Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Number 6
Ribbentrop: Hitler’s
Diplomat
World at War 1
• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of battle
In future issues:
Snared at the Severn: Tewkesbury 1471
Jordanian Elite: the Arab Legion
Fire & Ice: Chosin Reservoir, Korea
Monte Cassino: The Road to Rome, 1944
and much, much more!
Number 6
Jun/Jul 2009
Features 6
6 The Greater East Asia War:
A Strategic Analysis
The Japanese take on China, America and the British Empire
in one of the most epic military campaigns in history.
by Joseph Miranda
21 Joachim von Ribbentrop: Imbecile or Foreign
Policy Colossus?
The Third Reich’s foreign minister is still a controversial figure:
did he single-handedly start World War II or was he merely a
pawn of Adolf Hitler?
by Blaine Taylor 21
33 Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean
Features
4 #6
World at War 5
World
War II in the Pacific comprised one of the largest campaigns in his-
tory, both in terms of geographic extent and the manpower engaged.
To the Western Allies, this vast arena was composed of the Pacific
Theater of Operations (PTO) and the China-Burma-India Theater of
Operations (CBI). The Japanese called the conflict that raged across those sea, land and airways Dai Toa Senso,
the Greater East Asia War.
During the years following World War I’s conclusion, there was debate within the Japanese ruling class over
their national strategy. The two main factions involved were centered on the high commands of the Imperial
Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Both the IJA and IJN had considerable political power
and were in positions to dictate policy. The ascendancy of the military in Japan was in contrast to the situation in
the other major powers of the time. In the United States, Great Britain and France the military was subordinate to
civilian authority. In the USSR, Stalin had crushed all independence of thought in the Red Army with his purges.
Even Hitler had succeeded in bringing the Wehrmacht under his control. What all that indicates is Japanese strat-
egy for the coming war was—relatively speaking—uniquely dictated by military men for military objectives,
undiluted by conflicting political considerations.
The overall objectives of the Japanese strategists were in many ways a reflection of the geopolitic theories of
the time. Broadly, those theories called for the control of central landmasses and sea lanes that would, in turn,
make for much easier domination over even larger regions of the world. One such principle was termed “autarky,”
the control by an empire of sufficient resources to support its home industrial system.
6 #6
World at War 9
12 #6
World at War 13
18 #6
Japanese were still able to take territory in China. The order of battle was easy to research. Among
The game system is based on that of Twilight of the others, I used John Ellis’s World War II Statistical
Ottomans, which I also designed for S&T, but I modi- Survey, the British official history, The War Against
fied it to account for advances in doctrine between the Japan, and Saburo Hayashi’s Kogun. One thing re-
two World Wars. GEAW uses a double-impulse sys- quiring further research was the disposition of the Jap-
tem, in which players have two opportunities to move anese navy’s land-based aviation, special naval land-
and fight in each turn. That represents the increases ing forces, and base defense forces, since they weren’t
in mobility and command control that were in place included in the Army orders of battle.
by 1941. Even so, you have to expend supply to use You win the game with VP. The critical thing is
second phases. Logistics remain as critical as ever. you accumulate VP on a turn by turn basis. That repre-
The victory point (VP) system for mobilizing units sents the accumulation of resources (for the Japanese)
allowed me to overcome a common problem of strate- that could be used to support the overall war effort, or
gic games, that of reinforcements. Given the time and (for the Allies) maintaining morale, especially to keep
space scales, a fixed reinforcement schedule would China in the war. Since you get VP at the end of each
make little sense. Both sides sent in reinforcements turn, players have a reason to fight over objectives that
based on many factors: pressure from the high com- might otherwise make little military sense, as well as
mand to initiate offensives, response to enemy moves, holding on to them as long as possible.
mobilization of local forces, etc. By paying VP to get So that’s GEAW. We have some variants in the
new units, players have a hand in those decisions. It works for future issues, including an expansion to
also allows for play strategies in which you choose cover the various actions between the Japanese and
how much you want to risk. Soviets in Manchuria.
20 #6
Maligned as “Brickendrop” in British propaganda, remained virgin territory to authors. That changed,
Joachim von Ribbentrop was also ridiculed as a vain, however, with the appearance that year of two excel-
pompous and glory-seeking imbecile in a spate of bi- lent biographies: Hitler’s Diplomat: The Life & Times
ographies, diaries, letters, trial transcripts and mem- of Joachim von Ribbentrop, by the late John Weitz,
oirs by leaders, field marshals, generals and diplomats and Ribbentrop by Michael Bloch.
