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An Initiative of MADE EASY Group

INTERVIEW GUIDANCE PROGRAMME


CSE-2017

International Relations

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CONTENTS
1. India-Afghanistan Air Corridor .............................................................................. 1
2. Kabul-Mumbai Air Corridor.................................................................................... 2
3. New Af-Pak Policy of U.S. ....................................................................................... 2
4. China-Af-Pak Trilateral ............................................................................................ 4
5. Nawaz Sharif Removed as PM ................................................................................ 5
6. Dealing with Pakistan (View of Standing Committee) ........................................ 6
7. UNSCR 1267 ............................................................................................................... 8
8. Militant Political Parties ........................................................................................... 9
9. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ................................................................................ 10
10. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) ........................................................ 15
11. Doklam Stand-Off Ends .......................................................................................... 16
12. XI Jinping Thought: A New Era ............................................................................ 18
13. Expert Panel on Border ........................................................................................... 21
14. Panchsheel – (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) ..................................... 22
15. The Brahmaputra Conundrum .............................................................................. 23
16. Rohingya ................................................................................................................... 27
17. Renaissance in India-Myanmar Relations............................................................ 32
18. Kaladan ..................................................................................................................... 34
19. IMT Highway ........................................................................................................... 37
20. BCIM Economic Corridor ....................................................................................... 38
21. BIMSTEC ................................................................................................................... 42
22. Rina Mitra Committee on Indo-Myanmar Border .............................................. 45
23. Hambantota: The Next Djibouti? .......................................................................... 45
24. Fishermen Problem in India-Sri Lanka Relations ............................................... 48
25. High Seas .................................................................................................................. 49
26. Bottom Trawling Ban .............................................................................................. 49
27. SL Reconciliation Post Eelam War ........................................................................ 50
28. Nepal-China Mega Hydropower Agreement ..................................................... 53
29. India, Japan Civil Nuclear Deal ............................................................................. 53
30. North Korea – U.S. Tension.................................................................................... 54
31. Hwasong-15 .............................................................................................................. 57
32. India–Asean Trade .................................................................................................. 59
33. Does India Need Thermonuclear Weapons ......................................................... 60
34. Rise of Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) ................................................................ 62
35. Saudi Arabia’s Economic Challenges ................................................................... 64

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36. Saudi-UAE Partnership .......................................................................................... 65


37. Us Iran Nuclear Deal ............................................................................................... 66
38. American Shadown over India-Iran Relations .................................................... 69
39. India–Iran Chabahar Port ....................................................................................... 70
40. Growing International Recognition of Palestine................................................. 74
41. India-Israel Relations .............................................................................................. 76
42. Lebanon ..................................................................................................................... 77
43. Kurdistan .................................................................................................................. 80
44. Qatar .......................................................................................................................... 81
45. Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) ................................................................. 85
46. Djibouti ...................................................................................................................... 87
47. Decline in Gulf Jobs ................................................................................................. 89
48. Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill of 2017 ................................... 90
49. Hurdles in EU-India FTA ....................................................................................... 90
50. Catalonia ................................................................................................................... 92
51. International Students Considered ‘Migrants’ in Britain .................................. 94
52. Gun Violence in America ...................................................................................... 95
53. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) .............................................. 96
54. Raise Act ................................................................................................................... 96
55. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) ........................................................................... 97
56. Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) ........................................................................... 100
57. Quad ........................................................................................................................ 103
58. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)....................................................... 106
59. US Withdrawal from the UNESCO .................................................................... 107
60. Dalveer Bhandari Re-Elected to ICJ .................................................................... 108
61. Bhutan’s Exit from BBIN Agreement ................................................................. 111
62. G-20 Hamburg Summit ........................................................................................ 112
62. Strengthening Indo-Russia Relations Recommendations ............................... 114
63. 100th Anniversary of Russia’s October Revolution ........................................... 116
64. Carmichael Project ................................................................................................. 117
65. Antarctica Policy and Law ................................................................................... 119

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INDIA-AFGHANISTAN AIR CORRIDOR


Recently, news emerged that India-Afghanistan air corridor has been hit by shortage of
cargo planes.
OVERVIEW OF AIR CORRIDOR:
● In 2016, it was decided to establish an air corridor connecting the two countries. The plan
developed by Afghanistan president Mr. Ghani himself, allows traders to pay what they would
have to transport their goods by road and the Afghan government underwriting the rest.
● The corridor was inaugurated in June 2017 and it passes through the airspace of Pakistan.
● India is hoping to eventually extend air cargo flights to other cities.
SIGNIFICANCE:
1. Afghanistan is landlocked, due to which it has to depend on Pakistan for its trade. But Despite the
signing of Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), Pakistan has often impeded
the Afghan exports and imports.
2. Afghanistan and India don’t share border. Their only access is via Iran and Pakistan but there
access has been limited due to following issues:
a. Pakistan’s obstructionist behaviour: Although (based on the APTTA) Afghan trucks had the
right to export limited amount of perishable goods over Pakistani territory via the Wagah
crossing point to India, It did not offer Afghanistan the right to import Indian goods across
Pakistani territory.
b. Insufficient follow-through on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline
after its inauguration in 2015.
c. Delay in development of Chabahar port in Iran.
3. The corridor is expected to boost annual trade between the two countries from $700 million to
$1 billion in three years.
4. India is the second largest destination for exports from Afghanistan, but lack of easy access has
been a dampener. It would enable Afghan farmers quick and direct access to the Indian markets
for their perishable produce.
5. It will open up access for India to not just Afghanistan but also Central Asian markets.
CRITICAL COMMENT:
1. Just making a plan won’t do anything. Recent news has revealed that apart from shortage of cargo
planes, there are procedural delays and shortage of “cargo screening machines” (that necessitates
packaging and repackaging) and cold storage facilities (leading to loss of perishable items) at the
airport.
2. Air route (which is expensive) is not a substitute to land route which is cheap. Thus work on
improving relations with Pakistan so that it gives us access to Afghanistan; If necessary then raise
the issue at SAARC. Also expedite the work on Chabahar port.

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KABUL-MUMBAI AIR CORRIDOR


India and Afghanistan launched an air freight corridor service connecting Kabul with
Mumbai.
About:
 This comes six months after a similar
corridor connected Kabul with Delhi.
 Significance:
o Since the launch of the corridor
to New Delhi, fruits and
medicines worth $20 million
had been imported by India.
o Afghanistan hopes that
connectivity with India’s commercial capital would increase fruit exports from
Afghanistan. India is not imposing taxes on Afghan traders.
o The recent development comes as Afghanistan joined Pakistan and China in a trilateral
talk in Beijing which marked Kabul’s opening up to Islamabad.

NEW AF-PAK POLICY OF U.S.


In late august 2017, US President Donald Trump announced a new “Af-Pak” policy.

BACKGROUND
 BUSH ERA: Operation Enduring Freedom
o The war in Afghanistan was launched with the full support of the international community
in 2001 after 9/11 under the name operation enduring freedom.
o But it got derailed as the US shifted focus towards Iraq from 2003 onwards.
o Subsequently Taliban launched their insurgency in 2005 after they had regrouped,
refinanced and re-equipped themselves from their sanctuary in Pakistan. Since then, the
insurgency has gathered momentum.
 OBAMA ERA: Operation resolute support and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel
o After taking over in 2009, President Barack Obama announced that the withdrawal of
troop would commence in 2011, and by 2014 the Afghan security forces would take
charge of all combat operations.
o Operation Enduring Freedom formally concluded on December 28, 2014, which was
replaced by Operation Resolute Support (under which approximately 8,400 US soldiers &
5,000 from allies stayed behind to “advise, train and assist” the Afghan security forces). In
addition, under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, the US maintains 2,000 soldiers in
Afghanistan, for counter-terrorism operations, described
o However, withdrawl of U.S. only encouraged the Taliban insurgency and also exposed the
shortcomings of the Afghan army and the police forces, in terms of numbers, training and
Equipment to deal with it. Infact, Islamic State is establishing it’s presence there.
o Initially, Operation Resolute Support too was to conclude by end-2016 but faced with a
difficult political and security situation, Mr. Obama decided to pass on the decision to his
successor.

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ABOUT TRUMP’S NEW “AF-PAK” POLICY

The component of this new policy of USA consists of Expansion in Afghanistan, Criticism of Pakistan
and outreach to India.

1) Expansion in Afghanistan:

There will be an additional deployment of 4,000 soldiers to train and buttress Afghan forces, which
will increase the total number of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan to 16,000. The new strategy, will be
dictated by “the conditions on the ground” instead of “arbitrary timetables”.

 A shift from his earlier position on the war in Afghanistan: In 2013 he stated that we should
rebuild U.S., not Afghanistan. In 16 years, more than $800 billion have been spent and nearly 2,400
US soldiers have lost their lives in Afghanistan.
 Why a shift in policy towards Afghanistan? It has been done to avoid the collapse of the US-
backed government in Afghanistan as a hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for terrorists.
 Will the policy be effective? Deploying 16,000 troops in total would hardly change anything on
the ground when some 100,000 American troops at the beginning of Obama presidency failed to
do so.
2) criticism of Pakistan:
Pakistan was criticised for being a safe haven for terrorists and it was further stated that if Pakistan
doesn’t change its approach then U.S. would have to reassess its partnership with Pakistan.
 U.S. has to rely on Pakistan for ensuring supply to its troops in Afghanistan because other possible
access routes through Iran or though Russia and Kyrgyzstan are not feasible as
o Sanctions on Iran has been increased and
o US base in Kyrgyzstan closed in 2014 under Russian pressure.
 In return, Pakistan secures billions of dollars in US civilian and military aid.
 But now president trump is changings the policy.
o E.g. Aid to Pakistan has declined from $3.5 billion in 2011 to less than $1 billion.
o Also Pakistan has been placed alongside North Korea and Iran as countries which are being
watched closely by Trump administration.
 But confronting Pakistan is difficult because
o Decline in Military aid is being compensated by the flow of investments from its all-
weather friend China.
o Whenever pressure is put on Pakistan, it restricts the movement of trucks carrying
supplies to US forces in landlocked Afghanistan.
 Anyways, Indian administration welcomed the new approach of criticism of cross-border
terrorism.
3) OUTREACH TO INDIA:
It was stated that a “critical part” of the new South Asia policy is to further develop the US’s strategic
partnership with India. India has contributed to stability in Afghanistan, but U.S. wants more
assistance from Indian in Afghanistan, esp. in the area of economic assistance and development.
It is a remarkable turnaround as:

 India was viewed as part of the problem of Afghan imbroglio. But now India is being viewed as a
part of a solution.
 U.S. had wanted to keep India out of its “Af-Pak” policy so that Pakistan is not offended.

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Way ahead for India:

Although India welcome President Donald Trump’s new assertive policy in Afghanistan, sceptics
wonder if U.S. has the political will to put pressure on Pakistan to stop hosting terror sanctuaries on
its soil.

But no matter what, India should take steps to seize the opportunity opened up by his new policy to
raise India’s profile in Afghanistan.

A positive Indian approach would involve three elements

1. Economic: India must ramp up its economic diplomacy in Afghanistan to bring immediate benefits
to Kabul amidst the deteriorating conditions in the country.
2. Security: India must step up security cooperation with Afghanistan, especially in the training of its
police and armed forces and intelligence sharing.
3. Diplomatic: On the diplomatic front, India must counter the emerging argument that Trump’s new
approach will intensify the “Indo-Pak rivalry” in Afghanistan and the old one that Kashmir holds
the key to peace in Afghanistan.

CHINA-AF-PAK TRILATERAL
China offered to extend the CPEC project to Afghanistan.

China-Afghanistan-Pakistan dialogue:

 Timeline:
o In June 2017, the three
countries agreed to
establish a trilateral
dialogue mechanism.
o IN December 2017, the first
trilateral meeting of foreign
ministers of China, Pakistan
and Afghanistan was held in
Beijing, China.
 Objectives of trilateral dialogue:
o Facilitating dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan
o Reinforcing trilateral cooperation in politics, economy and security.
o Support Afghanistan’s peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation peace process
 Outcomes of first Meeting:
o China offered to extend the $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project
to Afghanistan.
o The three sides pledged to step-up counter terrorism cooperation.
o Consensus was reached on eight-point plan to bring peace between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.

Significance for Trilateral:

 Growing influence in South Asia: This is China’s another ambitious move in South Asia apart from
being an impressive display of China’s growing global clout as USA reorients itself with an inward-
looking perspective.

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 Strategic interests: China is concerned that Uyghur militants active in the resource-rich Xinjiang
region would find sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So closer cooperation with and
between these two nations is viewed as essential.
 Economic interests: The trilateral platform is also being used by China to push Pakistan and
Afghanistan toward forging closer economic cooperation at a time when China’s economic
interest in Pakistan is at an all-time high.

Challenges:

 Complicated Afghan-Pakistan ties:


o Afghanistan continues to blame Pakistan for providing a safe haven for the Taliban
militants seeking to destabilize the government in Kabul.
o Afghanistan does not officially recognize the international border with Pakistan. Instead,
it has territorial claims on areas comprising nearly 60 percent of Pakistani territory.
o Thus, it is unlikely that the trust deficit between Afghanistan and Pakistan will reduce in
the near future despite Chinese mediation.
 Issues with CPEC:
o Moreover, the CPEC project has become more complicated as Pakistani domestic debate
questioning the lack of transparency, Chinese financing methods, and labor policies.

Way ahead for India:

 India should not be too worried about the rhetoric coming out the recent trilateral.
 But it should think more creatively about building a robust partnership with Afghanistan and
providing an alternative narrative to China’s very attractive connectivity initiatives.

NAWAZ SHARIF REMOVED AS PM


Recently Pakistan’s supreme court disqualified PM Nawaz Sharif from holding public office on
account of concealment of assets in his nomination papers for the 2013 General Elections
which were revealed in the Panama Leaks.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS:

● Subsequently Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was elected as PM.


● Shahbaz Sharif, the former PM’s younger brother and currently CM of Punjab, is expected to
succeed Mr. Abbasi in six weeks after his election to the National Assembly.
PROBABLE IMPACT OF THIS DECISION:

On Pakistan:

● Till date no civilian prime minister has ever completed a full five-year term in Pakistan.
● This verdict might push Pakistan into further political turmoil after a period of relative stability.
● Through this judgment the court has established its independence in a system where army is most
powerful. In future, elected civilian government through democracy may put pressure on the
Supreme Court to hold the various corrupt military generals accountable.
On CPEC:

● In future, it may lead to growing uncertainty over CPEC project and other investments due to
security fears and tough business climate.

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On India:

● Sections of Indian media have expressed apprehensions that this will lead to greater border
tensions due to increasing role of Army in the absence of stable political leadership.
● However, other experts argued that earlier also Army had the last word on policy towards India.
Thus, India should not be much bothered about these developments in Pakistan.

DEALING WITH PAKISTAN (View of Standing Committee)


The Standing Committee on External Affairs (Chaired by Shashi Tharoor) submitted a
report on ‘Indo-Pak relations’ in August, 2017.
Key observations and recommendations made by the Committee include:

AREAS OBSERVATION RECOMMENDATION


BORDER A volatile situation exists across the Complete the Comprehensive Integrated
MANAGEMENT border. Border Management System in a time
AND SECURITY Road conditions across the border bound manner.
are in poor condition. Strengthen coastal security by ensuring
coordination between Coast Guard,
Navy, CISF etc.
TERRORISM Pakistani sponsored terrorism Continue pressuring Pakistan to expedite
continues to exist. the 26/11 Mumbai attack trials. It
further recommended
Clearly spelt out the military and non-
military policy options to deal with
Pakistani sponsored terrorism.
SURGICAL Limited counter terrorism This policy should be continued along
STRIKES operation (surgical strikes) was with diplomatic outreach to highlight
carried out by the Indian Army terrorism supported by Pakistan.
along the Line of Control (LoC) in
September 2016.
The surgical strikes demonstrate a
restrained response, and hence do
not indicate a change in India’s
policy of ‘strategic restraint’.
JAMMU AND There is increasing alienation in the Ensure infrastructure and economic
KASHMIR Kashmiri youth due to radicalisation development, and preventing
supported by Pakistan and lack of radicalisation of the youth.
employment opportunities.
NUCLEAR AND The nuclear doctrines of the two Government must aggregate its nuclear
MISSILE countries are contradictory. India capability and enhance its deterrence
PROGRAMME follows the ‘no first use of nuclear capabilities.
weapons’ policy, and Pakistan does
not.
Further, there is a growing
cooperation between China and
Pakistan in missile and nuclear
programmes.
ECONOMIC Trade between the two countries Pursue Pakistan for (i) extending MFN
ENGAGEMENT exhibits great potential. status to India, (ii) the removal of trade
Under the WTO agreement, India restrictions on land routes, and (iii)
had extended the Most Favoured

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Nation (MFN) status to all WTO allowing transit of Indian exports to


members, including Pakistan. Afghanistan through Pakistan.
However, Pakistan has not
reciprocated.
The MFN principle prohibits
discrimination among similar
products from different countries.
INTEGRATED Several infrastructural issues exist The Committee recommended that the
CHECK POST at the ICP, Attari: (i) limited storage efficiency of the ICP be improved through
(ICP) space, (ii) lack of mechanised technological handling.
loading/unloading, and (iii)
inadequate cargo holding.
SAARC By blocking major regional Government should undertake
development projects, Pakistan has constructive engagements to implement
made SAARC dysfunctional. the SAARC Regional Convention on
In response to Pakistan-sponsored ‘Suppression of Terrorism’.
terrorism, Bangladesh, Afghanistan
and Nepal withdrew from the
proposed SAARC summit in 2016.

NAWAZ SHARIF REMOVED AS PM


Recently Pakistan’s supreme court disqualified PM Nawaz Sharif from holding public office on
account of concealment of assets in his nomination papers for the 2013 General Elections
which were revealed in the Panama Leaks.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS:

● Subsequently Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was elected as PM.


● Shahbaz Sharif, the former PM’s younger brother and currently CM of Punjab, is expected to
succeed Mr. Abbasi in six weeks after his election to the National Assembly.
PROBABLE IMPACT OF THIS DECISION:

On Pakistan:

● Till date no civilian prime minister has ever completed a full five-year term in Pakistan.
● This verdict might push Pakistan into further political turmoil after a period of relative stability.
● Through this judgment the court has established its independence in a system where army is most
powerful. In future, elected civilian government through democracy may put pressure on the
Supreme Court to hold the various corrupt military generals accountable.
On CPEC:

● In future, it may lead to growing uncertainty over CPEC project and other investments due to
security fears and tough business climate.
On India:

● Sections of Indian media have expressed apprehensions that this will lead to greater border
tensions due to increasing role of Army in the absence of stable political leadership.
● However, other experts argued that earlier also Army had the last word on policy towards India.
Thus, India should not be much bothered about these developments in Pakistan.

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UNSCR 1267
China has again blocked a US proposal to designate Jaish-e-Mohammed's chief Masood
Azhar as an international terrorist by the UNSC sanctions committee.

UNSCR 1267 Committee:

United Nations Security Council resolution 1267

 In 1999, the U.N. had set up an al-Qaeda/Taliban sanctions committee (UNSCR 1267) to impose
strictures on anyone dealing with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.
 It took two years and the 9/11 attacks for the JeM to be designated a terror group by the UNSC
1267 sanctions committee in 2001.
 In 2015, the UNSC renamed it as the “ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee”
(UNSCR/2253).
Masood Azhar:

 He is a Pakistani national who was released by India in 1999 in return for hostages who had been
hijacked on the Indian Airlines Flight 814 (IC-814).
 In his own book “From Imprisonment to Freedom”, he has openly stated about the links to
Taliban.
 He was also responsible for the January, 2016 attack on Pathankot.
India's demand to censor him:

 In September 2016, India asked the 1267 committee to consider banning of Masood Azhar, the
head of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, which was already a banned entity.
 Censuring Azhar would result in freezing his financial assets and cutting off supply of funds to his
terror organisation.
 But China has blocked India’s attempts to list Masood Azhar in the agenda of the 1267 committee.
India’s reaction:

 India reacted angrily to the Chinese move and called it “short-sighted and counter-productive“.
India believes that china is trying to protect Pakistan because censuring Azhar will expose Pakistan
as a safe haven for terrorists.
 The Azhar episode also displayed the limitations of the UNSC'S 1267 committee, showing that the
exercise of veto has afflicted the counter-terrorism centre as well.
 There is also the Unspoken fact that the India-sponsored Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism has not got anywhere due to global differences on the issue of tackling
terrorism.
 Seeking reform of the working of the committee, India said the committee was non-transparent
and it had to address procedural shortcomings.

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MILITANT POLITICAL PARTIES

Incredible Pakistan: “Political parties having militant wings” to “militant groups having political wings”
In the by-elections held in October 2017, militant political parties participated which
although lost, but performed well.
BACKGROUND:

 In August, 2017, Pakistan’s erstwhile Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was declared ineligible to hold
his office by the country’s Supreme Court on a corruption charge.
 Subsequently, Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD), the public charity wing of the Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT)
terrorist group declared that it would enter politics and field a candidate to contest elections for
Nawaz Sharif’s vacated seat, NA-120, in Lahore.
 This new political party, which calls itself the Milli Muslim League (MML), was the LeT’s first foray
into electoral politics.
 Another party that chose to contest elections is the Tehreek-e Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), the political
party avatar of the Barelvi extremist group Tehreek-e Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLY), which openly
declares support for Mumtaz Qadri, the Barelvi extremist who killed Punjab governor Salman
Taseer.
ELECTION RESULT:
 Kulsoom Nawaz, the wife of the ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, won the NA-120 by-poll by
a substantial margin.
 The result was along expected lines as the constituency is a Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-
N) stronghold.
 However, the party suffered a loss in terms of the absolute number of votes cast in its favour.
 What came as a surprise to many was that the two militant parties, the MML and TLP, did well
for first-timers by finishing fourth and third respectively behind the PML-N and Imran Khan’s
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).
 They got more votes than Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), a left of centre party once known for
its Pan-Pakistan appeal, which was placed 5th.
REASONS FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE:
a) Public sympathy:
 Much before its jump into electoral politics, the LeT had already been trying to present a ‘softer
image’ of itself through charity work esp. after earthquakes and floods in a bid to boost its
popularity and public acceptability.

