Judicial Immunity from Suit

By Judge Eliza B. Yu, LLM, DCL

Incumbent Supreme Court Justices are immune from disbarment suits before their
impeachment and subsequent conviction by the Senate in Article XI, Section 3 (6) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. The grounds for their removal are culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust (Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution).

In Cuenco v. Justice Fernan, A.M. No. 3135, February 17, 1988, the Supreme Court
held that there is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the
Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by
impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a
Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent
and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in
Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2] of the
Constitution), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C]
[1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2] of the Constitution), and the members of the
Commission on audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1] of the
Constitution), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine
Bar.

In Re First Indorsement from Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez dated March 16, 1988
Requesting Honorable Justice Marcelo B. Fernan to Comment on an Anonymous
Letter – Complaint, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988 citing Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court said: The broad power of the New Constitution
vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions,
however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by
impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: Sec. 2 The
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and
corruption." Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the
aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public
officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while
holding his office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution,
states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The above provision is a
reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the
explicit character of the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the

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loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the
Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against,
tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer
expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The
Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear implication is, the party convicted
in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a
conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in
accordance with law" may not prosper. The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we
referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment. Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment
shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. It is important
to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for
possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him
in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of
judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial
independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme
Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by
other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial
authority by the Court. It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting
officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a
Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file
impeachment proceedings.

Generally, Supreme Court Justices are immune from administrative and criminal suits
pertaining to their official acts without bad faith or malice.

In Maylas Jr. v. Sese, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012, August 4, 2006, The filing of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge
perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial
remedy exists, thus: [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
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nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be. Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory
of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in
the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative,
or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted
and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his
criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. Even
granting that respondent judge erred in the issuance of the assailed Order, he could not
be held administratively liable considering that there is no proof that such error of
judgment was tainted with bias or partiality, fraud, dishonesty, bad faith, deliberate
intent to do an injustice, or gross ignorance. To merit disciplinary action, the error or
mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. In the absence of
a showing to the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have
been issued in good faith.

In Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu
Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2,
2010, the subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by the
Supreme Court on January 18, 2010), issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the
“Chief, Office of the Administrative Services or AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE,
Supreme Court, Manila,” for the submission to the Office of the Ombudsman of the
latest Personal Data Sheets and last known forwarding address of former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez. The
subpoena duces tecum was issued in relation to a criminal complaint under (b) below,
pursuant to Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No.
6770. The Office of the Administrative Services (OAS) referred the matter to us on
January 21, 2010 with a request for clearance to release the specified documents and
information; a copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline
Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J, cited by the
Ombudsman as basis for the subpoena duces tecum it issued. We secured a copy of
this criminal complaint from the Ombudsman to determine the legality and propriety of
the subpoena duces tecum sought; and Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court
received on February 9, 2010), signed by Acting Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of
the Office of the Ombudsman (with the approval of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas
Navarro-Gutierrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action. The order was premised on the Memorandum issued on
July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints against
judges and other members of the Judiciary be immediately dismissed and referred to
the Supreme Court for appropriate action. In light of the Ombudsman’s dismissal order
of February 4, 2010, any question relating to the legality and propriety of the subpoena
duces tecum the Ombudsman issued has been rendered moot and academic. The
subpoena duces tecum merely drew its life and continued viability from the underlying
criminal complaint, and the complaint’s dismissal – belated though it may be – cannot

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but have the effect of rendering the need for the subpoena duces tecum academic. As
guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court, past and
present, in relation to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial functions, we
deem it appropriate to discuss for the record the extent of the Ombudsman’s authority in
these types of complaints. In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has
full authority to issue subpoenas, including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and information relating to
matters under its investigation. The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited, as
the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the Constitution
and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the issuance,
service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of
subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of
reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to be reasonable and
for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the first
place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.
In the present case, the “matter” that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum was a criminal complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the alleged
violation by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired
Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended
(the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). A first step in considering whether a criminal
complaint (and its attendant compulsory processes) is within the authority of the
Ombudsman to entertain (and to issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the
Supreme Court.

This Court, by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial

power is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle
actual controversies, but also to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or
instrumentality of government. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the
exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose
judgment is final. This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted through a
criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the Court and its
Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the
Court.

Effectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court

that, by constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond question. A simple
jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had the occasion to rule
on the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019—the very same provision that the complainants Lozano invoke in this case.

