the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or
competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the donation in question
must be upheld.[14] It rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of the land in question which is
now declared in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorneys fees of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant
to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.[16] The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and
held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing that plaintiff-appellants
failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when
the property in dispute was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation coupled with
compliance with certain solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real property
under Article 749, which provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of her
ownership, the property is completely subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by law of the
concurrence with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees Folder of Exhibits) of the
property by Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing
of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less apparent in the deed itself or
from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
registered only in 1992, after the death of Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab
initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a
similar vein, jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor
the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing
and more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073
IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR
MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE WAS DONATED;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT S) AND THE
REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS
S-1 AND S-2) ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073
IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE
MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-
4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES. [18]
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to donate property to Mercedes had been
rebutted because they presented more than the requisite preponderance of evidence. First, they presented
the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by the Board
of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953,
Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the
guardianship of BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been
suffering from a mental condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any contract
thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Felicianos marriage to Corazon
Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the time he made the questioned
donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano executed in favor of his successors (Decision, CA-
G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these donations were approved and
confirmed in the guardianship proceedings.[19] In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and
fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the document was registered only on February 20,
1992, more that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both
knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be innocent
purchasers of the property in question.[20] Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not barred by
prescription or laches under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1,
1997, even before the four year period after Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.[21]
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another,
who accepts it.[22] Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts
presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to
which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. [23] The parties' intention must be
clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. [24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give consent at the
time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely
given.[25] However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. [26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated
the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948,
Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of
Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending
to his property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s,
Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, combined hebrephrenia and catatonia with certain paranoid states
and called the condition dementia praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins
conception in the early 1900s to include cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition
schizophrenia. According to medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of
symptoms, with symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses. The condition
improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear
relatively normal, while other patients in remission may appear strange because they speak in a monotone,
have odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are prone to have ideas of
reference. The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against the sufferers. [27] It
has been proven that the administration of the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic
medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce
delusions, hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of
relapse.[28] Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimers disease.
However, the illness will wax and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect. [29]
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of
schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that
Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the
contrary was adduced.[30] Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established
when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent onDecember 22, 1953. [31]
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time he donated the
property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of
marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their
favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is
bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence,
shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the
contrary is shown.[32]
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever
she chose.[33] Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of the
property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was
registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and
Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to
Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal
before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present appeal had prospered, the
Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not
annulled in a proper action in court within four years. [34]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Vicente Foz for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of
September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the
plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs of
the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was
amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the
deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed
Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that
Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area
situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in
paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs
and their sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the
year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the
plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of
P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz,
notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of
the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of said
land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part of
the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan,
was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the
time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to
be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the
defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in
the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof,
uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each and all
of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the
complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased
Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao
Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area
such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao
Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his children
sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to
wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's)
children, and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other
sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging
themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the
notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying
said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by
their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and
perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased
mother and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-
complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious,
and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the
said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep
perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for
losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and in
special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint
the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the
annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they be absolved from the
defendant's cross-complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a
new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill of
exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17, 1910, on
the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the decision of this
court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable
of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such,
whether a person who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can,
after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed
by him, because of some defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts.
1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of the land sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by composition
with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of
Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59 centares, which facts
appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his four
children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent's estate, the
parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the
brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y
Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and
Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation
of law, one-half of the land described in the complaint.
The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-fourths of
the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint, and which,
they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant excepted,
alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of
seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by
actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on
litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account of the
loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and
furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public documents of the Province
of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the
plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1,
of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la
Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land
had been made by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower Wenceslao
Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis
Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to this
vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question — a
transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's
needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo
and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age
and in possession of the required legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their
deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and authorization, they sold
absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase
price, the land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an
area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano
Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the
south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-
Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the
date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further reason that
the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the
execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were born in
Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or
burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she
testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397
of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa
Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority,
by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it
appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was
22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit
3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and sisters
removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu,
who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in interest; that it was her
uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where
in it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not know why her uncle did so;
that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father
Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu who
directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria
Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know just
how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to his sister-
in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to the
aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and minimum
yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as compared with the
land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was 764 cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the defendant.
He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the
grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said document was signed by
the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to them and had been translated into
the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand Spanish. On cross-examination, witness
added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings,
and that all this took place about the year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time of his
testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter, testified
that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was under witness'
administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion of this land, to
wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by
reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao
Mercado took possession of another portion of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and
which had been left by this deceased, and that he held same until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis
Espiritu. lawphi1.net
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the plaintiff
Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910,
and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his other relatives. He denied that
his father had at any time administered the property belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he mediate in
several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the
deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents. This same
witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu
(he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot.
He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to
him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever was presented to him for identification. The
transaction mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in
1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14,
1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In
rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the
purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that she saw the document
Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion
and while said document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto
whose names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as
well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having
been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her
consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu
employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the document
Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and the sisters Domingo,
Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale
which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with
the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in
the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor
Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they
declare having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth any
and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of the property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel or
portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of the
purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage
of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400
over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected
during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her
brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father
mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law, Luis
Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the
plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality of the land, consisting of an
area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in
exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and
simulated on account of the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of
the consent of the vendors who executed it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates, Exhibits 1
and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting parties, and also the general
custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in
the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, without proof to the contrary, it
would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis
Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May,
1894, he has held in the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes
of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6
cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate estate is in
lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of
the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in consequence of the
contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the
remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership was
conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of
6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of
the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under
security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis
Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to
attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in the
deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the nature of a
public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter,
even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita
Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of
seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 — an
instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the protocols and register
books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the
request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony recorded in said
notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the
plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had personal
knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding
that his testimony affected his children's interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that
might be produced by said real property.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the
plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document is false, and
it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father, there is no
legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as
evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the date of
May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet
attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that the
plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were presented of their
baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that
Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17,
1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo
Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it cannot be
gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed
and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a
sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased
father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu,
for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs'
mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to
be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative
to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of
the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis Espiritu who
took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years
to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of the same
year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of
the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914, where in it is recorded that
Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any
proof adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument
Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the
annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be concluded that
the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have
suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of
said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of
the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice to the
plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or
pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu
and which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to
meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their
father himself, they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into
the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of
money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs
received and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by
Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter and
father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the
price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was not impugned,
and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said
land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been refuted,
and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we should, and do
hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.
Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.
Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged
that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that
the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the
said land. This being so, the fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff
sold the land in question to the defendants.
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17,
1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation
made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with
imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's
allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for
the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it
does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.
What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente
Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which,
according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva
Muerong having learned later that the land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had
a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only heir and caused the
plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.
At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites
prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496,
bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the
transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to
the property sold as much less, if it is taken into consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the
herein plaintiff, was a minor.
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil.,
215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending
to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his
minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's
first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1992
as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by the
defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears in the
document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her
husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a
year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula Prado
was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant
Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. There
are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without any
express findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950
SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners,
vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and
Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months
and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco
Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and
accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara
executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified
the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the
meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for
the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land covered by
certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw
Chiao, Antonio, Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter two being, respectively, the
brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the decision of
the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his
minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the
sum of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio
Azores (who was absolved from the complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided one-
fourth interest in the lot originally covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit.
From this judgment Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.
It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931, showed
that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It is not pretend and there is nothing
to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such recital of fact. This conclusion is decisive and
very obvious in the decision of the Court of Appeals It is true that in the resolution on the for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when informed of appellant's minority,
the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their interest beyond requiring the appellant to execute
a ratification of the sale while still a minor, strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when
the deed of sale was executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently negative by the following positive
pronouncements of the Court of Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision.
As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the appellees were informed
of his minority within one (1) month after the transaction was completed. (Resolution.)
Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect their interest form and after
August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of appellant's minority. (Resolution.)
. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that appellant was a minor, through
the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing appellees of his client's desire to disaffirm the contract . .
. (Decision.)
The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the contract was made, the
delay in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to bar it unless the period fixed by the statute of
limitations expired before the filing of the complaint. . . . (Decision.)
In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the appellants
invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein this court held:
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to
valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to
the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)
The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the appellants did not actually
pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of
sale, it being stipulated that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's
father, Rufino Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first place, in the
case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing obligation. In the second
place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for
his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since
appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness
(unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in the absence of any
other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void
on any ground other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a
contract executed by parties with full legal capacity.
The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the
appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had already
estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference that
the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of the contract, and
somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said
information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants the sum of P500.
Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the real age of the
appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The suggestion, while perhaps
practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of the Court of
Appeals do not show that the appellants knew or could suspected appellee's minority.
The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee informing the
appellants of his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the choice to
disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said
notice shielded the appellee from laches and consequent estoppel. This position is untenable since the
effect of estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the promptness with which a notice to disaffirm is made.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from the
complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So ordered.
Ozaeta, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result not upon the grounds stated in the majority opinion but for the following reasons: The
deed of sale executed by Ramon Alcantara on 3 August 1931 conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land is
null and void insofar as the interest, share, or participation of Ramon Alcantara in two parcels of land is
concerned, because on the date of sale he was 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old only. Consent being
one of the essential requisites for the execution of a valid contract, a minor, such as Ramon Alcantara was,
could not give his consent thereof. The only misrepresentation as to his age, if any, was the statement
appearing in the instrument that he was of age. On 27 August 1931, or 24 days after the deed was
executed, Gaw Chiao, the husband of the vendee Sia Suan, was advised by Atty. Francisco Alfonso of the
fact that his client Ramon Alcantara was a minor. The fact that the latter, for and in consideration of P500,
executed an affidavit, whereby he ratified the deed of sale, is of no moment. He was still minor. The
majority opinion invokes the rule laid down in the case of Mercado et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215. The rule
laid down by this Court in that case is based on three judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Spain
on 27 April 1960, 11 July 1868, and 1 March 1875. In these decisions the Supreme Court of Spain applied
Law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida which expressly provides:
"Diziendo o ortogando el que fuese menor, que era mayor de XXV años, si ouiesse persona que paresciesse
de tal tiempo, si lo faze enganosamente, valdria el pleyto que assi fuere fecho con el e non deue ser
desatado despues, como quier que non era de edad quando lo fizo: esto es, porque las leyes ayudan a los
enganados, e non a los enganadores. . . ." (Alcubilla, Codigos Antigous de España, p. 613.)
The contract of sale involved in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu, supra, was executed by the minors on 17
May 1910. The Law in force on this last-mentioned date was not Las Siete Partidas, 1 which was the in force
at the time the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Spain referred to, but the Civil Code which took
effect in the Philippines on 8 December 1889. As already stated, the Civil Code requires the consent of both
parties for the valid execution of a contract (art. 1261, Civil Code). As a minor cannot give his consent, the
contract made or executed by him has no validity and legal effect. There is no provision in the Civil Code
similar to that of Law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida which is equivalent to the common law principle of
estoppel. If there be an express provision in the Civil Code similar law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida, I would
agree to the reasoning of the majority. The absence of such provision in the Civil Code is fatal to the validity
of the contract executed by a minor. It would be illogical to uphold the validity of a contract on the ground
of estoppel, because if the contract executed by a minor is null and void for lack of consent and produces
no legal effect, how could such a minor be bound by misrepresentation about his age? If he could not be
bound by a direct act, such as the execution of a deed of sale, how could he be bound by an indirect act,
such as misrepresentation as to his age? The rule laid down in Young vs. Tecson, 39 O. G. 953, in my
opinion, is the correct one.
Nevertheless, as the action in this case was brought on 8 August 1940, the same was barred, because it was
not brought within four (4) years after the minor had become of age, pursuant to article 1301 of the Civil
Code. Ramon Alcantara became of age sometime in September 1934.
Moran, C.J. and Bengzon, J., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.
R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court of Appeal's
decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2
% interest from October 30, 1944.
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944 P70,000 in
Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay him P10,000 "in
legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International
Exchange has been established in the Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have received P40,000 only
— instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when
they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing the parties and their evidence, said court rendered
judgment, which the appellate court affirmed, in the terms above described.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the minority of her
consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the minors. However, such
defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors may be responsible, (Art. 1148,
Civil Code). It is not denied that at the time of signing Exhibit A, Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were
minors-16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following
reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal
age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their incapacity, and if the
former, in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his money, then he should be
contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their desire
to acquire much needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing
the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant
case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on be permitted to excuse
themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et
al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same
promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted
thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact, according to Corpuz Juris
Secundum, 43 p. 206;
. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract as part of the
contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort. Other authorities hold that
such misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is
not a part of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the enforcement of liability for such
misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability on the contract. In order to
hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not constructure. It has been held that his mere
silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an
action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that he is of full
age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient. (27
American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document signed therein by
the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained no such statement. In other words, in
the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors
were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a
growing sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the application of the Mercado ruling, what with the
consideration that the very minority which incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them
from the results of misrepresentation.
We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally bound by
their signatures in Exhibit A.
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed only in 1951, and
inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too late to invoke it because more than 4
years had elapsed after he had become emancipated upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of
Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of
majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. The parties do not specify
the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however, that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the
basis of such datum, it should be held that in October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he
was 25 years old. So that when this defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely
elapsed from October 1947.
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil
Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking for any positive
relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action for annulment.2 They
merely interposed an excuse from liability.
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In
accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable because of non-
age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they received. (Art.
1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during
the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to the extent of
the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively established in the so-called Ballantine
Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should now return
P1,166.67.3Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be enforced, as already
stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently
declared without regard of said Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of
P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall pay
jointly5 to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when
the complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
SALVADOR ATIZADO andSALVADOR MONREAL, G.R. No. 173822
Petitioners,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
 -versus - BRION, feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable cause or motive, with
intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang
BERSAMIN, Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly
caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
VILLARAMA, JR., and
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
SERENO, JJ.
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7, 1994,[4] the trial
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, ensued.