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 The group’s public outreach programme has undoubtedly been strong and has led to the creation
of considerable goodwill within society, with many people seeing the organisation of being
capable of delivering services that the Pakistani State itself is unable to deliver.
 The LeT has also tried to push a ‘pro minorities’ image by allowing the occasional Sikh speaker at
their rallies and donating to impoverished Hindu families in Sindh.
 In this context, it is pertinent to note that some Tharparkar Hindus protested against Hafiz Saeed’s
house arrest in February of 2017.

b) Role of Army:

 As admitted by retired Lt. General Amjad Shuaib himself and others, Pakistan Army is behind the
entry of these militant groups into electoral politics, apparently to bring them into the mainstream
of the political process so as to ‘deradicalise’ them.
 International sanctions on the LeT leadership had forced the Pakistani Army in the early 2000s, to
try and create a ‘softer image’ for the group.

CRITICISM OF PAKISTAN’S ARMY MAINSTREAMING POLICY:

In 2011, Supreme Court of Pakistan had observed that political parties have militant wings, but
now militant groups having political wings of their own…..coming full circle.

 The mainstreaming argument doesn’t hold water as these militant parties are not shelving their
militant ideologies for mainstream ones, instead, they seek to project their militant ideologies
onto the mainstream political canvas.
 Earlier also Pakistan’s Army attempted the same but all this only led to the death, destruction and
chaos on its soil.
 It may not take long for a group earmarked as a ‘good’ terrorist group to turn into a ‘bad’ terrorist
group because of the threat of splinter elements going rouge, as evinced by the Jaish-e
Mohammed (JeM) assassination attempt on General Musharraf.

BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)


One Belt One Road (OBOR)
China hosted the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) from May 14 to May 15 in Beijing where high-level
delegations, including 29 Heads of State gathered to discuss china’s strategy on belt and road
imitative.
Belt and Road Forum (BRF)

Some of the key highlights of the forum were:

 Agreement was signed to deepen cooperation on china-Europe railway.


 China pledged additional RMB 100 billion ($14.5 billion) into the Silk Road Fund.
 China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank will set up new lending schemes of 250 billion
($36.2 billion) and RMB 130 billion ($18.8 billion), respectively, for Belt and Road projects.
 China will also provide RMB 60 billion ($8.7 billion) for humanitarian efforts focused on food,
housing, health care, and poverty alleviation.

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BRI/OBOR

 The Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project was launched
by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013.
 The project intends to link Asia with Europe and Africa through an overland “belt” and a maritime
silk “road”.
 But it is more than that as it involves
o the export of Chinese capital, labor, technology,
o the use of the Yuan and
o the development of new ports, industrial hubs, special economic zones and military
facilities, under Beijing’s auspices.

Ancient Silk Road

More than 2,000 years ago, China’s imperial envoy Zhang Qian helped to establish the Silk Road, a
network of trade routes that linked China to Central Asia and the Arab world.
The name came from one of China’s most important exports—silk.
And the road itself influenced the development of the entire region for hundreds of years.
Taking reference from the historic Silk Road, which transformed the nature of international trade
links in ancient times, the Belt and Road Initiative (according to Chinese government) offers a
modern-day solution that fosters inclusive growth and development in the 21st century.

Components

The project consists of two main components

 The land-based "Silk Road Economic Belt" (SREB) which consists of six land condors (see below)
and
 Oceangoing "Maritime Silk Road" (MSR).

1 New Eurasian Land It will run from Western China to Western Russia
Bridge
2 China - Mongolia - It will run from Northern China to Eastern Russia
Russia Corridor

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3 China - Central Asia It Will Run From Western China To Turkey


- West Asia
Corridor
4 China - Indochina It will run from Southern China to Singapore
Peninsula Corridor
5 China - Pakistan It will run from South-Western China to Pakistan.
Corridor The CPEC in particular is often regarded as the link between China's
maritime and overland silk road, with the port of Gwadar forming
the crux of the CPEC project.
6 Bangladesh - China it will run from Southern China to India
- India – Myanmar
Corridor
7 Maritime Silk Road It will run from the Chinese Coast over Singapore and India to the
Mediterranean.

Why has china launched it?

 Bridging the infrastructure gap in Asia:


o According to china, the Belt and Road Initiative will bridge the 'infrastructure gap' and
thus accelerate economic growth across the Asia Pacific area and Central and Eastern
Europe.
o According to various economists, Asia alone (excluding China) will need up to $900 billion
in infrastructure investments annually in the next 10 years.
 Economic motives of china:
o OBOR is aimed at boosting domestic growth in China which has slipped in recent years. In
2016 china grew by 6.7%which is the lowest since 1990.
o According to experts OBOR is a second phase of ‘opening up’. Experts also believe that
China feels “isolated” as it is not involved with G7, and is limited to the BRICS countries.
Thus OBOR provides china another window to continue its economic expansion.
o OBOR also provides china a market to sells its product produce esp. steel. With the
massive demand creation of the BRI project, China will solve the problem of huge
overcapacity in its domestic industries, especially steel.
 Global leadership:
o But some feel that BRI is more out of political motivation rather than real demand for
infrastructure.
o It is a masterstroke by China to establish itself as a world-leading economy and to spread
its power, particularly in the South Asian region at the expense of US.
o One Belt, One Road has been contrasted with the two US-centric trading arrangements,
the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
o According to experts based in Washington, china wants to seize the global leadership from
U.S. Since it cannot match the US government’s defence spending, China has come up
with the BRI to win over Eurasia with international economic cooperation.

Why India has not joined BRI?

India didn’t attended the belt and road forum, not even as an observer as india is apprehensive about
the belt and road initiative.

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India's reservations, according to the Ministry of External Affairs, are threefold.

1. The primary objection is that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (part of BRI) passes though
Gilgit-Baltistan region and thus ignores India’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity”. According to
political commentators, merely changing the name of CPEC to CSEC (China South Asian Economic
Corridor) – as china has offered to India – will not address India’s grievances.
2. Second, BRI would lead to Chinese neo-colonialism causing
a. unsustainable debt burden for communities and
b. an adverse impact on the environment in the partner countries.
3. And three, New Delhi there is a lack of transparency in China’s agenda. Some experts believe that
B&RI is not just an economic project but one that China is promoting for political control.

Criticism of India’s decision

Now some have criticized india for not joining BRI as

 India may also face some difficult choices in the road ahead, because as a member of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and a co-founder of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and (from
June 2017) it will be asked to support many of the projects under the B&RI.
 By this India will isolate itself amidst the apparently growing international support for the
ambitious project.
 The partner countries will benefit as this will lead to inflow of billions of dollars in loans for projects
 Even countries such as U.S. and Japan, which are not a part of the B&RI but sent official
delegations.

Counter-arguments to it

But diplomats based in India have counter-argued that

 International isolation is not India’s biggest problem as India is too large an economic and political
entity to be isolated by another power.
 And China needs our market more than India needs Chinese investment

Challenges posed by BRI to India

But no matter what the experts say, BRI definitely poses two geo-political challenges:

 China in Kashmir: China is gradually emerging the real third force in Kashmir. Since 1950s, China
is in occupation of Aksai chin; In 1963, Pakistan ceded Trans-Karakoram Tract (Shaksgam Tract) to
china; China’s first trans-border infrastructure project in Kashmir — the Karakoram Highway —
dates back to the late 1960s and now it’s presence is increasing further with CPEC. Thus China
looms larger than ever before over J&K.
 China’s in south Asia: BRI will massively strengthen China’s commercial, economic, political and
security influence in South Asia marginalize Delhi’s regional primacy.

Way ahead for India

1. Improve infrastructure in frontier regions:

Whether it is in Kashmir, Arunachal, the Andamans or the neighbourhood, India’s neglect of its frontier
regions has weakened its regional position. Thus we should improve infrastructure in frontier regions.

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Kashmir  Delhi must step up the effort to modernize and deepen J&K’s connectivity with the rest
of India.
Arunachal  While China asks India to downplay the sovereignty argument in Pakistan occupied
Kashmir, but it objects to India’s activity Arunachal Pradesh.
 In Arunachal, India should accelerate the state’s economic development and its
connectivity to the rest of India.
Andaman  India should realize the strategic importance of Andaman and Nicobar islands that sit
across China’s planned maritime silk routes in the eastern Indian Ocean.
 Thus we should devote high-level political attention to the long-neglected islands. By that
only we can cope with the maritime dimension of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

2. Improve internal connectivity:

 Then we should improve our own internal connectivity.


 We should remember that China’s BRI did not start out as an external initiative. It was built on the
existing internal “Go West” strategy launched two decades ago, that has focused on unifying
China’s domestic market and connecting its developed east coast with the interior provinces.

3. Improve connectivity with neighbors

 India should modernize connectivity across its land and maritime frontiers with its neighbors in
the Subcontinent, South East Asia and the Gulf by completing our projects in these regions.
 China has not stopped India from building road and rail links to its borders.

4. Collaborate with Japan under it’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure:

 India can work with nations like Japan and multilateral institutions in developing regional
connectivity in the Subcontinent and beyond.
 Japan has already outlined a Belt and Road initiative of its own, called the Partnership for Quality
Infrastructure under which Japan has put up nearly $150 billion to support infrastructure projects
all across the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia.
 India should also improve our access to Europe by expediting projects like INSTC and others.

5. About participation in CPEC & overall BRI

 On BRI: Delhi must, however, focus on debating the specific terms of individual projects rather
than having to say “Yes” or “No” to the BRI as a whole.
 On CPEC: India should check that whether Pakistani and Chinese are serious about Indian
participation in CPEC. In the past India has made specific proposals to both Pakistan and China
regarding cross-border infrastructure cooperation in Kashmir. For this India must now articulate a
political framework for economic cooperation across the contested frontiers of Kashmir in all
directions.

Steps taken by India

Project  Launched in: 2015.


Sagarmala  Objective: Transforming the existing Ports into modern world class Ports
and integrate the development of the Ports, the Industrial clusters and
hinterland and efficient evacuation systems through road, rail, inland and
coastal waterways resulting

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Project  NDA government announced the initiative in 2014.


Mausam  It will study monsoon winds that helped sailors in ancient times en route to
South East Asia in reducing sailing time.
The project exists at two levels
 At the macro level, it aims to re-connect and re-establish communications
between countries of the Indian Ocean world, which would lead to an
enhanced understanding of cultural values and concerns.
 At the micro level, the focus is on understanding national cultures in their
regional maritime milieu.
Heritage status:
 One of the key objective of this project is nomination of maritime cultural
landscapes across the Indian Ocean as a trans-national property on the
World Heritage List of UNESCO.
 Once it gets the heritage status, no other project can interfere with the
designated area, apparently being done to counter the swelling Chinese
influence in the Indian Ocean Region.
 However, China is countering it on the pretext that it will affect its proposal
to revive the maritime silk route.”

CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC)


 It is a 3,000 km route that will link china’s under-developed far-western region (Kashgar in
Xinjiang) to Pakistan’s gwadar deep sea port on the Arabian sea via POK through a network of
roads, railways, business zones, energy schemes and pipelines
 It will be build at the cost of USD 46 billion
 It is expected to be ready in 3 years.
 Advantages for China –
o Will link the silk road with MSR
o It will give another point of access to Indian ocean bypassing Malacca strait where USA
has heavy military dominance
o Will shorten the route for china’s energy imports from the middle east by about 12,000
km.
o Gilgit baltistan adjoins the 225-km long Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan
o China has yet again tacitly approved Pakistan’s claim and control over this region.
 Threat to India and what should we do
o The CPEC project is meant to connect Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Province with the
strategic port of Gwadar in Pakistan which is seen as an important pearl in the string
around india. India may have the Chabahar Port with Iran; yet the volume of financial
backing that Gwadar Port receives from China is far superior to what India can match.
o CPEC project runs through the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK), an integral part of India. So in future China may emerge as a ‘direct party’
in the Kashmir dispute.
o China has heavy presence in the form of Karakoram Highway, establishing industrial parks
in special economic zones, constructing hydropower projects (kohala, neelum-jhelum and
chakothi-hattia) brings Chinese at our doorsteps. Around 3,000 chinese workers are
camping in POK

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 What should India do?


o Strange is the reaction of india who seems to have no worry over its construction. Modi
didn’t took up the issue of chinese presence in POK. India is yet to comprehensively
articulate its approach towards the CPEC despite the fact that the corridor bodes strategic
implications for India.
o Domestically, there has been, till now, no serious political or public debate on how India
should approach the issue.
o Thus India should openly articulate its claims over POK on a regular basis, a matter that is
closely linked to India’s sovereignty. It should raise the issue with china at bilateral level-
ask China to reconsider the execution of CPEC-related projects.

DOKLAM STAND-OFF ENDS


In august 2017, In a very positive development, India and China agreed to expeditiously
disengage the deployment of their respective armies from Doklam. However, the Chinese troops
would continue to patrol the Doklam area.
Doklam plateau is an 89 sq km pasture that falls close to Chumbi valley at the corner of India-Bhutan-
China tri-junction. It is not very far from the Sikkim sector.

ABOUT THE STAND-OFF:

 It began in June 2017, India accused China of constructing a road in the disputed territory towards
Doklam plateau and asked China to halt its construction work. Earlier the Royal Bhutanese Army
has also raised a similar objection.
 China, citing the 1890 China-Britain treaty, calls Doklam its own while Bhutan has disputed the
fact saying the convention applies to the India-Bhutan border, not Bhutan and China.
 Chinese troops even asked India to remove two bunkers that were set up in 2012 at Lalten in
Doklam plateau and later on destroyed these bunkers.
 Later, China asked Indian troops to withdraw from the Doklam region. In the aftermath of the
standoff, China refused to allow the entry of Kailash Mansarovar pilgrims into its territory through
the Nathu La Pass on the Sikkim border.

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Timeline

CHINESE INTENTION BEHIND IT:

Indian security experts mention following strategic benefits to China from a control of the Doklam
plateau.

1. it gives it a commanding view of the Chumbi valley itself.


2. Second, it outflanks the Indian defences in Sikkim which are currently oriented northeast towards
the Dongkya range.
3. Third, it overlooks the strategic Siliguri Corridor to the south.
a. A claim to the Mount Gipmochi and the Zompelri ridge would bring the Chinese to the
very edge of the Himalayas, from where the slopes descend into the southern foothills of
Bhutan and India.
b. From here, the Chinese would be able to monitor the Indian troop movements in the
plains or launch an attack on the vital Siliguri corridor in the event of a war.
4. The road construction move was likely a means of pressuring Bhutan to complete their border
negotiations with China and allow Beijing to establish an embassy in Thimphu.
POSSIBLE REASONS FOR DEFUSION OF CRISIS:

A number of factors can be attributed to the ending of the stand-off:

 Military and diplomatic maturity of the two countries didn’t allow the situation to escalate to
unmanageable proportions. Despite the Doklam incident, PM Modi reached out to President Xi
Jinping in a bilateral meeting on the margins of the G-20 Summit in Hamburg.
 India’s firm resolve not to yield to Chinese military pressure and to resist any advancement by
Chinese border personnel.
 Then there was moral & diplomatic support extended by major powers like the USA, Japan and
other friendly countries.
 The BRICS Summit was round the corner. If Doklam continued the way it was going, Indian PM
was likely to boycott the Summit. If that happened, it would have been India's second snub to
China after BRI which would have actually taken out much of the air out of BRICS.
 Later this year is slated the 19th Congress of the CPC, a forum where the President will try to
consolidate his position besides bringing in more of his protégés into the CPC. With Doklam going
this way, Xi was likely to face a stiff opposition from the Congress.
 Weather and terrain wise as well, Doklam would have been untenable after Oct/Nov. The only
way face-saving exit route was through the diplomatic door whose credit could be equally shared
by both sides;. it thus happened.

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LESSONS THAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM DOKLAM:

 Realize that Doklam is not the first and will not be the last face-off.
 The focus should now be on finalising and demarcating the boundary in this sector so as to avoid
the future recurrence of such standoffs.
 Stand firm and tall on what the nation considers its rightful position/possessions. The country is
sufficiently strong not to buckle (get deterred) under psychological/military pressure from China.
 Before the next Doklam-repeat presents itself, focused efforts must be directed to make up critical
deficiencies in the specific arms and munitions.
 On the diplomatic fronts as well as on the military front, India should strengthen its relations with
USA, Japan, Russia, France, Israel and UK.
 Defence diplomacy with Japan and Australia should also be foregrounded by giving membership
to Australia in Malabar exercise.
 India should also should resist attempts to turn BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation into
China-led clubs.
 This time must be utilised fully in making up critical deficiencies in a time bound manner.
 It is high time that the two countries focus their minds on larger issues of bilateral, regional and
global importance, than wasting precious time and energy on scoring points.

MESSAGE TO INDIA’S NEIGHBOUR:


 Doklam crisis was the first instance of India facing down Chinese troops on territory claimed by a
third country, Bhutan.
 It sends a strong message to India's neighbours that New Delhi can stand for them in the times of
crisis and there is no need to get bullied by China or succumb to Chinese military and economic
pressure to the extent of compromising sovereignty.
 Sri Lanka and Bangladesh may rethink their Chinese policy and come out stronger in dealing with
Beijing.

XI JINPING THOUGHT: A NEW ERA


At the 19th Party Congress of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping, was appointed
general-secretary for a new five-year period.

TIMELINE OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP

LEADER IDEOLOGY ABOUT IT


Mao Mao Zedong Post the 1949 Communist Revolution, Mao emerged as an
Zedong Thought autocratic paramount leader of China.
His ideology ‘Mao Zedong Thought’, encapsulated in the famous
‘red book’, was enshrined in the party’s constitution.
Deng Socialism with After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping assumed the ‘Second
Xiaoping Chinese Generation’ leadership.
characteristics His ideology was ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics, a clear
departure from the ‘class struggle’ enunciated by Mao.
Jiang Three After Deng’s demise in 1997, Jiang Zemin emerged as the ‘Third
Zemin Represents Generation’ leader.

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He was architect of the ‘three represents’ ideology i.e. Communist


Party should be representative of advanced social productive forces
– economic growth, culture and interests of majority of Chinesese.
Hu Jintao ‘Scientific His successor Hu Jintao, representing the ‘Fourth Generation’
development Leadership, followed a similar model, professing the concept of
‘scientific development and harmonious society’.
Xi Jinping Socialism with To take on the mantle of the ‘Fifth Generation’ leadership, Xi Jinping
Chinese was picked as the consensus candidate in 2012.
Characteristics
for a New Era

Rise of Xi Jinping:

 After being appointed, Xi moved quickly to strengthen his hold on the Party and the PLA, the two
key structural pillars of the People’s Republic.
 When Xi Jinping, in 2012, was appointed general-secretary of the CCP, China was in the middle of
a deep political crisis with internal divisions in CCP.
 In the military, top generals were engaged in severe corruption, which among other things
involved buying and selling of positions.
 Xi conducted an intensive anti-corruption campaign which resulted in the purge of more than 200
ministerial-level officials.
 He launched a campaign to create a party where the focus is on quality rather than quantity. The
growth of the party has been reduced and new and strict rules for recruiting and training party
members have been implemented.
 He has also spearheaded a centralisation of Party leadership by emphasising that Party should be
presented at all levels and in all types of organisations in China.
o Even private and foreign-funded companies are now required to have a Party committee,
which has to be consulted on major issues regarding running the company.
 He believes that the public sector and the state should control the market. Since then state
ownership has been strengthened. A process of consolidation and of merging the big state-owned
enterprises has taken place.

19th CPC:

In the 19th Party Congress (A Five yearly affair which concluded in October 2017), following decisions
were taken

1. Re-election: He has been re-elected for a second five year term.


2. No successor: He is apparently set to call the shots well beyond 2022, since the new PSC has no
chosen successor to be groomed, which is a glaring shift from the tradition during the last two
decades.
3. Xi Jinping thought:
a. The “Xi Jinping Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” has
been enriched in the Party constitution as a guiding principle.
b. This puts him in the league of Mao and Deng Xiaoping
c. Henceforth, any criticism of Xi’s policies will be deemed as an attack on the Communist
system itself.
4. New committee: He unveiled the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee.

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At the National People's Congress in March, 2018, he will also be reappointed president of the
People's Republic of China.
Xi’s Grand Strategy:

To realise his ‘China Dream’, which envisions a ‘powerful and prosperous’ China, Xi unfolded his grand
design while addressing the Party Congress.

 He referred to China entering a ‘New Era’ marked by social contradictions.


 To this end, Xi has propounded the policy of ‘striving for achievements’ and advocating a greater
Chinese leadership role in world affairs. This is a departure Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of
“maintaining low profile till China completes its peaceful rise”.
 He outlined the ‘twin centenary objectives’:
o to become a ‘fully modern’ economy and society between 2020 and 2035; and
o acquire ‘great power’ status by 2050, coinciding with the centenary of the foundation of
the PRC.

Way ahead?

Future of democracy in China?

