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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
NATURE AND SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DEFINITION
 Embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to
control, the administrative operations of the government
 It includes the law that governs the structure of the
government and prescribes the procedure but not the
substantive law which administration is supposed to apply
 Part of the public law which fixes the organization and
determines the competence of the administrative
authorities, and indicates to the individual the remedies for
the violation of his rights
 Branch of the modern law which the executive department
of the government, acting in a quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative capacity, interferes with the conduct of the
individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of
the community
 Study of the exercise of administrative power
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
 Origin of administrative law is in legislation and it proceeds
from the increased functions of government
 It became customary to delegate to the particular
administrative agencies the power to formulate their
regulations in implementing the statute enacted3
SUBJECT MATTER
1. The body of statutes which sets up administrative agencies
and endows them with powers and duties
2. The body of rules, regulations, and orders issued by
administrative agencies
3. The body of determinations, decisions, and orders of such
administrative authorities made in the settlement of
controversies arising in their respective fields
4. The body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the
creation, operation and effect of determinations, and
regulations of such administrative agencies
CLASSIFICATION
1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities either by
creating boards and commissions or administrative offices
or by confiding the powers and duties to existing boards,
commissions, or officers, to amplify, apply, execute, and
supervise the operation of and determine controversies
arising under particular laws in the enactment of which the
legislature decided for matters of convenience or for
quicker or more efficient administration to withhold the
controversies, at least in the first instance, from the courts
of law
2. Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative
authorities enacted and promulgated in pursuance of the
purposes for which they were created or endowed
3. The determinations, decisions, and orders of such
administrative authorities made in the settlement of
controversies arising in their particular fields
4. The body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the
creation, operation and effect of determinations and
regulations of such administrative authorities
DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER BRANCHES OF LAW
From the law of public administration—
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 Where the emphasis is on the different branches of the
government and on their relations, this pertains to public
administration
 Where the emphasis is shifted to the problems of
administrative regulation rather than those of
administrative management, then this is the field of
administrative law
Constitutional law—
 Constitutional law lays down the general rules of
government which are fundamental and without which no
governmental organization can hope to stand on its feet
 Administrative law on the other hand lays down secondary
rules which limit and equalify, expand and amplify the
general precepts of governmental organization
Penal laws—
 Penal laws consist really of a body of penal sanctions which
are applied to all the branches of the law
 Bu a rule of law protected or enforced by a penal sanction
may be really administrative in character for indeed one of
the most common and efficient means of enforcing a rule of
administrative law is to give it a penal sanction and the
mere fixing of a penalty to a violation of a rule of
administrative law doesn't deprive such rule of its
administrative character
International law—
 This law cannot be regarded as binding upon the officers of
any government considered in their relation to their own
government except insofar as it has been adopted into the
administrative law of the state
1 REPUBLIC V. CA
200 SCRA 226
FACTS:
Republic Planters Bank together with other sugar producers
instituted an action for collection of sum of money and preliminary
injunction against the Philippine Sugar Commission. Before an
answer was filed, a compromise agreement was filed but to the
move of its execution, petitioners were opposed. The CA ruled in
this case that the SRA doesn't have the authority to represent the
government in any suit against and for it.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar
Regulatory Administration may not lawfully bring an action on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to
represent said petitioner in this case.
Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took
effect immediately, abolished the Philippine Sugar Commission
(PHILSUCOM) and created the Sugar Regulatory Administration
(SRA) which shall be under the Office of the President. However,
under the third paragraph of Section 13 thereof, the PHILSUCOM
was allowed to continue as a juridical entity for three (3) years for
the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and
enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of
continuing the functions for which it was established, under the
supervision of the SRA.
Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and
functions of the SRA; but it does not specifically include the power
to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or
against it, nor the power to sue and be sued although it has the
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power to "enter, make and execute routinary contracts as may be
necessary for or incidental to the attainment of its purposes
between any persons, firms, public or private, and the Government
of the Philippines" and "[t]o do all such other things, transact such
other businesses and perform such functions directly or indirectly
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purposes of the
Sugar Regulatory Administration."
It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to
represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against
the latter.
It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An
administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged
with administering and implementing particular legislation.
CREATION, ORGANIZATION AND ABOLITION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
LEGAL BASES FOR CREATION
1. Constitutional provisions
2. Legislative enactments
3. Authority of law
FORMS AND PURPOSES
1. To dispense certain privileges accorded by the government
2. To carry on governmental business or functions
3. To carry on or undertake some business service for the
public
4. To regulate certain public callings or business affected with
public interest
5. To promote the general welfare through police regulations
6. To determine rights of individuals in certain cases where a
strong social policy is involved
METHODS OF RE-ORGANIZATION AND ABOLITION
 Experimentation is frequent in the field of administration
 The powers of departments, boards, and administrative
agencies are subject to expansion, contraction, or abolition
at the will of the legislative and executive branches of the
government
 With respect to administrative agencies created by
constitutional provisions, they cannot be abolished by
statute
 But with respect to those created by legislative enactments,
or authority of the same, the legislature may validly abolish
and reorganize them
2 CARIÑO V. CHR
204 SCRA 483
FACTS:
This is the classic case of the public school teachers being
dismissed from service after concerting mass actions during a
school day. They instituted a complaint before the Commission on
Human Rights against petitioner among others. The Commission
contends to adjudicate the matter.
HELD:
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on
Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial
agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
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power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no
such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that
power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may
adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or
in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is
not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or
track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking
of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a
certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge
in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially,
to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely
the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve
on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters.
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An administrative agency must be created by law—either by the
Constitution or by statute.
The organic act is important because it is the basis of the
importance of the agency. For example, if it is the Constitution
that sets forth the creation of the agency, then only the amendment
or revision of the Constitution can affect the creation of the agency.
The powers of the agency must be set forth in the organic act or the
Constitution.
In the case of Cariño, the powers of the agency are defined in the
organic act. The reading of the powers of CHR show that it doesn't
have the power to adjudicate but only to investigate or
recommendatory in nature.
How would we recognize the administrative agency? The name
usually gives off the idea if the office is an administrative agency or
not.
3 PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR V. CA
171 SCRA 348
(DEFINITION OF QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY)
FACTS:
State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to
as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search
warrants against many companies allegedly engaged in the dollar
salting industry. The application for the issuance of said search
warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of
Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. The
companies then sought to declare the warrants null and void.
HELD:
The question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one
whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts,
other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this
Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule making." The most
common types of such bodies have been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is
offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct
Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and
NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of
Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special
Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service
Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of
Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks &
Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber
Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the
Insurance Commissioner.
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(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking under the police power to regulate private business and
individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of
Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the
Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social
policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission,
the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of
Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to
adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its
decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing
authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A
perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic
act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not
meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide
claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called
upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing
and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to
handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.
4 PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION V. PSC
70 PHIL. 221
FACTS:
Petitioner has been engaged in the transportation business using
what is known to be TPU buses, in accordance to the certificates of
public convenience issued to it. It later applied for authorization to
operate additional buses. When it was authorized given new
conditions, it wasn't amenable to the same, prompting it to file an
action against the Commission and to declare the pertinent
provision of CA 454 unconstitutional. It averred that the said
provision is an unlawful abdication of the legislature of its power to
the Commission, giving it unbridled discretion in implementing the
law. The subject provision says that no public service shall
operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting
certificate of public convenience from the Public Service
Commission, to the effect that the operation of said service and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a
proper and suitable manner. There is an additional condition that
the government may acquire the business upon payment of proper
costs as well as amend the certifications, etc.
HELD:
There was a valid delegation of powers to the Commission in
inserting conditions in the issuance of certificates of public
convenience and necessity. The standards set forth in the law
giving it authority has expressly allowed for such discretion.
However, the imposition of the condition upon petitioner should
be remanded back to the Commission. The act of the Commission
to outright impose the condition without affording due process to
petitioner is uncalled for. The Commission took advantage of the
need to augment petitioner’s equipment in its business to impose
the 25-year limitation.
5 PEO. V. MACEREN
79 SCRA 450
FACTS:
Accused were charged of violating a Fisheries Administrative
Order, specifically on violating provisions on electro fishing. The
trial court dismissed the complaint and this was affirmed by the
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CFI on the ground that there electro fishing cannot be penalized as
electric current is not one of those contemplated as obnoxious or
poisonous substance as contemplated in the old Fisheries law.
HELD:
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute as an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing their Administrative Orders,
providing for the punishment for those who practice electro
fishing. There is nothing provided in the Fisheries law that defines
and punishes electro fishing. To declare what shall constitute a
crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in
the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or
agency.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
SEPARATION OF POWERS
 In general, administrative law may be divided into three
broad segments—
o The transfer of power from the legislature to
administrative agencies
o The exercise of such delegated powers by these
agencies
o The review of such administrative actions by the
courts
 Laws enacted prescribing the powers and functions of
administrative agencies should respect constitutional
limitations
 The most common of the constitutional limitations is the
separation of powers, with the concomitant non-delegation
of powers
6 US V. BARRIAS
11 PHIL. 327
FACTS:
The defendant has been charged of violating the circular duly
published in the Official Gazette of the Insular Collector of
Customs, for being the captain of the boat Maude, and moving and
directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig river, by
bamboo poles in the hands of the crew and without steam, sail, or
other external power. A paragraph in the said circular prohibits
the movement of any craft in the Pasig river without being towed by
steam or moved by other adequate power.
HELD:
By certain sections of Act 1136, the Collector of Customs is
authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage (loading,
carrying or unloading in a lighter or barge for cargo) or other
exclusively harbor business of the ports of the islands, and with
certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to
be so licensed. The Act also provides that any violation of the law
or any rule and regulation promulgated by the Collector shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished upon conviction of
imprisonment and a fine.
Pertaining to the abovementioned law, the regulation of the
Collector should be sustained as coming within the terms of the
Act. Furthermore, the complaint in this instance was framed in
accordance also with the Philippine Customs Administrative Act.
The collector is not only authorized to promulgate regulations but
also fix penalties for the violation thereof.
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The power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by the department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there is must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. This is
based on the ethical principle that a delegated power constitutes
not only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate in
the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon
the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another.
7 SUNVILLE TIMBER V. ABAD
206 SCRA 482
FACTS:
Petitioner was granted a TLA for the cutting of timber in
Zamboanga del Sur. Private respondents then filed a complaint for
injunction against it. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case
for allegedly violating the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative
agencies. This was denied by the judge, averring such doctrine
admits of exemptions and the present case comes within the
purview of the same.
HELD:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for
resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the
resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-
observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action,
which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional.
Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a
ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed
with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation
of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of
non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The
theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position
to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that
errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be
rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less
important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually
questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be
added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the
courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise
would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
There are a number of instances when the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is
purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3)
when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is
urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is
small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong
public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy
is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.
The court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require
prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine
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above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would
still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR
the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition,
extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition
of all lands of the public domain," and in the Forest Management
Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the
responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid
regulations here claimed to have been violated. This
comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the
DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any
controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of
justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely
legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged,
both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the
petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the
provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves
factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence.
Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative
authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may
step in to exercise their powers of review.
8 NOBLEJAS V. TEEHANKEE
23 SCRA 405
FACTS:
Noblejas was appointed as the Commissioner of Land Registration.
He enjoyed the same rank and privileges of a district judge. During
his tenure as Commissioner, a letter was sent to him by Teehankee,
asking him to explain himself for the alleged approval of
subdivision plans among others. He then apprised Teehankee that
he enjoyed the privileges as of a district judge and thus, could only
be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of
the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to
his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action
thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No.
296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
He then was suspended by order of the President upon finding of a
prima case against him.
HELD:
The petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of
First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated
only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon
its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right
being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the
Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon
the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all
these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the
consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative
grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove
administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which
the Constitution expressly placed under the President's supervision
and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion
that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the President,
could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts
confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a
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Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only
removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment.
The more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas
is that, if the Legislature had really intended to include in the
general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme
Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would
be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine
of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the
Chief Executive over such officials.
Petitioner seeks to be differentiated with the other executive
officials by averring that he exercises a judicial function, that is,
resolution of a consulta by the Register of Deeds. Serious doubt
may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta
by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with
administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of
the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner
"shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds"
alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation in effect
identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner
with those of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or
orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's
resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not
administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable
to the corresponding department head.
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of
Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial)
function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration
Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will
show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of
his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to
the latter.
NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
 No department of the government, except when authorized
by the constitution, can abdicate authority or escape
responsibility by delegating any of its power to another
body
 Any attempt at such delegation of power is void under the
maxim potestas delegari non potest delegari
 This principle rests on the ethical principle that a delegated
power constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be
performed by the delegated body and through the
intervening mind of another
 While the rule of non-delegation is applicable to all three
departments of the government, the doctrine has found
greater and persistent application to the prohibition against
the delegation of legislative power
 Take note however that this rule isn’t absolute—any power
not legislative in character, which the legislature may
exercise, it may delegate.
 What the rule precludes is the delegation of those powers
which are strictly or inherently and exclusively legislative
and the abdication of the legislation of its own power and
conferring such power upon an administrative agency to be
exercised in its uncontrolled discretion
9 US V. ANG TANG HO
43 PHIL. 1
FACTS:
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The Philippine legislature enacted a law entitled “An Act
penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating
the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the
necessary rules and regulations therefore, and making an
appropriation for this purpose”. Under the said law, the governor-
general is authorized whenever, for any cause, conditions arise
resulting in the extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,
to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State,
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act.
The governor-general, in pursuance of this law, fixed the price at
which rice should be sold. A few days after, the accused is
charged for violation of such proclamation, charging him of selling
rice at a higher price. He was found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment and payment of a fine.
HELD:
By looking at the first section of the subject law, the promulgation
of temporary rules and emergency measures is left at the discretion
of the governor-general. The legislature doesn’t undertake to
specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
governor-general shall issue the proclamation, but says it may be
issued “for any cause” and leaves the question as to what is “any
cause” to the discretion of the governor-general. There is also no
definition to what the phrase “extraordinary rise” means. It doesn’t
specify what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure or how
long these shall remain in force and effect and when they shall be
in effect.
Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of
government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
1. Be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate
2. Fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determined or determinable—to which the delegate
must conform in performance of his functions.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and without the appropriate standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
10 PANAMA REFINING CO. V. RYAN
293 U.S. 288 (1935)
FACTS:
One of the economic problems caused by the Great Depression was
faltering oil prices. This was due to overproduction and a general
economic slowdown. The oil industry sought Congressional
intervention to control the situation. The President issued Executive
Order 6199 on July 11, 1933, banning interstate oil shipments if the
oil was produced in excess of state quotas. Basis for this EO was
section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which
authorizes the President to prohibit transportation of excess oil and
prescribes punishment of a fine, imprisonment, or both. President
then issued Executive Order 6204 on July 14, 1933, authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to exercise authority as vested in the
President in enforcing section 9(c) and EO 6199.
Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out EO 6199 and
6204 on July 15, 1933.
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 Regulation IV: Every producer of petroleum should file a
monthly statement giving information on the company and
oil production.
 Regulation V: Every purchaser/shipper/refiner of petroleum
should file a monthly statement giving information on the
company and oil production.
 Regulation VII: Aforementioned should keep adequate
books and records of all transactions involving the
production and transportation of petroleum and petroleum
products.
Further EOs were issued:
 President issued “Petroleum Code” (Code of Fair
Competition for the Petroleum Industry) on August 19,
1933 regulating the production of petroleum as deemed
necessary by each state’s requirement.
 President issued an EO on August 28, 1933 designating the
Sec. of the Interior as the Administrator and the
Department of the Interior as the federal agency, to
exercise on behalf of the President all powers vested in him
under that Act and Code.
The Panama Refining Co. and the Amazon Petroleum Corp.
pressed suits on October 1933 to restrain the defendants (federal
officials) from enforcing the restrictions on the production and
disposition of oil.
HELD:
EO 6199, 6204 and the regulations issued by the Sec. of the Interior
are without constitutional authority.
In trying to regulate the transportation of oil production in excess
of state permission, “the Congress has declared no policy, has
established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no
requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in
which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.”
Congress had failed to provide a “primary standard” to guide the
executive branch. This oversight allowed the president to act as he
pleased rather than within an administrative role.
This gives the President “unlimited authority to determine the
policy… as he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a
crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.”
This “hot oil” provision was seen as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative powers to the executive branch, thus violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.
11 YNOT V. IAC
148 SCRA 659
FACTS:
An Executive Order was issued by the then President Marcos. The
said Executive Order prohibited the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of another Executive Order. Violation of said EO is
punished by confiscation. Petitioner was found guilty of violating
said order when he transported his carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo,
and his carabaos were subsequently confiscated.
HELD:
It is marked that the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive
order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
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dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
EXCEPTIONS: PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
1. When permitted by the Constitution itself
a. Example is the emergency powers granted to the
President
2. In case of delegation of legislative power to local
governments
a. Creation of municipalities exercising local self-
government
b. Following are usually delegated to the local
governments—police power, eminent domain, and
taxation
3. Delegation of power to fill in the details
a. Matters of detail may be left by the legislature to
the discretion of the administrative agencies by
filling it with rules and regulations
4. Delegation of rule-making and adjudicatory powers to
administrative bodies, provided ascertainable standards are
set
a. The legislature is not always in session and its
members can agree only on general policies but not
matters of detail. Even if they could agree on
details, there is the danger of being too detailed
control and regulation may hamper the efficiency
of the administrative agencies
5. Delegation of the power to ascertain facts, contingencies or
events upon which the applicability or non-applicability of
a law is made to depend
a. Congress may enact a law the taking effect of which
is made to depend upon the happening of future
specified contingencies to be determined by the
executive or administrative agencies or officers
6. Delegation of power to people at large, when such has been
reserved by the Constitution
a. Referendum is an example
7. Delegation of power to the executive in the field of
international and diplomatic relations
ADVANTAGES OF DELEGATION OF POWER TO
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1. It relieves the legislature of great burden of work in respect
to which it has no special competence, and thus, enables it
more largely to direct its attention to matters of general
import
2. It entrusts the drafting of detailed provisions, which are
usually of highly technical character to the agencies most
familiar with the conditions to be met and which will have
responsibility for its enforcement
3. It permits great flexibility in adopting the regulations to the
different classes of individuals or interests affected
4. It makes possible the prompt modification of a provision as
soon as experience dictates that it is unsatisfactory
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12 EDU V. ERICTA
35 SCRA 481
FACTS:
Edu is the Land Transportation Commissioner. He issued an
Administrative Order to implement the Reflector Law. Galo filed
for preliminary injunction for the execution of said law and
challenged its constitutionality. The judge issued the injunction
against the execution of the Administrative Order and the subject
law.
Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has
a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in
the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make,
class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with
reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector
commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The
luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and
clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be
visible 100 meters away at night." Then came a section on
dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the following is
provided for: "Glass reflectors Not less than 3 inches in diameter or
not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape At least 3 inches
wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger
at the discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then made as to
how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted."
There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors
there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each
side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or
painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. The
color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial
glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front
part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed
on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. Penalties resulting from
a violation thereof could be imposed.
HELD:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative
power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the
exception that local governments may over local affairs participate
in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is
the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not
there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must
be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted.
The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way
in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has
rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance
of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature
the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise,
the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
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carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice
Laurel in a decision announced not long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has
been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments." He continued:
"Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 45
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder
that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress
being assumed.
Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J.
B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this
jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the
latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the
law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation
be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes ... "
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with
the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it
is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on
public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this
character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power
of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate
rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse.
His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-
from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
13 CRUZ V. YOUNGBERG
56 PHIL. 234
FACTS:
An action was brought against Youngberg who was then the
Director of Bureau of Animal Industry. The action was against the
refusal of Youngberg to issue a permit for the landing and
subsequent slaughtering of large cattle imported by Cruz. Cruz
averred that the law on which Youngberg was basing his refusal is
unconstitutional. The subject law’s purpose was to prevent the
spread of cattle diseases in the country.
HELD:
In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The
lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No.
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3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion,
the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful
delegation of the legislative powers."
This contention is bereft of any merit.
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
14 SOLICITOR GENENRAL V. MMA
204 SCRA 837
FACTS:
In an earlier case, it was held that the confiscation of license plates
and driver’s licenses were not part of the sanctions to be imposed
in case of traffic violations. But subsequent developments
occurred, wherein there were many incidents of confiscation. An
ordinance was then enacted for the confiscation of license plates in
case of violations. The court acted on such ordinance. MMA
defends itself by saying that the ordinance it promulgated was in
pursuance of an executive order. The solicitor general on the other
hand contended that the ordinance was null and void for being an
unlawful delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
The problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of
legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of
the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments
acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the
acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their
principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now
before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as
laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid:
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent
with public policy.
The measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is
PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license
plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan
Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to
impose such sanctions.
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such
sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to
"impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in
such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,"
that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates
directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be
imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly
provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall
not be confiscated."
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The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate
existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to
legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature (except only that the power to create
their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called
the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress,
the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of
PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow
and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard
and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
15 ALLEGRE V. COLLECTOR
53 PHILS. 394
FACTS:
The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged
in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets.
He applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred
bales of abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he
would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a
certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board.
It be noted that the purpose and intent of the original law, wherein
the respondent based his denial, was to provide in detail for the
inspection grading and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal and other
fibers, and for a uniform scale for grading, and to issue official
certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp, so that an
intending purchaser from an examination of the certificates might
be assured and know the grade and quality of the hemp offered for
sale.
HELD:
The question here is whether or not the law in question delegates
to the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative functions to
carry out the purpose and intent of the law for its more efficient
administration. It must be conceded that the details, spirit and
intent of the law could only be carried into effect through a board
of commission.
It will be noted that section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as
amended, provides:
The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official
standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers
that are or may hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for
shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and
designation which, together with the basis upon which the several
grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a
general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of
information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the
foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to
such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor.
If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time,
notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of
at least six months before the new standard shall go into effect.
That is to say, the Legislature has specifically provided for the
creation of "official standards for commercial grades of fibers," and
that "the Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official
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standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers,"
and that:
All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for
export shall be pressed in uniform bales. The approximate volume
and net weight of each bale, together with the manner of binding,
marking, wrapping, and stamping of the same, shall be defined in a
general order by the Fiber Standardization Board.