In In re Wenceslao Laureta, the client of Atty. Laureta filed a complaint with the
Tanodbayan charging Members of the Supreme Court with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with bad faith rendered an
unjust resolution in a land dispute. The Court unequivocally ruled that insofar as this
Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such collective decision is “unjust” should not
prosper; the parties cannot “re-litigate in another forum the final judgment of the Court,”

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as to do so is to subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to another
body.

In re Joaquin T. Borromeo reiterates the Laureta ruling, particularly that (1) judgments
of the Supreme Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil and criminal
complaints against a judge should not be turned into substitutes for appeal; (3) only
courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a situation where the Ombudsman is
made to determine whether or not a judgment of the Court is unjust is an absurdity. The
Court further discussed the requisites for the prosecution of judges, as follows: That is
not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of
rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the
foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of
malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgment or order. Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this
Court under our constitutional scheme, only this Court – not the Ombudsman – can
declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust.

In Alzua v. Arnalot, the Court ruled that “judges of superior and general jurisdiction are
not liable to respond in civil action for damages, and provided this rationale for this
ruling: Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of
the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom and would destroy
that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.”

The same rationale applies to the indiscriminate attribution of criminal liability to judicial
officials. Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme
Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say that Members of
the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for they are not. The
Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their
removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Only after
removal can they be criminally proceeded against for their transgressions. While in
office and thereafter, and for their official acts that do not constitute impeachable
offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities therefor are as defined in the
above rulings. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically grants the
Ombudsman the authority to investigate impeachable officers, but only when such
investigation is warranted: Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office
allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a
verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. Conversely, if a complaint against an
impeachable officer is unwarranted for lack of legal basis and for clear misapplication of
law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman should spare these officers from the
harassment of an unjustified investigation. The present criminal complaint against the
retired Justices is one such case where an investigation is not warranted, based as it is
on the legal correctness of their official acts, and the Ombudsman should have
immediately recognized the criminal complaint for what it is, instead of initially
proceeding with its investigation and issuing a subpoena duces tecum. As the
Ombudsman’s dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline
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Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J) clearly implied,
no complete dismissal took place as the matter was simply “referred to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action.” Although it was belatedly made, we cannot fault this
Ombudsman action for the reasons we have already discussed above. While both
accused are now retired from the service, the complaint against them still qualifies for
exclusive consideration by this Court as the acts complained of spring from their judicial
actions while they were with the Court. From this perspective, we therefore pass upon
the prima facie merits of the complainants Lozano’s criminal complaint. By its express
terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the participation of the accused in the
Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of Antonio Pael v. Court of
Appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The retired Chief Justice and
retired Associate Justice allegedly committed the following unlawful acts: (1)
Overturning the findings of fact of the CA; (2) Stating in the Resolution that the
“Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP property,” when the DENR Survey Report stated
that the “UP title/property overlaps the Chin-Mallari property;” (3)Issuing a Resolution,
for which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision for which five Justices voted. By
these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally accountable on
the theory that they violated the Constitution and the law in their ruling in the cited
cases, thereby causing “undue injury” to the parties to these cases. After due
consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retired Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez under Section 3(e)
of RA 3019. We fully expound on the reasons for this conclusion in the discussions
below. The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts. It has the authority to
promulgate rules on practice, pleadings and admission to the bar, and suspend the
operation of these rules in the interest of justice. Jurisprudence holds, too, that the
Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual findings of the lower courts,
among other prerogatives, in the following instances: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd of impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. Thus, contrary to the complainants Lozano’
assertions in their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the proper cases, can and does rule
on factual submissions before it, and even reverses the lower court’s factual findings
when the circumstances call for this action. The complainants Lozano appear to us to
have brazenly misquoted and misused applicable constitutional provisions to justify their
case against the retired Justices. We refer particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of
Article X, Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution which they claim to be the governing rule
that the retired Justices should have followed in acting on Pael. This constitutional
provision states: Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at
least five Members, but if such required number is not obtained the case shall be
decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in
a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
Court sitting en banc. For failure of the retired Justices to act according to these terms,
the complainants claim that the former subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a
vote of a majority of only three members, the decision of the First Division unanimously