 Nothing indicates a weakening of the Party's role in the coming five-year congress period.
 It is also hard to find evidence that Xi Jinping, after having finally consolidated his power, might
introduce basic economic and political reforms in an attempt to introduce Western-style
democracy.

Ramifications on global affairs:

 Today, USA is conflicted about its global role, with President Trump advocating an ‘America First’
policy. Russia under Putin is still in delusion about Cold War symmetry.
 Xi, on the other hand, has enunciated a clearer strategy for China and has articulated the idea of
parity in US-China relations.
 Now with the stature of a paramount leader, Xi is expected to pursue assertive diplomacy in
restructuring the international system.
 Major projects like the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR), part of Beijing’s
new peripheral diplomacy will be used for the same.

Ramifications for India

 Xi stated in his recent speech that China would strive to resolve disputes through dialogue but will
not compromise on national sovereignty.
 But he also stated that integration of claimed territories with the motherland does not preclude
the use of force. He told the 2.3 million strong PLA to be combat ready and focus on ‘how to win
wars’.
 For India, China under a powerful autocratic leader does not augur well, given the past record.
o The 1962 War and stand-offs in 1967 and 1987 occurred when Mao and Deng reigned
supreme.
o The recent face-offs at Depsang, Demchok and Doklam have all taken place during Xi’s
tenure.
 India will have to be prepared to counter China’s growing assertiveness and be wary of the latter’s
strengthening nexus with Pakistan.

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EXPERT PANEL ON BORDER


Union Home Ministry has decided to constitute a high-level expert committee to study
various issues relating to 3488-km India-China border.
ABOUT:

 Terms of reference:
o It will examine issues related to poor infrastructure along the indo-china border and study
the various aspects discussed by the parliamentary panel on border management which
recently submitted its report.
o It will also study how to provide basic facilities like water, electricity, telephone, bridges,
tracks and foot suspension bridges wherever possible in high altitude Border outposts
(BoPs).
 The move comes over a month after the resolution of Doklam stand-off
 Earlier the Centre had earlier formed expert study groups to analyse problems at borders with
Pakistan, Bangladesh and very recently with Myanmar.
VIEW OF PARLIAMENTARY PANEL ON 'BORDER MANAGEMENT' (2017):

Earlier in 2017, A parliamentary panel on 'border management' submitted its report in which it made
various observations regarding Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

Observations:

 ITBP troops in forward posts, which are located at altitude of over 9000 feet and are covered with
snow for almost six months, have to use mules. Thus it takes days for supplies to reach their
camps.
 Of the ITBP BoPs, 81 are located at a height of more than 12000 feet and 20 at a height of more
than 15000 feet and only limited patrolling is possible due to excessive gaps, hilly terrain and lack
of roads.
Recommendations:

 Government should to fast-track border projects.


 Provide ITBP troops with permanent integrated buildings at high altitude BoPs to improve their
operational efficiency.
 Construct more helipads in forward locations to provide timely supplies to troops.
 Make a plan to create a dedicated air wing of ITBP and procure a minimal fleet of helicopters and
planes as per its requirements.
INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE (ITBP):
 It is one of the five Central Armed Police Forces of India.
 Origin: It was raised in 1962 in the wake of the Sino-Indian War under the CRPF Act. However,
in 1992, parliament enacted the ITBPF Act.
 It is also known as Himveers.
 Roles:
o It is the border guarding force along the 3488 Km long Indo-China border. Battalions of
ITBP are deployed on border guard duties from Karakoram Pass in Ladakh to Diphu La
in Arunachal Pradesh.
o They are the first responder for natural Disaster in Himalayas.
o Since 1981 it is also providing security to the pilgrims during Annual Kailash Mansarovar
Yatra.
 Governing body: Ministry of Home Affairs.

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PANCHSHEEL – (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence)


 In 1954, India and china agreed on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (panchsheel)
 These are –

Keyword Literal wordings


1 Cooperation Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.
2 Peaceful coexistence Peaceful co-existence
3 Non – aggression Mutual non-aggression.
4 Non – interference Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
5 Territorial integrity & Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty sovereignty.
 However, these were abandoned with the onset of 1962 indo-china war

Relevance of panchsheel?

 Strategists on both the sides argue that these 5 principles are of timeless relevance for the bilateral
relations because of its emphasis on non-use of power and tolerance. The 2 sides even celebrated
its 50th and 60th anniversary.
 Now India has till date followed it. E.g. we accepted that Tibet has been an integral part of china
and has also followed the policy of non – aggression by not attacking it.
 But china has been practiced more in breach than in observance
o Violation of Territorial integrity and sovereignty: China Claims Arunachal; Objects to visit
by Indian PM and president to Arunachal; is Building CPEC through POK which is integral
part of India; Occasionally claims Sikkim too.
o Violation of Non-interference: i.e. alleged funding/arming of Maoists and north east
insurgents.
o Violation of Non – aggression: Violated this principle in 1962 with the indo – china war.
And even now incidence of intrusion into each other territories occurs inspite of signing
of Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) in 2013 to avoid military face- offs
along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
 Conclusion –
o China talks of its relevance just to drive attention away from the Chinese threat.
o India might face heavy loss if it followed the principles of Panchsheel when dealing with
China. They can again do the hypocrisy of panchsheel and hindi-chini bhai bhai on one
side while attacking india on the other side.
o Thus it is important to note that Panchsheel, to some extent, has lost its essence. So we
should review the principles of Panchsheel in the changed circumstances.

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THE BRAHMAPUTRA CONUNDRUM


Recently, waters of Siang River and Brahmaputra River in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam
respectively, turned muddy allegedly due to the Chinese project of cave construction under the
mentioned river.
Others reports have also pointed to China blocking the Xiabuqu tributary of the Brahmaputra
River for a dam project.

BRAHMAPUTRA AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR INDIA

 The Brahmaputra River, called Yarlung Tsangpo by the Tibetans and Tsan-Po by the Chinese,
is the soul of India and lifeline for those living in Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Assam.
 The river originates from a glacier around Mt. Kailash and flows at an average altitude of 4,000
mtrs in Tibet and is considered to be the highest river on earth. It flows eastwards over 2,057
km in Tibet before entering the Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh as Siang River.
 Lohit and the Dibang River join Siang to form the Brahmaputra River in Assam which after
traversing Meghalaya finally enters Bangladesh at Bahadurabad Ghat.
 For India, the Brahmaputra River is of great
importance for two reasons:
I. It accounts for 29% of the total run-
off of India’s rivers, and is key to
India’s river linking project.
II. The Brahmaputra basin possesses
about 44% of India’s total
hydropower potential.
 People in the region largely depend on the
river for irrigation, fishing, and transportation
of goods.
RECENT CONTROVERSY

 Due to some construction of dam or some


accident in China Brahmaputra’s water has
recently seen some abnormal deviation like
containing cement particles and turning muddy.
 There is speculation of plans for a 1000 km-long tunnel being tested in order to transfer water
from the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet to Xinjiang causing the muddying of Brahmaputra.
 However, there are reports that muddying occurred due to landslide in Tibet region following
an earthquake of 6.4 on Richter scale.
OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN

 The Great Western Extraction plan of China potentially involving diversion of 200 billion cubic
metres of the waters from water rich south i.e. Tibet into the Yellow River to provide for the
water needs of the deficient north.
 In 2010, China initiated construction work along the Brahmaputra River at Medog, Tibet,
which is only 30 kilometres north of the Indian border.
 There is ongoing construction of Three Georges dam and $1.2 billion hydro-power/diversion
projects for generation of 40,000 megawatts on the Brahmaputra River.

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 The reports of National Remote Sensing Centre, Hyderabad, show Chinese construction on
28 run-of the river power stations at the Great Bend and downstream.
 China did not bother to have any prior consultation with the lower riparian countries such
as India and Bangladesh before initiating construction work on the Brahmaputra River.
EFFECTS OF THESE ACTIVITIES

 With the initiation of the diversion cum hydro-power production work on the Brahmaputra
River, both India and Bangladesh have begun to face problems with respect to water-
resources due to diurnal variation in the downstream flow.
 Diversion of the waters of the Brahmaputra River may bring about an environmental disaster
and that it would have a negative impact on the economy.
 Both damming and diversion have a bearing on the flow of river waters. Damming reduces
the flow of the river water, whereas diversion would mean altering the normal flow of the
river in another direction. The latter course adversely affects the environment and the
lifeline of the recipient country.
 The large amount of water in dams has the potential to wash away the human settlements
and forests in the downstream areas.
 This will also likely lead to a reduction in the nutrient-rich sediments in the basin affecting
the agriculture through depletion of fish species and destruction of farmland.
 Inland water transportation in the region is also heavily dependent on the Brahmaputra River.
It could affect the navigability of National Waterway-2, the 890 km stretch from Sadiya to
Dhubri, due to the requirement of maintaining a minimum depth of 1.5-2 metres.
 China may build additional dams and divert water from all important rivers originating in the
Tibetan plateau and which flow to neighboring countries in South Asia impacting the region
greatly.
 This may impact India’s efforts to exploit the hydro potential of the region.
 This will also pollute the water leading to many environmental, social and geological risks in
the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, India and Bangladesh.
 It would also make the region prone to natural disasters and would further degrade the
fragile ecology of the region.
 The growing siltation problem in the reservoir basin of the dam badly exposed the
weaknesses of the Chinese system of damming the river.
 Undertaking such a project in the seismically sensitive high Himalayas carries deadly
ecological and environmental implications for China. The impact on India would follow later
and will be marginal.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

 The negative impacts may cause conflict in the region as livelihood of millions may get
affected.
 Dams over the Yarlung Zangpo, even the ‘run of river’ projects, provide China the ability to
control the flow of water in the Brahmaputra.
 China may use the Brahmaputra waters as a leverage to arm twist its riparian neighbors.
 Recently after Doklam conflict or because of some technical reasons as China claimed, Beijing
didn’t provide the hydrological data to India for this year which is of great importance to the
Indian side to predict or prepare for flood and to mitigate flood damage.

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 For India, national security implications also follow as the Yarlung Tsangpo also flows into a
disputed border region with China.
WHAT DO THE EXPERTS SAY?

 Estimated cost of diversion of Brahmaputra’s water in China would be higher than the
alternative of desalination of sea water.
 The perception in India that structural interventions always reduce downstream flows may
not be true in case of Brahmaputra.
 Flow volume and discharge in the Yarlung River is not sufficient to generate and transport
the large amount of suspended sediment load that gets deposited in the downstream to form
a fertile Jamuna floodplain. It is created downstream in India, where precipitation is almost
12 times higher than the rain shadow Tibet.
 Brahmaputra gets fatter and mightier as it flows downstream due to the flow contribution of
the various tributaries like Dibang, Luhit, Subansiri, Manas, Sankosh, Teesta, etc.
CHINA’S POINT

 China having more than 20% of the world’s population has less than 7% of global freshwater
resource at its disposal. Moreover, the available water is unequally distributed, with Tibet
having more water than northern China.
 To relieve the enormous pressure on water resource in China’s north, the leadership in early
2000s launched a gigantic South-to-North Water Transfer Project.
 To cater to the demands for electricity and as a part of its shift away from coal, China is
focusing on Hydroelectricity power generation as major source.
PRESENT ARRANGEMENT

 Brahmaputra agreement between China and India is a suboptimal arrangement within


broader bilateral relations. As per the current agreement, China has thus far agreed to share
hydrological data on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra (YTB) during the monsoon season.
 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigation Uses of International
Watercourses does not allow any country to bar the natural flow of water of an international
river. However, China is not a signatory to this Convention.
 The agreement has been overshadowed by the border dispute.
 China is shifting towards multilateral arrangement approach to trans-boundary water
sharing. In 2015, China signed the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework along
with five other countries through which the Mekong flows. LMC aligns with China’s Belt and
Road Initiative and focuses on land and water connectivity, besides river management
 The Indian approach to the YTB issue is influenced by developmental imperatives and
domestic politics. The Brahmaputra is an important resource for India’s own water diversion
plans – the national river interlinking project , and is considered a powerhouse to meet India’s
energy demands in the future.
STEPS TAKEN BY INDIA

 India has planned to construct 76 dams with an estimated capacity of 36,900 MW, taking
advantage of the ‘UN advisory on the river water dispute’, whereby a downstream riparian
state can ensure ‘first user right’ on the international rivers by building dams.

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WAY AHEAD

 It is important for the lower riparian countries to develop sound strategies to bring China to
the negotiating table to stopping it from further damming or diverting the waters of the
Brahmaputra or any other river originating in Tibet and flowing into South Asia.
 Cooperation among the stakeholders would ensure better understanding and add to the
prosperity of the region as lack of a common framework, interpretations and understanding
based on precedents can aggravate the situation further.
 While China as an upper riparian state enjoys ‘restricted territorial sovereignty’ as per
international law, it also has an obligation to protect the interests of lower riparian nations.
 Holistic development of the Brahmaputra River could be explored by China, India and
Bangladesh and frameworks could be worked upon to arrive at solutions that meet the needs
and interests of all three countries.
 India could well attempt to counter China by playing the Tibet card differently.
 India also needs to make a realistic assessment of its water demands to meet its industrial
and domestic needs and tap the domestic resources like southern tributaries of Brahmaputra
River efficiently before any overtures on water sharing solutions are made towards
Bangladesh and China.
 India perhaps needs to revisit some norms that govern the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin
by engaging Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan to generate a consensus on conflict-laden issues.
 India needs to re-strengthen its relationship with Bangladesh and push the impending Teesta
river agreement and restore its image as a responsible upper riparian.
CONCLUSION

 Indian and Chinese policy makers must think of a long term solution, and forge an agreement
that would prove beneficial for the region as a whole.
 In the emerging geopolitical scenario, water and energy security are critical for India to realize
its global aspirations.
 India needs to mirror its strength and firmness in negotiations with China on water rights, as
it did in the case of the Doklam stand-off and in opposing the Belt and Road Initiative, rather
than projecting itself as a victim and refrain from populist China bashing.
 India must also build its own capabilities to redress and withstand such disasters. It is only
from such a position of sanity and strength that India can get China to regularize existing
mechanisms and expand them for mutual benefit.

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ROHINGYA
In the background of Rohingya crisis, questions have been raised over the broken
international refugee protection system as well as India’s refugee policy.

WHO ARE THEY?

 They are an ethnic group, majority of


whom are Muslim, who have lived for
centuries in the majority Buddhist
Myanmar.
 Currently, there are about 1.1 million
Rohingya living in Myanmar. Nearly all
of the Rohingya in Myanmar live in
the western coastal state of Rakhine.
 Despite being able to trace Rohingya
history to the 8th century, they are
not considered one of the country's
135 official ethnic groups and have
been denied citizenship in Myanmar
since 1982, which has effectively
rendered them stateless.
 Myanmar's government does not
recognize the term "Rohingya" and
prefers to refer to them as
‘’Bengalis.’’
 Rohingyas are restricted from
freedom of movement, state education and civil service jobs thus facing Apartheid-like
restrictions.

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 Due to ongoing violence and persecution, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled to
neighbouring countries either by land or boat over the course of many decades.
 The Rohingya are often described as "the world's most persecuted minority".

ARAKAN ROHINGYA NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (ARSA):

 Rohingya campaign groups, notably the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARSA),
demand the right to "self-determination within Myanmar".
 The government calls ARSA a terrorist organization. The International Crisis Group (ICG) says the
militants have trained abroad and the group is led by Rohingyas living in Saudi Arabia.

THE CURRENT CRISIS (AUGUST - SEPEMBER):

 On 25th August, 2017, after weeks of rising tension, militants from the group ARSA attacked at
least 25 police posts and killed several Myanmar security personnel.
 Following this, the Myanmar military aided by violent mobs of local Buddhist led a crackdown
against the Rohingya in Rakhine state which at least 1,000 Rohingyas were killed between 25
August and 8 September.
 In this background, some 4 Lakh left their homes, majority of them moving to Bangladesh.

VIEW OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI:

 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK) – Myanmar’s de-facto leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate - is
under growing criticism over this issue.
 She rejects the reports in the international media and maintains that tensions are being fanned
by fake news promoting interests of terrorists.
 But the fact is that in several areas in Myanmar, the military still calls the shots. It controls 25
percent of parliamentary seats as well as ministerial positions in defense, internal security, border
affairs etc. DASSK’s flexibility is hence considerably restricted.

INDIA’S DILEMMA:

This has put India in a difficult situation.

a) Indo-Myanmar relations:

 PM Modi during his visit to Myanmar on 5th-7th September, 2017, generously praised the
leadership of DASSK and expressed full support against terrorist attacks on Myanmar security
forces.
 It is because Myanmar is extremely significant for India:
o It represents the Gateway for India's northeastern states to other ASEAN countries.
Success of India’s Act East Policy depends largely on productive relations with Myanmar.
o Several major connectivity projects including the Trilateral Highway from India’s northeast
to Thailand and beyond through Myanmar, and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport
Project, are in advanced stages of implementation.
o Myanmar security forces are actively collaborating with India to deny space and territory
to Indian insurgents in Myanmar
o The expanding presence and increasing influence of China in Myanmar is a matter of
growing concern for India.

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 DASSK who was under intense international pressure expressed fulsome gratitude for the
unambiguous support from the world's largest democracy.

b) Indo-Bangladesh relations:

 Simultaneously India's relations with Bangladesh are equally important esp. in the background of
China's increasing leverage in Bangladesh which is detriment of India's interest.
 But Bangladesh has been the worst affected by the refugee crisis, which has received more than
370,000 refugees after the august 25 attacks.
 Because of this India significantly modified its position on 9th September and advised Myanmar
to use restraint so that it does not add burden on Bangladesh.
 Under its ''Insaniyat'' (Humanitarian) initiative, India has promised 7,000 tons of relief material
including food items, medicines, tents etc. for refugees in Bangladesh. Daily flights carrying these
materials are travelling to Dhaka.

c) Security concerns:

 India has traditionally welcomed all refugees, although it is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention.
 Yet in the present instance the serious concern is that amongst the refugees could be members
of ARSA with linkages to Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Jamaat-ud-Dawa etc.
 Pakistan's ISI is also reported to be active in training terrorist elements amongst the refugees.
 Militant activists have been found amongst refugees temporarily settled in Jammu, Delhi,
Hyderabad and Mewar.
 This poses a serious security challenge to India which could lead to social tension and law and
order problems.
 This also puts an addition burden on land and other resources of India (India already has the 2nd
largest population in world)
 Thus, it has declared its intention to deport 40,000 refugees which have come to India so as to not
to expose the country to terrorist threat by accepting these refugees.

d) Pressure from Human rights activist:

UNHCR and human right activists have criticised this decision on following grounds:

1. It will be against the principle of non-refoulement,


which is considered as a part of a customary PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT
means not sending back refugees to a
international law and binding on all States, whether
place where they face danger.
they had signed the Refugee Convention or not.
2. It is impractical to expel thousands of people who are scattered across the country.
3. Government of India said that it is discussing the deportation plan with Bangladesh and Myanmar.
But deportation is likely to be difficult because of:
a. Myanmar’s official position that all Rohingyas need to be scrutinised before they can be
allowed back in as citizens.
b. Bangladesh’s complain of being burdened by the heavy flow of refugees (some 75,000
Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh since October 2016).
4. Government is deciding to deport these refugees because they are Muslims. However
government has staunchly refuted this charge.

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THE WAY FORWARD:

a) For Myanmar:
KOFI ANNAN-LED ADVISORY COMMISSION ON RAKHINE
STATE
 Solution of the issue lies in
Myanmar, not in Bangladesh or The commission submitted its report in August 2017. Its key
India or any other country. recommendations to Myanmar government are:
 Blatant criticism of DASSK will not  Ending all restrictions on movement imposed on the
make Myanmar change its Rohingya and other communities in Rakhine.
 Shut down refugee camps -- which hold more than hold
position. Diplomacy and discussion
more than 120,000 people in often miserable conditions.
is the only way. Myanmar needs to  Review the controversial 1982 law that bars Rohingya from
be convinced that it is in its own becoming citizens
interest to have an inclusive,  Invest heavily in the region
peaceful resolution of the matter.  Allow the media unfettered access there.
 Ensure voluntary return of refugees from Bangladesh to
 Myanmar needs international Myanmar through joint verification.
support for its political and  encourage inter-communal dialogue to dispel
economic development which it misinformation about different communities.
will receive by becoming a
responsible member of the international community.
 India should encourage Myanmar to seriously consider implementing suggestions contained in
the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission on Rakhine state.

b) For India:

 India has to undertake a creative tightrope walk in its relations with its neighbours, Bangladesh
and Myanmar, as well as with international human rights watchdogs.
 Domestically it has to deal with outcries from opposition parties and civil society organizations.
 The coming days will show whether India is able to rise up to the challenge.
 Its performance over last several months in effectively dealing with even more formidable
disputes gives reason to hope that it will emerge triumphant.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REFUGEE, ASYLUM-SEEKER AND MIGRANT:


Refugee:
 A refugee is a person who cannot return to their own country because they are at risk of serious
human rights abuses there, or because of who they are or what they believe in.
 Because their own government cannot or will not protect them, they are forced to flee their
country and seek international protection.
Asylum-Seeker:
 An asylum-seeker is someone who is seeking international protection abroad, but is yet to be
recognized as a refugee.
Migrant:
 A migrant moves from one country to another, usually to find work, although there may be
other reasons such as to join family. Some move voluntarily, while others may feel compelled
to leave because of economic hardship or other problems.
 People can migrate “regularly”, with legal permission to work and live in a country, or
“irregularly”, without permission from the country they wish to live and work in.