And section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be
exported in quality greater than the amount sufficient to make one
bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this
law provided. That is to say, the law provides in detail for the
inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the
power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In
legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is
exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded
and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and vested it
with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a
delegation o legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation
of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the
purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the
Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from
necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board
of commission.
The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for
the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of
its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or
commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism
that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law
is not an argument against its constitutionality.
16 MUN. OF CARDONA V. MUN. OF BINANGONAN
36 PHIL. 547
FACTS:
The plaintiff still insists with great vigor that section 1 of Act No.
1748; entitled "An Act authorizing the adjustment of provincial and
municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of
provinces and subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time
to serve the public convenience and interest," is in violation of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative
powers to the Governor-General, whereas the Act of Congress
referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine Legislature.
Section 1 of the Act referred to provides in substance that,
whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public
welfare requires, he may, by executive order, enlarge, contract, or
otherwise change the boundary of any province, subprovince,
municipality, or township or other political subdivision, or separate
any such subdivision into such portions as may be requires, merge
any of such subdivisions with another, divide, any province into
one or more subdivisions as may be required, name any new
subdivision so created, change the seat of government within any
subdivision existing or created thereunder, to such place therein as
the public interests require, and shall fix in such executive order
the date when the change, merger, separation or other action shall
take effect. The section also provides that whenever the Governor-
General creates a new political subdivision he shall appoint such
officers for the new subdivision with such powers and duties as
may be required by the existing provisions of law applicable to the
case and fix their salaries; and that such appointees shall hold office
until their successors are appointed or elected and qualify.
Successors to the elective offices shall be elected at the next general
election following such appointment.
HELD:
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The contention of the plaintiff is not well founded. The delegation
of the power referred to on the Governor-General does not involve
an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature
with regard to the particular subject-matter with which it authorizes
the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain
details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships,
many of them newly created, and all of them subject to more or less
rapid change both in development and centers of population, the
proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action
but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the
legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.
17 CALALANG V. WILLIAMS
70 PHIL. 726
FACTS:
Calalang filed an action against Williams and several others for
prohibiting animal-drawn vehicles from passing particular roads.
He alleged that the law granting the Director of Public Works from
implementing rules and regulations is unconstitutional as it an
undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
This is untenable.
The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
“SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations,
with the approval of the President, may contain provisions
controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of
traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.”
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon
the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them
and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any
or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore,
is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated.
18 EASTERN SHIPPING V. POEA
166 SCRA 533
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FACTS:
Victoriano Saco was the employee of a vessel who was killed in an
accident. Pursuant to a Memorandum Circular, his widow filed
with the POEA an action against the vessel owner for the burial
and funeral expenses of her deceased husband. The vessel owner
averred that the husband wasn't an overseas contract worker and
thus, the claim must have been filed somewhere else. Nonetheless,
the POEA acted on the action and ordered that damages be paid to
the widow.
Part of what was appealed was that the Memorandum Circular by
the POEA was an undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of
the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen
Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard
shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by
the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative
discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate
Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must
observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission
a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
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Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes
of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the
three major powers of the Government but is especially important
in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances
when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities
to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power,
however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if
not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and
more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority
to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This
is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued
by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
19 OSMEÑA V. ORBOS
220 SCRA 703
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to assail the unconstitutionality of a provision of a
PD with respect to an unlawful delegation of legislative power to
the Energy Regulatory Board. This is related to the
implementation of the OPSF. Petitioner premises his arguments
that what the OPSF entailed was taxation power which should have
been lodged with the State and not to the ERB.
HELD:
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred
to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of
the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from
the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the
general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a
"trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to
the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that
these measures comply with the constitutional description of a
"special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the
ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides
a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In
addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates,
Section 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose
additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite,
quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to tax."
The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the
premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as
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already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not
so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the
provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could
be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be
overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the
delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the
law which are embraced by the police power of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors
involved in the determination of the price of oil and petroleum
products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or
exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or
rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. To do so
would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to
mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As
such, the standard as it is expressed, suffices to guide the delegate
in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the
circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law
delegating the power must be (1) complete in itself, that is it must
set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix
a standard limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform.
The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied.
In that light, there can be no ground upon which to sustain the
petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable
standard which guides the exercise of the power granted to the
ERB. By the same token, the proper exercise of the delegated
power may be tested with ease. It seems obvious that what the law
intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there
exists a need to protect the general public and the petroleum
industry from the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations.
"Where the standards set up for the guidance of an administrative
officer and the action taken are in fact recorded in the orders of
such officer, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured
that the orders in the judgment of such officer conform to the
legislative standard, there is no failure in the performance of the
legislative functions."
This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the
validity of the legislation; the express purpose for which the
imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of
the fund are readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient
standard upon which the delegation of power may be justified.
20 GUINGONA V. CARAGUE
196 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Senators are questioning the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the
aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio
when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of
the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the
legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987
when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a
need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic
appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved
any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests
on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
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Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No.
81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster
of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness
in an appropriation, 11 otherwise it is an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President who determines in advance the
amount appropriated for the debt service.
HELD:
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All
existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been
adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that
legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such
laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent
with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or
revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the
clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the
principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available
when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of
periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor,
since both the periods and necessities are incapable of
determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the
effective execution of debt management policies.
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be
nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except
enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its
enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have
been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the
omissions. This is invalid delegation.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific
amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem
being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt
servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by
virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No
uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be
the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
REQUISITES FOR VALID DELEGATION
21 PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL
15 SCRA 569
FACTS:
In accordance with the Revised Administrative Code, the President
of the Philippines issued Executive Orders ordering the creation of
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new municipalities. This prompted the petitioner, who was then
the vice-president of the country to file a special civil action for a
writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction against the auditor-
general, to restrain him of passing into audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement of said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that the said
executive orders are null and void as they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
The legislature cannot delegate to the President the power to create
municipalities. Whereas the power to fix such common boundary,
in order to avoid or settle disputes of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature—
involving the adoption of ways and means to carry into effect the
law creating such municipalities—the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. It is strictly a
legislative function.
Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of
government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
1. Be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate
2. Fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determined or determinable—to which the delegate
must conform in performance of his functions.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and without the appropriate standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
COMPLETENESS
 The law gives the delegated body what to do
 Usually found in the text of the law
22 U.S. V. ANG TANG HO
43 PHIL. 1
FACTS:
The legislature passed a law called “An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn
under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and
sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose.” Subsequently, the governor-general ruled on the price
and as consequence thereof, defendant was charged with
overcharging. He was convicted and imprisoned. He now assails
the validity of the statute for which he was found guilty of violating.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No.
2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price
at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1
authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its
very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue
the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause,"
and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion
of the Governor-General.
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HELD:
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of
the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive
and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of
the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe
the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the
law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must
be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law
in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact
or event.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of
legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the
legislature to any other department of the government, executive or
judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete
in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative
only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its
operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action to depend.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime.
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price.
In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause"
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under
certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should
be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the
law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when
the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or
define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the
absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged
sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-
General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of
rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice,
and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.
STANDARDS
 Provides the quality that the body must follow the
instruction
 Usually found in the whereas clauses of the law
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23 PEO. V. ROSENTHAL
68 PHIL. 328
FACTS:
Accused were charged of violations of the Blue Sky Law. The same
has the following provision—
Under section 2 of Act No. 2581, every person, partnership,
association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the
Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular
Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein
and to pay the required tax of twenty pesos. Certain securities listed
in section 3 are exempted from the operation of the Act. Section 5
imposes upon the Insular Treasurer the mandatory duty to examine
the statements and documents thus filed and the additional duty to
make or cause to be made, if deemed advisable by him, a detailed
examination of the affairs of the applicant. Section 5 also provides
that "whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is
satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided,
that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled
to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for
sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person,
partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit
reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation
has complied with the provisions of this Act, and that such person,
partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are
entitled to offer the securities named in said certificate or permit
for sale"; that "said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority,
whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said
certificate or permit", and that "an appeal from the decision of the
Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the
Secretary of Finance."
HELD:
Besides it is certainly apparent that if the conditions are within the
power of the State to impose, they can only be ascertained by an
executive officer. Reputation and character are quite tangible
attributes, but there can be no legislative definition of them that
can automatically attach to or identify individuals possessing them,
and necessarily the aid of some executive agency must be invoked.
The contention of appellees would take from government one of its
most essential instrumentalities, of which the various national and
state commissions are instances.
24 CERVANTES V. AUDITOR GENERAL
91 PHIL. 359
FACTS:
This action commenced from the denial of the Auditor General of
petitioner’s quarters allowance pursuant to being the manager of
the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO).
NAFCO was created through special charter and subsequently, a
law was passed granting the President authority to effect reforms
and changes in government-controlled and owned corporations.
He then issued an executive order pursuant to this and formed a
General Enterprises Council, one of the members composing this is
the President himself, among others. Thereafter, pursuant to the
authority of the General Enterprises Council and the objective of
reforming and improving government-owned and controlled
corporations, the GES cancelled the resolution issued in allowing
the quarters allowance. One ground for its cancellation is the
illegal increase in salaries.
HELD:
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So long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am.
Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the
Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in
government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and
policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant
upon the establishment of the free and independent government of
the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency
in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The
President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating
the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above
cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
25 PEO. V. JOLIFFE
105 PHIL. 677
FACTS:
HELD:
26 BALBUNA V. SEC. OF EDUCATION
110 PHIL. 150
FACTS:
An action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Compulsory
Flag Ceremony law, wherein petitioners aver as one of the grounds
against its validity is the violation of delegation of legislative powers
for its failure to lay down any specific and definite standard by
which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation
of those rules and regulations which he has been authorized to
promulgate."
HELD:
In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an
adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag
ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem specially when
contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts:
"public interest"; "public welfare”; Interest of law and order";
justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case"; or
"adequate and efficient instruction". That the Legislature did not
specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the
validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down
of standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the
regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the
manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the
administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.
27 A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTRY V. U.S.
295 U.S. 495
FACTS:
Live poultry code was enacted pursuant to the National Industrial
Recovery Act. The law gave the President unbridled discretion
with respect to regulations and rules that could be implemented in
preventing unfair competition. Note that there was no standards
specifically set in defining what unfair competition is.
HELD:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Section 3 of the
Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any
trade, industry, or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules
of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by
appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules
of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them.
For that legislative undertaking, section 3 sets up no standards,
aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation,
correction, and expansion described in section 1. In view of the
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scope of that broad declaration and of the *542 nature of the few
restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in
approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is
virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making authority thus
conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
SOURCES AND SCOPE
 The powers and functions of administrative agencies are
defined either in the Constitution or in legislation or in
both
 Where created by statute or where their powers are left to
be defined by legislation, the powers of administrative
agencies are limited by the statutes creating them to those
conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication
28 GUERZON V. COURT OF APPEALS
164 SCRA 182
FACTS:
Guerzon entered into a service station lease contract with Basic
Landoil Energy Corporation, which was later acquired by Pilipinas
Shell. The said contract contained a provision stating that the
contract would end at a certain date. Further, respondent wrote
Guerzon that upon the expiration of the contract, it would not be
renewed. The date came and Guerzon still didn't vacate the
premises. Shell wrote him a letter, furnishing the Bureau of
Energy Utilization a copy thereof. The bureau on the other hand
issued an order against Guerzon to vacate the premises as soon as
possible.
HELD:
Court has no recourse but to rule against the legality of the order,
the Bureau of Energy Utilization not being empowered to issue it.
Section 7 of P.D. No. 1206, as amended, is very clear as to the
courses of action that the Bureau of Energy Utilization may take in
case of a violation or non- compliance with any term or condition
of any certificate, license or permit issued by the Bureau or any of
its orders, decisions, rules or regulations. The Bureau may: (1)
impose a fine not exceeding P1,000.00; and (2) in case of failure to
pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the violation or
non-compliance, order the suspension, closure or stoppage of
operations of the establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is
limited to these two (2) options. It can do no more, as there is
nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the Bureau
to issue an order to vacate in case of a violation.
As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises
is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful
detainer or accion publiciana [Secs. 19(2) and 33(2), B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended.] There is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that
would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been
granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule
that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof.
CONSTRUCTION OF GRANT OF POWERS
 General language describing the powers and functions of
an administrative body may be construed to extend no
further than the specific duties and powers conferred in the
same statute
 In determining whether a board or commission has a
certain power, the authority given should be liberally
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construed in the light of the purposes for which it was
created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full
exploitation of the legislative intent should be upheld as
being germane to the law
28 LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ
243 SCRA 497
FACTS:
A complaint for attempted rape was filed against the municipal
mayor by the public health nurse. This was referred to an
investigator who didn't find any prima facie case against the mayor
and recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The
Ombudsman disagreed with the findings and ordered for the
corresponding charges to be filed against the mayor. The case was
referred to the prosecutors who after conducting preliminary
investigation, found no probable cause to file a case against the
mayor. This prompted the Ombudsman to preventively suspend
the prosecutors and filed administrative complaints against them.
HELD:
he office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the
investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of
are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of
his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was
committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when
committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call
on prosecutors for assistance. It does not matter that the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court.
Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature
of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
29 MATIENZO V. ABELLERA
162 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Respondents sought the licensing of their excess taxicab units
pursuant to PD101, which was enacted to prevent the unlawful
operations of clandestine taxicabs, etc. Petitioners sought the
annulment of the provisional licenses granted to the respondents
for the operation of their excess taxicab units.
HELD:
Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to
the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards
the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged
time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the
petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months
after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the
withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section
declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless
drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no
impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad
powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public
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convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a,
Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board
or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be
liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was
created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full
implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being
germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the
appropriate means are deemed given
30 PASEI V. TORRES
212 SCRA 298
FACTS:
Due to the numerous stories of Filipino workers being abused in
Hong Kong, the DOLE suspended the recruitment by private
employment agencies of OFW’s for Hong Kong. Pursuant to this
department order, the POEA issued a memorandum circular laying
down guidelines for government processing and deployment of
workers. Petitioner sought the annulment of the orders, on the
ground that they are unlawful and oppressive and in excess of the
rule-making authority of the POEA and DOLE.
HELD:
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of
the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72,
79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in
the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the
particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected
from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful
reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that
the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the
respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to
"restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code
involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals,
24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62,
Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for
the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility
and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable
for lack of power publication and filing. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
31 REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. V. SENDINO
233 SCRA 665
FACTS:
Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with REVI for a
parcel of land in a subdivision. She was able to complete payment
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for reservation but REVI wrote to her that the agreement was
cancelled due to non-compliance by Sendino with the submission
of some requirements. This prompted the respondent to file a
complaint for specific performance with the HLURB, which
decided in favor of Sandino.
HELD:
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.
In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its authority
in ordering petitioners to comply and continue with the sale of the
house and lot subject of the contract between the original parties. It
cannot be gainsaid that the quasi-judicial functions exercised by
the body are necessary incidents to the proper exercise of its
powers and functions under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted
delineating the scope of authority of its Board of Commissioners.
Denying the body those functions so necessary in carrying out its
power to regulate housing and land use results in its effective
emasculation as an important regulatory body in an area vital to the
national economy.
The acute housing shortage problem has prompted thousands of
middle and lower class buyers of houses and lots and condominium
units to enter into all sorts of agreements with private housing
developers involving all manner of installment schemes under
contracts drawn exclusively by these developers. Many of these
virtual contracts of adhesion entrap innocent buyers by requiring
cash deposits under reservation agreements which include,
sometimes in the fine print, default clauses guaranteeing huge
monetary windfalls for the developers in the event that their buyers
(oftentimes for the flimsiest of reasons) default by failing to come
up with certain requirements. While the Court can take judicial
notice of this pernicious practice, it can only hope that future
legislation would address the need to protect the innocent middle
or lower class home purchaser. In the case of the individual victim,
this Court can only go to the extent of awarding such damages as
may be proper under the peculiar circumstances of the cases
brought before it.
32 MKSE V. SECRETARY
14 SCRA 620
FACTS:
Petitioner is denied authority to operate until it lists and trades
stocks not yet traded in the Manila Stock Exchange. The petitioner
averred that such is tantamount to prohibition since it is impossible
to do such condition given that Manila Stock Exchange has long
been the primary stock exchange in the country.
HELD:
It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute, and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the
Commission cites no provision expressly supporting its rule.
Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is "necessary for the
execution of the functions vested in it"; but it makes no
explanation, perhaps relying on the reasons advanced in support of
its position that trading of the same securities in two or more stock
exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors, besides
contravening public interest. (Of this, we shall treat later).
EXECUTIVE)/ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS
 The powers and functions usually granted to and exercised
by administrative agencies are the following—rule making,
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adjudication, and such incidental powers such as

investigating, supervising, prosecuting, advising, declaring, FACTS:
and informally adjudicating Petitioner was granted a timber license agreement. On a
subsequent act, the boundary covered by the license was
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING OR QUASI- established. Thereafter, a timber license agreement was also
LEGISLATIVE POWER granted to respondent, which was adjacent to the land covered by
 It is the power to promulgate rules and regulations or petitioner. Petitioner then complained because of the alleged
general orders which are legally binding and receive encroachment of the area by respondent. Because of this, it was
statutory force upon going into effect and the formulation found out that it was actually petitioner who was depriving the
of interpretative rulings or regulations which don't receive other a certain area of land. The amendment done to the TLA was
statutory force but are accorded great weight when found to be erroneous. To this judgment, the petitioner seeks a
questioned reversal.

TESTS DETERMINING NATURE OF POWER HELD:

 The test as to whether a power is strictly legislative or
whether it is administrative is to determine its exercise
involves a discretion as to what law shall be or merely the
authority to fix, the details in the execution or enforcement
of a policy set out in the law itself
 The first is legislative
 The second is administrative
GENERAL KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATIONS
1. Supplementary or detailed legislation—rules and
regulations by reason of particular delegation of authority
2. Interpretative rules and regulations—rules and regulations
constructing or interpreting the statutes being administered
3. Contingent legislation—rules and regulations involving
determination under a delegated power whether a statute
shall go into effect
33 PICOP V. DEPUTY EXEC. SECRETARY
184 SCRA 606
In reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive branch of
the Government, . . . the findings of fact made therein must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence,
even if not overwhelming or preponderant. It is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of
the evidence.
It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and
discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In
general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings
and actions of the administrative departments of the government.
This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of
judgment or discretion, and findings of facts.
Public respondents Minister of Natural Resources and Deputy
Executive Secretary, the latter acting for and in behalf and with the
authority of the President, did not abuse their discretion when they
ordered the amendment or correction of petitioner's TLA No. 43-3.

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After finding that there was an authorized increase in the
concession area of PICOP, the correction of its license was a
necessary consequence.
34 EVANGELISTA V. JARENCIO
68 SCRA 99
FACTS:
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,
1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following
functions and responsibilities:
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral
practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical),
lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to
submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of
Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence
to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully
amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding
investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or
behavior of any public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested
in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation.
Pursuant to this, a subpoena was issued for the Acting Public
Service Officer Of Manila to assist in the investigation of a case
filed with the agency. Instead of following the subpoena, the
officer filed with the court for prohibition among other reliefs.
HELD:
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process
is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis
of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative
functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but
also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining
general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no
more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if
anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be
authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a
legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a
legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory
nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for
correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions. 10
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws
its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in
an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness,
administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation"
11 with the authority "to require the production of documents
under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects
to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
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proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power
operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in
the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered
by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b).
The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and
(h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim
of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is
to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil
service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined
to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore
imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions
under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling
authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction
when and in what function should the subpoena power be
exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself
makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged
strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to
abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses
and the authority to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects
to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to
require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under
the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for
hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection
with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14
before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative
agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however,
that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial
subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena,
one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an
administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions
and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against
infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is
unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in
the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even
before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the
case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of
law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is
enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.
18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to
prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the
discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a
trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the
proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and
that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that
might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is
reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be
relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an
administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are
enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The
administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but
can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or
even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When
investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to
whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be
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stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if
the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand
is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION
 This provides a practical guide as to how the agency will
seek to apply the law and as experienced and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance
 One who chooses to rely upon an interpretative regulation
does so at his own peril and stands the risk of its not being
followed by the courts
 An erroneous construction of a statute by an administrative
agency cannot operate to confer a legal right in accordance
with such construction
 The administrative construction doesn't and cannot control
the court’s decision as to the proper construction of a
statute but generally or in particular circumstances it is
given great weight and has a very persuasive influence and
may actually be regarded by the courts as the controlling
factor
 A construction is not binding on them or their successors if
thereafter they become satisfied that a different
construction should be given
35 ESPAÑOL V. CHAIRMAN, PVA,
137 SCRA 314
FACTS:
Petitioner was a widow of a military personnel who served during
World War 2. Her application for pension from the PVA was
approved but subsequently, it was cancelled due to the
administrative policy of the PVA not to grant anymore monthly
pensions to those already receiving from the USVA. After 22 years
from this cancellation, petitioner files for mandamus.
HELD:
The contention of appellant PVA that the action of appellee Maria
U. Español to compel the restoration of her monthly pension and
that of her children, effective from the date of cancellation on
November 1, 1951, has already prescribed, inasmuch as the same
was filed more than 10 years from the date of cancellation, is
without merit.
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that actions based on
an obligation created by law shall be brought within 10 years from
the time the right of action accrues. It is important to reckon the
date, when the right of action accrues, as the same is the beginning
for counting the 10-year prescriptive period.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action,
which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such
right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff (Cole vs. Vda. de Gregorio, 116
SCRA 670 [1982]; Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., 58
SCRA 559 [1974]; Vda. de Enriquez vs. De la Cruz, 54 SCRA 1
[1973]). It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it
can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen (Cole vs. Vda. de
Gregorio, supra).
The appellee cannot be said to have a cause of action, in
compelling appellant to continue paying her monthly pension on
November 1, 1951, because appellant's act of cancellation, being
pursuant to an administrative policy, cannot be considered a
violation of appellee's right to receive her monthly pension.