Respondent. Promulgated: The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr.
Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).

Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-law husband,
October 13, 2010 had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had
gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva),
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of Desders house, she heard thundering steps as
if people were running and then two successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the
prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, thats enough!;
that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking
DECISION sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously adjusting the
cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to the house
of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing
brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead. [5]
BERSAMIN, J.:
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994,[6] based on the warrant
of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.

On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners of
murder.[1] On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01450, but modified the awarded damages.[2]
The petitioners contest the CAs affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition for review
on certiorari.
We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because the RTC and
the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the commission of the crime. We order his
immediate release from prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add
to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to accord with the prevailing law and
jurisprudence.
Antecedents
Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated his spinal
column, liver, and abdomen.[7]
Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Llona. [8]
Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were Monreal,
Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his family
residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the house of a
certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo
had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had
been implicated only because of their being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in
the killing of Llona.

As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:

On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the petitioners and a
certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Boga, Municipality of Castilla, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused
to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to q Who were you saying we sat together?
pay the cost.
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he being a
detention prisoner, his immediate release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of
other lawful cause or causes.
q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the sala and the house you
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the service of wherein (sic)?
their sentence.
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
SO ORDERED.[9]
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting arrangement of yours, Kgd.
The Court referred the petitioners direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.[10] Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.

On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing: a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of me, I was at the
right side of Kdg. Llona
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado and Salvador
Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered
to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual
damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages. q How about Kdg. Jesalva?

SO ORDERED.[11] a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in otherwords, the door was at
his back.
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,[12] the petitioners now appeal.
q Was the door open?

a Yes, sir.
Issue
q Was the door immediately found Rather was this the main door of the house?
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder beyond reasonable
doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a credible witness; that some a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
circumstances rendered Mirandillas testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify them as the
assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
assumed that they had been the assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed
mastermind; (c) the autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, a Yes, sir.
contrary to Mirandillas claim; (d) Mirandillas testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e)
Mirandillas account was inconsistent with that of Jesalvas. q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished assisting the persons in
Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were you doing then?
Ruling
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.
The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed on Monreal
and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability. q How about Kgd. Jesalva?

I. a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.

Factual findings of the RTC and CA

are accorded respect q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was any incident that
happened?

a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were successive shots.
The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas positive identification of the petitioners as the
malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of them made during her court testimony on March
6, 1995,[13] viz:
q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or who was responsible for
the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado. a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of the person, the person
tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)
q Who is this Salvador Atizado?
q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his revolver and he was moving
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona. backward, did you see other persons as his companion, if any?

q Can you be able to identify him? a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already on the process of leaving
the place.
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered Salvador Atizado.)
q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?
a Danilo Atizado
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward.
q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?
q Then after that what happened?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible stop thats enough, and I gave assistance to
Kgd. Llona. Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandillas positive identification
of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they
q Then after that what happened? mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill
and had done so with treachery.
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the gun.
It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judges evaluation of the credibility
q Then what did you do when you heard that? of a witness and of the witness testimony is accorded the highest respect because the trial judges unique
opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him to determine whether the
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at that time I do not know witness is telling the truth or not.[14] Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court
his name. unless facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if
considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case. [15] We thus apply the rule, considering that
q Then what did you see of him? the petitioners have not called attention to and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is that Mirandillas positive declarations
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the cylinder of the gun. on the identities of the assailants prevailed over the petitioners denials and alibi.[16]

Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[17] Yet, the State did not have to prove
q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun was pointed
the petitioners previous agreement to commit the murder,[18] because their conspiracy was deduced from
at?
the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act. [19] They had acted in concert in
assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and design to achieve their
a It was pointed towards me.
evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable as co-principals.[20] Thus, they cannot now
successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in murder.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
Act No. 7659, which provides:
a Yes, sir.

Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this man? be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
a Yes, sir.

q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
a Yes, sir. to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder? 2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might make.[21] For treachery to be attendant,
the means, method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the
offenders.[22] Moreover, treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the
attack.[23]
The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative sufficiently established that treachery attended the
attack o[n] the victim because Atizados shooting the victim at the latters back had been intended to ensure
the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their
presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreals
handgun did not fire.[24]
We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their deadly assault with
suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an altercation between the
victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest.
The assailants had designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of
the opportunity to defend himself.[25] Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack
that ensured their unhampered execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal
and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC. [26] But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of
age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the murder
probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed
on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of
age.[27] Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of
his arrest on May 18, 1994.[28]Thirdly, Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a
minor on the date of the incident.[29] Fourthly, as RTCs minutes of hearing dated March 9,
1999showed,[30] Monreal was 22 years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9,
1999,[31] which meant that he was not over 18 years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly,
Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident. [32]
The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms
subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006,[33] viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the childs birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall
be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in
any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the
Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate
pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the
person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending.
Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned
shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,[34] when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion
temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal
was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day
of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as
the maximum period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the
present. Given that the entire period of Monreals detention should be credited in the service of his
sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,[35] the revision of the penalty now warrants his
immediate release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic Act No.
9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and services, such as
delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their
development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68
expressly so provides:

Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable
laws.
Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of Llona. Their
solidary civil liability arising from the commission of the crime stands, [36] despite the reduction of Monreals
penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The
CA granted onlyP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and moral damages should each
be raised to P75,000.00 to accord with prevailing case law; [37] and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00
due to the attendance of treachery should be further awarded,[38] to accord with the pronouncement
in People v. Catubig,[39] to wit:
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and
other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively,
the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages,
however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01450, subject to the following modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum period;
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release Salvador Monreal
due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being held for other lawful causes;
and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L. Llona P75,000.00 as
death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as
actual damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to
this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days from service.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472 March 13, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
William J. Rohde for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one for the
killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case. From this
judgment he appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court together.
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner charged
and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these crimes is not denied. The
defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant
appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. they also testified that
he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing.
Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the prosecution,
testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he refused into the house and saw
the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by the appellant; that there "were seven, including
the small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not know of any disagreement between the
appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt
pains in his head and stomach." The witness further stated that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red
and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own
eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family — his
wife and child."
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin capture the appellant;
that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt pains in the head and the stomach;"
that at the moment he was cutting those people " he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut
everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was."
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and stomach trouble
about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked very sad at the time, but I saw him
run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he must have been crazy because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified that he had
observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes
since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does without saying anything, even
if he comes back he does not say anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from work he does not
say a word; and that about every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people
are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the
appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds on her hands; and that
the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The witness stated that he
made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant in the
jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.
There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of
anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight
seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a
madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the
word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind,"
"idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness testified that "according to my own eyes
as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That
witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily
rational person would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy,
because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all
unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike
promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy
because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it being thus
used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not
inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse which would follow the
commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to
cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such
conduct could not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at the time the deeds were committed.
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an assault with intent
to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which would involved no guilt." The
supreme court on appeal in this decision distinguished between passion and insanity as follows:
But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to persons
under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost
control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain their
persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as to
make them reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to keep them from mischief is
merely the result of not applying restraint in season. There would be no safety for society if people could
with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then to desperate acts of violence. That condition which
springs from undisciplined and unbridled passion is clearly within legal as well as moral censure and
punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.)
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued with an explanation to
the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not
insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible for the crime, because a
large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives as these.' "
The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the subject of anger and
emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following concise statement:
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or
moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the
moral system, where the person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes
committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental
depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind.
In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was convicted of the crime
of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any question as to the actual commission of
the alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused committed them, confined himself to the statement, in
behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime the defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind and
that in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts, wounding his wife and the other members of her
family, without any motives whatever. In the decision in that case this court stated:
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is
improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the
ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proven.
Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal actions, we quote
as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265):
But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the accused is sane, which
certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact. (State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and
nothing more appears, this presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to
support a conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged "beyond a
reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof. This presumption however may be
overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the accused that the criminal intent did not exist at the time the
act was committed. This being exceptional is a defense, and like other defenses must be made out by the
party claiming the benefit of it. "The positive existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a
dispensation to the prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to be proved as it s affirmed by
him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.)
What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege insanity to
put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to make
not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the
presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered.
In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge,
which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield
from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a
criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the
offense was the direct consequences of his insanity.
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal,
and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed the
crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in
accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:p
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting
him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita
Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then
only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafananalias "Baket
Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San
Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to
help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the
store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to
help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the
complainant inside the store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I
do not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including
the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she
resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the
zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite
of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to
report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of the
accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the following
morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the
evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the night
before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita
Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went home
that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on
March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing
what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house
of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to
the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police
headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course
of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the
complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental condition
of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from
insanity. 2
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he
contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct
examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on
cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day.
Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted
her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and
brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross examination.
In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the
manner in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of
the complainant. 3
The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in this
respect is clear and convincing:
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and brought
you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled you from the
door and brought you inside the store what happened then?
A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.
Q And what did you say?
A "I do not like," I said.
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?
A I struggled and cried.
Q What did the accused do after that?
A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to do. He
was able to do what he wanted to do.
Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
xxx xxx xxx COURT:

Fiscal Guillermo: Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?

Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the bolo or Fiscal Guillermo:
that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do immediately after
placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse you? Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a leading
question which is a follow-up question?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Witness:
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
A I was wearing pants, sir.
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?
A Yes, sir, I have a panty.
A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to your
pants and your panty? Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?

A He removed them, sir. A Around five minutes maybe, sir.

Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do? Q After that what happened then?

A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he A He removed it.
succeeded.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?
A No more, sir, he sat down.
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q What, if any, did he tell you?
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?
A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my
A He was wearing pants.
mother and to anybody in their house.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he still
wearing his pants? Q What else did he tell you?

A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants. A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.

Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened? Q After that where did you go?

A I saw his penis. A I went home already, sir. 4

Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you saw, he
went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused when he
was on top of you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial
court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong
for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the
hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition
of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief,
Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.

xxx xxx xxx

In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental
condition were set forth:
On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever
questioned but refused to answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair, would stare
vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he
would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull
and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep
thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull,
he claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3
spheres and has no idea why he was brought here.
The report then concluded:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found
suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming,
sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize,
emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual
aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs
further hospitalization and treatment. 5
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental
condition:
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his affect
and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of
being irritable saying — "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or not
he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having
committed any wrong act
and the following conclusions:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present
time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody in particular, seclusive,
underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself,
preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved,
responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and .
. . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave
the hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for
check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores,
conversed and as freely with other members of the household and slept well, although, occasionally,
appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking
in a language he could not understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved
in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment,
medication and check-ups. 7
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and
no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having
hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental
condition to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant
was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was
already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9 The defense next presented Raquel
Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that she had examined and treated the
appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively
from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account,
it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that heacts without the
least discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that
there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29,
1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will,
because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with] imbecility or
insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are
always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order
to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests:
(a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b)
the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows
common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;"
examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on
the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying
"complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally
reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence
be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of
intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the
will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Formerly calleddementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops
between the ages 15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a disturbance of
association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude
of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism and the ambivalence
that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is
often referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered in no way
specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms
include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's
behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of
one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or influenced
from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of second-rank
symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other
forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are common
symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most
characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently,
the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are
threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the
hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by
hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic patients, but they
are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations
primarily at night or during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much
during the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep.
When visual occur in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three
dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning, and that are
idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They are among the common
symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type of
schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that exercises its
influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all,
schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic
whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or
spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15 it has mostly been
rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was
impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor that he was
completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place his penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you said, it deals
(sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is what we call
primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a normal individual, a
normal individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society while
an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary
environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here is suffering is
capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all the acts
preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet there is no
inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to commit is
wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The reasoning
is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission
of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be
sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal
she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last two
(2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental
faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony,
by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it
is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be
found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence
regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held
that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the
very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians
(Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during
that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or immediately
before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral
patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually
observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense
chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it
does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a
mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness
which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although
it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in
all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral damages is
increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5921 July 25, 1911
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.
Chicote and Miranda for appellant.
W.A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso,
Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and
severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three
months from date, with interest at P1 per month.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five debtors for payment of the
P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the 15th of
December, 1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was served on Vicente Sixto
Villanueva on April 17, 1909.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and were so notified,
the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at 1
per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete payment should have been made of the
principal, and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto
Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was declared to be insane by the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she was appointed his guardian by the same court; (3)
that, on October 11, following, she was authorized by the court, as guardian, to institute the proper legal
proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity, among
them that concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New York; (4)
that she, the guardian, was not aware of the proceedings had against her husband and was only by chance
informed thereof; (5) that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of this suit, he was already
permanently insane, was in that state when summoned and still continued so, for which reason he neither
appeared nor defended himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve
the said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered against him in the
suit before mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the said
defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond in question, which evidence
could not be presented in due season on account of the then existing incapacity of the defendant.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several years suffered from such
monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-legal doctrine above cited, that a person's believing
himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of
insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Specifically, in reference to this case, the following facts
were brought out in the testimony given by the physicians, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de
Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant, the first of whom had visited him some eight times during the years
1902 and 1903, and the latter, only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns his houses and if you should
direct him to read it, do you believe that he would understand the contents of the document?