from both the Allied camp and his own Axis Pact part- Many have wondered why Hitler picked him as the
ners during and after the war. He was also, however, Third Reich’s second foreign minister on 4 February
one of the major foreign affairs practitioners of the 1938, in a move that surprised both Ribbentrop and
Nazi epoch. his contemporaries. Part of the answer lay in fact Rib-
In a life full of ironies, he was one of the first of bentrop was well-traveled—far more so than almost
the top Nazi leaders to have a full-scale biography anyone else in the top leadership cadre, especially
written about him, in 1943: This Man Ribbentrop: Hitler himself—having journeyed to London, Rome,
His Life and Times, by Paul Schwarz, a disgruntled Paris and New York before his appointment, and to
former Foreign Office official who’d served with him Moscow and all the Axis Pact capitals except Tokyo
in Berlin. His autobiography, The Ribbentrop Mem- afterward. (As regards the latter, during the war he ac-
oirs—written between 25 August and 23 September tually planned to get there either by long-range Luft-
1946, in his Nuremberg jail cell as he awaited hang- waffe aircraft or by U-boat, but the mission was then
ing as a convicted war criminal—appeared with added forbidden by Hitler as too dangerous.)
material from his widow in 1954. From that date until Moreover, his rivals both within and without Ger-
1992—as every other top Nazi leader was profiled in many had reason to be jealous of Ribbentrop because
a seemingly unending series of biographies—Ribben- of the number of positions he held in succession and
trop, who Adolf Hitler called his “second Bismarck,” the success he achieved while in them. They included
World at War 21
at
World at War 23
World at War number eight will have Brian Train’s Most of the 280 iconic counters are military units;
Arriba Espana: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39. It’s however, their scale is abstract, with each generally
intended for two-player play, one representing the left- representing groupings of two or more historic regi-
wing coalition government of the Spanish Republic, ments, brigades or divisions. (There are also 16 new
and the other the alliance of right-wing forces that rose variant-add-on counters included for issue number
in revolt against it. Solitaire play is doable. one’s Barbarossa game.)
The 34x22” area-map shows all of Iberia and is There are four armed autonomous regions: As-
Game Preview
divided into regions, each with its own name. A re- turias, Basque, Catalonia and Santander. The Gov-
gion may be in one of three states: government con- ernment player controls those units along with the
trol, rebel control, or contested, meaning neither side Popular Army, the anarchists, the Marxist POUM, and
controls it. Getting and maintaining control of regions the international brigades. The Rebel player controls
is central for keeping your units supplied and for gain- Nationalist, Carlist, colonial, Portuguese, German and
ing a high political support level. Each region is sub- Italian units. There are 8,632 words in the rules. Two
divided into one or more areas corresponding to that experienced players can finish a game in about four
region’s component provinces. Each winter game turn hours.
represents three months, while those at the other times
of year each represent two months.
24 #6
In November 1943 the 10,000- choked with Allied shipping. Forbid- harbor. There it mixed with hundreds
ton Liberty Ship SS John Harvey den to reveal its cargo to the port of tons of oil floating on the surface.
was loaded with 2,000 M47A1 100 authorities, the supposedly “standard” A strong odor of garlic soon hung in
lb. bombs full of mustard gas at supply ship was ordered to tie itself the air. Slowly a dense cloud of black
Baltimore, Maryland. Just over four to a pier and wait its normal turn for smoke mixed with the gas and rolled
feet long and eight inches in diameter, off-loading. over the town. The worst casualties
each chemical bomb held 65 lbs. of Four days later, on 2 December, were suffered by the men floating in
mustard gas. Also on board were six Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham the harbor, standing in puddles of oil
members of the US Chemical Warfare held a press conference announcing in life rafts, or hanging onto pieces of
Service. the Allies had achieved “total air su- debris. Their entire bodies were im-
The Harvey and her cargo were premacy” over southern Italy. At 7:30 mersed in a solution of mustard and
part of what was standard operat- p.m., 100 German Ju-88 bombers, oil.
ing procedure by both the Allies and despite Coningham’s claim, roared in The rescue teams in the harbor
Axis militaries. Convinced chemical and inflicted the Allies’ worst post- and at the hospitals in Bari had no
warfare (CW) could start at anytime, Pearl Harbor port disaster. idea mustard gas was aboard the
both the Allied and German high In 20 minutes the bombers had Harvey; everyone aboard her had
commands in World War II faced sent 17 ships, carrying some 90,000 died in the explosion. The hospital
the dilemma of how to be prepared tons of supplies, to the bottom of was overwhelmed with 800 wounded
without looking as if they were about the harbor. Eight other ships were (1,000 had already died). Assuming
to initiate it. Throughout the war, set ablaze and seriously damaged. most of the men were suffering from
both sides kept supplies of chemi- Shortly after 8:00 p.m., a fuel ship simple exposure, there was no effort
cal weapons near the various battle exploded next to the Harvey with made to decontaminate them. Still
areas for such an eventuality. The two enough force to shatter windows in wet and covered in oil, the wounded
sides shrouded those “dumps” in the homes seven miles away. A few mo- were wrapped in blankets and given
greatest possible secrecy, fearful if the ments later, an explosion tore through warm tea. Most sat quietly in that
enemy discovered their existence he the Harvey causing her to list and state for the remainder of the night.
might use them as a pretext to initiate begin sinking. The wounded were thus dipped in a
chemical warfare. The Harvey, then, solution of mustard-and-oil, wrapped
Some of the mustard gas went
was only one of a number of such in blankets and allowed a prolonged
straight to the bottom, while other
merchant ships pressed into service to period for absorption. Inadvertently,
cylinders began to burn. The rest of it
assure the US had a sufficient stock of those were exactly the wrong things
began to leak out of the ruptured hold
chemical armaments on hand in case to do. The combination of circum-
and spread across the debris-choked
the Germans or Italians attempted to
slow the Allied invasion of Italy via
CW.