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It is elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, are entitled to great respect (Sierra Madre Trust vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384
[1983]; Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs,
29 SCRA 617 [1969]; Antique Sawmill Inc. vs. Zayco, et al., 17
SCRA 316 [1966]), and have in their favor a presumption of legality.
Thus, appellant's act of cancelling appellee's monthly pension
being presumed legal and valid, cannot be taken as a violation of
appellee's right to receive her monthly pension under R.A. No. 65.
In the case of Del Mar vs. The Philippine Veterans Administration
(51 SCRA 340 [1973]), this Court did not consider prescription in
favor of PVA, even though the action of Del Mar was filed on June
20, 1964 or more than 10 years from the cancellation of his monthly
pension in March, 1950; because the action of Del Mar was basically
to declare the questioned administrative policy invalid, which
action does not prescribe.
It is only when this Court declared invalid the questioned
administrative policy in the case of Del Mar vs. The Philippine
Veterans Administration, supra, promulgated on June 27, 1973, can
the appellee be said to have a cause of action to compel appellant to
resume her monthly pension; because it is at that point in time,
when the presumption of legality of the questioned administrative
policy had been rebutted and thus it can be said with certainty that
appellant's act was in violation of appellee's right to receive her
monthly pension.
The 10-year prescriptive period, therefore, should be counted from
June 27, 1973 when the case of Del Mar vs. The Philippine
Veterans Administration, supra, was promulgated, and not from
November 1, 1951, the date of cancellation by appellant of
appellee's pension. The action of appellee, which was brought on
February 25, 1974, is therefore well within the 10-year prescriptive
period.
36 VICTORIAS MILLING V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
4 SCRA 627
FACTS:
HELD:
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statute granted
by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the
policy stated therein or its innate wisdom ...." On the other hand,
"administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory,
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means."
Indeed, it cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the
authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser
administrative, executive office, or agency then can, contrary to the
express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more
extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the
constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the
legislative enactment.
37 HILADO V. CIR
100 PHIL. 288
FACTS:
Emilio Hilado filed his income tax return for 1951 with the
treasurer of Bacolod City, claiming a deductible item of P12,837.65
from his gross income pursuant to General Circular V-123 issued
by the Collector of Internal Revenue. The Secretary of Finance,
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through the Collector, issued General Circular V-139 which
revoked and declared void Circular V-123; and laid down the rule[s]
that losses of property which occurred in World War II from fires,
storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or
embezzlement are deductible in the year of actual loss or
destruction of said property. The deductions were disallowed.
HELD:
Philippines Internal Revenue Laws are not political in nature and
as such were continued in force during the period of enemy
occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation
government. Such tax laws are deemed to be laws of the occupied
territory and not of the occupying enemy. As of the end of 1945,
there was no law which Hilado could claim for the destruction of
his properties during the battle for the liberation of the
Philippines. Under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1948, the
payment of claims by the War Damage Commission depended
upon its discretions non-payment of which does not give rise to any
enforceable right. Assuming that the loss (deductible item)
represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim, the
amount would be at most a proper deduction of his 1950 gross
income (not on his 1951 gross income) as the last installment and
notice of discontinuation of payment by the War Damage
Commission was made in 1950.
38 CO V. CA
227 SCRA 444
FACTS:
HELD:
PROMULGATION OF RULES
 There is no constitutional necessity for a hearing as a
prerequisite to the promulgation of a general regulation by
an administrative body hence in the absence of any a
statutory restriction an administrative agency may ascertain
in any manner
 It sees fit what rules what rules should be made
 When the rule is procedural, no notice is required
 Notice is also not required in the preparation of substantive
rules affecting the class at large and the questions to be
resolved involve the use of wide discretion which has been
committed to the rule-making agency
 But if the rule or order is directed specifically to a party or
of a compact group and the administrative agency exercises
only a limited degree of discretion, actual notice and
opportunity for hearing may be required
39 TAXICAB OPERATORS V. BOT
117 SCRA 597
FACTS:
The Board of Transportation issued a memorandum circular
prohibiting the operation as taxis of cars, which were more than 6
years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director
of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing
Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional
Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within
the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and
formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances.
HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation
the power
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4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said
agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in
the preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the
method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its
discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the
Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly
the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government office or agency that
may be able to furnish useful information or data in the
formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the
implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of
position papers or other documents, information, or data by
operators or other persons that may be affected by the
implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means
of inquiry.
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural
due process, petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to
submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to
attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT
Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway
accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering
necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan
or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference
or require the submission of position papers or other documents
from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one
of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they
were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state
with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other
sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars.
operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of
the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in
Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307
(1972):
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested
property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss
takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which
has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the
validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern
future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law
provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6)
years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of
taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to
which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical
condition should be taken into consideration at the time of
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registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of
the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles
affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies
that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by
that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a
fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the
public specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift.
With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness,
the requirement of due process has been met.
40 TAÑADA V. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446
FACTS:
Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, Tañada, et.al. seek a writ of mandamus
to compel public officials to publish presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamation, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
HELD:
The publication in the Official Gazette is required to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actins and conduct as citizens. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and
make penalties binding on the person affected thereby. The
publication of all presidential issuances of a “public nature” or “of
general applicability” is a mandated by law, and is a requirement of
due process. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures
or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures fall within this category.
Before a person may be bound by law, he must be first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. When not published,
such shall have no force and effect. However, the
implementation/enforcement of the presidential decrees prior to
their publication in the Gazette is an operative facts, which may
have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
RATE-FIXING POWERS
 The power to fix or limit the rates or charges exacted by
public service corporations may be conferred upon
administrative agencies without involving an unlawful
delegation of legislative power
 This also applies to the regulation of prices
 The only standard which the legislature must prescribe for
the guidance of the administrative authorities is that the
rate must be reasonable and just
RATE-FIXING WHEN LEGISLATIVE; WHEN QUASI-
JUDICIAL
 When rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative
agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines, they may partake of a
legislative character
 If its quasi-judicial in character, then a valid exercise would
need notice and hearing
 Dean Roy: on the question of whether it is quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative, it depends on the circumstances. If the
rates are to be applied industry-wide, then it might be held
as quasi-legislative but when the consumers assert their
right to be heard, then it may be held as quasi-judicial.
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 Following the latest rebate on electrical costs of
MERALCO, it would depend on your present
consumption. If you would still look on the history of every
consumption, then it would never end.
 Provisional increase may be withdrawn and doesn't repose
any right—this is subject to return. This is the morale of
the story of the MERALCO cases.
REVIEW ON THE TYPES OF RULES AND THE CRITERIA
FOR THE RULES IMPLEMENTING THE LEGISLATION
 Internal rules
 Rules of procedure
 Rules implementing the legislation
o Authority
o Scope
o Reasonableness
41 PHIL. CONSUMERS V . SEC. OF EDUCATION
153 SCRA 622
FACTS:
Pursuant to the recommendation of a special task force created for
the purpose of assessing tuition fee increases in private higher
education institutions, the DECS issued an order authorizing the
increase of tuition fees by 15-20%. Upon opposition from
petitioner, the margin was deducted to 10-15%. Despite this
however, the petitioner questioned the authorization of this
increase by the DECS.
HELD:
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may
be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a
legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards
rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the
validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an
administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively
to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function
is quasi-judicial in character. 9a
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of
its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department
Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by
all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This
being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
its issuance.
This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of
the petitioner to show clear and convincing evidence of such
arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not
without any justification for the issuance of the questioned
Department Order. It would be reasonable to assume that the
report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based
its decision to allow an increase in school fees, was made
judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the petitioner, as it so
admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original
rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the
circumstances peculiar to this case, We cannot consider the
assailed Department Order arbitrary.
Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been
regularly performed. 10 In the absence of proof to the contrary,
that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on
the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case
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at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the
presumption.
42 PHILCOMSAT V. ALCUAZ
180 SCRA 218
FACTS:
Petitioner was a holder of franchise allowing it to operate stations
and equipment for international satellite communications. It is also
authorized to construct facilities for the delivery of
telecommunication services. Under the franchise afforded it, it was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission,
now the NTC. However, in pursuant to a later Executive Order,
Petitioner was placed under its jurisdiction. NTC allowed it to
continue its operations but was ordered to reduce its present
authorized rates by 15%.
HELD:
In performance of such act, the respondent performed a function,
which partook of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of
which demands previous notice and hearing. Aside from statute,
the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances
involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general
rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, legislative functions; but
where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-
judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather
than general and prospective, the person whose rights and property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
43 RCPI V. NTC
184 SCRA 517
FACTS:
PLDT filed an application with respondent for the approval of rates
for Digital Transmission Services. Respondent issued a notice of
hearing and petitioners were not able to receive any notice and they
weren’t included in the list of affected parties.
HELD:
As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent to give
personal notice to all parties affected, not all of them being known
to it. More than that, there is no dispute that the notice of hearing
was published. Petitioners have timely opportunity to oppose the
petition in question so that the lack of notice is cured. Under the
circumstances, respondent can be deemed to have substantially
complied with the requirements. In any event, the provisional
nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application
shall be given a full hearing are the safeguards against its abuse.
44 REPUBLIC V. MEDINA
41 SCRA 643
FACTS:
MERALCO filed an application with the Public Service
Commission seeking approval of revised rate schedules, with
increased charges, claiming that the floating exchange rate and
economic conditions resulting therefrom increased its operating
and maintenance expenses by more than 40%, and likewise
increased the peso cost of servicing its foreign debts, causing it to
incur an operational deficit and net loss of over one million pesos a
month. Embodied in the application was a motion "for immediate
provision approval of proposed rates," which, over the opposition
of many was granted by the respondent Commission with a
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condition that if after hearing, the application may still be
disapproved.
The commissioner ordered the books of accounts of MERALCO to
be examined and after hearing on the application, the Commission
approved the same with minimal modifications.
HELD:
It is concluded that the claim of denial of due process is unfounded
and must be overruled. It is well to note here that the trial and
hearings were not continuous, and intervals of several days,
sometimes of a week or more, took place. The main outlines of the
case for respondent Meralco (the adverse effect of the floating rate
on the cost of operation) appeared from the testimony in chief of
applicant's witness Antonio Ozaeta, whose cross examination was
lengthy, occupying over 130 pages of the transcript. Hearings were
held morning and afternoon, but only once did they proceed
beyond 5 p.m., and most afternoon sessions starting at 2:00 p.m.
ended at 4 or earlier. No undue restrictions were placed on
oppositors until the Public Service Commission, apparently
realizing that its policy to allow even individual consumers to cross
examine independently applicant's witnesses was unworkable and
would lead only to confusion, decided to limit the number of cross
examiners. This lay within the trier's discretion and should not be
interfered with in the absence of abuse, which is not here shown.
The foregoing consider and should not, however, be understood as
an approval of the practice of unnecessarily curtailing the
opportunities of parties litigant, barring exceptional circumstances.
Otherwise, suspicion is aroused, and the public confidence eroded,
to the detriment of the administration of justice. It is the duty of
tribunals, judicial or quasi-judicial, not only to be just but to appear
to be actually so. It is equally their task to sedulously avoid giving
rise to speculation, rumours and gossip by hasty or ill-considered
action.
REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY OF RULES
1. That the rules and regulations must have been issued on
the authority of law (AUTHORITY)
2. That the rules and regulations must be within the scope
and purview of the laws (SCOPE)
3. That said rules and regulations must be reasonable
(REASONABLENESS)
ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF LAW
 The authority should essentially be based upon some
legislative act
45 VDA. DE PIÑEDA V. PEÑA
187 SCRA 22
FACTS:
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan. After his
death, his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they waived their rights and
interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir
Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes.
The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo and
was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.
Thereafter, the Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Association was formed but
was later converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to
which the members conveyed their respective mining claims,
including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims
were assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation.
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A civil action was filed by the petitioners against Feliza on the
ground that the deed of extrajudicial settlement executed before
was falsified, wherein an amicable settlement was entered into by
the parties. The Ped claim was returned to the petitioners.
Thereafter, a law was passed ordering that existing mining claims
should file an application. Petitioners failed to comply.
HELD:
On the issue of jurisdiction….
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that public
respondents may not validly and legally take cognizance of an issue
not raised in the complaint, i.e., the issue of the validity of the
"Ped" mining claim.
This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had filed the protest case
pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of Mines
with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48,
Pres. Decree No. 463].
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of
Natural Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines,
the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to
carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance
with the statutory grant of rule-making power, the Department
Secretary on May 17, 1975 issued the Consolidated Mines
Administrative Order Implementing Pres. Decree No. 463, which
was published in the Official Gazette on June 16, 1975.
One such implementing rule is Section 128, which respondent
Minister of Natural Resources relied upon in his decision to dispose
of the jurisdictional issue raise d by petitioners. Section 128
provides:
Sec. 128. Issues Joined . . .
The Director, or the Secretary, in case of appeals, may motu
proprio look into the validity of mining claims, whether raised as an
issue or not.
It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly
delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies [People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957);
Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23
SCRA 1183]. In order to be valid, the administrative regulation
must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform
to the standards that the law prescribes and must relate solely to
carrying into effect the general provisions of the law.
With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules
invoked by public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot
be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department
Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it
does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor
does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely
prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of
the enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the
statute.
Neither can it be maintained that such an implementing rule results
in a denial of procedural due process, for it is axiomatic in
administrative law that what the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard [Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations,
G.R. No. L-27392, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 303, citing De Borja v.
Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953)]. In this case, petitioners were afforded the
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opportunity to be heard on the validity of the "Ped" mining claim
when they submitted rebuttal evidence on appeal.
Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and
effect of law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered to
inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the protest
case, even if not raised in issue.
On the issue of due process…
As a rule, the courts will not interfere with purely administrative
matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, and
findings of fact, of the administrative agency. The exception is
when there is a clear showing that the agency acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion or when it acted in a capricious
manner such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. In this case, the findings of the director was solely
based on the evidence of the private respondents and denied the
evidence presented in rebuttal by petitioners. There was grave
abuse of discretion.
WITHIN SCOPE OF LAW
 For administrative rules and regulations to be valid, must
be within the authority conferred upon the administrative
agency
 The regulations adopted under legislative authority must be
in execution of or supplementary to, but not in conflict
with, the law itself
 Such delegated power cannot extend to amending or
adding to the requirements of the statute itself, but it is to
be presumed that the recognitions adopted were to carry
out only the provisions of the statute and not to embrace
matters not covered, nor intended to be covered
 It must be germane to the law and conform to the
standards that the law prescribes
46 LUZON POLYMERS V. CLAVE
209 SCRA 711
FACTS:
The emergency allowance of employees in the private sector has its
origin in Presidential Decree No. 390, granting said allowance to
government employees. Marcos issued an LOI directing the
Minister of Labor to do necessary implementations for the private
sector. Under this statutory backdrop, petitioner, a corporation
with an authorized capital stock of P1 million and total assets of
P2,656,793.45 as of December 31, 1974, was named a respondent in
a complaint for underpayment of emergency allowance filed before
Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor in 1976 by the
Luzon Polymers Labor Union (FFW) on behalf of 185 of its
members. Alleging that since February 1974, regular employees of
petitioner corporation who were members of the union had been
receiving P1.15 daily or P30.00 monthly emergency allowance,
complainant-union contended that its members were entitled to
P50.00 monthly emergency allowance in as much as their
employer's total assets were over and above P1 million.
For its part, petitioner claimed that since it had fully complied with
LOI No. 174, it had not underpaid its employees.
HELD:
To start with, paragraph 3 of LOI No. 174 mandates the grant of
P50 a month emergency allowance for employees of "enterprises
capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more" and P30 for
employees of "enterprises capitalized at P100,000 to P1 million."
While the determinative factor for the amount of emergency
allowance is simply the capitalization of the employer concerned,
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the problem lies in the fact that the same provision of LOI No. 174
categorizes an enterprise capitalized at P1 million as under both the
P50 and the P30 brackets of emergency allowance.
This grey area, however, was clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin
on LOI No. 174 issued by the Department of Labor. Sec. 5 thereof
which is quoted above states that an employer has to pay the fifty-
pesos allowance "where the authorized capital stock of the
corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings,
exceeds P1 million or thirty pesos" where the authorized capital
stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other
undertakings, is not less than P100,000 but not more than P1
million." Clearly then, the petitioner falls under the bracket of
employers required to give a thirty-peso monthly emergency
allowance under LOI No. 174 in view of the undisputed fact that it
is a "domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws" with an authorized capital stock of one million
pesos.
What seems to have muddled the matter are the provisions of Sec.
7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Under
that section, petitioner appears to have been covered by the fifty-
peso bracket for it states that a monthly emergency allowance of
fifty pesos is required "where the authorized capital stock or total
assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is P1 million or more."
It should be observed that this provision not only injects a new
determinative factor, i.e., the total assets of the employer, but also
provides a choice for the determinative factor: whichever is higher
between the employer's authorized capital stock and its total assets.
An examination of the issuances of the Department of Labor,
however, reveals that said option is more apparent than real. In its
Interpretative Bulletin aforementioned, the Department uses as a
basis for granting the emergency allowance the "authorized capital
stock, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings." The
phrase "authorized capital stock" clearly refers to employers which
are incorporated by law and therefore have authorized capital
stocks to speak of. Total assets as a determinative factor should only
refer to "other undertakings."
Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations, therefore, introduced a matter
which is not germane to the provisions of P.D. No. 525 by
considering total assets as a criterion. Moreover, it further
complicated the law by the addition of the phrase "whichever is
applicable and higher." In practice, the exercise of the option
expressed in such phrase may lead to absurd situations. As
demonstrated in this case, that which is higher, meaning
petitioner's total assets, may not also be applicable because
petitioner is not an "undertaking" within the purview of the
Interpretative Bulletin and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. No. 525.
Sec. 7 of the Rules has not conformed with the standards that P.D.
No. 525 prescribes. Having been based on an erroneous decision of
the Office of the President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the
principle that an administrative agency like the Department of
Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement.
47 LINA V. CARIÑO
221 SCRA 515
FACTS:
The Secretary issued an order fixing the allowed percentage
increases in tuition fees of private schools. This was assailed by the
petitioner on the grounds that the Secretary didn't have any
authority to order such parameters. He averred that the amending
laws withdrew the power from the Secretary.
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HELD:
The power to fix the prescribed rates for tuition fee increases of the
Secretary of Education should be sustained. Under the relevant
law, the private schools are authorized to fix at first instance the
increase in fees. Nonetheless it should be in accordance with the
rules and regulations promulgated. There is nothing in the
subsequent laws that withdrew this. In case of the SAC, which is
said to be the one authorized to fix the rates of allowable increase,
its power is limited to the granting of government assistance to
teachers and students.
REASONABLENESS
 Administrative authorities may not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the enactment of rules and regulations in
the exercise of their delegated powers and whether
required by statute or judicial decisions, their regulations to
be valid must be reasonable
 They must be reasonably adapted to secure the end in view
and are invalid if shown to bear no reasonable relation to
the purposes for which they are authorized to be made
 The reasonableness of rules and regulations and
exemptions therein is determined by their relationship to
the statutory scheme they are designed to supplement,
protect and enforce
 Reasonableness under the law is different as it has a
technical meaning
 Reasonableness under the law is within the law or within
its limits
 Reasonableness is never beyond the law—interpretation
that may extend the law but never exceeds the law
48 LUPANGCO V. CA
160 SCRA 848
FACTS:
PRC issued a resolution, therein was stated that no examinee shall
attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted
by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or
any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including
examination day. It was also mentioned that any violation shall
warrant a sanction in accordance with the rules. The petitioners
were reviewees preparing for the licensure examination in
accountancy. They filed with the RTC for prohibition against the
commission.
HELD:
There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party
who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional
Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential
Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission,
that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either
to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. Consequently,
Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the
enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional
Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall
within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now
the Regional Trial Court.
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the
Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the
President for general direction and coordination.
The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable
purpose. However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
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constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review
class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or
any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor,
official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one
who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted
by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the
Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every
examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should
not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable
and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then
they must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution as well as the school’s academic freedom.
49 DECS V. DIEGO
180 SCRA 533
FACTS:
San Diego was prohibited from taking the NMAT again after failing
the said exam thrice already. He assails the constitutionality of the
said rule.
HELD:
The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those
not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire
as a doctor, he doesn’t have the constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one’s
ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less
worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving
the individual a sense of satisfaction.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES WITH PENAL SANCTIONS
 Administrative authorities may be empowered to enact
rules and regulations having the force and effect of law, but
any criminal or penal sanction for the violation of rules and
regulations must come from the legislature itself
 Executive Order 200 was enacted referring to publication in
newspapers of general circulation. But what constitutes
newspapers of general circulation?
 The enactments of administrative agencies must also be
deposited in the UP Law Center. Failure to do may not
render invalid the law but it may be questioned for efficacy.
 Previously, the publication in the Official Gazette would be
sufficient but the EO200 added the requirement of
publication in the newspapers of general circulation
REQUISITES FOR THE VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS WITH PENAL SANCTIONS
1. The law authorizing administrative authorities to issue rules
and regulations must itself declare as punishable the
violation of rules and regulations issued under its authority
2. The law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of
rules and regulations
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3. Publication in the official gazette should be made
50 PESIGAN V. ANGELES
129 SCRA 174
FACTS:
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the
Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order
No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation
and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one
province to another.
Petitioners were carabao dealers transporting carabaos. They had
with them not only health certificates but also the permit to
transport as well as certifications of inspection. Despite this
however, while passing an inspection point, the carabaos were
confiscated pursuant to an executive order. This provided "that
henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos"
HELD:
The said executive order should not be enforced against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11
of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code)
includes circulars and regulations, which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby.
51 PEO. V. VERIDIANO II
132 SCRA 523
FACTS:
Go Bio was charged with violating BP22. He moved for the
quashing of the information on the ground that when he issued the
check, the law wasn't in effect yet. This was opposed by the
petitioners saying that the date material is the dishonor of the
check, which happened after the effectivity of the law. The judge
granted the motion to quash and hence, this case.
It was Go Bio’s contention that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
was published in the Official Gazette issue of April 9, 1979,
nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14, 1979 and,
considering that the questioned check was issued about the second
week of May 1979, then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.