The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of evidence, after due A. As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see nothing particularly remarkable; but
consideration of which, when taken, the court decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th of afterwards, to decide upon the question involved, it might be that he could not do that; it depends upon
December, 1908, executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly well the nature and what the question was.
consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for the purpose was
entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such findings the court ruled that Dr. Ocampo:
the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered in the case be denied and that the
said execution be carried out. Q. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those concerning greatness?

After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with reference to the A. Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of greatness and wealth.
defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in support of the
appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment of error as follows: Q. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he not?

Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva, A. Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he can, I have made no trial.
does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein concerned.
Q. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the exception of this monomania of greatness
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal doctrine which supports the and wealth?
conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result that the defendant
Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond like the one here in question. A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.

This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the lower court. It would have Q. He knows how to read and write, does he not?
been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental
A. Yes, sir I believe that he does.
perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was the result of such
monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was not, nor could there have been
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he had prepared the instrument of
any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely an effect of monomania of
bond and received the statements of the signers; that he explained to Mr. Villanueva its contents and when
wealth; and that the monomania existed on the date when the bond in question was executed.
the witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign it he replied that he was willing and did in fact do
so; that the defendant's mental condition appeared to the witness to be normal and regular and that he
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch of medical
observed nothing to indicate the contrary; and that the defendant was quiet and composed and spoke in
science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility, some of them, as Casper, going so far into
an ordinary way without giving cause fir any suspicion that there was anything abnormal.
a wealth of classification and details as to admit the existence of 60 to 80 distinct states, an enumeration of
which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion and the doubt in the minds of the majority of the authors of
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in the Court of First
treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane judgment and the point of beginning of this
Instance, over which he presided, the case concerning the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr.
incapacity, there being some who consider as a sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity and
Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him some questions about his
imbecility, but even those other chronic diseases or complaints that momentarily perturb or cloud the
property, in order to ascertain whether he was solvent and would be adequate surety, and that Villanueva
intelligence, as mere monomania, somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the divers
testified the same as many, others had done, and witness did not notice any particular disorder or
passional states which more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty." (Manresa,
perturbation of his mental faculties; that he answered the questions concerning the property that he held,
Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation
stated its value, specified the place where it was situated, his answers being precisely relevant to the
such certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who
matter treated; that he therefore approved the bond; and that all this took place between July and
suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is really insane and
September, 1908. This witness having been asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva,
it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under the influence of a perturbed
subsequent to the date mentioned, had again been surety in any other case, and whether it appeared
mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous contract .The bond, as aforesaid, was
strange to witness that Mr. Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he
executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a
rejected this new bond, replied that it was in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-
guardian for him, was not declared until July 24, 1909.
Cho-Co that he endeavored to investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva
had given any other previous bond, and the discovered that he had in fact previously given bond in a
criminal case, but that, as it had already been cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the one offered
by Mr. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable,
and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court,
has not been proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a consideration to
substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not be expressed in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In
the contract of bond the consideration, general, is no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the
liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the ordinary, a bond may be given for some other
consideration, according to the agreement and the free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in onerous
and remuneratory contracts, something remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of the
beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members of the firm of
Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testified that he had never had dealings with
Villanueva; from which it is inferred that the latter could hardly have been moved to favor the former by
the benefit of an assumed obligation to pay him some three thousand pesos, with monthly interest .But he
added that Arenas & Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for them, to whom Arenas paid a certain
sum of money. The witness did not know, however, whether Arenas gave the money for the signature of
the bond or simply in order that the agent might find sureties. The fact is that the sureties came with the
agent and signed the bond.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his dealings with Arenas, a
note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva, on the 13th of May, 1909, that is, two days
before Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting him to a conference "for the purpose of treating of
a matter of great importance of much interest to Villanueva, between 5 and 6 of that same day, in the
garden and on the benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel, on Calle Palacio, corner of Calle
Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can not be affirmed with certainty (the trial court
considers it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the business of giving bonds for a certain consideration or
remuneration; but neither can it be sustained that there was no other cause for the giving of the bond in
question than the mental disorder that dominated the intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his
believing himself so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever.
There is no proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor
that, if Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein concerned, he was
influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that, granting that he was a
monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond now under discussion. In the
interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant
application that is not enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state
of dementia at a given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the performance of the act
which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the executor, the latter was insane
or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the performance of that act, give his conscious, free,
voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent. The witness who as physicians testified as to extravagancies
observed in Villanueva's conduct, referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903, and another of them to
the year 1908, but none to December 15, 1908, the date of the execution of the bond sought to be
invalidated. the testimony of one of these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored, in
1908, to have her husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein, objection was made
by the director of the institution who advised her that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for
old men, as soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked up in the
insane ward; to which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly insane enough to be
placed among the insane." This same lady, testifying as a witness in this case, stated: that no restrictions
had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to go wherever he wished and do what he liked; that her
husband had property of his own and was not deprived of its management; that he went out every
morning without her knowing where he went; that she did not know whether he had engaged in the
business of signing bonds, and that, with reference to the one now concerned, she had learned of it only by
finding to note, before mentioned, wherein Arenas invited him to a rendezvous on the benches in front of
the Delmonico Hotel; that she had not endeavored legally to deprive him of the management of his own
real estate which had been inherited by him, although he did not attend to the collection of the rents and
the payment of the land tax, all this being done by her, and she also it was who attended to the subsistence
of the family and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct reference to the point under discussion, she was
asked:
Q. It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he used to go out of the house and was on
the streets nearly every day? to which she replied:
A. He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He goes to the markets, and buys provisions and
other things. In fact I don't know where he goes go.
Q. From his actions toward others, did he show any indication of not being sane when he was on the
street, according to your opinion?
A. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very strange that this should have
occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there are many people who can testify in regard to this
particular.
The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when he went to the market, would
return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions, and when she was asked by the judge
whether he was a man of frugal habits, she replied that, as far as she knew, he had never squandered any
large sum of money; that he had never been engaged in business; that he supported himself on what she
gave him; and that if he had something to count on for his living, it was the product of his lands.
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it is very evident
that it can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva subscribed the
obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect
to the bond which he freely executed.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE v Bugalao GR 184757, OCT 2011x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-----------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14,
2008 which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No.
197-M-2001 and Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006.
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate Informations both
dated December 21, 2000. The Informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have
carnal knowledge of [AAA],[3] 14 years old, against the latters will and consent. [4]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001
That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have
carnal knowledge of [AAA], 14 years old, against the latters will and consent. [5]
Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on both counts. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the prosecution. AAA was born on April 13,
1986. According to her late-registered birth certificate, her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC
(father). AAA, however, testified that BBB and CCC are not her biological parents, as she was only adopted
when she was very young.[6] CCC died in December 1999.[7]
In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house of her brother DDD (son of BBB and
CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and
accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger sister, then six-year-old FFF (who were also the
children of BBB and CCC).[8]
On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room which had no door. AAA was
suddenly awakened when she felt somebody enter the room.She recognized the accused-appellant as the
intruder, and saw that he was holding a knife. Accused-appellant poked the knife at AAAs neck, causing her
to freeze in fear.Accused-appellant removed AAAs clothes, and then his own. Both AAA and accused-
appellant were wearing t-shirt and shorts before the undressing. Accused-appellant kissed her neck and
inserted his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but accused-appellant did not stop and
continued raping AAA for one hour. [9]
On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was sleeping in the second floor of the house, where there
are no rooms. AAA was roused from her sleep when accused-appellant was already undressing
her. Accused-appellant removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to resist, but
accused-appellant held her hands. Accused-appellant then touched her breasts and kissed her. Accused-
appellant remained on top of her for half an hour.[10]
AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape incidents. Upon learning of the same, BBB
did not believe AAA and whipped her.[11]
During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the character and chastity of AAA, asked AAA
about an alleged sexual intercourse between her and the now deceased CCC. AAA affirmed her statement
in her affidavit that CCC took advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was still alive. This allegedly
happened five times, the first of which was when she was only seven years old. [12] Answering a query from
the court, AAA testified that she was currently in the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD).[13]
The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan Richard Viray as its second
witness. However, the latters testimony was dispensed with upon the stipulation of the parties on the fact
of examination of AAA by Dr. Viray on September 5, 2000, and the contents of the examination
report,[14] which includes the finding that AAA was in a non-virgin state.
When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a year later, it also presented as its
witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the prosecution. This time, she testified that the sexual
encounters between her and the accused-appellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of rape
against the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with him. She also claimed that she was
instructed by the police officer who investigated the incident to say that the accused-appellant used a
knife. She also testified that she was raped by her father CCC when she was seven years old. She was
recanting her previous testimony because she purportedly was no longer angry with accused-appellant.[15]
On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of rape because she was angry with the
accused-appellant for making her do laundry work for him.However, when asked if she consented and
voluntarily submitted herself to the accused-appellant when she had sexual intercourse with him, she
answered in the negative. She had been released from the custody of the DSWD and was alone by herself
for some time, but she now lives with the family of accused-appellant. [16]
On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force himself upon her. She affirmed
that accused-appellant had a little defect in his mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that accused-
appellant was not her sweetheart.[17]
Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist. She conducted a mental
examination on accused-appellant on September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering
from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. [18]

Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June 15, 2005, claimed that AAA seduced
him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they ended up merely kissing each other and did not have
sexual intercourse. He denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was asking
for P300 from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified that there was no legal proceeding for
the adoption of AAA (ampun-ampunan lang).[19]
On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001,
decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime as charged, and hereby sentences him to suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the
private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the
private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00.[20]
The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she testified for the prosecution, and
was returned to the family of the accused-appellant after her original testimony. It was during the time
when she was back in the custody of the accused-appellants family that she recanted her testimony for the
prosecution. According to the RTC, it is clear that she had no other place to go to as she was completely
orphaned and was dependent on the family of the accused, and it was understandable that she may have
recanted in order to remain in the good graces of the accused-appellants family.[21]
As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from mental retardation, the RTC noted
that the psychological examination of accused-appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after
the dates of the complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the psychologist that
accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. Even
assuming that accused-appellant was of such mental state at the time of the incidents, the psychologist
testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong. [22]
On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that of the RTC, except with a
modification on the penalty in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition
of death penalty. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 13, dated 23 January 2006, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and damages
awarded. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, in each of the two (2) counts of rape. He is further directed to pay private complainant the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each count of rape, in addition to the civil indemnity awarded by the
court a quo.[23]
Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties manifested that they are waiving
their rights to file a supplemental brief, as the same would only contain a reiteration of the arguments
presented in their appellants and appellees briefs.[24]
In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that the prosecution evidence was
insufficient, particularly in view of AAAs withdrawal of her original testimony.
We have recently held that [c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be
obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts.Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court
of justice, simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or
another.[25] We have, in the past, also declared that the recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, does not
necessarily render the prosecutions evidence inconclusive. [26]In the often-cited Molina v. People,[27] we
specified how a recanted testimony should be examined:
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible. The
rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not
contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of
comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous
testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances
under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change,
discriminatingly analyzed. x x x.[28] (Emphases supplied.)
These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant is usually the lone
eyewitness. Thus, in People v. Sumingwa,[29] where the rape victim later disavowed her testimony that she
was raped by her father, this Court held:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely on
the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed
and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and
marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable
doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a
prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly unreliable for there is
always the probability that such recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the
test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on
the stand.[30]
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of AAAs accusation and recantation
is facilitated by the fact that her recantation was made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike
in cases where recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the opportunity to see
the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid details of the alleged rape by her adoptive
brother, but also when she claimed that she made up her previous rape charges out of anger. As such, it is
difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted accused-appellant even after examining the
young witness as she made a complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial Q: Do you know where they were living?
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in
this case where AAA was subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross A: No, sir.
examinations both as a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court found that the private
complainants testimony for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of belief. Q: From the time you were released from the DSWD you are alone by yourself?