As the ship made its way toward
the major Allied supply port of Bari,
on southern Italy’s Adriatic coast,
the men aboard had plenty to occupy
them. Fashioned by the cheap and
speedy “Levinstein H” process, US
mustard gas was notoriously unstable.
Because of that process, the mustard
gas inside the bombs contained up
to 30 percent impurities. Those other
gases could build up inside the casing
and cause an explosion. Consequent-
ly, the bombs had to be regularly
vented and the casings constantly
inspected for evidence of corrosion.
On 28 November the Harvey
arrived at Bari, where the harbor was SS John W. Brown on the Great Lakes in 2000. John W. Brown is one of only two
surviving World War II Liberty ships, the other is SS Jeremiah O’Brien.
World at War 25
On the Seas
Axis Blockade Runners
runners therefore became almost the nothing it could do but scuttle to pre-
only means of obtaining essential vent capture by the enemy. Though
Throughout much of World War the vessels had some armament, they
commodities.
II, the Germans relied on blockade couldn’t fight off warships. Even Axis
runners to deliver vitally needed All the ships employed in the
venture were either German vessels submarines were a menace, as they
strategic materials. Their Axis partner, occasionally mistook blockade run-
Japan, agreed to supply tungsten, tin, or Italian ones under German control.
Those en route to Europe passed ners for Allied vessels.
rubber, vegetable oils and quinine.
Rubber, in particular, was critical through the Sunda Strait, the Indian To increase the chances of surviv-
to the Nazi war effort. In return for Ocean, the Cape of Good Hope, ing, the Germans took a number of
raw materials, Tokyo requested steel, and the South Atlantic. For most the precautions. Vessels often employed a
aluminum, optical glass, mercury and destination was Bordeaux in German- “cover ship” ruse. If challenged, they
German military technology. occupied France. Outbound vessels claimed to be an Allied ship. As for
delivered goods to Yokahama and the threat of friendly fire, the German
The conquest of France granted U-boat command established safe
picked up raw materials in Singapore
Germany better access to the high lanes for blockade-runners. Some 200
or Batavia. By mid 1942, Japanese
seas than had been possible in miles in width, Lane A extended from
control of the Sunda Strait further
World War I. Blockade running was France to 30 degrees west longitude,
facilitated German access to Japan’s
therefore inaugurated before the end then down to about five degrees south
rich southern conquests.
of 1940, though few ships sailed in latitude. Whenever a blockade run-
the first months of the program. The Even in the halcyon days,
blockade running was a hazardous ner was scheduled to pass through,
need for the trade became more acute, U-boats were forbidden to attack any
however, after the onset of the Rus- enterprise. Ships had to traverse
thousands of miles of ocean, nearly lone ships in the lane. The Germans
sian campaign. From June 1941, war also arranged for U-boats to escort
with the USSR deprived the Reich all of it dominated by Allied navies.
If a blockade runner was confronted both outbound and inbound vessels.
of contact with the Far East via the As an added precaution, most sailings
Trans-Siberian Railway. Blockade by an enemy warship, there was often
occurred during the autumn or winter.
26 #6
World at War 29
The
Mediterranean Sea’s importance as a strategic waterway in the modern world grew with in-
dustrialization in Europe, as it became a conduit for shipments of petroleum and other critical
resources. The 1930s witnessed increasing geopolitical tensions throughout its nearly 970,000
square miles as French, British, and Italian colonies placed increasing demands on home coun-
try merchant fleets. Middle Eastern and North African territories offered abundant resources to the metropolitan powers,
as well as providing bases to outflank potential continental foes. Possession of Gibraltar, Suez, and the Sicilian Strait-
Malta chokepoints were a prerequisite to controlling the Mediterranean’s sea lanes. All that wasn’t lost on pre-World War
II naval planners. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria and Lebanon were French; Libya was Italian, and Egypt and Palestine
were British. The most critical British facility, of course, was the Suez Canal, which was the gateway to the petroleum-rich
lands of the Middle East as well as the British colonies in India and the Far East.
World at War 33
operations, with the carriers grouped into “hunter-killer” non-existent. An absence of sonar until October 1942, when
units. Royal Navy carriers remained in close support of the the SAFAR MC 3000 and GC 3000 models came into use,
convoys they escorted. effectively blinded the Italian fleet in anything other than
visual acquisition of submarines.