HELD:
The dismissal of the case was upheld.
It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made
public only on June 14, 1979 and not on the printed date April 9,
1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by
its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be
published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or
its penalties. For, if a statute had not been published before its
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violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be
violated and, consequently, the accused could not have committed
the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically
states that "This Act shall take effect fifteen days after publication
in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in such clause
should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make
known to the people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had
intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the
point of reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in
question, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity
provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act,
complained of in the Information as criminal, in May 1979, there
was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special
provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on
June 29, 1979. As a matter of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to
be violated and, consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not
commit any violation thereof.
With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was
committed on September 26, 1979 when the check was presented
for encashment and was dishonored by the bank, suffice it to say
that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of
a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor.
CONSTRUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATIONS
 Rules in the exercise of a power delegated by statute should
be construed together with the statute to make
 If possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with
common sense and sound reason
 The rule should be construed and applied to make it
conform to the powers conferred upon the administrative
body, rather than as being an assumption of power not so
conferred
 A regulation cannot be construed to operate retroactively
unless intention to have it to operate clearly appears
 Dean Roy: administrative rules and regulations may be
regarded to be at the bottom of the totem pole. You may
be guided by the rules on amendment.
 The rules of procedures of administrative agencies may also
be respected in adjudicating claims of a person
52 D. M. CONSUNJI V. COA
199 SCRA 549
FACTS:
MWSS made an advertisement for public bidding with respect to a
Contract for Pump/Lift Stations and Rehabilitation: Tondo Pump
Station" or "Contract No. PS-1." The project was partly financed
through a loan from the Asian Development Bank. The bidding
was held and the contract was granted to Erectors. The contract
was finalized and was sent to the President for approval. Before the
approval however, Erectors backed out from the contract and was
later substituted with petitioner. The contract was made and duly
approved. The project was finished earlier and pursuant to this,
there was demand for an incentive bonus and also the escalation
clause payment. MWSS paid the petitioner but later demanded for
reimbursement because of notice of disallowance by the
Commission on Audit due to overpayment. Petitioner alleges that
the reckoning date for escalation should be the date for bidding
and not otherwise. It mentioned that the contract was a bid
contract and not a negotiated contract. A contrary stance was
adopted by the respondent.
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HELD:
No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or use of government funds and properties. Even so,
this auditing procedure is not of absolute discretion since it should
be done within legal constraints.
Parenthetically, P.D. 1594 and its implementing rules are clear to
the effect that infrastructure projects are awarded in the order of
priority as follows: First, by public bidding and second by a
negotiated contract. However, resort to negotiated contract is only
after a failure of public bidding. Furthermore, the implementing
rules are clear as to when there is a failure of public bidding after
which a negotiated contract may be availed of. Thus, if no bid is
acceptable in accordance with the implementing rules during the
first bidding, the project should again be advertised for a second
bidding and in the event the second bidding fails anew, a
negotiated contract may be under-taken.
It follows from the law and the rules that the subject Contract PS-1
No. 1 was a bidded contract. The petitioner was one of the three
bidders in the initial bidding of the Contract for Pump/Lift Station
and Rehabilitation: Tondo Pump Station. Although the petitioner
was the highest bidder, it got the contract after the lowest bidder
A.L. Sarmiento was disqualified and the second lowest bidder
Erectors Inc. withdrew its contract before it could be approved by
the President. A suggestion from the Solicitor General that there
was failure of the first public bidding when the second lowest
bidder withdrew its contract paving the way for an award of a
negotiated contract to the petitioner is without basis.
53 PHIL. PETROLEUM V. MUN. OF PILILIA
198 SCRA 82
FACTS:
Under the NIRC, manufactured oils and other fuels was subject to
specific tax. PPC was engaged in such business and was holding
operations in respondent municipality.
The local tax code provides for the taxing power of the
municipalities, provinces, and cities. It is provided in Sections 19
and 19 (a) thereof, provide among others, that the municipality may
impose taxes on business, except on those for which fixed taxes are
provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers,
rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits
and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein. This
was further bolstered by the Circulars of the Secretary of Finance
directed to all provincial, city and municipal treasurers to refrain
from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances
in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing
in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National
Internal Revenue Code and to refrain from collecting any local tax
imposed in tax ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of
the Local Tax Code on July 1, 1973, on the businesses of
manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in, petroleum
products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal
Revenue Code.
The municipality enacted its own tax code through an ordinance
and in its relevant sections provided for the imposition of a tax on
business, except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the
Local Tax Code on manufacturers, importers, or producers of any
article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers,
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distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors,
distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule found
in the Local Tax Code, as well as mayor's permit, sanitary
inspection fee and storage permit fee for flammable, combustible or
explosive substances.
Thereafter, was an amendatory PD on the tax code increasing the
amount of specific tax on lubricating oils, diesel oils, and the like.
The NIRC was then enacted and it stated that a specific tax was
imposable on the manufacture of mineral oils and motor fuels.
HELD:
The crucial issue in this case is whether or not petitioner PPC
whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is
still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees,
considering Provincial Circular No. 6-77; and mayor's permit and
sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla,
Rizal, based on Municipal Ordinance No. 1.
PC No. 26-73 and PC No. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of local
tax ordinances imposing a tax on business under Section 19 (a) of
the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), with regard to manufacturers,
retailers, wholesalers or dealers in petroleum products subject to
the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code NIRC, in
view of Section 22 (b) of the Code regarding non-imposition by
municipalities of taxes on articles, subject to specific tax under the
provisions of the NIRC.
There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1
imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is valid especially
Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto
and/or is a literal reproduction of Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax
Code as amended by P.D. No. 426." It conforms with the mandate
of said law.
But P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have
repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73 issued by the
Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19 (a), were carried over
into P.D. No. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers,
wholesalers, retailers, or dealers in petroleum products.
Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of discrepancy between
the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, the former prevails.
Furthermore, while Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition
of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend
Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426, wherein
the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of
manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of commerce of
whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on
the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax on business of
manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products contravenes a declared
national policy, it should have been expressly stated in P.D. No.
436.
Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal
treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on
flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax
ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the
payment of storage permit fee.
The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is a
fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable,
combustible or explosive substances. Inasmuch as said storage
makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla, but by
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petitioner PPC, same is obviously not a charge for any service
rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of
the same Code.
54 CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CORP. V. DRILON
176 SCRA 24
FACTS:
Petitioner and its employee’s union entered into a collective
bargaining agreement. One of the provisions in said agreement was
the increase in the employee’s salaries every certain period.
Thereafter, a law was passed amending the Labor Code with
respect to salary increases. The minister issued rules implementing
the same. Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the
employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated
under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage
increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. Petitioner
accordingly credited the first year increase of P200.00 under the
CBA and added the difference of P61.66 (rounded to P62.00) and
P31.00 to the monthly salary and the 13th month pay, respectively,
of its employees from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6640.
Nonetheless, upon inspection, it was found that petitioner
committed underpayments of basic salaries and 13th month pays. It
was ordered to pay the deficiency.
HELD:
Public respondents aver that petitioner should have first appealed
to the Secretary of Labor before going to court. It is fundamental
that in a case where only pure questions of law are raised, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply
because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders
involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since
administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality. The
questions raised in this petition are questions of law. Hence, the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be considered
fatal to this petition.
As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules
implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer
from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective
bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules
cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to
implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit
the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of
compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules
cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus
petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it
pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases
should be considered in determining compliance with the wage
increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However,
the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage
increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The
wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the
employees even before the said law was enacted. Petitioner therefor
correctly credited its employees P62.00 for the differential of two (2)
months increase and P31.00 each for the differential in 13th month
pay, after deducting the P200.00 anniversary wage increase for 1987
under the CBA. Indeed, it is stipulated in the CBA that in case any
wage adjustment or allowance increase decreed by law, legislation
or presidential edict in any particular year shall be higher than the
foregoing increase in that particular year, then the company
(petitioner) shall pay the difference.
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REPEAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS
 An administrative body doesn't as a general rule exhaust its
power to make rules and regulations by having made a
particular regulation doesn't revoke an earlier one by
implication, if there is nothing in the second one
inconsistent with the continuance of the first
 Where the commission has made an order having a dual
aspect as legislative in one respect and judicial in another,
it may not in subsequent proceedings act in its quasi-
legislative capacity and retroactively repeal its own
enactment
 This follows the rules on repeals of statutes
 Express repeal is favored while otherwise for implied repeal
 Even if there is apparent inconsistency, no repeal will be
regarded to have taken place if they can still co-exist
 An administrative agency may not repeal its rules and
regulations using another of its powers. Ergo, a rule in
exercise of quasi-judicial powers may not be repealed in the
exercise of quasi-legislative powers
 Note that a quasi-judicial decision is not a subject of repeal
56 HILADO V. CIR
100 PHIL. 288 (TAKEN WITH CO V. CA)
FACTS:
Hilado filed his income tax return wherein from other things, he
deducted from his total gross income an amount pursuant to a
General Circular issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue,
which was GC 123. This deducted amount was pursuant to a war
damage claim duly approved by the War Damage Commission. He
was assessed for a deficiency in his payment of income tax later on.
Thereafter, the Collector issued a Circular declaring null and void
his previous circular and declared that property which were
destroyed by fire, storm, shipwreck or other casualty, robbery, theft
or embezzlement during the World War 2 were deductible in the
year of actual loss or destruction of said property. As a
consequence of this, Hilado was disallowed the deduction and was
demanded to pay the deficiency. To this he appealed but was
denied.
HELD:
In this case, the regulation was just an interpretation rendered and
it doesn't create a binding right. This is different from filing a
claim and a decision is reach which subsequently becomes final.
As the regulation or interpretative opinion is concerned, it wasn't
final in adjudicating what the rights of the claimant was and thus, it
could be legally revoked or changed by the administrative agency.
EXTENT OF THE ACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
 The duly executed acts of an administrative body can have
legal effects even beyond the lifespan of that body
 Rules and regulations issued under a law expressly
providing that they shall be in full force and effect until the
Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provides, are
good only up to the life of the law itself
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
DEFINITION OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
 Power to hear and determine, or ascertain facts and decide
by the application of rules of law to the ascertained facts in
the enforcement and administration of law
 Any power of the administrative agency aside from rule-
making but including licensing
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 The thought process is the same as of a judge’s except that
the administrative agency has limited type of classes being
adjudicated
57 LUPANGCO V. CA
160 SCRA 848
FACTS:
The PRC issued a resolution regarding the taking of handouts,
reviewers, and attending review classes 3 days before the licensure
exam. (Same case as above)
HELD:
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from
proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-
judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is
defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-
judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges
and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific
situation . This does not cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its
purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105
which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to
preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
In the subject resolution, it was issued not in the PRC’s quasi-
judicial function but merely as an incident to its administrative
functions. Thus, appeal was properly made to the RTC.
58 TORRES V. HIBIONADA
191 SCRA 268
FACTS:
The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville
Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to
private respondent. The installment payments having been
completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of
title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor
Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for
specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board.
HELD:
P.D. No. 1344 empowered the National Housing Authority to issue
writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D.
No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as
follows:
In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
1. Unsound real estate business practices;
2. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
3. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
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condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, incidental only when the class is
broker or salesman. affexted

Under a subsequent law, the regulatory functions conferred on the

59 CARIÑO V. CHR
National Housing Authority were transferred to the Human
204 SCRA 483
Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was renamed Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board.
FACTS:
The CHR issued a cease and desist order against petitioner for
It is clear that the complaint for specific performance with damages
issuing a return-to-work order to public teachers who abandoned
filed by Diongon with the Regional Trial Court of Negros
their classes to do mass concerted actions.
Occidental comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot
HELD:
seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to
The CHR doesn’t have any jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers
him the corresponding certificate of title.
over certain types of cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. The most that may be conceded
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER DISTINGUISHED FROM
to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
JUDICIAL POWER
investigate. It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice or
Quasi-judicial power Judicial power even quasi-judicial bodies do.
Where the function of an officer Primarily to decide questions of
or body is primarily legal rights between private CONFERMENT OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS
administrative and the power to parties, such decision being the  The legislature may confer on administrative bodies quasi-
hear and determine primary object and not merely judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and
controversies is granted as an incidental to regulation on some discretion as incident to the performance of administrative
incident to the administrative other administrative function functions
duty  But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in
express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such
QUASI-JUDICIAL COMPARED WITH QUASI-LEGISLATIVE quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited if they are to be
POWER valid, up to those incidental or in connection with the
Quasi-judicial Quasi-legislative performance of administrative duties, which don't amount
Exercise needs the requirements No need for notices and hearing to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively
of due process—notice and when making rules vested in the courts
hearing
Binding on the parties and it is 60 MAGPALE V. CSC

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215 SCRA 398
FACTS:
Magpale was charged with failing to account for equipment and
liquidate cash advances given to him. He was charged with
dishonesty, pursuit of private business, among others. The case
remained unacted upon for 4 years but he was consequently found
guilty.
HELD:
While it is true, as contended by respondent Civil Service
Commission that under Section 12 (par. 11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A,
Book V of Executive Order 292, the CSC does have the power to
hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments,
and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it, the exercise of the power is qualified by and should
be read together with the other sections of the same sub-title and
book of Executive Order 292, particularly Section 49 which
prescribes the following requisites for the exercise of the power of
appeal, to wit:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision;
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision, unless a petition for the reconsideration is seasonably
filed; and
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office,
which shall forward the records of the case, together with the
notice of appeal to the appellate authority within fifteen days from
filing of the notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.
Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition
of:
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.
The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve
dismissal or separation from office, rather, the decision exonerated
petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position.
Consequently, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of
appeal to the CSC.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by
law to hear and decide the case.
61 ANTIPOLO REALTY V. NHA
153 SCRA 399
FACTS:
Through a contract to sell, Hernando acquired prospective and
beneficial ownership over a subdivision lot. With the consent of
the petitioner, he transferred his rights to Yuson. However,
petitioner wasn't able to develop the subdivision project in
accordance with the contract to sell. It later was able construct the
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improvements in the subdivision and through a letter, informed
Yuson about it and was asking for resume in payment but the latter
refused to do so. After another notice with no payment from
Yuson, the contract was rescinded. Yuson filed then a complaint
with the NHA and the petitioner was ordered to reinstate the
contract.
HELD:
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative
agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions,
though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction,
basically because the need for special competence and experience
has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of
complex or specialized character and because of a companion
recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained
crowded and clogged.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such
powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights
thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by
our regular courts.
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete
certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the
specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the
Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options
under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither
rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments
made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed,
under the general Civil Law, in view of petitioner's breach of its
contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with
the option either to rescind the contract and receive
reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal interest)
made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to
suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time
as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA
was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior
installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of
discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such
reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's
correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to
rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that
under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally
empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting
parties under the law administered by it and under the respective
agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder
are faithfully performed.
62 MILLER V. MARDO
2 SCRA 898
FACTS:
This case involves one identical question of law, namely, the
validity of the Reorganization Plan, prepared and submitted by the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission presumably
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under the authority of Republic Act 997, insofar as it confers
exclusive and original jurisdiction to a regional office to decide the
claims of laborers for wages, backwages, underpayment of wages,
overtime and separation pay, etc.
HELD:
It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of
Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered
(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which
may not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for
the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and
functions.
But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer
merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created
to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the
National Government, which plainly did not include the creation of
courts. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law. Thus, judicial power rests
exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature
may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial
powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as
incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so
doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that
would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must
be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in
connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter
exclusively vested in the courts.
If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms
when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then
certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power
to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission
to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of the
Executive Branch of the Government.
CLASSIFICATION OF ADJUDICATING POWERS
63 SALAZAR V. ACHACOSO
183 SCRA 145
FACTS:
A complaint was lodged with the POEA for alleged illegal
recruitment activities of petitioner. In connection with this,
Administrator Achacoso issued a closure and seizure order against
petitioner.
HELD:
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the
following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only
judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
64 RCPI V. NTC
215 SCRA 455
FACTS:
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The wife of private respondent sent two rush telegrams to his sister
and brother-in-law through petitioner’s facilities but such didn't
reach the supposed to be recipients. This prompted the private
respondent to file a complaint with the NTC against RCPI for poor
service. Accordingly, NTC ordered RCPI to answer the complaint
and set the case for hearing.
HELD:
E. O. 546, it will be observed, is couched in general terms. The
NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of Communications
which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The
power to impose fines should therefore be read in the light of the
Francisco Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not
grant additional powers to the Board of Communications. The
Board in other words, did not possess the power to impose
administrative fines on public services rendering deficient service
to customers, ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such
power, in the absence of legislation. It is true that the decision in
RCPI vs. Board of Communications seems to have modified the
Santiago ruling in that the later case held that the Board of
Communications can impose fines if the public service entity
violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any
certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the Commission.
But can private respondent's complaint be similarly treated when
the complaint seeks redress of a grievance against the company? 8
NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine.
No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order
No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's
jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power
to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including
telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service
to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the
supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to
be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in
administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is
the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like
respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such
body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and
ineffective.
65 BOISER V. CA
122 SCRA 945
FACTS:
The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran
City and other municipalities in the province of Bohol. Sometime
later, the petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract
denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT
bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas
facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue
City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of
Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas
calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of
the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to
preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT,
provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and
otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of
facilities under the agreement.
Later, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT
issued a "circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT
employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the
connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the
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petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner
avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited "
Interconnecting Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the
public and private hours resulting from any disruption of the
petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long distance
and overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled
to seek judicial relief.
HELD:
The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach
of contract. Premiere asks for compliance with the terms of the
contract and for the payment of P100,000.00 exemplary and moral
damages in addition to attorney's fees.
PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given to the Board
of Communications, now National Telecommunications
Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's powers which
authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to
award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by
the private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining
order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior
notice provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they
were, this question is one which should be clarified in the civil case
for breach of contract.
Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order
which does not merely involve "a purely internal transaction of a
telecommunications company" but one which would necessary
affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated.
The Board of Communications has been renamed National
Telecommunications Commission. The NTC has no jurisdiction,
and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary
implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract.
66 DEIPARINE V. CA
221 SCRA 503
FACTS:
Spouses Carungay entered into an agreement with Deiparine to
construct a three-story dormitory. On a report of the civil engineer,
Deiparine was deviating from the specifications and plans, thus
impairing the strength and safety of the building. The spouses sent
a memorandum to petitioner, complaining that the building was
being done haphazardly and they suggested core testing.
Consequently, it was found out that the building was structurally
defective. This prompted the spouses to file an action for
rescission and damages.
HELD:
PD 176 created the Construction Industry Authority of the
Philippines as the umbrella organization which shall exercise
jurisdiction and supervision over certain administrative bodies
acting as its implementing branches. The body in this case is the
Philippine Domestic Construction Board and not the Philippine
Construction Development Board.
However, the wording of the law is clear that the jurisdiction of the
Philippine Domestic Construction Board are meant to apply only to
public construction contracts. It power over private construction
contracts is limited to the formulation and recommendation of
rules and procedure for the adjudication and settlement of disputes
involving such private contracts.
SOURCES OF JURISDICTION
ESTOPPEL
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67 TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
23 SCRA 29
FACTS:
On July 19, 1948—barely one month after the effectivity of
Republic Act 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 88 of
which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
amount of demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest
and cost—the Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio
to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00 with legal interest plus
costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was
issued by the court against defendants’ properties, but the same
was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants
and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to
as the Surety.
After trial upon the issues, the Court rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory,
upon motion of the latter, the court issued a writ of execution
against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied,
the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against
the Surety’s bond, against which the Surety filed a written
opposition upon two grounds, namely (1) Failure to prosecute,
and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of
the amount due under the judgment. The Surety prayed the Court
not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond
but also to relieve the company of its liability, under the bond in
question. The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that
no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. After the necessary demand was made,
and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiffs, filed a second motion for execution of counter-bond,
such motion was eventually granted and the corresponding writ
was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals raising
the following assignment of errors and not one of the assignment of
errors raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly
nor indirectly. Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the
Court of Appeals, decided the case affirming the orders appealed
from. The Surety filed a Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter
filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially the appellees action was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only; that a month before that said date, Republic Act
292, has already become effective, section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
actions where the value of the subject matter or the amount of the
demand does not exceed P2,000.00; that the Court of First Instance
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The Court of
Appeals resolved to set aside its decision and certified the case to
the Supreme Court.
HELD:
It is undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy was for
recovery of sum of P1,908.00 only – an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts. True also is the rule
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the court
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the Supreme Court is
of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling
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everything done in the case with its active participation. As already
stated, the action was commenced almost fifteen years before the
Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time , to do that which, by exercising
due diligence , could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omision to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims, and unlike the statue of limitations,
is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
or asserted. It has been held that a party can not invoke the
jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question the same jurisdiction.
EFFECT OF EXPIRATION OF LAW
68 ROXAS V. SAYOC
100 PHIL. 448
FACTS:
Roxas was issued an import control license to import cotton
counterpanes. With this, she imported from Japan bales of cotton
counterpanes. However, the license was issued in violation of the
Import Control Law. She tried to recover the cotton counterpanes
but the Collector of Customs decided to forfeit said merchandise
for being imported in violation of the law.
HELD:
The decision of the collerctor was appealed in due time and the
case reached the office of the Commissioner of Customs also in due
time while RA 650 was still in force. The commissioner acquired
jurisdiction over the case and he was duty bound to act thereon.
Petitioner contends that at the expiration of the law, the
commissioner loss his jurisdiction. This is untenable because it is a
settled rule that a court, be it judicial or administrative, that has
acquired jurisdiction over a case, retains it after the expiration of
the law governing the case. Herein, once the Commissioner has
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the mere expiration of the law
doesn't divest him of his jurisdiction thereon duly acquired while
the law was still in force. He retained jurisdiction and should
continue to take cognizance of the case until final determination
thereof.
DUE PROCESS
69 RIVERA V. CSC
240 SCRA 43
FACTS:
Rivera was the manager of the corporate banking unit of Landbank.
He was charged with many things—dishonesty among others. He
was alleged to acting as fixer and financial consultant to some of the
clients of the bank. Upon the complaint, he was placed under
preventive suspension. He was found guilty for grave misconduct,
acting prejudicial to the interest of the service, and violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act. Upon appeal to the MPSB,
he was exonerated for the rest and was only found guilty for acting
prejudicial to the interest of the service.
Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of
the petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process
when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her
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capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had
taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part,
this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration with the CSC. The Court, in its
resolution of 05 July 1994, resolved to grant the motion, to reinstate
the petition and to require respondents to comment thereon.
HELD:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no
real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would
be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of
the case.
70 PNOC V. NLRC
201 SCRA 487
FACTS:
Private respondent Danilo Mercado was first employed by herein
petitioner Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation (PNOC-EDC for brevity) on August 13, 1979. He held
various positions ranging from clerk, general clerk to shipping clerk
during his employment at its Cebu office until his transfer to its
establishment at Palimpinon, Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.
The grounds for the dismissal of Mercado are allegedly serious acts
of dishonesty.
HELD:
This issue has already been laid to rest in a previous case of
involving the same petitioner and the same issue, where this Court
ruled that the doctrine that employees of government-owned
and/or con controlled corporations, whether created by special law
or formed as subsidiaries under the General Corporation law are
governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, has
been supplanted by the present Constitution. "Thus, under the
present state of the law, the test in determining whether a
government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil
Service Law are the manner of its creation, such that government
corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions
while those incorporated under the General Corporation Law are
not within its coverage."
Specifically, the PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the
General Corporation Law was held to be a government owned or
controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the
provisions of the Labor Code.
The fact that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution
was still in effect, does not deprive the NLRC of jurisdiction on the
premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is
the Constitution in place at the time of the decision.
On the issue of due process, indisputably, the requirements of due
process are satisfied when the parties are given an opportunity to
submit position papers. What the fundamental law abhors is not
the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of
opportunity to ventilate a party's side. There is no denial of due
process where the party submitted its position paper and flied its
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner's subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Appeal has the effect of curing whatever
irregularity might have been committed in the proceedings below.
Furthermore, it has been consistently held that findings of
administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not
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only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court does
not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence but is
limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. A
careful study of the records shows no substantive reason to depart
from these established principles.
71 NERA V. AUDITOR-GENERAL
164 SCRA 1
FACTS:
The petitioner was retired on January 4, 1951, with the rank of
lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He
applied for retirement gratuity under R.A. No. 340, otherwise
known as the Armed Forces Retirement Act, but in the
computation of the total amount due him, he was not credited with
the sums of P 12,324.41 and P 983.01 which he claimed represented
his longevity pay under a later enacted law. His claims were denied
on the ground that the law cannot be applied retroactively to him.
HELD:
Under the petitioner's theory, even the rulings he sought to have
reconsidered would have to be disregarded because they were
rendered when he was acting on his own and therefore, as he
contends, acting invalidly. In effect, following this logic, all
proceedings where a person is not represented by counsel are null
and void ab initio for violation of due process because he could not
legally act by himself alone. Yet, magically, they become valid and
may be reconsidered the moment and provided such person retains
the services of a lawyer and starts acting through such counsel.
The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due
process unless required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is
made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a
person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right to
counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel and
during the trial of the accused, who has the right "to be heard by
himself and counsel, either retained by him or provided for him by
the government at its expense. These guarantees are embodied in
the Constitution, along with the other rights of the person facing
criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to
defend his liberty (and before even his life) against the awesome
authority of the State.
In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of
counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed essential to their validity.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-
criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and
that without such representation he will not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members
the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is
not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a
lawyer at his side.
In the case at bar, the petitioner acted for and by himself quite
ably, arguing knowledgeably on what he considered the applicable
laws to justify his claim.
72 DIZON V. PSC
50 SCRA 500
FACTS:
HELD:
73 DORMITORIO V. FERNANDEZ
72 SCRA 388
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FACTS:
In a case involving petitioner as plaintiff and Lazatina as defendant,
judgment was rendered in favor of the former but execution wasn't
pursued in furtherance of an agreement between the parties that
Lazatina should be reimbursed for incurred expenses in
transferring her house to another lot. The court rendering
judgment was then misled by the petitioners by averring
fraudulently that the judgment was still in place and execution of
the judgment was proper. However, after knowledge that there was
a compromise agreement between the parties, the court took no
delay in setting aside the issued writ of execution and thereafter,
stayed the compromise agreement.
HELD:
There is no merit to the point raised by petitioners that they were
not informed by respondent Judge of the petition by private
respondent to set aside the writ of execution. The order granting
such petition was the subject of a motion for reconsideration. 16
The motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. 17 Under
the circumstances, the failure to give notice to petitioners had been
cured. That is a well-settled doctrine. 18 Their complaint was that
they were not heard. They were given the opportunity to file a
motion for reconsideration. So they did. That was to free the order
from the alleged infirmity. Petitioners then cannot be heard to
claim that they were denied procedural due process.
74 SAVORY V. LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA
62 SCRA 258
FACTS:
Savory filed an action for unfair labor practice against Lakas
Pilipino. It averred that latter has committed strikes and mass
action, in contravention of the collective bargaining agreement.
one of the witnesses presented by the company was their counsel.
Defense lawyer has failed three times to cross-examine the witness
however. Alas, the lawyer-witness succumbed to a heart attack.
The defense then moved that his testimony be stricken out for
failure to rebut. This was subsequently granted by the court.
HELD:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or
in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly
or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination. Thus, where a Party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the rights to cross-examine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied
waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the
common basic principle underlying the application of the rule on
implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take
advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.
Private respondents through their counsel, Atty. Amante, were
given not only one but five opportunities to cross-examine the
witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite the warning and admonitions of
respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct the cross-
examination or else it will be deemed waived and despite the
readiness, willingness, and insistence or the witness that he be
cross-examined, said counsel by his repeated absence and/or
unpreparedness failed to do so until death sealed the witness's lips
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forever. By such repeated absence and lack of preparation on the
part of the counsel of private respondents, the latter lost their right
to examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, and they alone must stiffer
the consequences. The mere fact that the witness died after giving
his testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his from the
record so long as the adverse party was afforded an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination but through fault of his own
failed to cross-examine the witness.
DUE PROCESS IN QUASI-CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
75 ASPREC V. ITCHON
16 SCRA 921
FACTS:
Petitioner claims among others that he was denied his day in court
by the board of examiners for surveyors which found him guilty as
charged for unprofessional conduct and ordered the revocation of
his certificate of resignation as a private land surveyor. From the
records it appears that the board proceeded in petitioner’s and his
counsel’s absence as he and counsel didn't appear at the last and
stipulated date of hearing without cause or reason, without any
excuse at all. This, is in spite of the fact that petitioner had notice
of trial. Will the petitioner be sustained?
HELD:
Presence of a party is not always of the essence of due process. All
that the law requires to satisfy adherence to the constitutional
precepts is that the parties are given notice of the trial. The
petitioner cannot charge now that he received less than a fair
treatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND RECEIVE
EVIDENCE
 While the power to decide resides solely in the
administrative agency, this doesn't preclude a delegation of
power to hold a hearing
 The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise
his own judgment and discretion doesn't preclude him
from utilizing as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report
to him the facts on the basis of which the officer makes his
decisions.
 It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law
76 AMERICAN CYANAMID V. DIR. OF PATENT
76 SCRA 568
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Philippine Patent Office to
cancel the certificate of registration of Tiu Chian’s Sulmetine on
the ground that it is confusingly similar to its own trademark
Sulmet on a veterinary product used for the same purpose, a
trademark it has long been using both in the US and the
Philippines. The Director denied the petition. Petitioner appealed
from the said decision and among others, assigned as error the
delegation made by the Director of the authority to hear and
receive the evidence in the said case to a hearing officer.
HELD:
The director has the authority to designate a ranking official of the
patent’s office to hear inter partes proceedings in the registration of
trademarks and tradenames.
It is well settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the
administrative agency vested by law, this doesn't preclude a
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delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the bsiss of which the
decision of the administrative agency will be made.
This rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own
judgment and discretion doesn't preclude him from utilizing as a
matter of practical administrative procedure the aid of subordinates
to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his decision. It is sufficient that the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by
law.
77 SKYWORLD V. SEC
211 SCRA 565
FACTS:
Inter Realty obtained a loan from the CBC as security for which it
mortgaged three (3) parcels of land and the improvements thereon.
Inter-Realty eventually failed to pay its debt and thus, the condo
project was foreclosed and CBC was the highest bidder for the
project. A compromise agreement was then forged between the
two and the redemption period was extended. Meanwhile, Inter-
Realty made a written authorization in favor of Bautista to buy or
sell the condominium units to buyers. CBC was notified by
petitioner SCOAI through Angel Bautista, who was the latter's
president, of the organization and official incorporation of the
SCOAI. Ultimately, there was failure to redeem the foreclosed
properties. As the new owner and with the aim of recovering the
unpaid debt, it authorized Bautista to sell the unsold condo units
but this was revoked later on for discovering the latter’s violation of
his fiduciary obligations as an agent. Two petitions were filed
against the petitioner SCOAI, one of them contesting the existence
of the petitioner as an entity, and the other, for a writ of
preliminary injunction praying that the petitioner be stopped from
exercising the prerogatives of a condominium corporation
HELD:
The petitioner essentially questions the authority of Mr. Ruiz to
decide. It was Mr. Ruiz who was assigned the case of PED No. 88-
0418 for investigation and prosecution. Accordingly, Mr. Ruiz filed
a petition (SEC No. 3601) before the Securities Investigation and
Clearance Department (SICD) of the SEC. It is argued that Mr.
Ruiz acted as prosecutor and judge over the case, hence, he issued
the resolution without authority and with grave abuse of discretion.
He allegedly went beyond the duties required of a member of the
PED which are limited to investigation and prosecution of civil and
criminal cases as well as other actions involving violation of laws,
rules and regulations enforced by the SEC. The petitioner adds
that the presentation for approval of the resolution of Mr. Ruiz to
the Commission, en banc was irregular, null and void for being
done without the knowledge of the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner
was allegedly deprived of the benefit of an appeal from the
resolution to the Commission, en banc.
The contentions are without merit. Pres. Decree No. 902-A vests on
the Commission the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving, among others, disputes between the
corporation and the state regarding its legal right to exist, and the
power to hear and decide on the suspension or revocation of a
certificate of registration of a corporation.
The Commission can validly delegate the authority to exercise the
specific powers assigned to it by law. In the consolidated cases,
the Commission empowered the PED to conduct the hearing and
to decide on the revocation of a certificate of registration. The task
was assigned to Mr. Ruiz for and in behalf of the Commission.
It is true that Mr. Ruiz signed a petition with the BSCC as a relator
prior to the consolidation of the two cases. However, that petition
was apparently disregarded. Mr. Ruiz was validly authorized to
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handle the two cases simultaneously filed by the private parties
themselves against each other. It must be recalled that in PED No.
88-0418, BSCC pursued its case by itself and not as a mere relator
suing through the help of the PED. A private entity is not
prohibited from prosecuting its action for revocation of registration
by itself. Otherwise, the petition of SCOAI against the BSCC also
seeking the revocation of the latter's registration would not have
been taken cognizance of by the SEC on the ground that the case
should have been prosecuted by the Commission upon the relation
of SCOAI.
In judging the merits of the case at the instance of the Commission,
Mr. Ruiz acted only as a trier of the facts presented to him and not
as a prosecutor at the same time. The resolution arrived at was
adopted by the Commission, en banc as its own decision, upon its
approval.
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS WITHOUT NOTICE
AND HEARING
 Notice and hearing are only necessary in order to comply
with due process of law only when some constitutional
right is claimed to be invaded
 Where the purpose of the administrative agency is to
decide whether a right or privilege which an applicant
doesn't possess shall be granted to him or withheld, or
where the power exercised is either legislative or executive,
notice and hearing is not necessary in the absence of an
express or implied statutory provision therefor, and a
statute may provide for such determination without
requiring notice and hearing
 Even though the power exercised is quasi-judicial, notice
and hearing may not be essential to due process of law if no
personal or property rights are involved
78 SUNTAY V. PEOPLE
101 PHIL. 833
FACTS:
The first charge of seduction filed against the accused was made by
the victim’s father but this was dismissed for lack of merit. Another
charge was filed but this time by the victim herself. The NBI and
the Department of Foreign Affairs were notified to take proper
steps to bring back the accused so that he can be dealt with in
accordance with law. His passport was then cancelled without
notice and hearing.
HELD:
True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to
withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised
at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a
criminal charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant City
Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously
subscribed and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the
petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City
Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as
the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly leaving the country in
such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a
deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore,
he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law
should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the
order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a
miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued
it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined
from carrying it out.
Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been
granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent Secretary
before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him.
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Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but
doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a
charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal
prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and
cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested
with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious
criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation
of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due
process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the
discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and
capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing
should always be held in order to comply with the due process of
clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction
issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.
RULES OF PROCEDURE
79 MENDOZA V. CSC
233 SCRA 657
FACTS:
Petitioner, was a Senior Revenue Inspector serving under a
permanent appointment in the Office of the Treasurer of Tarlac,
Tarlac. On a relevant date, the city mayor sent him a notice asking
for explanation regarding his falsification of real estate tax receipts
and for unlawful collection of taxes. Failing to render an answer,
he was dismissed from his position.
HELD:
As to the first issue, we agree with the CSC that petitioner was
afforded due process and opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner insists that he was never furnished a copy of the letter-
complaint of March 10, 1989, which directed him to answer the
charges contained therein within 72 hours from receipt thereof.
The CSC believed otherwise, relying on the evidence on record
showing that the letter-complaint was sent by registered mail to
petitioner's address at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Tarlac as shown by the Tarlac Post Office Registry Receipt No. 5151
and was received by someone in that office on March 17, 1989 as
shown by the registry return card. It is a common practice that
letters addressed to an official or employee in a government office
are received by an employee assigned to handle mail matters.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner did not question the
failure of respondent Mayor to serve him the letter-complaint.
Instead, he claimed that while the letter-complaint directed him "to
answer the adverse allegations contained therein," it did not
apprise him of his right to counsel and therefore was
constitutionally defective. Another telling point in his motion for
reconsideration is his admission therein that he may be deemed to
have waived his right to answer the complaint.
80 MANGUBAT V. DE CASTRO
163 SCRA 608
FACTS:
The mayor filed with the provincial board a complaint against the
petitioner for misconduct and dishonesty. The board conducted its
investigation and accordingly submitted the case for decision. No
memorandum was ever submitted by the petitioner even though he
was required to do so. Before the decision, the charter of the city
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came into being. It was the legal opinion of the fiscal that he
should take cognizance of the case and thus records were
transmitted to him. Again, investigation was done and he later
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. Somewhere down
the line, the case was remanded to the board of investigators who
did not conduct additional evidence gathering or the like. The
board found the petitioner guilty.
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the absorption or taking over by the Police
Commissioner of pending cases should take place only after the
publication of the Manual as explicitly and clearly provided by
Section 26 of the Police Act of 1966.
Petitioner insists that the action of the Police Commission was
highly irregular when it took over the case and thereafter made its
own findings, contrary to the findings of the City Fiscal acquitting
petitioner of the charges, apart from the fact that its decision was
based on the records which were forwarded by the Board of
Investigators without the latter making its own investigation, and its
own findings and recommendation.
This argument misconceives the meaning of due process. The
proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in
character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of
procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses."
Otherwise stated, where due process is present, the administrative
decision is generally sustained.
The records show that the case at bar was exhaustively heard both
in the Municipal Board and in the Fiscal's Office, with both parties
afforded ample opportunity to adduce their evidence and argue
their causes. But as earlier stated, the findings of the Fiscal that
there was no prima facie case were not finalized with the requested
brief statement of materials and relevant facts on which a
conclusion could be based. Without the requested resolution, the
City Mayor was unable to issue the corresponding administrative
order. Verily, the respondent Commission can not be bound by the
findings of the City Fiscal, much less was it prohibited from making
findings of its own on the basis of the records which both the
Commission and the Board of Investigators considered sufficient
for purposes of rendering a decision. Neither was the Board's
discretion not to conduct a new investigation foreclosed by such
findings.
Furthermore, apart from the fact that the uniform requirements of
due process were all complied with under Republic Act No. 557,
Republic Act No. 3857 (the Revised Charter of Cebu City) and
Republic Act No. 4864 by the investigating officials, there is
nothing in the records indicative of any act on the part of subject
administrative bodies amounting to a deprivation of petitioner's
right to administrative process.
At this juncture, the oft-repeated rule that findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but
also finality where the decision and the order of execution issued
by public respondents are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction deserves reiteration. The findings of fact must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence
even if not overwhelming or preponderant.
Indeed, if the Police Commission were to accede to the suggestion
of petitioner that the Board of Investigators be directed to conduct
its own investigation and give the parties a chance to present their
evidence and not merely rely on the result of the investigation
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conducted by the Municipal Board and by the City Fiscal's Office,
this would be favoring technicalities over substantial justice.
Clearly, petitioner was given his "day in court" and there is no
occasion to impute deprivation of due process. On the contrary, the
rendition of the questioned decision by the Police Commission
actually promoted and served the interests of justice.
In addition, there is no denial of due process if the decision was
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
81 RABAGO V. NLRC
200 SCRA 158
FACTS:
Ace Building Care and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society entered
into a contract under which the former would provide the latter
with janitorial and allied services for a stipulated consideration,
subject to such adjustment as might be subsequently required by
law. The contract was renewed yearly until 1985, when the services
were placed under public bidding and a new contract was awarded
to another company, which then took over from ABC.
On a relevant date, 41 janitors ABC had earlier detailed to PTS
filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission
against both ABC and PTS for unpaid wage differentials under
Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, holiday premium pay, damages and
attorney's fees, reimbursement of cash bond, incentive leave pay
and bonus and separation pay. ABC filed a cross-claim against PTS,
contending that the latter was liable for the statutory increases,
while PTS moved to dismiss on the ground that it belonged to the
public sector and was not covered by the Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter held that they are not entitled to the
reimbursement of cash bond and were not entitled to the holiday
pay except for the five complainants.
HELD:
As the Court sees it, the wage orders do not apply to the direct
employees of PTS who in fact are members of the Government
Service Insurance System. The complainants in G.R. No. 82868
unquestionably belong to the private sector and for this reason are
covered by the Social Security System. They are the indirect
employees of the PTS and as such are entitled to hold it liable,
solidarity with their direct employer, for their unpaid wage
differentials. In this sense, the PTS is correctly classified as an
employer coming under the private sector. The reference to it as
belonging to the public sector relates only to its direct employees
"for purposes of coverage under the Employees' Compensation
Commission," not to its indirect employees coming from the private
sector.
The issues regarding the separation pay and the service incentive
leave pay are factual. It is often enough said that the findings of fact
of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise on the
specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this
Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by
substantial evidence.
We are satisfied that the complainants were able to establish by
Exhibit "B" their length of service to entitle them to service
incentive leave with pay. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay
because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is
not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the
NLRC, where decisions may be reached on the basis of position
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papers only. It is also worth noting that ABC has not presented any
evidence of its own to disprove the complainant's claim. As the
Solicitor General correctly points out, it would have been so easy to
submit the complainants' employment records, which were in the
custody of ABC, to show that they had served for less than one
year.
A slight modification must be made, though, in the case of Norma
Moreno Mangabat, who was denied the service incentive leave with
pay, possibly through an oversight. Exhibit "B" shows that her
employment was from "7/79 to 12/81 and 3/84 to 7/84." Section 3 of
Rule V, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, provides that the term "at least one year service" shall mean
service within 12 months, whether continuous or broken, reckoned
from the date the employee started working.
The submission that the five complainants awarded separation pay
were not entitled thereto because their terms expired it with the
contract with PTS is also not acceptable. ABC never offered any
evidence that the employment of the claimants was co-terminal
with the janitorial contract. We agree that the termination of ABC's
contract with PTS resulted in a partial closure or cessation of
operations of ABC that called for the application (if only by
analogy) of Article 283 of the Labor Code providing in part as
follows:
... In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures
or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction
of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
Our conclusion is that Ace Building Care and the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society are solidarily liable to the complainants for
their differential pay under Wage Orders Nos. 5 and 6, PTS being
considered in the circumstances of this case to be the indirect
employer of workers in the private sector. ABC is liable for the
payment of the separation pay and incentive leave pay of the
complainants mentioned in the challenged decisions, with the
modification only that Norma Moreno Mangabat shall also be
entitled to service incentive leave with pay:
In view of the above findings, it is no longer necessary to resolve
the motion of the complainants that the supersedeas bond fixed by
the Court for the issuance of the temporary restraining order on
May 11, 1988, be increased to P500,000.00.
82 MACEDA V. ERB
199 SCRA 454
FACTS:
Due to the Persian war conflict, the oil companies have filed their
respective applications for oil price increase. The ERB granted
provisional increases. Maceda assailed this preliminarily on the
ground that no hearing was held in granting provisional increases.
Hearing was conducted and during the proceedings, the ERB
ordered that testimonies shall be in affidavit-form, among other
changes in the trial proper. This was assailed once again on the
allegation of denial of due process by not being able to finish cross-
examination.
HELD:
The Solicitor General has pointed out that aside from the increase
in crude oil prices, all the applications of the respondent oil
companies filed with the ERB covered claims from the OPSF.
We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5, 1990
granting a provisional price increase on petroleum products
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premised on the oil companies' OPSF claims, crude cost peso
differentials, forex risk for a subsidy on sale to NPC, since the oil
companies are "entitled to as much relief as the fact alleged
constituting the course of action may warrant." Nonetheless, it is
relevant to point out that on December 10, 1990, the ERB, in
response to the President's appeal, brought back the increases in
Premium and Regular gasoline to the levels mandated by the
December 5, 1990 Order (P6.9600 and P6.3900, respectively).
FORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
83 DADUBO V. CSC
223 SCRA 747
FACTS:
Dadubo, Senior Accounts Analyst and Cidro, Cash Supervisor, of
the DBP were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. The charges were based on reports
on the unposted withdrawal of P60,000.00 from a certain Savings
Account.
Veloso, an authorized representative of the Tius, presented an
undated withdrawal slip for P60,000.00. Dadubo, as acting teller,
prepared the needed preliminaries and the money was
subsequently released to Veloso. The Received payment portion of
the withdrawal slip was signed Veloso but Cidro, who disbursed
the amount, failed to initial the passbook.
