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Padillo

v. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 119707
Veronica Padillo, petitioner v. Court of Appeals and Tomas Averia Jr., Respondents
Supreme Court
November 29, 2001
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
Facts
-Civil Case no 9114 is a petition for declaratory relief and damages by petitioner Padillo.
-In the petition filed against respondent Tomas Averia Jr and one Beato Casilang, petitioner Padillo alleged that she is
the absolute owner of a 251 sqr. meter parcel of land (TCT No. T-9853) purchased from Marina M. de Vera-Quicho and
Margarita de Vera with improvements thereon located in Q. Ave, Lucena City, Quezon Province.
-Petitioner ascribed fault upon Averia and Casilang with unlawful refusal to turn over the property in her favor; and that
respondent Averia even instituted Civil Case No. 1690-G, a suit for rescission of 2 deeds solely for harassment and
dilatory purposes although the suit actually established petitioner’s right of ownership over the subject property.
-Casilang alleged that as early as June 1, 1982, he vacated the subject property thus the case against him should be
dismissed.
-Respondent Averia filed his Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss wherein he invoked the decision
rendered in Civil Case no. 1620-G, a suit for specific performance against de Vera-Quicho. He further raised the defenses
of litis pendentia, estoppel, res judicata and lack of cause of action and prayed for the dismissal of the petition as well as
the grant of his counterclaims for damages.
-It appears that prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 9114, there were already 3 actions which involved the said
property:
A. Civil Case No. 1620-G – instituted by respondent Averia against de Vera-Quicho and the Register of Deed of
Lucena City. This case ordered de Vera-Quicho to execute the necessary documents over the property covered by said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9863 and ordered the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to stop from entering any
encumbrance or transaction on said certificate of title and/or cancel the same except in favor of respondent Averia. The
said decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed.
B. M.C. No. 374-82 – was instituted by petitioner Padillo to compel the Register of Deed of Lucena City to
register the deed of sale wherein Margarita de Vera sold to petitioner her ½ pro-indiviso share of the lot and the
building erected thereon covered by TCT No. T-9863, considering the refusal of the Register of Deeds to register said
deed of sale in view of a restraining order issued in CC. No.1620-G. The petition to register the deed was opposed by
respondent Averia.
-During the pendency of case B, Civil Case No. 1690-G was instituted by Averia against spouses Edilverto de Mesa and
petitioner Padillo. The said case is a complaint for rescission of 2 deeds of sale.
-Civil Case No. 1690-G was dismissed by Branch 61 of the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon Province for improper venue.
Respondent Averia interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
-In the meantime, a decision was rendered in case B wherein RTC Lucena City ordered the Register of Deeds to register
the deed of sale. Averia assailed this and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition GR No.65129 with the SC
contending thath the trial court has no jurisdiction. The SC declared that the trial court has jurisdiction since Section 2
PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction and the limited
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a cadastral court under Section 112 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
-The SC then set aside the decision in case-B and ordered a new trial of the same.
-The new trial on case-B declared that petitioner Padillo is the sole owner of the property in question
-This new decision was appealed in the CA but CA sustained the decision of the trial court
-Respondent Averia then appealed to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari which was denied for failure to show
that the CA had committed any reversible error.
-Two motions for reconsideration was denied by SC.
-Civil Case no. 9114 was temporarily archived in view of the pendency in the CA of the appeal of respondent Averia in CC
no. 1690-G.
-When CA subsequently affirmed the dismissal of CC no 1690-G, the hearing in CC no. 9114 was resumed but resolution
of respondent Averia’s motion to dismiss was deferred in view of the pendency of case-B.
-But wen case-B was decided, Averia’s motion to dismiss was denied for CC no 9114.
-The denial for motion to dismiss was appealed in the CA and rendered a decision therein ordering the suspension of the
proceedings in CC no. 9114 to await the final termination of case-B then pending appeal in the CA. No appeal was filed
therefore the decision to suspend became final.
-With the SC’s affirmance of the decision in case-B (giving Padilla the property), the trial court rendered a decision in CC.
no 9114 giving Petitioner Padillo the property and she was supposed to claim P150,000 every year from January 5,1982
until Averia vacates the same, attorney’s fees in the sum of P107,000 plus P1,000 per appearance in the hearing of the
case and litigation expenses of P10,000, moral damages of P50,000, exemplary damages of P20,000.
-On appeal to the CA of the decision of the trial court giving Padillo the property in CC 9114, CA reversed the trial court’s
decision based on the ground of res judicata (finality of judgment).
-CA reasoned that the instant case is supposedly one for declaratory relief and damages (CC 9114) while the former
(case-B) is one originally for registration of the appellee’s documents of title. A party cannot by varying the form of
action or adopting a different method of presenting the case escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the parties and their privies. (final na daw yung judgment dun
sa case-B na binigay title kay Padillo kaya bawal na daw i-litigate yung CC 9114 na kung saan naman kumukha ng money
si Padillo from Averia kasi nga res judicata na daw)
Issues
1. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court in CC no 9114.
2. Whether or not the damages ruled in CC no 9114 should be sustained.
Holdings and Rationale
1. The CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court in CC no 9114 based on res judicata.
-Doctrine of res judicata is within Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
-Bar by prior judgment (res judicata) exists when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of:
a. parties,
b. subject matter
c. cause of action.
-Where between the first case wherein judgment was rendered and the second case where such judgment is invoked,
there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and NOT as to matters merely involved therein.
-The appellate court apparently overlooked the significance of the principle called the LAW OF THE CASE which is totally
different from the concept of res judicata. Law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata and
applies only to that one case whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in
another case.
-It is noteworthy that when case-B was ordered by the SC to be tried again, CC no. 9114 was already existent.
-The CA incorrectly ordered the mere suspension of CC no. 9114 to await the final termination of case-B, instead of
dismissing the case and/or ordering that the claim for damages be filed in case-B.
-Even if erroneous, the ruling of suspension of CC no. 9114 by the CA became the law of the case as between the parties.
-Petitioner therefore should not be faulted for yielding in good faith the ruling of the suspension and continuing to pursue
her claim for damages in CC no.9114.
2. The damages will not be sustained.
-The Court however is not inclined to sustain the monetary award for damages granted by the trial court.
-P150,000 per year since 1982 as the income petitioner could have realized is highly SPECULATIVE.
-Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual, compensatory and consequential damages must be proved and cannot be
presumed.
-The actual rent per month is P800 and the actual rent per year was P9,600. Averia stayed from 1982-1992 thus
amounting to P97,600 and such will earn interest.
-The Moral and exemplary damages cannot be sustained because it cannot be logically inferred that the cases filed by
respondent was in malice or bad faith.
-The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate such right is so precious that moral damages
may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.
-Attorney’s fees as part of the damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing ltitigant.
Thus it should be reasonably reduced to P25,000.
Disposition: The instant petition is GRANTED. Averia should pay the corresponding damages.

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