Recent Jurisprudence Digest Compilation, 2014-2015

2016 University of the Philippines
College of Law
Digest Compilation
Recent Jurisprudence
DIGEST
COMPILATION
2014-2015
UP Law Bar Operations Commission 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS
POLITICAL LAW
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises………………………………………………… 5
Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas…………………………………………………… 6
Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises Inc…………………………………………………………… 7
Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson……………………………………………. 8
James and Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, Executive Secretary, et al………..…… 9
Jose Jesus M. Disini, et al v. Secretary of Justice, et al.…………………………………………………………….. 11
Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156………………………………………………………………….. 12
Araullo v. Aquino………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13
Naval v. COMELEC……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
Jardeleza v. Sereno………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 16
Landbank v. Lajom……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17
GMA v. COMELEC………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18
Arigo v. Swift………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19
Jalover v. Osmena………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 21
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College……………………………………………………………………………………………… 22
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan…………………………………………………………………………………… 23
Republic v. Spouses Lazo……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
DBP v. COA………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 25
Peak Ventures Corporation and/or El Tigre Security Investigation Agency v. Heirs of Villareal…… 26
Corporate Strategies Development Corporation and Rafael Prieto v. Norman A. Agojo……………. 27
Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito v. Hon. Commission on Elections, et. al………………………………….. 28
Dennis A. B. Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service Commission, Francisco T. Duque III, Executive
Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza, Office of the President…………………………………………………….. 29
Cerafica v. Commission on Elections……………………………………………………………………………………… 30
Geronimo v. Sps. Calderon……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 31
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr., and the Province of Camarines Sur v. Hon. Robredo, in his capacity as
32
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government………………………………………………………………..
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Hon. Colet…………………………………………………………………….. 33
Maritime Industry v. COA ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 34
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC…………………………………………………………………………………………… 35
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC…………………………………………………………..…………………………………………… 36
In re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v.
Abolition of JDF and reduction of Fiscal Autonomy…………………………………………………………… 37
Araullo v. Aquino (MR) …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 38
Tordilla v. Amilano.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 39
LBP v. Heirs of Alsua…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 40
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al………………………. 41
Joseph B. Timbol v. Commssion on Elections…………………………………………………………….…………… 42
Villanueva v. JBC……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………… 43
SWS v. COMELEC………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……….. 44
1-UTAK v. COMELEC…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 45
Bishop Pabillo v. COMELEC………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 46
UP LAW BOC TABLE OF CONTENTS DIGEST COMPILATION
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Reyes………………………….. 47
The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marcos……………………………………………………………………. 48
LABOR LAW
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. v. Ferdinand Acibo, et al.………………………………………………. 49
Raul Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al.……………………………………………………………………………….. 51
Universidad De Sta Isabel v. Marvin-Julian L. Sambajon, Jr……………………………………………………… 52
Indophil Textile Mills v. Adviento……………………………………………………………………………………………. 53
Imasen v. Alcon……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 54
New Filipino Maritime Agencies Inc., St. Paul Maritime Corp., and Angelina T. Rivera v. Michael
D. Despabelarderas………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 55
Sara Lee Phils v. Macatlang…………………………………………………………………………………………………... 56
Saudi Arabian Air v. Rebesencio……………………………………………………………………………………..…….. 57
One Shipping v. Penafiel………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 58
Unicol v. Malipot………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 59
Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove…………………………………………………………………………… 60
Milan v. NLRC………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 61
Protective v. Fuentes…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 63
CIVIL LAW
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Asuncion Felonia and Lydia De Guzman…………………….. 64
Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson……………………………………………. 65
Macaria Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank Inc………………………………………………………………………. 66
PNB v. Garcia……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 67
AFP-RSBS v. Republic………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 68
Landbank v. Lajom……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 69
Noveras v. Noveras……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 70
Ando v. DFA…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 71
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan…………………………………………………………………………………… 72
Dela Torre v. Imbuido……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 73
Robles v. Yapcinco……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 74
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Wilfred N. Chiok/Global Business Bank, Inc. v. Wilfred N. Chiok………………………………………… 75
Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem…………………………………………………………………………………………… 76
NFF Industrial v G&L…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 77
Kalaw v. Fernandez………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 78
First Optima v. Securitron……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 79
Aguilar v. Siasat……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 80
Sps. Salvador v. Sps. Rabaja…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 81
BBB v. AAA………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 82
Reyes v. Sps. Valentin…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 83
PAGE 2 OF 149
TAXATION LAW
Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas…………………………………………………… 84
Procter & Gamble Asia PTE LTD v. CIR…………………………………………………………………………………… 85
Commissioner of Customs v. Oilink……………………………………………………………………………………….. 86
CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation………………………………………………………………………………………….. 87
Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue…………………………………………. 88
The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. The Secretary of Finance and
89
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue……………………………………………………………………………..
City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority/Prove of Bataan, represented by
Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., and Emerlinda S. Talento, in her capacity as Provincial
Treasurer of Bataan v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority………………………………………………. 90
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Hon. Colet…………………………………………………………………….. 91
BDO v RCBC………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 92
CBK Power v. CIR………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 93
Chinabank v. CIR………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 94
MERCANTILE LAW
Raul Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al.……………………………………………………………………………….. 95
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp, Tesoro Mining and Development Inc and Mcarthur
Mining Inc v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp……………………………………………………………… 96
Yujuico v. Quiambao…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 97
Patrimonio v. Gutierrez and Marasigan………………………………………………………………………………….. 98
Areza v. Express Savings………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 101
CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation………………………………………………………………………………………….. 102
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Wilfred N. Chiok/Global Business Bank, Inc. v. Wilfred N. Chiok………………………………………… 103
Victoria-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., and Marcelo, Jr.……………………………………………………………… 104
Dona Adela v. TIDCORP……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 105
CRIMINAL LAW
People v. Abetong………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 106
People v. Paras…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 107
Syhunliong v. Rivera……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 108
Ariel T. Lim v. People of the Philippines…………………………………………………………………………………. 109
Villareal v. People / People v. the Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. / Dizon v. People / Villa v.
Escalona II, et al.…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 110
Gutierrez v COA……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 111
Almendras v. Almendras………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 112
People v. Chi Chan Liu………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 113
Ricalde v. People………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 114
PAGE 3 OF 149
REMEDIAL LAW
People v. Noel Enojas y Hingpit……………………………………………………………………………………………… 115
People v. Henry Go……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 116
People v. Abetong………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 117
Paranaque Kings Enterprises v. Catalina Santos…………………………………………………………………….. 120
Landbank v. Lajom……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 121
Ando v. DFA…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 122
Villalon v. Chan…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 123
Republic v. Spouses Lazo……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 124
Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People of the Philippines……………………………………………………. 125
Luzvimin Cebu Mining Corp. and Luzvimin Port Services Company, Inc. v. Cebu Port Authority
and Port Manager Angelo C. Verdan……………………………………………………………………………….. 126
The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. The Secretary of Finance and
127
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue……………………………………………………………………………..
Marcelo Investment and Management Corp. and the Heirs of Edward T. Marcelo, namely
Katherine J. Marcelo, et. al. v. Jose T. Marcelo, Jr.……………………………………………………………… 128
City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority/Prove of Bataan, represented by
Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., and Emerlinda S. Talento, in her capacity as Provincial
Treasurer of Bataan v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority………………………………………………. 129
Escalona II, et al.…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 130
Victoria-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., and Marcelo, Jr.……………………………………………………………… 131
Aguilar v. Lightbringers Cooperative……………………………………………………………………………………… 132
Estrada v Ombudsman………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 133
Fortune v COA……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 134
Reicon Realty Builders v Diamond Dragon Realty………………………………………………………………….. 135
BBB v. AAA………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 136
Dona Adela v TIDCORP………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 137
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia and Berteni Cataluña Causing vs. The Superintendent of
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), The Honor Committee (HC) of 2014 of the PMA and
HC Members, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB)………………………………………. 138
Jose “Pepe” Sanico v People of the Philippines………………………………………………………………………. 139
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo………………………………. 140
Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan……………………………………………………………………………………. 141
Lexber Inc. v. Dalman…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 142
LEGAL ETHICS
Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Celera………………………………………………………………………… 143
Rex Tupal v. Judge Remegio Rojo………………………………………………………………………………………….. 144
Dulang v. Judge Regencia…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 145
Quiachon v. Atty. Ramos………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 146
RE: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on 147
September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan………………….
Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People of the Philippines……………………………………………………. 148
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v COA………………………………………………………………… 149
PAGE 4 OF 149
UP LAW BOC POLITICAL LAW DIGEST COMPILATION
POLITICAL LAW
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises
January 15, 2014 / GR No. 172551
FACTS:
Yatco was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Laguna. The Government placed this land under
the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. LBP valued the property at P1.13 M but
Yatco elevated this valuation to the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. DAR PARAD valued
the property at P16.54 M. LBP filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation with the
RTC-SAC.
RTC fixed the just compensation at P200 per square meter or P55.15 M. It did not give weight to LBP’s
evidence as it failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Sec. 17 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper.
HELD:
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. R.A. No. 6657 explicitly
vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for lands under
CARP coverage.
In the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-
SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-
enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. However, the RTC-SACs, are not
strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations
that do not warrant the formula’s strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax
the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them.
Considering that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the property’s value at the time
of taking, the Court remanded the case for the determination of just compensation, with a cautionary
reminder for the proper observance of the factors under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable
DAR regulations.
PAGE 5 of 149
Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas

February 18, 2014 / GR No. 204429
FACTS:
Smart constructed a telecommunications tower in Malvar. The municipality of Malvar passed
Ordinance No. 18, which imposed an assessment fee on Smart. Smart filed a protest with the
municipality, the trial court and the CTA, which were all denied. Smart also contends that Ordinance
No. 18 violates Sections 130(b)(3) and 186 of the LGC since the fees are unjust, excessive, oppressive
and confiscatory. CTA claimed that it had no jurisdiction over the case since the assessment involved
was regulatory fee and not a tax.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 18 is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
The Court held that the fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. Consistent with Sec. 5,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, the LGC grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees, and
charges not otherwise levied by provinces.
The Municipality issued Ordinance No. 18 to regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching, installing,
repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and
other apparatus, and provide for the correction, condemnation or removal of the same when found to
be dangerous, defective or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitants. Since the main
purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special
projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No.
18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising.
Smart has not sufficiently proven that the fees are unreasonable. The presumption of validity subsists.
On the constitutionality issue, Smart merely pleaded for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Ordinance No. 18 without evidence to support its plea. It also failed to cite any constitutional provision
allegedly violated by the issuance of Ordinance No. 18. Settled is the rule that every law, in this case an
ordinance, is presumed valid.
To strike down a law as unconstitutional, Smart has the burden to prove a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, which Smart miserably failed to do. This presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
PAGE 6 of 149
Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises Inc.

February 19, 2014 / GR No. 199310
FACTS:
Remman Enterprises filed an application for judicial confirmation over two parcels of land in Taguig.
LLDA filed its Opposition to the application for registration, asserting that the lots are not part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Republic also opposed, alleging that Remman
failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE: WON the land is alienable.
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., Court stated that in addition to the certification
issued by the proper government agency (such as the PENRO or CENRO) that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable.
Republic v. Tan Properties ruling applies retroactively, since it merely refers to the proper construction
of an already existing law. Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945,
or earlier, the respondent’s application for registration should be denied.
PAGE 7 of 149
Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson

March 10, 2014 / GR No. 163767
FACTS:
Rosario filed an application for land registration of ricelands in Bulacan. Director of Lands and the
Bureau of Public Works opposed, averring that whatever legal and possessory rights the respondent
had acquired by reason of any Spanish government grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for
failure to occupy and possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; and that the land applied for, being actually a portion of the Labangan Channel operated
by the Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land registration.
ISSUE: WON the land is alienable.
HELD:
The Court held that it is not, there being no express declaration by the State that it was alienable and
no longer needed for public purpose.
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain is not considered in reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the possessor.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. No tax declarations for prior years
except 2002 were shown.
PAGE 8 of 149
James and Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, Executive Secretary, et al

April 8, 2014 / G.R. No. 204819
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. However, numerous petitions
were filed contesting the constitutional of RA 10354. Some of the following important issues raised
are the following: 1] Right to Life, 2] Right to Health, 3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free
Speech
Petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Sec. 12
Art. II of the Constitution; the assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives
effectively sanctions abortion. Petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the right to health
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals, which shall cause
negative effects and expose high risk of diseases to women. It is also argued that the RH law imposes
upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for such patient’s needs.
ISSUE: WON the RH Law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court held that the RH Law is not unconstitutional except for certain provisions.
On the issue of life, the Court noted that every human being enjoys the right to life, which is protected
in Art. III Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Based on the traditional meaning of the word, the constitution
framers’ intent and medical studies, life begins at fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm
and female ovum.
The RH Law clearly prohibits any contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum as that would
be abortive and prohibited. However, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-
abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Art. 256, which penalizes the destruction or
expulsion of the fertilized ovum. However, Abortifacients under the RH-IRR are unconstitutional since
it includes the word primarily. It redefines an abortifacient from drug or device that induces abortion or
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum from
implanting in the mother’s womb to drug or device that primarily induces abortion or
destruction of a fetus… This must be struck down for being ultra vires, since the word primarily
would pave the way for approval of contraceptives that would harm or destroy the life of an unborn
from fertilization in contravention of Art. II, Sec. 12 of the Constitution.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. All the Constitutional provisions
should be considered as self-executing unless the contrary is intended. None of the contraceptives
have been submitted to the FDA for determination that they are safe and fit for public consumption.
The Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their
inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed
as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
PAGE 9 of 149
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine
device is safe and non-abortifacient.
The Court also held that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find
morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly.
One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation. Hence, even non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers are exempted from such referral as their religious
freedom should be respected. However, there is an exception, life- threatening cases. While generally
healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it
would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother
should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a
denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
PAGE 10 of 149
Jose Jesus M. Disini, et al v. Secretary of Justice, et al.

April 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 203335
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a reconsideration of the Courts decision holding some provisions of RA 10125
(Cybercrime Prevention Act) unconstitutional and some constitutional.
ISSUE: WON RA 10125 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court upheld its earlier decision and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law imposes penalties that are one degree higher when the crimes
defined in the Revised Penal Code and certain special laws are committed with the use of information
and communication technologies (ICT). Petitioners insist that Section 6 is invalid since it produces an
unusual chilling effect on users of cyberspace that would hinder free expression. The Court held that
the power to fix the penalties for violations of penal laws, like the cybercrime law, exclusively belongs
to Congress.
In any event, Section 6 of the cybercrime law merely makes the commission of existing crimes through
the internet a qualifying circumstance; this is not at all arbitrary since a substantial distinction exists
between crimes committed through the use of ICT and similar crimes committed using conventional
means. The vast potential and benefits of the Internet are rooted in its unique characteristics, such as
its speed, worldwide reach and relative anonymity. Users of the technology have found means to
evade being identified and for this reason have been emboldened to reach far more victims or cause
greater harm or both. Compared to traditional crimes, cybercrimes are more perverse.
The Court held that libel is not a protected speech. Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms of
speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection and are considered outside the realm of
protected freedom. Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and insulting or "fighting" words.
As to Section 4(c)(4) being vague and overbroad, the Court held that online libel is not a new crime. It
is essentially the old crime of libel found in the Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in the
cyberspace. Consequently, the mass of jurisprudence that secures the freedom of expression from its
reach applies to online libel.
PAGE 11 of 149
Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156

June 2, 2014 / GR No. 203696
FACTS:
President Estrada established SPTF 156 in order to investigate anomalies in the Department of
Finance.
Petitioner was one of the officers investigated in a case involving the questionable issuance of tax
credits to Evergreen Corporation. The Office of the Ombudsman found substantial evidence on record
finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
In challenging the findings of the OMB, petitioner alleges that he cannot be held administratively
liable for grave misconduct in the performance of his official duties and responsibilities because he
was just an evaluator and not the approving authority for tax credit applications.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can be held liable for grave misconduct given that he was only performing his
functions based on his job description and under instructions from superiors.
HELD:
The Court held that the petitioner is liable. The petitioner apparently failed in one of his duties and
responsibilities as an evaluator which was to conduct a physical verification/inspection of
manufacturing and plant facilities. While he followed the instructions and training given to him by his
superiors at the Center, he neither conducted a physical verification/inspection on the actual office
premises and the manufacturing and plant facilities.
There is no doubt that the petitioner, together with the other evaluators, committed a deliberate
disregard of established rules which can only be considered as grave misconduct.
Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been
demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule
the common denominator in these cases was the employee’s propensity to ignore the rules as clearly
manifested by his or her actions.
PAGE 12 of 149
Araullo v. Aquino
July 1, 2014 / G.R. No. 209287
FACTS:
Sen. Estrada delivered a privilege speech before the Senate regarding the allotment of P50 million to
each senator as an incentive in voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. In view of
this revelation, Sec. Abad of the DBM issued a public statement to explain that the funds released
were part of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). It was designed by the DBM to ramp up
spending to accelerate economic expansion. The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the
DAP’s use of savings, namely the (a) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted
to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law, (2)
Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987);
and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on
the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special
provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
ISSUES:
1. WON the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). - NO
2. WON the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive. – NO.
3. WON the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. – NO.
4. WON the DAP are savings. – NO.
5. WON the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional. –NO.
6. WON the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program
for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn
from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation m ade by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.
2. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be
an unm anageable national governm ent budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was
the transfer of funds.
3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds.
a. However, such transfer or realignm ent should only be m ade “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed.
But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
PAGE 13 of 149
b. Transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an

existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
4. These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances,
when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned.
a. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
b. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there
is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.
5. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer
to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
6. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable.
The DAP’s effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact m ay not be applicable to the authors, im plem enters,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
crim inal, or adm inistrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
PAGE 14 of 149
Naval v. COMELEC
July 8, 2014 / G.R. No. 207851
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Angel Naval had been elected and had served as a member of
the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. The President approved Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. In the 2010 elections,
Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Nelson Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013
elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and
filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for
three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been
elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective
post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run
as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
ISSUE: WON Naval could run as a provincial board member when the legislative district he initially
served had already been reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are
carved out and renamed as another district.
HELD:
The Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to declare
otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution
and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a
result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier
exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation.
Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years.
These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert.
The actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the current Third District
amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third
District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is
correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that
the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office
in 2004 and 2007.
Jardeleza v. Sereno
August 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 213181
FACTS:
Before Justice Abad’s retirement, in accordance with its rules, the JBC announced the opening for
application or recommendation for the said vacated position. Petitioner Jardeleza (incumbent Solicitor
General) was nominated for the position. However, there were objections to his integrity by CJ Sereno.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the
integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a
sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a
PAGE 15 of 149
public hearing. He requested that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice
Carpio. Thereafter, he was not included in the short-list.
ISSUE: WON Jardeleza’s right to due process was violated.
HELD:
The Court could not accept the argument that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded under the
due process clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal and
administrative due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their peculiarity is
insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not demandable.
Notwithstanding being "a class of its own" (sui generis), the right to be heard and to explain one’s self
is availing. Where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is
not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the
precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. The JBC is not expected to
strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test
that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
The "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due process. Due
process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in
the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster
a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then
and there, subjected to an inquiry. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which
the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable
opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Petition granted.
PAGE 16 of 149
Landbank v. Lajom
August 20, 2014 / G.R. No. 184982
FACTS:
Respondents were the registered owners of several parcels of land in Nueva Ecija. A portion of the
land was placed under the government's Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to the "Tenants
Emancipation Decree".
Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and, instead, filed an amended Petition for determination of just
compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR, the LBP, and the farmer-
beneficiaries. He argued that the DAR valuation was arrived at without due process, highly prejudicial
and inimical to his and his heirs’ property rights. He alleged that in computing the amount of just
compensation, the DAR erroneously applied the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228, Series of 1997, that
have already been repealed by Section 17 of RA 6657.
For its part, the LBP agreed with the DAR valuation and insisted that PD 27 and EO 228, on which the
DAR valuation was based, were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657, contrary to Lajom’s
stance.
ISSUE: What is the applicable law in the determination of just compensation?
HELD:
Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is
overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled,
as in this case, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA
6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27
and EO 228 are superseded.
As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be determined at
the time of the property’s taking. Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the time
emancipation patents are issued by the government.
The Court emphasized that while the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the
value of lands placed under the land reform and, accordingly, the just compensation therefor, its
valuation is considered only as an initial determination and, thus, not conclusive. Verily, it is well-
settled that it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, which should make the final
determination of just compensation in the exercise of its judicial function.
PAGE 17 of 149
GMA v. COMELEC
September 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 205357
FACTS:
During the May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010 elections, COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and
interpreting Section 6 to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per
station.” For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties'
airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total
aggregate” basis.
The 5 petitions before the Court hence put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.
ISSUE: WON Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.
HELD:
The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be
based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations.
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what
is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media
for such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At
the same time, the right to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability
to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by which the
communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615, with its adoption of the “aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits –
leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. The COMELEC cannot
simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular
manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with
sufficient basis.
PAGE 18 of 149
Arigo v. Swift
September 16, 2014 / G.R. No. 206510
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and
exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian
departed Subic Bay for Makassar, Indonesia. While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative
and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident. They ask for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan
ISSUES: WON the petitioners have legal standing. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US
respondents. WON the writ of kalikasan must be issued.
HELD:
The Court held that the petitioners have locus standi. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in
Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which
allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules
“collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature.”
On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court noted that the US respondents were sued in their official
capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering
that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke
federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to
any action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents
are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance. The Court is not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the
region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
PAGE 19 of 149
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the
VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in
pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
It can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged
with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. In any case, it is the Court’s view that
a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. It is unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws cannot be granted. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an
environmental law.
Actually, this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined
or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But
insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure
and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are
entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the
coral reef.
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is not the
proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
PAGE 20 of 149
Jalover v. Osmena
September 23, 2014 / G.R. No. 209286
FACTS:
On October 3, 2012, Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Mayor of
Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC, Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen
(15) years prior to the May 2013 elections. Petitioners filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny
Osmena’s application. They alleged that Osmeña was never a resident of Toledo City and that his
alleged house in Toledo City was actually owned by his son.
COMELEC dismissed the petition. Osmena, later, won the elections.
ISSUE: WON Osmeña fulfilled the residency requirement.
HELD:
The petitioners largely rely on statement that Osmeña was “hardly seen” in Toledo City, Cebu.
However, the law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7)
days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. The fact that Osmeña has no registered property
under his name does not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not
among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in
the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the
district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the
landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.
Moreover, in a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one
hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we
cannot choose the electorate’s will.
PAGE 21 of 149
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 202666
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College, Cebu
City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about
to attend, Julia and Julienne took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded on Facebook.
Using STC’s computers, STC's students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed a teacher photos of the students. STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. STC informed their parents
that they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
Petitioners filed a petition for injunction and damages and prayed that the minors be allowed to
participate in the commencement exercises. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for habeas data,
averring that the children’s privacy was invaded.
ISSUE: WON a writ of habeas data should be granted. WON there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this
case.
HELD:
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to STC teachers. Respondents were mere recipients of
what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if
any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their
parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to the teacher.
It is incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the
courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which
they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if
they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone.
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan
September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 211356
FACTS:
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove. While the company
was already operating a resort in the area, it also applied for the issuance of a building permit covering
the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land located in Sitio Diniwid.
PAGE 22 of 149
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed
construction site was within the "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.
Subsequently, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel.
ISSUE: WON respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing EO 10.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of
nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the Court still finds that the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare.
The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of
the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological
balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental
issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle-compliance.
PAGE 23 of 149
Republic v. Spouses Lazo