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INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME

a) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):

 It is a UN agency formed in 1950. It is headquartered in Geneva.


 Task –
o To protect and support refugees at the request of a government or the UN itself
o Assist in their voluntary repatriation (return to their native place), local integration or
resettlement to a third country
o Original mandate has been expanded to protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) who
would fit the definition of refugee under the 1951 UN convention on refugees status.
 UNHCR has won two Nobel Peace Prizes (once in 1954 and again in 1981)
b) UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees:

 It is also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention.


 The convention was approved in a UN conference in 1951. It came into force in 1954.
 Salient features of the convention:
o It defines who is a refugee and which people do not qualify as refugees, such as war
criminals.
o It Sets out the rights of individuals who are granted asylum
 He/she is not to be panelized under illegal migration if its shown that his life is
under threat;
 Principle of non-Refoulement: He/she can’t be expelled or forcibly returned
back to the place from where he came escaping persecution.
o It sets out responsibilities of nations that grant asylum.
o It provides for some visa-free travel for holders of travel documents issued under the
convention.
c) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948:

 Article 14 of this declaration recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution
in other countries.
INDIA’S REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME:

a) India’s track record on protecting refugees:


 India has had an exemplary track record in protecting refugees. It has protected refugees from
Tibet, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.
 During the 1971 crisis, when 10 million refugees crossed the border, the government set up
relief camps for 7 million while over 3 million were supported by host families.

b) Is India a signatory to the UN refugee convention of 1951?


India is not a signatory to the 1951 convention. Thus India doesn't have any formal definition of
refugees.
Why has India not signed the convention?
 During 1950s, India had reservations with a definition of refugee which doesn't identify the
fundamental actors that cause the situation.

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 Also at that time, signing the convention would mean mandatory cooperation with the UNHCR,
which could be seen as losing some sovereign rights.
 During the Bangladesh refugee crisis of 1971, India faced a period of strained relationship with
UNHCR and many experts argue that the legacy could also be a hindrance in India signing the
convention.
 Security-related concerns: Borders in South Asia are extremely porous and any conflict can
result in a mass movement of people. This can have two results:
o First, a strain on local infrastructure and resources in countries that are poorly equipped
to deal with sudden spikes in population.
o Second, it can upset the demographic balance.
 Another argument is that India already does its duty, so where’s the need to sign it? It mostly
doesn’t even take UN money to look after the refugees.

Then how does India deal with refugees? What are the laws to protect them?
 However, refugees are largely dealt with by the Registration of Foreigners Act 1939, Foreigners
Act 1946 and Passport Act 1967.
 The Indian constitution provides the right to equality before law and right to personal liberty
to everyone living in India.
 India is signatory to various universal human right conventions against torture, child and
women's rights abuse, racism and so on and these also protect refugees.
 Apart from this, the principle of non-refoulment is widely accepted as a principle of
international law.

RENAISSANCE IN INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS


PM Modi paid his first bilateral State visit to Myanmar from 5th to 7th September 2017.
The two sides signed various MoUs in the areas of health, culture, capacity building,
maritime security etc.
Historically, bilateral relations between India and Myanmar remained low, but since 2014, under PM
Modi, New Delhi has made an attempt to proactively reach out to Naypyidaw within the broader
agenda of “Act East Policy”.

The recent visit by PM Modi follows successive State visits to India last year by President U Htin Kyaw
and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

REASONS FOR COOPERATION WITH MYANMAR:

 Consolidating Myanmar as a gateway to southeast Asia, and as a long-term partner in the Mekong
sub-region and Bay of Bengal region.
 Countering China’s growing clout in the region.
 Accessing its energy resources to ensure energy security.
 Tackling insurgency and ensuring overall development of north-east region (NER). India shares a
long land border of over 1600 Km with Myanmar as well as a maritime boundary in the Bay of
Bengal.
The landslide victory by Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2015 general
elections further strengthened the engagement.

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AREAS OF COOPERATION

Trade & Energy relations:


 Bilateral trade has been growing steadily to reach US$2 billion.
 Pulses: Myanmar is also a key supplier of beans & pulses to India. India
plans to import 100,000 tonnes of pulses annually from Myanmar.
 Energy:
o India plans to construct of a 6900-km gas pipeline from Sittwe to its Northeast via
Bangladesh under the 'Hydrocarbon Vision 2030' agenda.
o Numaligarh Refinery of India have signed an agreement with Parami Energy Group of
Myanmar for supply of diesel to Myanmar across the land border. The first
consignment of the high speed diesel reached Myanmar on 4th September 2017.
Regional Connectivity:
 Greater connectivity between the two countries will ensure stronger trade, production,
market, and people-to-people linkages.
 Some of the steps taken by NDA government in this direction are proposing a Motor Vehicles
Agreement (MVA); planned construction of nine border ‘haats’ (trading points), renewed
attention to India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) trilateral highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal
Transport Project (KMMTTP).
Developmental assistance:
 As of August 2017, India's commitment to Myanmar's development stands at over US$ 1.726
billion, which is more than the assistance offered by other countries.
 India has also offered humanitarian assistance to Myanmar towards rehabilitation efforts in
the strife-torn Rakhine State.
 Disaster relief: India has also promptly assisted Myanmar in humanitarian relief operations
following natural calamities like Cyclone Mora (2017).
Security Cooperation:
 Defence& Security Cooperation has strengthened over the years as can be seen by Exchange
of high-level visits, signing of MoU on Border Cooperation and providing training to Myanmar
armed forces.
 Myanmar has assured India of not allowing its territory for anti-India activity.
 India has begun supplying arms and communication equipment to its armed forces esp. in the
maritime domain (where sonars and torpedoes have been provided).
Bilateral Cooperation in Regional/ Sub-regional context:
 Myanmar is the only ASEAN country adjoining India and, therefore, India’s gateway to South
East Asia and a pillar of 'Act East' Policy.
 The two sides are also a member of BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation, thus adding a
regional/sub-regional dimension to bilateral relations. In BIMSTEC there is a renewed interest.
Culture:
 Both countries share a heritage of religious (Buddhist), linguistic and ethnic ties.
 Archaeological Survey of India is guiding the restoration of the Ananda Temple in Bagan.
 During PM Modi’s visit to Myanmar in 2017, an MoU on Cultural Exchange Programme (CEP)
for the period 2017-20 was signed so as to promote cultural exchanges between the North
Eastern States of India and the bordering areas of Myanmar.
Democratic transformation:
 During PM Modi’s visit to Myanmar in 2017, Election Commission of India signed an MoU to
help its counterpart in conducting free and fair elections;
 India also agreed to train Myanmar diplomats at the Foreign Service Institute, New Delhi.

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CHALLENGES:

 Economic: Trade remains below potential. It is mainly dominated by agriculture. Most of the
MoUs remain confined to paper and are yet to be actualised on the ground, including the Sittwe-
Northeast India pipeline. Cooperation in the banking sector is crucial for investment and trade.
 Connectivity challenges: India is way behind china whose projects in Myanmar have moved at
double the pace of India’s, thanks to its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
o The KMMTTP incomplete, proposed MVA too is still on stand-by, the construction of the
IMT is held back by land acquisition issues.
 Demarcation of some stretch of border, dense forest cross-regional cultural linkages and free
movement zones are some of the key reasons for persistence of security challenges.
 On the democratic institution-building front, India can do more by increasing Parliamentary
exchanges.
 On the Rohingya issue, NDA government is walking a tight-rope due to the sensitive nature of the
issue. India plans to deport what it calls ‘illegal Rohingya settlers’, but that has not happened yet.

CONCLUDING REMARK:

 Overall, the current lines of bilateral engagement are a significant improvement from the previous
administrations, they are insufficient to ensure long-term viability and consolidation, esp.
countering the rapidly expanding Chinese influence.
 Thus, India should pay close attention to the missed opportunities of the past decades and build
on them in the future to create a sustainable bilateral engagement.

KALADAN
MULTI-MODAL TRANSIT TRANSPORT PROJECT
According to recent reports, The Kaladan project scheduled to be completed in 2018, is
unlikely to be within the timeframe.

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ABOUT:

 The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, known as Kaladan Project, will link India’s
seaport of Kolkata with its landlocked north eastern states through Mizoram by traversing Arakan
and Chin States in Myanmar through riverine and highway transport systems.

COMPONENTS:

The project will be undertaken in the following components :

COMPONENT STATUS
As of June 2017
Redevelopment and expansion of Sittwe port in Myanmar so This sea route has been
that it can accommodate larger vessels. operational for several decades.
It will receive goods from seaport of Kolkata via Bay of Bengal.
Development of navigational channel along river Kaladan from Still some work is pending
Sittwe to Paletwa.
It involves dredging a stretch of 158 km in Kaladan river.
Thereafter, a 100+ km highway Paletwa To Zorinpuri on the Construction contract awarded
Indo-Myanmar border in Mizoram State. in June 2017; construction
expected to start after October
2017.
A two lane highway from Lomasu (border point) to Lawngtlai in Almost complete (June 2017).
Mizoram to be developed which will link up with existing NH-
54.
This NH-54 in turn is part of the larger East-West Corridor
connecting North East India with the rest of India.

TIMELINE:

 2003: A Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the project developed.


 2008: India and Myanmar entered into a “Framework Agreement” to facilitate implementation
of the project.
 2010: Construction began in 2010 with a deadline of 2015.
 2017: In June 2017, contract for construction of Paletwa-Mizoram road awarded.

IMPLEMENTING MECHANISM:

 According to the 2008 framework agreement,


o Myanmar will provide the required land and security for the project.
o India will bear the full cost of the project.
 After completion, the project will be handed over to the Myanmar Government as per the
mutually agreed terms and conditions.

POSITIVE IMPACTS:

 Reduces the distance between Kolkata and the North Eastern states substantially thus providing
with a shorter route between mainland India and the Northeast Region.
 Provides an alternate connectivity to North Eastern Region (NER) other than the Siliguri corridor.
 Provides landlocked North-Eastern region an access to the sea and an opportunity to develop
economic linkages with Southeast Asia.

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 Will Improves our overall ties with not only Myanmar but also with south east Asian region.
Physical connectivity is a pre-requisite for economic and cultural connectivity.
 Can act as a counter-balance to China’s growing influence in Myanmar, South East Asia and Bay of
Bengal region.
 Generate employment for the local people where unemployment rate is high right from
construction stage. Provide small to medium scale business opportunities for locals.

CONCERNS:

 The intra - regional as well as inter - regional connectivity in NER is woefully short to take
advantage of the Kaladan project. Unless there is a simultaneous plan of transport development
in the region, Kaladan Project alone wont make much difference.
 The poor state of infrastructure and weak economic base in NER will not be able to take advantage
of the opportunities opened up by opening of Kaladan Project.
 In the long run, the highway connectivity from the Sittwe port alone may not be able to meet the
logistics requirement. Thus link Sittwe port to Mizoram by railways too.
 There are fears of large-scale displacement of people due to land eviction specially for
construction of highway from Paletwa to Indian border.
 Environmentalists argue dredging and movement of vessels will cause environmental damage.
These concerns exist due to lack of consultation and transparency.
 The project is expected to miss the deadline of 2018 due to poor planning and inadequate funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS

 Connectivity with other state capitals of NER and rest of India should be taken up simultaneously
to take advantage of the Kaladan project.
 Alternative routes from NER to rest of India through southern side of North Bengal or even
Bangladesh needs to be explored.
 To fully realise the potential of connectivity to Sittwe port, railway line should also be planned to
link Aizwal to Sittwe port.
 Setup Special Economic Zone around Sittwe, or near Paletwa, with facilities like power plants and
other industries so as to provide employment to locals and ensure economic development of the
region.
 Both the Governments should conduct assessment of environmental and social impacts and make
results public. Hold consultations with local people and prevent human rights abuses.

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IMT HIGHWAY
Indian government is giving a renewed push to IMT Highway. During PM Modi’s maiden
Myanmar visit in September 2017, a joint venture of Punj Lloyd & Varaha Infra won the
contract for construction of Yagyi-Kalewa section in Myanmar.

ABOUT INDIA-MYANMAR THAILAND TRILATERAL


HIGHWAY (IMT HIGHWAY):

 It is the road connectivity project with Southeast Asia.


 Route: The 1,360-km long highway starts from Moreh
in Manipur on the India-Myanmar border and runs via
Tamu (Myanmar) to Mae-Sot in Thailand.
 The India-Myanmar Friendship Road forms the first
segment of the IMT Highway.
o It runs from the border at Tamu/Moreh to
Kalemyo and Kalewa.
o It was built with Indian government assistance
and handed over to the Myanmar government
in 2009.
 The project requires about 78 km of new roads and the
upgrading of existing 400 km of roads.
 Implementing agencies: On the Indian side, the
project is being implemented by the Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA) with the cooperation of its counterparts in Myanmar and Thailand and
budgetary allocation from the Ministry of Finance.

TIMELINE:

 The idea was conceived in 2002.


 It was initially scheduled to be completed by 2015, however, now the deadline has been pushed
to 2020.

SIGNIFICANCE:

The ongoing project, which is the “only land connectivity project” between India and the Southeast
Asian region is very significant due to various reasons:

 India has increased its diplomatic focus on the CMLV countries. Bilateral trade between India and
the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) has grown from $0.46 billion in 2000
to over $10 billion in 2015-16 and is expected to touch $100 billion in coming years.
 In this background, land route needs to be given priority, as unlike air and sea, it is more enduring
(a permanent asset) and has much wider development impact along the corridor.
 Physical connectivity is also the first step to enhancing people to-people contacts.
 Chinese competition: The Mekong sub-region is witnessing increased geopolitical competition.
China plans to connect Kunming (capital of its southwest Yunnan province) with the Southeast
Asian nations with the “Pan-Asian Railway Network”, which is part of OBOR.
 North-East Region (NER): Opening up the border will also ensure greater economic interaction of
NER with their neighbouring countries. IMT highway holds the potential to make India's Northeast
a Gateway to the East.

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HURDLES:

According to current projections, the project is unlikely to be fully operational by end of 2020 due to
various hurdles:

 Changes of government in participating countries impact international projects adversely, as


decision-making is stalled during the transition period.
 Till now, the three countries have failed to negotiate a Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) for
seamless movement of vehicles among them.
 Issues in Myanmar side: Prolonged ethnic conflicts, displacement & unfair compensation and
trust deficit between centre and regional government in Myanmar have affected smooth
implementation of project.
 Indian side: Forest clearances or conflicts by locals are not an issue in India. The problem lies with
“Development Administration Partnership (DPA)” organisation within MEA which since 2012, is
mandated to handle India's aid projects. It is more bureaucratic, lacks financial muscle and an
effective team to deliver the projects of strategic importance.

LESSONS FROM CHINA:

 In this context, it is worthwhile to examine how China has embarked on its 'One Belt One Road
(OBOR)' dream which has more than 300 huge projects in Europe, Asia and Africa.
 To implement it, Chinese President has set up an informal high- level body linking government,
the party, and financial institutions. It carries enough weight to seamlessly coordinate all
components of bureaucracy, state-owned enterprises and other stakeholders.
 Also, around $82 billion has been provided to 'Policy Banks', i.e., government owned banks to
support the push for OBOR.

WAY AHEAD FOR TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECT:

 A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with joint ownership of all three countries could be incorporated
to take over the project and ensure seamless movement of traffic.
 Finalise the 'Trans-regional Transportation Framework' (TTF) for movement of freight and people
seamlessly.
 TTF should be fully integrated with ITES (Information Technology Enabled Services) to make travel
control and management smooth.
 Make it Development corridor to ensure that benefits accrue to local people along the highway.
For this develop Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) alongside the highway.
 Extend the highway to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in the next phase.

BCIM ECONOMIC CORRIDOR


Official and media discussions on the proposed Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar
(BCIM) Economic Corridor (EC) have intensified in recent months, owing to China's
strong push for the initiative.

ABOUT:

 BCIM corridor is name of the proposed 2,800-km long economic corridor (EC) which will pass
through Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar.

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 Under this a ‘multi-modal transport network’ with accompanying infrastructure would be


developed. But it goes beyond physical connectivity by providing digital connectivity, trade
facilitation and lowering barriers for seamless movement of goods.
ROUTE:

 The proposed EC will traverse from Kolkata via Benapole/Petrapole on the India-Bangladesh
border to Dhaka and Sylhet before again entering India near Silchar in Assam.
 After coursing through Imphal, it moves to the Tamu-Kalewa friendship road in Myanmar.
 After crossing Mandalay and Lashio the road will reach Kunming via Ruili, Longling and Dali.

China also wants the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project connecting Mizoram with
Kolkata via the Kaladan river and Sittwe port in Myanmar to become part of the EC.

TIMELINE:

 The issue of promoting connectivity between the underdeveloped south-western region of China
and Myanmar, India and Bangladesh has been under discussion since the early 1990s in a Track-II
process known as the 'Kunming Initiative'.
 This was formalised into the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation in 1999.
 The idea gained some momentum after the success of the 2013 Kolkata to Kunming (K2K) car
rally which demonstrated, the road is completely motorable except two stretches which require
additional work before it can be integrated into the EC.
o The 250 km-long Imphal-Jiribam-Silchar highway in the NER is not an all-weather.
o In Myanmar, the 200 km Yargyi road, connecting Kalewa to Monywa, experiences
landslides and a steep, hostile terrain.
 Subsequently it was mentioned in the Joint India-China statement in 2013 and India elevated it to
Track I level initiative.
 The initiative saw progress between 2013 and 2015, with all four members establishing a Joint
Study Group (JSG) that held three annual meetings during this time.
 However, since then, despite all four countries having agreed to implement the EC in principle,
admittedly, there has been a lull in its progress, mainly due to (right) concerns of India.

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ARGUMENTS FOR:

 Economic potential: BCIM region, one of the richest in the world in terms of natural & mineral
resources and involving 440 million people has huge economic potential. But Inspite of this, the
region is underdeveloped. The EC aims to reverse that.
 Short route: It is also the shortest journey between China and India, thereby making it an
economical route.
 North-east development: It will benefit North East (esp. Manipur & Barak valley of Assam
through which it will pass) as it will improve infrastructure and provide them market to sell their
goods.
 Security: The overall lack of development contributes to varying degrees of instability and security
challenges across the sub-region, creating a vicious cycle of stunted development and
deteriorating security.
 Look east policy: BCIM along with India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway will allow
North-East region to serve as gateway to southeast and East Asia (thus contributing to Act East
Policy).
 Reviving Cultural linkages: It will revive the ancient “Southern Silk Road” which was used by
merchants in 12th century for trade between China and India

PART OF OBOR:

Technically and de facto, BCIM EC forms a part of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative. Analysts
have expressed misgivings regarding OBOR projects, many of which are applicable to BCIM EC as well:

 Most projects included in OBOR are east-west corridors of benefit and interest principally to
China. Projects in which countries of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and India have interest, such
as the International North-South Transport Corridor from Bandar Abbas to Russia through Iran
and Central Asian countries have not been included in OBOR.
 Most infrastructure created by China in Central Asia, Pakistan and West Asia have been built with
its own labour force, generating little employment & benefits for the recipient countries.
 The project has geo-political ramifications, for instance the encircling of India by boosting Chinese
naval presence in the Indian Ocean

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:

Apart from the above mentioned misgivings about OBOR, several of which are common to BCIM EC,
other doubts persist about the latter.

 Lack of trust: There is lack of trust and confidence between India and China as seen by recent
Dokalam crisis, opposition to membership of nuclear export control regimes such as NSG etc.
 Minimal benefits for other members: EC will principally serve the interests of China by boosting
economic production in China's Yunnan province and providing direct access to Bay of Bengal,
thereby reducing dependence on the risk-prone Malacca Straits for global trade. On the other
hand, benefits to India, Bangladesh and Myanmar will be minimal.
 Widening trade deficit:
o The other three member countries of BCIM have huge trade deficits with China. In the
case of India, was $51 billion in 2015).

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o EC will only worsen their trade deficits due to flooding of cheap and low-quality Chinese
goods in their markets.
 Strategic implications:
o Arunachal: EC will bring China within sniffing distance of Arunachal Pradesh, which it
claims as Southern Tibet.
o Further alienation of NE: It is likely that EC will bring India's north-eastern states under
the increasing influence of China, further weakening their physical, economic, social and
emotional chord with mainland India.
o Already several insurgent and rebel groups in North East are getting Chinese origin arms.
 Partial (so-called) development of NE: The EC will touch only two states — Assam and Manipur
— out of the seven in Northeast India. The other five states will remain untouched by the so-called
benefits proposed by China.
 Hurdles in implementing it:
o The whole region is embroiled in insurgencies, drug and human trafficking and gun-
running. Under the prevailing circumstances, it will be difficult to provide security for
constructing different BCIM EC segments.
o It’s a dense forest region thus will lead to environmental loss.
o Opening up of corridor will lead to influx of outsiders which will may encounter tribal
resistance esp. in Manipur (in recent past they were angry over Inner Line Permit issue).

WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA:

 Focus on North-East: It is time India strengthened connectivity and integration of the northeast
with its mainland by building infrastructure and connectivity projects within north-eastern states.
 Involve Japan: Instead of china, invite Japan to invest in and build infrastructure in the North-
eastern region.
 Expedite connectivity projects: Work on the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and
India- Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway needs to be expedited which can prove to be
game-changers in promoting security, peace, development and prosperity in its Northeast.
 Revive other grouping: India is a member of several other regional & sub-regional projects such
as BBIN, BIMSTEC, East-West Corridor; and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative. These
groupings should be accorded the highest priority.
 What about BCIM?
o Even though India has agreed in principle for a BCIM Economic Corridor, it appears highly
unlikely that it would be realized in near future unless there is a fundamental change in
the nature of Sino-Indian relations.
o China should be given access to this region only after the border issue is amicably settled,
the onus for which rests to a large extent on China.
o In BCIM, a step-by-step approach is desirable. Rather than building heavy infrastructure,
develop people-centric projects in education, healthcare, tourism and cottage industries
so that locals are benefitted. Local talent, material and products should be utilised in this
endeavour.