After banking hours, another withdrawal slip was presented by
another employee of the Tius. This was the second P60,000.00
withdrawal. Veloso did not know about it. The withdrawal slip was
processed and approved on the same day. It was indicated in the
slip that it was posted but it wasn't actually made, absent
presentation of passbook.
The following day, prior to the payment of the ABH withdrawal,
Veloso presented another undated withdrawal slip for P60,000.00.
This was the third P60,000.00 withdrawal. The withdrawal slip was
received by Dorado, who handed it to Dadubo. At that time, Cidro
was encashing the check at PNB to satisfy the ABH withdrawal.
When she returned from the bank, she paid this withdrawal to
Veloso, who thought that what she was collecting was the
P60,000.00 corresponding to the withdrawal slip she presented that
morning.
When Dadubo informed Cidro about the third withdrawal, till
money of P100,000.00 was made to service it. Prior to the payment
of the third P60,000.00 withdrawal, Veloso came back and
presented another withdrawal slip for P40,000.00. The petitioner
claimed she disbursed P100,000.00 to Veloso, covering the third
P60,000.00 and the P40,000.00 withdrawals. On the other hand,
Veloso testified that she received only P40,000.00 from the
petitioner. She acknowledged receipt of the amount by signing the
withdrawal slip and indicating opposite her signature the amount
of P40,000.00.
That left the balance of P60,000.00 unaccounted for and directly
imputable to Dadubo. She was then charged and subsequently
found guilty for embezzlement of bank funds.
HELD:
Appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties was, to
repeat, the prerogative of the administrative body, subject to
reversal only upon a clear showing of arbitrariness. The rejection of
the affidavit of Ballicud, for example, was not improper because
there was nothing in that document showing that the petitioner did
not embezzle the P60,000.00.
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It is true that the petitioner was formally charged with conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the bank and not specifically with
embezzlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence
presented sufficiently proved her guilt of embezzlement of bank
funds, which in unquestionably prejudicial to the best interest of
the bank.
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need
not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of
the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the
acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.
The petitioner's complaint was rightfully dismissed, when it
averred that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the
constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which a decision is based. This provision applies
only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the
Civil Service Commission. In any event, there was an earlier
statement of the facts and the law involved in the decision rendered
by the MSPB dated February 28, 1990, which affirmed DBP's
decision to dismiss the petitioner. In both decisions, the facts and
the law on which they were based were clearly and distinctly stated.
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW
84 CORONA V. CA
214 SCRA 378
FACTS:
President Aquino issued an AO creating a President Committee on
Public Ethics and Accountability, which vested also powers to the
department secretary to discipline offices, agencies, and others
attached to its department. Pursuant to this, the Secretary created
the AAB to act and decide on cases of administrative malfeasance,
irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the department.
Therafter, complaints were filed against numerous officers with the
AAB. These officers eventually questioned the jurisdiction over
them.
HELD:
Management of personnel, an attached agency is to a certain extent
free from departmental interference and control. Although the
pertinent provisions don't expressly provide for a mechanism for an
administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting power to
remove erring employees on the general manager, with the
approval of the board of directors, the law impliedly grants said
officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of
assistant general manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA general
manager may subject the employee concerned to preventive
suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set by law. Only after gathering sufficient facts
may the PPA general manager impose the proper penalty in
accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the
approval of the PPA board of directors.
The DOTC secretary as an alter ego has jurisdiction over PPA
personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a
certain extent.
What is prescribed by the law is that all complaints against a PPA
official or employee below the rank of assistant general manager
shall be filed before the PPA general manager by the proper
officials. The aggrieved party shouldn't however be one and the
same official upon whose lap the complaint the has filed may
eventually fall on appeal.
85 DEL CASTILLO V. CSC
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241 SCRA 317
FACTS:
Professor del Castillo was an employee of the PRC. He was
assigned as a watcher in the Optometry Licensure Examination. A
report was filed by his fellow watchers that saw him answering the
test papers of an examiner. He was dismissed from the service
because of this. He appealed this to the MPSB and it reversed the
decision of the PRC. This was reversed by the CSC.
Petitioner averred that the CSC didn't have jurisdiction in
reversing his acquittal. Upon the grant of his appeal by the MPSB,
he averred that the same became final and executory.
HELD:
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law and the same contemplates that a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative
charges.
RES JUDICATA AND REOPENING OF CASES
86 VDA FISH BROKER V. NLRC
228 SCRA 681
FACTS:
VDA is a licensed fish broker. It engaged the services of Bula and
Salac, among others as batilyos to arrange the fish in the banera.
On a relevant date, a complaint against VDA was filed for non-
payment of service incentive pay, emergency cost of living
allowance, thirteenth month pay, legal holiday and premium pay
for rest day and holiday was filed against VDA. The labor arbiter
dismissed the case and ruled that there was no employer-employee
relationship. The two employees were eventually dismissed by the
company and this prompted them to file for illegal dismissal. The
labor arbiter noted the previous decision and dismissed the
complaint. But the NLRC reversed this, averred that there was no
res judicata.
HELD:
Decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant
to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality the force
and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata.
It is undisputed that the finding of the non-existence of employer-
employee relationship is with finality.
NOTE:
There was vested right because the ruling affected their status as
employees.
Res judicata is applicable only when there is exercise of quasi-
judicial powers.
87 SY HONG V. COMM. OF IMMIGRATION
L-10224, 11 MAY 1957
FACTS:
Prior to February 1940, petitioners were permanent residents in
this country. Sometime in February 1940, they went to China for a
temporary sojourn. They were unable to return to the Philippines
within the period of validity of their special return certificate, and
the Pacific War had caught up with them in China. They were
admitted to this temporary visitors expired on January 20, 1950.
After proper investigation, petitioners were ordered deported for
violation of Philippine Immigration Act, as amended, on April 19,
1950. Petitioners requested for the correction of their status from
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temporary visitors to returning residents, and the first deputy
commissioner, who was then acting commissioner of Immigration,
ordered the correction of their status into returning residents. On
a later date however, the Commissioner of Immigration set aside
the aforesaid order and proceeded to enforce the warrants of
deportation issued against petitioners as overstaying temporary
visitors. On the basis of these facts, the Court below held that
petitioners, having accepted the status of temporary visitors in
entering this country, must first abandon the Philippines before
seeking permanent admission thereto, and denied the petitioner for
certiorari.
HELD:
The petitioners having lost their right of re-entry as permanent
residents, and having been admitted as temporary visitors or non-
immigrants and the period allowed for their temporary sojourn in
these islands having already expired, they are under the law,
subject to deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration.
NOTE:
There was no vested right because the subject matter was a
privilege. It was the correction of a status by the Commissioner of
Immigration.
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS
ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
 Administrative determinations are enforceable only in the
manner provided by statute
 If the state has failed to provide a remedy for their
enforcement, they are unenforceable
 Some determinations are not to be enforced at all, in the
ordinary sense of the term—in such cases, their only
sanction is the force of public opinion invoked by the
fairness of a full hearing
METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT
1. Investigation
2. Summary action
3. Imposition of administrative sanctions
4. Judicial action
INVESTIGATION
 The life blood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and analysis of
evidence
 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions,
not only for rule-making, adjudication and licensing, but
also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing for
determining general policy, for recommending legislation,
and for purposes no more specific than illuminating
obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.
 An administrative agency may be authorized to make
investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative and
judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose
is to obtain information upon which future action of a
legislative and judicial nature may be taken and may
require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a
purely investigatory nature
 Investigatory or inquisitorial powers—power to inspect or
to secure or to require the disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records or otherwise
 This power may include the following—
o Of subpoena
o Of swearing witnesses
o Of interrogating of witnesses before them
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o Of calling the production of books, records and
papers
o Of requiring books, records and papers to be made
available for inspection
o Of inspecting premises
o Of requiring written answers to questionnaires
o Of requiring reports, periodic or special
o Of requiring the filing of statements
88 MASANKAY V. COMELEC
6 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Masangcay was being punished with contempt by the COMELEC
for violating its resolution prohibiting the opening of ballot boxes
without the presence of the required authorized officers.
Masangcay questions the constitutionality of the pertinent statutory
provision, questioning the exercise of the COMELEC of the power
to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants
to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt
is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the
separation of powers that exists among the three departments of
our constitutional form of government.
HELD:
Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power
to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it
in connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice
within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII),
for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-
judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision
law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the
demarcation line between the duty which inherently is
administrative in character and a function which calls for the
exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission.
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to
enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed
against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an
administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the
procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other
election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact,
Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one
designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of
election supplies in that province, was charged with having opened
three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among
several municipalities in violation of the instructions of the
Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except
in the presence of the division superintendent of schools, the
provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the
Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he
ordered their opening and distribution not in accordance with the
manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions. And because
of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission
and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its
decision is null and void.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF OR RELIEF AGAINST
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
89 FIRST LEPANTO V. CA
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231 SCRA 30 respondents. Petitioners sat as directors and officers of the subject
corporation. Private respondents averred that these petitioners
90 FIRST LEPANTO V. CA violate their duties of loyalty and diligence by unlawfully refusing
237 SCRA 519 the private respondents from participating in the management of
the corporation. Meanwhile, the US court issued a temporary
91 LIBORO V. CA restraining order prohibiting the private respondents from being
218 SCRA 193 proxies for the American corporation. This order was unheeded.
They were elected as the new directors in an annual stockholders’
WHERE REVIEW IS NOT GRANTED BY STATUTE meeting and yet they averred that they were prohibited unlawfully
by the sitting directors from assuming office. They sought thereby
92 MACAILING V. ANDRADA a temporary restraining order against the petitioners. Hence, these
31 SCRA 126 petition by the petitioners against it.

93 DABUET V. ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS HELD:

149 SCRA 386 The petitioners do not question the jurisdiction of the SEC over
the case between them and the private respondents. What they
94 LUPANGCO V. CA challenge is the continuance of the temporary restraining order
160 SCRA 848 (JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE ONLY) issued by the respondent SEC and the apparent delay of the latter's
en banc division in resolving their main and supplemental petitions
95 BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION V. ALFONSO which also pray for the lifting of the questioned restraining order.
176 SCRA 304
The SEC "in order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction," is
conferred the power, inter alia, "to issue preliminary or permanent
96 ALMINE V. CA
injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in
177 SCRA 796
which it has jurisdiction, and in which cases the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply."
FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FOR PURPOSES
OF REVIEW
Since the SEC is at least a co-equal body of the Regional Trial
97 AGUINALDO V. SEC
Court when it adjudicates controversies over which it has
163 SCRA 262
jurisdiction, it follows that the temporary restraining order issued
by SEC must have the same life-span as that issued by the trial
FACTS:
court. It is a well-settled rule that a temporary restraining order
NAMECOR was a corporation with shares owned by a foreign
issued by a trial court has a life of only twenty (20) days—under
corporation which in turn has some of its shares owned by private
Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge may issue a temporary

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restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of
issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application
for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporarily restraining
order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action
is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction
within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would
automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. A temporary
restraining order can no longer exist indefinitely for it has become
truly temporary.
To the extent, therefore, that the enforcement of the temporary
restraining order issued by the respondent SEC exceeded twenty
(20) days, this Court rules that the said respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion. However, although the questioned order no
longer has any force and effect, the respondent SEC still has the
jurisdiction and obligation to proceed with the hearing of the case
on the merits and to issue the appropriate orders pursuant thereto
subject to review by the Court of Appeals and eventually this Court.
EXCEPTIONS TO DOCTRINE OF FINALITY
98 PT & T V. COA
146 SCRA 190
FACTS:
Petitioner was granted a franchise whereby he was given a
preferential tax rate. A subsequent law was passed whereby it was
ruled that any grant of a similar franchise which extends benefits to
another not mentioned with the franchise of petitioner shall
likewise be given to petitioner. Thereafter, a franchise was granted
to another provider and had a smaller tax rate. The COA
conducted an audit and found out the deficiency tax payment of
petitioner. It then sought exception averring that it applied the tax
rate given to DOMSAT.
HELD:
A cursory examination of the two (2) letters in question shows that
the same are not a "final award, order or decision" within the
meaning of the aforequoted provisions. Respondent Commission in
the said letters did not decide the issue. It did not render a
decision, order or final award. It merely expressed an opinion.
Even assuming that the "opinion" of respondent Commission
expressed in its two (2) letters is proper subject for review, the same
is in accordance with the law.
In construing the "most favored treatment clause" of Republic Act
No. 5048, it has been held that the principle behind such provision
is that of "fair play" � "to place both competing groups or entities
on equal footing and not to give one an advantage over the other."
(Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. The Commissioner of
Customs, 44 SCRA 127). An examination of the franchises of
petitioner PT & T and DOMSAT discloses that while they are both
engaged in telecommunication activities, they are not necessarily in
competition with each other. DOMSAT is a "carrier's carrier". It is
a communications outfit that provides services to other
communication petitions outfits. It was formed for the exploitation
of the benefits of the communications satellite system. It is
principally a "middleman" between the operators of the
communications satellite system and the domestic carriers such as
petitioner. Thus, its franchise states that petitioner shall have "the
right and authority ... to construct, maintain and operate such
ground and other facilities, as needed to deliver
telecommunications services to and from the communications
satellite system and the telephone, telegraph, telex and other
networks and terminals of specialized telecommunications network
of government and/or private persons and/or corporations such as
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computer-data communications systems and point-to-point or
switched voice networks.
On the other hand, petitioner was granted a franchise to render
communications services to end users. It was not licensed to
operate as a "carrier's carrier." Thus, its franchise states that it has
authority to install and operate facilities for "international and
domestic public communications." Therefore, since DOMSAT
caters to other carriers while petitioner caters to end users, they are
not competitors. Stated otherwise, there can be no business rivalry
between the two firms inasmuch as the customers of one are not
the customers of the other and vice-versa.
Another reason why DOMSAT and petitioner cannot be
considered competing firms is the fact that the former principally
provides communications services through the communications-
satellite system, while the latter-does so principally through its own
facilities.
Since petitioner and DOMSAT are not competitors, petitioner
cannot avail itself of the privilege of paying its franchise tax at the
rate of 1/2% instead of 1-1/2% as provided in its franchise.
Moreover, what petitioner is claiming in effect, is a reduction of its
taxes due the Government. The rule is that, as the power of taxation
is a high prerogative of sovereignty, its relinquishment is never
presumed and any reduction or dimunition thereof with respect to
its mode or its rate must be strictly construed and the same must be
couched in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be
applied.
DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESORT/PRIMARY JURISDICTION
99 INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES V. CA
184 SCRA 426
FACTS:
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal
operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of
Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks
in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then
Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the
exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the
original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area."
IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of
rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-demand balance . . .
the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which was already
developing the coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area) and that
the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC. Thus,
IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI
assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the
two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating
contract.
Subsequently, IEC sought the rescission of the memorandum of
agreement due to several raised issues and strangely enough, the
president of the IEC and MMIC is one and the same person.
Anyway, the trial court through a summary judgment held that the
rescission was valid but this was reversed by the appellate court.
HELD:
The decisive issue in this case is whether or not the civil court has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract
over coal blocks. A corollary question is whether or not respondent
Court of Appeals erred in holding that it is the Bureau of Energy
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Development (BED) which has jurisdiction over said action and not
the civil court.
While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears
to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact
is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is
derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up
with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination
of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over
the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated
national program for coal-development and with the objective of
rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance,
IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but
the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks.
Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the
Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued
efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed
the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI
more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the
domain of the BED.
For the BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board
(abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is
tasked with the function of establishing a comprehensive and
integrated national program for the exploration, exploitation, and
development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's
coal resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all
activities relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or through
service contracts such exploitation and development, all in the
interest of an effective and coordinated development of extracted
resources.
100 RCPI V. NTC
184 SCRA 517
FACTS:
PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the
Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities under
NTC Case No. 84-003. The respondent Commission provisionally
approved and set the case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day
period allowed by law. The petitioners except PT&T were
informed of the hearing. They moved to oppose and file a reply to
the application of PLDT but was denied.
HELD:
The Public Service Commission found that the application
involved in the present petition is actually an application for
approval of rates for digital transmission service facilities which it
may approve provisionally and without the necessity of any notice
and hearing as provided in the above-quoted provision of law.
Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now is
empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without the
necessity of a prior hearing. Under the Public Service Act, as
amended (CA No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now
the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber's
investment to be effective immediately, without hearing makes no
distinction between initial or revised rates. These rates are
necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves them.
Moreover, the Commission can hear and approve revised rates
without published notices or hearing. The reason is easily
discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature
temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the
definitive rates approved after final hearing (Republic v. Medina,
supra; Cordero v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 83931,
November 3, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution) and it was so
stated in the case at bar, in the National Telecommunications
Commission's order of January 25, 1984.
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The Commission did not grant the PLDT any authority to engage
in new communication service, but merely in any new proved
provisionally PLDT's proposed revision of its then authorized
schedule of rates for the lease on availment by endusers of the
digital full period leased lines or channels for data transmission
which said company acquired, installed, and presently maintain in
serviceable condition, a relief well within its power to grant.
Undoubtedly, a public utility is entitled to a just compensation and
a fair return upon the value of its property while it is being used in
public service.
Finally, there is a legal presumption that the rates are reasonable
and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the government
through its authorized agent, involves the exercise of reasonable
discretion, and unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the
courts will not interfere. Likewise, as a rule, the court does not
interfere with administrative action prior to its completion on
finality.
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an
administrative office the power to determine particular questions or
matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such office
shall prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of administrative
officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
101 VIDAD V. RTC
227 SCRA 271
FACTS:
A group of public school teachers held a strike against the non-
payment of their salaries by the Department of Budget as well as
against the corruption allegedly existing in the DECS. This
prompted a return-to-work order and following circumstances.
Afterwards, the teachers filed a petition for prohibition.
HELD:
It should be conceded that the various complaints against the
DECS officials have prescinded from the administrative actions
taken, and contemplated to be yet taken, against public school
teachers, the plaintiffs in the cases pending with the court a quo.
The said complaints charge the defendants, all government
officials, with having illegally withheld their salaries, having
wrongfully filed administrative charges against the plaintiffs, having
unjustifiably refused to inform the latter of the nature and accuse of
accusation upon which the charges were initiated, having
inexcusably violated elemental due process, and having erroneously
applied the law. The school teachers pray for actual and moral
damages, plus attorney's fees, as well as for an order restraining the
defendants from further proceeding with the administrative
investigations.
The contention of the school teachers that the DECS officials are
being sued solely in their private capacity certainly is not borne out
by their above allegations and prayers. The root of the cases filed
below deals, in fact, on the performance of official functions by the
DECS officials. Whether the actions they have taken were proper
or improper, or whether they have acted in good faith or bad faith,
cannot, pending a full hearing that would aptly afford all parties an
opportunity to ventilate their respective contentions, be yet
determined. Until then, we must presume that official duties have
been regularly performed.
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We accordingly hold that the Solicitor General did not act
improperly in deciding to represent the DECS officials in the above
cases.
The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaints have likewise
been precipitately sought, and we see no reversible error in the
denial thereof by the lower court. The various complaints filed by
the public school teachers allege bad faith on the part of the DECS
officials. It cannot be pretended this early that the same could be
impossible of proof. On the assumption that the plaintiffs are able
to establish their allegations of bad faith, a judgment for damages
can be warranted. Public officials are certainly not immune from
damages in their personal capacities arising from the acts done in
bad faith; in these and similar cases, the public officials may not be
said to have acted within the scope of their official authority, and
no longer are they protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions. 12
It was, nonetheless, inopportune for the lower court to issue the
restraining orders. The authority of the DECS Regional Director to
issue the return to work memorandum, to initiate the
administrative charges and to constitute the investigating panel can
hardly be disputed.
102 SAAVEDRA V. DOJ
226 SCRA 438
FACTS:
The owners of shares of stock of PPI sold the same to petitioner. A
memorandum of agreement and deed of assignment was drafted to
evidence the transaction. There was however non-payment of
balance by petitioner and that is why the private respondents filed
with the SEC for rescission. The petitioner in turn filed a
complaint for damages against the private respondents. He alleged
in the verification that he is the president of the PPI. A complaint
for perjury was filed against him. Probable cause was found to exist
for perjury. Petitioner sought the reversal of this finding.
HELD:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal having been so placed
within its special competence under a regulatory scheme. In such
instances the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the
administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. 13
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question which is
within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, 14 much
less can the Provincial Prosecutor arrogate to himself the
jurisdiction vested solely with the SEC.
In the case at bar, the applicable regulatory statute is P.D. No. 902-
A conferring upon the SEC the legal competence to rule on
intracorporate disputes, which competence had already been
upheld by us in a number of cases. 15 Considering that it was
definitely settled in Saavedra, Jr. v. SEC that the issues of
ownership and automatic rescission are intracorporate in nature,
then the Provincial Prosecutor, clearly, has no authority whatsoever
to rule on the same. In fact, if we were to uphold the validity of the
DOJ Resolutions brought before us, as respondents suggest, we
would be sanctioning a flagrant usurpation or preemption of that
primary and exclusive jurisdiction which SEC already enjoys.
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Obviously, it cannot be done. Thus, the Provincial Prosecutor upon
being confronted with the issue of whether the sale of stocks to
petitioner was automatically cancelled while in the course of
determining probable cause for perjury, should have withheld filing
any information against the accused.
Public respondent DOJ in attempting to justify the action of the
Provincial Prosecutor avers that the latter is empowered to make a
preliminary ruling on the matter for the purpose of finding
probable cause against petitioner, and that petitioner may raise the
pendency of the issue before the SEC as his defense at the trial
proper.
We are not persuaded. The duty of a prosecutor during preliminary
investigation is not only to find evidence to warrant continuation of
the criminal process against an accused. Of equal importance, and
it has been repeated often enough, is his duty to protect the
innocent from hasty, expensive and useless trials. 16 This duty, in
addition to the "primary and exclusive" jurisdiction of the SEC,
demands the outright termination of the criminal prosecution of
petitioner which, at the very outset, was already bereft of factual
and legal bases. Indeed, the prosecution of petitioner cannot be
based on a mere Secretary's Certificate which cannot attest to the
validity of the automatic rescission, hence, cannot likewise settle
the question as to who between petitioner and private respondent
is the lawful President of PPI.