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approved by its full membership of five members. Had the complainants bothered to
carefully consider the facts and developments in Pael and accordingly related these to
the applicable constitutional provision, they would have discovered that Pael was
decided in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution, was the
prevailing Charter. They then would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard
and decided by Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section
4(3), Article VIII of this Constitution provides: Cases or matters heard by a division shall
be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. This was the provision that
governed in 2003 and still governs to this day. Thus, the complainants’ argument and
basis for their criminal complaint – that in ruling on a motion for reconsideration, all five
members of the Division should concur – is totally wrong. A public official can violate
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[14] in two ways: (1) by causing undue injury to
any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference; in either case, these acts must be committed with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence. “Partiality” is
defined as a bias or disposition to see and report matters as wished for, rather than as
they are. “Bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest
purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud. “Gross
negligence,” on the other hand, is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons
are concerned. The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and
circumstances showing that the retired Justices acted with partiality, bad faith or
negligence. A judicial officer’s act in reviewing the findings of fact in a decision and
voting for its reversal cannot by itself constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 in the absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstrating a dishonest
purpose, conscious partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his or her part. A
complainant’s mere disagreement with the magistrate’s own conclusions, to be sure,
does not justify a criminal charge under Section 3(e) against the latter. In the absence of
alleged and proven particular acts of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity are generally presumed in the
performance of official duties by public officers. For the criminal complaint’s fatal
omissions and resultant failure to allege a prima facie case, it rightfully deserves
immediate dismissal.

In A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC (THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT), it

provides:

Section 13. Ethics Committee. – In addition to the above, a permanent Committee on

Ethics and Ethical Standards shall be established and chaired by the Chief Justice, with
the following membership: (a) a working Vice-Chair appointed by the Chief Justice; (b)
three (3) members chosen among themselves by the en banc by secret vote; and (c) a
retired Supreme Court Justice chosen by the Chief Justice as a non-voting observer-
consultant.

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The Vice-Chair, the Members and the retired Supreme Court Justice shall serve for a
term of one (1) year, with the election in the case of elected Members to be held at the
call of the Chief Justice. The Committee shall have the task of preliminarily
investigating all complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of ethical
standards, including anonymous complaints, filed against Members of the Court, and of
submitting findings and recommendations to the en banc. All proceedings shall be
completely confidential. The Committee shall also monitor and report to the Court the
progress of the investigation of similar complaints against Supreme Court officials and
employees, and handle the annual update of the Court’s ethical rules and standards for
submission to the en banc.

In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, February 24, 2009, the Supreme Court found Justice
Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) liable for Grave Misconduct for leaking a confidential internal
document of the Court and he was fined P500,000.00, to be charged against his
retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold any office or employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes was directed to show cause within
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be disciplined as
a member of the Bar in light of the aforementioned findings. The subsequent retirement
of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he is answerable (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, A.M. No. 06-
6-340-RTC, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 313, 339 citing Concerned Trial Lawyers of
Manila v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 285, 298-299).
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of
the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite Justice Reyes’s
retirement. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be
imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of
the administrative offenses charged, including the disqualification to hold any
government office and the forfeiture of benefits (Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., G.R. No.
149072, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 622, 628). The Court retains jurisdiction
either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him/her
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a civil
servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his/her last days in office?
What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing
abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he/she would soon be
beyond the pale of the law and immune from all administrative penalties? If only for
reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over
members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts
performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of
litigants and the general public. If innocent, a respondent official merits vindication of
his/her name and integrity as he leaves the government which he/she served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and imposable under the situation (Largo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
177244, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 721, 729 citing Perez v. Abiera, Adm. Case

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No. 223-J, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 302, 307; Gallo v. Judge Cordero, 315 Phil. 210,
220).