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BIMSTEC
Recently, in October 2017, the first BIMSTEC Disaster Management Exercise (BIMSTEC
DMEx-2017) concluded.

In June 2017, BIMSTEC completed 20 years of its establishment.

BIMSTEC is an international organization involving a group of countries in South Asia and South East
Asia.

OBJECTIVE:

BIMSTEC at present has “14 priority sectors” which


cover almost all areas of cooperation such as energy,
handling of refugees, anti-narcotic measures.

 Its primary objective is to improve connectivity


between the members through multi-modal
transport corridors.
 These networks would be used facilitate trade,
exchange of energy through oil and gas pipelines,
promotion of tourism and increase of
communication.
ORIGIN:

 Encouraged by India’s Look East Policy (LEP) and Thailand’s Look West Policy it was Initiated in
1997 as BIST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation).
 With Myanmar joining the grouping as a full member the same year, the ‘BIST-EC’ was renamed
as ‘BIMST-EC’.
 With Nepal and Bhutan becoming its members in 2004, the grouping was renamed as the Bay of
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).
IMPORTANCE:

 Economic: BIMSTEC, which comprises over 20 per cent of the world population and a combined
GDP of over US$ 2.5 trillion has huge potential to emerge as a meaningful economic bloc.
o The grouping has signed a Free Trade Agreement (2004), although not implemented yet.
o It also gives India a potential access to alternative energy resources in Myanmar. It has
 Alternative to SAARC: SAARC has not made any progress due to obstructive attitude of Pakistan.
But BIMSTEC (which contains most of the major SAARC countries) provides another alternative to
ensure cooperation among South Asia.
 Link between South & Southeast Asia: However, it is not a mere to substitute to SAARC as it
occupies a distinctive position of linking South and Southeast Asia.
 Look east policy: BIMSTEC provides India yet another opportunity, besides ASEAN to engage with
Southeast Asia (at least partially), thus making it an important part of India’s ‘Look East Policy’.
 Security: It provides India a platform to engage in anti-drug trafficking, counter-terrorism and anti-
insurgency cooperation with Myanmar. It has signed a Convention on Combating Terrorism and
Organised crime (2009).

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 North-east development: India’s Northeast, which shares common border with four BIMSTEC
members would benefit from integration with East Asian economies and infrastructural
development under the ambit of BIMSTEC.
 Refugee crisis: BIMSTEC, which has Myanmar, Bangladesh and India can also be used to discuss a
common solution for the Rohingya refugee crisis.
CHALLENGES:

Though largely devoid of bilateral tensions, as is the case in SAARC, BIMSTEC does not seem to have
made much progress in the last two decades due to many factors:

 Attitude of members:
o India, the largest member of the grouping is criticised for not providing leadership to
BIMSTEC.
o Thailand and Myanmar are criticised for ignoring BIMSTEC in favour of ASEAN.
 Overlapping membership:
o BIMSTEC is not considered as a unique a mechanism to enhance partnership amongst its
members as they have acquired memberships in various other regional/sub-regional
organizations such as SAARC, ASEAN, Ganga –Mekong Initiative.
o Formation of another sub-regional initiative, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
(BCIM) Forum, with the proactive membership of China, created more doubts about the
potential of BIMSTEC.
 It has identified 14 priority areas, thus making it difficult to prioritize. The organisation needs to
focus on fewer priority areas for purpose of better implementation.
 Institutional factors:
o Absence of a permanent secretariat for a long time (It took 17 long years to establish its
permanent secretariat in Dhaka in 2014).
o Lack of commitment to invest in several priority areas
o Lack of proper coordination among its member states.
o So far (October 2017), BIMSTEC has held only three summit meetings. The fourth summit
meeting is expected to take place later in 2017 in Nepal.
 Lack of media coverage and public awareness about the grouping is one of the major
shortcomings.
 BIMSTEC seriously lags behind ASEAN and other regional organisations in terms of people-to-
people contacts.

RENEWED INTEREST:

 Recently, PM Modi described BIMSTEC as “a natural platform” to fulfill India’s “key foreign policy
priorities of ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’”.
 In October 2016, India had hosted the BIMSTEC members at Goa during the BRICS Outreach
Summit.
 In March 2017, India hosted the first meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs.
 India is also working on finalising the BIMSTEC Motor Vehicles Agreement. The ongoing India-
Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the India-Myanmar Kaladan Multimodal Transit
Transport Project will further augment connectivity in the sub-region.

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BIMSTEC DMEx-2017:

It was a four-day exercise, conducted by the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) as the nodal
agency in Delhi from October 10-13, 2017. The idea was discussed during the 2016 meeting.
Objective: To share Best Practices on all aspects of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).
Need:
 The BIMSTEC region is home to around 1.5 billion people with a combined GDP of US $2.7
trillion economy.
 Majority of the BIMSTEC countries are situated in the South Asian Region (SAR), prone to
natural disasters such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes, avalanches and drought.
India has been at the forefront of DRR efforts.
 Has hosted the South Asian Annual Disaster Management Exercise (SAADMEx) and the Asian
Ministerial Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR).
 India has also offered its expertise and capabilities in DRR such as the South Asia satellite,
GSAT-9, and the Tsunami Early Warning Centre to other countries.

WAY AHEAD:

 For BIMSTEC should focus on less issues, increase people to people contact and undertake projects
that are economically feasible and result-driven.
 A Coastal Shipping Agreement should be concluded to allow the member states to trade freely
within the sub-region.
 Last but not the least, India should be more proactive towards BIMSTEC to make its Look East
Policy 3.0 a success.

MERGING BCIM AND BIMSTEC?

China has also expressed its desire to join BIMSTEC. There have also been talks of merging or
combining of BCIM and BIMSTEC.

Arguments for merger:

 Like BIMSTEC, it’s objective is to ensure sub-regional cooperation revolving around trade,
commerce and connectivity.
 Since BIMSTEC has remained a dead-organization, should India push for BICM to achieve sub-
regional cooperation and economic activity?
Arguments against merger:

1. Involving china in such projects would also enable China to influence the local people in the
North East in many ways that might prove to be detrimental to Indian interests.
2. China would dominate this regional sub-grouping thus taking away India’s central role.
3. There is also contradiction between the objectives of BCIM and BIMSTEC
a. BIMSTEC aims to develop west to east connectivity.
b. BCIM aims to develop connectivity in North-South direction.

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RINA MITRA COMMITTEE ON INDO-MYANMAR BORDER


Recently a committee on India-Myanmar border headed by Rina Mitra, Special Secretary-Internal
Security, visited the border areas.
The committee was constituted by Home Ministry in June 2017.
Objectives:

 To examine various methods to curb the misuse of Free Movement Regime (FMR) along the Myanmar
border.
o Under FMR, with Myanmar, a friendly country, India shares unfenced borders and unhindered
movement of people across the border.
 The move comes in the wake of large-scale displacement of Rohingya people from Rakhine State in
Myanmar.
 To allow Indian nationals going and staying in Myanmar under the bilateral agreement for up to 72
hours. While India allows Myanmarese nationals to stay for 72 hours without visa, Myanmar allows
stay only up to 24 hours, an official said.

HAMBANTOTA: THE NEXT DJIBOUTI?


In December 2017, Sri Lanka Formally Handed Over Hambantota Port to Chinese Firms on 99-
Year Lease.

Hambantota port: An Overview

 Hambantota is the main town in Hambantota District, Southern


Province, Sri Lanka.
 The area is underdeveloped and was also hit hard by the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami.
 Thus the Sri Lankan government has planned to transform
Hambantota into the second major urban hub of Sri Lanka, away
from Colombo.
 After the end of Eelam War, the Mahinda Rajapaksa
government first went ahead with massive infrastructure
projects in his electoral constituency of Hambantota district
with Chinese funding without assessing their economic viability
and long term implications.
 Loan: Sri Lanka took a massive loan of USD 8 billion at an
interest rate of more than six per cent taken from China for modernising the Hambantota port.
 Concession agreement: Struggling to pay its debt to Chinese firms, in July 2017 Sri Lanka and China
signed the Hambantota Port Concession Agreement. According to it:
o China Merchants Port Holdings Company (CMPort) will pay $1.12 billion for an 85 percent
share in Hambantota port on a 99-year lease.
o Two special vehicle companies will be formed — the Hambantota International Port
Services Company (HIPS) to provide port services and security, and the Hambantota
International Port Group Company (HIPG) to look after the commercial aspects.
 Part of BRI: Soon after the Agreement was signed, China declared that the Hambantota port is a
part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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 Formal handover: In December 2017, the government of Sri Lanka completed the formal
handover of the strategic port of Hambantota to a state-run Chinese company, China Merchants
Port Holdings.

Concerns for Sri Lanka:

 Government critics have said that the deal threatens the country’s sovereignty.
 But the Successor Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government, which had accused Rajapaksa of
converting the country into a Chinese colony and promised to reverse these decisions, had very
little choice.
 While the agreement remains controversial, China is likely to consolidate its presence and Sri
Lanka is likely to get deeper into the Chinese debt trap even though it has gained temporary relief
through the equity for debt swap.

Concerns for India:

 Access to Indian ocean: Hambantota, which sits on Sri Lanka’s southern coast, provides access to
critical Indian Ocean sea lanes. China, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, is interested in
expanding its footprint in the Indian Ocean.
 Pearl in the string: It is claimed by some analysts to be a part of China's String of Pearls strategy.
And the fear’s are not unfounded given china’s decision to acquire its first overseas base in
Djibouti and its presence in Gwadar as part of the intensifying Sino-Pakistan axis.
 The next military base? Beijing has just one overseas military base for the People’s Liberation
Army-Navy, in Djibouti. Indian observers express concerns that Beijing could operationalize
Hambantota as a resupply node for the People’s Liberation Army-Navy in the future.
 Impact on foreign policy: The long term impact of China acquiring equity in the Sri Lankan
economy can be china influencing Sri Lanka’s ability to practice an independent foreign policy.

Other steps by China:

 Submarine access: Under the previous government led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, a PLAN
Song-class submarine was allowed to visit the Colombo International Container Terminal. The
current Sri Lankan government, led by President Maithripala Sirisena, has exercised more caution,
rejecting a Chinese request for a submarine visit in 2017.
 FTA with Maldives: In addition to Sri Lanka, Beijing has made important inroads in the Maldives,
which concluded a free trade agreement with Beijing at the end of November, 2017.
 FTA with Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka, which has been railing against a Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement with India, is also negotiating an FTA with China.

CHINA’S CREDITOR IMPERIALISM / CHINA’S DEBT-TRAP DIPLOMACY

Working of its debt-trap diplomacy


 Rather than offering grants or concessionary loans, China provides huge project-related loans
at market-based rates, without transparency, much less environmental- or social-impact
assessments.
 To strengthen its position further, China has encouraged its companies to bid for outright
purchase of strategic ports, where possible.

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 The easy loans China offers are addictive. And, because China chooses its projects according to
their long-term strategic value, they may yield short-term returns that are insufficient for
countries to repay their debts.
 This gives China added leverage, which it can use, say, to force borrowers to swap debt for
equity, thereby expanding China’s global footprint by trapping a growing number of countries
in debt servitude.

Comparison with IMF and world bank:


 Unlike International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending, Chinese loans are collateralized
by strategically important natural assets with high long-term value (even if they lack short-term
commercial viability).
 i.e. In exchange for financing and building the infrastructure that poorer countries need, China
demands favourable access to their natural assets, from mineral resources to ports.

Benefits for China:


 It hopes to advance its strategic interests, including expanding its diplomatic influence, securing
natural resources, promoting the international use of its currency, and gaining a relative
advantage over other powers.
 It also wants to address overcapacity at home by boosting exports.
 Thus China uses sovereign debt to bend other states to its will, without having to fire a single
shot
Targets:
 Hambantota: China’s lease agreement over Hambantota, concluded in 2017, included a
promise that China would shave $1.1 billion off Sri Lanka’s debt.
 Djibouti: After lending billions of dollars to heavily indebted Djibouti, China established its first
overseas military base in 2017 in that tiny but strategic state, just a few miles from a US naval
base—the only permanent American military facility in Africa.
 Piraeus: The Mediterranean port of Piraeus, which a Chinese firm acquired for $436 million
from cash-strapped Greece in 2016, will serve as the BRI’s “Djibouti” in Europe.
 Turkmenistan: China has also used its leverage over Turkmenistan to secure natural gas by
pipeline largely on Chinese terms.
 Darwin: In 2015, a Chinese firm took out a 99-year lease on Australia’s deep-water port of
Darwin—home to more than 1,000 US Marines—for $388 million.
 Next?
o Several other countries, from Argentina to Namibia to Laos, have been ensnared in a
Chinese debt trap, forcing them to confront agonizing choices in order to stave off
default.
o Kenya’s crushing debt to China now threatens to turn its busy port of Mombasa—the
gateway to East Africa— into another Hambantota.
Lesson for countries:
 These experiences should serve as a warning that the BRI is essentially an imperial project.
 States caught in debt bondage to China risk losing both their most valuable natural assets and
their very sovereignty.

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FISHERMEN PROBLEM IN INDIA-SRI LANKA RELATIONS


In Mid-January 2018, the Sri Lankan Navy arrested 16 Indian fishermen for poaching
illegally in the island's northern seas
Earlier In July 2017, Sri Lanka passed a legislation to prohibit bottom trawling.

OVERVIEW OF FISHERMEN DISPUTE

 Problem
o The issue of Indian fishermen allegedly poaching on Sri Lankan waters and their
subsequent arrests, torture and killing by Sri Lankan Navy poses a challenge to India- Sri
Lanka diplomacy.
o Over 550 Indian fishermen have been killed in the last 30 years.
 Reason for Indian fisherman getting into Lankan waters:
o The Maritime boundary between the 2 countries is clearly demarcated, so that is not the
reason for Indian fisherman getting in Sri Lankan waters.
o Origin of conflict: During the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka’s northern districts, Sri Lanka had
prohibited all coastal fishing in a bid to curb the LTTE’s naval prowess. The Indian
fishermen took advantage of the cessation of fishing on the Sri Lankan side and expanded
their trawler fleet. Now the Politicians and fishermen were unwilling to give up trawling
due to large profits.
o No trawlers for high seas: Cases of arrest of Sri Lankan fishermen by Indian authorities
are comparatively less since they mostly fish in the high seas by using multi-day crafts.
But due to the dearth of multi-day fishing capability, Indian fishermen cannot go beyond
the Palk Bay area.
o Kachchatheevu: Many of these fishermen have also asserted their traditional fishing
rights around Kachchatheevu, although the Maritime Agreement of 1974 doesn’t grant
them any such fishing rights.
o Ignorance of IMBL: Straying into Lankan water also takes place also due to sheer
ignorance about international maritime boundaries line.
 Arguments by Sri Lanka for attacks:
o Protecting their maritime boundary is important to them.
o Indian fishermen are threatening the livelihood of Sri Lankan fishermen.
o The use of trawlers by Indian fishermen which is banned in Sri Lanka affects the maritime
ecology.
 Solution for preventing intrusion: Instead of advocating unrealistic solutions like retrieving
Kachchathivu island, the parties should concentrate on solving the problems of the fishermen.
o Promote deep sea fishing: Indian govt. should provide finance to the Fisherman’s to have
deep sea fishing boats so that they can do multi day fishing in international waters (high
seas).
o Develop fish farming: Additionally, developing fish farming extensively in Indian waters
would prevent its fishermen from venturing into other waters in search of a 'big catch'.
o Lease fish blocks: Indian can also consider leasing fish blocks (just like oil blocks) from Sri
Lanka as an Interim measure.
 Solution for preventing attacks:

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o Even if Indian fishermen cross the maritime border, the dispute should be solved
amicably. Firing on them is in no way justified.
o Joint patrolling: To prevent smuggling activities and shooting incidents, 'joint patrolling'
between the navies of both countries can be considered.
o No torture: Setup an arrangement so as to deal with the issue of detention of fishermen
in a humane manner.

HIGH SEAS
Oceans, seas, and waters outside of national jurisdiction are also referred to as the high seas. It is
also called as international waters or trans – boundary waters.

High seas highlighted in dark blue

BOTTOM TRAWLING BAN


 What is it?
o Trawling — more specifically bottom-trawling — is a fishing technique where a heavy
bag-shaped net is dragged along the sea bottom using a mechanically powered boat.
 History of trawling:
o The technique, originally applied in fishing nations in the temperate waters, was
introduced in Asian tropical waters on a commercial scale after World War II.
o In India, it was popularised in the late 1950s by the Indo-Norwegian Fisheries Project in
Kerala to take advantage of the demand for prawns in the international market. During
that time trawling was banned in Norwegian coastal waters.
 Criticism:
o It is a destructive fishing practice as it causes great depletion of fishery resources.
Curbing it is in the interest of sustainable fishing.
o Trawling was developed in the temperate marine waters, which are home to fewer
species. Inter-species interactions are limited there, while each species is available in
millions of tonnes. In such an ecological context, trawling is not overly destructive.

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o In tropical marine waters, there are thousands of species, exhibiting phenomenal inter-
species interactions, but each in limited quantities. Trawls used in such a milieu damage
the ecosystem.
o Trawling of the sea bottom is akin to clear-felling of tropical forests.
 Ban by Sri Lanka:
o In July 2017, Sri Lanka passed a legislation to prohibit bottom trawling.
o Doing so in sri lanka’s territorial waters will now attract a possible two-year prison term
and a fine of 50,000 Sri Lankan rupees.
 Reaction by India
o Political parties of Tamil Nadu claimed that the amendment is draconian, and is
targeted at the State’s fishermen who regularly use hundreds of trawlers in Sri Lankan
territorial waters.
o But the criticism is not justified as the amendment is also targeted at some fishermen
in northern Sri Lanka have adopted bottom trawling.
 Way ahead for India
o An appropriate response from Tamil Nadu would be to expedite the conversion of its
trawlers to deep sea fishing vessels, for which a beginning has been made.
o The Central and State governments plan to provide 500 deep sea fishing boats with
long lines and gill nets, as part of a plan to replace 2,000 trawlers in three years.

SL RECONCILIATION POST EELAM WAR


In march 2017, UN Human Rights Office published a report on post-Eelam war reconciliation.
Eelam is the native Tamil name for Sri Lanka.

BACKGROUND

The former President Rajapaksa on May 18, 2009, announced the end of the Eelam war. This historic
development, however, came at a heavy price.

 Loss of life: About 22,000 Tigers were exterminated by the end of the last phase of war. Over
11,500 civilians lost their lives and over 5200 security personnel were killed.
 IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons): According to UNHCR, by the end of June 2009, nearly 300,000
people were internally displaced.
 Living conditions: These IDPs were housed in camps which were overcrowded and had poor basic
facilities such as sanitation, insufficient water for drinking and bathing, inadequate food and
medical care.

GRIEVANCES OF LANKAN TAMILS: IMMEDIATE

In this backdrop, the native Sri Lankan Tamils had following immediate grievances:

1. Investigation into disappearances of individuals towards the end of the war


2. Reduction of military presence in the area
3. Resettlement of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons)
4. Release of Tamil political prisoners

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GRIEVANCES OF LANKAN TAMILS: LONG-TERM

Along with these immediate grievances, there are some long term issues:

1. Political settlement:
a. Ending institutional and social as well as perceived and non-perceived discrimination
against Tamils.
b. Tamils in Sri Lanka believe that success of reconciliation will depend on effective
devolution of power to the minorities in the north and east.
2. Justice:
a. No one denies the fact that war crimes had indeed been committed.
b. Ensuring justice to the affected victims of war crime is considered vital to infusing
confidence in the Tamils
c. Thus they demand an independent, impartial and transparent inquiry into the alleged war
crimes. This would be an essential component of reconciliation.
3. Social Infrastructure:
a. Basic social infrastructure in the form of healthcare facilities, schooling, banking facilities,
employment generation and equal opportunities needed to be provided to the war torn
Tamil citizens of Lanka.
b. This would equip Tamils and will instill a feeling of togetherness in their minds of being an
equal stakeholder in Sri Lanka’s growth.

SLOW PROGRESS ON CRUCIAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION: UN REPORT (MARCH 2017)

In march 2017, UN Human Rights Office published a report in which it assessed the progress made in
the implementation of Human Rights Council resolution 30/1, on promoting reconciliation,
accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka between October 2015 and January 2017.

Positive developments:

 The Government has advanced on constitutional reforms, on crucial issues like land restitution
and symbolic gestures towards reconciliation, as well as legal reforms and the design of an Office
of Missing Persons.

Concerns:

 The structures set up and measures taken until now have been inadequate, lacked coordination
and a sense of urgency.
 Addressing war crimes
o Sri Lanka has made “worryingly slow” progress in addressing its wartime past, which could
threaten lasting peace and stability.
o The UN has been pushing for a special court to investigate allegations that government
forces killed up to 40,000 Tamil civilians in the final months of fighting.
o Mr. Sirisena had agreed to a UN Human Rights Council resolution in October 2015 which
called for special tribunals and reparations for victims and gave Sri Lanka 18 months to
establish credible investigations.
o But the deadline lapsed without those commitments being met.
 Use of torture: Reports of abuses including torture remain widespread in Sri Lanka. There is
routine use of torture by the police as a means of interrogation and investigation.