Be that as it may, the outcome of SEC Case No. 3257 is not
determinative of whether or not the charge for perjury against
petitioner can prosper. Even if private respondent Ramos succeeds
in proving the validity of the automatic rescission of the sale before
the SEC, it does not necessarily mean that the criminal prosecution
has basis. There are four (4) elements of the crime of perjury to be
taken into account in determining whether there is a prima facie
case, to wit: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement
or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit,
the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood;
and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 17
Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is not enough to amount to
perjury. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. While there
may have been a falsehood asserted, which we are not prepared to
accept, no evidence exists to show that the same was done
deliberately and wilfully. On the contrary, the records tend to show
that the assertion was done in good faith, in the belief that the non-
payment of the last installment price was justified by the sellers'
non-compliance with their warranties. Besides, petitioner alleges
that he has deposited the balance in escrow, which is not disputed.
Consequently, a finding of probable cause does not follow as a
matter of course even if SEC decides adversely against petitioner,
for an essential element of the crime appears to be wanting in the
case before us, i.e., that the falsehood is willful and deliberate.
Moreover, as a rule, pleadings need not be verified unless otherwise
required by the Rules of Court, and no rule requires complaints for
damages, as in the case before us, to be under oath. Since the
complaint filed by petitioner against private respondent is not
required to be verified, another essential element of the crime of
perjury is absent, i.e., that the sworn statement containing the
falsity is required by law. Consequently, petitioner cannot be
prosecuted on the basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified
pleading which is not mandated by law to be verified.
103 FREEMAN V. SEC
233 SCRA 735
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FACTS:
Corporation secured loans from Equitable Bank and these was
evinced by promissory notes. Due to the failure to pay, the bank
instituted collection suits against the corporation. The minority
shareholders moved to intervene but was denied by the court. The
collection suit was later terminated due to a compromise
agreement, wherein properties were conveyed to be sold in public
auction for the corporation to pay its debts. Later, the minority
shareholders moved the dissolution of the corporation and
liquidation of its properties. They were denied once again.
HELD:
We sustain petitioners. The present petition seeks to annul and set
aside the order of the SEC for want of jurisdiction to issue the writ
of injunction, a provisional remedy to the principal action pending
in the SEC for the dissolution of petitioner FREEMAN. Hence, the
petition is not an appeal from a final order of the SEC but a special
civil action questioning the legal competence of the latter to issue
such interlocutory order. It is covered by Sec. 1, Rule 65, of the
Rules of Court which allow a person aggrieved to file a verified
petition in the proper court praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of the
tribunal, board or officer when the latter, exercising judicial
functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
We have consistently ruled that petitions for certiorari must be
filed within a reasonable time. In the instant case, the records show
that the petition at bench was filed on 4 June 1993, or two (2)
months and nineteen (19) days from 17 March 1993, which was the
date when petitioners received copy of the order of the SEC
denying their motion for reconsideration. There is no doubt that
this petition was seasonably filed.
SEC Case No. 3577 arose from the action filed by private
respondents as minority shareholders of petitioner FREEMAN for
the dissolution of the corporation and reconveyance of the
properties conveyed to another petitioner FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT in a public auction. The SEC maintained that it
had jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction preventing the
consolidation of ownership in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT on the
basis of our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals. We denied the
intervention of private respondents in the trial court in Civil Case
No. 88-44404 which had already been terminated. As we stated
therein, even with the denial of herein private respondents' motion
to intervene nothing could really be lost to them as their rights
were being litigated before the SEC and would be fully asserted
and protected in that separate proceeding.
Our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals should be understood in the
light of two(2) basic legal principles. First, that administrative
agencies like the SEC are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as
such can exercise only those powers which are specifically granted
to them by their enabling statutes. 14 Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A,
as amended, provides the cases over which the SEC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide. These include
controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations
between and among stockholders, members or associates; between
any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association
of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
and, between such corporation, partnership or association and the
state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to
exist as such entity. Section 6 of the same decree empowers the
SEC to issue preliminary or permanent injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction.
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The action for dissolution of FREEMAN filed by its minority
stockholders is well within the jurisdiction of the SEC to resolve in
accordance with P.D. No. 902-A. However, the inclusion in the
SEC case of FREEMAN MANAGEMENT of which private
respondents are not stockholders for the purpose of compelling it
to reconvey to FREEMAN the properties originally owned by the
latter but were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT in a public auction is a matter outside of the
limited jurisdiction of the SEC. The petition for reconveyance of
properties against FREEMAN MANAGEMENT is not an intra-
corporate controversy since private respondents have no shares or
interests whatsoever in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT, a corporation
separate and distinct from FREEMAN, which is undergoing
dissolution proceedings in the SEC.
The second basic principle is the doctrine of non-interference
which should be regarded as highly important in judicial stability
and in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or
vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 15 The
SEC is at the very least co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. As
such, one would have no power to control the other. 16 Moreover,
in the instant case, judgment was rendered by the trial court in
Civil Case No. 88-44404 approving the compromise agreement
between EQUITABLE on one hand, and FREEMAN and Saw
Chiao Lian on the other. A writ of execution was issued against the
defendants to enforce the judgment and two (2) properties of
FREEMAN were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT as highest bidder in the public auction.
Finally, the judgment was fully satisfied and a certificate of sale was
issued to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT. It is axiomatic that after a
judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated
once and for all. 17 It cannot be modified or altered. Hence, the
properties sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT are now considered
excluded from the corporate assets of FREEMAN and can no
longer be the subject of the proceedings in the SEC for the
dissolution of the latter. Therefore SEC exceeded its jurisdiction
when it issued a writ of injunction enjoining FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT from consolidating its ownership over the two (2)
parcels of land it acquired as highest bidder in the execution sale.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
104 FERNANDO V. STO. TOMAS
234 SCRA 546
FACTS:
Petitioners were mediation arbiters and discharging their duties as
such. A memorandum circular was issued causing the
reassignment of officers and some of those affected were the
petitioners. They didn't follow the said circular given that it was
allegedly a transfer and was made without their consent. The
Secretary clarified in a subsequent circular that such wasn't a
transfer and again made the reassignment clear. Again, they didn't
comply which caused a complaint for gross insubordination to be
filed against them.
HELD:
Finally, we do not deem it appropriate to rule on the merits of the
order issued on July 26, 1993 by respondent Secretary preventively
suspending petitioners for ninety (90) days, as well as her
subsequent order dated October 25, 1993 finding petitioners guilty
of insubordination and imposing on them the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year. Evidently, herein petitioners, in asking
us to resolve the issues thereon in their present recourse, have
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overlooked or deliberately ignored the fact that the same are clearly
dismissible for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
On the first aspect, petitioners allowed the 90-day period of
preventive suspension to lapse without appealing from the Order of
July 26, 1993. In fact, the investigation which necessitated such
suspension has long since been concluded and thereafter resulted
in the condemnatory Order of October 25, 1993. Hence, they are
now clearly estopped from invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court in a belated attempt to seek redress from the first Order.
Secondly, as stated earlier, the Order dated October 25, 1993
imposing a punitive suspension of one year on herein petitioners
cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Presidential Decree No.
807 and Executive Order No. 292 explicitly provide that
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days are appealable
to the Civil Service Commission. 13 Not having fully exhausted the
remedy available to them, petitioners cannot resort to their present
judicial action which is both premature at this juncture and
proscribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we find any
of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies which could be applicable to the instant case, nor have
petitioners essayed any submission on that score.
105 BAGUIORO V. BASA
214 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were the elementary teacher
head and elementary principal respectively. They both sought the
promotion as division head. The petitioner was subsequently
chosen for the position but through a motion for reconsideration of
private respondent, he reversed himself and chose private
respondent. Petitioner opposed this. The Secretary found the
reversal irregular and thus, held the affirmance of the earlier
decision. The District Superintendent was then ordered to prepare
the necessary documents for the appointment of petitioner. Private
respondent then after defeat with the court, sought an action for
quo warranto against the DECS Regional Director of Region VI,
the Civil Service Commission Regional Director of Region VI, the
Schools Division Superintendent of San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental), the Administrative Officer of DECS, Region VII and
the petitioner. Private respondent prayed for judgment (a)
annulling the 17 April 1985 Memorandum-Report of the
Complaints Committee of DECS, the letter of Minister Laya of the
same date expressing concurrence with the findings and
recommendation therein and the letter of the MECS Regional
Director of 17 September 1985 directing the Schools Division
Superintendent to issue to the private respondent an appointment
back to his former position as Elementary School Principal I and
(b) ordering defendants therein to pay him P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs of the suit. He also sought the
issuance of a restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent
the enforcement of the abovestated rulings and directives. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 162 and was assigned to Branch 57
of the court below.
HELD:
It is equally clear that private respondent had not exhausted the
administrative remedies provided by law to set aside the promotion
extended to the petitioner. In this regard, therefore, the complaint
in Civil Case No. 162 fails to state a cause of action. A dismissal on
the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action. 12
What private respondent should have done was to appeal the 17
April 1985 decision of the then MECS Minister Jaime Laya to the
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Merit Systems Board (now Merit System Protection Board). Under
present procedure, a next-in-rank employee who is competent and
qualified and feels aggrieved by the promotion of another may filed
a protest with the department or agency head who shall render a
decision thereon within thirty (30) days from receipt of the protest.
Such decision may be appealed by an aggrieved party within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof to the Merit Systems Protection
Board which, in turn, shall render its decision thereon within sixty
(60) days from the time the case is submitted for decision. The
decision of the Board is final unless it involves a division chief or an
official of higher rank; in such a situation, the decision may be
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On the other hand,
decisions involving positions below division chief may be reviewed
by the Commission.
106 ROSARIO V. CA
211 SCRA 384
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Land for the Landless program of the city
government, Cruz and Rosario sought the conveyance of particular
lands to them. Previously, Cruz built a residential house and
rented it out to Rosario. Upon their application, the two lots were
given to them. Averring that Rosario was merely a lessee of the
lots, Cruz sought reconsideration and was granted such. Rosario
then filed a complaint with the trial court but it was sought to be
dismissed since there was no exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
HELD:
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not being the
sublessee and "actual occupant" of Lot 3-A, he has the preferential
right to buy said lot.
Unfortunately, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals skirted
that legal issue and simply dismissed Rosario's petition for review
of the Resolution of the City Tenants' Security Commission on the
grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and
tardiness.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not, however,
necessarily fatal to an action. Failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long
line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule
is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is
a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time,
this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take
cognizance of the case and try it.
It does not appear in this case that a motion to dismiss based on
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been filed. We
therefore feel, as we did in a number of cases before this, that
"where the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse," the
petition may be given due course.
107 ROSALES V. CA
165 SCRA 344
FACTS:
A list of honor students were released in an elementary school.
Rosales was a candidate for valedictorian and yet his name wasn't
reflected in the list. This prompted his parents to question such
and ask for a recomputation. It is said that the action was belated,
having the commencement exercises to be held the next day. On
April 20, 1972, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of
Private Schools sent a copy of the complaint by first indorsement to
the Rector of herein respondent school. Said comment was made
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on April 21, 1972, stating, among others, that the complaint had
lost its validity because the same was filed on the eve of the
commencement exercises of the school, in violation of the
provision of paragraph 176, Section XI of the Manual of Regulation
for Private Schools requiring complaints of the kind to be filed not
later than ten (10) days before commencement exercises. However,
defendant Rector indicated that he would welcome an investigation
in order to erase any doubt as to the selection of the honor students
of the grade school concerned.
On May 5, 1972, the Director of Private Schools rendered a
decision holding that Rommel Rosales was the rightful
valedictorian.
On November 29, 1972, Rosales filed a complaint for damages
itemized as follows: P25,000.00 for moral damages; P15,000.00 for
correctional damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, in view of
the failure of the school to graduate Rommel Rosales as
valedictorian of his class.
In its answer, respondent school prayed that the complaint be
dismissed on the ground that the Director of Private Schools acting
on its motion dated May 11, 1972 reconsidered and set aside his
decision of May 5, 1972 and instead "approved and/or confirmed
the selection and award of honors to the students concerned for the
school year 1971-1972 as effected by the school." (p. 14, Rollo [R.A.,
p. 31])
Petitioners, in their reply, averred that said motion for
reconsideration was mysteriously filed, there being no original
copies of the same in the Office of the Director of Private Schools
which would show the date of filing thereof and their
corresponding receipt of a copy thereof by the petitioners.
HELD:
Subject complaint, Civil Case No. 16998, was filed with the trial
court on November 29,1972, showing beyond dispute that the
request for reconsideration judicially admitted to have been filed by
the petitioners on February 7, 1973 with the Secretary of Education
and Culture had not yet been resolved at the time of the filing of
Civil Case No. 16998.
Hence, the said civil case which is an action for damages is
premature. The finality of the administrative case which gives life to
petitioners' cause of action has not yet been reached. This was still
pending as evidenced in the certificate issued by the agency trying
the same (Record on Appeal, pp. 53-54; Rollo, p. 14). The court a
quo was thus correct in acting upon the motion to dismiss filed by
the respondents on the ground that plaintiffs failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
recourse through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper
until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative
level. When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive
Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or
refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to
interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on
convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party
litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court.
APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT
108 FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS V. INCIONG
161 SCRA 295
FACTS:
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Federation of Free Workers is a labor organization registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment. It is the certified
collective bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of the
herein private respondent, the Allied Sugar Centrals Company, a
registered partnership.
Presidential Decree No. 1123 was promulgated requiring all
employers in the private sector to pay their employees an across-
the-board increase of P60.00 in their existing monthly emergency
allowance as provided for in an earlier law, Presidential Decree No.
525. The increase was to take effect on May 1, 1977. The Decree
also authorizes the Secretary of Labor to issue the appropriate rules
necessary to implement the provisions of the said law, including
such regulations to govern the procedure through which financially
distressed employers may be exempted from the requirements of
the same.
Sometime in May, 1977, the private respondent was about to pay
the increase in emergency living allowance mandated by the
Decree. Preparations were made in order to effectuate the payment
but the attempt to do so was short-lived. The private respondent
decided against the payment and the plan was, therefore, aborted.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 1977, the petitioner wrote to the Secretary
of Labor inquiring if the private respondent filed an application for
exemption in accordance with the abovecited Section 6. The
petitioner also requested that it be furnished a copy of such
application if one had indeed been filed by the private respondent.
On August 30,1977, the herein respondent Chairman of the Wage
Commission of the Department of Labor Rachel Fidelino sent her
reply to the petitioner stating therein that there was no application
in the name of the private respondent in the records of their office.
Sometime thereafter, the respondent Chairman of the Wage
Commission submitted her report to the Secretary of Labor
recommending the approval of the said application. 3 On
November 21, 1977, the herein respondent Acting Secretary of
Labor Amado Inciong wrote to the private respondent informing it
that its application was approved for a period of one year, effective
May 1, 1977. The letter of approval recited therein that the same is
final and unappealable. 4 A notice of the order of approval was
sent to both the president of the petitioner labor organization and
the private respondent.
On December 2, 1977, Chairman Fidelino received a letter from the
petitioner dated November 17, 1977 again inquiring on the
existence of any application on the part of the private respondent.
Chairman Fidelino did not send any reply.
On December 15, 1977, the petitioner filed with the Office of the
Secretary a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
approval of the said application on the grounds that the exemption
granted to the private respondent is discriminatory and that the
firm is not in unsound financial condition. 5
On March 3, 1978, the private respondent filed another application
for exemption, this time for the year 1978. In a letter addressed to
the Secretary of Labor dated May 31, 1978, the petitioner opposed
the application and reiterated its objection to the exemption
granted to the firm for 1977 for the same reasons earlier mentioned.
6
On June 5,1978, Chairman Fidelino overruled the opposition and
motion for reconsideration which stressed that the private
respondent does not appear to be in distressed financial condition
as observed by a financial analyst of the Commission. 7 Thus, on
June 9, 1 978, Acting Secretary Inciong issued an order approving
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the second application for exemption covering 1978, for a period of
one year effective May 1 thereof. The approval also recited therein
that the same is final and unappealable.
HELD:
For their part, the respondents argue that the petitioner did not
exhaust all administrative remedies available before it sought
judicial review. They are of the view that the rulings of the
respondent Acting Secretary of Labor can still be elevated to the
President of the Philippines for review. This view is traversed by
the fact that, as stated by the respondent Acting Secretary in
approving both applications, such approval is final and
unappealable. Moreover, in the absence of a constituttional
provision or a statute to the contrary, the official acts of a
Department Secretary are deemed the acts of the President himself
unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter. This is the doctrine
of qualified political agency, to wit—under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in force by ...
our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law ta act in person or the
agencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. ...
Inasmuch as no grave abuse of discretion appears to have been
committed by the herein public respondents, the writ of certiorari
sought by the petitioner cannot issue,
109 TESORERO V. MATHAY
185 SCRA 124
FACTS:
DALIGHT sought the appraisal of its properties. At first
application, it was held to be disqualified. On the second
application, it was granted the appraisal. The petitioners sought
reconsideration of this decision.
HELD:
Certiorari is not the proper remedy to be sought. The law creating
the BOE provided for the remedy of appeal to the office of the
President within a certain period. It will be noted that the
petitioners belatedly filed their motion for reconsideration, after
the decision has become long final and executory. Nonetheless,
while there was an error in the remedy sought, the court has
numerously given due course to a petition for certiorari in the
interest of justice, although the proper remedy is appeal especially
where the equities warrant such recourse and considering that
dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION
110 AQUINO-SARMIENTO V. MORATO
203 SCRA 515 (QUESTION OF LAW)
FACTS:
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB),
wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine
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the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by
the individual board members after a review of the movies and
television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are
either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner
that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel
Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in
judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual
voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are
purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of
respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive
property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access
thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a
request therefor may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to
examine are public in character and other than providing for
reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of
examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have
no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's
records.
HELD:
Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be
dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies
simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the
courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies
available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344
[1988]). The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for
reasons of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the
courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available
administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to and
the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to
act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level.
If the error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be
unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain
exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided
by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte
v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40
SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984];
Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans
Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board,
106 Phil. 466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is
guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans' Backpay Commission
[1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently
illegal, arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA
50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of
Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant
(Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108
Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is
impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA
291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies
(Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).
The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the
doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by
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respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any
rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that
petitioner adhered to the administrative processes in the
disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior
to filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive
Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the Office of
the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore
fail.
111 MADRIGAL V. LECAROZ
191 SCRA 20 (QUESTION OF LAW)
FACTS:
Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta, Jr.,
Provincial Board of Marinduque members Domingo Riego and
Marcial Principe abolished petitioner-appellat Joventino Madrigal's
position as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the
Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget
for fiscal year 1971-1972 (p.2, Records) by virtue of Resolution No.
204. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition
of the province and it appearing that his position was not essential
(p. 6, Records).
On April 22, 1972, Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. On August 7, 1973, he transmitted a follow-up letter
to the Commission regarding his appela. On January 7, 1974, the
Commission in its 1st Indorsement declared the removal of
Madrigal from the service illegal (pp. 7-8, Records).
On April 26, 1974, public respondent Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz
moved for a reconsideration of said resolution. On February 10,
1975, the Commission denied the motion for reconsideration (pp.
9-10, Records).
On August 4, 1975, Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board
requesting implementation of the resolution of the Commission
and consequently, reinstatement to his former posistion.
On August 18, 1975, the Provincial Board, through Resolution No.
93, denied Madrigal's request for reinstatement because his former
posistion no longer exists. In the same resolution, it ordered the
appropriation of the amount of P4,200.00 as his back salaries
covering the preiod December 1, 1971 up to June 30, 1973 (p. 47,
Records).
On December 15, 1975, Madrigal filed a petition before the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque against
public respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor
Celso Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board Members Domingo Riego and
Marcial Principe, Provincial Engineer Enrique M. Isidro, Abraham
I. Taduran and the Province of Marinduque for mandamus and
damages seeking, inter alia, (1) restoration of his abolished position
in the Roads and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province; (2)
reinstatement to such position; and (3) payment of his back salaries
plus damages (pp. 1-5, Records).
On March 16, 1976, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
petition on the ground that Madrigal's cause of action was barred
by laches.
HELD:
The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect
that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to
public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the
petitioner is ousted from his position.
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[W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an
office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year.
This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having
been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy
on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of
which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps
to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period
of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right
thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public
policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar
period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service.
There must be stability in the service so that public business may
(sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to
positions in the service must be discouraged.
And this one (1) year period is not interrupted by the prosecution
of any administrative remedy. Actually, the recourse by Madrigal to
the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case
where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law
cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions of
law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers
cannot decide such issues with finalitY. In the present case, only a
legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not the abolition
of Madrigal's position was in accordance with law.
112 PAINAGA V. CORTES
202 SCRA 245 (DIFFERENT ISSUE INVOLVED)
FACTS:
On December 29, 1962, petitioner purchased from Bonifacio
Merendad a parcel of corn and pasture land with improvements
thereon situated at Sitio Igbolo, Barangay Cabiawan, San Remigio,
Antique with an area of 60,000 square meters more or less. He has
since then been in possession thereof.
On or about April 21, 1977, private respondent, claiming that the
northern portion of said parcel of land is included in his Original
Certificate of Title No. N-1889 (Free Patent No. 319059), caused a
technical survey of said portion over the vehement opposition and
objection of petitioner. Petitioner thereafter filed with the District
Officer, Bureau of Lands, San Jose, Antique a protest under oath,
praying that the original certificate of title issued in private
respondent's favor be annulled on the ground of fraud. An
investigation was forthwith commenced by the District Land
Officer.
In the meantime, on September 20, 1978, petitioner filed before the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Capiz an
action for Injunction with Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with
Damages.
HELD:
We grant the petition. The court a quo misapplied the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This misapplication
stemmed primarily from its characterization of petitioner's action as
one for annulment of private respondent's original certificate of
title which included the area in dispute. Since a protest aimed
precisely at this relief had been previously filed by petitioner in the
Bureau of Lands District Office, the trial court readily concluded
that the action in court was premature, following the
pronouncement in Pestanas vs. Dyogi, supra.