Italy (Regia Marina)
Perhaps most critically, the Regia Marina’s fuel re-
Mussolini’s plan was to make Italy a contending imperial
serves—1,666,674 tons in July 1940—proved hopelessly
power, with the Mediterranean as its Mare Nostrum (Latin
inadequate. The Germans provided some shipments of Ro-
for “our sea”). By 1939 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rhodes, Libya and
manian oil, but by September 1940 a mere 58,750 tons of
the Adriatic Sea were under Italian control. In addition, Sar-
fuel remained. That made the Italians rely increasingly on
dinia and Sicily could be used as forward air and naval bases.
aircraft, mines, submarines and naval special forces. While
Still, Britain’s Suez and Gibraltar bases confined the Regia
those forces could and did exact a toll on Allied shipping,
Marina within the Mediterranean. As Italy approached ac-
they were incapable of maintaining control of vital sea
tive belligerency, it modernized its aging battleships Giulio
lanes.
Cesare and Conte di Cavour in anticipation of some great
surface action. Like their contemporaries in other European countries,
the Italian Naval High Command (Supermarina) believed
By June 1940 the Regia Marina enjoyed an impressive
Jutland-style fleet actions would be decisive. Consequently,
and generally modern fleet of cruisers, destroyers and nearly
the Regia Marina adopted hit-and-run raids aimed at pre-
operational “super-battleships.” It also had the world’s larg-
serving their ‘fleet in being.’ The idea was those raids would
est submarine force. The confining waters of the Adriatic
attrition the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean and thus set
and Aegean seemingly made speed and performance more
the stage for a decisive action—or at least avoid the destruc-
critical for Italian warships than protection, range and dam-
tion of the Italian fleet. That defensive husbanding, however,
age control. Sailing out of such waters, striking hard, then
also surrendered the initiative and diminished the ability of
retiring in safety took priority over ship-to-ship combat ca-
the Regia Marina to make an impact on the campaign in
pability.
North Africa. In the end that was decisive in that the Allied
The Italian dilemma came from the fact their military victory on land opened up Italy itself to amphibious inva-
functioned within a hopelessly unprepared larger frame- sion.
work. The Italians hadn’t maintained the pace of industri-
There was also the matter of command structure. Where
alization necessary to build a completely modern navy. The
Royal Navy commanders exercised operational control and
fascist economic system, for all its superficial efficiency,
could used their own initiative, their Italian counterparts
couldn’t mobilize the nation for war to the same degree as
were required to fulfill specific mission objectives. Any de-
Nazi Germany or the democracies. Exacerbating the situa-
viations required Supermarina’s approval. That adherence to
tion were assorted technological limitations. Ship designs
Mussolini’s directives promoted debilitating inter-command
weren’t compatible with larger gun calibers, while electric
rivalries.
torpedoes, reliable shells and radar were in short supply or continues on page 38
36 #6
World at War 37
Following the Luftwaffe’s defeat in the Battle of Britain war. And again, politics made an impact. Mussolini expected
in the autumn of 1940, the Mediterranean became an impor- to maintain an intact combat fleet to leverage his post-war
tant Axis theater of operation, as one place where the Allies position, so protection of merchant shipping got short shrift.
could be confronted. The Regia Marina found itself assigned Meanwhile Germany refused to allow the Italians access to
ever increasing responsibilities but lacked the resources to French colonial ports in North Africa until November 1942,
execute them. largely to maintain the uneasy neutrality of Vichy France.
The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 brought Unable to replace sunken merchant ships or confiscate
about another shift in strategic direction. The Italian Navy French vessels, the Italians resorted to more unorthodox
and Air Force (Regia Aeronautica), which could have been supply techniques. Merchant vessels sent to the overcrowd-
better used in the campaign against British Empire forces in ed port of Tripoli were often pessimistically under-loaded
Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean, were diverted at a criti- to speed transit and better enable the anticipated salvage
cal moment. In September, Italy’s Marshal Rodolfo Graziani of damaged ships. Battleships were used as convoy escorts
had invaded Egypt in a lackluster offensive. Gen. Richard starting in January 1942, and warships were on occasion em-
O’Conner’s counteroffensive, opening in December, quickly ployed as tankers.
overran Graziani’s forces. A concentrated Italian naval and Even when the Axis captured Tobruk in June 1942, its
air offensive against British bases from Malta to Suez could port was underused as the approaches to it were vulnerable
have made a difference but, in the event, operations were to Allied interdiction. That led to the over-extension of land
indecisive. supply routes as Axis forces under Rommel plunged into
With the Regia Marina’s refusal (or, given the fuel situ- Egypt. While the Regia Marina successfully maintained a
ation, inability) to undertake major fleet actions, its mission supply line to North Africa into early 1943, ad hoc measures
also changed. The Italian Navy’s “principal, indeed only proved insufficient. That poor logistical situation did much
task,” according to its fleet commander, Adm. Angelo Iachi- to determine the course of operations on the North African
no, became convoy and logistical security duty. To make mainland. If nothing else, the lack of a secure port between
matters worse, at the start of the war a third of Italian mer- Tripoli and the Egyptian frontier meant that what reinforce-
chant ships (218 ships and 1,215,000 tons) were stranded, ments and supplies did reach North Africa couldn’t be swift-
captured or interned in foreign harbors. ly concentrated.
