Knowledge Restructuring in the Life

Sciences: A Longitudinal Study

of Conceptual Change in Biology

N. RENEE PEARSALL, JO EL J. SKIPPER, JOEL J. MINTZES

Department of Biological Sciences, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington,
NC 28403, USA; e-mail: mintzes@uncwil.edu

Received 24 May 1995; revised 29 March 1996; accepted 28 June 1996

ABSTRACT: This study examined successive and progressive changes in the structural com-
plexity of knowledge held by introductory, college-level biology students and how those
changes are affected by the students’ primary learning mode and gender. To examine the way
learners restructure knowledge over the course of a semester, subjects constructed concept
maps at 4-week intervals throughout the term. The maps were then evaluated for structural
complexity and change based on the works of other investigators.
Results suggest that a substantial amount of knowledge restructuring takes place and that
much of it is incremental in nature; “accretion” and “tuning” accounting for 75% of the ob-
served structural changes. Of potential importance, however, is that “radical” changes involv-
ing higher order, superordinate concepts are concentrated in the first 4 weeks of the semester.
The observed relationships between knowledge restructuring and predominant learning mode
and gender of students are potentially significant. The evidence suggests that students who use
“active,” “deep” information processing strategies construct more elaborate, well-differenti-
ated knowledge structures. Furthermore, it appears that gender may be an important mediator
of meaningful learning. It is particularly notable that where gender differences were found,
they tended to favor females. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Sci Ed 81:193 – 215, 1997.

INTRODUCTION
By comparing successive concept maps produced as the student gains mastery of the domain, the
researcher can see how knowledge is restructured in the course of acquisition. Carey (1986)

The products of over two decades of work and some 3500 studies in science learning
(Pfundt & Duit, 1994) have revealed that students often fail to understand central concepts
in the natural sciences despite the best efforts of good teachers (Mintzes, Wandersee,
& Novak, in press; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994) Additionally, it appears that
difficulties in understanding are widespread and not necessarily limited to students of
low ability, and that even those graduating from our finest institutions experience similar
problems (Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 1996). Recent evidence suggests that

Correspondence to: J. J. Mintzes

© 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0036-8326 /97/020193-23

194 PEARSALL ET AL.

conceptual difficulties are a normal part of learning, and that misconceptions are typical of
attempts by students to construct meanings about natural objects and events (Mintzes,
Trowbridge, Arnaudin, & Wandersee, 1989).
To some in the science education community, the findings of these studies suggest a need to
refocus our efforts on ways of effecting lasting conceptual change in the natural sciences. It is
clear, however, that short-term efforts at innovation and instructional treatments of brief dura-
tion are unlikely to bring about the desired results (Edmondson & Novak, 1993). In our judg-
ment, the practical work of developing and testing effective intervention strategies will require
a more fundamental understanding of the basic cognitive processes underlying knowledge re-
structuring in formal educational settings. Put more succinctly, we need a better understand-
ing of the cognitive events that drive conceptual change and the principal factors that affect
these events.
In this article we report on a pair of companion studies that investigated knowledge
restructuring among students enrolled in two university-level biology courses. Based on
previous work in similar settings (Benton, Mintzes, Kendrick, & Solomon, 1994;
Markham, Mintzes, & Jones, 1994; Songer & Mintzes, 1994; Wallace & Mintzes, 1990),
concept maps (Novak & Gowin, 1984) were used to examine changes in the structural
complexity of students’ knowledge of biological concepts at successive four-week inter-
vals over the course of a semester. Specifically, the study sought evidence: (1) that
growth in the structural complexity of students’ knowledge frameworks is substantial
and incremental over the course of a semester; (2) that this growth is significantly af-
fected by the predominant learning mode (i.e., meaningful versus rote) employed by stu-
dents; (3) that gender plays a significant role in mediating growth; and (4) that
incremental growth in structural complexity is concomitant with periods of both “weak”
and “strong” restructuring.
Although much in the science education research literature suggests that formal instruc-
tion in science has a profound effect on the structural complexity of students’ knowledge
frameworks, longitudinal studies addressing this issue are rare (Novak & Musonda, 1991).
Furthermore, although the theoretical framework is strong (Novak, 1987, 1993a, 1993b),
the relationships between structural complexity and such variables as learning mode and
gender have been almost entirely ignored. Finally, while studies in the multidisciplinary
field of cognitive science suggest that meaningful learning is accompanied by significant
periods of weak and strong restructuring (Carey, 1987), we have found few studies in the
science education literature that have examined this issue within the context of a formal
learning environment.

MEANINGFUL LEARNING, KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING

AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE: THE HUMAN
CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE
Theory
The relationships between meaningful learning, cognitive structure, and conceptual change
have been a focus of interest and considerable speculation in science education for over a
decade (West & Pines, 1985). Research in the cognitive aspects of science learning has pro-
vided strong evidence that successful science learners as well as professional scientists de-
velop elaborate, strongly hierarchical, well-differentiated, and highly integrated frameworks
of related concepts as they construct meanings (Mintzes, Wandersee, Novak, in press; Novak,
 KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING 195