In Dissenting Opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC − In the Matter
of the Charges of Plagiarism Etc. against Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo,
February 8, 2011, he opined: Under the Constitution, the sole disciplining authority of
all impeachable officers, including Justices of this Court, is Congress. Section 3(1),
Article XI of the Constitution provides that, “The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” Likewise, Section 3(6) of the
same Article provides that, “The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
cases of impeachment.” These provisions constitute Congress as the exclusive
authority to discipline all impeachable officers for any impeachable offense, including
“betrayal of public trust,” a “catchall phrase” to cover any misconduct involving breach of
public trust by an impeachable officer. While impeachment is often described as a
political process, it also functions as the equivalent of administrative disciplinary
proceedings against impeachable officers. Impeachable officers are not
subject to administrative disciplinary proceedings either by the Executive or Judicial
branch, in the same manner that non-impeachable officers are subject. Thus,
impeachment by Congress takes the place of administrative disciplinary proceedings
against impeachable officers as there is no other authority that can administratively
discipline impeachable officers. Removal from office and disqualification to hold public
office, which is the penalty for an impeachable offense, is also the most severe penalty
that can be imposed in administrative disciplinary proceedings. Impeachment is not a
criminal proceeding because conviction in an impeachment complaint is not a bar to
criminal prosecution for the same act. An impeachable offense, like betrayal of public
trust, may not even constitute a criminal act. Like in an administrative proceeding, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required for conviction in impeachment. If an
impeachable officer is charged of a crime, as distinguished from an administrative
charge, the proper court has jurisdiction to try such impeachable officer because the
proceeding is criminal, not administrative. However, neither the conviction nor acquittal
of such impeachable officer in the criminal case constitutes a bar to his subsequent
impeachment by Congress. There is no double jeopardy because impeachment is not a
criminal proceeding. Only Congress, as the exclusive disciplining authority of all
impeachable officers, can decide in a non-criminal, non-civil proceeding whether a
sitting Justice of this Court has committed plagiarism. Plagiarism is a betrayal of public
trust because, as the majority puts it, to plagiarize is “‘to steal and pass off as one’s
own’ the ideas of another.” However, in writing judicial decisions a judge is liable for
plagiarism only if the copying violates the moral rights of the author under the Law on
Copyright. This Court may conduct an investigation of an administrative complaint
against a sitting Justice to determine if there is basis in recommending to the House of
Representatives the initiation of an impeachment complaint against the sitting Justice.
This Court may also conduct an investigation of an administrative complaint against a
sitting Justice to determine if the complaint constitutes contempt of this Court. However,
this Court has no power to decide on the guilt or innocence of a sitting Justice in the
administrative complaint because such act is a usurpation of the exclusive disciplinary
power of Congress over impeachable officers under the Constitution. Any decision by
this Court in an administrative case clearing a sitting Justice of an impeachable offense
is void for want of jurisdiction and for violation of an express provision of the
Constitution. Such a decision will put this Court on a collision course with Congress if
subsequently an impeachment complaint for plagiarism is filed with Congress against
the sitting Justice. Incidentally, an impeachment complaint has already been filed in the
House of Representatives involving the same complaint subject of this administrative

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case. If the House of Representatives decides to take cognizance of the complaint and
initiates an impeachment based on the same administrative complaint that this Court
had already dismissed as baseless, then this Court would have created a constitutional
crisis that could only weaken the public’s faith in the primacy of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court cannot assume jurisdiction over an administrative complaint against a
sitting Justice of this Court by invoking Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution. This
provision states that the “Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.” This provision refers to the administrative supervision
that the Department of Justice used to exercise over the courts and their personnel, as
shown by the following exchange during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:

MR. GUINGONA: xxx. The second question has reference to Section 9, about the
administrative supervision over all courts to be retained in the Supreme Court. I was
wondering if the Committee had taken into consideration the proposed resolution for the
transfer of the administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of
Justice. But as far as I know, none of the proponents had been invited to explain or
defend the proposed resolution. Also, I wonder if the Committee also took into
consideration the fact that the UP Law Constitution Project in its Volume I, entitled:
Annotated Provision had, in fact, made this an alternative proposal, the transfer of
administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice. Thank
you.

MR. CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner Regalado?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. We did invite Minister Neptali
Gonzales, who was the proponent for the transfer of supervision of the lower courts to
the Ministry of Justice. I even personally called up and sent a letter or a short note
inviting him, but the good Minister unfortunately was enmeshed in a lot of official
commitments. We wanted to hear him because the Solicitor General of his office,
Sedfrey Ordoñez, appeared before us, and asked for the maintenance of the present
arrangement wherein the supervision over lower courts is with the Supreme Court. But
aside from that, although there were no resource persons, we did further studies on the
feasibility of transferring the supervision over the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice.
All those things were taken into consideration motu proprio.

For sure, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over judges is expressly
governed by another provision, that is, Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 11 provides: Section 11. xxx The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. Clearly, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over judges is found in
Section 11 of Article VIII. However, this disciplinary authority is expressly limited to
lower court judges, and does not include Supreme Court Justices, precisely because
the Constitution expressly vests exclusively on Congress the power to discipline

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Supreme Court Justices. By excluding Supreme Court Justices, Section 11 withholds
from the Supreme Court en banc the power to discipline its own members. The
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 of the United States, which gives judicial
councils composed of federal judges the power to discipline federal judges short of
removal from office, does not apply to Justices of the United States Supreme Court who
are subject to discipline only by the United States Congress. Moreover, a similar law
cannot be enacted in the Philippines because all lower court judges are subject to
discipline by the Supreme Court en banc under Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Thus, reference to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is
inappropriate in this jurisdiction. I submit that this Court recall the Resolution of 12
October 2010 subject of the present motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction to
decide the administrative complaint against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.

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