Inadequate numbers of escort and auxiliary ships con- In August 1942, with Axis forces stalled at El Alamein,
tinued to plague the Regia Marina for the remainder of the the Italian fleet attempted a recovery. Central to the dilemma
was, as usual, the increasing fuel shortage. So the Italians Navy Special Assault Units
restricted their activities to essential merchant fleet support, While the Regia Marina’s major surface units proved in-
protective corvettes, and X MAS (Motoscafo Armato Silu- capable of achieving a decision at sea, the Italians deployed
rante) raiders, while the major surface units stayed in port. an assortment of supplementary craft that were effective.
The idea was to accumulate sufficient fuel reserves to allow The most successful of them was the secret, cover-named
for future major operations. 10th Light Flotilla (Decima Flottiglia MAS or X MAS).
The battleship Roma was also commissioned in 1942, Unexpectedly striking against Allied naval bases from Gi-
bringing battleship strength back to six. Five new destroy- braltar to Alexandria, that remarkable contingent of torpedo
ers and three new cruisers were also added to the fleet, but motor-boats (Surface Department) and SLC (Siluro a Lenta
those ships couldn’t compensate the for 45 and 11, respec- Corsa) Maiale (“pig boats”), two-man “human torpedoes,”
tively, lost of those types in the war up to that time. By Janu- miniature submarines, and assault swimmers (Underwater
ary 1943 only a third of the Italian Navy’s escorts remained Demolitions) inflicted severe damage on Allied shipping.
afloat, while 1,278 merchant ships had been sent to the bot- The Regia Marina’s progressive application of those assault
tom. With the final Axis capitulation in North Africa in May units in coastal defense and interdiction roles accounted for
1943, the Regia Marina ceased operations. the sinking or disabling of 28 allied ships totaling 202,762
Regia Marina Fuel Usage tons (72,190 in warships and 130,572 in merchantmen).
Destroyers: 42% (758,968 tons) The 10th Light Flotilla used small exploding motorboats
(MTM-modified touring boat, Motoscafo Turismo Modifi-
Torpedo Boats: 34% (624,513 tons) cato or E-Boat) to sink the British cruiser York and cripple
Corvettes: 3% (49,644) the merchant ship Pericles in Suda Bay in March 1941. SLC
Italian Warship Losses: 339 ships “pigs” provided effective harbor-penetration, raiding, and
Regia Marina Tonnage Dispatched to North Africa anti-shipping capabilities as well. On 19 December 1941,
the Marceglia and de la Penne, with 300 kilogram detach-
1940 98.0% able hull-detonating warheads, sank the Alexandria-based
1941 83.9%
1942 84.2%
To Tunisia Rotta della morte 68.3%
(The road to death)
Last Quarter 59.1%
Italian Shipments
Libya:
1,930,000 tons (14% losses)
189,200 men (8.4% losses)
Tunisia:
306,530 (28.0% losses)
72,250 men (7.0% losses)
Italian Shipments to North Africa Sent Safely:
91.7% of 206,202 men
84.6% of 2,844,698 supplies
Naval special ops: Italian mini-sub.
World at War 39
Queen Elizabeth and Valiant in harbor. That removed the tionale withdrew to bases at Toulon, Bizerta, Algiers, Oran,
last British battleships in the Mediterranean (Barham having Mers-el-Kébir and Alexandria. France capitulated on 21
been sunk by U-331 on 25 November), and left Axis con- June, and technically its armed forces reverted to neutrality.
voys much safer for the next five months. Italian naval spe- With Britain now focusing on the Mediterranean, the
cial forces thereby gained more for the Axis than did their French naval situation became even bleaker. The Marine
entire surface fleet. Nationale was faced with conflicting loyalties between the
X MAS units also targeted the Allied bases in Algiers and Vichy administration under Marshal Pétain and De Gaulle’s
Gibraltar. The latter’s position as British Fleet Headquarters Free French “government-in-exile.”
(Western Mediterranean) made it especially critical as the Fearing the Axis would seize French warships, the Royal
home port for many Allied warships and merchant vessels. Navy attacked the French fleet anchored at Mers-el-Kébir
“Pigs” and assault swimmers operated covertly against on 3 July 1940, sinking three battleships, while the French
those vessels from a partially scuttled ship, the Olterra, off Force X in Alexandria, Egypt, was subsequently disarmed.
neutral Spain’s coast. Known as the “Floating Trojan Horse The irony was those moves were unnecessary, as the Ger-
of Gibraltar,” X MAS attacked targets of opportunity at Gi- mans lacked the trained crews to use any seized French
braltar, sinking or damaging 14 ships (82,967 tons) between ships. The British attack on its former ally also had political
September 1941 and August 1943. Ambitious plans were repercussions, further entrenching French anti-Allied senti-
drawn up for an attack against New York, but the Italian ar- ment.