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Recommendations:

 In its report, the UN urged the government to


o prioritise the return of private land occupied by the military
o adopt laws allowing the creation of a hybrid court
o invite the UN rights office to establish a presence in the country
o Formulate a communications campaign to inform the public about details of the
reconciliation agenda

Annexure: 13th Amendment

 Background
o On 29 July 1987, Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed which talked about devolution of
powers to the provinces.
o In this background, on 14 November 1987 the Sri Lankan Parliament passed the 13th
Amendment to the constitution.
o Article 18, 138, 155 and 170 of the 1978 Constitution were amended and Chapter XVII A
consisting of Article 154A to 154T and 8th and 9th schedule were added by the 13th
Amendment.
 Objective: to provide devolution of power to provinces, the 13th Amendment provided for:
o The establishment of Provincial Councils.
o Making Tamil as one of the official language (along with Sinhalese) and English as a link
language.
o Merging of north and eastern provinces into a single province i.e. North – East province.
o The appointment and powers of the Governor of Provinces, the establishment of the High
Court of the Province, establishment of finance commission etc.
 Present status of implementation:
o The provision of merging of north and eastern provinces was revoked in 2006.
o Athough provincial councils have been created but not much power has been devolved.
o That’s why India keeps on insisting about proper implementation of the 13th amendment
provisions.

Annexure: 13th amendment plus

 After the defeat of the LTTE, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated that the government
would go beyond the 13th Amendment “to devolve substantial powers to the Tamil majority
areas”.
 This was termed as the ‘13th Amendment Plus.’ Approach.
 What does it involve?
o However, President Rajapaksa never made it clear what exactly he meant by ‘13th
Amendment Plus.’
o Acc. to some it would include creating an upper house to the parliament or a senate to
ensure more minority participation but there is no official conformation. So it’s all vague.

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NEPAL-CHINA MEGA HYDROPOWER AGREEMENT


Nepal has signed an agreement with China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) to
build the 1,200 megawatt Budhi-Gandaki hydroelectric project.

WHY IS NEPAL COOPERATING WITH CHINA IN HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECTS?


● Nepal, a water-rich country has a mountain river system that could make it an energy-producing
powerhouse (As per an estimate it could be generating 83,000 megawatts).
● But its total installed generation capacity currently stands at less than 2% of its potential. Due to
this, Nepal imports much of its electricity from India.
● Although India has engaged in hydroelectric cooperation with Nepal, including extending credit
on concessional terms, the progress has been slow.
● In this background, China is quietly enlarging its presence in Nepal. CGGC is currently building
three smaller hydropower plants in Nepal and has completed another one.

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS COOPERATION:


1. While dressing its investment in the cloak of economic aid, China is imposing stiff commercial
terms on Nepal while taking majority project ownership upfront. For example, its State-run China
Three Gorges Corporation will have a 75% stake in the West Seti Dam, in mid-west Nepal. Thus,
Nepal is at a risk of becoming a client-state of Beijing.
2. Nepal serves as the corridor for several rivers that flow into India’s Gangetic plains from Tibet.
Thus, construction of projects on it can diminish flows into the Ganges which can lead to water
crisis.
3. This could also affect India’s Ganges water-sharing arrangement with Bangladesh since India is
forced by the treaty’s terms to bear the shortfall in downstream flow volumes.
Way forward
● As opposed to China’s water mega-projects at home; smaller scale and ecologically friendly
projects in the Himalayas backed by thorough and impartial environmental impact assessments
can yield major benefits without carrying significant environmental, social and diplomatic costs.
● The integrated development of the Ganges basin demands trilateral institutional collaboration
between Nepal, India and Bangladesh and this cooperation extending to energy, transit and port
rights.

INDIA, JAPAN CIVIL NUCLEAR DEAL


The India-Japan Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,
which was signed in 2016, entered into force in July 2017.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS PACT:


● This pact is essential for enhancing nuclear energy cooperation with the U.S. as prominent
American nuclear companies are owned by the Japanese nuclear majors like Toshiba.
● India is the only non-NPT signatory with which Japan has entered into a civil nuclear deal. This can
be described as a recognition for Delhi’s impeccable non-proliferation record.

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● Japanese companies are in possession of critical technologies, such as steel shields covering a
nuclear reactor core which are otherwise difficult to acquire from the international market.

SOME CONCERNS:
● There is a clause in the deal that Japan may suspend the nuclear agreement in the event of India
conducting nuclear tests, even with its own resources. This is seen as a huge concession given by
India.
● There are doubts about the economic viability of the deal as Westinghouse (a subsidiary of
Japanese giant Toshiba), which is to make huge investments in Indian nuclear power generation
program declared bankruptcy.
● According to critics of nuclear energy, India is seen to be treading along the wrong path as after
the Fukushima incident, many countries are moving away from nuclear power.
o Germany has decided to pull out of nuclear power altogether by 2022.
o In Fact in Japan itself, there has been no domestic construction on a new reactor for the
past eight years since a unit at the Tomari plant on the island of Hokkaido came on stream
in 2009.

NORTH KOREA – U.S. TENSION


North Korea recently conducted its 6th nuclear test, a thermonuclear weapon and fired
missiles over japan. This has moved U.S. and North Korea closer to the brink of a war.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NORTH KOREA–


UNITED STATES RELATIONS

 Relations between the two nations are


hostile and have developed primarily
during the Korean War.
 Since the Korean War, the United
States has maintained a strong military
presence in South Korea and considers
South Korea as the sole legitimate
representative of all of Korea.
 In recent years relations have been
largely defined by North Korea's six
tests of nuclear weapons and its
development of long-range missiles
capable of striking targets thousands of
miles away.

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR HISTORY:

1990’s  In 1993, joint exercises between U.S. and South Korea were resumed.
 Subsequently, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
 In 1994, an Agreed Framework was concluded under which

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o North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT,


agreed to freeze its nuclear activities.
o In return, the U.S. pledged to build two light water nuclear power
reactors. Clinton administration also provided Food aid and
humanitarian assistance to the tune of $750 million from 1995 till
2000.
Bush era &  The Bush administration in 2002, declared North Korea a part of the ‘axis
cancellations of evil’ and cancelled direct talks and annulled the 1994 agreement.
of Direct talks o Since then, the U.S. has not held bilateral talks with North Korea.
 In response, North Korea threw out International Atomic Energy Agency
inspectors and formally quit the NPT.
Six party talks  Six Party Talks (led by China and Russia) were initiated in 2004 which led to
the 2005 joint statement. This expanded the scope to more than the
nuclear issue.
 However, the talks collapsed when the U.S. imposed sanctions a few
months later
 In response, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006.
Present status Since then, North Korea has made steady progress in its missile and nuclear
programs.
 It has built an underground nuclear facility at Mt. Musan.
 Nuclear tests were conducted in 2013 and twice in 2016 and in 2017
conducted its sixth nuclear test.
 North Korea at present claims to possess enough fissile material for 10-15
nuclear devices.

TRUMP ERA:

Recent events from U.S. side which have


contributed to escalating tensions:

 After assuming office, Donald Trump has


declared that he would do “whatever is
necessary” to prevent North Korea from
developing a nuclear-capable missile
that can reach the U.S.
 Recently, U.S. President described North
Korea as his “biggest challenge”; he also
cautioned that “There is a chance of
having a major major conflict with North
Korea.
 U.S. has deployed a nuclear submarine,
USS Michigan, in Korean waters.
 It has also decided to accelerate
deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) system in South Korea.

IS THE PACE OF MISSILE TESTING SPEEDING UP?


Less than six years into his reign, Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his father and
grandfather combined.

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Reasons for increasing missile test:

 They need to conduct tests to perfect the technology of having a missile capable of reaching the
United States topped with a nuclear warhead which is considered to be Pyongyang's ultimate goal.
 They want it because they believe the US will eventually try to remove Kim Jong Un from power
just the way they did with Moammar Gaddafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
 The political turmoil in South Korea, which led to the eventual impeachment of former President
Park Geun-hye, may also have factored into North Korea's decision making.
WAY AHEAD:

Will North Korea end it’s nuclear program?

 While, in the long-run, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the objective, but in
foreseeable future, Mr. Jong-un will not give up on North Korea’s missile and nuclear capability.
 After seeing Western interventions in Libya & Iraq and Russian intervention in Ukraine, he will
retain his nuclear capabilities till the end of what will be a long negotiating process Mr. Jong-un
believes that nuclear capability is the ultimate security guarantee against U.S. intervention.
 At maximum, he can agree to a freeze on its programs i.e. no further tests.
So What should U.S. do?

 Firstly, there should be an end to this loud confusing rhetoric that has escalated tensions.
 Secondly, Re-start the dialogue: U.S. should realize that neither military strikes nor more
sanctions are viable options; the only option is ‘dialogue’. Imposing sanctions will only aggravate
the situation which will start the cycle of sanctions, test, sanctions, further tests and so on.
 Thirdly U.S. will have to provide assurances relating to regime acceptance and a gradual
normalization of relations.
 Fourthly, U.S. should also work towards normalization of relations between the two Korea. In that
it should involve their neighbors i.e. China, Japan and Russia.

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Will China support U.S.?

 Off late China is unhappy about Mr. Jong-un’s behavior, particularly because of the executions of
those considered to be close to China.
 However, China won’t help U.S. in a regime collapse because
o First that would create instability in the region.
o Secondly, it can’t allow its communist ally to be subsumed into a unified Korea.
 And this was seen recently, when at the UN Security Council meeting in April 2017, Chinese
Foreign Minister reaffirmed support for a de-nuclearised Korean peninsula but did not support
additional punitive measures.

HWASONG-15
On 28 November 2017, North Korea launched Hwasong-15.
About:

 The Hwasong-15 is an intercontinental ballistic missile developed by North Korea.


 It had its maiden flight on 28 November 2017.
Range:

 Based on its trajectory and distance, the missile would have a range of more than 13,000 km.
 Thus it is the first ballistic missile developed by North Korea that is theoretically capable of
reaching all of the United States mainland (including Washington D.C.).
 In addition, the range covers several of the United States’s international allies such as the United
Kingdom and France, as well as all of Earth's continents, except South America and most of
Antarctica.
Mission accomplished:

 After the launch, Kim Jong-un, the country’s supreme leader, claimed that the country had “finally
realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force.”
 Hwasong-15 is the ‘greatest ICBM’ that could be armed with a ‘super-large heavy nuclear
warhead’ capable of striking the ‘whole mainland’ of the U.S.A.
Geo-strategic implications:

 By this, North Korea indeed may have achieved a feat that only the P-5 nuclear club (and not even
India and Pakistan) have attained.
 Strategically, North Korea’s breaking into the nuclear high table is a potential game changer in
global geo-politics, particularly if it shares its ICBM technology with Pakistan, a failing state with a
growing anti-American sentiment.
 It was Pakistan, with China as a go-between, which helped North Korea with nuclear enrichment
technology in exchange for missile technology in the 1990s.
 Iran is another potential North Korean client, and it is not hard to see other anti-US regimes
making a beeline to Pyongyang, an isolated cash-starved country that has stewed in anti-US hatred
for more than half a century.

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INDIA–ASEAN TRADE

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Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee On Commerce presented its


137th report to parliament titled “Trade with ASEAN”.
KEY FINDINGS OF THE REPORT:

Present status:

 Total trade: ASEAN is India’s fourth largest trading partner with the annual trade between the two
standing at US$ 71 billion in 2016-17 which constitutes a significant 11 % of India’s overall global
trade of $660.6 billion.
 Trade deficit: Out US$ 71 billion, Indian exports stood at US$ 31 billion, while imports stood at
US$ 40 billion. Hence, India faces a trade deficit of around US $9 billion, which is rising every year
(apart from some exceptions).
 Countries with trade deficit: Between 2015-16 and 2016-17, India had a trade deficit with five
ASEAN members namely Lao, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. With Indonesia, India has
the maximum trade amongst all the ASEAN member states and also maximum trade deficit.
 Trade with CLMV countries (Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar and Vietnam): It is not at desired level.
Reason for this status:

 Goods Agreement with ASEAN (along-with Bilateral trade


India has bilateral Comprehensive
agreements with Malaysia and Thailand) have not
Economic Cooperation Agreement
delivered optimally for Indian exporters. (CECA) with Malaysia and the
 Wrt Indonesia: Under the existing trade agreement, Framework Agreement with
Indonesia has committed a tariff elimination on 50.1% of Thailand.
its items which is the least in comparison to other ASEAN
member States.
 India ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement was although signed in 2015, but has not been ratified
by some of the ASEAN countries.
 Exports of agricultural products from India faced high import tariffs and barriers.
 Due to ‘near absence of quality norms’ there is import of cheap processed food products from
ASEAN countries.
Recommendations to improve the trade balance:

 India must seek better market access for goods where India has an edge over ASEAN nations, like
leather goods and pharmaceuticals
 Utilize the Project Development Fund (PDF) for CLMV countries to ensure growth of Indian direct
investments in these countries.
 Fix quality norms for import of processed products from ASEAN as well as other regions of the
world.
 Get access to services trade in ASEAN so as to increase the footprint of Indian banks and financial
institutions in the region.

DOES INDIA NEED THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS?

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North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test on 3 September 2017, stating it was its first
test of a hydrogen bomb a.k.a. thermonuclear bomb.

ABOUT HYDROGEN BOMBS:

 Atomic weapons like those previously tested by North Korea


rely on nuclear ‘fission’ — basically splitting atoms to release
energy
 Hydrogen bombs use nuclear ‘fusion’, in which atoms fuse
together, to release even greater amounts of energy.
 The two-stage process is often referred to as a
THERMONUCLEAR REACTION.

TWO STAGE PROCESS:


 Stage 1: In the first stage, the thermonuclear fuel inside hydrogen bombs is ignited which is still
powered by nuclear fission.
 Stage 2:
o In this stage, it uses an initial nuclear fission explosion to create a tremendous pulse that
compresses and fuses small amounts of deuterium and tritium, kinds of hydrogen, near
the heart of the bomb.
o The amount of neutrons set free can ramp up the explosive chain reaction of a uranium
layer wrapped around it, creating a blast far more devastating than uranium fission alone.
WHAT WOULD A SUCCESSFUL HYDROGEN TEST MEAN?
 It would show that the it’s nuclear program has become more sophisticated and is closer to making
an atomic warhead that could be fitted on a long-range missile able to strike the mainland United
States.

 It could open the way to making warheads that pack much more destructive power in a smaller
space. Thus it would also enable it to enhance the threat from its limited stocks of enriched
uranium.

HOW MANY COUNTRIES HAVE A HYDROGEN BOMB?

 If North Korea really has tested a hydrogen bomb, as it claims — and that remains a big “if” — it
has joined a select group.
 According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and
China have nuclear arsenals composed of hydrogen weapons; Israel, India, and Pakistan are
generally believed to have nuclear weapons that use only nuclear fission.
DOES INDIA NEED H-BOMB ?

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In the aftermath of the North Korea’s testing a “thermonuclear” weapon on 3 September 2017, the
focus upon that country’s nuclear capability has been on the yield of the said test.

Some experts have also tried to draw comparison between North Korea’s undoubtedly powerful test
and India’s proven nuclear capability to date.

Shakti-1: success of failure?

 One of those questions is whether India’s deterrent is “credible” given the doubts that have been
raised about the test of a thermonuclear device in 1998.
 Dr. K. Santhanam argued that the Shakti-1 device failed to achieve its designed yield and as such
has to be considered a failure. This means that more tests are needed to establish India’s
thermonuclear capability.
 For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that India has not deployed any thermonuclear
weapon.

Does India need Thermonuclear Weapons?

Despite the credibility of the Indian deterrent being unaffected by a fully proven thermonuclear
capability, it is widely accepted that the development of thermonuclear weapons is an essential part
of weapons development.

a) Lighter:

 Thermonuclear weapons are inevitably lighter.


 These lightweight, but relatively high-yield, warheads would enhance the potential efficacy of any
Indian strike, particularly in respect of stand-off air-delivered munitions where the payload/yield
trade-off has a direct bearing on the performance of an air-delivered missile.

b) Requires less fissile material

 Thermonuclear weapons achieve this superior weight to yield ratio by virtue of requiring less
fissile material.
 This point is important for India since its reported fissile material stocks of weapons-grade
plutonium and highly enriched uranium are relatively modest.

c) Makes the deterrent more flexible:

 Thermonuclear weapons also offer the prospect of variable yield weapons.


 Shortly after the 1998 tests, Dr. Frank Barnaby suggested that an operational nuclear weapon
could have variable yields of 5, 50 and 500 kilotons.
 Such flexibility obviates the need for India to maintain a separate inventory of fission weapons to
provide lower-yield options alongside larger fusion-boosted-fission weapons. This would
inevitably make fusion weapons a potentially cost-effective option.

Conclusion

 While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they offer
variable yields and light-weight warheads that use less fissile material.
 Since India’s deterrent requirements will evolve with time, thermonuclear weapons should be an
essential component in India’s arsenal.

RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN (MBS)

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In early November 2017, Saudi police arrested 11 princes, along with dozens of other officials
and businessmen, at the direction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and his father,
King Salman.
THE NIGHT OF PURGE:

 The arrests were said to be part of an anti-corruption drive spearheaded by the prince.
 But experts believe that the roundup is part of a series of steps that MBS has taken since becoming
crown prince in June, 2017 to secure his own position as by jailing potential rivals to cement his
own power.
 The goal appears to transform the Saudi political system from consensus within the royal family
and compromise with the religious establishment, into a one where power is heavily
concentrated in the hands of the monarch.
BACKGROUND:

 To understand the true implications of these sudden arrests, one need to understand a little bit
about the recent history of Saudi royal politics.
 King Salman took power in January 2015 after the death of the prior king, Abdullah.
 Salman was already old for a world leader, 79. There are widespread rumors that he is suffering
from some form of dementia.
 Thus, his coronation kicked off a quiet struggle between the many competing branches of the
sprawling royal family.
 MBS, just 29 at the time of his father’s ascension, quickly emerged as the big winner: Shortly after
Salman’s coronation, the king appointed his son defence minister.
 In June 2017, MBS aged 31, is promoted to the position of crown prince.
Thus since 2015, MBS is essentially, the architect of Saudi policy.

DOMESTIC POLICY

In the background of economic slowdown due to the plunge in international oil prices as well as to
consolidate power, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has unfurled an array of political, economic
and social reforms:

 Vision 2030: His brainchild, Vision 2030, aims at diversifying the economy from its over-
dependence on oil revenues, privatisation, and making the Kingdom an attractive destination for
business and investment.
 IPO of Saudi Amarco: In early 2017, Saudi Aramco, the largest oil company in the world,
announced of its first-ever initial public offering (IPO). Although as of Nov 2017, there is no clarity
on the date or the venue of Saudi Aramco’s IPO listing.
 Renewables: In February, 2017, the Saudi government launched an ambitious $50 billion
investment plan in renewable energy.
 NEOM: He has planned NEOM, an artificial intelligence-driven city on the Red Sea at an estimated
cost of US $500 billion, so as to make the Kingdom a completely modern country.
 Anti-corruption drive: Through his anti-corruption drive he has
o targeted rivals and tightened his grip,
o build his reputation as a ruler who favours transparency and accountability that would
help legal businesses to flourish.
o gained access to assets worth billions.
 Religious reforms: He has pledged to create a country of “Moderate Islam”, breaking with the
kingdom’s reputation for exporting Salafism.

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 Women Reform:
o 2015: Opens up elections to women as both Candidates and voters for the first time.
o 2017 (sept): Ends the long-standing ban on women driving from June 2018.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY

On the international front, Saudi foreign policy has been quite aggressive:

 Regional proxy wars: In recent years, Saudi Arabia has seen an array of proxy wars, including the
Qatar blockade, intensification of the Yemen crisis, and the resignation of the Lebanese prime
minister, which can all be perceived as part of the Saudi strategy of containing rival Iran.
 Ties with Iran: He sees Iran and its growing influence across the region as a near existential threat,
and is trying everything to counter Iran.
 Ties with U.S.:
o All this have found resonance in the Trump Administration’s growing hard-line posture
towards Iran.
o In May 2017, Donald trump paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, leading to contracts worth more
than $380 billion, including a $ 110 billion arms deal.
Comment:

“It is the most volatile period in Saudi history in over a half-century.”


 It’s a truly astonishing level of power consolidation for a monarchy where, traditionally,
decision-making authority was shared among the various different members of the family. In
effect, MBS and his father are the most powerful kings Saudi Arabia has ever seen.
 According to experts, MBS’s agenda is good for Saudi women and the economy — but
dangerous for the region
 e.g. Yemen has suffered greatly due to a Saudi blockade and airstrikes that have destroyed
civilian infrastructure, making Yemen the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, eclipsing even
Syria.
 In short, the kingdom is at a crossroads: Its economy has flatlined with low oil prices; the war
in Yemen is a quagmire; the blockade of Qatar is a failure; Iranian influence is rampant in
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; and the succession is a question mark.
 Thus, it is the most volatile period in Saudi history in over a half-century.
Lesson from history:
 The recent purge under the pretext of curbing corruption is a smart, populist move.
 This recipe was tried by a number of aspiring leaders for political succession like Libya's Gaddafi,
Egypt's Gamal Mubarak and Syria's Bashar al-Assad
 But the first two have been deposed, and Assad is struggling to rule over a devastated nation
after six years of upheaval and civil war.
 Will MBS share a similar fate as those favoured sons? Or, will he lead a new, "modern" Kingdom
inspired by "moderate Islam" for decades to come? Only time will tell.

WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA:


It appears that Fight between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia will intensify for supremacy in West
Asia.
Importance of Saudi:
 Saudis have traditionally supported Pakistan with cash infusions but it’s now paying heed to
India’s rising global stature.
 State-owned oil giant Aramco has just announced plans for “mega-investments” in India.

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 Saudi Arabia is also India’s second-largest oil supplier and home to almost four million
remittance-sending Indians.
Importance of Iran:
 At the same time, India must keep on the good side of Iran where we’re building the Chabahar
port.
 Iran has a key role in stabilisation in Afghanistan and giving India access to Central Asia.
Thus India needs to tread carefully. India should be wary of Prince Bin Salman’s push for internal
control and regional clout.
It must use all weapons in its diplomatic bag to ensure that India’s interest in the geo-strategic West
Asia are not compromised.

SAUDI ARABIA’S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES


In 2016, Saudi Arabia’s budget deficit reached 13.6 per cent of GDP.

PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA:


Decline in international oil prices is
 One of the key reason for the rising budget deficit is decline in oil due to:
revenues due to fall in oil prices. As of June 2017, oil exports account 1. Entry of the US shale oil (and gas)
for 90 per cent of its export earnings and 42 per cent of its GDP. Thus in the world market;
any decline in oil prices directly affects the Saudi’s economy. 2. Increasing emphasis on clean
STEPS TAKEN BY SAUDI ARABIA IN THIS DIRECTION: energy resources amidst
concerns over climate change;
 Saudi Arabia vision 2030: In 2016 Saudi government released
and
‘Saudi Vision 2030’ document. Its salient features are:
3. Attempts by the Organisation of
o Diversifying the economy by reducing over-dependence on
Petroleum Exporting Countries
oil;
(OPEC) to increase oil prices by
o Achieving a six-fold increase in non-oil revenues by 2030;
cutting down production have
Double the production of gas; build a competitive not succeeded.
renewable energy sector;
o Develop service sectors such as health, education,
infrastructure, recreation, and tourism.
o Localize the work force in the oil and gas sector from the current 40 to 75 per cent;
o Transform Saudi Aramco from ‘an oil producing company into a global industrial
conglomerate.’
 Disinvestment of Saudi Aramco:
o Saudi Aramco is the energy giant of Saudi Arabia, with an estimated worth of $2 trillion.
o It is preparing for its Initial Public Offer (IPO), worth around $100 billion in late 2018. Selling
off it’s some shares would help the kingdom to manage its rising budget deficit.
 With the expected succession of Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the throne, several more changes
are anticipated in the Saudi oil industry.
WHAT IS THE WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA?

 Enhanced energy cooperation (a Win-win situation for both):


o We should remember Saudi Arabia is among the world’s largest exporters of oil. And despite
the falling demand for oil globally and emphasis on renewables, India is expected to be (at
least in the medium term), one of the largest importers and consumers of oil.
o Hence, the strengthening of ties between the two countries through an enhanced energy
partnership could prove to be a win-win for both.

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 India should aim to get a stake in Saudi Aramco: When Saudi Aramco floats its shares next year, India
should aim at having a stake in company. This would mean India getting a share of profits from one of
the world’s largest and most profitable companies.
 Saudi Arabia should invest in Indian downstream companies: On its part, Saudi Arabia should invest
in India’s downstream (refinery and petrochemical) sector, which is expected to grow at an annual rate
of 12 per cent. Both countries are planning several joint ventures in the downstream sector.

SAUDI-UAE PARTNERSHIP
UAE and Saudis form new partnership separate from GCC.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

 It is a regional intergovernmental political and


economic union consisting of all Arab states of
the Persian Gulf, except for Iraq.
 Members: Its member states are Qatar,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and
Oman.
 Established in: 1981.
 HQ: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Recent announcement:

 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi


Arabia have formed a new military and trade
partnership separate from the GCC.
 It was announced as representatives of the six countries met on the side-lines of the 38th GCC
summit in Kuwait City.
 The Emirati announcement did not say whether any other Gulf Arab countries would be invited to
join the new group.
Background:

 The development comes amid heightened tensions within the GCC over the past six months amid
a Saudi-led blockade of Qatar.
 Since June, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt have enforced a land, sea and air blockade
against Qatar, accusing the tiny Gulf nation of supporting "terrorism".
 Qatar has denied the allegations and accused the neighbouring countries of attempting to infringe
on its sovereignty.
 The move could undermine regional bloc amid Qatar crisis
Closer UAE-Saudi ties:

 The UAE and Saudi Arabia have cultivated even-closer ties in recent years.
 Emirati troops are deeply involved in the Saudi-led war in Yemen.
 Abu Dhabi’s powerful Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nayhan, also is believed to have a
closer relationship with Saudi Arabia’s young Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

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US IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL


On 13 October, 2017, U.S. President Trump announced that he would not certify to the
Congress that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed with Iran is in US’
national security interest.
About the deal:

 JCPOA, also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, is an international agreement concluded by P-5 and
Germany with Iran in 2015 after years of negotiations.
 Under the deal Iran will have to do the following in next 15 years.
o Reduce number of centrifuges from 20,000 to about 6,000 (Centrifugues are used to
enrich uranium).
o Uranium can be enriched to only to 3.67%. That too this can only be used for generating
electricity.
o Reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium from 10,000 kg to 300 kg.
o Allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to inspect its nuclear sites,
uranium mines and mills, centrifuge factories.
o Nuclear facility at Natanz will be as a physics laboratory and not for enriching Uranium.
 In return, US and EU will suspend the sanctions after IAEA verifies that all the above steps have
been taken.
 The JCPOA is being monitored and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since
January 2016.
Reasons for negotiating the deal:
a) By US/world powers/significance –
 It will stop Iran from possessing nuclear arms. According to then president Obama, it was the best
way of limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
 The world can now with single mind shift the focus to North-Korea.
 Military action was neither possible (due to U.S. weariness in Afghanistan), nor desirable.
 Stability in Iraq and Afghanistan (the two Neighbours of Iran) is of vital importance to US as well
Iran. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) has brought about a significant change in the geopolitical
situation in West Asia.
 Western Europe is looking for alternative gas supplies to lessen its dependence o Russia.
 Iran, already a key player in the region is likely to emerge stronger. Iran already has enhanced
influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and, most recently, Yemen. Thus its better to have stable relations
with it.
b) By Iran –
 Sanctions crippled all sectors of its economy as it’s oil exports were drastically reduced. It will also
bring more investment.
 It would end Iran’s isolation from the world. President Hassan Rouhani, a relative moderate was
elected years ago on promise to reduce Iran’s isolation.
 It will “encourages” international cooperation to aid Iran’s civil nuclear R&D.
Certification:

 According to US law, the US president is required to certify every three months that the deal is in
US national interest.

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Arguments by Trump:

Trump administration has already certified so on last two occasions. This time around however, Trump
has overruled key cabinet colleagues and gone ahead to ‘decertify’ Iran.

He had often said publicly that

 The deal was highly flawed as IAEA’s inspection regime was weak.
 Iran had violated the agreement.
 Lifting of sanctions had rewarded Iran’s bad behavior etc.
Criticism of this decision:

“His most feckless foreign policy decision yet” – The New York Times

 The IAEA in its seven quarterly reports has not suggested any violation of the agreement by Iran.
According to IAEA, Iran had been subjected to the world’s most robust nuclear verification regime,
and it has access to all locations it needed to visit.
 The crisis comes at a time when the North Korean nuclear issue is assuming grave proportions
with every passing day.
 The move may force Iran to re-start it’s nuclear program. Thus US has opened up yet another
front.
 Resumption of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme could bring the region to the brink of war.
 Since Trump came to
power, the US has
walked out of the
Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP)
FTA, the Paris climate
Accord, UNESCO and
even planning to
abandon NAFTA.
Abandoning
previously negotiated
agreements raise
questions about US’
credibility.
 It raises the question:
Is the US even capable
of taking rational and reasonable decisions any more. Can it be trusted to play the leadership role
in world affairs?
 With this, U.S. may get isolated internationally and cede space to China which is coming up with
its own versions of international agreements like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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Way ahead:
(a) For U.S.
 Decertification does not automatically end the agreement. The ball is now with the U.S.
Congress which has sixty days to decide on the future course of action.
 If the Congress does not agree with Trump, he has threatened to pull out of the agreement
anyway under his own powers.

(b) Are U.N. Security council sanctions possible?


 The US is not the only party to JCPOA. There are others signatories too who have all opposed
the US action as there has been no violation reported.
 Also, Russians and Chinese who have good relations with Iran and several European Union
companies are eyeing several projects in Iran. Thus they may not follow the US lead.
 Thus, there may be a situation where the US reimposes sanctions but the others do not. Thus
US will find it difficult to have a resolution in the UN Security Council imposing sanctions on
Iran.

(c) For Iran:


 Iran has condemned the US President’s rhetoric but indicated that Iran will continue to stick to
its commitments for the time being. Thus Iran is in wait and watch mode.
 But if the US congress reimposes sanctions on Iran, the Iranians may walk out of the deal and
restart their nuclear program.
 President Rouhani may come under pressure from Iranian hardliners who were opposed to the
signing of the deal in the first place. Thus, a renewed tussle between Rouhani and the hardliners
may ensue.

(d) For India:


 If US Congress reimposes sanctions on entities doing business with Iran, then Indian companies
will be under pressure to cut their links with Iran and the fate of Chabahar Port will be in
jeopardy.
 The Chabahar project and India’s membership in the International North South Transportation
Corridor (INSTC) provide us a major opportunity to come up with a viable and workable riposte
to the OBOR.
 Things could get worse if there is war and the oil supply from the Persian Gulf to India is hit and
the Indian diaspora forced to return home.
 Instead of being carried away by the rhetoric of a country whose leader is both intemperate
and unreasonable, India should make rational choices in national interest.
 India will need to ensure that its ties with Iran are not affected by the latest crisis. For this India
should argue that Iran is not violating its commitments under JCPOA and there is no reason why
sanctions should be imposed.

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AMERICAN SHADOWN OVER INDIA-IRAN RELATIONS


The recent announcement by Donald Trump of not certifying the U.S. Iran JCPOA has
again raised concerns in South Block in India regarding the India-Iran relations.

Pre ‘Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal’ period (2005):


 Before 2005, India and Iran dealt with each other as two sovereign
nations independent of their relations with any other country.
 Though our imports of crude were the largest from Saudi Arabia,
Iran was our second largest supplier accounting for an annual bill of $12
to $14 billion at its peak.
 India maintained equidistant relations with both the two rival centres of power in West Asia.

Downfall in relations:
India’s Civil Nuclear Deal with the US changed all that.
 IAEA Vote: India’s first acts after the deal was to vote against Iran in the IAEA General
Conference of September 2005. This went against all our previous votes and was the beginning
of the rift.
 IPI Pipeline: Soon after, India started soft–pedaling on the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) oil
pipeline. That pipeline hardly had any prospect of materialising, as it was to pass through a
terrorist infested territory in Pakistan. But that did not prevent our leaders from pursuing it.
 Reduction in Imports: India’s import of Iranian oil started gradually reducing to less than
$4billion per year by around 2014 due to:
o Further tightening of sanctions on Iran in 2011 under Obama Administration,
o U.S. pressure to import more from Saudi Arabia,
o India becoming unable to pay for the oil imports in US Dollars because of American
treasury systematically shutting out India’s banking options.

Reapproachment:
 It must be said, however, to the credit of President Obama that despite all the domestic &
external pressure on him, he concluded a JCPOA with Iran for a negotiated settlement of the
nuclear issue with Iran.
 India began to reap the benefits of the West’s rapprochement:
o Oil imports from Iran started to rise.
o Farzad B gas fields were granted to a ONGC led consortium for exploration
o The stalled Chahbahar project was renewed
 India also decided to commit billions of dollars in the
o Chabahar Free Trade Zone
o Aluminium smelters plant proposed to be set up by the National Aluminum Company
(NALCO) in Iran.
o Urea plants proposed to be set up by the state-run Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilisers
Trump(ed): a new phase of Uncertainity
 With election of Donald Trump as U.S. President, things are changing:

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oIn January 2017, he placed Iran in a list of seven countries whose nationals were
banned entry into the US without any justification.
o In February 2017, Trump administration imposed sanctions on Iran for test-firing a
ballistic missile which was a clear message that Iran has not entered a ‘post-sanctions
era’
o And now it is planning end the JCPOA which he called as a ‘bad deal’ on several
occasions.
 Thus a new phase of uncertainty has emerged in India’s relationship with Iran. Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA) has asked the concerned departments to go slow on the proposed
Chabahar FTZ, urea plant and aluminum smelter plant.
CRITICISM:

 While this decision has been taken on the possibility of Indian investment getting caught in the
crossfire of US sanctions on Iran, what is striking is the inability to protect our bilateral
relationships from arbitrariness of American policies in our region.
 Iran has repeatedly questioned India as to how could the US intervene in a purely bilateral trade
relationship.
 Certainly if Russia and China could do business with Iran, we should be able to do too.
WORDS OF WISDOM FOR U.S.:

 The US is clearly an indispensable partner for India for the future. However, the US must
understand that like any other bilateral relationship, there will be differences between itself and
India on various issues such as the Iran issue.
 Ideally these should not be allowed to come in the way of their bilateral ties. Thus India’s Iran
policy must not be seen as a litmus test for Indo-US relations.

INDIA –IRAN CHABAHAR PORT


“First phase of the Chabahar port in Iran was inaugurated”
Why in news?

 Recently, first phase of the Chabahar port consisting of two


container berths together with a handling capacity of 8.5
million tons which was built at a total cost of $85 million is
operationalized. It was inaugurated by Iranian president
Hassan Rouhani in the presence of Indian and Afghanistan
officials.
Geographical location of Port
 The port of Chabahar is located on the Makran coast of Sistan
and Baluchistan Province of Iran, next to the Gulf of
Oman and at the mouth of Strait of Hormuz. It is the only
Iranian port with direct access to the Indian Ocean.
Evolution of Chabahar
 Past
o India and Iran first formally agreed to develop the Chabahar port in 2003, during the visit
by then Iranian president Mohammed Khatami to New Delhi. But the project stalled due
to sanctions on Iran.

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 Current scenario
o As per the MoU signed between India and Iran, India is to equip and operate two berths
in Chabahar port Phase-I with the capital investment of USD 85 million and annual
revenue expenditure of USD 22 million on a ten year lease.
o Ownership of equipment will be transferred to Iranian side on completion of 10 year
period or for an extended period, based on mutual agreement.
 Future development
o The future plan is to expand the port capacity from 8.5 million tons to 85 million tons and
build a total of ten berths.
o Also, part of the agreement is a free trade zone where a total investment of Rs 1 lakh crore
is envisaged. Iran has cheap natural gas and power that Indian firms would set up a range
of industries from aluminum smelter to urea plants in the region.
o State-owned NALCO will set up an aluminum smelter while private and co-operative
fertilizer firms are keen to build urea plants.
o There are plans of a fertilizer plant through a joint venture with the Iran government.
Securing hydrocarbon sources is a priority for India as Delhi and Tehran would look to
expand the basket in the coming years.
o In 2016, a memorandum of understanding was also signed for financing of the planned
Chabahar–Zahedan railway section of Chabahar–Zahedan-hajigak railway, by Indian
Railway's public sector unit Ircon International.

Implications on India

 Strategic
o Keep an eye on Chinese and Pakistan activities - It is located in less than 80Km west of
the Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which is being developed by China. This makes it ideal for
keeping track of Chinese or Pakistan’s military activity based out of Gwadar.
o It is the nearest port to India on the Iranian coast, which Provides access to the resources
and markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia.
o Strategic move of finding a foothold on the Makran coast will be seen as a big step by
India in establishing itself as a regional power.
 Political
o Stability and security in Afghanistan - Both India and Iran have stake in the Stability of
Afghanistan. Chabahar provides India an easier land-sea route to Afghanistan, where it
has fostered close security co-operation and economic interests over the years. India has
already built 220-kilometre road from Zaranj to Delaram in Afghanistan which will be
extended till Chabahar. India is helping Afghanistan build railway lines to central Asia
which would increase its trade and stability.
o The port opens a new strategic route connecting Iran, India and Afghanistan bypassing
Pakistan, and reflecting growing convergence of interests among the three countries.
o Counter Chinese encircling of India – China encircling India through its policy of String of
Pearls, pursuant to this policy china is developing Gwadar Port in Pakistan. Therefore,
Developing Chabahar port will help encountering Chinese presence in this region.

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o It will provide India access to


the Middle East and Gulf
countries increasing trade
and ties.
o Provides India a foothold in
the western Arabian Sea,
which is important as many
of our energy imports pass.
 Economic
o Feeder port to INSTC –
Chabahar is Part of
International North-South
Transport Corridor (INSTC)
which is a ship, rail, and road route for moving cargo between India, Russia, Iran, Europe
and Central Asia. Being close to Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries
of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan etc., it has been termed the "Golden Gate" to these land-
locked countries.
o Alternate route to Afghanistan – It would provide an alternative access to trade with
Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan. India, Iran and Afghanistan already singed a trilateral
transport and transit agreement in 2016 for moving the cargo.
o Free trade zone – The free trade zone around the port can be an important trade centre
with West Asia. A total investment of Rs 1 lakh crore is envisaged. Indian companies would
set up a range of industries from aluminum smelter to urea plants in the region.
o Boost regional Trade - In 2016, the export to Central Asia was a meagre $ 549.16 million
and the imports amounted to approximately $754.42 million. This poor trade statistics is
mainly because of poor connectivity between India and central Asia. The development of
Chabahar coupled with the proposed INSTC will in all certainty boost trade with the
region.
o Energy security- India is one of the biggest buyers of Iranian crude and is set to import
at least 400,000 barrels per day from Iran. Iranian crude is very suitable for Indian
refineries and its demand is high. Renewed ties could also make the proposed under -
sea pipeline for evacuating Iranian gas a reality.
o Reduced Current Account Deficit: it will reduce the trade costs and time by 1/3rd and this
reduced transportation costs will allow India to import crude oil, Urea and dry fruits at
lower prices.
o Take up global port projects - The project investment arm of the shipping ministry, India
Ports Global is partnering with a joint venture between the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust
and Gujarat's Kandla Port Trust to develop the port. The success of this project can boost
Indian capabilities to take up similar other projects abroad.
 Diplomatic
o It will promote cultural linkages between India and Iran.
o It can act as a center to coordinate humanitarian operations such as mass evacuation of
refugees in times of need.
o It will provide the diplomatic edge to India’s ambition of developing a blue-water navy by
enhancing its footprint in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman.

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Afghanistan Gains from Chabahar

 Reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan - It will reduce dependence of Land locked


Afghanistan on Pakistan for Sea access lowering Pakistan’s strategic hold on Afghanistan (as
Pakistan denies access to India for trade in Afghanistan via the Wagah Border).
 Recently India shipped to Afghanistan through the Iranian port of Chabahar 1.1 million tonnes of
wheat on grant basis.
Iranian Gains from Chabahar

 Chabahar provides it an opening to expand southwards since the development of the port will
ease its reliance on exporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz which has seen continued tensions
due to the changing dynamics of intra-religious conflicts and hostilities with its immediate
neighbors in the Gulf.
 Free trade zone around the port, Indian investments along with INSTC will boost the Iranian
economy which has been in isolation due to western sanctions.
Chinese reaction

 Chabahar port is seen as Indian response to Chinese funded Gwadar port of Pakistan under its
OBOR project. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman observed that “the relevant cooperation can
be conducive to maintaining regional peace and promoting regional stability and prosperity”.
What are the future challenges?

 Economic viability of the project


o Competition from Gwadar port –China is investing $46 billion in Economic corridor to link
Gwadar to Kashgar as part of its OBOR Project. It is unclear whether the Chabahar route
will generate enough trade and traffic to justify the investment. Infact, Iran itself plans to
invest $4billion to build a refinery in Gwadar to Process 4,00,000 barrels of oil per day.
o Maritime Transit vs. Rail, Road transit logistical challenges – The Federation of Freight
Forwarders’ Associations of India FFFAI conducted a dry run through proposed INSTC
along two test routes, Mumbai-Baku and Mumbai to Astrakhan which took 33 and 43 days
compared with mumbai to Rotterdam of 26 days. Even when the overland route is
completely streamlined, it is unlikely to bring goods to European markets faster than the
sea routes.
o Competition from Bandar Abbas (busiest port) in Iran - Bandar Abbas connects to both
central Asia and beyond till Russia and most of the Europe with North South Corridor. It
poses a serious challenge to Chabahar, India’s initiative to reach central Asia.
 Threat of fresh sanctions by US – India and Iran agreed upon to build the port way back in 2003,
but India was deterred by sanctions against Iran by U.S. and European countries. Sanctions were
eased after signing of a nuclear agreement by the P5+1 countries, as a result India was able to
finish these two berths. But the Donald Trump regime calls the agreement as one of the worst
deals ever made and ready to impose fresh economic sanctions on Iran.
 Political instability and security situation is the biggest concern and will determine the future of
Chabahar trade route considering the fact that Taliban controls most part of western region in
Afghanistan. Most of the 800 Km long Delaram – Zaranj – Kabul route is under Taliban control.
During construction of the Delaram Zaranj project, 129 Afghanis and six Indians were killed.