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 195594
FACTS:
Respondent Spouses Rogelio and Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers of Monte Vista Homes,
a residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily
sold to the National Irrigation Administration a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an open
irrigation canal. Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of Engr. Donno G. Custodio, retired
Chief Geologist of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, to conduct a geohazard study on the possible
effects of the project on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up with a Geohazard Assessment
Report, finding that ground shaking and channel bank erosion are the possible hazards that could
affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista. Respondents filed a petition for an injunction
against NIA.
ISSUE: Does this case for just compensation with damages one of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue such that unless a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction is issued
grave injustice and irreparable injury on the part of respondents will arise?
HELD:
R.A. No. 8975 is the present law that proscribes lower courts from issuing restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions against government infrastructure projects. In ensuring the expeditious and
efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects, its twin objectives are:
(1) to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs; and (2) to allow
the immediate enjoyment of the social and economic benefits of the project.
R.A. No. 8975 exclusively reserves to the Supreme Court the power to issue injunctive writs on
government infrastructure projects. A judge who violates the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of
suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay, in addition to any civil and criminal liabilities that he
or she may incur under existing laws. Through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, the Court has
instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts to comply with and respect the prohibition.
Here, respondents failed to demonstrate that there is a constitutional issue involved, much less a
constitutional issue that is of extreme urgency. More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the public
at large are bound to respect the fact that official acts of the Government, including those performed
by governmental agencies such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, and cannot be summarily, prematurely and capriciously set aside. Such
presumption is operative not only upon the courts, but on all persons, especially on those who deal
with the government on a frequent basis.
PAGE 24 of 149
DBP v. COA
September 30, 2014 / G.R. No. 202733
FACTS:
Foreign travels of former DBP Chairman Vitaliano N. Nañagas II and former Director Eligio V. Jimenez
were not cleared by the Office of the President as required by Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO)
No. 103 (Directing the Continued Adoption of Austerity Measures in the Government). COA disallowed
disbursements to both officials.
ISSUE: WON disbursements should be allowed.
HELD:
In an effort to recover from its non-compliance with the requirements of the law, petitioner invoked
good faith as a defense due to the fact that it was faced with a doubtful or difficult question of law. SC,
however, agrees with respondent COA in ruling that petitioner cannot find solace in the defense of
good faith since not only are senior government officials, such as the petitioner’s concerned officials
herein, expected to update their knowledge on laws that may affect the performance of their
functions, but the laws subject of this case are of such clarity that the concerned officials could not
have mistaken one for the other.
Hence, when government officials are found to have clearly committed an outright violation and
disregard of the law, We will not hesitate in ordering the refund of incentive awards and allowances
for while the acts of public officials in the performance of their duties are presumed to be done in good
faith, the presumption may be contradicted and overcome by evidence showing bad faith or gross
negligence.
Decision of the Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED.
PAGE 25 of 149
Peak Ventures Corporation and/or El Tigre Security Investigation Agency v. Heirs of

Nestor B. Villareal
November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 212584
Facts: On March 17, 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron due
to loss of trust and confidence brought about by violations of RA 3019, Incompetence, gross
negligence, intellectual dishonesty, and intellectual immaturity as mayor of Puerto Princesa City.
COMELEC issued a Resolution finding the recall petition sufficient, but suspended further proceedings
on recall until the funding issue raised before Congress (in that no funding relative to the conduct of
recall elections was included in the 2014 GAA) is resolved. Goh filed this complaint alleging that
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for refusing to augment its savings, which power is
granted to it in the Constitution.
Issue: Whether supplemental legislation is needed to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall
elections for 2014.
Held: No. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall. The Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC’s fiscal autonomy, but
also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.
The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.
PAGE 26 of 149
Corporate Strategies Development Corporation and Rafael Prieto v. Norman A. Agojo

November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 208740
Facts: CSDC is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Makati. From 1994 to 2006, its real
property taxes had not been paid. As a result, the City Treasurer of Makati issued a warrant subjecting
the property to levy pursuant to Section 258 of the LGC. A public auction sale was then conducted
where respondent emerged as the highest bidder and was issued a certificate of sale. After the
expiration of the 1 year period for redemption, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title. CSDC filed its opposition thereto. It alleged that the auction sale was defective as
they did not receive the tax delinquency or the warrant subjecting the property, for the same was
made upon its old office address despite its transfer to another location years ago. CA ruled that the
sale was valid, on the basis of the presumption of regularity in the performance of the City Treasurer’s
duties.
Issue: Whether the auction sale was defective for failure to observe due process.
Held: Yes. There could be no presumption of the regularity of any administrative action which
resulted in depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale. This is an exception to the rule that
administrative proceedings are presumed to be regular. The due process of law to be followed in tax
proceedings must be established by proof and the general rule was that the purchaser of a tax title
was bound to take upon himself the burden of showing the regularity of all proceedings leading up to
the sale. The requirements for a tax delinquency sale (publication of notice, issuance of a warrant of
levy served upon the person having legal interest therein, public advertisement of the sale within 30
days from service of levy) under the LGC are mandatory, and failure to observe the same is tantamount
to a deprivation of due process sufficient to invalidate the sale.
PAGE 27 of 149
Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito v. Hon. Commission on Elections

November 25, 2014 / G.R. No. 212398
Facts: Edgar San Luis, a gubernatorial candidate and the incumbent governor of the Province of
Laguna, filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC First Division against E.R. Ejercito for
distributing material consideration in the form of “Orange Cards”, which could be used in any public
hospital within the province. He also alleged that Ejercito exceeded the maximum amount of
authorized expenses for the candidate by P16M. COMELEC disqualified him. Ejercito argued that an
unidentified supporter without his knowledge and consent executed the advertising contract with
ABS-CBN and Scenema Concept and that he must not be penalized for the acts of third parties. He
furthermore wishes to draw a distinction between “contribution” and “expenditure”, for which
COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 makes no proscription on the amount of contributions.
Issue: Whether Ejercito should be disqualified for overspending in his election campaign.
Held: Yes. COMELEC Resolution 9476 requires that advertising contracts be signed by the donor and
accompanied by the written acceptance of the candidate before election propaganda materials
donated thereto shall be broadcasted. Thus, there was consent and the concept of “independent
expenditure” for which no authority or request for contributions were made cannot be applied. There is
likewise no merit in petitioner’s attempt to draw a distinction between “contribution” and
“expenditure”. The Court traced the legislative history of the assailed provision and concluded that the
intent of the lawmakers was to regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his
contributor/supporter/donor, by including in the aggregate limit of the former’s election expenses
those incurred by the latter. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Rights of the
supporters to freedom of speech can neither be invoked for the regulation involved is content-neutral.
PAGE 28 of 149
Dennis A. B. Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service Commission, Francisco T. Duque III,
Executive Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza, Office of the President
November 25, 2014 / G.R. No. 191672
Facts: On January 11, 2010, PGMA appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC, which appointment was
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on February 3, 2010. On February 22, 2010, PGMA
issued E.O. No. 864 providing for the inclusion of the Chairman of the CSC as “Ex-Officio member” of
the Board of Trustees/Directors of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC, and HDMF. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of EO 864 and the designation of
Duque as member of the Board of Directors/Trustees for being clear violations of Sections 1 and 2,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent argues that the prohibition against holding any
other office or employment under the Constitution does not cover positions held without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities.
Issue: Whether Duque’s appointment as member of the Board of Trustees is proscribed by the
constitutional provision against holding any other office or employment.
Held: Yes. Section 2, Article IX-A provides that no member of a Constitutional Commission shall,
during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. The court interpreted this disqualification in
relation to Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, which provides that unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government xxx. Being an appointive official who does not occupy a Cabinet position, Duque can hold
any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position. Such is not the case here. The term “ex officio” means “from
office; by virtue of office”, and refers to an authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position. A
perusal of the charters of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF reveal that the functions of being an Ex
Officio member do not arise as a consequence of being the Chairman of the CSC. Thus, he cannot be
considered an “ex officio” member of these entities.
PAGE 29 of 149
Cerafica v. Commission on Elections

December 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 205136
Facts: On October 1, 2012, Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig, for
the 2013 Elections. Said COC stated that she was born on October 29, 1992, or that she will be 20 on
the day of the elections, in contravention of the minimum age requirement of 23. She was summoned
to a clarificatory hearing, but instead of attending, Kimberly opted to file a Sworn Statement of
Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute for Kimberly. COMELEC
resolved to cancel Kimberly’s COC and denied the substitution on the ground that the initial COC was
void and thus cannot be used for substitution.
Issue: Whether the substitution was valid.
Held: Yes. The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not give due course to COCs. The duty of the
COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and while the
COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on its
face. The question of eligibility and ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC. Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B.P. Blg. 881, not just any
person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party” may be substituted.
In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can validly
substituted.
PAGE 30 of 149
Geronimo v. Sps. Calderon

December 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 201781
Facts: Respondents filed a verified complaint before the HLURB against Silverland Realty &
Development Corp., Silverland Village Homeowners Association, Silverland Alliance Christian Church
(SACC) and the Geronimos. They alleged that the Geronimos caused construction of a building, which
turned out to be the SACC. The building was used for daily worship services, baptisms, summer
school, choir rehearsals, band practice, etc., causing a lot of noise and allegedly affecting their health.
This was contrary to the Contract to Sell the parcel of land, which provided that the parcel of land
“shall be used exclusively for one single-family residential building”. SACC responded that the HLURB
had no jurisdiction over the case which primarily involves abatement of nuisance, which is primarily
lodged with the regular courts. The HLURB rendered its decision, enjoining the use of the property for
religious purposes.
Issue: Whether HLURB had jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the
cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties. The provisions of P.D. No. 957
entitled “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” were intended to encompass
all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. In the present case, respondents are buyers
of a subdivision lot from the Corporation, and its action against the same was for violation of its own
subdivision plan when it allowed the construction and operation of the SACC. Respondents sought to
stop the church activities inside the subdivision which is in contravention of the residential use of the
subdivision lot. Undoubtedly, the suit for enforcement of statutory and contractual obligations of the
subdivision developer clearly falls within the ambit of the HLURB’s jurisdiction.
PAGE 31 of 149
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr., and the Province of Camarines Sur v. Hon. Robredo, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
December 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 195390
Facts: In 1995, the COA conducted an audit on the manner the LGUs utilized their Internal Revenie
Allotment (IRA) for the years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, revealing that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for
development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against Maintenance and
Other Operating Expenses (MOOE). In response thereto, the DILG Secretary released Memorandum
Circulars restricting the meaning of “development” and enumerated activities which must be funded
by the development fund. It also required publication of income and expenditures. In 2011, Villafuerte
filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the issuances for allegedly infringing upon the local and
fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Respondent filed his comment, moving to dismiss the case for failing to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: 1) Whether the case is ripe for judicial review; and 2) Whether the Memorandum Circulars is
void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
1) Yes. The issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the DILG. In challenging the
validity of an administrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-making power, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the
filing of a case in court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-judicial power.
2) No. The assailed Memorandum Circulars do not transgress the local and fiscal autonomy granted to
LGUs. A reading of the MC shows the definition provided for “development” is a mere reiteration of an
existing provision in the LGC. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they had
been complying with the law. The requirement of posting is valid, as the supervisory powers of the
President are broad enough to embrace the power to require publication of certain documents as a
mechanism for transparency. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. The President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs for the entire country.
PAGE 32 of 149
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Hon. Colet

December 10, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 120051, 121613, 121675, 121704, 121720-28,
121847-55, 122333, 122335, 122349, 124855
Facts: 10 consolidated petitions question the constitutionality and/or validity of the Manila Revenue
Code, enacted in 1993. Petitioners were corporations with principal offices in Manila that paid
business taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water under
protest to the City Treasurer, pursuant to the business tax provision in the Manila Revenue Code. The
RTC upheld the power of the City of Manila, as an LGU, to levy business tax, consistent with the basic
policy of fiscal autonomy.
Issue: Whether Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code was valid.
Held: No. The provision was null and void for being beyond the power of the City of Manila and its
public officials to enact, approve, and implement under the LGC. It is well-settled that although the
power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for the LGUs to whom the power must be
delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may
provide. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, or the municipality
cannot assume it. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides, “the power to tax is no longer
vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes,
fees and other charges.” Nevertheless, such authority is “subject to such guidelines and limitations as
the Congress may provide”. Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from
imposing any tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water. This is a
specific provision that explicitly withholds from any LGUs the power to tax the aforementioned
activities, and cannot be defeated by the “catch-all” provision in Section 143(h) of the LGC on the
grant of the power to the municipality to impose business tax.
PAGE 33 of 149
Maritime Industry v. COA

Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 185812
Facts: Several officers and employees of the Maritime Industry Authority received allowances and
incentives, as supposedly approved by the President. The Resident Auditor issued notices of
disallowance on the allowances and incentives received by the officers and employees of Maritime
Industry Authority, citing the Salary Standardization Law, ruling that the grant of the allowances
would constitute double compensation under the Constitution. The Legal and Adjudication Office of
the Commission on Audit upheld the notices of disallowance issued. The Commission on Audit
affirmed the notices of disallowance. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue: WoN the allowance or incentives granted to the officers and employees of Maritime Industry
Authority have legal basis
Ratio: No. The position of the MIA that the allowances were not integrated into the SSL because no
circular to that effect had yet been issued is untenable.
Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits received by government officials and
employees as incorporated in the standardized salary, unless excluded by law or an issuance by the
Department of Budget and Management. The integration of the benefits and allowances is by legal
fiction. Action by the Department of Budget and Management is not required to implement Section 12
integrating allowances into the standardized salary. Rather, an issuance by the Department of Budget
and Management is required only if additional non-integrated allowances will be identified. Without
this issuance from the Department of Budget and Management, the enumerated non-integrated
allowances in Section 12 remain exclusive.
The disallowed benefits and allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority’s officials and
employees were not excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management.
Thus, these were deemed already given to the officials and employees when they received their basic
salaries. Their receipt of the disallowed benefits and allowances was tantamount to double
compensation, and therefore void.
PAGE 34 of 149
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

Jan. 21, 2015 / G.R. No. 205728
Facts: The Diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarps within a private compound. The first one read
“IBASURA RH LAW,” while the second, more controversial one contains the heading “Conscience
Vote,” and lists candidates either as (Anti-RH) Team Buhay, with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team
Patay with an X mark, obviously based on how they voted on the RH bill.
Mavil Majarucon, Election officer of Bacolod City, issued a notice to remove campaign materials
addressed to the Bishop of Bacolod, on the ground that it was oversized. In response the bishop
requested for a definite ruling regarding the legality of the tarpaulin.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issues:
1. WoN the COMELEC has the legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens.
2. WoN the limitation on the size of the tarpaulin is content-neutral or content-based.
3. WoN there was an infringement of the principle of separation between Church and State.
Held:
1. As the Diocese of Bacolod is neither a franchise holder nor a candidate, the COMELEC has no
constitutional power to regulate their speech. The Constitution only gives it the power to regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits, or public information campaigns among
candidates. The COMELEC’s own rules define election propaganda as matters done by or on
behalf of and in coordination with candidates and political parties. The tarpaulins here were not
paid for by any candidate or political party and hence outside the scope of the COMELEC’s power.
2. The proposed speech is content-based. The size of the tarp strikes at a core part of expression;
among others, it enhances efficiency in communications and allows for more messages. Thus, the
regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and is subject to the clear and present danger
rule.
3. The tarpualins were not religious speech. Not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops,
ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. The
religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
In this case, the tarp does not on its face convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.
Thus, the speech was not religious, and could not be subject of any violation of the separation of
church and state.
PAGE 35 of 149
Risos-Vidal v COMELEC
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 206666
Facts: Joseph Ejercito Estrada was convicted of plunder by the Sandiganbayan. This crime brought
with it perpetual absolute disqualification. However, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo extended executive
clemency in the form of pardon to Estrada. The pardon explicitly provided that he was restored to his
civil and political rights.
Freshly pardoned, Erap ran for President. This was opposed by 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. All
were dismissed. Erap lost. This led to a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed for mootness.
And then Erap ran for Mayor of Manila, which led Risas-Vidal to file a petition for disqualification
against Erap, citing his previous conviction for plunder, an offense involving moral turpitude.
COMELEC dismissed the petition, and affirmed its stand en banc. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Meanwhile, Erap won. Fred Lim then intervened in this case.
Issue: WoN Erap is qualified to vote and be voted for as a result of the pardon. (Yes)
Held: Erap was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
including the right to seek public elective office. Contrary to the claim that the pardon, in order to
allow Erap to run again, should expressly restore such right, obviously a restoration of all political
rights includes that.
Further, the President’s power to pardon cannot be limited by legislative action. In particular, Arts. 36
and 41 of the RPC, which require that a pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
public office or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, must not be interpreted to diminish the President’s power to pardon by requiring that the
President explicitly name the rights to be restored. This is because the form and manner in which the
President pardons is part of the power to pardon.
Finally, though the pardon’s preamble states that “whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,” that does not function to make the
pardon conditional on that commitment. The preamble is not an essential part of an act, or in this
case of a pardon.
PAGE 36 of 149
In re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v.
Abolition of JDF and reduction of Fiscal Autonomy
Jan. 21, 2015/UDK-15143
Facts: The Save the Judicial Indepenence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement prays for an issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel the court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy
against the perceived hostility of Congress, in that there were proposed bills abolishing the Judicial
Development Fund and replacing it with the Judiciary Support Fund.
The controversial bills would have the collections from the JDF remitted to the national treasury but
then distributed as disbursements from the National Treasury.
Issue: WON the mandamus can be issued (No)
Held: The bills are merely proposed bills and are not yet law. Thus, the petition is premature, there
being as of yet no case or controversy. Further, this would be overreaching the judiciary’s
constitutional powers.
Moreover, Mijares has no standing. He has not shown that he has sustained or will sustained a direct
injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it
does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a
proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.
Neither is there transcendental importance in this case. The mere invocation of that doctrine does not
mean that the petition is of transcendental importance.
PAGE 37 of 149
Araullo v. Aquino (MR)

Feb. 3, 2015 / G.R. No. 209287
Facts: This an MR of the decision in which the SC ruled that the DAP is unconstitutional.
Issue: WON PDAF is unconstitutional (Yes)
Held: The Court reiterated the bases for its original decisions, to wit:
1. The interpretation of “savings” was a judicial matter which the Court was competent to rule on,
because that issue was brought up in the pleadings.
2. The power to augment should be strictly construed because it is an exception to the general rule
that PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. This is in order to keep
the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget
execution. Thus, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, an regardless if it is
an effective tool in stimulating the national economy, it is still illegal and unconstitutional so long
as it allows the funds used to finance the projects to deviate from the relevant provisions of the
GAA.
3. As to the argument that the DAP was just the augmentation of funds out of the savings of the
executive, although the President does have the power to suspend or stop further expenditure,
and then use any savings in the regular appropriations, under the AC1987, the reissuance of such
allotments shows that they have not been suspended or stopped. Rather obviously they have been
reappropriated.
a. The SC was quick to point out that this doesn’t apply to the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group, including the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, the CHR, and
the Ombudsman.
4. The power granted by Sec. 39 to the President to approve the use of any savings to cover a deficit
in any other appropriations, however, is plainly unconstitutional, as under the Constitution, the
President may only augment an item in the GAA in his own department. The DAP allowed the
President in exercising the augmenting power must still comply with the requirements of line-
veto. Contrary to the argument that the Constitution allows for “allotment classes,” what is really
required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President.
a. That being said, any DAP-funded projects funded with legally accumulated savings would
be considered legal.
5. Next, unprogrammed funds may only be released upon proof that the total revenues exceeded
their targets.
6. Despite this, the SC clarified that despite the pronouncement that the operative fact doctrine
cannot be used to shield liable officials, the presumption of good faith in the performance of
duties remains.
7. However, importantly, recognizing the impact of declaring all DAP-funded projects void, the
operative fact doctrine was applied to uphold the efficacy of such projects.
PAGE 38 of 149
Tordilla v Amilano
February 4, 2015 / AM No. P-14-3241
Facts: Mary-Ann Tordilla filed an administrative complaint against Court Stenographer Lorna
Amilano for failure to pay just debts. The debt in question involved the cash advance Amilano
supposedly received as Tordilla’s travel allowance, despite the latter not going on that trip.
Issues: WON Amilano was administratively liable for willful failure to pay just debts. - YES
Ratio: The OCA ruled that Amilano was only liable for simple negligence because the debt had not
been judicially declared. However, failure to pay just debts includes not only those which have been
judicially declared but also those which are admitted by the debtor. As such, failing to pay such a debt
is grounds for administrative liability.
PAGE 39 of 149
LBP v. Heirs of Alsua

February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 211351
Facts: Alsua owned an unregistered parcel of cocoland in Albay. His heirs voluntarily offered to sell
part of the land to the government under the CARL. The LBP used the formula of the DAR in arriving
at a value for just compensation of P1.37M. The heirs rejected that amount. LBP deposited the cash in
their name anyway.
Deciding on the matter of amount of just compensation, PARAD fixed the value at P5.47M. LBP filed a
case for determination of just compensation before the RTC. RTC came up with a new valuation based
on a new DAR formula of P4.245M, fixing the date of taking as the date of presumptive taking, in
accordance with the most recent DAR circular. On appeal, CA fixed amount for just compensation
using the DAR formula, but starting from the date of actual taking, resulting in a lower valuation of
P2.465M. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues: WoN the CA correctly calculated the just compensation to be paid. - NO
Ratio: The RTC and CA used formulae to be applied to rice and corn land, not to cocoland. The
taking should be at the time of actual taking. Thus, the RTC was wrong.
The following guidelines are to be observed:

1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property. In this case, this was the issuance of OCTs in
the names of the beneficiaries.
2. The evidence must conform to Sec. 17 of the CARL.
3. The RTC may impose interest on the just compensation as may be warranted by the
circumstances of the case.
4. Finally, despite all this wrangling about the proper application of the formula, the RTC is not
strictly bound to adhere to DAR formulas if the situations before it do not warrant their
application.
PAGE 40 of 149
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al.
February 23, 2015 / G.R. No 181293
Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement (ASTOA) which was approved by the DOTC Secretary and not the President.
Issue: WON the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid. - YES
Ratio: The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the
Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative
functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. Each head of a department
is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.
PAGE 41 of 149
Joseph B. Timbol vs. Commssion on Elections

February 24, 2015 / G.R. No 206004
Facts: Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. He was placed on the COMELEC list of nuisance
candidates.
Despite the recommendation of an election officer, his name was not removed from the list of
nuisance candidates. Regardless of the clarificatory hearing, his name was still not removed.
Issue: WON Timbol should have been afforded due process before his name was included as a
nuisance candidate. - YES
Ratio: COMELEC’s power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to
the candidate’s opportunity to be heard.
To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law." Among these
limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance candidates are persons who file their
certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion
among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances
or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate.”
However, in this case, Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a
chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution
No. 9610on January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a
clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
PAGE 42 of 149
Villanueva vs. JBC