However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on A: Yes, sir.
the stand while testifying, it is clear to this Court which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was
concocted. AAAs testimony for the prosecution, which was taken when she was in the custody of the Q: And the person[s] who are now taking care of you are giving you shelter and everyday foods [sic] from
DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material discrepancies. All accused-appellant can harp on in his the family of the accused, is that correct?
appellants brief was AAAs failure to recall the length of the knife used in the assaults, a minor and
insignificant detail not material to the elements of the crime of rape. She remained steadfast on cross- A: Yes, sir.
examination even as defense counsel tried to discredit her by bringing up her dark past of being sexually
molested by the accused-appellants father when she was seven years old. This is in stark contrast to her
testimony for the defense, where AAA, now living with accused-appellants family, claimed that she
xxxx
fabricated a revolting tale of rape simply because accused-appellant made her do laundry. AAAs
recantation even contradicts the testimony of accused-appellant himself. While AAA claims in her
retraction that she had consensual sex with her brother, accused-appellant testified that they merely kissed
and that AAAs purported motive for the rape charges was monetary.
Q: Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be dismissed because you testify today[, would] you admit
for a fact that he [was] also staying in the house where you are staying now?
As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the cross-examination of AAA as
a defense witness revealed that it was taken at a time when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay
A: No, sir.
with the family of accused-appellant and upon a reliance on the familys implied commitment to send
accused-appellant to Mindanao:
Q: Where will he stay?
PROS. JOSON:
A: In Mindanao, sir.
Q: Where are you staying at present?
Q: Because that was one of the promise or commitment of the family of the accused, is it not?
A: In our house, sir.
A: No, sir.
Q: And your house where you were staying is the house of the parents of the accused?
Q: And how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Because my other Kuya will not allow him to stay in the house, sir.
Q: And you dont have any relatives where you can go and stay except from that house?
Q: Because your other Kuya does not like Aniceto Bulagao to do the things that you have complaint [sic]
against him, is it not?
A: None, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where [are] your parents?
Q: And what you are isinusumbong is the case today against him, is it not?
A: I do not know, sir.
A: Yes, sir.[31]
Q: Are they all dead or still alive?
Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering from
A: They are deceased, sir.
mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that
the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was
Q: All?
already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
A: Both are deceased, sir. insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. [32] Besides, this Court observes
that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony,
Q: Do you mean to say that do you have full blood brother and sister? show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was
completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the
A: They all separated, sir. crime.[33] Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. [34]
As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of death for each count of SO ORDERED.
rape. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to reclusion perpetuain view of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346. It should be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of
death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would have warranted the imposition of
the death penalty would still cause the award of moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each
from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing
jurisprudence.[35] Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon. Under Baguio City
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when
committed with the use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This crime was
proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to have occurred on June 17,
2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information, the proper FIRST DIVISION
penalty is reclusion perpetua.

On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used a knife on June 17, 2000, she
said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000, the date of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.[36] As such, the
crime that was proven in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any circumstance
NILO OROPESA, G.R. No. 184528
affecting criminal liability.However, simple rape is also punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article 266-
B.
Petitioner,

Present:
In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even without the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, as well
as moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, both for each count of rape. [37] In addition, we have held
CORONA, C.J.,
that since exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same can be awarded, not only in the presence
of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly Chairperson,
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.[38] This Court believes that the conduct of accused-
appellant herein, who raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls under this category and is therefore LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
liable for exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count of rape, in line with existing
jurisprudence. [39] - versus - BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole,
for each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Promulgated:

1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape, in addition to the amountsawarded by the Court of Appeals, CIRILO OROPESA,
namely: civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, both
for each count of rape;and Respondent. April 25, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA. The Court of Appeals issuances affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and the
Order[4] dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260
in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for guardianship over
the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a petition for
him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the
(respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch
260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his
hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in
memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and
medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing, and
directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study,
interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her
report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004,
the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister
Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The
(petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not
formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant
leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter,
the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006.[5] (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that
Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties,
Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.[6]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated November
14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to provide
sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to
run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated
27 September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.[7]
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through
the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a
quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in
guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:

a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years
already;
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE
92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set
aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the
trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing
respondents incompetence.
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after his stroke,
he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his
hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks
sufficient to cover his medical expenses;

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following
wise: c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and management;

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a guardian
acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A
guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and his
preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only
those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.[11]

e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the
former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did not
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven procure another vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;
to be a minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his daughters
and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed without the latters knowledge or consent;
under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:

g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word incompetent includes persons the orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who
are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and furniture,
easy prey for deceit and exploitation. despite protests from his children.[14]

We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material evidence to
positive and definite evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or
applied in the case at bar. testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent
largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that
the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled Report of
Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum[16] to illustrate that
said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in
conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a
clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He was able
to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He
did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he
was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to problem
situations. x x x.[17]
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest
in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony,
were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the
demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his,
his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real
estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned
Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was
never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned
earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses
on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the
average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we
had the occasion to rule that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary
[and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of
mental sanity will suffice.[18]
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the
fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial
court made known its own observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the
contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen.
Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of
mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen.
Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning
and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.[19] (Citation
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.[20] We only take cognizance of questions of fact in
certain exceptional circumstances;[21] however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also
long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be
disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and
respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record.[22] We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule
that the grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue.[23] We have also held that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the
merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily
have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.[24]
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without
first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to
evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting
his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February DECISION
29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88449 are AFFIRMED. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both rendered
SO ORDERED. by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA. The Court of
Appeals issuances affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and the Order[4] dated November 14,
2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016,
which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for guardianship over the properties of his father,
Republic of the Philippines respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.
Supreme Court

Baguio City
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

FIRST DIVISION
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a petition for him
and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the
(respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.

NILO OROPESA, G.R. No. 184528

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
Petitioner, maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his
Present: hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory
and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical
condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
CORONA, C.J.,
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing, and
Chairperson,
directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study,
interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report
- versus - BERSAMIN,
but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
DEL CASTILLO, and
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004,
the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister
Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
Promulgated:

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The
CIRILO OROPESA, (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.

Respondent. April 25, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not
formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave
to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter,
the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. [5] (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen.
Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositors
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.[6]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated November 14,
2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to provide
sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to
run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27
September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. [7]
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through
the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a
quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED. [8]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE
92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP [9]
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set
aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the
trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing
respondents incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following
wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a guardian acts
for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship
is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards
property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that
while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities,
but those of one in loco parentis as well.[11]
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to
be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and
their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word incompetent includes persons suffering
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot,
without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey
for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive
and definite evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in
the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in
guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years
already;
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after his stroke, he
purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital
bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to
cover his medical expenses;
c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and management;
d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and his
sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the former
would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another
vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his daughters
without the latters knowledge or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon the
orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and furniture, despite
protests from his children.[14]
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material evidence to
support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or
testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent
largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that
the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal
affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled Report of Neuropsychological
Screening,[15] were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact
favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in
conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear
voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He was able to
correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did
BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was
able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to problem
situations. x x x.[17]
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in
their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting
under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the
demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his
fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate
taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to
make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned Report of
Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified
by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent
at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent,
it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we
had the occasion to rule that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and
that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental
sanity will suffice.[18]
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the
fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial
court made known its own observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa
does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary,
Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1)
performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental
calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and
orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.[19] (Citation
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.[20] We only take cognizance of questions of fact in
certain exceptional circumstances;[21] however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long
settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed
by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are
deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[22] We therefore
adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of
respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the Decision 5 dated February 12, 2002 of the
Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering (Jacinto), and in
behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against petitioner Crewlink, Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign
principal Gulf Marine Services for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance,
damages and attorney's fees.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas employment contract with Crewlink,
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services, the details of which are as follows:
case or sustain the issue.[23] We have also held that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the
merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily
Duration of Contract : 12 months
have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. [24]

Position : Oiler
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without
first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to
evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his Basic Monthly Salary : US $385.00
evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

Hours of Work : 48 hrs/wk

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29,
2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 Overtime : US $115.50
are AFFIRMED.