mistice in September 1943 ended that proceeding. During the Marine Nationale’s neutral interim it achieved
France (Marine Nationale) some success protecting French merchant shipping. Some
Like its Italian counterpart, the Marine Nationale focused 4,440,000 tons of Axis supplies were delivered to North
on retaining a strong Mediterranean position from which to Africa via French ports between July 1940 and November
protect colonial possessions in Syria and North Africa as 1942 when, with Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of
well as metropolitan locales. French naval forces were active Algeria, French forces in North Africa broke with Vichy and
during the 1939-40 winter drôle de guerre (“Phony War”), Germany. Ultimately, then, the combination of French war-
while the western front was quiet. On 10 June 1940, Mus- ships and merchant marine convoys can be said to have kept
solini declared war on France. On 14 June, with France on their overseas empire viable during the Nazi occupation.
the verge of capitulation, elements of the French fleet bom- Naval Air Power & Air Warfare
barded Genoa and Vado, severely damaging the former’s oil
production installation. With the armistice, the Marine Na- Britain (Fleet Air Arm)
The Royal Navy’s limited resources restricted Mediter-
ranean deployments to a maximum of two aircraft carriers
prior to mid-1943. Throughout the war, land-based aircraft
provided the majority of air support.
The Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm initially deployed 232
aircraft to the theater; however, their actual combat value
was questionable. The aircraft included a large number of
outdated biplanes. A dearth of pre-war naval air doctrine
then further hindered operations as FAA coordination with
land-based RAF commands was often lacking. Early car-
rier aircraft complements were small, composed only of
three fighters and 17 torpedo-bombers on each. Even so,
skilled FAA pilots employed obsolete Blackburn Skuas to
great effect in escort and interdiction duties, while outdated
Swordfish Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance (TSR) planes
sustained anti-shipping operations.
Tactics dictated aircraft attacking bigger ships with their
larger silhouettes. Swordfish biplanes achieved successes
War in the air: Italian Savoia bombers. against Italian shipping at Taranto and Cape Matapan.
40 #6
Italy (Regia Aeronautica Italiana) the Regia Marina, resulting in limited naval-aerial recon-
The Royal Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica Italiana) naissance and negligible CAP (combat air patrol) for ship-
enjoyed excellent leadership and a Douhet-inspired doctrine ping. Making matters worse were flaws in existing naval
emphasizing the offensive, with strategic bombing of enemy seaplanes. The catapult-launched Ro-43 recon aircraft were
infrastructure being the theoretical imperative. The Regia unrecoverable at sea and had to land ashore. There was also
Aeronautica’s growth indirectly reflected Mussolini’s advo- the underlying deficiency in Italy’s failure to build aircraft
cacy of airpower as a symbol of the future. The reality, how- carriers. While later in the war the Italians attempted to con-
ever, was Italy had virtually no modern aircraft available at vert merchant ships into carriers, those efforts were too little
the war’s start and, indeed, many of its existing designs were and too late.
rapidly becoming obsolete. Reserves were deficient and tac- The primary Regia Aeronautica aircraft were the CR-42
tical doctrine was undeveloped—and the Axis was facing a biplane, the Savoia-79 bomber and the Cant-501 flying boat.
campaign in the Mediterranean in which strategic bombing The striking power of those aircraft was inadequate, but
would be of minimal importance. then their British counterparts weren’t much better. Argu-
Italian efforts had been concentrated on the building of ably the best Regia Aeronautica aircraft was the improvised
an independent air force not subject to army or navy control. three-engine torpedo/bomber, the SIAI Marchetti SM. 79-1.
While that was certainly a step in the right direction, it ran Italian planes operated from airfields positioned to threaten
afoul of the already fragile inter-service coordination struc- Allied bases from Malta to the Suez Canal, but those facili-
ture. Since the Regia Aeronautica had to conduct a campaign ties lacked the mobility of carriers. Further reducing overall
over the Mediterranean, it needed to closely coordinate with combat effectiveness was Italy’s lack of torpedo production.
the naval command. A mere nine torpedo squadrons were equipped by 1942, a
glaring deficiency for an air force that was supposed to be
In the event, priorities for the Regia Aeronautica and its
attacking enemy shipping.
Luftwaffe partner were continually placed above those of
continues on page 44
Italian Aircraft
Name Speed Armament Ceiling Range Payload
(mph) (feet) (mi) (lbs)
Fighters
Fiat CR 42 272 2 x 12.7mm MG 34,450 480 490
Torpedo Bomber
SIAI Marchetti 267 3 x 12.7mm MG 23,000 1,180 2,756
SM. 79-1 Sparviero 2 x 7.7mm MG
(Sparrow Hawk)
CRDA Cant Z.506B 226 1 x 12.7mm MG, 26,240 1,700 2,650
Airone (Heron) 3 x 7.7mm MG
Reconnaissance
CRDA Cant Z.501 171 3 x 7.7mm MG 22,965 1,490 1,408
Gabbiano (Seagull)
IMAM Ro. 43 186 2 x 7.7mm MG 21,600 678 -
(Catapult)
World at War 41
42 #6
World at War 45
46 #6
at
World at War 47
The
war in the Mediterranean pro- the Italian mainland. After a hard fought delaying action, the
vides many lessons, most of them Germans evacuated their divisions and many of the Italians
negative. For one, it demonstrat- from Sicily with hardly any Allied interference. The Royal
ed that, despite overwhelming Navy high command explained that lack of aggressiveness
British naval superiority, there never was an attempt by the was due to concerns that attacking Axis coastal defenses
Allies to clear the Mediterranean of Axis naval forces. That might have led to another repeat of the disasters of the first
failure was further highlighted with the entry of the US into phase of Gallipoli, 1915, in which British capital ships took
the war on 7 December 1941, and the ensuing buildup of considerable losses due to Turkish shore-based defenses and
American naval power in the following years. The combined minefields. Allied naval superiority in the European Theater
Anglo-American fleets still couldn’t engage and destroy the of Operations in World War II was far greater than it had
much smaller Italian and German fleets in the Mediterra- been in World War I, though, which indicates what was re-
nean. ally in play in 1943 was a lack of mission focus for naval
The campaign lasted from Italy’s declaration of war power in a combined naval-air-land theater of operations.
against France in June 1940 to the Allied landings in south- The Royal Navy was in fact limited by several factors.
ern Italy in September 1943, a period of over three years. One was the need to keep the fleet divided between the At-
Those years saw numerous minor fleet actions involving lantic, the Mediterranean and, after Japan entered the war,
cruisers and destroyers, air attacks against naval forces and the Pacific. Another factor was the Royal Navy lacked the
bases, and naval special operations. Despite the interwar de- support ships possessed by the US Navy, making it logisti-
cade’s emphasis on capital ship building by Britain, the US cally difficult to keep a fleet at sea. Given the lack of Al-
and Italy, however, there never was any general action be- lied naval bases in the central Mediterranean, maintaining a
tween opposing battle fleets. The situation can be compared permanent naval presence was difficult. The threat of Axis
to a much shorter period during the Pacific War surround- airpower against vessels that sortied too far toward Italy was
ing the Guadalcanal campaign of August 1942 to February also considerable.
1943, which saw several actions between opposing cruiser On the Italian side, the reluctance to fight is more under-
fleets and at least one battleship versus battleship fight. standable, given their battle line was outnumbered by that
One reason for the indecision was doctrinal. In the of the Allies. That numeric disparity was made all the worse
Mediterranean both sides operated to some degree under after the losses the Italians sustained as a result of the British
the “fleet in being” concept, which emphasized maintaining air attack on their battleship anchorage at Taranto in Novem-
one’s battleships as a threat and deterrent rather than risk- ber 1940. The general Axis fuel shortage also did much to
ing them in combat. To give an example of the indecision in limit Italian sorties. The Italian fleet was therefore less effec-
the Mediterranean, as late as August 1943 the Allied navies tive than it could have been had it been more aggressively
proved unwilling to interdicting the strait between Sicily and utilized. As for the Kriegsmarine, it was an ocean away fac-
48 #6
at
By
late 1944 Nazi Germany was surrounded 43, the Hungarians only reluctantly contributed an ex-
and being closed in by enemies, German peditionary force to fight against the Soviet Union. In
troops controlled only a remnant of the 1944, with the war going badly for the Reich, Berlin
massive realm they’d occupied two years earlier. Fur- was concerned the Hungarians might make some kind
ther, Berlin’s allies were having second thoughts about of deal with the Allies. That would be a threat to the
continuing their allegiance to what plainly was the Germans’ oil supplies, since Hungary contained one
losing side. Relations among those countries weren’t of the last sources for petroleum available to them. A
rosy, either. The traditional hostility among the Bal- Hungarian defection would also threaten German lines
kan nations wasn’t being extinguished by the loom- of communication with Romania and its Ploesti oil-
ing menace posed to all of them by the advancing Red field.
Army. Hitler therefore tried to assemble a united Roma-
One of the linchpins of the Reich’s eastern marches nian-Croat-Slovak front against the Hungarians. The
was Hungary, ruled by Regent Miklos Horthy. As the problem was those peoples had no more use for each
Red Army approached the Hungarian frontier, he con- other than they did for Hungary. Romania and Hunga-
sidered switching sides and allying his country with ry, in fact, were already devising strategies for a post-
the Allies. That would cause the center of what was World War II struggle between themselves. Romania’s
left of the German line on the Eastern Front to collapse Antonescu regime had, in 1942, begun persecuting the
and cut off all the troops still fighting in the Balkans. Hungarian minority living in southern Transylvania.
The situation was desperate, and Hitler believed only At the same time Hungary was maltreating the Roma-
one man could turn it around—Otto Skorzeny. nians living in northern Transylvania.