1987). Furthermore, it is apparent from studies by cognitive scientists that the ability to rea-
son well in the natural sciences is constrained largely by the structure of domain-specific
knowledge in the discipline, which accounts for differences seen in the performance of
novices and experts in many science-related fields, including physics (Chi, Feltovich, &
Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980), biology (Atran, 1990; Gobbo &
Chi, 1989), medicine (Lesgold et al., 1988; Patel, Groen, & Frederikson, 1986), and computer
programming (Adelson & Soloway, 1988).
In the view of many cognitive scientists (Carey, 1987; Rumelhart & Norman, 1978),
significant change in the way individuals understand natural phenomena results from
both the gradual and orderly elaboration and refinement of an existing framework (i.e.,
“weak restructuring,” “tuning” and “accretion”) as well as radical alterations that result
from the introduction of entirely new superordinate concepts or significant and substan-
tial changes in the meaning of existing superordinate concepts (i.e., “strong restructur-
ing”). Carey has shown that both types of restructuring occur in the acquisition of
biological knowledge during childhood. Nussbaum (1983) has suggested that the dis-
tinction between gradual and radical change bears close similarity to the “normal” and
“revolutionary” periods of investigation (Kuhn, 1962) that characterize the history of
natural science.
In our judgment, the cognitive processes that are thought to account for restructuring in
formal knowledge systems are compatible with an epistemological view that has its ori-
gins in Kelly’s (1955) personal construct theory, and with contemporary analyses in the
history and philosophy of science (Kuhn, 1962; Laudan, 1984; Posner, Strike, Hewson,
& Gertzog, 1982). Novak (1993a) has suggested that “meaning making” is the common
thread that ties the work of science students to that of Nobel laureates in scientific disci-
plines:

My thesis is simple. It is my view that the psychological processes by which an individual

constructs his or her own new meanings are essentially the same as the epistemological
processes by which new knowledge is constructed by the professionals in a discipline.

This view, which he describes as “the unity of psychological and epistemological meaning
making,” is the essence of Novak’s Human Constructivist perspective and is grounded in
several underlying principles of Ausubel’s cognitive assimilation theory (Ausubel, Novak,
& Hanesian, 1978). The most important idea is that human beings are, fundamentally, mean-
ing-makers; and, furthermore, that meanings are constructed by forming connections between
new knowledge and concepts that are part of an existing framework of relevant, domain-
specific knowledge. The distinction between meaningful and rote learning depends on the ex-
tent to which individuals incorporate new knowledge into their existing frameworks in a
nonarbitrary, nonverbatim, substantive manner. For meaningful learning to occur three criteria
must be met: the material itself must have potential meaning (i.e., rather than a list of non-
sense syllables); the individual must possess a framework of relevant, domain-specific con-
cepts to anchor the new knowledge; and the individual must choose voluntarily to incorporate
new concepts in a nonarbitrary, nonverbatim fashion (i.e., a condition referred to as a “mean-
ingful learning set”).
Those who choose to engage in meaningful learning tend to develop and store strongly hi-
erarchical frameworks of successively more inclusive concepts in long-term memory rather
than sets of disconnected, isolated propositions that characterize rote learners. The principal
benefits of meaningful learning are enhanced retention and retrieval of new knowledge,
196 PEARSALL ET AL.

facilitation of subsequent learning, and the ability to use knowledge to solve novel problems
through the application of logical reasoning strategies.
Ausubel, Novak, and Hanesian (1978) suggest that essentially four processes account for
meaningful learning: subsumption; superordinate learning; progressive differentiation; and
integrative reconciliation. In subsumption, new knowledge composed of more specific, less
inclusive concepts, is linked to more general and inclusive concepts in the individual’s cogni-
tive structure. When, for example, an individual learns the names and critical attributes of the
nine planets comprising the solar system, he or she is engaged largely in subsumption. This
gradual, elaborative, and assimilative process accounts for much of the weak restructuring
that goes on in good science classes, often resulting in the accretion, extension, modification,
and qualification of large amounts of domain-specific knowledge. On the other hand, when
that individual subsequently learns that scientists no longer consider Pluto a planet, he or she
must engage in significant restructuring involving high level, general and inclusive concepts
in order to accommodate and make sense of this new information. The strong restructuring re-
quired to effect this conceptual change is accomplished through a process of superordinate
learning which, in this example, may result in a significant shift in the meaning of the con-
cept, planet.
In summary, much of school science produces learning that is gradual and assimilative in
nature; it is caused by a cognitive process called subsumption, and results in a weak form of
knowledge restructuring, and an incremental change in conceptual understanding. In contrast
the rare, insightful moments that signal a significant and rapid shift in conceptual understand-
ing are caused largely by a cognitive process called superordinate learning which triggers a
strong or radical form of knowledge restructuring.
As new knowledge is constructed, concept meanings are clarified and the knowledge base
takes on a more complex form that includes multiple levels of hierarchy and a branching, den-
dritic structure. This process that results in increasing structural complexity is referred to as
progressive differentiation; hence, both subsumption and superordinate learning result in the
progressive differentiation of cognitive structure. Additionally, the process of progressive dif-
ferentiation is accompanied by the explicit delineation of similarities and differences among
closely related concepts — an event called integrative reconciliation. When individuals learn
about differences and similarities in the atmospheres of Earth, Venus, and Mars, for example,
their knowledge structures become more interconnected, integrated, and cohesive. This kind
of integration is especially characteristic of expertise in a knowledge domain and is thought to
be essential to inferential and analogical reasoning in science disciplines (Gobbo & Chi,
1989).