April 7, 2015 / G.R. No. 211833
Facts: Petitioner MCTC Judge Ferdinand Villanueva applied for vacancies in three RTCs, but was not
included on the list of candidates due to the JBC’s policy requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-
level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, and he had only served one
year. He assailed the policy for being unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the JBC’s policy requiring five years of service before a first-level judge can qualify to
apply to second-level courts
Held: Yes. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary,
this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies
to effectively ensure its mandate. The JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing
its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by
the Constitution and law for every position.
PAGE 43 of 149
SWS vs. COMELEC

7 April 2015 / G.R. No. 208062
Facts: Petitioners SWS and Pulse Asia conducted a pre-election survey on voter preferences for
senatorial candidates, and published the same. COMELEC asked SWS to give the names or identities
of the subscribers who paid for the pre-election survey, or else be liable for violation of the Fair
Election Act. The COMELEC issued a resolution directing petitioners and similar survey firms to submit
the names of all commissioners, payors and subscribers for copying and verification by COMELEC.
Petitioners contended that this was ultra vires.
Issue: Whether the requirement to disclose the names of subscribers to election surveys is
constitutional.
Held: Yes. The resolution is a valid exercise of the COMELEC’s regulatory powers; there is a
compelling interest and it effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service, and is impelled by the imperative of fair elections. While election
surveys on their face do not state or allude to preferred candidates, when published, they have the
tendency to shape voter preference and thus partake of the nature of election propaganda.
PAGE 44 of 149
1-UTAK vs. COMELEC

April 14, 2015 / G.R. No. 206020
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, providing for the implementing rules for the Fair
Election Act in connection with the May 2013 national and local elections, and subsequent elections.
Sec 7 enumerated prohibited forms of election propaganda, which included posting of election
propaganda outside of authorized common poster areas in public places. “Public places” was defined
to include public utility vehicles and the premises of public transport terminals. Violation would result
in revocation of the public utility franchise and make the owner liable for an election offense.
Petitioner challenged the Resolution as violative of the free speech and property rights of the owners
of PUVs and transport terminals.
Issue: Whether the prohibition of posting campaign materials in PUVs and transport terminals was
valid
Held: No. These restrictions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech, i.e. the freedom of the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to express their
preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others
to agree with them. COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation
utilities during an election period pursuant to Sec 4, Art IX-C of the Constitution; it may not regulate
the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
The expression of ideas of a PUV owner through posting election materials on the vehicle does not
affect considerations pertinent to the PUV’s operations; hence, regulating expression of ideas is in
such a manner not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very
ownership of the vehicle.
PAGE 45 of 149
Bishop Pabillo vs. COMELEC

April 21, 2015 / G.R. No. 216098
Facts: After bidding, a lease with option to purchase until December 31, 2010 and warranty for labor,
technical support and maintenance for 10 years for the AES was awarded to Smartmatic-TIM in 2009.
In 2012, COMELEC exercised the option to purchase. In 2013, Smartmatic offered to extend the
warranty of the PCOS machines for 3 years, and a draft contract was sent to COMELEC. The
COMELEC’s Law Department upon review stated that the procedure for direct contracting would only
be applied if the conditions for resort to said method were present, and that the Bids and Awards
Committee and COMELEC’s Information Technology Department should first confirm if Smartmatic
was the sole provider of the services to be procured. However, the COMELEC approved the proposal.
Petitioners challenged the validity of the contract due to the resort to direct contracting.
Issue: Whether the resort to direct contracting was valid
Held: No. Public bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government contracts. As an
exception, Art. XVI of the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA) sanctions resort to alternative
methods of procurement, including via direct contracting. This is only available in highly exceptional
cases and subject to several conditions.
The Manual of Procedures for the Procurement of Goods and Services of the Government Procurement
Policy Board allows alternative methods if: (1) There is prior approval of the Head of the Procuring
Entity, as recommended by the BAC; and (2) The conditions required by law for the use of alternative
methods are present. Also, (3) The Procuring Entity must ensure that the chosen method promoted
economy and efficiency; and (4) The most advantageous price for the government must be obtained.
There was non-compliance with (2). Sec 50(a), Art XVI of the GPRA allows direct contracting only
when it involves goods of proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the proprietary source.
The “goods” herein involved refer to the services of the machines’ repair and refurbishment, not the
machines themselves. No evidence was shown that Smartmatic-TIM possessed intellectual property
rights over the method, process, system, program, or work servicing the PCOS machines for their
repair and refurbishment, and thus cannot be said to be the services’ proprietary source. Moreover,
based on the 2009 contract, COMELEC was granted a license to use, modify and customize the PCOS
systems and software, including the right to alter and modify the source code, due to the exercise of
the option to purchase.
PAGE 46 of 149
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Reyes
April 21, 2015 / G.R. No. 180771
Facts: Two petitioners were filed concerning Service Contract 46 which allowed the exploration,
development and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tanon Strait and was executed with
JAPEX, which was 100% Japanese-owned. The petitioners in the first petition, were collectively
referred to as the “Resident Marine Mammals”, consisting of the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises
and other cetacean species inhabiting the waters in and around Tanon Strait. They were also joined by
their legal guardians and friends who allegedly empathize with and seek the protection of the
aforementioned marine species.
Issues:
1. Whether the resident marine mammals have standing to file the petition
2. Whether the SC No. 46 is violative of the Constitution
Held:
1. Unnecessary to show. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases have been given a
more liberalized approach. The Resident Marine Mammals need not be given standing since any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, is allowed to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. Notably, the Stewards are joined as real parties, not just in representation of the named
cetacean species, and thus said Stewards have the legal standing to file the petition.
2. Yes. SC-46 was null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the Constitution as
enumerated in La Bugal: (1) That the service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general
law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country; (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government; (3) Within 30 days of the
executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government
an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. SC-46 did not
comply with (2) and (3).
Moreover, Tanon Strait is a protected seascape, and thus any activity outside the scope of its
management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA
to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system. The exploitation and utilization of
this energy resource may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, but there is no such
law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tanon Strait.
PAGE 47 of 149
The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco

April 22, 2015 / G.R. No. 202331
Facts: Five days before the end of her term as Governor, Governor Ong appointed Hilario Marco as
Cooperative Development Specialist II, along with 25 other appointments. These were later
disapproved due to lack of funds. Marco successfully challenged the disapproval. However, the
Province then argued that Marco was a midnight appointee. The CA ruled that Marco’s case was an
exception to the prohibition of midnight appointees as he was fully qualified for the position and
underwent a screening process long before the election ban. The Province then claimed that Marco
failed to present convincing evidence showing that he underwent a regular screening process.
Issue: Whether the prohibition against midnight appointments applies
Held: No. A midnight appointment, prohibited by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution, is one made
within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election. The constitutional prohibition
on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to those made
by local chief executives.
The CSC may establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in civil service,
including prohibition against local officials making appointments during the last days of their tenure.
In Nazareno, the Court upheld a CSC Resolution prohibiting local electives from making appointments
immediately before and after elections, and against mass appointments. However, Nazareno is
inapplicable as the Resolution effective during the appointments made in Nazareno was superseded
by another Resolution which permits appointments made after elections up to June 30 if the
appointee is fully qualified and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban.
Marco fell under this category.
PAGE 48 of 149
UP LAW BOC LABOR LAW DIGEST COMPILATION
LABOR LAW
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. v. Ferdinand Acibo, et al.
January 15, 2014 / GR. No. 186439
Facts:
Complainants in this case were employees of URSUMCO hired from February 1988 to April 1996 on
different capacities. Each signed contracts of one month or for a specific season but were repeatedly
hired for the same duties with renewed contracts each time. These complainants filed a case before
the LA for regularization and entitlement to CBA benefits. LA dismissed for lack of merit, ruling that
they were seasonal or project workers and not regular employees. It noted that complainants were
required to perform, for a definite period, phases of URSUMCO’s several projects that were not at all
directly related to the latter’s main operations. NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA, finding that
complainants performed activities which were usually necessary and desirable in the usual trade or
business of URSUMCO, and had been repeatedly hired for the same undertaking every season. CA
upheld the finding that they were regular employees, further noting that URSEMCO failed to prove
that it had given the employees opportunity to work elsewhere during the off-season.
Held:
The Court distinguished the various kinds of employment, thus:
A. Regular Employment
Regular employment refers to that arrangement whereby the employee "has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer." Under the definition, the primary standard that determines regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee and the usual
business or trade of the employer; the emphasis is on the necessity or desirability of the employee’s
activity.
Art. 295, par. 2 of the Labor Code also considers regular a casual employment arrangement when the
casual employee’s engagement has lasted for at least one year, regardless of the engagement’s
continuity. The controlling test in this arrangement is the length of time.
B. Project Employment
Project employment contemplates an arrangement whereby "the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking whose completion or termination has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee." Two requirements need to be satisfied to remove the engagement
from the presumption of regularity of employment, namely: (1) designation of a specific project or
undertaking for which the employee is hired; and (2) clear determination of the completion or
termination of the project at the time of the employee’s engagement.
The length of time of the engagement is not controlling as the employment may last for more than a
year, depending on the needs or circumstances of the project. Nevertheless, this length of time or the
continuous rehiring of the employee may serve as a badge of regular employment when the activities
performed by the purported "project" employee are necessary and indispensable.
C. Seasonal Employment
PAGE 49 of 149
Seasonal employment operates much in the same way as project employment, albeit it involves work
or service that is seasonal in nature or lasting for the duration of the season. Although the seasonal
employment arrangement involves work that is seasonal or periodic in nature, the employment itself is
not automatically considered seasonal so as to prevent the employee from attaining regular status. To
exclude the asserted "seasonal" employee from those classified as regular employees, the employer
must show that: (1) the employee must be performing work or services that are seasonal in nature; and
(2) he had been employed for the duration of the season.
D. Casual Employment
Casual employment, the third kind of employment arrangement, refers to any other employment
arrangement that does not fall under any of the first two categories, i.e., regular or project/seasonal.
E. Fixed-term Employment
The Labor Code does not mention another employment arrangement – contractual or fixed term
employment (or employment for a term) – which, if not for the fixed term, should fall under the
category of regular employment in view of the nature of the employee’s engagement, which is to
perform an activity usually necessary or desirable in the employer’s business.
In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, the Court upheld the validity of the fixed-term employment in
instances where (a) the fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the
parties absent any circumstances vitiating the employee’s consent, or (b) where the facts satisfactorily
show that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms.
The Court ruled that the employees were regular seasonal workers of URSUMCO since:
(a) they performed tasks that did not at all pertain to any specific phase of URSUMCO’s operations
that would ultimately cease upon completion of a particular phase; rather, they performed
activities that are necessary and desirable in sugarcane production;
(b) they were regularly and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks year after year; and
(c) contrary to the assertion of URSUMCO, the records do not show that the employees were free to
work elsewhere during the off-season.
PAGE 50 of 149
Raul Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al.

February 5, 2014 / GR No. 201298
Facts:
Cosare was employed as a salesman by respondent Arevalo in April 1993. Arevalo was engaged in the
sale of broadcasting equipment to television networks and production houses and later set up
Broadcom to continue the business. Cosare was named as an incorporator of Broadcom and was later
promoted to Asst. Vice President for Sales. In 2003, Alex Abiog was appointed VP for Sales. In March
2009, Cosare sent a memo to Arevalo reporting anomalies alleged to have been committed by Abiog.
Arevalo failed to act on his accusations and instead asked him to tender his resignation. Cosare
refused. Cosare later received a memo charging him with serious misconduct and willful breach of
trust, and giving him 48 hours to respond. In the meantime, he was prevented from entering company
offices and his Memo addressing the accusations had to be sent by mail. He filed a case for
constructive dismissal. LA ruled in favor of Broadcom but this was reversed by the NLRC. On petition
for certiorari before the CA, Broadcom raised the argument that the case was an intra-corporate
controversy since Cosare was a stockholder and a corporate officer. CA granted the petition, finding
that the case involved and intra-corporate controversy.
Held:
The Court ruled that there are two circumstances which must concur in order for an individual to be
considered a corporate officer, as against an ordinary employee or officer, namely: (1) the creation of
the position is under the corporation’s charter or by-laws; and (2) the election of the officer is by the
directors or stockholders.
Cosare was not a corporate officer as his position of AVP for Sales was not listed in the corporate by-
laws. The reliance by the CA on the General Information Sheets was misplaced as this could neither
govern nor establish the nature of the office held by Cosare.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder of Broadcom at the time of the filing of the
case did not necessarily make the action an intra-corporate controversy. The Court ruled that the
controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as
well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.
The Court distinguished between a “regular employee” and a “corporate officer” for purposes of
establishing the true nature of a dispute or complaint for illegal dismissal and determining which body
has jurisdiction. In case of the regular employee, the LA has jurisdiction; otherwise, the RTC exercises
the legal authority to adjudicate. Here, the LA had the original jurisdiction over the complaint for
illegal dismissal because Cosare was not a “corporate officer” as the term is defined by law.
PAGE 51 of 149
Universidad De Sta Isabel v. Marvin-Julian L. Sambajon, Jr

April 2, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 196280 & 196286
Facts:
Universidad De Sta Isabel hired Sambajon as an Assistant Professor on probationary status effective
from November 1, 2002 up to March 30, 2003 (one semester). After the contract expired, Universidad
continued to give him teaching loads. In June 2003, Sambajon completed his master’s degree and his
salary was increased, as reflected in his pay slips starting October 2004. In a letter, Sambajon argued
that his salary increase should be made effective as of June 2003 and demanded the payment of his
salary differential. Universidad denied his claim saying that he effectively wanted his salary adjusted
after a mere one semester of probationary service, a privilege that not even the permanent teachers
enjoyed. Universidad then sent him a letter of termination stating that his full time probationary
appointment will no longer be renewed when it expires on March 31, 2005. Sambajon filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
held:
The probationary period can only last for a specific maximum period and under reasonable, well-laid,
and properly communicated standards (for regular employees, 6 months; for teachers, 3 years).
Clearly, the fixed contract of the teacher is due to the fact that the school year is divided into
trimesters. Therefore, the fixed-term contracts are convenient arrangements and not because the
parties really intended to limit the period of their relationship to any fixed term and to finish this
relationship at the end of that term, seeing as such contracts are renewable, unless the petitioners fail
to pass the school’s standards.
In a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not specifically used
for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the
contract must give way. However, since Sambajon has not completed 3 years (six consecutive
semesters), he is still a probationary employee.
Notwithstanding the limited engagement of probationary employees, they are entitled to

constitutional protection of security of tenure during and before the end of the probationary
period. Their employment may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized
cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
prescribed by the employer. Here, the letter of termination did not state a just or authorized cause.
Prior to this, respondent had consistently achieved above average rating. Clearly, respondent’s
termination after five semesters of satisfactory service was illegal.
PAGE 52 of 149
Indophil textile Mills v. Adviento

August 4, 2014 / G.R. No. 171212
Facts:
Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged manufacturing thread for weaving. In
1990, it hired respondent Adviento as a civil engineer to maintain its facilities. In 2002, respondent
consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness. He was diagnosed with chronic poly
sinusitis, and thereafter, with moderate, severe and persistent allergic rhinitis. Accordingly,
respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and textile dust as exposure to
these elements would cause him health problems. Since the respondent’s persistent requests for
better health conditions in his office went unheeded, respondent filed a complaint with the NLRC for
alleged illegal dismissal and money claims. Subsequently, he filed another complaint with the RTC,
alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of petitioner
to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable environment. In the RTC case, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming among others, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint
because the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the LA under Article 217 (a)(4) of
the Labor Code.
HELD:
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code,
to be cognizable by the LA, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided
for in that article. The "reasonable causal connection rule" states that if there is a reasonable causal
connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within
the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have
jurisdiction.
True, the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases. More, the
acts complained of appear to constitute matters involving employee-employer relations since
respondent used to be the civil engineer of petitioner. However, it should be stressed that
respondent’s claim for damages is specifically grounded on petitioner’s gross negligence to provide a
safe, healthy and workable environment for its employees - a case of quasi-delict, within the ambit of
the regular court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction.
PAGE 53 of 149
Imasen v. Alcon
October 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 194884
FACTS:
Ramonchito Alcon and Joann Papa, both employees of Imasen, were caught having sexual intercourse
at the Imasen plant’s “Tool and Die” section during work hours. They were given the opportunity to
provide an explanation and a hearing was also conducted regarding the administrative charge against
them. They were found guilty of gross misconduct contrary to company regulations and were
terminated. While the LA and NLRC found the dismissal valid, the CA did not consider such act to be
covered by serious misconduct to warrant dismissal.
HELD:
For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, the following elements must
concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's
duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it
must have been performed with wrongful intent.
Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises and during work
hours. These circumstances, by themselves, are already punishable misconduct. Added to these
considerations, however, is the implication that the respondents did not only disregard company rules
but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could reflect adversely on the status of ethics and
morality in the company. Dismissal valid.
PAGE 54 of 149
New Filipino Maritime Agencies Inc., St. Paul Maritime Corp., and Angelina T. Rivera v.
Michael D. Despabelarderas
November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 209201
Facts:
On April 26, 2009, Michael joined the vessel M/V Athens Highway as Wiper for a contract period of 9
months. On August 20, 2009, while going down the stairs of the vessel, he slipped and fractured his
left hand. A few days later, he experienced severe pain and swelling in his left wrist, and so he was
brought to the nearest hospital. He was repatriated on August 28, 2009 and was given medical
attention supervised by the company physician, and later on endorsed to an orthopedic surgeon, who
recommended that he continue with physical therapy sessions. On Feb 10, 2010, he was required to
return for a follow-up checkup on Feb 17, but for unknown reasons, he failed to return, and instead
demanded to be paid disability benefits. During this length of time of more than 120 days, no
assessment of his fitness to return to work or permanent disability was made by the company
physician. Michael argued that this failure to report for more than 120 days, leaving his medical
condition unresolved, rendered him totally and permanently disabled.
Held:
The Court in Vergara held that the 120-day rule could not simply be applied as a general rule for all
cases and in all contexts. Vergara’s application depends on the circumstances of the case, especially
the parties’ compliance with their contractual duties and obligations as laid down in the POEA-SEC
and/or their CBA, if one exists. That same case instructed that the POEA-SEC contract must be read
together with the Rules Implementing the Labor Code in that if the 120-day period is exceeded and no
such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, the temporary total
disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.
There being no assessment because of his own medical abandonment, his condition cannot be
considered a permanent total disability. Temporary total disability only becomes permanent when
declared by the company physician within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of
the 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or permanent
disability.
PAGE 55 of 149
Sara Lee Phils v Macatlang

Jan. 14, 2015/ G.R. No. 180147
FACTS:
Aris Philippines ceased operations, leaving almost 6,000 employees unemployed. However, Fashion
Accessories Phils Inc. was later incorporated. This led the employees to file a case for illegal dismissal
against both those companies, alleging that FAPI was a mere continuation of Aris Philippines. LA
found that there was illegal dismissal. NLRC reversed, on the ground that the corporations had yet to
post an appeal bond. CA ordered them to file the bond, as did the SC. Hence this MR.
HELD:
Previous rulings that 10% appeal bonds are sufficient compliance pertains only to the reasonable
amount that the NLRC would accept to accompany a motion to reduce bond, not a reduction of the
amount of the appeal bond.
As for the compromise designated as confession of judgment, it was struck down for being against
public policy. First, a confession of judgment is void when executed by counsel without the knowledge
and authority of the client. Here, not all 6000 complainants signed SPAs. Thus, the confession of
judgment is void.
Even if this was a compromise agreement and not a confession of judgment, it is against public policy
because there is a great disparity between the amount offered therein by the corporations (342M) and
the judgment award (3.45B). Accepting this outrageously low amount of consideration as a
compromise defeats the complainants’ legitimate claims.
PAGE 56 of 149
Saudi Arabian Air v. Rebesencio

Jan. 14, 2015 / G.R. No. 198587
FACTS:
Two Filipina stewardesses were dismissed from Saudi Arabian Airlines, on the ground that their
employment contracts provided that should stewardesses become pregnant during the pendency of
the contract, their employment shall be terminated. However, instead of terminating them, they were
forced to sign resignation letters. This led them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA dismissed
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. NLRC reversed. CA
affirmed. Hence this petition for review.
HELD:
Summons were validly served on Saudia, through its Philippine office. Thus the courts had jurisdiction.
Next, there were no circumstances which required the application of forum non conveniens. Even
though forum non conveniens is different from choice of law, the choice of law clause in the contracts
does not preclude the application of Philippine law.
Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded
at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived. It must also proceed from a
factually established basis, i.e. that the case has been brought in another jurisdiction. Thus, a
defendant must show not only supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in this jurisdiction, but
also that the danger is real and present in that litigation and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to
exercise jurisdiction.
As for choice of law, citing Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople, Philippine labor laws must be
construed as being written into employment contracts of Filipinos, in accordance with the public policy
of the Philippines. That also includes the constitutional provisions on the equal treatment of women
and the CEDAW. The provision on termination in case of pregnancy touches on public policy, and
Philippine law should be applied.
Thus, the stewardesses were constructively dismissed, as they did not intend to resign and were forced
to resign. They intended to continue working for Saudia, and exerted all efforts to remain so
employed.
PAGE 57 of 149
One Shipping v Penafiel

Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 192406
FACTS:
One Shipping hired Ildefonso Penafiel as a Second Engineer aboard the MV/ACX Magnolia. While
aboard, he had chest pains. However, he was refused medical attention. When he came back to the
Philippines after his contract was up, he died of myocardial infarction. His wife then filed for monetary
claims arising from his death. One Shipping refused to pay death benefits because they claimed his
death came after the employment contract had lapsed.
HELD:
Ildefonso pre-terminated his contract when he asked for a vacation leave and was paid all that was
due him as a result of his employment. Thus, at the time he arrived in the Philippines, the employer-
employee relationship had already been terminated. In accordance with the POEA standard
employment contract, to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the
effectivity of the employment contract.
PAGE 58 of 149
Unicol v Malipot
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 206562
FACTS:
Glicerio Malipot worked as a seaman processed by Unicol Management services. While he was aboard
the ship, he suffered emotional strain. Because of this, he wanted to disembark, but the Port captain
did not allow him to leave the vessel. He thus became depressed until he committed suicide by
hanging in the store room of the ship. His wife filed a complaint for death benefits.
HELD:
The CA ruled that there was no suicide because the evidence did not state the circumstances
regarding the cause of Glicerio’s death. The SC ruled that the Investigation Report, log book extracts,
and Master’s Reports all strongly point out that seaman Glicerio died because he committed suicide.
As such, in accordance with the POEA standard employment contract, no death benefits should be
paid in respect of death resulting from his own willful or criminal acts, including suicide.
PAGE 59 of 149
Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove

Jan. 28, 2015 / G.R. No. 187226
FACTS:
Leus was a teacher with St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove. She was fired for engaging in pre-marital
sexual relations, and getting pregnant out of wedlock, allegedly because this constituted immoral
conduct, a ground for dismissal under the Education Act of 1982. This, even if she later married the
father of her child. She thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
HELD:
The conclusion that the premarital pregnancy was disgraceful or immoral conduct was arrived at
arbitrarily. The LA, NLRC, and CA all ruled that pregnancy out of wedlock was disgraceful and
immoral per se, as Leus worked at a Catholic school. The SC disagreed. For that to be the case, there
must be substantial evidence to establish that the pre-marital sexual relations and pregnancy out of
wedlock were indeed immoral. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case
should be considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct an applicable laws. It is
worth noting that those norms should be public and secular morals, not religious morals.
Here, the pregnancy out of wedlock was ruled not disgraceful or immoral conduct because she and the
father of her child had no impediment to marry each other. Neither was there any evidence that the
pregnancy caused grave scandal to the school and its students.
PAGE 60 of 149
Milan v NLRC
February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 202961
Facts:
Various employees of Solid Mills had been allowed to live in SMI village, which was owned by Solid
Mills, on the condition that they would vacate the premises any time the Company deemed it fit. Solid
Mills then ceased operations due to serious business losses. As part of the cessation of business, Solid
Mills was to give separation pay and benefits. In order to be paid such benefits, the employees signed
quitclaims, which included agreements to vacate the village. Milan et al. refused to sign the
quitclaims, but demanded the payment of their separation pay. The company refused. This led to the
filing of a complaint for non-payment of separation pay. Solid Mills’ defense was that it would not pay
until Milan vacated the village.
held:
While, as a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees, as an
exception, the employer may require clearance before the release of wages. Such clearance
procedures are SOPs among employers, and are provided for in order to ensure that their properties in
the possession of the separated employees are returned to the employer before the employee’s
departure.
The bases are Art. 113 of the LC, which provides that an employer, as an exception may deduct from an
employee’s wages when authorized by law, and Art. 1706 of the CC, which provides that an employer,
again by exception, may withhold wages for a debt due.
The debts contemplated include the undertaking to vacate the premises of SMI Village. The continued
stay at the village was as a result of employment with Solid Mills, which had terminated. It is not
claimed otherwise. The law does not sanction a situation where employees who do no assert any claim
over their employer’s property are allowed to take all the benefits out of their employment while
simultaneously withholding possession of their employer’s property for no rightful reason.
PAGE 61 of 149
Villena v Batangas II Cooperative

February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 205735
Facts:
Villena was a financial manager of Batangas II Cooperative. She won a labor case for illegal dismissal.
However, the NLRC judgment was silent on the payment of allowances, benefits, and attorney’s fees.
Thus, she filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA granted petition, granting her allowances and
any other benefits, before remanding the case to the NLRC for computation. The LA, on computing the
amounts, excluded, among others, retirement benefits and representation, transportation, and
cellular phone usage allowances. NLRC included those amounts, leading Batangas II to appeal to the
CA. CA reversed the inclusion of those benefits. Hence this petition for review.
HELD:
Representation, transportation, and cellular phone allowances are clearly given to financial managers
as part of their benefits so they should be awarded. However, retirement benefits should not be
awarded. Villena’s complaint for illegal dismissal stated no cause of action for retirement benefits.
She had not retired at the time the decision had become final and executory.
PAGE 62 of 149
Protective v. Fuentes
February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 169303
Facts:
Fuentes worked as a security guard for Protective Maximum Security Agency. He was assigned to
PICOP in Agusan Del Norte. However, the compound was ransacked by the NPA. Fuentes was
believed to have conspired and acted with the NPA, based on the affidavits of the other security
guards. Thus, a complaint for robbery was filed against him. As a result of this, Fuentes was detained
by police in Surigao del Sur, and later at the Trento Municipal jail. Fortunately for him the case was
dismissed at the PI stage. When he tried to return to work, he was refused entry at PICOP on the
ground that he was a member of the NPA and that a new guard had been hired to replace him. He
then filed a case for illegal dismissal.
HELD:
Fuentes’ absence did not constitute abandonment. Abandonment constitutes a just cause for
dismissal because the employer cannot be compelled to maintain an employee who is remiss in
fulfilling his duties to the employer, particularly the fundamental task of reporting to work. However,
the employer must prove the ff. 2 elements of abandonment: (1) a failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reasons; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship.
Here, there were justifiable reasons for Fuentes not to return to work. It was proven that he was beaten
by PICOP’s employees while in the custody of the police. He was so traumatized that he asked to
remain in police custody because he feared for his life. He only left such custody when accompanied by
his mother. Thus, he was justified in not reporting for work.
Neither was there a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. He reported for work
after the criminal charges against him were dropped. This shows that he still intended to work for
Protective.
PAGE 63 of 149
UP LAW BOC CIVIL LAW DIGEST COMPILATION
CIVIL LAW
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Asuncion Felonia and Lydia De Guzman
February 26, 2014 / GR No. 189477
Facts: Felonia and De Guzman were the registered owners of a parcel of land. They mortgaged it to
Delgado but executed a Deed of Absolute sale with option of Repurchase. However, Felonia and De
Guzman filed an action to reform the deed into a deed of mortgage, Delgado appealed.
During the pendency of the case, Delgado filed a petition for consolidation of ownership over the
property, which was granted and a new title was issued in Delgado’s name.
Delgado then mortgaged the property to HSLB. Felonia and De Guzman caused a notice of lis pendens
on Delgado’s title.
Eventually, HSLB foreclosed the property and transferred title into its own name. Felonia and De
Guzman filed a complaint against HSLB.
Issue: WON HSLB is a buyer in good faith? NO.
Ratio:
A buyer in good faith is one who not only checks the title but also who are in possession of the land
and in what concept they possess such land. Meanwhile, a purchaser in good faith is defined as one
who buys a property without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property
and pays full and fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
other persons in the property.
Spouses Mathay v. CA: When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and circumstances as to arouse
his suspicion, he must take precautionary steps to qualify as a purchaser in good faith. The failure of a
prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would
thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in good faith.
In this case, at the time HSLB purchased the subject property, the Notice of Lis Pendens was already
annotated on the title. Hence the HSLB cannot be considered a buyer in good faith.
PAGE 64 of 149
Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson

March 10, 2014 / GR No. 163767
Facts: Rosario filed an application for land registration in Bulacan. An issue arose as to whether the
land is alienable or not, as there was no express declaration by the State that it was such.
Ratio: There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain is not considered in reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the possessor.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. No tax declarations for prior years
except 2002 were shown.
PAGE 65 of 149
Macaria Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank Inc

March 19, 2014 / GR No. 200468
Facts: Sps. Guia owned a parcel of land. However, they sold the south portion to Sps. Arguelles.
However, despite Sps. Arguelles immediately acqurigin possession of the ladn, the deed of sale was
not registered or annotated. Sps. Guia supposedly subdivided the land and applied for separate titles
but Sps. Arguelles claimed they never received their TCT.
Sps. Guia later obtained loan from Malarayat Bank with a deed of mortgage over the land. Years later
did the Sps. Arguelles discover that their land was burdened with a mortgage. Hence, they filed a
complaint for annulment of mortgage.
Ratio: In Bank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, Jr.,19 we declared that indeed, a mortgagee has a
right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property offered as security,
and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to
undertake further investigation… In addition, In cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with
the registered owner of real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised
by the mortgagee.
Respondent, however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private

individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those
involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering
into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as
security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.
PAGE 66 of 149
PNB v. Garcia
June 2, 2014 / GR No. 182839
Facts: Spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the
petitioner, Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank). The loan was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over their property.
Jose Garcia Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject property as
additional collateral security for the latter’s increased loan. The mortgage was executed after the
death of his wife Ligaya Garcia, but before the liquidation of their conjugal assets.
PNB sought to foreclose on the mortgage, but the heirs of Ligaya Garcia sought to have the mortgage
annulled, as they were not parties to the contract.
PNB asserts that since the property was registered in the name of Jose Garcia, the same is exclusive
property.
Issue: WON the property mortgaged is conjugal. YES.
Held: Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired. The registration of the property is
not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property
appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage.
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved
and terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and the successional rights of her heirs
vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that"[t]he rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." Consequently, the conjugal
partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after the death
of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil
Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed
property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his children’s consent.
PAGE 67 of 149
AFP-RSBS v. Republic
July 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 180086
Facts: The Armed Forces of the Phils. Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) filed
an application for original registration over certain parcels of land. These were allegedly acquired from
Narciso Ambrad, Alberto Tibayan, and Restituto Tibayan on March 13, 1997. It was also alleged that
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the properties since June 12, 1945.
The lower court ruled in their favor. The Republic appealed, arguing that since the land was declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the period of possession of the predecessors-in-
interest before that date should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Hence,
AFPRSBS’s and its predecessors-in-interest’s possessions could not ripen into ownership.
Issue: WON the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and disposable
agricultural land should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession for purposes of
original registration. – YES.
Ratio: The court here upheld its ruling in Republic v. Naguit.

1. The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
2. Petitioner’s right to the original registration of title over the property is, therefore, dependent on
the existence of: a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the
application for registration and b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner
through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
PAGE 68 of 149
Landbank v. Lajom
August 20, 2014 / G.R. No. 184982
Facts: Respondents were the registered owners of several parcels of land in Nueva Ecija. A portion of
the land was placed under the government's Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to the
"Tenants Emancipation Decree".
Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and, instead, filed an amended Petition for determination of just
compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR, the LBP, and the farmer-
beneficiaries. He argued that the DAR valuation was arrived at without due process, highly prejudicial
and inimical to his and his heirs’ property rights. He alleged that in computing the amount of just
compensation, the DAR erroneously applied the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228, Series of 1997, that
have already been repealed by Section 17 of RA 6657.
For its part, the LBP agreed with the DAR valuation and insisted that PD 27 and EO 228, on which the
DAR valuation was based, were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657, contrary to Lajom’s
stance.
Held: While the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed
under the land reform, its valuation is considered only as an initial determination and not conclusive.
As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be determined at
the time of the property’s taking. Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the time
emancipation patents are issued by the government (see LBP vs Heirs of Domingo).
PAGE 69 of 149
Noveras v. Noveras
August 20, 2014 / G.R. No. 188289
Facts: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines,
Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.
Held: Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. As a
general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
PAGE 70 of 149
Ando v. DFA
August 27, 2014 / G.R. No. 195432
Facts: Petitioner Edelina married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National. Yuichiro Kobayashi
validly granted under Japanese laws a divorce. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated
her to remarry, petitioner married Masatomi Ando.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname with
her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the DFA that the same cannot be issued to her
until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Ando is valid.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief. RTC dismissed the case stating that she
had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to file a
direct petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage, with even more reason can
it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further,
petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one that is void or voidable – shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Held: With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should
have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
PAGE 71 of 149
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 211356
Facts: Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove. While the
company was already operating a resort in the area, it also applied for the issuance of a building
permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land located in Sitio Diniwid.
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed
construction site was within the "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.
Subsequently, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel.
Held: In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type
of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times
and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotel’s
particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the Court still finds that the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare.
The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of
the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological
balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental
issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle-compliance.
PAGE 72 of 149
Dela Torre v. Imbuido

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 192973
Facts: Pedrito filed a complaint for damages against herein respondents in their capacity as the
owners and operators of the Divine Spirit General Hospital in Olongapo City. Pedrito alleged in his
complaint that he was married to Carmen, who died while giving birth at the Divine Spirit General
Hospital on February 13, 1992.
HELD: The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection
between the negligence and the injuries. The claimant must prove not only the injury but also the
defendant's fault, and that such fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be
based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability
based upon competent expert testimony, which the Court finds absent in the case at bar.
In this case, while the expert (Dr. Patilano) provided by the Petitoners opined that Carmen died of
peritonitis, which could be due to the poor state of the hospital equipment and medical supplies used
during her operation, there was no sufficient proof that any such fault actually attended the surgery of
Carmen, caused her illness and resulted in her death. It is also significant that the Chief of the Medico-
Legal Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Torres, testified before the trial court that
based on the autopsy report issued by Dr. Patilano, the latter did not comply with the basic autopsy
procedure when he examined the cadaver of Carmen. Dr. Patilano did not appear to have thoroughly
examined Carmen’s vital organs such as her heart, lungs, uterus and brain during the autopsy. His
findings were then inconclusive on the issue of the actual cause of Carmen's death, and the claim of
negligence allegedly committed by the respondents.
PAGE 73 of 149
Robles v. Yapcinco
October 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 169568
Facts: Yapcinco constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of Jose C. Marcelo to secure the
performance of his obligation. Marcelo later transferred his right to Apolinario Cruz. Apolinario Cruz
brought an action for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage when Yapcinco was unable to pay. Yapcinco
died during the pendency of the action so his estate was held liable. Cruz was the highest bidder at the
public auction. However, he did not register the certificate of sale; nor was a judicial confirmation of
sale issued. He later donated the property to his grandchildren. Yapcinco’s heirs filed an action to
reconvey the property. They claimed that although the property had been mortgaged, the mortgage
had not been foreclosed, judicially or extra-judicially.
Issue: Who has a better right to the property – Cruz’s heirs
Held: Before anything more, the Court clarifies that the failure of Apolinario Cruz to register the
certificate of sale was of no consequence in this adjudication. The registration of the sale is required
only in extra-judicial foreclosure sale because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the
exercise of the right of redemption. The applicable rule on March 18, 1959, the date of the foreclosure
sale, was Section 3, Rule 70 of theRules of Court. The records show that no judicial confirmation of the
sale was made despite the lapse of more than 40 years since the date of the sale. Hence, it cannot be
said that title was fully vested in Apolinario Cruz.
The effect of the failure of Apolinario Cruz to obtain the judicial confirmation was only to prevent the
title to the property from being transferred to him. For sure, such failure did not give rise to any right in
favor of the mortgagor or the respondents as his successors-in-interest to take back the property
already validly sold through public auction. Nor did such failure invalidate the foreclosure
proceedings. To maintain otherwise would render nugatory the judicial foreclosure and foreclosure
sale, thus unduly disturbing judicial stability. The non-transfer of the title notwithstanding, Apolinario
Cruz as the purchaser should not be deprived of the property purchased at the foreclosure sale. With
the respondents having been fully aware of the mortgage, and being legally bound by the judicial
foreclosure and consequent public sale, and in view of the unquestioned possession by Apolinario
Cruz and his successors-in-interest (including the petitioner) from the time of the foreclosure sale until
the present, the respondents could not assert any better right to the property. It would be the height of
inequity to still permit them to regain the property on the basis alone of the lack of judicial
confirmation of the sale. After all, under the applicable rule earlier cited, the judicial confirmation
operated only "to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law."
PAGE 74 of 149
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Bank of the Philippine

Islands v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Global Business Bank, Inc. v. Wilfred N. Chiok
November 26, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 172652, 175302, 175394
Facts: Chiok has been engaged in dollar trading for several years, by reason of which he maintained
accounts with Metrobank and Global Bank, with which he had a Bills Purchase Line Agreement
(BPLA). 2 Manager’s Checks (MC) and 1 Cashier’s Check (CC) were issued by Global Bank and
Metrobank respectively in the name of Gonzalo Nuguid, which Chiok deposited in the Nuguid’s BPI
account. In return, Nuguid was supposed to deliver around US$1M, which he failed to do. Chiok
secured a TRO from the RTC directing the banks from honoring the checks, which Metrobank received
a day after the check was presented for payment. BPI filed a complaint-in-intervention for allegedly
allowing Nuguid to withdraw the amounts of the Global Bank MCs on the same day the checks were
deposited. RTC ruled that payment of MCs and CCs are subject to the condition that the payee thereof
complies with his obligations to the purchaser of the checks. It ultimately ordered the banks to pay
Chiok the value of the checks, and Nuguid to pay the banks. The banks submit that the Stop Order was
illegal and contrary to principles of commercial law.
Issues: Whether the purchaser of the checks has the right to have the checks cancelled by filing an
action for rescission of its contract with the payee.
Held: No. The right to rescind under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the CA in tis ruling, is
predicated upon the reciprocity of the obligations of the injured party and the guilty party. The right of
rescission under Article 1191 can only be exercised in accordance with the principle of relativity of
contracts under Article 1131, where contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof. Here, while Chiok may have a cause of action against Nuguid for the rescission of
their contract, he does not have a cause of action against the banks that would allow him to rescind
the MCs and CC, which would have resulted in the crediting of the amounts thereof back to his
account. The RTC and CA Order on this point must therefore be reversed.
PAGE 75 of 149
Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem

December 10, 2014 / G.R. 193707
Facts: Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
Sept. 25, 1990. In 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who, at the
time of filing the petition, was 16 years of age. They were divorced in 1995 by virtue of a Court Decree
issued by the Court of Holland; thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. She
alleged that Ernst promised to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of P17,500, but he
never gave such support. On August 28, 2009, Norma sent a letter demanding support from Ernst,
who refused to receive the letter. She thus filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu for violation of Section 5 (E2) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjust refusal to support his minor child. The
RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the obligation to support of the accused is subject to his national
law, thus he cannot be charged under R.A. No. 9262 for failure to support his child.
Issue: Whether a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child and can thus be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
Held: Yes. Since Article 15 stresses the principle of nationality, petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of
the NCC is demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen. Insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. However, this does not mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether. Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum”. Thus, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforces a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalizes non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines, because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto. Thus, respondent may be made liable under R.A. 9262.
PAGE 76 of 149
NFF Industrial v G&L

Jan. 12, 2015 / G.R. No. 178169
Facts: G&L bought bulk bags from NFF Industrial. The delivery of such bags were duly acknowledged
by representatives of G&L, and were covered by sales invoices. However, G&L claimed that the delivery
was not made to an authorized representative, as proven by the name in the purchase order. Thus, it
did not pay for the supposed delivery within 30 days
This led NFF to send a demand letter to G&L for payment. This, and 2 subsequent demand letters
went unheeded. Thus, NFF filed a complaint for a sum of money against G&L. RTC ruled in favor of
NFF. CA reversed. MR denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issues: WON there was valid delivery on the part of NFF, which would give rise to an obligation to
pay on the part of G7L to pay. (Yes)
Ratio: NFF clearly actually delivered the bulk bags, albeit not to the person named in the purchase
order. In addition, by allowing NFF’s employee to pass through the guard-on-duty, who allwed the
entry of delivery into the premises of Hi-Cement, which is the designated delivery site, G&L effectively
abandoned whatever infirmities may have attended the delivery of the bulk bags. If G&L was wary
about the manner of delivery, that issue should have been brought up immediately after the first
delivery was made. Instead, the non-representative acknowledged receipt of the bulk bags and even
followed up on the balance.
This means that the failure to strictly comply with delivery instructions was of no moment, because
acceptance may be inferred from the conduct of G&L. Further, the use of the bulk bags shows that
they took ownership over the bags. Thus, delivery having been made, G&L should have paid NFF.
PAGE 77 of 149
Kalaw v. Fernandez
Jan. 14, 2015 / G.R. No. 166357
Facts: In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going
out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion
of psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Held: YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this
case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.
The guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application
to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given
the clear intendment to enable “some resiliency in its application.” In the task of ascertaining the
presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the
opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally

examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.” Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts
existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court
in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
PAGE 78 of 149
First Optima v Securitron

Jan. 28, 2015 / G.R. No. 199648
Facts: First Optima owned a property in Pasay City. Securitron offered to buy the property though its
GM Eleazar. However, the EVP of First Optima said that she could not accept the offer without the
approval of the Board of Directors.
Undeterred, Securitron sent a letter to First Optima which included a check for P100k supposedly as
earnest money. This letter was received by a receptionist, and the check was deposited to First
Optima’s bank account without the directors ever knowing about it.
As a result, Securitron demande the sale of the property in writing. First Optima said that it could not
be compelled to sell the property. This led Securitron to file a case for specific performance against
First Optima. RTC ruled in favor of Securitron. CA affirmed. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue WON the payment of earnest money bound First Optima to sell the property. (No)
HELD: In a potential sale transaction, the prior payment of earnest money even before the property
owner can agree to sell his property is irregular, and cannot be used to bind the owner to the
obligations of a seller under an otherwise perfected contract of sale,The property owner-prospective
seller may not be legally obliged to enter into a sale with a prospective buyer through the latter's
employment of questionable practices which prevent the owner from freely giving his consent to the
transaction; this constitutes a palpable transgression of the prospective seller's rights of ownership
over his property, an anomaly which the Court will certainly not condone.
Thus, while there were negotiations, and while the check was deposited, this cannot be considered as
consent to enter into a contract to sell the property. First Optima, as represented by its Board, never
accepted Securitron’s offer. Thus, there was still no contract. The sending of the check was merely a
reiteration of the offer.
Neither could the deposit of the check constitute acceptance of the offer. The supposed payment was
made under dubious circumstances and the EVP and the Board coul not have known about it. Despite
approaching EVP young personally, Securitron sent the check to a clerk/receptionist, which places it
under grave suspicion of putting into effect a premeditated plan to unduly bind First Optima to its
offer.
PAGE 79 of 149
Aguilar v. Siasat
Jan. 28, 2015 / G.R. No. 200169
Facts: The Sps. Aguilar died intestate an without debts. In controversy are 2 parcels of land which are
part of their estate.Rodolfo Aguilar claimed to be the son and the sole surviving heir to the spouses.
He filed a case for mandatory injunction that Edna Siasat, Mrs. Aguilar’s sister, be ordered to
surrender the titles over the said land to him.
In response, Siasat alleged that Rodolfo was not the son and heir of the spouses, and was merely a
stranger raised by the Aguilars out of the goodness of their hearts. As such, she claimed, she inherited
the land from her sister, and so she was in lawful possession of the same. The determination of the
case hinged on whether or not Rodolfo was the son of the deceased spouses.
RTC ruled that no proof existed to show that Rodolfo was a child of the spouses. CA affirmed. Hence
this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue: WON Rodolfo was a recognized son of the spouses. (Yes)
Held: Admission of legitimate filiation may be made in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned. In this case, Rodolfo was filiated through his father
Alfredo’s SSS form E-1. This is a public instrument through which express recognition can be given.
PAGE 80 of 149
Sps. Salvador v. Sps. Rabaja

February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 199990
Facts: The Sps. Salvador sold a parcel of land to the Sps. Rabaja through their agent Rosario
Gonzales. Payment was made to Gonzales, who in turn gave the OCT over the parcel of land to the
Sps. Rabaja.
However, the Sps. Salvador complained that they never received any payment from Gonzales, which
caused the Rabajas to suspend payment of the purchase price.
This led the Salvadors to file an ejectment suit against the Rabajas. The Rabajas responded with a
complaint for rescission. This case concerns that case for rescission.
RTC ruled in favor of the Rabajas, ruling that the payment had already been made. CA affirmed.
Hence this petition for review.
Issues: WON payment had already been made to the Salvadors, despite Gonzales not remitting
payments. - YES
Ratio: The contract was a contract of sale which could be validly rescinded. An act done by an agent,
as far as 3rd persons are concerned, if within the terms of the power of attorney as written, is valid.
Here, Gonzales acted within the bounds of her SPA, as presented to the Rabajas.
This being the case, the Rabajas made a valid payment. Payment to an agent who does not remit the
funds to his principal is still valid payment. That matter is an internal matter between the principal
and the agent.
PAGE 81 of 149
BBB v. AAA
February 9, 2015 / G.R. No. 193225
Facts: BBB was charged with violation of VAWC by his wife AAA. AAA already had a son, CCC. Their
relationship resulted in the birth of DDD and EEE.
It was alleged that his mistress FFF insulted and humiliated AAA in BBB’s presence. This led AAA to
leave the conjugal home. While AAA and CCC eventually returned to the conjugal home, BBB
supposedly was biased in favor of DDD and EEE to the detriment of CCC. He also failed to pay the
rentals for the condo in which AAA was staying and did not give sufficient support to them.
This led to BBB filing for a TPO against BBB, which was granted and eventually made permanent by
the RTC. BBB appealed to the CA, which affirmed. Hence this petition for review. This digests focuses
on a supposed memorandum of agreement between AAA and BBB, which was supposedly a
compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.
Issue: WON the award of support should be deleted, in light of the compromise agreement.
Ratio:
This case is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement. Under RA 9262, compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women is prohibited, because a process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. Further, the Rules
on Court-Annexed Mediation explicitly except those covered by the Anti-VAWC law.
PAGE 82 of 149
Reyes v. Sps. Valentin