A reading of the complaint in Civil Case No. 1539 however shows
that the same is, as its caption states, an original action for
injunction brought to protect and preserve petitioner's right of
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possession over the subject land in accordance with the provision
of the New Civil Code which recognizes a possessor's right to be
respected in his possession, thus:
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
In the very recent case of Maximo Solis, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72486, June 19, 1991, this Court
ruled that the "power and authority given to the Director of Lands
to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the regular
courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by
occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective
possessions and occupations. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of
rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition
of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual,
physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession
over public lands remains with the courts."
The rationale for this ruling was given, thus:
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the
wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means
to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its
power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it
may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making
the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of
possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the
civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual
possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.
The protest filed by petitioner before the Bureau of Lands seeking
the cancellation of private respondent's original certificate of title
on the ground of fraud differs from Civil Case No. 1549 in terms of
their nature, the causes of action upon which they rest as well as in
the reliefs sought. The administrative protest boils down to the
question of ownership of the area in controversy, while the court
action is concerned merely with possession. That ownership and
possession are two entirely different legal concepts is illustrated in
the case of German Management Services, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 4 in this wise:
... It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall
not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a
party who can prove prior possession can recover (or retain) such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he had in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better light by
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Whatever decision the trial court may render in Civil Case No. 1539
will not encroach on the primary jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands over the question of who between petitioner and private
respondent is entitled to the ownership of the land in question.
Thus, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not find application in the case at bar.
Indeed, the case at bar is easily distinguishable from Pestanas vs.
Dyogi, supra, so heavily relied upon by the trial court. There is no
doubt that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
obtained in that case as the plaintiffs-appellants therein, after filing
with the Bureau of Lands a petition for cancellation of free patent
No. V-166124 issued to Josefa Dyogi, filed with the Court of First
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Instance of Quezon a complaint to have the identical free patent
No. V-166124 declared null and void, praying that they be declared
the owners of the portions of land possessed by them and/or that
they be declared as having the preferential right to acquire the said
land. In the case at bar, the action in court brought by petitioner
did not seek that the title of private respondent be annulled, which
issue was already before the administrative agency, but merely
asked that petitioner be respected in his prior possession of the
piece of land in controversy.
113 U.P. V. RASUL
200 SCRA 685 (IRREPARABLE DAMAGE)
FACTS:
The principal issue in this case is whether or not respondent Dr.
Felipe A. Estrella who holds the position of Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) can invoke security of tenure
during his term of office notwithstanding the abolition of the said
position by the University of the Philippines Board of Regents.
Estrella was appointed as the director of the PGH. After the new
president of the PGH assumed office, he recommended the
reorganization of the whole UP Manila and PGH, which included
the position of Estrella. The Board of Regents acted on this
proposal and formed a nomination committee to replace Estrella.
To this, Estrella sought injunction.
The trial court held that aside from some changes and
combinations of functionaries, the structure remains substantially
the same. The leadership element, which the defendant Abueva
wants to impress upon this Court, encourages reorganization and
justifies abolition of positions. But the whole reorganization set-up
under our law cannot or should not have the effect of abolishing
the position of the plaintiff unless legal requirements are complied
with. If the reorganization plan results in abolishing the position of
the plaintiff and in putting in his place another one, with
substantially the same duties, not to say qualifications, in the name
of leadership, it will surely be considered a device to unseat the
incumbent and to circumvent the constitutional and statutory
prohibition of removal from office of a civil service officer even
without cause provided by law. Plaintiffs position should not
therefore be deemed abolished by mere implication.
HELD:
Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella's failure to exhaust
all administrative remedies, We hold that this case has special
circumstances that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted
exceptions to the rule. As the facts show, respondent Dr. Estrella
was about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must
have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents
would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts,
irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the
implementation of the proposed reorganization.
114 QUISUMBING V. GUMBAN
193 SCRA 520 (WHIMSICAL USE OF POWER)
FACTS:
On or before 1979, private respondent Esther B. Yap was appointed
District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools and assigned to
the District of Glan, South Cotabato (Rollo, p. 2).
On February 11, 1987, in view of the agitation of teachers and
concerned citizens of Glan, then Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing
issued a Memorandum Order, directing Regional Director Teofilo
E. Gomez to reassign or transfer Esther B. Yap to another district
(Rollo, p. 24), which was effected by Director Teofilo E. Gomez in
his Memorandum Order dated February 12, 1987, ordering the
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transfer of private respondent Esther B. Yap as a public school
district supervisor from Glan District to Malapatan District and for
Crisanto B. Delamin, another public school district supervisor, to
assume that of respondent's position at Glan (Rollo p. 25). The
latter in turn issued a Memorandum Order to the principals and
headteachers of different public schools at Glan informing them of
his assumption of office (Rollo, p. 26).
However, private respondent Esther B. Yap defied the orders of her
superiors and she continued to perform the functions of public
school district supervisor of Glan.
HELD:
After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that
the appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a
District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not
indicate a specific station (Rollo, p. 13). As such, she could be
assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently
at any specific station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974];
Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. 81032, March 22,1990), citing Brillantes v. Guevarra (27 SCRA
138 [1969]).
Finally, the lower court did not err in taking cognizance of the case.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard
and fact rule. It has been repeatedly held that the requiring
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one: where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President,
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or
where the respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process.
The rule does not apply where insistence on its observance would
result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
115 ESTUERTE V. CA
193 SCRA 541 (NO REMEDY AVAILABLE)
FACTS:
Tan, a Junior Resident Physician of Corazon Locsin-Montelibano
Memorial Hospital, Bacolod City, without any justifiable reason
shouted at, humiliated and insulted the petitioner, Patria Esuerte,
Head Nurse, Medicare Department of the said hospital and as a
result of the said incident, said petitioner complained to the Chief
of the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro P. Motus, in writing. The other
petitioner, Herminia Jayme, who was one of those who were
present at the time of the incident also sent a letter to the Chief of
the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro Motus, informing the latter of what she
had witnessed. As a result thereof, private respondent was advised
to explain in writing by the Chief of the Hospital, but private
respondent instead of explaining only her side of the incident also
complained against the petitioners. The Discipline and Grievance
Committee, Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial Hospital,
conducted a fact-finding investigation and later, the Chief of the
Hospital, Dr. Teodoro P. Motus, issued a resolution dated
November 8, 1978, transmitting the records of the case to the
Regional Health Office, No. 6, Jaro, Iloilo City for appropriate
action. The opposite parties sought the dismissal of the complaint
for not exhausting administrative remedies.
HELD:
The second ground raised by petitioners is devoid of merit. The
alleged need by private respondent Tan to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing the complaint for damages does not apply to
the instant case. Private respondent as plaintiff in the civil Case for
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damages has no administrative remedy available to her. It is true
that the same incident complained of in the administrative case
filed by petitioners against Tan is the subject of the action for
damages filed by Tan against the petitioners in the trial court.
However, the cause of action in the administrative case is different
from that of the civil case for damages. While the complainant in
the administrative case may be a private person, it is the
government who is the aggrieved party and no award for damages
may be granted in favor of private persons. In the civil action for
damages, the trial court's concern is whether or not damages,
personal to the plaintiff, were caused by the acts of the defendants.
The civil action for damages can proceed notwithstanding the
pendency of the administrative action.
116 BRETT V. IAC
191 SCRA 687 (PATENTLY ILLEGAL)
FACTS:
HELD:
117 DATILES V. SUCALDITO
186 SCRA 704 (NO ORDER)
FACTS:
Petitioner Datiles and Company has in its favor a fishpond lease
agreement 1 whereby the Republic of the Philippines, thru the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, agreed to lease to
the company one hundred seventy five hectares, ninety nine ares
and fifty-nine centares (175.9959 has.) of public land located in
Batu, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur, for fishpond purposes. Fishpond
Lease Agreement (FLA) No. 1902 was executed on 16 June 1971,
with an original period of ten (10) years, later extended to twenty
five (25) years, or up to year 2002. 2
About the middle of 1973, petitioner-lessee filed a complaint for
"Injunction with Writ of Possession with Preliminary and
Prohibitory Injunction, with Damages" before the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Sur, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 1389, against herein private respondents
Jesus Deypalubos and Daniel Cabdieza. 3 Said court action was
alleged to have been resorted to after the vehement refusal of the
respondents to obey the orders of the then Philippine Fisheries
Commission and Bureau of Fisheries 4 (now Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources) to vacate that portion of the area covered
by FLA No. 1902 which they (private respondents) were occupying
without a fishpond permit and the knowledge and consent of
petitioner.
To the accusation of their unlawful entry, private respondents set
up the defense of good faith at the time of their entry and
occupation of the land which they described as forested and
uncultivated.
Thereafter, or on 2 June 1974, the Barrio Council of Batu, Slay,
Zamboanga del Sur prepared and submitted to the Bureau of
Fisheries a resolution 9 which attests that the 49 hectare
controverted fishpond area was never occupied by the Datiles
family (herein petitioner company's predecessor) and that it was
Mr. Deypalubos (herein private co-respondent) who cleared the
same and constructed all the improvements therein.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie against an
executive officer, the petitioner must first exhaust administrative
remedies. This doctrine rests upon the assumption that the
administrative body, board or officer, if given the chance to correct
its/his mistake or error, may amend its/his decision on a given
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matter. 20 It follows therefore that there has to be some sort of a
decision, order or act, more or less final in character, that is ripe for
review and properly the subject of an appeal to a higher
administrative body or officer, for the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to operate. In the present case, however,
there is no administrative order or act as above described, that can
be appealed from. The respondent Regional Director has not
rendered any decision, or made any final finding of any sort, and is
in fact just about to conduct an investigation which happens to be
the very act sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative
remedies that must be exhausted, although available, cannot be
resorted to. There being urgency in stopping public respondent
Guieb's investigation but no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, petitioner's recourse to the respondent
court for relief by way of a petition for prohibition was proper.
We now look into PD No. 605. Its evident purpose is to prevent the
substitution of judicial judgments for those of public administrative
officials in disputes involving the disposition or utilization of
natural resources of the country. The decree seeks to leave to
administrative agencies the authority to decide controversies
involving licenses, permits, patents or public grants in connection
with natural resources, obviously because of the expertise of such
administrative officials in dealing with such problems.
The issuance of said decree (No. 605) does not, however, mean that
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction where questions of law are
involved, as in the case at bar. Here, what was assailed before
respondent judge is Regional Director Guieb's move to conduct an
investigation on Deypalubos' formal protest, the petitioner's theory
being that to investigate the matter is to go beyond what the
Director of the Bureau of Fisheries had authorized in his 3 January
1975 Memorandum, which is "to cause an immediate formal
investigation of those issues involved in the foregoing resolution
and the protest ... and not touched upon in Civil Case No. 1389. 21
(Emphasis supplied)
The situation, therefore, called for a determination of whether or
not the proposed investigation was indeed an over-exercise of
authority by respondent Regional Director as claimed by the
petitioner; and if this was resolved in the negative, the investigation
would have been allowed to proceed. The respondent court was
called upon to look only into the propriety of the investigation
regardless of the fact that the investigation could result in the
issuance and/or revocation of fishpond lease permits of the
contending parties.
As to the prohibition dictated by PD No. 605, the same pertains to
the issuance by courts of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts on controversies which involve facts or exercise
of discretion in technical cases, because to allow courts to judge
these matters could disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery. But on issues definitely outside of this
dimension and involving questions of law, courts are not prevented
by PD No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.
118 AQUINO V. LUNTOK
184 SCRA 177 (URGENCY)
FACTS:
Reduced to its essential terms, the present petition raises a
question, apparently of first impression, concerning the validity of a
writ of preliminary injunction issued beyond the 20-day period of
the effectivity of a restraining order and during the extended
efficacy of such order. Indeed, in the cases treating on the matter of
TROs, it appears that only the propriety of orders extending the
efficacy of the initial TRO, or the issuance of another TRO after the
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first had automatically expired after the twentieth day of its
issuance, have been squarely ruled upon, but not the question of
the validity of a writ of preliminary injunction issued to restrain the
same act complained of after the lapse of the 20-day period of the
TRO.
The records show that petitioners, in their capacity as Provincial
Auditor of Camarines Sur, State Auditor I of the Provincial
Auditor's Office and State Examiner of the Provincial Auditor's
Office, respectively, conducted an audit of private respondent's
accounts as Municipal Treasurer of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and
found a cash shortage of P274,011.17 under his accountability. 3
Allegedly pursuant to Section 157, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
petitioners seized private respondent's cash, books, papers and
accounts and the latter was suspended from office. As a
consequence, private respondent requested reinvestigation by the
Commission on Audit. 4 Pending action on the request, private
respondent filed a petition dated August 26, 1987 with the trial
court, presided over by respondent judge, for prohibition with
injunction and with a prayer for a restraining order and damages. 5
Forthwith, respondent judge issued the TRO of August 27, 1987,
enjoining all respondents therein, their agents and/or
representatives, for a period of twenty (20) days from date thereof,
to desist from proceeding or taking action against private
respondent based on petitioner Yumang's report and from
exercising such derivative powers and functions. 6
On September 16, 1987, which was the last day of effectivity of the
TRO, respondent judge, on motion filed by private respondent,
issued an order extending the efficacy of the TRO for another
period of twenty (20) days, or until October 6, 1987. 7
On September 24, 1987, likewise upon motion of private
respondent, respondent judge issued an order directing petitioners
to return to private respondent the cash, books and other papers
they had seized. Thereupon, petitioner Aquino filed a motion for
the reconsideration of said order, to which private respondent filed
his opposition. Under date of October 5, 1987, petitioners also filed
their answer to the petition, with an opposition to the application
for preliminary injunction. 8
On October 6, 1987, the last day of the extended effectivity of the
TRO, private respondent filed another motion for extension of the
efficacy of the restraining order. On the same date, respondent
judge issued an order directing petitioners to refrain from taking
any action against private respondent until the motion is resolved. 9
HELD:
Petitioners asseverate that the questioned writ of preliminary
injunction is null and void, it being in reality a fourth restraining
order issued beyond the 20-day effectivity of the preceeding TRO.
15 Further, petitioners claim that the injunction was issued in utter
disregard of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
private respondent having brought the action below pending his
request for reinvestigation with the Commission on Audit. 16
On the charge of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
although it is well-settled in our jurisdiction that, unless otherwise
provided by law or required by public interest, before bringing an
action in or resorting to the courts of justice all remedies of
administrative character affecting or determinative of the
controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved
party, 17 this doctrine is not a hard and fast rule. In the present
case, we are inclined to subscribe to private respondent's
invocation of the urgency of judicial intervention, as one of the
admitted exceptions to the rule, 18 which likewise would be in
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keeping with the court's broad discretion in granting injunctions.
Whatever circumstances warranted the grant of injunction in the
court below would be no different than the circumstances which
created the urgency, and there can ordinarily be no better judge to
determine the existence thereof than the trial court itself.
Thus, it has been said that the court which is to exercise the
discretion of granting an injunction is the court of original
jurisdiction and not the appellate court; 19 and a preliminary
injunction will usually be granted when it is made to appear that
there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of
them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had
on the merits of the case. The only limitations to such discretion
would be that it must have been exercised upon the grounds and in
the manner provided by law, 20 an inquiry into which is precisely
part of the subject of our immediately succeeding discussion on the
matter of the status of the injunction in controversy.
Contrary to petitioners' position, we are disposed to sustain the
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in question. A
temporary restraining order, while being in effect a species of
injunction, is in some respects to be distinguished therefrom. It is
an interlocutory order or writ issued by the court as a restraint on
the defendant until the propriety of granting a preliminary
injunction can be determined, thus going no further in its
operation than to preserve the status quo until that determination.
When such determination is made, the whole force of the order
ceases by its own limitations and become functus officio, having by
then served its purpose.
119 SABELLO V. DECS,
180 SCRA 623 (POVERTY)
FACTS:
Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also
the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the
Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit
at that time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay for
their monthly tuition fees. Since at that time also, the President of
the Philippines who was earnestly campaining was giving aid in the
amount of P 2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through
proper resolutions alloted the amount of P 840.00 to cover up for
the salaries of the high school teachers, with the honest thought in
mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and as such
therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question.
The only part that the herein petitioner played was his being
authorized by the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount
and which was subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's
Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. That was a
grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it involves the
very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its
technicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio
captain, were charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and
both were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and
disqualification to hold public office. The herein petitioner
appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila. The Court of
appeals modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of
the amount being involved. The herein petitioner, being financially
battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the highest
court of the land.
Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE
PARDON by the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this instrument
on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the
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government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a
mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as
Elementary School Principal I.
HELD:
This is not a hypothetical or abstract dispute. It is not academic or
moot for, to our mind, there is a definite and concrete controversy
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal relations.
This is a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a court decree that is conclusive in character. The case
does not call for a mere opinion or advise, but for affirmative relief .
As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should
be reappointed to his former position is a matter of discretion of
the appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case,
if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of' what is rightfully
his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice
to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of
the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and
justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports cannot be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be
sued for alleged grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore
technicality by considering this a suit against the officials of this
government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a non-lawyer,
who claims that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, We
also set aside the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition.
In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 3 this Court held that the absolute
disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms
part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that
pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such
pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle
him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for
reappointment to said office.
In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was
reinstated to the service as a classroom teacher by the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports.
As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution
in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his
former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of
a mere classroom teacher.
However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from
September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this
Court said he is not entitled to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner
was lawfully separated from the government service upon his
conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had
been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages.
Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally
dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charge against them.
In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government
service be made continuous from September 10, 1948 to the
present when it is not. At any rate when he reaches the compulsory
age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate retirement benefits
as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom
teacher.
120 ROCAMORA V. RTC
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167 SCRA 615 (USELESS)
FACTS:
In order to impress the Pope, petitioners sought the widening of
the road where the Pope would pass. This entailed however the
expropriation of private respondent’s properties.
HELD:
On the second ground, we affirm the salutary rule that decisions of
administrative authorities must first be appealed to their superiors
in the executive department before resort to judicial review may be
permitted; otherwise, the case may be dismissed for lack of a cause
of action. 15 This is based on sound public policy and practical
grounds. One reason is that the administrative superiors, if given a
chance, can and will correct the mistakes of their subordinates,
thus rendering judicial intervention unnecessary. Another is that
administrative authorities are presumed to be experts in their
respective fields of specialization and their decisions should as a
rule not be disturbed by the courts of justice, which cannot claim
similar knowledgeability. A third justification is that these decisions
are usually reviewable only in the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which are not accepted except only
where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to
the petitioner. No less important is the consideration that by
withholding action until the administrative remedies have been
exhausted, the judiciary will be observing the doctrine of separation
of powers and according deference to the acts of a coordinate
department of the government.
But the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
inflexible rule. In fact, it yields to many accepted exceptions. As we
have noted in a number of cases, exhaustion is not necessary where
inter alia there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; 16 where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 17 where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; 18 where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
19 and where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided anyway by the courts of justice. 20 At
least two of these exceptions are applicable to the case at bar.
In the first place, it appears that the administrative officers have sat
on this case for as long as nine months, during which as many as
eight endorsements were made from office to office in an
apparently endless discussion and denial of the complainants'
claims for compensation. 21 Even the supposed adjustment of the
appraisals to be made by the Ministry of Public Highways was still
pending after the complaint was filed and when the defendants
submitted their answer. 22 The matter was apparently hibernating
in the doldrums of bureaucratic indecision and inaction. In the
meantime, the complainants remained unpaid despite their
repeated demands.
In the second place, the other issue raised was a question of law, to
wit, the applicable criterion in the determination of the
compensation to be paid the plaintiffs for the loss they had
sustained. More specifically, the legal question presented was
whether or not P.D. 76 should dictate the amount of the
compensation to be paid the owners as against the price they
negotiated with the Ministry of Public Highways.
121 PALMA V. DE LA PAZ
160 SCRA 751 (SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE)
FACTS:
HELD:
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The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief This rule is not a
hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that (1)
the question in dispute is "purely a legal one" and (2) the
controverted act is 'patently illegal" (Carino vs. ACCFA, No. L-
19808, September 29,1966,18 SCRA 183). The questions involved
here are purely legal. The subject Hospital Orders violated
petitioner's constitutional right to security of in tenure and were,
therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial intervention was called for to
enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts.
There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies since she had
filed a letter-protest With the respondent Secretary of Health, with
copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the
Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission, but the
same remained unacted upon and proved an inadequate remedy.
Besides, an action for quo warranto must be filed within one year
after the cause of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court),
and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to
suspend the running of the one-year period (Cornejo vs. Secretary
of Justice L-32818, June 24, 1974, 57 SCRA 663).
122 ADRISOLA V. CA
133 SCRA 245 (INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT)
FACTS:
HELD:
We sustain the Appellate Court on the second ground inasmuch as
the requirement that no recourse to Courts can be had until all
administrative remedies have been exhausted, is not absolute. It is
subject to certain exceptions. It is not applicable where the
question involved is essentially judicial, as in this case where the
controversy revolves around the interpretation of a contractual
stipulation. 2
We agree with the Appellate Court that the stipulation in the deed
of mortgage that the mortgagee PINOY "is the one to transplant"
on the Landholding is tantamount to a prohibition against the
institution of a tenant. Although transplanting is merely one of the
phases of farming and cultivation, it is evident that what was really
meant was that the mortgagee himself was to cultivate the
Landholding personally. That such was the intendment is shown by
the fact that since 1957 when the verbal mortgage was constituted,
it was the mortgagee, PINOY, who had been cultivating the
Landholding personally although through hired laborers, one of
whom was PETITIONER. The requirement of personal cultivation
was documented in 1975.
PETITIONER's alleged institution as tenant by PINOY in 1973,
and as agricultural lessee in 1976, was in violation of the mortgage
contract, aside from the fact that the institution as agricultural
lessee was apparently made in bad faith inasmuch as prior to the
execution of the agricultural lease contract on August 18, 1976, and
its registration on August 24, 1976, SALAMANQUE had already
notified PINOY of his (SALAMANQUE's) intention to redeem the
Landholding. The institution of tenancy having been prohibited,
PINOY, as the mortgagee, could not be considered as an
"agricultural lessor" or a "legal possessor" within the meaning of
Section 10 3 and 166(3) 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms (RA No.
3844) such that by reason of the redemption, SALAMANQUE
would be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations
of the agricultural lessor. It will have to be held, therefore, that the
institution of respondent Sabio as the tenant by the landowner,
SALAMANQUE, was valid as within the latter's right.
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