The Concept Map

In addition to their work on a theoretical synthesis of psychological learning theory and
epistemology, Novak and colleagues have developed several practical tools that have been
very useful in documenting and exploring changes in cognitive structure; foremost among
these is the concept map (Novak & Gowin, 1984). Concept maps are two-dimensional, hierar-
chically organized, node-link diagrams that depict the major concepts within a domain of
knowledge and the significant relationships among those concepts (Fig. 1).
Developed in the early 1970s as a research tool, concept mapping has been adopted by
thousands of teachers around the world as a way of gaining insight into the conceptual un-
derstandings held by students. By examining concept maps made by students we can infer
much about the propositional validity and structural complexity of their knowledge, in-
cluding, for example: the number and quality of scientifically acceptable concepts and
 Figure 1. Jeane’s first concept map.
197
198 PEARSALL ET AL.

propositions; the extent of progressive differentiation as reflected in the number of hierar-

chical levels and amount of branching; and the cohesiveness or degree of integration as
seen in the number of crosslinks. Additionally, if so desired, we can look for the incidence
of particularly “critical” propositions that are central to an understanding of a knowledge
domain (Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994).
It is assumed that concept maps offer a conservative representation of knowledge stored in
long-term memory, and that dynamic changes occurring in the knowledge base are reflected
in the propositional validity and structural complexity of the map. Accordingly, we would ex-
pect that radical restructuring of the knowledge base which accompanies significant concep-
tual change would be reflected at the highest levels of hierarchy in the map. In similar fashion,
we would anticipate that the gradual, elaborative, and assimilative changes accompanying in-
cremental subsumption learning would be depicted most commonly as additions or deletions
at lower levels in the hierarchy.
It is important to note that concept mapping is but one of a number of currently used strate-
gies that has proven helpful in exploring knowledge restructuring and conceptual change. Fur-
thermore, we readily acknowledge that no single technique by itself adequately addresses all
of the myriad of factors that play into conceptual change. Nevertheless, it is our contention,
based on over 15 years of experience with concept mapping, that this strategy and several oth-
ers such as the SemNet program (Fisher, 1990) provide a unique window into the way learn-
ers structure their knowledge, offering an opportunity to assess both the propositional validity
and the structural complexity of that knowledge base. In previous studies (Benton et al., 1994;
Markham et al., 1994; Songer & Mintzes, 1994), we have employed a combination of tech-
niques, including concept mapping, clinical interviewing, card sorting, picture drawing, and
problem solving in our attempt to reveal and explain students’ knowledge structures. In the
present study we have chosen to focus attention on the concept may as a heuristically power-
ful but largely underutilized approach that researchers might consider as they build a reper-
toire of useful strategies.

METHOD
Overview
The concept mapping procedure was used to examine knowledge restructuring occurring at
four successive intervals in introductory, university-level biology courses for science and non-
science majors. Students were given written and verbal instructions on concept mapping dur-
ing the second week of class and were asked to map their understandings of cells (science
majors) or living things (nonscience majors). Subsequently, the concept maps were returned
to students at 4-week intervals throughout the semester with instructions to “draw another
map that shows your current understanding of cells/living things.” Thus, at the end of the se-
mester we had assembled a set of four maps for every student, each map representing a kind
of fleeting picture of the student’s understanding and, when viewed in series, providing a
glimpse of the dynamic process of knowledge restructuring.
Using a simplified form (Markham et al., 1994) of Novak and Gowin’s techniques, the con-
cept maps were scored for frequencies of concepts, relationships, hierarchies, branching, and
crosslinks. Additionally, the maps were scored for incidence of restructuring, tuning, and ac-
cretion as suggested in the work of Rumelhart and Norman (1978). The scored concept maps
were then analyzed to examine changes occurring over time, and to document the effects of
predominant learning mode and gender on these changes.
 KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING 199

Context
Students participating in this study attend a regional campus of a comprehensive level I
state university in southeastern North Carolina. The institution enrolls approximately 8700
students of whom more than 80% are in-state residents. The mean combined SAT score of in-
coming freshmen is 968, placing them somewhat above the national mean in both verbal and
mathematical aptitude.
In the first study (science majors), responses were elicited from 68 students (33 males and
35 females) who enrolled in a one-semester, introductory university-level biology course that
focuses on cell structure and function, metabolism, and Mendelian and molecular genetics.
All students have taken 3 years of high school science courses, including at least 1 year of bi-
ology, and almost half have taken one or more additional university-level science courses.
The second study (nonscience majors) is based on the responses of 93 students (34 males
and 59 females) who enrolled in a one-semester, general biology course that introduces con-
cepts of reproduction, genetics, evolution, biodiversity, and ecology. Enrollees typically elect
this course to fulfill a university requirement for one laboratory course in the life sciences.
Most students have taken a year of high school biology and are majoring in business, educa-
tion, or one of the humanities, fine arts, or social sciences.
The courses, each normally enrolling some 400 – 500 students every semester, are conven-
tional in almost every respect: students attend three 50-minute lectures and one 3-hour labora-
tory each week. Each lecture section enrolls 150 – 200 students and the laboratory has a
seating capacity of 24 – 28 students. The same instructor, a male, full professor with 20 years
of teaching experience, coordinates and lectures in the two courses. Laboratory sections are
taught by graduate teaching assistants who are working on MS or PhD degrees in departmen-
tal and cooperative programs. Evaluation of student achievement is also quite conventional in
most respects: three multiple-choice tests composed primarily of “comprehension” and “ap-
plication” level questions each account for 20% of the course grade; the weekly laboratory
quizzes account for an additional 20%; and the concept maps make up the final 20%. Al-
though grade distribution varies somewhat from one semester to the next, because of large
class sizes the grades tend to distribute normally around the mean.
Clearly the context just described departs substantially from an optimal environment where
conceptual understanding is valued and rewarded. Unfortunately however, it is quite similar to
that found in comparable institutions around the country. Typically, these introductory-level
courses are poorly financed and enrollment is maximized; teaching assistants are poorly pre-
pared for their responsibilities; senior instructors have limited opportunities to interact with
students; and much about the situation encourages student passivity. Our experience has
shown that many students engage in a substantial amount of rote mode learning, and that
funding limitations combined with entrenched institutional practices and priorities tend to
perpetuate this state of affairs. Yet, despite these conditions, we have found a significant mi-
nority of students who actively engage in meaningful learning, as the results of this study
show. Regrettably, the effort required to learn meaningfully often goes unrewarded, a situation
typified by one of the case studies we present.

