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Given the foregoing review of the stances taken by the early medi-
eval Hindu philosophersand their critics on the capacity of scripturesto
yield genuine knowledge, we now have a context in which to examine
the stancestaken by the Buddhistepistemologistson the authorityof the
Hindu and Buddhistscripturaltraditions.A natural place to begin this
phase of our investigationis with the writing of Vasubandhu(ca. 400-ca.
480 C.E.),who is credited with writing not only an encyclopedic work on
Buddhist dogmatics from the perspective of the Vaibhisika school of
Kaimir, and two influentialtreatisesoutlining the essence of the Mahay-
anistic Yogacara school, but also two elementary tracts on logic and
epistemology.5Some of Vasubandhu'sattitudes towards the Buddhist
scripturesare articulatedin his masterpiece,the Abhidharmakosa(Trea-
sury of Dogmatics).In this work Vasubandhustates explicitly that there
is no means of attaining salvation other than through the accurate dis-
crimination of pure and impure characteristics(i.e., personalitytraits),
for it is only when one has correctlyunderstoodwhich characteristicsare
beneficial and which are malignant that one can cultivate the good
aspects of one's character and eradicate the bad. And the purpose of
engaging in the systematic study of the Buddha's teaching is to help
develop this capacity for accurate discrimination.The study of other
systems of thought than Buddhism, says Vasubandhu,fails to lead to
salvation, because other systems are vitiated by erroneous views, and
acting in accordance with misconceptionsis bound to be counterpro-
ductive.6Since Vasubandhuplaces such a high premiumon the necessity
of following the true religion in order to attain salvation,it is naturally
incumbent upon him to address the issue of whether the Buddha's
religion is indeed the true one and whether he, Vasubandhu,has given
the correct account of the Buddha'sreligion. His answer occurs in the
final paragraphsof the Abhidharmakosa(1973 edition, pp. 1185-8). Let
me first provide a translationof these paragraphsin extenso and then
offer some brief observationson them:
Buthowlongwill the truereligion,in whichthesetypesof [pure
and impure]characteristics
are accuratelydiscriminated,
endure?
Buddha or the words of the Vedic seers, flavor our experiences of the
world around us and predigest the informationthat we acquire through
our senses, and in so doing they form an obstacle to our experiencing
things as they really are. The purposeof mental discipline,suggestsDini-
niga, is to enable us to surpassthose barriersput in our way by those
who have instructed us. What is particularly noteworthy about these
comments is that they are applied to all scripturalauthority,including,
one supposes,the entire range of Buddhistteachings.
A second passage that indicates Dinnaga's attitudes towards tradi-
tional teachings is to be found in the third chapter of his Pramanasa-
muccaya. In this passagethe topic under discussionis what characterizes
a genuine assertionin the context of an argumentwith anotherparty. An
assertionin an argumentcan be entertained,says Difinaga,if "the person
advancing the argument himself believes it and it is not overthrownby
anything that is known through sensation,inference or the testimony of
a competent witness."9I would like to draw attention to two phrasesin
this simple passage.First, the question arisesas to what exactly Dinndga
intended by specifying that the person advancing an assertion should
himself believe the assertion.And, second, the question arisesas to what
sort of person Difnnga had in mind when he spoke of a competent wit-
ness (apta). Answersto both of these questionsappear in Dinndga'sown
commentaryto his work. First, in saying that the person advancing an
assertionshould himself believe it, Dinndgasays that he means to specify
that the person making the assertion should "accept the assertion
independently of any treatise."A later commentator,Prajfiakaragupta,
quotes Diinnga's words and takes them to mean that a person in debate
is not to be held accountablefor any views propoundedby anyone but
himself; in other words, a person in debate need not defend a view sim-
ply because he belongs to a traditionthat propoundsthat view, but nei-
ther can one cite as evidence for the truth of an assertionthe fact that
others have also believed it. "Hence,"concludes Prajfinkaragupta, "Diii-
ndga states that treatisesin and of themselvesare of no The
use."1? com-
mentator Jinendrabuddhillalso explains Diinnga's words along these
lines, saying that Dimnagamistruststreatisesbecause their authorsoften
propounddoctrinesthat are themselvesin need of proof and they often
commit errorsin reasoning,and hence nothing stated in a treatisecan be
accepted as true simply on the groundsthat it appearsin a treatise.But
in Hattori(1968:94,notes 1.48, 1.49).
9 Pramninasamuccaya 3.2 reads: "svaruipenaiva / pra-
nirdelyah svayam isto'nirAkrtah
tyaksdrthdnuminaptaprasiddhena svadharmini."It is quoted in Dharmakirti(1958 edi-
tion, p. 545 and p. 549).
10 Dharmakirti(1953 edition, p. 494-95): "kirhm~stramdtrameva prayojanamuktam
acaryena.
11 Jinendrabuddhi(1957 edition, folio 158a, line 7).
16 See Nagatomi(1959).
17 The Sanskritreads:"tasmadavastudarianabalapravrttam anumanam.
dgam&*rayam
namely, that action in conformity with the belief must yield predicted
results. All action is preceded by a wish for specified results, and all
action is directed by a set of beliefs. If an action has results other than
those desired in initiating the action, then some of the beliefs directing
the action were false. Any belief that is not proven false by this pragma-
tic test may tentativelybe consideredtrue. Now this criterionworkswell
enough for beliefs that govern actions having immediate consequences.