February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 194488
Facts: Reyes filed a complaint for easement of right of way against the Sps. Valentin in order to
access a national road from her property in Malolos, Bulacan. RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the
proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the servient estate of the Valentins, as it would
pass through improvements such as their garage, garden and grotto. Instead, the trial court
recommended that a right of way be built over a nearby irrigation canal through an adjacent rice land.
CA affirmed. Hence this petition for review.
Issues:
WON Reyes has compulsory easement of right of way over the Valentins’ property. - NO
Ratio: First, Reyes was isolated due to the acts of her predecessor-in-interest. These acts bind her,
and already deny her the easement she prays for, because her isolation is caused by her acts.
Second, there was an adequate exit to a public highway, namely the path through the rice field over
the irrigation canal. The convenience of the dominant estate’s owner is not the basis for granting an
easement of right of way, especially if the owner’s needs may be satisfied without imposing the
easement.
While the proposed right of way is longer and more inconvenient to Reyes because she has to traverse
other properties and build a bridge over the canal, these do not justify the imposition of an easement
on Valentin’s property. “Least Prejudice” trumps “Distance between the dominant estate and the
public highway.”
Here, her proposed right of way would involve destroying permanent structures, which is far more
prejudicial to the servient estate than her having to build a bridge.
PAGE 83 of 149
UP LAW BOC TAXATION LAW DIGEST COMPILATION
TAXATION LAW
Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas
February 18, 2014 / GR No. 204429
Facts:
Smart constructed a telecommunications tower in Malvar. The municipality of Malvar passed
Ordinance No. 18, which imposed an assessment fee on Smart. Smart filed a protest with the
municipality, the trial court and the CTA, which were all denied. CTA claimed that it had no jurisdiction
over the case since the assessment involved was regulatory fee and not a tax.
Issue: WON the assessment fee was a tax? NO. It is a regulatory fee.
Ratio:
“Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the
identified special projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed
in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the
fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental… If the
generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a
tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does
not make the imposition a tax."
PAGE 84 of 149
Procter & Gamble Asia PTE LTD v. CIR

February 19, 2014 / GR No. 202071
Facts:
P&G filed an administrative claims with the BIR for refund/credit of input VAT on September 26 and
December 13, 2006. On October 2 and December 29, 2006, filed judicial claims with the CTA. The CTA
dismissed their case for having been prematurely filed (for not complying with the mandatory 120 day
waiting period).
Issue: WON P&G’s judicial claim was proper? YES. Due to CIR v. San Roque.
Ratio:
The Court, in San Roque, ruled that equitable estoppel had set in when respondent issued BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03. This was a general interpretative rule, which effectively misled all taxpayers into filing
premature judicial claims with the CTA. Thus, taxpayers could rely on the BIR ruling from its issuance
on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal on 6 October 2010, when CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of
Asia, lnc, was promulgated.
BIR ruling stated that the taxpayer claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120 day period before it
could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of petition for review.
The judicial claims in the instant petition were filed on 2 October and 29 December 2006, well within
the ruling's period of validity. Petitioner is in a position to "claim the benefit of BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03, which shields the filing of its judicial claim from the vice of prematurity."
PAGE 85 of 149
Commissioner of Customs v. Oilink

July 2, 2014 / G.R. no. 161759
Facts:
In 1966, Union Refinery Corporation (URC) was established under the Corporation Code. It was
involved in the business of importing oil products. In 1996, Oilink was incorporated for the primary
purpose of manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying, selling or dealing in oil and gas, and their
refinements and by-products at wholesale and retail of petroleum. Oilink and URC had interlocking
directors.
In applying for and in expediting the transfer of the operator’s name for the Customs Bonded
Warehouse then operated by URC, the VP and General Manager of URC manifested that URC and
Oilink had the same Board of Directors, and that the former owned the latter.
In 1998, the District Collector of the Port of Manila and the Customs Commissioner demanded URC to
pay the taxes due on its shipment. Such demands were initially unacted upon, until URC’s president
conveyed to the then Customs Commissioner of URC’s willingness to pay only a portion of the
assessment, with the payment taken from the collectibles of Oilink from the National Power
Corporation, and the balance to be paid in monthly installments over a period of three years to be
secured with corresponding post-dated checks and its future available tax credits.
Despite the offer, a final demand was made upon Oilink and URC to pay the taxes due. Oilink formally
protested the assessment on the ground that it was not the party liable for the assessed deficiency
taxes.
Issues:
1. WON the CTA had jurisdiction over the controversy. – YES.
2. WON there was a ground to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. – NO.
Ratio:
1. Yes, the CTA had jurisdiction. The CTA correctly ruled that the reckoning date for Oilink’s appeal
was July 12, 1999, not July 2, 1999, because it was on the former date that the Commissioner of
Customs denied the protest of Oilink. Clearly, the filing of the petition on July 30, 1999
by Oilink was well within its reglementary period to appeal. The insistence by the
Commissioner of Customs on reckoning the reglementary period to appeal from November 25,
1998, the date when URC received the final demand letter, is unwarranted. The November 25,
1998 final demand letter of the BoC was addressed to URC, not to Oilink. As such, the final
demand sent to URC did not bind Oilink unless the separate identities of the
corporations were disregarded in order to consider them as one.
2. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no application here because the Commissioner of
Customs did not establish that Oilink had been set up to avoid the payment of
taxes or duties, or for purposes that would defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues,
perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. It is also noteworthy that from
the outset the Commissioner of Customs sought to collect the deficiency taxes and duties from
URC, and that it was only on July 2, 1999 when the Commissioner of Customs sent the demand
letter to both URC and Oilink.
PAGE 86 of 149
CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 192398
FACTS:
Respondent entered into a Plan of Merger with its affiliate, Shell Philippine Petroleum Corporation
(SPPC). In the Plan of Merger, it was provided that the entire assets and liabilities of SPPC will be
transferred to, and absorbed by, respondent as the surviving entity.
Believing that it erroneously paid documentary stamp tax on its absorption of real property owned by
SPPC, respondent filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a formal claim for refund or tax
credit of the documentary stamp tax in the amount of P22,101,407.64.
HELD:
The transfer of real properties to the surviving corporation in pursuance of a merger is not subject to
documentary stamp tax.
In a merger, the real properties are not deemed "sold" to the surviving corporation and the latter could
not be considered as "purchaser" of realty since the real properties subject of the merger were merely
absorbed by the surviving corporation by operation of law and these properties are deemed
automatically transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed.
Therefore, the transfer of real properties to the surviving corporation in pursuance of a merger is not
subject to documentary stamp tax.
Documentary stamp tax is imposed only on all conveyances, deeds, instruments or writing where
realty sold shall be conveyed to a purchaser or purchasers. The transfer of SPPC’s real property to
respondent was neither a sale nor was it a conveyance of real property for a consideration contracted
to be paid as contemplated under Section 196 of the Tax Code.
Notably, RA 9243, entitled "An Act Rationalizing the Provisions of the Documentary Stamp Tax of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997" was enacted and took effect on April 27, 2004 which
exempts the transfer of real property of a corporation, which is a party to the merger or consolidation,
to another corporation, which is also a party to the merger or consolidation, from the payment of
PAGE 87 of 149
Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 198076
Facts:
Taganito Mining Corp. is registered with the Board of Investments for exporting nickels and ores. It
filed an application with the CIR on February 19, 2004, for refund of its excess input VAT paid on its
domestic products on taxable goods and services. The CTA dismissed the case, invoking the Aichi
doctrine, and ruling that it was bereft of jurisdiction for being prematurely filed for not waiting for the
120 days mandated by Section 112(D) of the NIRC. Taganito questioned the Aichi doctrine, arguing
that before that case, a taxpayer need not wait for the decision of the CIR on its administrative claim
for refund before it could file its judicial claim for refund, consonant with the period in Section 229.
Issue: Whether CTA had jurisdiction over the claim.
Held:
Yes. Under the Aichi doctrine, the 120+30 day period prescribed under Section 112(D) is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The jurisdiction of the CTA over decisions or inaction of the CIR is only appellate in
nature and, thus, necessarily requires the filing of an administrative case before the CIR under Section
112. An exception to this period was carved out in San Roque, where the Court ruled that judicial claims
filed from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 need not wait for the exhaustion of the 120-day
period, pursuant to good faith reliance on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which expressly stated that the
“taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief
with the CTA by way of a Petition for Review”. Being filed within the period of exception, CTA has
jurisdiction over the present case.
PAGE 88 of 149
The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. The Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
November 24, 2014 / G.T. No. 210987
Facts:
Philamlife sold its Class A shares in PhilamCare for USD 2,190,000 to STI Investments, Inc., who
emerged as the highest bidder. After the sale was completed and the necessary DST and CGT were
paid, Philamlife filed an application for a certificate authorizing registration/tax clearance with the
BIR Large Taxpayers Service Division to facilitate transfer of shares. It was instructed to secure a BIR
Ruling due to potential donor’s tax. The Commissioner denied Philamlife’s request and imposed a
donor’s tax pursuant to RR 06-08 and RMC 25-11, which Ruling was appealed to the Secretary of
Finance, assailing the nullity of the rules and circular. The same was dismissed. Petitioner then
appealed to the CA under Rule 43, which dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that
the same was with the CTA. Petitioner argued that the CTA had no jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari and may not rule on the nullity of rules.
Issue:
Whether the CTA had jurisdiction over an appeal from the Secretary of Finance involving the nullity of
revenue regulation and revenue memorandum circulars.
Held:
Yes. While there is no provision in the law that expressly provides where exactly the ruling of the
Secretary of Finance under Section 4 of the NIRC is appealable to, RA 1125 (Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals) addresses the seeming gap in the law as it vests the CTA with jurisdiction over the petition as
“other matters” arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR. CTA furthermore has
the power certiorari in cases within its appellate jurisdiction. As held in the case of City of Manila v.
Grecia-Cuerdo. in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over
appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction, such as
the power to issue writs of certiorari.
PAGE 89 of 149
City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority/Prove of Bataan, represented

by Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., and Emerlinda S. Talento, in her capacity as
Provincial Treasurer of Bataan v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority
November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 184203
Facts:
The City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA P32M in real
property taxes from 1992 to 1998 on its properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. The City
made subsequent demands to PEZA; in its last reminder, PEZA was assesserd P86M as real property
taxes for the period of 1992 to 2002. PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Pasay, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of the same. The City filed an MR
and thereafter appealed to the CA. The City argued that in the first place, the RTC of Pasay had no
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. CA dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Whether the petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy for PEZA.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the remedy of a taxpayer depends on the stage in which the LGU is enforcing
its authority to impose real property taxes. Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the LGC is
necessary in cases of erroneous assessm ents where the correctness of the amount assessed is
assailed. The taxpayer must first pay the tax then file a protest with the Local Treasurer within 30 days
from the date of payment of tax. If denied or upon the lapse of the 60-day period to decide the protest,
the taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days, which has 120
days to decide the appeal. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision, he may appeal before the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, whose decision is thereafter appealable to the CTA En Banc.
The decision can then be appealed to the SC raising pure questions of law.
In case of an illegal assessment where the assessment was issued without authority, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not necessary and the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action. The
taxpayer shall file a complaint for injunction before the RTC to enjoin the local government from
collecting real property taxes. The party unsatisfied with the decision shall file an appeal, not a
petition for certiorari, before the CTA, the complaint being a local tax case decided by the RTC. The
decision may then be appealed before the SC through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
raising pure questions of law.
In case the LGU has issued a notice of delinquency, the taxpayer may file a complaint for injunction
to enjoin the impending sale of the real property at public auction. In case the property had already
been sold, the taxpayer must first deposit with the court the amount for which the real property was
sold, together with interest of 2% per month from the sale of the to the time of the institution of the
action. The decisions of the RTC in these cases shall be appealable to the CTA, whose decisions are
can then be appealed to the SC raising pure questions of law.
A petition for declaratory relief was not the proper remedy, since the subject matter of the petition,
PEZA’ alleged tax exempt status under its charter, had already been breached.
PAGE 90 of 149
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Hon. Colet

December 10, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 120051, 121613, 121675, 121704, 121720-28, 121847-55, 122333, 122335,
122349, 124855
Facts:
10 consolidated petitions question the constitutionality and/or validity of Section 21(B) of Ordinance
No. 7794 of the City of Manila, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, enacted in 1993.
Petitioners were corporations with principal offices in Manila that paid business taxes on the gross
receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight
by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water under protest to the City Treasurer, pursuant to the
business tax provision in the Manila Revenue Code. The RTC upheld the power of the City of Manila, as
an LGU, to levy business tax, consistent with the basic policy of fiscal autonomy.
Issue: Whether Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code was valid.
Held:
No. The provision was null and void for being beyond the power of the City of Manila and its public
officials to enact, approve, and implement under the LGC. It is well-settled that although the power to
tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for the LGUs to whom the power must be delegated by
Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide. The
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, or the municipality cannot assume
it. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides, “the power to tax is no longer vested
exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and
other charges.” Nevertheless, such authority is “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide”. Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from
imposing any tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water. This is a
specific provision that explicitly withholds from any LGUs the power to tax the aforementioned
activities, and cannot be defeated by the “catch-all” provision in Section 143(h) of the LGC on the
grant of the power to the municipality to impose business tax.
PAGE 91 of 149
BDO v. RCBC
Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 198756
Facts:
RCBC assisted CODE-NGO in requesting approval from the Department of Finance for the issuance of
Treasury Certificates, which it would purchase through a special purpose vehicle, and then repackaged
and sold at a premium to investors as PEACe bonds, in order to endow a permanent fund to finance
meritorious activities and projects of accredited NGOs throughout the country.
Upon a request for a BIR ruling on the tax treatment of the bonds, the BIR initially ruled that the
bonds, not being issued to 20 or more individual or corporate lenders, were not to be considered
deposit substitutes, and thus were not subject to 20% withholding tax. In accordance to this ruling,
the auction for the said bonds were only offered to at most 19 buyers, as the origination of the bonds
was “one time” in accordance with the NIRC.
RCBC won the auction, resulting in a discount of approximately 24.83B. RCBC Capital later entered
into an underwriting agreement with CODE-NGO. Under the underwriting agreement. It was stated
that all income derived from the bonds was tax-exempt, based on the prior ruling of the BIR.
However, the BIR later reversed that ruling in a later ruling, and imposed a 20% final withholding tax.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Ratio:
It must be noted that any monetary benefits from deposit substitutes are subject to a 20% final
withholding tax, unlike regular debt instruments, which are subject to regular income tax. Deposit
substitutes are an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public. Public means borrowing from
20 or more individual or corporate lenders at one time.
A zero-coupon bond is a bond bought at a price substantially lower than its face value, with the face
value repaid at the time of maturity. It is claimed that the zero coupon bonds involved here were only
issued to one lender—RCBC.
The SC disagreed. The financial market is an aggolomeration of financial transactions in securities

performed by market participants that works to transfer the funds from the surplus units to those who
need them. From the viewpoint of the financial market, the phrase “at any one time” for purposes of
determining the “20 or more lenders” means every transaction executed in the primary or secondary
market in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
Here, while ostensibly there was only one lender, the issuance of bonds in favor of RCBC would then
be followed by a sale to an undisclosed number of individual buyers, but possibly more than 20. Thus,
the SC ruled, this indirect financing made the issuance of the bonds public, and subjected the income
derived from the deposit substitute PEACe bonds taxable. If there were more than 20 purchasers the
income from the bonds would be subject to FWT.
Petition Granted. BIR rulings saying that the bonds are tax -exempt nullified.
PAGE 92 of 149
CBK Power v. CIR

Jan. 14, 2015/ G.R. No. 193383-84
FACTS:
CBK is a limited partnership engaged in the development and operation of hydroelectric power plants
in Laguna, and registered as a preferred pioneer area of investment. It obtained a syndicated loan
from several foreign banks, from countries with tax treaties with the Philippines. Under the treaties,
income derived from the loans are subject to a preferential tax rate of 10%.
Nevertheless, the CIR assessed a Final Withholding Tax of 20%. CBK’s claim for a refund was not
acted upon. Upon the lapse of the mandatory 180 day period, petitions for review were filed with the
CTA. CTA granted the petitions and ordered a refund. However, the CTA en banc reversed. Hence
these consolidated petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON the BIR may add a requirement-prior application for an ITAD ruling-that is not found in
the income tax treaties signed by the Philippines (No.)
2. WON CBK should have exhausted administrative remedies before seeking redress (No)
HELD:
1. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No.
1-2000, which required that the parties apply for treaty relief with the International Tax
Affairs Decision. The policy of the latter issuance is to prevent erroneous interpretation or
interpretation of the treaties. However, where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or
excessive payment, and not a supposed attempt to claim benefits. Thus, those who are
entitled to the benefit of a treaty cannot be deprived of such benefit for failing to strictly
comply with an administrative issuance. Further, that requirement is not found in the treates
at all. Thus, the administrative claim should be deemed substantial compliance with the RMO.
2. The exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only to judicial claims for refund, not
administrative ones like this one.
Petition Granted. CTA reversed.
PAGE 93 of 149
Chinabank v. CIR
February 4, 2015 | G.R. No. 172509
Facts:
CBC was assessed deficiency DST on the sales of foreign bills of exchange to the CB. CBC protested to
the BIR. More than 12 years after the filing of the protest, the BIR rendered a decision upholding the
assessment. CBC filed a petition for review to the CTA. CTA in division affirmed, as did the CTA en
banc. In the meantime, the CIR demanded that CBC pay its deficiency taxes. Hence this petition for
review.
ISSUES:
WON the right of the BIR to collect the deficiency tax has prescribed. - YES
Ratio:
The time limit to collect the tax is set at 3 years from the date when the BIR sends the assessment
notice. The attempt to collect by the BIR was made 13 years from the date from which the prescriptive
period was to be reckoned. The collection period was not suspended by the request for reinvestigation.
Doctrinally, when the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is barred by
prescription, the court must dismiss the claim even if prescription is not raised as a defense.
Further, the failure of the BIR to raise the raising of the defense for the first time on appeal estops it.
Estoppel or waiver prevents the government from invoking the rule against raising the issue of
prescription for the first time on appeal. To clarify, while the general rule is that estoppel does not
prevent the government from paying taxes, in this case the estoppel was only on a procedural matter,
and to rule otherwise would be injustice. The fact is that it took more than 12 years for the BIR to take
steps to collect the taxes.
Petition Granted.
PAGE 94 of 149
UP LAW BOC MERCANTILE LAW DIGEST COMPILATION
MERCANTILE LAW
Raul Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al.
February 5, 2014 / GR No. 201298
Facts:
Cosare was employed as a salesman by respondent Arevalo in April 1993. Arevalo was engaged in the
sale of broadcasting equipment to television networks and production houses and later set up
Broadcom to continue the business. Cosare was named as an incorporator of Broadcom and was later
promoted to Asst. Vice President for Sales.
In 2003, Alex Abiog was appointed VP for Sales. In March 2009, Cosare sent a memo to Arevalo
reporting anomalies alleged to have been committed by Abiog. Arevalo failed to act on his
accusations and instead asked him to tender his resignation. Cosare refused.
Cosare later received a memo charging him with serious misconduct and willful breach of trust, and
giving him 48 hours to respond. In the meantime, he was prevented from entering company offices
and his Memo addressing the accusations had to be sent by mail. He filed a case for constructive
dismissal.
LA ruled in favor of Broadcom but this was reversed by the NLRC. On petition for certiorari before the
CA, Broadcom raised the argument that the case was an intra-corporate controversy since Cosare was
a stockholder and a corporate officer. CA granted the petition, finding that the case involved and intra-
corporate controversy.
Held:
The Court ruled that there are two circumstances which must concur in order for an individual to be
considered a corporate officer, as against an ordinary employee or officer, namely:
(1) the creation of the position is under the corporation’s charter or by-laws; and
(2) the election of the officer is by the directors or stockholders.
Cosare was not a corporate officer as his position of AVP for Sales was not listed in the corporate by-
laws. The reliance by the CA on the General Information Sheets was misplaced as this could neither
govern nor establish the nature of the office held by Cosare.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder of Broadcom at the time of the filing of the
case did not necessarily make the action an intra- corporate controversy. The Court ruled that the
controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as
well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.
PAGE 95 of 149
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp, Tesoro Mining and Development Inc and
Mcarthur Mining Inc v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp
April 21, 2014 / G.R. No. 195580
Facts:
Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., a domestic corp, wanted to engage in mining in Palawan.
However, the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration were already covered by applications for
a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) by Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators 3 petitions for the denial of the three applications,
alleging that all three were owned by MBMI Resources, a 100% canadian owned corporation, thus
failing to complete with 60% filipino owned requirement under Art. XII Sec. 2 of the Constitution (state
may engage in co-production contracts for the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources with Filipino citizens or corporations whose capital is owned 60% by Filipinos).
Narra, Tesoro and Mcarthur claimed that they are qualified person to engage in mining under the Phil.
Mining Act of 1995, since using the control test, 60% of their capital stock are owned by Filipinos.
POA found that the corporations were foreign corporations and were being effectively controlled by
MBMI thus their MPSAs were void. The CA used the grandfather rule and affirmed the POA.
Issue: WON Narra, Tesoro and Mcarthur are foreign corporations? YES! They are disqualified from
engaging in mining activities in the Philippines.
Ratio:
In other words, based on DOJ Opinion No. 020, the Grandfather Rule applies only when the 60-40
Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with
Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other
joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated
differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule
will not apply.
Clearly, in this case, because all corporations have a common investor, MBMI, who is a 100% Canadian
corporation, the 60-40 Filipino-Foreign equity ownership is doubtful. Doubt does not only exist when
stockholdings are less than 60%. It would be ludicrous to limit the application of the said word only to
the instances where the stockholdings of non-Filipino stockholders are more than 40% of the total
stockholdings in a corporation. The corporations interested in circumventing our laws would clearly
strive to have "60% Filipino Ownership" at face value.
Using the grandfather test, the court has found that all three corporations are foreign corporations.
PAGE 96 of 149
Yujuico v. Quiambao
June 2, 2014 / GR No. 180416
FACTS:
Petitioner Yujuico was the newly elected president of STRADEC, replacing respondent Quiambao.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against one Giovanni Cassanova for refusing to turn over
corporate records of the company.
Petitioners theorize that the refusal by the respondents and Casanova to turnover STRADEC's
corporate records and stock and transfer book violates their right, as stockholders, directors and
officers of the corporation, to inspect such records and book under Section 7 4 of the Corporation
Code. For such violation, petitioners conclude, respondents may be held criminally liable pursuant to
Section 144 of the Corporation Code.
ISSUE: WON a criminal complaint based on the provisions of the Corporation Code may lie against
outgoing corporate officers. NO.
HELD:
A criminal action based on the violation of a stockholder's right to examine or inspect the corporate
records and the stock and transfer book of a corporation under the second and fourth paragraphs of
Section 74 of the Corporation Code can only be maintained against corporate officers or any other
persons acting on behalf of such corporation.
Violations of the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74 contemplates a situation wherein a
corporation, acting thru one of its officers or agents, denies the right of any of its stockholders to
inspect the records, minutes and the stock and transfer book of such corporation.
The problem with the petitioners' complaint and the evidence that they submitted during preliminary
investigation is that they do not establish that respondents were acting on behalf of STRADEC. Quite
the contrary, the scenario painted by the complaint is that the respondents are merely outgoing
officers of STRADEC who, for some reason, withheld and refused to turn-over the company records of
STRADEC; that it is the petitioners who are actually acting on behalf of STRADEC; and that STRADEC
is actually merely trying to recover custody of the withheld records.
PAGE 97 of 149
Patrimonio v. Gutierrez and Marasigan