Procedure
Concept Mapping. Based on strategies developed at Cornell University (Novak & Gowin,
1984), students were trained to concept map in a single 3-hour laboratory session and were
given homework assignments and individual feedback on their efforts (Arnaudin, 1985). Each
200 PEARSALL ET AL.

student subsequently constructed a concept map depicting his or her understanding of cells
(science majors) or living things (nonscience majors). The concept maps provided two-
dimensional, hierarchical, node-link representations depicting the major concepts and rela-
tionships comprising the knowledge structure. At 4-week intervals throughout the semester
the maps were returned to the students along with a uniquely colored pencil; subjects were
then instructed to review their previous map and either to disregard it and begin anew or re-
draw their last map adding to and changing it to reflect their current understanding of the do-
main. In completing the task, students were explicitly prevented from relying on external
memory aids (e.g., notes, textbooks, diagrams). Accordingly, by semester’s end we had a col-
lection of four maps from every student, providing a dynamic, longitudinal picture of changes
in the propositional validity and structural complexity of the knowledge base over time.
The practice of returning concept maps serves the important function of encouraging reflec-
tion on prior knowledge, one of the characteristics commonly attributed to experts in many
science-related domains (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). The practice apparently enables individ-
uals to consider what they know in light of what they have recently learned. When used in the
classroom, the objective is to encourage students to monitor their own learning, to foster a
deeper level of critical analysis, and to wrestle with and resolve inconsistencies in their think-
ing (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994).
The completed concept maps were scored using Novak and Gowin’s (1984) procedure as
simplified by Markham, Mintzes, and Jones (1994). One point was awarded for each concept,
for each relationship, and for the first instance of branching. Three points were given for each
additional instance of branching, five points for each level of hierarchy, and ten points for
each crosslink. As suggested by Novak and Gowin, only scientifically acceptable connections
were recognized in the scoring procedure. In the simplified scoring method we employed, a
scientifically acceptable exemplar was scored as a correct “relationship” rather than an in-
stance of a separate category for “examples.” Additionally, we scored the total number of
unique and nonredundant concepts appearing on the map as a gross estimate of the relative
size of the domain-specific knowledge structure. The point values assigned to each scoring
category are based on Novak and Gowin’s assessment of the relative importance of each
structural characteristic. For example, each instance of a crosslink is assigned 10 points, a
value reflecting the relative importance assigned to integrative reconciliation which crosslinks
are assumed to represent.
A number of studies have examined the reliability and validity of concept mapping as a tool
for exploring and documenting the structural complexity of knowledge held in science do-
mains (Liu & Hinchey, 1993; Markham et al., 1994; Stuart, 1985; Wallace & Mintzes, 1990;
Wilson, 1993, 1994). In a study of grade 7 general science students conducted in one of the
Canadian Atlantic provinces, Liu and Hinchey (1993) examined the construct validity and in-
ternal consistency of concept mapping scores following instruction on “solutions.” Pearson
correlations between concept mapping scores and conventional test scores were found to be
.44 ( p , .05) and Cronbach’s alpha was calculated at .65, suggesting relatively strong psycho-
metric qualities that are comparable to other commonly used measures of classroom learning.
In a pair of exceedingly well-done studies conducted in Queensland, Australia, Wilson
(1993, 1994) explored relationships between structural characteristics of concept maps on
“chemical equilibrium” drawn by year 12 chemistry students, and achievement on a school-
based performance assessment in chemistry and the Australian National Chemistry Quiz. Us-
ing a number of multivariate analytic procedures (i.e., multidimensional scaling, canonical
correlation, and multiple regression), she found strong and significant relationships between
measures of “hierarchical organization and complexity” and the conventional measures of
achievement. The reported canonical correlation among these variables was .56 ( p , .02).
 KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING 201