Vacation Leave with pay : 1 mo. leave after

12 months
SO ORDERED.

Point of Hire : Manila, Philippines

Republic of the Philippines

xxxx
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was subjected to a pre-employment
medical examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit to work." Thus, her husband joined his vessel of
THIRD DIVISION
assignment and performed his duties as Oiler.
G.R. No. 166803 October 11, 2012
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of Health of the United Arab
CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, Petitioners, Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001 due to asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an
vs. embalming and sealing certificate was issued after which the remains of Jacinto was brought back to the
Philippines.
EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH ROSE DE GARCIA
TERINGTERING, Respondents.
After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners the payment of death
DECISION compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial expenses in the amount of US$1,000.00, as well
as additional death compensation in the amount of US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach Rose de Gracia
PERALTA, J.: Teringtering but was refused without any valid cause. Hence, a complaint was filed against the petitioners.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be compensable it is enough that he died
Decision1 dated July H, 2004 and Resolution2 dated January 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. during the term of his contract and while still on board. Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering
SP No. 79966, setting aside the Resolutions dated February 20, 2003 3 and July 31, 20034 of the National from a psychotic disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his jumping into the sea and
his eventual death. Respondent further asserted that her husband’s death was not deliberate and not of his
own will, but was a result of a mental disorder, thus, compensable.
For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001, around 8:20 p.m. while at Nasr
Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly jumped into the sea, but the second engineer was able to
recover him. Because of said incident, one personnel was directed to watch Jacinto.
However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor south of Nasr Oilfield and went on standby,
Jacinto jumped off the boat again. Around 11:00 p.m., the A/B watchman reported that Jacinto was
recovered but despite efforts to revive him, he was already dead from drowning.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being claimed, because Jacinto
committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement, however, Teringtering was even given burial assistance in
the amount of P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May 21, 2001. She likewise received the amount of
US$792.51 representing donations from the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner likewise argued that
Teringtering is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with
her late husband's untimely demise as the same was due to his own doing.
As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C. Morado's report on the incident, which
we quote:
At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1 passenger. 2018 hrs. A/side Nasr
Complex boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At 2020 hrs. Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering suddenly jump to the sea,
while the boat cast off from Nasr Complex boatlanding. And the second Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump and
recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering the oiler.
2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that time informed to GMS personnel
about the accident, And we informed to A/B on duty to watch Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230 hrs. The A/B
watch man informed that Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering jump again to the sea. And that time the wind NW 10-
14 kts. and strong current. And the second Engr. jump to the sea with life ring to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering
Tering. 2300 hrs. We recovered Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering onboard the vessel and apply Respiration Kiss of
life Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to take doctor.
2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to check the patient. 2330 hrs. As per
Nasr Complex Doctor the patient was already dead. Then informed to GMS personnel about the accident.
I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best of my knowledge and reserve
the right, modify, ratify and/or enlarge this statement at any time and place, According to the law. 6
In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto Teringtering died during the effectivity of his
contract of employment and that he died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his
deliberate or intentional jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly attributable to him.
Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and sought
the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated February 20, 2003, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision dated February 12, 2002.
On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf Marine Services are hereby DECLARED jointly and severally
liable and, accordingly, are directed to pay deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries, namely
respondent Editha Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de Gracia, the Philippine Currency
equivalent to US$50,000.00, and an additional amount of US$7,000, both at the exchange rate prevailing at
the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as petitioner, raised the following
issues:
I
WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES CORRECTION OF THE NLRC'S EVALUATION OF
THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON OR CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF FACTS IN THE
JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC;
II
WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES FOR THE COMFORT
AND SAFETY OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER, AMONG OTHERS, WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN
THE ASSAILED CA DECISION AND WHICH ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THE SHIPMATES OF
THE DECEASED, BUT POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE NOW
BEING HELD LIABLE – ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SOURCE OF OBLIGATION THAT IS
PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR TORT AS PROVIDED UNDER OUR CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO
REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR CODE;
III
WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A RESULT OF A DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS
OWN LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DECEASED, AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED
BY THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that the latter's death resulted
from his willful act. It argued that the rule that the employer becomes liable once it is established that the
seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract is not absolute. The employer may be
exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act, as in this case.
We find merit in the petition.
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of
any showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly
erroneous. We are not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are
binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown
that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record. This case is no
different.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident but was deliberately
done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was on his second attempt that caused his death.
The accident report of Captain Oscar Morado narrated in detail the circumstances that led to Jacinto's
death. The circumstances of Jacinto's actions before and at the time of his death were likewise entered in
the Chief Officer's Log Book and were attested to by Captain Morado before the Philippine Embassy. Even
the A/B personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first attempt of
committing suicide, testified that despite his efforts to prevent Jacinto from jumping again overboard, Commission in NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-06-1144-00, affirming the February 12, 2002 Decision of
Jacinto was determined and even shoved him and jumped anew which eventually caused his death. the Labor Arbiter, are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence presented as well as the SO ORDERED.
findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. More so, when there is no
showing that said findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.

Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly inapplicable in this case. For precisely, the
issue for resolution here is the obligation of the employer to its employee should the latter die during the
term of his employment. The relationship between the petitioner and Jacinto is one based on contract of
employment and not one of contract of carriage.

Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of
All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is provided that:

xxxx

6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a
willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)

Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of
the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer
liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may
be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act.

In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was attributable to his
deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare
allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical
report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show when the
alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but
the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for
insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know
what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and
judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be
given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational
basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness’ own perception of the person, or who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.8 No such evidence was presented to support respondent's
claim.

The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis
for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left with no choice but to deny her petition,
lest an injustice be caused to the employer. Otherwise slated, while it is true that labor contracts are
impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be construed logically and liberally
in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is
that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the
applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition Is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, dated
July 8, 2004, and its January 17, 2005 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The February 20, 2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations