Ethics

Definitions.
To explain what spinoza understands by "definition" we need to examine his letters.
In letter 8, de Vries tells Spinoza that the group couldn't agree on what does
Spinoza understand when he say definition.
In Letter 9, (Letter 9, G IV.42�3/ C I.194), Spinoza explain to de Vries what he
understand by "definition":
There are two ways to think about what a definition is.
1.On the one hand, a definition can be a kind of CONVENTION or SETUP about what
something is to mean in a given context, for example, when euclid says that "a
point is that which has no part", he can be read as meaning something like the
following: "for my purposes, this is how i shall understend the term".
On this conception of definition, it makes no sense to ask whether the definition
is true or false. This kind of definition can be purely arbitrary.
2.On the other hand, a definition can indicate the way something really is in
itself (this is the case with definitions of things, as opposed to definitions of
words).
A definition either explains a thing as it is (in itself), outside the intellect or
else it explains a thing as we conceive it or can conceive it
Naturally, one will want to know how Spinoza can be so sure � and, more
importantly, how he can persuade us � that these definitions are true. Because
they are definitions, he does not immediately provide any arguments for them.
Spinoza thinks that the definitions are self-evidently true.
One possibility is that the definitions are �proven� by their consequences. Spinoza
believes that one acquires greater knowledge of a cause by coming to a greater
knowledge of its effects: �Knowledge of the effect is nothing but acquiring a more
perfect knowledge of its cause�. Thus, the more one sees how much follows from a
given set of definitions, the greater is one�s knowledge of those starting points.

Axioms.
Spinoza also believes that the truth of an axiom is not something that requires
independent proof, but should be evident to any sufficiently attentive mind.
Axiom III. From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily;
and, conversely, if there is no determinate cause no
effect can follow.
The second part of this axiom is simply a claim of universal causality: nothing
happens without a determinate cause; there are no spontaneous or uncaused
events.The first part of the axiom represents causal necessitarianism: the
relationship between a cause and its effect is a necessary one. In fact, Spinoza�s
claim here, as we shall see, will turn out to be quite strong. He believes that the
necessity that is found between a cause and its effect is a logical necessity. If x
is the (only) cause of y, then if x occurs it is logically impossible that y not
occur.
Axiom IV. Knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge
of its cause. (This axiom plays a crucial role throughout the Ethics, as Spinoza
will go on to claim that obtaining the most perfect knowledge of things in the
world around us � the knowledge that is the key to our well-being � involves
knowing their higher causes in Nature, up to and including God itself.)
For example, water is one of the causes of rain. Rain, among others, depends on
water, both in terms of its being and in terms of the true understanding of it:
there is no being of rain without the prior being of water, and you cannot fully
know what rain is without knowing what water is. The being and knowledge of the e?
ect (rain) depend on the being and the knowledge of the cause (water).
Causes may sometimes be distinguished into two types: necessary and sufficient.A
third type of causation, which requires neither necessity nor sufficiency in and of
itself, but which contributes to the effect, is called a "contributory cause."
*Necessary causes
If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the
prior occurrence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will
occur.[14]
*Sufficient causes
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the
subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y.
Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.[14]
*Contributory causes
For some specific effect, in a singular case, a factor that is a contributory cause
is one amongst several co-occurrent causes. It is implicit that all of them are
contributory. For the specific effect, in general, there is no implication that a
contributory cause is necessary, though it may be so. In general, a factor that is
a contributory cause is not sufficient, because it is by definition accompanied by
other causes, which would not count as causes if it were sufficient. For the
specific effect, a factor that is on some occasions a contributory cause might on
some other occasions be sufficient, but on those other occasions it would not be
merely contributory.[15]

Propositions.
They are the substantive conclusions.
In P1-5 Spinoza will establish that there cannot be two or more substances having
the same nature or attribute
In P6-11 he will prove that there necessarily is a substance with infinite (i.e.,
all possible) attributes, namely (by definition) God.
It follows, in conclusion, that the existence of that infinite substance precludes
the existence of any other substance