June 4, 2014 / GR No. 187769
Facts:
Petitioner Alvin Patrimonio and the respondent Napoleon Gutierrez entered into a business venture
under the name of Slam Dunk Corporation (Slum Dunk), a production outfit that produced mini-
concerts and shows related to basketball.
In the course of their business, the petitioner pre-signed several checks to answer for the expenses of
Slam Dunk. Although signed, these checks had no payee’s name, date or amount. The blank checks
were entrusted to Gutierrez with the specific instruction not to fill them out without previous
notification to and approval by the petitioner.
Without the petitioner’s knowledge and consent, Gutierrez went to Marasigan, to secure a loan in the
amount of P200,000.00 on the excuse that the petitioner needed the money for the construction of
his house. Marasigan eventually gave the money and Gutierrez simultaneously delivered to Marasigan
one of the blank checks the petitioner pre-signed.
Marasigan deposited the check but it was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED." It was later
revealed that petitioner’s account with the bank had been closed since May 28, 1993.
Marasigan sued Patrimonio for violation of BP 22. Patrimonio then sought to have the loan annulled
and have Gutierrez and Marasigan pay damages.
ISSUES:
WoN Marasigan was a holder in due course. NO.
WoN Gutierrez was authorized to make the loan. NO.
HELD:
The contract of loan entered into by Gutierrez in behalf of the petitioner should be nullified for being
void; petitioner is not bound by the contract of loan.
In the absence of any showing of any agency relations or special authority to act for and in behalf of
the petitioner, the loan agreement Gutierrez entered into with Marasigan is null and void. Thus, the
petitioner is not bound by the parties’ loan agreement.
Marasigan merely relied on the words of Gutierrez without securing a copy of the SPA in favor of the
latter and without verifying from the petitioner whether he had authorized the borrowing of money or
release of the check. He was thus bound by the risk accompanying his trust on the mere assurances of
Gutierrez.
The checks given to Gutierrez are incomplete but delivered instruments.
If the maker or drawer delivers a pre-signed blank paper to another person for the purpose of
converting it into a negotiable instrument, that person is deemed to have prima facie authority to fill it
up. It merely requires that the instrument be in the possession of a person other than the drawer or
maker and from such possession, together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a material
particular, the law presumes agency to fill up the blanks.
In order however that one who is not a holder in due course can enforce the instrument against a party
prior to the instrument’s completion, two requisites must exist:
(1) that the blank must be filled strictly in accordance with the authority given; and
PAGE 98 of 149
(2) it must be filled up within a reasonable time. If it was proven that the instrument had not been
filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time, the maker can
set this up as a personal defense and avoid liability.
However, if the holder is a holder in due course, there is a conclusive presumption that authority to fill
it up had been given and that the same was not in excess of authority.
Marasigan’s knowledge that the petitioner is not a party or a privy to the contract of loan, and
correspondingly had no obligation or liability to him, renders him dishonest, hence, in bad faith. Since
he did not receive the checks in good faith, he cannot be a holder in due course.
Gutierrez was only authorized to use the check for business expenses; thus, he exceeded the authority
when he used the check to pay the loan he supposedly contracted for the construction of petitioner's
house. This is a clear violation of the petitioner's instruction to use the checks for the expenses of Slam
Dunk. It cannot therefore be validly concluded that the check was completed strictly in accordance
with the authority given by the petitioner.
Considering that Marasigan is not a holder in due course, the petitioner can validly set up the personal
defense that the blanks were not filled up in accordance with the authority he gave. Consequently,
Marasigan has no right to enforce payment against the petitioner and the latter cannot be obliged to
pay the face value of the check.
PAGE 99 of 149

July 2, 2014 / G.R. no. 161759
Facts:
In 1966, Union Refinery Corporation (URC) was established under the Corporation Code. It was
involved in the business of importing oil products. In 1996, Oilink was incorporated for the primary
purpose of manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying, selling or dealing in oil and gas, and their
refinements and by-products at wholesale and retail of petroleum. Oilink and URC had interlocking
directors.
In applying for and in expediting the transfer of the operator’s name for the Customs Bonded
In 1998, the District Collector of the Port of Manila and the Customs Commissioner demanded URC to
pay the taxes due on its shipment. Such demands were initially unacted upon, until URC’s president
conveyed to the then Customs Commissioner of URC’s willingness to pay only a portion of the
assessment, with the payment taken from the collectibles of Oilink from the National Power
Despite the offer, a final demand was made upon Oilink and URC to pay the taxes due. Oilink formally
protested the assessment on the ground that it was not the party liable for the assessed deficiency
taxes.
Issues:
Ratio:
Customs denied the protest of Oilink. Clearly, the filing of the petition on July 30, 1999
by Oilink was well within its reglementary period to appeal. The insistence by the
Commissioner of Customs on reckoning the reglementary period to appeal from November 25,
1998, the date when URC received the final demand letter, is unwarranted. The November 25,
1998 final demand letter of the BoC was addressed to URC, not to Oilink. As such, the final
demand sent to URC did not bind Oilink unless the separate identities of the
corporations were disregarded in order to consider them as one.
Customs did not establish that Oilink had been set up to avoid the paym ent of
taxes or duties, or for purposes that would defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues,
perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. It is also noteworthy that from
the outset the Commissioner of Customs sought to collect the deficiency taxes and duties from
URC, and that it was only on July 2, 1999 when the Commissioner of Customs sent the demand
letter to both URC and Oilink.
PAGE 100 of 149

Areza v. Express Savings

September 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 176697
FACTS:
Petitioners spouses Areza maintained two bank deposits with respondent Express Savings Bank. A
certain Gerry Mambuay purchased from them a second-hand Mitsubishi Pajero and a brand-new
Honda CRV. Mambuay paid petitioners with nine Philippine Veterans Affairs Office checks payable to
different payees for a total of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,800,000.00).
Petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account with the Bank. The Bank, inturn,
deposited the checks with its depositary bank, Equitable-PCI Bank. Equitable-PCI Bank presented the
checks to the drawee, the Philippine Veterans Bank, which honored the checks. The Bank informed
petitioners that the checks they deposited with the Bank were honored. He allegedly warned
petitioners that the clearing of the checks pertained only to the availability of funds and did not mean
that the checks were not infirm. Based on this information, petitioners released the two cars to the
buyer.
Later, the subject checks were returned by PVAO on the ground that the amount on the face of the
checks was altered from the original amount of P4,000.00 to P200,000.00. The Bank closed the
Special Savings Account of the petitioners with a balance of P1,179,659.69 and transferred said
amount to their savings account. The Bank then withdrew the amount of P1,800,000.00 representing
the returned checks from petitioners’ savings account.
HELD:
A depositary/collecting bank may resist or defend against a claim for breach of warranty if the drawer,
the payee, or either the drawee bank or depositary bank was negligent and such negligence
substantially contributed to the loss from alteration.
When the drawee bank pays a materially altered check, it violates the terms of the check, as well as its
duty to charge its client’s account only for bona fide disbursements he had made. If the drawee did not
pay according to the original tenor of the instrument, as directed by the drawer, then it has no right to
claim reimbursement from the drawer, much less, the right to deduct the erroneous payment it made
from the drawer’s account which it was expected to treat with utmost fidelity. The drawee, however,
still has recourse to recover its loss. It may pass the liability back to the collecting bank which is what
the drawee bank exactly did in this case. It debited the account of Equitable PCI Bank for the altered
amount of the checks.
The law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited with it for
the purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank being primarily
engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the law holds it to a high standard
of conduct. As collecting banks, Express Savings Bank and Equitable PCI Bank are both liable for the
amount of the materially altered checks. Since Equitable PCI Bank is not a party to this case and
Express Savings Bank allowed its account with Equitable PCI Bank to be debited, it has the option to
seek recourse against the latter in another forum.
PAGE 101 of 149

CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 192398
FACTS:
Respondent entered into a Plan of Merger with its affiliate, Shell Philippine Petroleum Corporation
(SPPC). In the Plan of Merger, it was provided that the entire assets and liabilities of SPPC will be
transferred to, and absorbed by, respondent as the surviving entity.
Believing that it erroneously paid documentary stamp tax on its absorption of real property owned by
SPPC, respondent filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a formal claim for refund or tax
credit of the documentary stamp tax in the amount of P22,101,407.64.
HELD:
In a merger, the real properties are not deemed "sold" to the surviving corporation and the latter could
not be considered as "purchaser" of realty since the real properties subject of the merger were merely
absorbed by the surviving corporation by operation of law and these properties are deemed
automatically transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed.
Therefore, the transfer of real properties to the surviving corporation in pursuance of a merger is not
subject to documentary stamp tax.
Documentary stamp tax is imposed only on all conveyances, deeds, instruments or writing where
realty sold shall be conveyed to a purchaser or purchasers. The transfer of SPPC’s real property to
respondent was neither a sale nor was it a conveyance of real property for a consideration contracted
to be paid as contemplated under Section 196 of the Tax Code.
Notably, RA 9243, entitled "An Act Rationalizing the Provisions of the Documentary Stamp Tax of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997" was enacted and took effect on April 27, 2004 which
exempts the transfer of real property of a corporation, which is a party to the merger or consolidation,
to another corporation, which is also a party to the merger or consolidation, from the payment of
PAGE 102 of 149

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Bank of the Philippine

Islands v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Global Business Bank, Inc. v. Wilfred N. Chiok
November 26, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 172652, 175302, 175394
Facts:
Chiok has been engaged in dollar trading for several years, by reason of which he maintained accounts
with Metrobank and Global Bank, with which he had a Bills Purchase Line Agreement (BPLA). 2
Manager’s Checks (MC) and 1 Cashier’s Check (CC) were issued by Global Bank and Metrobank
respectively in the name of Gonzalo Nuguid, which Chiok deposited in the Nuguid’s BPI account. In
return, Nuguid was supposed to deliver around US$1M, which he failed to do. Chiok secured a TRO
from the RTC directing the banks from honoring the checks, which Metrobank received a day after the
check was presented for payment. BPI filed a complaint-in-intervention for allegedly allowing Nuguid
to withdraw the amounts of the Global Bank MCs on the same day the checks were deposited. RTC
ruled that payment of MCs and CCs are subject to the condition that the payee thereof complies with
his obligations to the purchaser of the checks. It ultimately ordered the banks to pay Chiok the value of
the checks, and Nuguid to pay the banks. The banks submit that the Stop Order was illegal and
contrary to principles of commercial law.
Issues:
1) Whether the Stop Order by the RTC, grounded on the breach of the payee’s obligation, was valid;
and
2) Whether the purchaser of the checks has the right to have the checks cancelled by filing an action
for rescission of its contract with the payee.
Held:
1) No. An MC, like a CC, is an order of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its
total resources, integrity, and honor behind its issuance, and is regarded substantially to be as
good as the money it represents. While indeed, it cannot be said that manager’s and cashier’s
checks are pre-cleared, “clearing” should not be confused with “acceptance”. MCs and CCs are
still the subject of clearing to ensure that the same have not been materially altered or otherwise
completely counterfeited. However, MCs and CCs are pre-accepted by the mere issuance thereof
by the bank, which is both its drawer and drawee. Thus, while MCs and CCs are still subject to
clearing, they cannot be countermanded for being drawn against a closed account, insufficient
funds, or for similar reasons such as a condition not appearing on the face of the check.
2) No. The right to rescind under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the CA in tis ruling, is
predicated upon the reciprocity of the obligations of the injured party and the guilty party. The
right of rescission under Article 1191 can only be exercised in accordance with the principle of
relativity of contracts under Article 1131, where contracts can only bind the parties who entered into
it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof. Here, while Chiok may have a cause of action against Nuguid for
the rescission of their contract, he does not have a cause of action against the banks that would
allow him to rescind the MCs and CC, which would have resulted in the crediting of the amounts
thereof back to his account. The RTC and CA Order on this point must therefore be reversed.
PAGE 103 of 149

Victoria-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., and Marcelo, Jr.

December 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 193018
Facts:
Pacific Plans Inc. is engaged in the selling of pre-need plans and educational plans, including
traditional open-ended educational plans (PEPTrads), and petitioner is a holder of 2 of these
PEPTrads. On April 7, 2005, foreseeing the impossibility of meeting its obligations to the availing
plan holders as they fall due, respondent filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation with the RTC.
The RTC issued a Stay Order, and subsequently approved the Alternative Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). In
the meantime, the value of the Peso strengthened and since Pacific Plan’s trust fund is mainly
composed of NAPOCOR bonds that are denominated in US Dollars, respondent submitted a
Manifestation and Motion to Admit the Modified Rehabilitation Plan (MRP) with the Rehabilitation
Court. The Rehabilitation Court, invoking its “cram down” power, approved the MRP over the
comments/opposition by the concerned parties. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review under Rule
43 with the CA, questioning the Rehabilitation Court’s approval of the MRP, insofar as it reduces the
original claim and amount that petitioner was to receive under the ARP.
Issues: 1) Whether a Rule 43 petition for review is the proper mode of review of a decision of the
Rehabilitation Court approving a Rehabilitation Plan; and 2) Whether it was within the power of the
Rehabilitation Court to approve the MRP.
Held:
1) No; but the petition may be given due course, as the Rules at the time the petitioner filed the
petition for review provided for a Rule 43 mode of review. The Supreme Court has since issued A.M.
No. 00-8-10-SC (Rehabilitation Rules) which took effect on January 16, 2009, which unequivocally
states that “an order issued after the approval of the rehabilitation plan can be reviewed only through
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2) The “cram down” power of the Rehabilitation Court has long been established and even codified
under the Rehabilitation Rules, to wit: “The court may approve a rehabilitation plan over the
opposition of creditors if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition
of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. While the voice and participation of the creditors is crucial
in the determination of the viability of the rehabilitation plan, as they stand to benefit or suffer in the
implementation thereof, the interests of all stakeholders is the ultimate and prime consideration.
Thus, while we recognize the predisposition of the planholders in vacillating on the enforcement of the
MRP, since the terms and conditions stated therein have been fundamentally changed from those
stated in the Original and Amended Rehabilitation Plan, the MRP cannot be considered an abrogation
of rights to the planholders/creditors.
PAGE 104 of 149

Dona Adela v. TIDCORP

February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 201931
Facts:
Dona Adela filed a case for Voluntary insolvency. During the proceedings, Dona Adela entered into a
compromise agreement with TIDCORP to enter into a dacion en pago in order to pay its obligations.
The agreement which specified the details of the dacion, which importantly was negotiated by BPI and
TIDCORP, and not with Dona Adela, included a waiver of confidentiality of bank accounts under the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the GBL of 2000 regarding Dona Adela’s accounts, as well as those
of its directors.
One of the affected directors, Epifanio Ramos, filed a manifestation challenging the waiver of the
confidentiality over his bank account, claiming that he has a separate personality from the
corporation. Nevertheless, the RTC approved the compromise agreement. Ramos’ MR was denied.
Hence this petition for review.
Issues:
WON Dona Adela is bound by the waiver provision of the compromise agreement. - NO
Ratio:
The compromise agreement was entered into by BPI and TIDCORP, with Dona Adela not a party. The
Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits requires that waiver be by written permission of the depositor. Here,
Dona Adela did not give such written consent. BPI and TIDCORP were the parties. The provision on
waiver as merely inserted into their agreement. Thus, Dona Adela was not bound by the provision.
Further, Dona Adela’s silence on the matter during the proceedings cannot constitute a waiver. Mere
silence on the part of the holder of a right should not be construed as a waiver thereof.
Petition Granted. W aiver struck down.
PAGE 105 of 149

UP LAW BOC CRIMINAL LAW DIGEST COMPILATION
CRIMINAL LAW
People v. Abetong
June 4, 2014 / GR No. 209785
FACTS:
Abetong was arrested for drug dealing after a buy bust operation conducted by the PNP and was
convicted by the trial court. On appeal, he raised the issue of non-admissibility of the evidence, as the
prosecution had failed to prove that the integrity of the evidence had not been preserved.
HELD:
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of it.
The failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the prosecution’s case, because he was the only one
who had the key to the evidence locker. As the lone key holder and consequentially a link in the chain,
Inspector Lorilla’s testimony became indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. Only he could have testified that no one else obtained the key from him for
purposes of removing the items from their receptacle. Only he could have enlightened the courts on
what safety mechanisms have been installed in order to preserve the integrity of the evidence acquired
while inside the locker. Absent his testimony, therefore, it cannot be plausibly claimed that the chain
of custody has sufficiently been established.
The date and time of confiscation do not appear on the markings of the seized items. It cannot also be
denied that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for documentation purposes. It is
admitted that no representative from the media, from the Department of Justice, or any elective
official was present to serve as witness in recording the arrest.
PAGE 106 of 149

People v. Paras
June 4, 2014 / G.R. No. 192912
Facts:
Paras was accused of raping AAA, a minor house helper of his elder sister, on March 1996. As a result
of the act, AAA became pregnant. Paras denied the charge, and capitalized on the fact that AAA was
already three months pregnant at the time she was examined in October 1996.
HELD:
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is
problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal
duration of pregnancy.
At any rate, pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the
rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What
is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's
will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.
PAGE 107 of 149

Syhunliong v. Rivera
June 4, 2014 / G.R. No. 200148
Facts:
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF). On the other
hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. Rivera, citing personal and family
matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually
continued working until March of the same year to complete the turnover of papers under her custody
to her successor, Lumapas. Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining
salaries, benefits and incentives. She informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check
representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong. This
prompted Rivera to send text messages to the company’s official cellphone describing how terrible
Syhunliong is as a boss on April 6, 2006. On April 16, 2007, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a
complaint for libel.
Held:
Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message
was sent. Its institution on April 16, 2007 was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in
Article 90 of the RPC.
The plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the
charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was held in People v. Moran, this
rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive provisions of the law,
such as that which refers to prescription of crimes.
Further, Section 9, Rule 117 partially provides that the defense of extinction of criminal action or
liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the accused had not raised the same in a
motion to quash. In Rivera’s case, the issue of prescription is raised in her comment to the petition
before the SC. Syhunliong does not specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted.
The text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication. Rivera was speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest and not out of an
intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the
message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned, Lumapas, who at that time was the best
person to help expedite the release of her claims.
PAGE 108 of 149

Ariel T. Lim v. People of the Philippines

November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 190834
Facts:
Lim issued a 2 Bank of Commerce Checks, payable to CASH, in the amount of P100,000 each. He gave
the checks to Willie Castor as his campaign donation to the latter’s candidacy in the 1998 elections.
Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed Lim to issue a “Stop
Payment” order for the 2 checks, which were used for the payment of the same. The checks were then
dishonored and 2 demand letters were sent by Ms. Badiee to Lim, who then filed a complaint before
the Office of the Prosecutor. After receiving the subpoena, Lim issued a replacement check for
P200,000, which Ms. Badiee was able to encash. Nevertheless, 6 months after payment, 2
Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against Lim before the MeTC, which found petitioner
guilty.
Held:
Although the payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided
for in B.P. 22 would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the Court has acknowledged
extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements are present, the conviction of the accused would
prove to be abhorrent to society’s sense of justice.
The fact that Lim had already paid the value of the dishonored checks 6 months before the filing of the
Information in court is enough to exonerate him, in keeping with justice and equity. The spirit of the
law (protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system) would not be served by
penalizing people who have made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed
against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already
attained the purpose of the law.
On the other hand, payment of the bounced check after the information has been filed in court would
no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused. Since from the commencement of the criminal
proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every
intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there
is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law
should be applied to its full extent.
The Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged
with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d). Damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense
and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability
of the crime but not the criminal liability.
PAGE 109 of 149

Escalona II, et al.
December 1, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 & 178080
Facts:
This case involves the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa due to fraternity hazing in 1991. In 1993, the
RTC found the 26 accused guilty of homicide. On appeal, the CA set aside the finding of conspiracy
and rendered judgment acquitting 19 of the accused and reducing the pronouncement of 4 of the
accused (Tecson et. al.) to slight physical injuries in 2002. Motions for reconsideration were filed by
the Republic of the Philippines. Tecson et. al. filed separate motions insisting that the previous verdict
of the CA has already lapsed into finality as a result of their previous availments of the probation
program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. SC found them guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide instead.
Held:
The motion for reconsideration is not barred by the accused’s right against double jeopardy. Section 7,
Rule 120 shows that to prevent double jeopardy, only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a
criminal case; and thus the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation –
makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. This rule, however, does not confer
blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. The rule of double jeopardy is not absolute, and this rule is
inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the
criminal judgment, such as in a Rule 65 petition. In such petition, any resulting annulment of a
criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
The accused may reapply for probation despite an appeal made from a previous judgment of guilt for
a crime wherein probation is unavailable. In Colinares v. People, the Court, on grounds of fairness,
allowed the accused to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him,
unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, is subject to probation. The Probation Law never
intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy
of probation is one of liberality towards the accused.
PAGE 110 of 149

Gutierrez v COA
Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 200628
Facts:
Gutierrez is a Cash Collecting Officer designated to the NFA’s NCR District Office. She sometimes
placed her daily collections in a wooden cabinet. The office was robbed, including the funds in the
wooden cabinet. Gutierrez was informed that she must immediately produce the missing funds. She
appealed, but the appeal was denied.
HELD:
First, the right to counsel applies only to criminal, not administrative proceedings. Petitioner is not
being accused of or investigated for a crime. Any proceeding conducted with the COA was for the
purpose of determining if petitioner's salaries should be withheld or if petitioner should be relieved
from her liability as a cashier.
Second, and more pertinently, a cashier who is found to have been negligent in keeping the funds in
his custody cannot be relieved from his accountability for amounts lost through robbery. As a cashier
for the NFA, Gutierrez qualifies as an accountable officer under PD 1445. An accountable officer is a
government officer whose duties require them to possess or be in custody of government funds or
properties. Under PD 1445, Sec. 105, they are liable for all losses attributable to negligence in the
keeping of funds.
Here, Gutierrez was negligent in keeping the funds in wooden cabinets instead of in the vault. As such,
she was liable.
PAGE 111 of 149

Almendras v. Almendras
Jan. 14, 2015/ G.R. No. 179491
FACTS:
Alejandro Almendras sent letters to House Speaker JDV and the President of Oil Carriers, Inc., wherein
he essentially insulted his brother Alexis Dodong Almendras, calling him a blackmailer. Thus, Dodong
filed a case for damages arising from defamation. RTC ruled that there was defamation. On appeal,
Alejandro claimed that the letter was privileged communication because he sent it to the house
speaker.
HELD:
The statements in the letter were defamatory, as they labeled Dodong as a renowned blackmailer, a
vengeful family member who fields cases against his mother and siblings with nefarious design.
As to the privileged communications argument, he did not send it only to the person with interest or
duty in the matter alleged, i.e. JDV. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. Examination of the letters would
reveal that petitioner himself intended for the letters to be circulated when Alejandro asked for the
assistance of the office in circulating the information to concerned officials. Thus, the letters were
defamatory and damages are in order.
PAGE 112 of 149

People v Chi Chan Liu

Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 189272
FACTS:
Chi Chan Liu was convicted of violation of Sec. 21 (a), Art. IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, which
prohibits illegal importation of drugs. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.
HELD:
The defense of Chi on appeal was that there was no actual importation because there was no proof
that the ship came in from a foreign country. The SC believed this, ruling that importation means that
something was brought in from a foreign country. Just because Chi and his co-accused are Chinese
nationals did not mean that the drugs came from China. Thus, he is not guilty of illegal importation of
drugs. That being said, possession is inherent in importation; thus, Chi is guilty of possession, not
importation.
PAGE 113 of 149

Ricalde v. People
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 211002
FACTS:
This case involves the rape of a 10-year old boy by Richard Ricalde. He was convicted for rape under
the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 266-A of the RPC, otherwise known as rape by sexual assault. He was
convicted by the RTC. CA affirmed. In this appeal, Ricalde claims reasonable doubt, because the
medico-legal found no signs of trauma in the victim’s anus, nor did the victim categorically say that
Ricalde inserted his penis into any orifice.
HELD:
The SC made the pronouncement that the standards for consummation in vaginal rape apply with
equal force to rape by sexual assault. Thus, the victim’s statement that his anus was penetrated was
given credence by the court. The finding of lack of anal orifice does not remove the possibility of an
insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter. The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ
distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.
PAGE 114 of 149

UP LAW BOC REMEDIAL LAW DIGEST COMPILATION
REMEDIAL LAW
People v. Noel Enojas y Hingpit
March 10, 2014 / GR No. 204894
Facts: 2 Policemen noticed that a man, Enojas, was suspicious in a taxi and brought him to the
station. On the way to the station, two more suspicious men appeared and a robbery occurred and the
suspect escaped. However, in the abandoned taxi, the cellphone of Enojas was left behind and
monitored the cellphone’s messages and discovered that Enojas was in collaboration with the two
other suspicious men and the robbery that occurred. Eventually, the policemen conducted an
entrapment operation and arrested the two accused.
Issue: WON the text messages were admissible? YES, pursuant to the Electronic Evidence Rule
Ratio: As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from
and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and
was competent to testify on them.
PAGE 115 of 149

People v. Henry Go
March 25, 2014 / GR No. 168539
Facts: An information was filed against Go for violation of RA 3019 in relation to PIATCO contracts
and conspiring with DOTC Secretary Enrile and entering into a contract which is grossly disadvantages
to the government. Go filed a motion to quash the information since Secretary Enrile passed away, the
public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired with was no longer a public officer, hence
the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense.
Issue: WON the motion to quash should be granted? NO! SB has jurisdiction over Go.
Ratio: It bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of
R.A. 3019.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a
public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
PAGE 116 of 149

People v. Abetong
June 4, 2014 / GR No. 209785
Facts: Abetong was arrested for drug dealing after a buy bust operation conducted by the PNP, and
was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, he raised the issue of non-admissibility of the evidence, as
the prosecution had failed to prove that the integrity of the evidence had not been preserved.
Held: The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possession of it.
The failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the prosecution’s case, becuase he was the
only one who had the key to the evidence locker.
As the lone key holder and consequentially a link in the chain, Inspector Lorilla’s testimony
became indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Only he
could have testified that no one else obtained the key from him for purposes of removing the items
from their receptacle. Only he could have enlightened the courts on what safety mechanisms have
been installed in order to preserve the integrity of the evidence acquired while inside the locker.
Absent his testimony, therefore, it cannot be plausibly claimed that the chain of custody has
sufficiently been established.
The date and time of confiscation do not appear on the markings of the seized items. It cannot
also be denied that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for documentation purposes. It is
admitted that no representative from the media, from the Department of Justice, or any elective
official was present to serve as witness in recording the arrest.
PAGE 117 of 149


July 2, 2014 / G.R. no. 161759
Facts:
1. In 1966, Union Refinery Corporation (URC) was established under the Corporation Code. It was
involved in the business of importing oil products.
2. In 1996, Oilink was incorporated for the primary purpose of manufacturing, importing, exporting,
buying, selling or dealing in oil and gas, and their refinements and by-products at wholesale and
retail of petroleum. Oilink and URC had interlocking directors.
3. In applying for and in expediting the transfer of the operator’s name for the Customs Bonded
4. In 1998, the District Collector of the Port of Manila and the Customs Commissioner demanded
URC to pay the taxes due on its shipment. Such demands were initially unacted upon, until URC’s
president conveyed to the then Customs Commissioner of URC’s willingness to pay only a portion
of the assessment, with the payment taken from the collectibles of Oilink from the National Power
5. Despite the offer, a final demand was made upon Oilink and URC to pay the taxes due.
6. Oilink formally protested the assessment on the ground that it was not the party liable for the
assessed deficiency taxes.
Issues:
2. WON there was a valid cause of action. – YES.
Ratio:
Customs denied the protest of Oilink. Clearly, the filing of the petition on July 30, 1999 by Oilink
was well within its reglementary period to appeal. The insistence by the Commissioner of
Customs on reckoning the reglementary period to appeal from November 25, 1998, the date when
URC received the final demand letter, is unwarranted. The November 25, 1998 final demand letter
of the BoC was addressed to URC, not to Oilink. As such, the final demand sent to URC did not
bind Oilink unless the separate identities of the corporations were disregarded in order to consider
them as one.
2. Yes, there existed a valid cause of action. The CA correctly held that the principle of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not an iron-clad rule because there were instances in
which the immediate resort to judicial action was proper. This was one such exceptional instance
when the principle did not apply. As the records indicate, the Commissioner of Customs already
decided to deny the protest by Oilink on July 12, 1999, and stressed then that the demand to pay
was final. In that instance, the exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been an exercise
in futility because it was already the Commissioner of Customs demanding the payment of the
deficiency taxes and duties.
PAGE 118 of 149

Customs did not establish that Oilink had been set up to avoid the payment of taxes or duties, or
for purposes that would defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime,
confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. It
is also noteworthy that from the outset the Commissioner of Customs sought to collect the
deficiency taxes and duties from URC, and that it was only on July 2, 1999 when the Commissioner
of Customs sent the demand letter to both URC and Oilink. That was revealing, because the
failure of the Commissioner of Customs to pursue the remedies against Oilink from the outset
manifested that its belated pursuit of Oilink was only an afterthought.
PAGE 119 of 149

Paranaque Kings Enterprises v. Catalina Santos

July 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 194368
Facts:
Respondent Catalina L. Santos (Santos) entered into a Contract of Lease with Frederick O. Chua
(Chua) over eight (8) parcels of land9 located in Parañaque City (leased premises), specifically giving
the latter the "first option or priority to buy" the same in case of sale.10 Chua then caused the
construction of a 6-door commercial complex on the leased premises but, by reason of business
reverses, he was constrained to assign his rights thereon to Lee Ching Bing (Lee), who likewise
assumed all obligations under the lease contract with Santos. Lee, in turn, executed a Deed of
Assignment over the leased premises, including all improvements thereon, in favor of petitioner.
Paranaque Kings filed a complaint before the RTC against Santos and Raymundo. This was denied.
The MR was also denied. However, the CA reversed, citing the existence of an actionable contractual
breach.
During the course of the proceedings in the lower court, Paranaque Kings filed a motion to cancel pre-
trial, on account of its counsel preparing a petition for certiorari and prohibition to be filed before the
CA. This was denied by the RTC. This led to the declaration of the RTC that the petitioner was non-
suited and the dismissal of its complaint.
Issues:
1. WON it was correct for the RTC to deny a motion to cancel pre-trial. – YES.
2. WON the dismissal of the Complaint for failure of petitioner to proceed to pre-trial as directed by
the trial court was warranted. – YES.
Held:
The trial court has the discretion on whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule
the pre-trial conference in accordance with the circumstances obtaining in the case. This must be so
as it is the trial court which is able to witness firsthand the events as they unfold during the trial of a
case.
Petitioner clearly trifled with the mandatory character of a pre-trial, which is a procedural device
intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of
the realm of surprise and maneuvering.
It bears stressing that the rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. These
rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of the judicial system. By trifling
with the rules and the court processes, and openly defying the order of the trial court to proceed to
pre-trial, petitioner only has itself to blame for the dismissal of its Complaint. The dismissal is a matter
within the trial court's sound discretion, which, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court hereunder quoted, must stand absent any justifiable reason to the contrary
PAGE 120 of 149

Landbank v. Lajom
August 20, 2014 / G.R. No. 184982
Doctrine: While the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands
placed under the land reform, its valuation is considered only as an initial determination and not
conclusive.
Facts: Respondents were the registered owners of several parcels of land in Nueva Ecija. A portion of
the land was placed under the government's Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to the
"Tenants Emancipation Decree". Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and, instead, filed an amended
Petition for determination of just compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR,
the LBP, and the farmer-beneficiaries. He argued that the DAR valuation was arrived at without due
process, highly prejudicial and inimical to his and his heirs’ property rights. He alleged that in
computing the amount of just compensation, the DAR erroneously applied the provisions of PD 27 and
EO 228, Series of 1997, that have already been repealed by Section 17 of RA 6657. For its part, the LBP
agreed with the DAR valuation and insisted that PD 27 and EO 228, on which the DAR valuation was
based, were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657, contrary to Lajom’s stance.
Held:
1. Applicable Law
Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is
overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be
settled, as in this case, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded
under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6657 is
sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.
2. Reckoning Point for Just Com pensation
As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be determined
at the time of the property’s taking. Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the time
emancipation patents are issued by the government (see LBP vs Heirs of Domingo).
3. RTC as Special Court
It must be emphasized that while the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining
the value of lands placed under the land reform and, accordingly, the just compensation therefor,
its valuation is considered only as an initial determination and, thus, not conclusive. Verily, it is
well-settled that it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, which should make the final
determination of just compensation in the exercise of its judicial function.
4. Interest Rate
The Court has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was
delay in the payment of just compensation, deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on
the part of the State. This incremental interest is not granted on the computed just compensation;
rather, it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its
payment.
Petition granted.
PAGE 121 of 149

Ando v. DFA
August 27, 2014 / G.R. No. 195432
Doctrine: An applicant should file an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial
of her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239.
Facts: Petitioner Edelina married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National. Yuichiro Kobayashi
validly granted under Japanese laws a divorce. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated
her to remarry, petitioner married Masatomi Ando. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her
Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at
the DFA that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that
her marriage with her said husband Ando is valid. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaratory Relief. RTC dismissed the case stating that she had no cause of action. Petitioner argues
that under the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to file a direct petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage, with even more reason can it not collaterally
attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that
under the law, a marriage – even one that is void or voidable – shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Held:
1. Docum entary Requirem ents
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, it is clear that for petitioner to
obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the
following: (1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and one photocopy
thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and
(3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or
consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned
foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
2. Appeal Process in case of Denial
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport under
her second husband’s name. Should her application for a passport be denied, she should have
filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA. Petitioner’s argument that her application “cannot
be said to have been either denied, cancelled or restricted by the DFA, so as to make her an
aggrieved party entitled to appeal", as instead she "was merely told" that her passport cannot be
issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the
denial of her application.
3. Recognition of Second M arriage
With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should
have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first
husband. In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
PAGE 122 of 149

Villalon v. Chan
Septem ber 24, 2014 / G.R. No. 196508
Facts: Respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua. She claimed that her husband and the
present petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person. During the subsistence of their
marriage, Leon, under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with
Erlinda Talde. Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a case for
bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners. Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia. Leonardo
filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia. He argued that Amelia could
not be represented in the bigamy case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the
complaint-affidavit.
Held:
1. Representation by Counsel
The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an
attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of
the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners. The RTC should have allowed
and should not have disqualified Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the
respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in
the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
2. Failure to Implead the People
The respondent’s failure to implead the "People of the Philippines" as a party-respondent is not a
fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of her petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the CA because: (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions alleged to have acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (2) the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent is a
special civil action separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the petitioners.
For these reasons, the "People of the Philippines" need not be impleaded as a party in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
PAGE 123 of 149

Republic v. Spouses Lazo

Septem ber 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 195594
Facts: Respondent spouses Rogelio and Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers of Monte Vista
Homes, a residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they
voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation Administration a portion of Monte Vista for the construction
of an open irrigation canal. Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of Engr. Donno G.
Custodio, retired Chief Geologist of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, to conduct a geohazard study
on the possible effects of the project on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up with a Geohazard
Assessment Report, finding that ground shaking and channel bank erosion are the possible hazards
that could affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista. Respondents filed a petition for an
injunction against NIA.
Held: R.A. No. 8975 is the present law that proscribes lower courts from issuing restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions against government infrastructure projects. In ensuring the expeditious
and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects, its twin objectives
are: (1) to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs; and (2) to
allow the immediate enjoyment of the social and economic benefits of the project. R.A. No. 8975
exclusively reserves to the Supreme Court the power to issue injunctive writs on government
infrastructure projects. A judge who violates the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at
least sixty (60) days without pay, in addition to any civil and criminal liabilities that he or she may incur
under existing laws. Through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, the Court has instructed all judges
and justices of the lower courts to comply with and respect the prohibition.
Here, respondents failed to demonstrate that there is a constitutional issue involved, much
less a constitutional issue that is of extreme urgency. More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the
public at large are bound to respect the fact that official acts of the Government, including those
performed by governmental agencies such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, and cannot be summarily, prematurely and capriciously
set aside. Such presumption is operative not only upon the courts, but on all persons, especially on
those who deal with the government on a frequent basis. Respondents failed to satisfy even the basic
requirements of the Rules for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it granted their application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction.
PAGE 124 of 149

Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People of the Philippines

November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 199032
Facts: The PNP, through Senior Police Superintendent Fajardo, applied with the RTC of Manila
Branch 50 for a warrant to search 3 caves located inside Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a,
Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims of the victims summarily executed by the “Davao
Death Squad” may be found. In support of the application, Avasola testified that he personally
witnessed the killing of 6 victims and was part of the group that buried them. The search warrant was
issued by Judge Peralta and the search yielded positive results. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash and Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence principally on the grounds that: 1) Judge Peralta had no
authority to act on the application since he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice
Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court, and 2)
the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant which was sought to be enforced in Davao.
Issue: Whether the Search Warrant was validly issued.
Held: Yes. While the imposition of administrative penalties, pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, did
operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, the abstraction of authority
would not, by itself, invalidate the Search Warrant. Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the
issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, as a matter of public policy, remain valid for all
purposes in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order for
the de facto doctrine to apply, the following elements must concur: 1) there must be a de jure office, 2)
there must be a color of right or general acquiescence by the public, and 3) there must be actual
physical possession of the office in good faith. These elements were all availing in this case.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of search
warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These criminal cases
pertain to those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, and other relevant laws
enacted by Congress and included herein by the Supreme Court. Search warrant applications for such
cases may be filed by the NBI, PNP, and the Anti-Crime Task Force, and personally endorsed by the
heads of such agencies. The Executive Judge of the RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges are authorized t act on
such applications and shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The case, murder, being a heinous crime, properly fell within
the Rule, and the judge here complied with all the procedures required for the issuance of the search
warrant.
PAGE 125 of 149

Luzvim in Cebu M ining Corp. and Luzvim in Port Services Com pany, Inc. v. Cebu Port
Authority and Port Manager Angelo C. Verdan
November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 201284
Facts: In 1997, the Cebu Port Authority (CPA) issued a Certificate of Registration and Permit to
Operate to petitioners, authorizing them to operate a private port facility until December 31, 2022. In
2006, the CPA rescinded the registration/permit on the ground that it is defective, and forthwith took
possession of the port facility, and started to fence the premises. Petitioners filed a complaint for
Injunction and Damages against CPA and its Port Manager before the RTC. RTC granted the
injunction, ruling that petitioners were not given an opportunity to be heard. The CA ruled that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, ruling that the
writ cannot be issued to take over the port facility because the repair of the RORO ramp, asphalting of
back-up area, construction of office, passenger terminal and covered walk are considered national
government projects as defined by RA 8975 against which no injunctive can lie pursuant to the same
law.
Issue: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ.
Held: No. The statute clearly states that no court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue injunctive
writs against the government to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: (d) Termination or
rescission of any such contract/project. The prohibition covers national government projects, which
include infrastructure projects, where the subject seaports are categorized under. Thus, only the
Supreme Court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents herein.
PAGE 126 of 149

The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. The Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
November 24, 2014 / G.T. No. 210987
Facts: Philamlife sold its Class A shares in PhilamCare for USD 2,190,000 to STI Investments, Inc.,
who emerged as the highest bidder. After the sale was completed and the necessary DST and CGT
were paid, Philamlife filed an application for a certificate authorizing registration/tax clearance with
the BIR Large Taxpayers Service Division to facilitate transfer of shares. It was instructed to secure a
BIR Ruling due to potential donor’s tax. The Commissioner denied Philamlife’s request and imposed a
donor’s tax pursuant to RR 06-08 and RMC 25-11, which Ruling was appealed to the Secretary of
Finance, assailing the nullity of the rules and circular. The same was dismissed. Petitioner then
appealed to the CA under Rule 43, which dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that
the same was with the CTA. Petitioner argued that the CTA had no jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari and may not rule on the nullity of rules.
Issue: Whether the CTA had jurisdiction over an appeal from the Secretary of Finance involving the
nullity of revenue regulation and revenue memorandum circulars.
Held: Yes. While there is no provision in the law that expressly provides where exactly the ruling of
the Secretary of Finance under Section 4 of the NIRC is appealable to, RA 1125 (Creating the Court of
Tax Appeals) addresses the seeming gap in the law as it vests the CTA with jurisdiction over the
petition as “other matters” arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR. CTA
furthermore has the power certiorari in cases within its appellate jurisdiction. As held in the case of
City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo. in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction, such as the power to issue writs of certiorari.
PAGE 127 of 149

Marcelo Investment and Management Corp. and the Heirs of Edward T. Marcelo, namely
Katherine J. Marcelo, et. al. v. Jose T. Marcelo, Jr.
November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 209651
Facts: On August 24, 1987, Jose Sr. died intestate, leaving 4 compulsory heirs: Edward, George,
Helen, and Jose Jr. MIMCO filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate,
and pending the issuance of the same, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose Jr. as special
administrators. The RTC then appointed Edward as regular administrator of the estate, to which Jose
Jr. filed an MR, arguing on his competence to better administer his father’s estate, which was denied.
The Court subsequently approved the partition of Jose Sr.’s estate as proposed by Edward. The
intestate proceedings were then archived pending Edward’s submission of proof of payment of estate
taxes, during which Edward died. Jose Jr. wasted no time in reviving the intestate proceedings
involving his father’s estate and moved for his appointment as regular administrator thereof. The RTC
granted the motion, ruling that there was no previous ruling that respondent was unfit to administer
the estate. Petitioners appealed the order on two points: 1) that the appointment of a regular
administrator is no longer necessary as there no longer remains a pending matter in the settlement of
Jose Sr.’s estate requiring attention and administration as there was no existing or unliquidated debt
against the estate; and 2) that Jose Jr. was found by final judgment to be unfit to act as administrator.
Issues:
1) Whether the appointment of an administrator is no longer necessary; and
2) Whether Jose Jr. is disqualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate.
Held:
1) No. The proceedings were still at the liquidation, partition, and distribution stage, necessitating
the appointment of a regular administrator. There was no showing from either parties that the
receivables of and claims against Jose Sr.’s estate has been actually liquidated. Further, the
liquidation scheme appears yet to be effected, and partition and distribution to the heirs are still
held in abeyance pending the payment of estate taxes. The intestate proceedings thus requires a
regular administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of the
decedent.
2) Yes. Records show that in all of Jose Jr.’s oppositions to Edward’s appointment as regular
administrator, he simultaneously prayed for his appointment, thereby proffering his competence
and qualification to be appointed as regular administrator as a legal issue for resolution of the
courts. The decision of the trial court appointing Edward, was not merely a comparison of the
qualifications of Edward and Jose Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the
unfitness of Jose Jr., who allegedly “borrowed” company assets for his personal use and has not
returned them. RTC’s categorical declaration of Jose Jr.’s unfitness and unsuitability to administer
his father’s estate was a decision had the imprimatur of a final resolution by this Court. Thus, he is
not qualified to be appointed as such.
PAGE 128 of 149

City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority/Prove of Bataan (represented

by Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., and Emerlinda S. Talento, in her capacity as Provincial
Treasurer of Bataan v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority)
November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 184203
Facts: The City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA P32M in
real property taxes from 1992 to 1998 on its properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. The City
made subsequent demands to PEZA; in its last reminder, PEZA was assesserd P86M as real property
taxes for the period of 1992 to 2002. PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Pasay, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of the same. The City filed an MR
and thereafter appealed to the CA. The City argued that in the first place, the RTC of Pasay had no
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. CA dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Whether the petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy for PEZA.
Held: No. The Court ruled that the remedy of a taxpayer depends on the stage in which the LGU is
enforcing its authority to impose real property taxes. Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the
LGC is necessary in cases of erroneous assessments where the correctness of the amount assessed
is assailed. The taxpayer must first pay the tax then file a protest with the Local Treasurer within 30
days from the date of payment of tax. If denied or upon the lapse of the 60-day period to decide the
protest, the taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days, which has
120 days to decide the appeal. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision, he may appeal before
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, whose decision is thereafter appealable to the CTA En
Banc. The decision can then be appealed to the SC raising pure questions of law.
In case of an illegal assessm ent where the assessment was issued without authority,
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary and the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial
action. The taxpayer shall file a complaint for injunction before the RTC to enjoin the local government
from collecting real property taxes. The party unsatisfied with the decision shall file an appeal, not a
petition for certiorari, before the CTA, the complaint being a local tax case decided by the RTC. The
decision may then be appealed before the SC through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
raising pure questions of law.
In case the LGU has issued a notice of delinquency, the taxpayer may file a complaint for
injunction to enjoin the impending sale of the real property at public auction. In case the property had
already been sold, the taxpayer must first deposit with the court the amount for which the real
property was sold, together with interest of 2% per month from the sale of the to the time of the
institution of the action. The decisions of the RTC in these cases shall be appealable to the CTA, whose
decisions are can then be appealed to the SC raising pure questions of law.
A petition for declaratory relief was not the proper remedy, since the subject matter of the
petition, PEZA’ alleged tax exempt status under its charter, had already been breached.
PAGE 129 of 149

Escalona II, et al.
Decem ber 1, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 & 178080
Facts: This case involves the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa due to fraternity hazing in 1991. In 1993,
the RTC found the 26 accused guilty of homicide. On appeal, the CA set aside the finding of conspiracy
and rendered judgment acquitting 19 of the accused and reducing the pronouncement of 4 of the
accused (Tecson et. al.) to slight physical injuries in 2002. Motions for reconsideration were filed by
the Republic of the Philippines. Tecson et. al. filed separate motions insisting that the previous verdict
of the CA has already lapsed into finality as a result of their previous availments of the probation
program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. SC found them guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide instead.
Issues:
1. Whether the motion for reconsideration is barred under the accused’s right against double
jeopardy – NO.
2. Whether the accused may reapply for probation despite an appeal made from a previous
judgment of guilt for a crime wherein probation is unavailable – YES.
Held:
1. Section 7, Rule 120 shows that to prevent double jeopardy, only the accused may appeal the
criminal aspect of a criminal case; and thus the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when
applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. This rule,
however, does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. The rule of double jeopardy
is not absolute, and this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction
of the court that issued the criminal judgment, such as in a Rule 65 petition. In such petition, any
resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of
jurisdiction.
2. In Colinares v. People, the Court, on grounds of fairness, allowed the accused to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, is subject to probation. The Probation Law never intended to deny an
accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is
one of liberality towards the accused.
PAGE 130 of 149

Victoria-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., and Marcelo, Jr.

Decem ber 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 193018
Facts: Pacific Plans Inc. is engaged in the selling of pre-need plans and educational plans, including
traditional open-ended educational plans (PEPTrads), and petitioner is a holder of 2 of these
PEPTrads. On April 7, 2005, foreseeing the impossibility of meeting its obligations to the availing
plan holders as they fall due, respondent filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation with the RTC.
The RTC issued a Stay Order, and subsequently approved the Alternative Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). In
the meantime, the value of the Peso strengthened and since Pacific Plan’s trust fund is mainly
composed of NAPOCOR bonds that are denominated in US Dollars, respondent submitted a
Manifestation and Motion to Admit the Modified Rehabilitation Plan (MRP) with the Rehabilitation
Court. The Rehabilitation Court, invoking its “cram down” power, approved the MRP over the
comments/opposition by the concerned parties. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review under Rule
43 with the CA, questioning the Rehabilitation Court’s approval of the MRP, insofar as it reduces the
original claim and amount that petitioner was to receive under the ARP.
Issues:
1. Whether a Rule 43 petition for review is the proper mode of review of a decision of the
Rehabilitation Court approving a Rehabilitation Plan – NO.
2. Whether it was within the power of the Rehabilitation Court to approve the MRP.
Held:
1. But the petition may be given due course, as the Rules at the time the petitioner filed the petition
for review provided for a Rule 43 mode of review. The Supreme Court has since issued A.M. No.
00-8-10-SC (Rehabilitation Rules) which took effect on January 16, 2009, which unequivocally
states that “an order issued after the approval of the rehabilitation plan can be reviewed only
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. The “cram down” power of the Rehabilitation Court has long been established and even codified
under the Rehabilitation Rules, to wit: “The court may approve a rehabilitation plan over the
opposition of creditors if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the
opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. While the voice and participation of the
creditors is crucial in the determination of the viability of the rehabilitation plan, as they stand to
benefit or suffer in the implementation thereof, the interests of all stakeholders is the ultimate and
prime consideration. Thus, while we recognize the predisposition of the planholders in vacillating
on the enforcement of the MRP, since the terms and conditions stated therein have been
fundamentally changed from those stated in the Original and Amended Rehabilitation Plan, the
MRP cannot be considered an abrogation of rights to the planholders/creditors.
PAGE 131 of 149

Aguilar v. Lightbringers Cooperative

Jan. 12, 2015 / G.R. No. 2096205
Facts: The case stemmed from 3 complaints for sum of money filed by Lightbringers vs. Aguilar and
Calimbas, which were consolidated before the MCTC. Aguilar et al filed their answers, but they did not
appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference, leading to Lightbringers presenting its evidence ex-
parte. Aguilar et al thus filed a motion to be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses presented. MCTC
denied that motion. As a result, judgment was rendered against Aguilar and Calimbas. RTC affirmed
the judgments. CA further affirmed RTC, partially holding that the petition was formally defective for
failure to attach the entire records of the case. MR denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON the failure to attach the entire records rendered the petition formally defective – NO.
2. WON the failure to attend pretrial conference results in the default of the parties – NO.
Held:
1. Sec. 2, R42 does not require that the entire records of the case be attached to the petition for
review, providing instead only that “material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition” be attached. That means not the entire records. The Court ruled that
attached photocopies of the material documents which is substantial compliance with Sec. 2, R42.
2. (CLARIFICATION) While the rule remains that the court can only consider the evidence presented
by the party which attended the pre-trial conference, this does not result in the default of the
defendant. Rather, such failure shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex
parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the Court could only consider
the evidence presented by Lightbringers, with Aguilar et al losing their right to present their
evidence.
Petition Partially Granted.
PAGE 132 of 149

Estrada v Ombudsman
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 212140-41
Facts: Jinggoy Estrada was charged by the Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019. After he filed his
counter-affidavit, he filed a request to be furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the other
respondents. The Ombudsman refused, ruling that nothing in the Ombudsman rules requires that the
respondent be served with the pleadings of his co-respondent. Hence this special civil action for
certiorari.
Issue: WON Jinggoy is entitled to receive the pleadings of his co-defendants (No)
Held: There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of
the coutner-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the ROC only gives the respondent a
right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished
and to copy them at his expense.
While administrative cases with the Ombudsman o require the service of the affidavits of co-
respondents, that is under a different set of rules of procedure from those in criminal cases. At that
point in the proceedings, Estrada was not yet an accused in the contemplation of the Constitution and
the requirements of due process.
Further, the request came at Estrada’s preliminary investigation, where the only purpose is to
determine probable cause. This is not part of the trial and as such the accuse cannot invoke the
various rights Jinggoy was raising, e.g. to confront an cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence. Also, any admissions made by the co-respondents could not prejudice him, unlike in the
jurisprudence Estrada cited. To treat them as such would have the disastrous consequence of
remanding all criminal investigations for preliminary investigation because none of them would satisfy
the administrative due process standard of Ang Tibay v. CIR.
Petition Granted.
PAGE 133 of 149

Fortune v COA
Jan. 27, 2015 / G.R. No. 213525
Facts: The Fortune Life Insurance policy files this MR against the SC order dismissing its petition for
certiorari under rule 64 due to the late filing of the petition. Fortune lost a case before the COA, and
filed an MR from that decision. However, as stated, the petition for certiorari before the SC was
denied. Fortune invokes the fresh period rule, claiming that the period for filing the petition
commenced upon denial of the MR by the COA.
Issue: WON the fresh period rule applies in appeals from the COA to the SC – NO.
Held: It just doesn’t. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition
for certiorari uner rule 64. Appeal is different from certiorari. The reglementary periods are diferent.
MR denied.
PAGE 134 of 149

Reicon Realty Builders v Diamond Dragon Realty

February 4, 2015/ G.R. No. 204796
Facts: Reicon owns a parcel of land and a one-storey building it leased to Diamond Dragon Realty.
Diamond failed to pay monthly rentals, and the checks it had issued to pay them bounced. This
prompted Reicon to terminate the lease and enter into new leases with Jollibee and Maybunga. This
led Diamond to file a complaint for breach of contract with damages. MTD denied. On certiorari to the
CA, Diamond challenged the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person via special
appearance, claiming that the address to which the petition was served was incorrect. MTD granted.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issues: WON The CA acquired jurisdiction over Diamond Realty – YES.
Ratio:
The case was decided on the ground that the address was the correct one. However, more doctrinally,
the SC ruled that special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance; accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court oer the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e. set forth in an unequivocal manner; and failure to do so constitutes
voluntary submission to the jurisdiciton of the court. Thus, the ff. guidelines were set out:
1. Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
2. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must
be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
3. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution.
Petition Granted.
PAGE 135 of 149

BBB v. AAA
February 9, 2015 / G.R. No. 193225
Facts: BBB was charged with violation of VAWC by his wife AAA. AAA already had a son, CCC. Their
relationship resulted in the birth of DDD and EEE. It was alleged that his mistress FFF insulted and
humiliated AAA in BBB’s presence. This led AAA to leave the conjugal home. While AAA and CCC
eventually returned to the conjugal home, BBB supposedly was biased in favor of DDD and EEE to the
detriment of CCC. He also failed to pay the rentals for the condo in which AAA was staying and did not
give sufficient support to them. This led to BBB filing for a TPO against BBB, which was granted and
eventually made permanent by the RTC. BBB appealed to the CA, which affirmed. Hence this petition
for review. This digests focuses on a supposed memorandum of agreement between AAA and BBB,
which was supposedly a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and
support of DDD and EEE.
Issue: WON the award of support should be deleted, in light of the compromise agreement. – NO.
Ratio: This case is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement. Under RA 9262, compromise on
any act constituting the crime of violence against women is prohibited, because a process which
involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. Further,
the Rules on Court-Annexed Mediation explicitly except those covered by the Anti-VAWC law.
Petition Denied.
PAGE 136 of 149

Dona Adela v TIDCORP

February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 201931
Facts: Dona Adela filed a case for Voluntary insolvency. During the proceedings, Dona Adela entered
into a compromise agreement with TIDCORP to enter into a dacion en pago in order to pay its
obligations. The agreement which specified the details of the dacion, which importantly was
negotiated by BPI and TIDCORP, and not with Dona Adela, included a waiver of confidentiality of bank
accounts under the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the GBL of 2000 regarding Dona Adela’s
accounts, as well as those of its directors. One of the affected directors, Epifanio Ramos, filed a
manifestation challenging the waiver of the confidentiality over his bank account, claiming that he has
a separate personality from the corporation. Nevertheless, the RTC approved the compromise
agreement. Ramos’ MR was denied. Hence this petition for review.
Issues: WON Dona Adela is bound by the waiver provision of the compromise agreement – NO.
Ratio: The compromise agreement was entered into by BPI and TIDCORP, with Dona Adela not a
party. The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits requires that waiver be by written permission of the
depositor. Here, Dona Adela did not give such written consent. BPI and TIDCORP were the parties. The
provision on waiver as merely inserted into their agreement. Thus, Dona Adela was not bound by the
provision.
Further, Dona Adela’s silence on the matter during the proceedings cannot constitute a waiver. Mere
silence on the part of the holder of a right should not be construed as a waiver thereof.
Petition Granted. Waiver struck down.
PAGE 137 of 149

First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia of the Philippine Military Academy (represented by his
father Renato P. Cudia, who also acts on his own behalf, and Berteni Cataluña
Causing) vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), The Honor
Committee (HC) of 2014 of the PMA and HC Members, and the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board (CRAB)
February 24, 2015 / G.R. No 211362
Facts: Cadet Cudia was dismissed from his class before his supposed graduation. He filed a petition
for mandamus that he be included in the graduating class.
Issue: WON mandamus will prosper as a remedy to include him to the graduating class. – NO.
Ratio: Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or
corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined
by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when
to perform the duty.
For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should
be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
PAGE 138 of 149

Jose “Pepe” Sanico v. People of the Philippines and Jennifer Son-Tenio

March 25, 2015 / G.R. No 198753
Facts: The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing (Criminal Case
No. 3433-CR) and theft of minerals (Criminal Case No. 3434-CR) in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu (MCTC). On April 22, 2009, Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in
the MCTC.4 Consequently, on January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City ordered Sanico to
file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply. On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Cañete,
another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a motion for reconsideration7 vis-à-vis the dismissal of the
appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with
problems due to his wife’s debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel,
Atty. Baring’s own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to
contact as principal counsel hereof.
Issue: WON the appeal should have been disallowed. - NO
Ratio: The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in
criminal cases. The relevant portions of Rule 122 are the following:
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in
civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c) imposes on the RTC
the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or
briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the
expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be
properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the petitioner was
entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether he filed his
memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the RTC was, therefore,
an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that occasioned severe prejudice because his
conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time appeal being a matter of right, and because his
conviction was then declared to have attained finality, causing the execution of the decision as to its
civil aspect.
PAGE 139 of 149

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo
April 8, 2015 / G.R. No. 197597
Facts: Butukan Malang was one of the accused for alleged participation in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre. Datukan Malang Salibo, who had been in Saudi Arabia from November 7-
December 19, 2009 for the Hajj Pilgrimage, learned that police officers in Maguindanao suspected
him to be Butukan Malang. Salibo presented himself with his passport and other documents to the
police to clear his name. Despite assurances that they would not arrest him, the police apprehended
Salibo and tore off the page in his passport evidencing his departure for Saudi Arabia. Salibo filed a
petition for habeas corpus. The CA dismissed the petition, stating that the proper remedy was a
Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest, since Salibo’s arrest and detention were made
under a valid information and warrant of arrest, even if these named Butukan Malang.
Issue: Whether the proper remedy was the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. YES.
Held: Generally, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must exhaust the
usual remedies (i.e. filing a motion to quash the information or warrant of arrest), not resort to the
extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus. However, petitioner was not arrested by virtue of
any warrant charging him of any offense, nor was he restrained under a lawful process or order of
court. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not
Datukan Malang Salibo. Even if Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect alleged could not be cured
by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest, as changing the name of the
accused appearing thereon would not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in his case.
PAGE 140 of 149

Luzon Development Bank vs. Krishnan

April 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 203530
Facts: Respondent Krishnan filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against
petitioners. The RTC granted a preliminary writ of attachment in Krishnan’s favor, by virtue of which
petitioner bank’s accounts were garnished. When petitioners were required to file a counter-bond,
they prayed to be allowed to deposit certificates of title of real property to serve as their counter-bond.
Issue: Whether a party has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to
secure a contingent lien on its property should the other party win the case. NO.
Held: Sec 2 and Sec 5 of Rule 57, RoC make it clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued,
the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the
counter-bond. Thus, this does not cover the deposit of real property to discharge the attachment or
stay the implementation thereof.
PAGE 141 of 149

Lexber Inc. vs. Dalman

April 20, 2015 / G.R. No. 183587
Facts: Lexber filed a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments on its loan
obligations. Among its creditors were the Sps. Dalman, to whom it had undertaken to sell a house and
lot. The TC gave due course to Lexber’s rehabilitation petition and appointed a rehabilitation receiver.
The Sps. Dalman filed a MR arguing that the TC should have dismissed the rehabilitation petition
outright for failure to approve the rehabilitation plan within 180 days from initial hearing, and that no
rehabilitation petition of a real estate company should be given due course without the HLURB’s prior
request for appointment of the rehabilitation receiver. The TC denied the MR, prompting the Sps.
Dalman to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was granted. Lexber sought recourse in the
SC. In the meantime, the TC had dismissed the rehabilitation petition due to disapproval of the
proposed rehabilitation plan, and at the time, the CA was currently reviewing said dismissal in a
separate proceeding.
Issue: Whether SC should rule on the petition despite the pendency of the dismissal order with the
CA – NO.
Held: This would lead to the possibility of rendering conflicting rulings with the CA, which was
reviewing the dismissal for different and more substantive reasons. This possibility of rendering
conflicting decisions among reviewing courts is one of the reasons why the 2009 Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Rehabilitation amended the Interim Rules’ on the available procedural remedies after
the filing of the rehabilitation petition, which was then further amended in the new 2013 Financial
Rehabilitation Rules of Procedure.
Under the Interim Rules, a MR was a prohibited pleading. Under the 2008 Rules, an appeal through a
Rule 43 petition may be filed only after the TC issues an order approving or disapproving the
rehabilitation plan. Any issue arising from a denied MR may only be raised as an assigned error in the
Rule 43 petition and may not be questioned in a separate Rule 65 petition. The exception is when the
issue only arose after the issuance of the order denying or approving the rehabilitation plan. In the
2013 Rules, any relief from the TC’s denial of a MR is no longer available, and the CA’s mode of review
is through Rule 65. However, the 2013 Rules retained the guideline that review may be sought from
the CA only after the rehabilitation court issues an order approving or disapproving the rehabilitation
plan. Hence, if after the filing of the rehabilitation petition the TC is satisfied that the jurisdictional
requirements were complied with, initial hearing will commence. At this stage, no appeal or certiorari
petition may be filed as any remedy is only available after the order approving or disapproving the
rehabilitation plan.
PAGE 142 of 149

UP LAW BOC LEGAL ETHICS DIGEST COMPILATION
LEGAL ETHICS
Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Celera
January 14, 2014 / AC No. 5581
Facts: Rose Bunagan-Bansig filed a Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Rogelio Celera for Gross
Immoral Conduct. She alleged that Atty. Celera had married her sister but then contracted a second
marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting. Despite numerous notices from the Court, Atty.
Celera failed to file his comment as required alleging that he did not receive a copy of the complaint.
However, it was later shown that the papers and notices were being returned to sender because Atty.
Celera kept giving the wrong address. Since Atty. Celera failed to appear in the mandatory conference
and hearings, the IBP recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.
Held: A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative proceeding for
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him
despite numerous notices.
For purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy. Such is grossly immoral
conduct and is a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, Atty. Celera’s repeated failure to file his comment constitutes willful disobedience of its
lawful orders, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.”
PAGE 143 of 149

Rex Tupal v. Judge Remegio Rojo

February 24, 2014 / AM NO. MTJ-14-1842
Facts: Judge Remegio Rojo is a Municipal Trial Court Judge in Bacolod City. He solemnized
marriages without the required marriage license and instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and
issued them to the contracting parties.
Held: As a general rule, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as
notaries public only in their ex officio capacities. They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if
lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. However, they must certify
as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio and that all notarial
fees shall be turned over and for the account of the government.
In this case, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected
with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. In fact, notarizing affidavits
of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage; such
prevents him from objectively examining and reviewing the affidavit’s statements before performing
the marriage ceremony. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo was suspended for
six months from office.
PAGE 144 of 149

Dulang v. Judge Regencia

June 2, 2014 / AM No. MTJ-14-1841
Facts: Dulang filed an ejectment case in 2000 (Civil Case No. 212 – B). Such case was submitted for
resolution on October 17, 2008. Despite the Rules of Summary Procedure setting a period of 30 days
from submission of the last affidavit/position paper within which a decision must be issued, Judge
Regencia rendered judgment two years and four months later, or on February 18 2011.
Held: Pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is
attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess
those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants.
In this case, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the
ejectment case, thus making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Her
length of service of more than 17 years should be taken against her. She should have already known
that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought to be
expeditiously resolved.
PAGE 145 of 149

Quiachon v. Atty. Ramos

June 4, 2014 / A.C. No. 9317
Facts: Atty. Ramos represented Adelia Quiachon in a labor case before the NLRC and a Special
Proceeding case before the RTC. In both cases, judgment was rendered against Quiachon but Atty.
Ramos did nothing to reverse such decisions. Quiachon hence filed a disbarment complaint against
Atty. Ramos for gross negligence and deceit, but later withdrew it.
Held: The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the
jurisdiction of the IBP and of the Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-
respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. Since the IBP in
this case found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04, it should have imposed the
appropriate penalty despite withdrawal of the charges.
PAGE 146 of 149

RE: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on
September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan
Septem ber 23, 2014 / A.M. No. SB-14-21-J [Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
Facts: This complaint concerns the “pork barrel scam” of 2013, which implicated incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong, herein respondent. On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice
Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of whistle-blowers Luy and Sula before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee “that the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles et
al., was ‘fixed’ (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan”. The
Court assigned the case to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for
investigation, who later recommended that Justice Ong be meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service.
Held: Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross"
has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not
to be excused." A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court
commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms.
Respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding
the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery. The totality of the circumstances strongly
indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations.
PAGE 147 of 149

Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People of the Philippines

November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 199032
Facts: Judge Peralta issued a warrant to search the Laud Compound where the alleged remains of
the victims of the Davao Death Squad may be found. Such search yielded positive results. However,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and Suppress the evidence, alleging the Judge had no
authority to act since he had been automatically divested of his position when several administrative
penalties were imposed against him by the Court.
Held: W hile the penalties divested Judge Peralta’s authority to act, such does not
invalidate the search warrant. Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a
de facto officer whose acts would, as a matter of public policy, remain valid for all purposes in so far as
the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order for the de facto doctrine
to apply, the following elements must concur: 1) there must be a de jure office, 2) there must be a color
of right or general acquiescence by the public, and 3) there must be actual physical possession of the
office in good faith. These elements were all availing in this case.
PAGE 148 of 149

Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v COA

Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 185544
Facts: Clark Development Corp (CDC) approached Laguesma Magsalin to handle the labor cases.
While the OGCC originally did not approve this request, it later did. Thus, Laguesma Magsalin began
rendering legal services. However, it had yet to get the approval of the COA. Eventually, however,
neither OGCC nor COA wanted to concur until the other did.
The COA decided the matter by denying the request for clearance of engaging Laguesma Magsalin,
ruling that CDC violated the Memorandum that the consent of both the OGCC and the COA was
necessary. Thus, it was not the government’s responsibility to pay the legal fees already incurred by
Clark, but the responsible government officials. MR denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Held: When a government entity engages the legal services of private counsel, it must do so with the
necessary authorization required by law; otherwise its officials bind themselves to be personally liable
for compensating private counsel’s services.
Generally, GOCCs are not allowed to engage the services of private counsels, but they are allowed to
only in “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” or “exceptional cases.” Here, the labor cases
were not of a complicated or peculiar nature that could justify the hiring of a known expert in the field.
Further, the private counsel was engaged without the necessary consent of the OGCC and the COA.
PAGE 149 of 149

Recent Jurisprudence Digest Compilation, 2014-2015

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2016 University of the Philippines

UP Law Bar Operations Commission 2016

Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 18 is valid and constitutional.

Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises Inc.

ISSUE: WON the land is alienable.

Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson

ISSUE: WON the land is alienable.

James and Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, Executive Secretary, et al

ISSUE: WON the RH Law is unconstitutional.

Jose Jesus M. Disini, et al v. Secretary of Justice, et al.

ISSUE: WON RA 10125 is unconstitutional.

Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156

b. Transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an

ISSUE: WON Jardeleza’s right to due process was violated.

ISSUE: What is the applicable law in the determination of just compensation?

ISSUE: WON Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.

COMELEC dismissed the petition. Osmena, later, won the elections.

ISSUE: WON Osmeña fulfilled the residency requirement.

Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College

ISSUE: WON respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing EO 10.

Republic v. Spouses Lazo

ISSUE: WON disbursements should be allowed.

Decision of the Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED.

Peak Ventures Corporation and/or El Tigre Security Investigation Agency v. Heirs of

Corporate Strategies Development Corporation and Rafael Prieto v. Norman A. Agojo

Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito v. Hon. Commission on Elections

Cerafica v. Commission on Elections

Issue: Whether the substitution was valid.

Geronimo v. Sps. Calderon

Issue: Whether HLURB had jurisdiction over the case.

City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Hon. Colet

Maritime Industry v. COA

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

2. WoN the limitation on the size of the tarpaulin is content-neutral or content-based.

Meanwhile, Erap won. Fred Lim then intervened in this case.

Issue: WON the mandamus can be issued (No)

Araullo v. Aquino (MR)

Issue: WON PDAF is unconstitutional (Yes)

LBP v. Heirs of Alsua

Issues: WoN the CA correctly calculated the just compensation to be paid. - NO

The following guidelines are to be observed:

Joseph B. Timbol vs. Commssion on Elections

Villanueva vs. JBC

SWS vs. COMELEC

1-UTAK vs. COMELEC

Bishop Pabillo vs. COMELEC

Issue: Whether the resort to direct contracting was valid

The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco

Issue: Whether the prohibition against midnight appointments applies

Raul Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al.

Universidad De Sta Isabel v. Marvin-Julian L. Sambajon, Jr

Notwithstanding the limited engagement of probationary employees, they are entitled to

Indophil textile Mills v. Adviento

Sara Lee Phils v Macatlang

Saudi Arabian Air v. Rebesencio

One Shipping v Penafiel

Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove

Villena v Batangas II Cooperative

Issue: WON HSLB is a buyer in good faith? NO.

Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson

Macaria Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank Inc

Respondent, however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private

Issue: WON the property mortgaged is conjugal. YES.