The wartime politics of the Balkans were complex. Mindful of potential damage to his vital eastern
Even though in theory Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, European oilfields, Hitler hoped to at least postpone an
Slovakia and Croatia were all Axis-allies, they actually open conflict between Romania and Hungary. He later
presented anything but a unified front. And Hitler nev- described to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini how he
er entirely trusted the Hungarian government. In 1941- had told Hungarian and Romanian delegations that:
52 #6
54 #6
When Otto Skorzeny was summoned to Berlin in April The coup in Hungary in October 1944 was therefore
1943 to meet Walter Schellenberg, head of the Reich Central Skorzeny’s second major operation. Aside from his own
Security Office Foreign Intelligence Service (German ac- Friedenthalers, one of the units that accompanied him into
ronym: RSHA), he was surprised to find himself appointed Budapest was the 600th SS Parachute Battalion, which in-
the chief of the Waffen SS’s new commando force. Skorzeny corporated remnants of the 500th SS Parachute Battalion, an-
was a long time Austrian Nazi who’d volunteered for the SS other of Germany’s special operations forces. Back in May
after the 1938 German-Austrian Anschluss. Serving in the 1944, the 500th had stormed Marshal Tito’s headquarters in
SS Reich Division on the eastern front, he was wounded in an abortive attempt to kill or capture him.
action. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, chief of the RSHA, had known Interestingly, the German high command always consid-
Skorzeny prior to the war and considered him to have the ered regular Luftwaffe paratroopers and glider troops to be
necessary intelligence, ruthlessness and finesse to create an qualified for special operations and, given their performance
unconventional force, and thus recommended him to Schel- in 1940, seizing airfields behind Allied lines and taking the
lenberg. Belgian fortress of Eben Emael, there was good reason to
Setting up shop at Friedenthal, near Berlin, Skorzeny use them for unconventional missions. As noted in the main
threw himself into studying commando warfare. Since the portion of the article, a battalion of Luftwaffe paratroopers
Wehrmacht (collectively, all the German armed forces, in- was also assigned to Skorzeny for Operation Panzerfaust.
cluding the army, navy, air force and Waffen SS) was a large- Later in 1944, Skorzeny organized the 150th Panzer Bri-
ly conventional force, Skorzeny had to start from scratch. gade for the Ardennes offensive, Hitler’s last great attack
Some experience could be gleaned from British commando in the west. The Friedenthalers and the 600th SS Parachute
operations, which had proved a constant thorn in the side of were both part of the 150th. The objective was to infiltrate
the Reich; otherwise, Skorzeny improvised. The new unit Allied lines by disguising the men as American soldiers. The
he formed would become known after its place of training operation largely failed, but the capture of a few of Skorze-
as the Friedenthaler Jagdverbande, or Friedenthal Hunting ny’s men was enough to cause a brief panic in the Allied rear
Group. At various other times in the war it was also called area. The Friedenthalers ended the war in 1945 by making
the SS Sonderverbünde z.b.V. Friedenthal, SS Jaeger Bat- their way to Hitler’s “Alpine Redoubt.” Alas for the Nazis,
talion 502, and SS Jägerverbande-Mitte. no such redoubt actually existed; so Skorzeny and a few
Recruits for the unit were trained in a variety of skills, other survivors surrendered to the Americans.
such as intelligence gathering, sabotage, foreign languages
and parachuting. Details on the unit’s organization remain
sketchy, owing mostly to the many reorganizations the Jag-
dverbande underwent. Roughly, it was the size of a battalion
with four companies. There were also some additional com-
panies of foreign volunteers who were useful for behind the
lines work. Personnel were often dispersed over the Reich’s
far-flung frontiers and beyond. One group parachuted into
Iran to support anti-British guerrillas who were supposed to
attack Allied lend-lease supply lines running to the Soviet
Union. Other missions included assorted plots to kill or kid-
nap various Allied leaders, mundane anti-partisan warfare
operations and, in the final days of the war, acting as a last-
ditch rearguard.
Skorzeny rocketed to fame in September 1943 with his
rescue of Benito Mussolini, imprisoned by anti-fascist Ital-
ians in the mountain fortress of the Gran Sasso. Skorzeny’s
initially assigned role in the mission was on the intelligence
end, locating the incarcerated Duce. Luftwaffe paratroopers
were assigned to conduct the actual rescue, flying onto the
Gran Sasso in gliders. When the aircraft carrying the Luft-
waffe mission commander overshot the mountain, however,
Skorzeny, in the second plane with some of his own men,
took command. He not only rescued Mussolini, he brought
him back to a grateful Fuehrer.
58 #6
Game Contents:
• 352 5/8” Counters
• One 34x22” Full-Color Game Map
• 55 Event Cards
• Rules Booklet
• Historical Study Booklet
• Player Aid Cards.
Game Scale
Time: each turn equals 15 minutes in the basic game,
30 in the extended game.
Units: companies for both sides.
Map: each hex equals 275 yards (250 meters).
Players:
62 #6one or two.
• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of Battle