But scripturestend to advise coursesof action the consequencesof which
are not to be reaped until far in the future, often beyond the end of the
present life. By the time we are in a positionto know whether following
a particularset of scripturesleads to the promisedrewards,or whether it
leads instead to several inconvenient eons in hell or to an eternity of
mindlessness,it will be too late. All we can know from where we sit now
is that the scripturesfollowed by one sect conflict with the scriptures
followed by another sect, and hence it cannot be that both bodies of
scriptureare reliable.But how can we decide which to accept and which
to reject? In answering this question, Dharmakirtigives us a second
criterion of credibility and in giving it he employs exactly the line of
reasoning used by many of the Brahmanicalthinkers to justify their
scriptures.A body of scriptures,says Dharmakirti,is only as trustworthy
as the personwho firstspeaksthem. Buddhistscripturesare credible only
if the Buddhahimself was credible. And the Buddhawas credible only if
he was himself in full possession of the truth and was furthermore
immune from all temptationto deceive anyone. So clearly the two prin-
cipal questionsthat Dharmakirtimust addressare: (1) how do we know
that the Buddhawas in possessionof the truth, and (2) how do we know
that the Buddhadid not lie to us? In dealing with the first of these ques-
tions, Dharmakirtifalls into the familiar trap of circularity.We can be
certain that the Buddhawas in full possessionof the truth, says Dharma-
kirti, because it was the Buddhawho taught us the four noble truthsand
the eightfold path to salvation.In other words,we know that the Buddha
is trustworthybecause it was he who taught us all the things that we
Buddhistsbelieve. The vicious circularityof Dharmakirti'sargument is
disguised somewhat by the fact that it takes him some two hundred
couplets to make the circle, but it is undeniablethat he does eventually
end up in a logical loop on this first question. But what about the second
of the above questions, which has to do with the Buddha's personal
integrity? Dharmakirti touches upon this question in an interesting
imaginary dialogue with an antireligious Cdrvaka philosopher.21The
Cdrvdka is portrayed as presenting the following argument: No one
speaks unless he has a desire to speak. Whoever desires to speak has a
21 This discussionoccursin the third chapterof
Pramanavitrttikain Dharmakirti'sauto-
commentary.See Dharmakirti(1960 edition, p. 9).
desire. But the Buddhistsclaim that desire is a fault that arises only in
one who is irrational,and that whoever is irrationalis not trustworthy.
Therefore,the Buddhistsmust admit that no one who speaksis trustwor-
thy. But the Buddha spoke. Therefore his followers must admit that the
Buddha was irrational and untrustworthy. Dharmakirti answers this
argument by denying that the Buddhistsclaim that all desire is irratio-
nal. The desire to help others, for example, is not considered by Bud-
dhists to be an irrationaldesire. Given that one's motivationin speaking
may be a desire to help others, the fact of speaking does not in itself
prove that the speaker is untrustworthy.Nor is it possible to determine
from the specific contents of any utterance whether the speaker of the
utterance was sincere in speaking it. In short, there is no way that we
can judge a man's integrity simply on the basis of what he says, for a
scoundreland a saint may utter exactly the same sentences. Therefore,
the judgment of the Buddha'sintegrity must be founded upon evidence
independent of what his doctrines were. Dharmakirtidoes attempt to
establishthe Buddha'sintegrity,22resting his case upon the contention
that the Buddha was altruistic.We know that the Buddha was altruistic,
says Dharmakirti,because we know that he practiced altruisticexercises
and meditationsthat form the backbone of Buddhist religious practice
through countless rebirths. These practices cannot fail, because of the
inevitability of the fruition of karma. But establishingthis claim leads
Dharmakirti in turn to having to provide arguments in defence of
rebirthand the theory of karma.Obviouslythe full complexityof Dhar-
makirti'sargument is beyond the scope of the present discussion,but I
do hope to have given enough of an outline to show how he proceeds.
There are two observationsthat I wish to make about this procedure.
First, as I have already said, it is logically circular, for Dharmakirti
begins by trying to show that Buddhistdoctrine is justifiablebecause it
was taught by a trustworthyauthority.But in showing that the Buddha
was trustworthy,Dharmakirtiends up appealing to information about
the Buddha's career through several rebirths. But the only source of
informationfor the Buddha'scareer is the very body of scripturesthe
authorityof which Dharmakirtiis trying to defend. The second observa-
tion that I wish to make about Dharmakirti'sprocedureis that in what is
ostensiblya work on the principlesof logic and epistemology, Dharma-
kirti ends up offering an elaboratelyargued apology of the central core
of Buddhistdoctrine,namely, that set of doctrinesaccepted by nearly all
schools of Buddhism and proclaimed in virtually all Buddhist&agamas,
whether Sravakaydna,Bodhisattvaydnaor Tantrayanain orientation.It
was this apologetic quality of Dharmakirti's work, along with his
attempts to justify the teachings of Buddhist scripture without explicitly
22 Dharmakirti(1968 edition, pp. 20ff.).
23 Sintaraksita(1968 edition,
p. 992, verses 3137 and 3139: samastvayavavyaktivista-
rajfiinasdhanam / kriyaminam anarthakam// svadharmdharma-
kkadantapariks.vat
/ tatpranitigamagrAhyaheyatve
mdtrajiiasidhanapratisedhayoh hi prasiddhyatah//
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