In a set of studies performed in North Carolina, Wallace and Mintzes (1990) and Markham
et al. (1993, 1994) examined the concurrent validity of concept mapping in college-level biol-
ogy courses. In the first study, an experimental group of preservice elementary school teachers
received 45 minutes of computer-assisted instruction on “marine life zones.” In comparison to
a placebo group who received equivalent exposure to an unrelated topic, the teachers demon-
strated significant ( p , .01) gains on all measures of structural complexity, suggesting that the
concept map is sensitive to even brief episodes of instructional intervention. In a second
study, a group of advanced college biology majors and a second group of freshmen enrolled
in a nonmajors biology course were asked to concept map their understandings of “mam-
mals.” Significant differences ( p , .01) favoring the advanced group were found in all scoring
categories, and furthermore, the organizational patterns revealed in the concept maps reflected
the underlying dimensions observed in a concurrent card sorting task and a clinical interview.
These studies and several others provide strong evidence of internal consistency and both
construct and concurrent validity. Further studies are needed however, especially if the con-
cept map is to become a standard procedure in large-scale performance assessments. As Liu
and Hinchey (1993) have suggested, the issue of interrater reliability has yet to be systemati-
cally investigated and studies in this area are sorely needed.
Although the simplified scoring system enabled us to describe the structural complexity of
the knowledge base at each of four times, we also wanted to differentiate among and charac-
terize the nature of the structural changes (i.e., gradual and radical) seen during the interven-
ing periods by comparing pairs of successive maps as described by Carey (1986). To do so we
adopted a second scoring system based on the work of Rumelhart and Norman (1978).
Rumelhart and Norman’s “active structural networks” theory describes three modes of
learning that closely parallel the types of structural changes we wished to document: accre-
tion, the most common mode in which knowledge is added to an already existing framework;
tuning, in which an existing framework is largely unchanged by new knowledge but con-
straints are placed which affect the accuracy and applicability of the framework; and restruc-
turing, a radical process in which new knowledge necessitates the construction of a
substantially new conceptual framework. Although data supporting the theory are scant,
Rumelhart and Norman suggest that “. . . in the learning of some complex topic matter
probably the first step is the accretion of a reasonable body of knowledge about the topic, fol-
lowed by the creation of new schemata to organize that knowledge appropriately. Then, con-
tinued learning consists of further tuning . . . ”
A careful review of the student concept maps suggested a way of operationalizing and ap-
plying these ideas to a systematic scoring technique. Two experienced science teachers col-
laboratively reviewed 120 concept maps produced by 30 students. Based on this review, the
teachers developed a simple dichotomous scoring approach (assigning either a 0 or 1) to
record each instance of accretion, tuning, and restructuring. Since this scoring method is ex-
perimental and a departure from previous practice, we wished only to estimate the simple fre-
quencies of these events. Operationally, an instance of accretion was acknowledged when at
least ten concept labels were added to a preexisting concept resulting in a differentiation or
elaboration of the concept. (Ten is an arbitrary frequency, however, in our view, it provides a
conservative estimate of an instance of accretion.) An instance of tuning was recognized when
any change to a preexisting concept resulted in the modification of its meaning by the addition
of constraining or constant variables, and a restructuring event was recorded whenever a
change was noted that involved the addition or deletion of one or more concepts to the first hi-
erarchical level of the concept map.
After establishing these scoring criteria, the teachers then reviewed 400 concept maps
drawn by 100 additional students and scored them independently for accretion, tuning and
202 PEARSALL ET AL.

restructuring. Because we wished only to examine the simple frequencies of these events, the
interjudge reliability estimates were calculated by comparing concept maps of each student
three times (i.e., map 1 vs. map 2; map 2 vs. map 3; map 3 vs. map 4). With each comparison,
the judges recorded a 0 or 1 for restructuring, tuning, and accretion. A “0” was recorded for
no instances of an event; a “1” was recorded for one or more instances. Accordingly, the total
number of recorded events was 900 for each judge (i.e., 3 comparisons/student 3 3
events/comparison 3 100 students). This procedure produced an overall interjudge agreement
of 96%. The interjudge agreements for the three event types were: restructuring (99%); tuning
(96%); and accretion (93%).

Self-Report Inventory. The Inventory of Learning Processes (Schmeck, Ribich, & Ramanaiah,
1977; Schmeck & Ribich, 1978), was administered during the first week of classes to character-
ize the predominant learning mode employed by students. This instrument is described by its au-
thors as “a self-report inventory using behaviorally oriented statements to assess important
learning processes in the academic setting” (Schmeck et al., 1977). A factor analysis of the 62
true-false items comprising the inventory yields 4 subscales with factor loadings ranging from .25
to .53. The subscales, designated Synthesis – Analysis, Study Methods, Fact Retention, and Elab-
orative Processing, possess an estimated KR21 (internal consistency) of .58 to .82 and test – retest
measures of .79 to .83.
The Synthesis – Analysis scale is composed of items that focus on organizational processes
(e.g., “I find it difficult to handle questions requiring comparison of different concepts”; “I of-
ten memorize material that I don’t understand.”) Students who score well on this scale tend to
be effective in dealing with semantic organization or structure, and evidence a concern for
meanings and the implications of words (Fisher, 1991; Schmeck and Ribich, 1978). The Elab-
orative Processing scale includes items that address verbal and visual encoding mechanisms
(e.g., “New concepts usually make me think of many other similar concepts”; “I learn new
concepts by expressing them in my own words”; “I learn new words and ideas by associating
them with words and ideas I already know.”) Students scoring well on this scale tend con-
sciously to form connections between new and old information, to employ visual imagery
techniques, to rephrase knowledge in their own words, and to think of practical applications.
“Taken together (the two subscales) appear to assess the tendency to take an active rather than
a passive role in processing new information . . . (and) the habitual use of “deep” rather
than “shallow” processing strategies” (Schmeck et al., 1977).
The authors of the Inventory report two studies that examined the criterion-related validity
of the instrument. Of particular interest here are the validity estimates associated with the
Synthesis – Analysis and Elaborative Processing scales. In one study, the authors explored the
relationship of scores on these scales to achievement on a 30-item multiple-choice test follow-
ing videotaped instruction on “the principles of instrumental conditioning.” The reported
Pearson correlations are .42 ( p , .05) for the Synthesis – Analysis scale and .51 ( p , .01) for
the Elaborative Processing scale. In a second study, the authors administered a verbal learning
task in which students were asked to recall or recognize 30 words recorded in random order
on audiotape. The Pearson correlations revealed significant relationships between scores on
the Synthesis – Analysis scale and both recall (r 5 .51; p , .01) and recognition (r 5 .44;
p , .05). Scores on the Elaborative Processing scale were significantly correlated (r 5 .35;
p , .05) with recall of concrete words only. Based on these results, it appears that the validity
estimates associated with the two scales approximate those of many comparable, widely used,
self-report instruments.
A preliminary analysis of our data revealed a strong, positive correlation between the two
scales (r1,68 5.50; p , .01) suggesting, on psychometric grounds (Anastasi, 1976), that they
 KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING 203

could be summed without loss of predictive validity and with enhanced reliability. Accord-
ingly, in the present studies, the predominant learning mode of each subject was assigned on
the basis of the summed total of the two subscales.
Based on our view of Human Constructivism (Mintzes, Wandersee, & Novak, in press) and
following the work of Fisher (1991) in a similar context, we refer to subjects scoring in the
top 33% (nonscience majors) and 40% (science majors) of our samples as meaningful learn-
ers and those scoring in the bottom 33% and 40% as rote learners. The “cutoff” scores we
used are somewhat arbitrary and are intended only to identify groups of students of approxi-
mately equal size (N 5 26 to 33).
In designating some students meaningful learners and others rote learners we do not imply
that individuals are entirely consistent in their learning strategies; in fact, we recognize that
much of meaningful learning is contextually determined and that often students actively and
voluntarily choose one mode of learning over another. As Novak (1977) has suggested, “. . .
the extent to which learning is rote or meaningful is partly a function of the learner’s predis-
position toward the learning task.” The designations are intended instead to reflect the pre-
dominant learning mode to the extent that it can be determined on the basis of a self-report
inventory of learning behavior. Based on successful efforts that attempt to help students “learn
how to learn,” it is clear that many students are predominantly rote learners and that meaning-
ful learning is a strategy that often must be learned.
Furthermore, the labels themselves reflect a careful reading of and close collaboration with
Novak and his research group over a period of some 15 years. Within the framework of Ausubel
and Novak’s theory, it seems to us quite reasonable to refer to individuals who agree with the
following statements as rote learners: “I often memorize material that I don’t understand”; “I
have trouble seeing the difference between apparently similar ideas”; and “I find it difficult to
handle questions requiring comparison of different concepts.” Likewise, it seems equally rea-
sonable to refer to those who agree with these propositions as meaningful learners: “New con-
cepts usually make me think of many other similar concepts”; “I learn new ideas by relating
them to similar ideas”; and “I learn new concepts by expressing them in my own words.”

Analysis1
Differences in concept map scores as a function of time were documented in a series of
one-way, univariate analyses of variance. Subsequent analyses investigating the effects of
learning mode and gender were based on a 2 3 4 factorial design employing a set of separate
two-way, univariate analyses of variance with repeated measures. Although a combined three-
way analysis (learning mode 3 gender 3 time) is preferable, such an analysis was precluded
by a limited data set and the occurrence of empty cells. Instances of accretion, tuning, and re-
structuring were documented by simple frequency analysis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this section we report and discuss the results of a pair of companion studies focusing on
knowledge restructuring among science and nonscience majors. In our judgment, because of
differences in prior experience, sampling techniques, and knowledge domains, a direct quanti-
tative comparison across studies is inappropriate. However, in the “Conclusions and Implica-
tions” section we speculate about potential differences and their significance.

1
Complete ANOVA summary tables are available upon request from the third author.
204 PEARSALL ET AL.

Additionally, we have chosen to introduce the results with two brief case studies (i.e.,
“Jeane” and “Lori”). The purpose here is to provide readers with tangible referents for inter-
preting the meaning of concept map scores. Jeane and Lori were chosen somewhat at random;
however, the concept maps they drew reflect significant change over the course of a semester,
offering specific instances of growth in structural complexity.

Study 1: Science Majors

Jeane. Figures 1 and 2 are reconstructions of Jeane’s concept maps. These maps are offered
as tangible examples of those constructed by science majors. It is important to note, however,
that a concept map is a unique and idiosyncratic representation of a student’s knowledge
structure at a given moment in time, and it would be inappropriate to label such a representa-
tion as either “typical” or “characteristic” of any identifiable subgroup. Jeane’s combined
score on the Inventory of Learning Processes places her well within the meaningful learning
group. Unlike most other students in the class, Jeane has already received a BS degree in ge-
ology and has enrolled in the course to fulfill a requirement for certification in secondary sci-
ence teaching.
In her first map (Fig. 1), Jeane depicts 24 unique concepts, a moderate amount of concept
differentiation (branching), some evidence of subsumption (hierarchy), but no identifiable in-
tegration (crosslinking) of concepts. Interestingly, she seems to understand that organs such as
the liver, heart, and brain are somehow related to cells but is unable to specify the connec-
tions. The most significant misconception she depicts is a confusion between eukaryotic and
prokaryotic cells; as a result, many of the propositions (relationships) she specifies are not sci-
entifically acceptable.
By the time of her second concept map (Fig. 2; plain type), Jeane has apparently restruc-
tured her ideas about prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells, identifying a number of membrane-
bound organelles associated with the latter. It appears that she has established a
well-differentiated structure for subsequent learning; however, the absence of substantial
numbers of crosslinks reflects some potential constraints on her understanding. For example,
she links “microtubules” and “cell wall” with prokaryotic cells but fails to crosslink the con-
cepts with eukaryotic cells. Her third (shaded) and fourth (bold type) maps seem to depict a
great deal of learning by accretion. It seems especially significant that all of her knowledge
about metabolic processes and molecular genetics is limited to eukaryotic cells. It may be that
her failure to integrate concepts such as “energy,” “DNA,” and “ribosomes” at an earlier point
in the course has resulted in a substantial amount of rote learning and “compartmentalization”
of knowledge.

Structural Complexity. A summary of concept map scores including means and standard
deviations for each of the four time intervals is given in Figure 3. The profiles suggest a clear
incremental growth in every scoring category over the course of the semester and the analyses
of variance confirm that the observed differences are significant (p,.01). A review of these
“structural complexity profiles” reveals substantial differences between the first and fourth
maps; for example, the mean number of concepts and relationships increased by a factor of
eight, while the number of crosslinks grew five times. In contrast, the number of levels of hi-
erarchy tended to stabilize after an initial period of rapid growth, suggesting that concept dif-
ferentiation and integration continue over the span of the semester while subsumption seems
to peak at about week 9 or soon thereafter.
205

Figure 2. Jeane’s subsequent concept maps (time 2: plain type; time 3-shaded; time 4-bold type).
206 PEARSALL ET AL.

Figure 3. Summary of concept map scores for science majors (N 5 68) [numbers above bar represent means and
(standard deviations)].

Learning Mode and Gender. The effects of predominant learning mode and gender on con-
cept map scores are summarized in Figures 4 and 5. Significant main effects ( p , .05) and in-
teractions favoring meaningful learners were observed in the concepts, relationships, and
branching categories. Furthermore, partialing out variance to learning mode did not diminish
the significance of differences ( p , .01) attributable to time. Significant interactions ( p , .05
for concepts and branching; p , .01 for relationships) suggest that the effects of learning
mode are progressively and favorably reflected in the scores of meaningful learners over time.
The results also suggest that gender may play a mediating role in some aspects of knowl-
edge restructuring. A significant main effect ( p , .05) favoring females in the hierarchies cat-
egory and an interaction ( p , .05) also favoring females suggest that women are engaging in
more subsumption learning and are constructing progressively more differentiated frame-
works over the course of the semester.

Structural Change. Figure 6 summarizes the comparisons of successive concept maps and
provides a way of viewing the structural changes occurring over the course of the semester.
The most impressive finding is a substantial decline in the frequency of restructuring after the
first 4 weeks. It appears that about half of the major changes involving the highest organiza-
tional level take place at an early time, with nearly 80% of the students engaging in some
form of “radical” reorganization in the first month. In contrast, the frequencies of tuning and
accretion seem to remain at a fairly stable level throughout the semester.

Study 2: Nonscience Majors

Lori. Like Jeane, Lori’s combined score on the Inventory of Learning Processes identifies
her as a meaningful learner. She says that her career goal is to become “a successful corporate
attorney” and that “science doesn’t spark (her) mind like the liberal arts do.” Her final grade
in the course was a “C.”
 KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING 207

Figure 4. Effect of learning mode on concept map scores (science majors) (“time” refers to structural differences in
maps drawn at weeks 2, 5, 9, and 13).

Figure 5. Effect of gender on concept map scores (science majors).

208 PEARSALL ET AL.

Figure 6. Summary of structural changes (science majors).

Lori’s first concept map (Fig. 7) is structured around the requirements of life: oxygen, food,
and water. Although the map is relatively simple (i.e., she depicts only nine concepts), all but
one of her relationships are scientifically acceptable. Significantly, she includes an important
crosslink as well (i.e., photosynthesis requires water).
In subsequent maps (Fig. 8) she restructures her framework substantially. The comprehen-
sive map, only a portion of which is shown in Figure 8, depicts several new organizing nodes,
including “Cells,” “DNA,” “Biomes,” and “Cellular Respiration.” Each of these nodes is the
source of multiple branches, crosslinks, and examples. Virtually all of her propositions are

Figure 7. Lori’s first concept map.

209

Figure 8. Lori’s subsequent concept maps.

210 PEARSALL ET AL.

scientifically correct, although she apparently harbors a common misconception that the “dark
phase” of photosynthesis occurs only at night. In her final map Lori depicts approximately
150 unique concepts and propositions, 11 levels of hierarchy, and 10 crosslinks.
It is of some interest and not a little concern that Lori and many other students whose
scores on the Inventory and whose concept maps suggest the potential for meaningful learn-
ing, complete the course with unexceptional grades. As suggested earlier, there is much about
these courses and similar courses around the country that discourages meaningful learning.
Perhaps it is a sad commentary, but one that needs to be said nonetheless, the structure and re-
ward system in place at colleges and universities often work to the detriment of students. In
this respect, higher education has much to learn from those who work in elementary and sec-
ondary schools.

Structural Complexity. The structural complexity profiles (Fig. 9) reveal significant change
( p , .01) in all scoring categories over the course of the semester. As with the science majors,
the changes appear to be substantially incremental and, in this analysis, the magnitude of
change seems to be relatively uniform across time intervals.

Learning Mode and Gender. The comparison of rote and meaningful learners revealed sig-
nificant differences ( p , .05) favoring the latter in concepts and relationships (Fig. 10). Un-
like science majors, however, no differences were found in the branching category and no
significant interactions were found.
Gender effects were observed in three scoring categories (Fig. 11). Females depicted a sig-
nificantly greater ( p , .01) number of concepts and the rate of concept differentiation, as re-
vealed in the branching category, tended to favor women as it did among the science majors.
Notably, the only scoring category where males excelled was in crosslinks. A significant inter-
action ( p , .05) suggests that men are successfully integrating their knowledge frameworks
more rapidly than are women.

Figure 9. Summary of concept map scores for nonscience majors (N 5 93).

 KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING 211

Figure 10. Effect of learning mode on concept map scores (nonscience majors).

Figure 11. Effect of gender on concept map scores (nonscience majors).

212 PEARSALL ET AL.

Figure 12. Summary of structural changes (nonscience majors).

Structural Change. The most revealing finding in the analysis of structural change (Fig. 12)
was a decline in the frequency of restructuring after the first 4 weeks of the semester, although
this decline was not as marked as that seen among science majors. Additionally, the frequen-
cies of tuning and accretion were found to be relatively stable — again, reflecting a pattern of
findings observed among science majors.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The primary purpose of these studies has been to contribute to a baseline of descriptive in-
formation about knowledge restructuring and conceptual change in biology. While much has
been written on this subject over the past 20 years, a significant portion of this work has been
speculative in nature, and strong evidence for change based on longitudinal work has been
sparse. A notable exception is found in the work of Novak and Musonda (1993) who have
documented changes in the way one group of students views the particulate nature of matter
over a period of 12 years. Using a succession of concept maps that spans the elementary, mid-
dle, and high school years, they have shown quite convincingly that misconceptions originat-
ing at an early age tend to remain intact despite repeated instructional intervention.
In the studies reported here we have shown that within the span of a one-semester college-
level science experience, a substantial amount of knowledge restructuring takes place. It ap-
pears that much of this learning is incremental in nature and that accretion and tuning together
account for some 75% or more of the observed structural changes. We think it is significant,
however, that changes involving superordinate concepts at the highest level (i.e., radical re-
 KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING 213

structuring) occur more frequently in the first half of the semester. Indeed, among science ma-
jors, 50% of the radical restructuring was confined to the first 4 weeks of the course. It seems
that, in this course at least, the most fundamental changes in students’ knowledge structures
are “front-loaded.”
What are the implications of these findings? If replications of these studies produce similar
results, it seems that we may need to take a closer look at what teachers and students are do-
ing in the classroom early in the year. Are teachers spending time helping students construct a
strong organizing framework for subsequent learning? What strategies do successful teachers
employ? What happens to students who fail to restructure their knowledge during this critical
period? Can metacognitive interventions such as concept mapping help?
Another potentially important finding is the observed relationship between students’ predomi-
nant learning mode and the complexity of the knowledge structures they build. It appears that stu-
dents who report employing “active,” “deep” information processing strategies tend to construct
more elaborate, well-differentiated frameworks of knowledge. In one sense, this is not particu-
larly surprising and may be taken as a kind of validity check on concept mapping as an evaluation
technique; after all, the concept map is intended to differentiate between meaningful and rote
learners. More importantly, however, we think findings such as these may be helpful in identify-
ing specific meaningful learning habits that are potentially “teachable.” Can we teach students to
“handle questions requiring comparison of different concepts”? Can we help them “learn new
words and ideas by associating them with words and ideas (they) already know”? The promise of
helping students learn how to learn (Novak & Gowin, 1984) is concisely captured by White and
Gunstone (1989) who suggested, “If metalearning can be taught then the problem of how to bring
about conceptual change may be solved.” This is an issue that needs to be pursued in well-
designed longitudinal studies over an extended period of time.
One additional finding that merits further comment and ultimately further study is the gen-
der issue. The results seem to suggest that gender may be an important factor explaining some
of the variance in the structural complexity of students’ knowledge frameworks over time. It is
particularly notable that, where differences were found due to main effects or interactions, all
but one favored females. This is a remarkable finding in that studies focusing on gender ef-
fects in the natural sciences generally tend to favor males. In this work we found that males
who enrolled in the course for nonscience majors tended to construct a progressively more in-
tegrated framework over the semester when compared to females, even though they had as-
similated substantially fewer concepts. This finding may be significant inasmuch as many
cognitive scientists think that the cohesiveness of a knowledge framework is especially impor-
tant in the efficient use of that knowledge (Gobbo & Chi, 1989).
Novak and Gowin (1984) have suggested that males and females may develop different
learning styles as a result of their socialization, and that “females are more acquiescent, and
accept the primarily rote learning characteristic of much school learning, whereas males more
frequently use the more meaningful learning strategies necessary for success in complex
problem solving in strongly hierarchical disciplines.” In our view this conclusion is somewhat
premature; however, it addresses a significant problem that may have its roots deeply embed-
ded in our social fabric or possibly even our biological makeup. Recent studies in the neurobi-
ology of cognition have shown, for example, that males and females differ in the cerebral
localization of certain cognitive functions (Gur et al., 1995).
Perhaps women excel in the accretion of verbal knowledge and men integrate knowledge
more effectively. If so, it might give new meaning to the claim that males and females have
different “ways of knowing.” It might also account for observed differences in performance
on some measures of scientific achievement. On the other hand, in the present studies the ef-
fects of gender on integration were significant only among the nonmajors. What if anything
214 PEARSALL ET AL.

does this tell us about women who choose to enter scientific disciplines? In any case, we think
that further study of knowledge construction in the natural sciences is especially important at
this time and that future work needs to focus more systematically on the issue of gender as a
potentially important mediator of meaningful learning.

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