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 Financial Problems - In order to build a couple of berths in Shahid Beheshti, India has so far been
able to invest only $85 million. While India recently indicated that it was willing to invest up to
$20billion – one of its largest overseas ventures- to develop the port, petrochemical and fertilizer
plants in the Chabahar SEZ, it remains to be seen if it can raise the funds.
Way Forward

 Resolving the Chabahar conundrum is vital to securing India’s interests in Iran, Afghanistan,
Central Asia and beyond.
 According to some experts given the challenges in manifesting this project, India is unlikely to
succeed on its own. India might be better off building an international consortium with the likes
of Japan, Australia and South Korea to invest in the project.
 Japan also needs central Asia markets and would like to export there and would like to have first
mover advantage once the port develops. India wants Japanese investment and help in building
the railway track between the port city and Zahedan. Also Australia also has a stake in the route
as they see a lot of their exports passing through Chabahar.
 India must now play a leadership role to undertake the initiative to develop Chabahar part
expeditiously and in a time-bound manner

GROWING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF PALESTINE


In the background of Palestine becoming a member of Interpol, the topic of growing
international recognition of Palestine came into focus.
About:

 Palestine, officially the State of Palestine is a de jure


sovereign state in the Middle East claiming the West
Bank (bordering Israel and Jordan) and Gaza Strip
(bordering Israel and Egypt).
 Most of the areas claimed by the State of Palestine
have been occupied by Israel since 1967 in the
aftermath of the Six-Day War.
 East Jerusalem is the designated capital although its
administrative centre is located in Ramallah.
 Since the proclamation of Palestinian Declaration of
Independence in 1988, international recognition of
Palestine Is the objective of Palestinians.

Interpol membership:

 The decision was made with more than the required


two-third majority approving the proposal (74
members approved the proposal and 24 opposed it).
 Significance:
o It will also help it in “following up cases outside its territories”. Interpol will now listen to
complaints from Palestine about alleged acts of terrorism from the Israeli side
o It will also boost Palestine's international status.

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UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA) NON-MEMBER OBSERVER STATE:

In 2012, the UN General Assembly passed a motion UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA) OBSERVERS
changing Palestine's "entity" status to "non-member In addition to its 193 member states, the
observer state" UNGA may grant permanent observer status
to an international organization, entity or
Significance: non-member state.
For applying to the status of Permanent
 This has been described as "de facto recognition of Observer, Non-Member States must be a
the sovereign state of Palestine". member of one or more UN specialized
 It recognizes Palestine's right to become a party to treaties agencies (Palestine was granted UNESCO
membership in 2011).
for which the UN Secretary-General is the depositary.
This entitles them to participate in the work of
 Following this it became member of the International
the UNGA, though with limitations.
Criminal Court (ICC). Earlier it couldn’t become. Apart from the state of Palestine, the other
But many called the change as "symbolic" which changes non-member permanent observer state is
the Holy See.
nothing on the ground.
There are two permanent non-member
CAN PALESTINE BECOME A FULL-MEMBER OF UN? observer states: Palestine and Holy See (it holds
sovereignty over the state of Vatican City).
 An application for membership must be approved by EU is the only international organization to
the United Nations Security Council (which is subject have enhanced rights (except right to vote)
to a veto) and then the General Assembly. such as the right to speak in debates, to
submit proposals and amendments.
 However, U.S., an ally of Israel will veto its
membership bid, because it holds the position that the
establishment of a Palestinian state can only be determined
through direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
National Authority.

Israel’s stance:

 Officially Israel has traditionally claimed it seeks a two state


solution, however its actions throughout the years have proven
the contrary. Palestine 194 is the name for the
diplomatic campaign by the
 Israel claims that the it will negotiate the creation of a Palestinian Palestinian National Authority
state on the condition that Palestine agree to direct bilateral for Palestine becoming the 194th
negotiations without conditions. member of the United Nations.
 But this has proved to be the most controversial point as Israel
refuses to treat Palestine as an equal actor with full rights in the negotiation.
 Thus Palestinians refuse to meet with Israel as long as they are treated as a second-class actor
within the negotiations.
 Thus in the near-term future there are little chances of it becoming a UN Members.

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INDIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS
In July 2017, PM Modi visited Israel.
ABOUT THE VISIT:

 This was the first visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Israel.


 During the visit, India and Israel signed seven agreements. These include agreements on:
o setting up a fund for research and development and technological innovation,
o cooperation on water conservation in India,
o agricultural cooperation, and
o space cooperation (regarding small satellites).

TIMELINE OF INDIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS:

1950 – 92:

 Although India formally recognised Israel in 1950, but full diplomatic relations were established
only in 1992. Till then India was one of its most persistent critics in the United Nations.
 This was strange because both the countries shared several similarities. The two were:
o former British colonies.
o constituted the only democracies in otherwise undemocratic regions.
o perpetual victims of Islamist terrorism and shared borders with hostile neighbours.
 Inspite of this India adopted an unsympathetic posture toward Israel soon after achieving
independence because of:
o Cold War politics.
Gandhi famously declared,
o fear of alienating India’s large Muslim populace. “Palestine belongs to the Arabs in
o desire to maintain strong ties to the Arab world. the same sense that England
o India’s founding fathers harbored anti-Zionist belongs to the English or France to
views who drew unfavorable comparisons the French. It is wrong and inhuman
between partition and the creation of Pakistan to to impose the Jews on the Arabs.”
the creation of the Jewish state.

1992–2014:

 But with the end of the Cold War and realisation that India’s imbalanced and ideological Israeli-
Palestinian policy had reaped few dividends and that engaging Israel on its own terms conferred
many benefits on India. As a result, in 1992 India extended full diplomatic recognition to Israel.
 Since then, bilateral ties have flourished, with defense & security cooperation representing the
cornerstones of the relationship.
 Even after more than 20 years, Israeli diplomats rightly believed that India seems to be reluctant
about expanding its political relationship with Israel even though other facets of the bilateral were
expanding. E.g. PM Ariel Sharon visited India in 2003, but no Indian head of the state made a
reciprocal visit despite repeated invitations from the Israel. It was because of the same reasons
that had motivated its Israel policy during the Cold War.

2015–Now: Diplomatic Renaissance

 But with election of Modi as India’s prime minister in 2014, experts predicted a “DIPLOMATIC
RENAISSANCE” in India-Israel relations. He had earlier visited Israel in 2006 as chief minister of
the Indian state of Gujarat and was full of praise for the Jewish state and its people.

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 The recent visit, passes a clear signal that India was is willing & able to pursue independent
relationships with both the Israeli and Palestinians, by de-hyphenating the two from one another.
 India’s de-hyphenation efforts were most clearly evidenced by Modi’s decision not to meet with
any Palestinian officials during his trip. It was a huge departure from traditional practice where
Indian officials normally visit Ramallah when traveling to Israel to preserve the delicate balance.

REASONS FOR CLOSER TIES BETWEEN INDIA AND ISRAEL:

In 2014, Israeli PM Benzamin Netanyahu told PM Modi that “sky is the limit” as far as the prospects of
India and Israel relationship goes.” This is because of reasons:

1. Defence deals: Israel is set to become the chief exporter of arms to India with Barak missiles,
surveillance drones etc. which have proved their expertise against the Hamas, Palestinian
insurgents and others battling Israel in various fronts.
2. National security and counter-terrorism: Indian diplomats are full of high praise for Israeli
counter-terrorism and intelligence units. But sides are boosting up the counter-terrorism
cooperation and sharing real-time intel on issues crucial to national security.
3. Water and agriculture: India which has a monsoon dependent agriculture can learn from Israel
which has transitioned from a water-deficit state to a water-surplus state by becoming a pioneer
in rainwater harvesting, use of oceanic water using water desalination technique and drip
irrigation.
4. Zionism and 'Hindu Rashtra': Those dreaming of a Hindu Rashtra have openly supported the
Zionist state of Israel and see in it a model state for India. They argue for a state-driven identity
politics (carried out by Israel) instead of India’s own alleged weakened “secularism”.
5. Palestine and Kashmir: Earlier India had been very much vocal about creation of the independent
state of Palestine. But the increasing clamour in the international press for equating Palestine with
Kashmir is pushing India under PM Modi to become slightly more tight-lipped about independent
Palestine.
LEBANON
Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri has been in international headlines for almost all
of this month, first for his resignation announced on Saudi TV and then for un-
resignation.
Before going further, it will be better to first read basic facts about Lebanon so as to make it easy to
understand the issue.

LEBANON: KEY FACTS


Geography:
 Capital: Beirut
 Neighbours: It is bordered by Syria, Israel and
Mediterranean Sea.

Religion:
Lebanon is the most religiously diverse country in the
Middle East. As of 2014 the CIA World Factbook estimates the following:
 Muslim 54% (27% Shia Islam, 27% Sunni Islam),
 Christian 40 % (includes 21% Maronite Catholic)
 Druze 5.6%,

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Politics: Confessionalism
 Lebanon is a PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, which implements a
special system known as confessionalism (It refers to de jure mix of
religion and politics).
 From 1975-1990, Lebanon saw a deadly civil war among its diverse
sects.
 To prevent further sectarian conflicts, agreement was worked out
under which
o President has to be a Maronite Christian.
o Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim.
o Speaker of the Parliament a Shi’a Muslim.

Hezbollah:
 It is a Shi'a Islamist political party and militant group based in Lebanon. It is powerful in Shia-
dominated Southern Beirut and southern Lebanon.
 Iran’s proxy? it was established by Iran's Revolutionary Guards in 1982 to fight Israeli troops in
Lebanon. It is considered as a proxy for Iran in the ongoing conflict with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
 Growing stronger:
o Militarily: Its last major war with Israel was in 2006, where it posed a major challenge
and since then it has grown stronger. Outside Lebanon, the group has been fighting
alongside Bashar al-Assad’s forces in Syria.
o Socially: it has opened various schools and hospitals, thus winning people’s sympathy.
o Politically: it heads a political coalition in parliament which gives it substantial power
in Lebanon’s politics. Thus Hezbollah had been "calling the shots" in the present Hariri
government. President Michel Aoun, is a Hezbollah ally.
 A terrorist organization? The group is blamed for the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri, the country’s most powerful Sunni leader, in 2005. It is designated as a terrorist
organisation by Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

“In 2006, Israel and Hezbollah battled in a month-long war where the militant group fired more than
4,000 rockets into Israel and Israeli forces fired around 7,000 bombs and missiles into Lebanon”

SAAD HARIRI: RESIGNATION and UN-RESIGNATION


He is the PM of Lebanon since December 2016.
A Sunni Muslim, he holds a dual Saudi-Lebanese citizen with deep financial
ties to Saudi Arabia, which gives Riyadh leverage over him.
 On November 4, Hariri announced his resignation live on Saudi
Arabian TV from Riyadh, where he’d travelled the day before to meet
King Salman.
 He explained he was stepping down because of rising Iranian influence in his country (via their
proxy Hezbollah) had made him fearful he would suffer the same fate as his father, Rafik Hariri
who was assassinated in 2005 allegedly by Hezbollah.
 On November 6, after Hariri’s resignation, Saudi Arabia claimed Lebanon had begun a war against
it, blaming Hezbollah for a rocket shot from Yemen, allegedly at Riyadh airport.
 All this fuelled speculation in Lebanon that the Saudi government had forced him to resign against
his will and was holding him under house arrest.
 After two- week long absence he came back to Lebanon and stated that he is delaying his decision
of resignation.

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Analysis
1) Iran-Saudi proxy wars
Hariri — and Lebanon itself — are cats-paws in a much larger game. To understand the crisis in
Lebanon, one first need to understand the cold war raging between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
 Iran’s government is a Shia Muslim theocracy; Saudi Arabia’s government is a monarchy closely
aligned with the country’s Sunni Muslim religious establishment.
 The two countries represent two ideological and political poles and have spent decades fighting
each other for
o Dominance in the Middle East and
o The right to represent the Muslim world.
 But instead of openly waging war, the two countries engage in proxy wars by backing opposing
political and extremist groups.
 Recently, this is playing out in Yemen, Syria and now openly in Lebanon.
2) Why he resigned?
Majority of the analysts alleged that Saudi Arabia forced him to resign because –
 Soft on Hezbollah: Saad Hariri hasn’t done enough to counter the growing influence of Hezbollah
in Lebanon. Hariri’s willingness to share power with Shias — the Hezbollah is part of Lebanon’s
cabinet — has angered Saudi.
 Another front of MBS: The timing also coincided with purging of 11 princes in Saudi Arabia by
Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) as a part of his anti-corruption drive. It is believed that he wanted
to open another front just the way he did in Yemen and Qatar so as to counter Iran.
3) Why he un-resigned?
Analysts have given various theories for the whole episode:
 Role of U.S. Even as the US backs Saudi Arabia, it continues to support Lebanon, including
providing military aid.
 Role of France: France, which ruled Lebanon once, retains a close interest in Beirut’s affairs. In
November 2017, to diffuse the tension, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Saudi Arabia
and invited Hariri to Paris.
 Already Saudi economy is not doing good and is involved in proxy wars in multiple places.
Thus it was seen as a face-saving by Saudi Arabia.
4) concluding remark:
 His decision to delay his resignation has ended a political crisis that could’ve devolved into a new
Middle East war. But only time will tell for how long?
 As MBS is consolidating power in his hand with time, further tensions in Lebanon and overall West
Asia are expected to rise.
 Gain for Hezbollah: Absence of a Sunni PM for two weeks is a political and military gain for
Hezbollah. This would certainly raise concerns in Jerusalem. It remains to be seen if Hariri’s return
minimized all that anxiety.
 Israel-Saudi Arabia coalition? Both Saudi Arabia and Israel detest Hezbollah, and analysts say
they could even unite to fight their common enemy.
 Next level of complexity: The game also extends beyond Saudi Arabia versus Iran to USA versus
Iran. Iran has received support from Russia, notably in the Syrian context.
o So what may have at first seemed like a small political issue in Lebanon had the potential
to turn into a wider Middle East quagmire. Hariri’s return doesn’t solve the region’s
problems, but it helps to calm a political crisis that could’ve made them much worse.

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KURDISTAN
The semi-autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq held a non-binding independence
referendum on September 25, 2017. In that over 90% of Kurds vote for independence
from Iraq.
KURDS:

 The Kurds are Mostly Sunni Muslims.


 An estimated 25-30 million Kurds mostly live in turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
 They do not have an official homeland and continue to seek recognition, political rights,
autonomy or independence.

SEMI-AUTONOMOUS KURDISH REGION OF NORTHERN IRAQ:

 Governed by: Kurdistan regional government.


 Type of government: Parliamentary democracy.
 Armed forces: Peshmerga (comprises more than 2 lakh kurds).
BACKGROUND:

 Kurds were denied a homeland of their own after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and various
movements seeking autonomy and independence in the four countries have been brutally
repressed over the years.
 In Iraq, Kurds were repressed during Ba’ath rule.
 After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, they managed to get a better deal in the new regime and
enhanced their autonomy following Baghdad’s entanglement in the civil war against the Islamic
State (IS).
 Kurds are an important partner for Baghdad in the fight against the IS, with the U.S. also treating
the Peshmerga forces as an ally. With a weakened Baghdad dependent upon Shiite militias and
Iran’s proxy forces in the long civil war, Kurds have used the situation to enhance the territory
under their control.

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WAY AHEAD?

 Even with the strong support, the non-binding vote is unlikely to lead to formal independence as
Iraq and its neighbours, along with virtually the entire international community, are opposed to
any redrawing of the map.
 Any moves for independence of “south Kurdistan” in Iraq have geopolitical ramifications. It could
complicate matters such as the still unfinished civil war against the IS in Syria and Iraq.
 But it has escalated long-running tensions with Baghdad, which has moved to block flights in and
out of the Kurds' autonomous region.
QATAR
Arab world leaders suspend diplomatic ties with Qatar.

About

 Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen have announced that they are suspending
diplomatic ties as well as sea and air travel to and form Qatar.
 Saudi Arabia urged other countries to take similar step. Subsequently, Maldives and Libya’s
eastern-based government in Bayda.
WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THIS MOVE?
Qatar has had differences from other Arab governments on a number of issues:
1. Al Jazeera:
a. Qatar broadcasts Al Jazeera wehich is seen to be biased against Saudi led countries.
b. Al-Jazeera claims that the recent dispute stems from a May 2017 hack of Qatar News
Agency. Iran blamed it on United States President Donald Trump.
2. Iran:
a. Qatar continues to maintain sound economic and diplomatic ties with Iran which is
resented by Sunni majority nations.
b. This should also be seen in the background of President Donald Trump’s recent visit to
Saudi Arabia who is for an anti-Iran agenda. Thus it can be seen as a step towards Saudi
arabia’s renewed attempt to rally Sunni countries under its leadership against Iran.
3. Muslim brotherhood:
a. Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood in the past.
b. The ideology of the Brotherhood opposes the concept of absolute monarchy. Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf monarchies see the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to hereditary
rule.
4. Terrorism:
a. Arab countries also accuse Qatar of supporting terrorism. In the past Qatar has allowed
the Afghan Taliban to set up a political office inside the country. Qatar has been accused
for funding rebel groups in Syria, including al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front.
b. But such allegations can be leveled against most Gulf countries as they back their proxy
militant groups throughout West Asia. E.G. in Syria, the Saudis back Salafi groups such as
Ahrar al-Sham.
c. Qatar also argues that hosts the largest American base in the Middle East, the Al Udeid
Air Base has been used by the United States in its campaigns in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.
5. These countries have also accused Qatar of interfering with their internal affairs.

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WHAT CAN BE THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THIS MOVE?

 On Qatar:
o Economic impact will be significant due to cancellation of transport to and from these five
countries. Egyptian banks have halted dealings with Qatar’s bank. It will also impact the
supply of construction material which is required for completing projects esp. for 2022
FIFA world cup.
o It will also impact food supply as it receives 40% of its food supply frromn saaudi Arabia
via roads. This will lead to inflation.
 On geo-politics in Middle East and it’s relationship with U.S.:
o In this background of being pushed to the corner, Qatar can grow further close to Iran.
o Qatar is a United States ally, hosting the largest United States Military base (Al Udeid Air
Base) in the Middle East. But if Qatar further grows close to Iran then it can trigger a
confrontation with U.S.
 On war against Islamic state:
o Gulf countries should remember that Qatar is an economic powerhouse. Also, it not only
hosts the headquarters of the U.S. military’s Central Command, the Al Udeid Air Base
(largest in middle east) has been used by the United States in the past its campaigns in
Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan is located in Qatar.
o So any prolonged attempt to isolate the country would complicate the fight against the IS
yet more. At present West Asia requires is a united front against terror which involves
lowering of Saudi-Iran tensions. Opening any new fronts in the rivalry at this moment will
further destabilize the region.
 On energy supplies:
o In 2016, Qatar was the biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas, accounting for 30% of
global supplies.
o This move can shake the natural gas market.
HOW CAN THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT IMPACT INDIA’S TIES WITH QATAR?

 With nearly 6.5 Lakh Indians living in the Qatar, India has the largest expatriate community in
Qatar, making up around 24% of Qatar’s population. Annual remittances from Qatar in 2015 were
estimated to be nearly $ 4.2 Billion.
 India is also eagerly seeking investment from Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund [Qatar Investment
Authority (QIA)] and private investors in Qatar. In words of former PM Manmohan Singh “The
investment requirements of a large emerging economy like India (requiring $1 Trillion in next
five years in infrastructure alone) and the vast financial surpluses of an energy rich economy
such as Qatar can be married to create a win-win situation for both of our countries.”
 Impact on jobs for Indian expatriates: Saudi Arabia has asked other nations to also snap ties with
Qatar and freeze investments in that country. If that happens then the job market could be
negatively impacted. There might be some implications on investments, and the movement of
labor could become difficult, apart from endangering security of Indian expatriates over there.
 Way ahead for India? Balancing the relationships in the region would require “diplomatic finesse”
of a high order. India should maintain a close watch in the region by staying in regular touch with
the Indian community over there.

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ABOUT QATAR

 Geography:
o Its sole land border is with Saudi Arabia to the south.
o Rest of its territory is surrounded by the Persian Gulf.
o An arm of the Persian Gulf separates Qatar from the nearby island country of Bahrain.

o Khawr al Udayd: it is also spelled as Khor al Adaid and is known to local English
speakers as the "Inland Sea". It is a inlet of the Persian Gulf in southeast Qatar, on the
border with Saudi Arabia.
 Economy of Qatar:
o Qatar is a high income economy, backed by the world's third largest natural gas
reserves and oil reserves.
o The country has the highest per capita income in the world and is the most advanced
Arab state for human development.
 Polity of Qatar:
o Qatar is a hereditary monarchy.
o It has been ruled by the House of Thani.
 Demography:
o Population:
 In early 2017, Qatar's total population was 2.6 million. Our of this 2.3
million were expatriates and only 3 Lakh are Qatari citizens.
 With nearly 6.5 Lakh Indians living in the Qatar, India has the largest expatriate
community in Qatar, making up around 24% of Qatar’s population.
o Religious population:
 Qatar is 67.7% Muslim, 13.8% Christian, 13.8% Hindu.
 Around 70-80 of Mulims in Qatar follow Salafi Muslim movement of Sunni
Islam, about 20% follow Shia Islam.
 Al Jazeera:
o It is a Doha-based state-funded broadcaster owned by the Al Jazeera Media Network,
which is partly funded by the House of Thani, the ruling family of Qatar.

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INDIA-QATAR BILATERAL RELATIONS: OVERVIEW

 Political Relations:
o There has been regular exchange of high-level bilateral visits in the recent past.
o The Emir of Qatar Hamad Al Thani had paid a State Visit to India in 2015. In June 2016,
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a Official Visit to Doha.
o The last Indian PM to visit Qatar was the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2008.
 Defence relations:
o India-Qatar Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2008 which is implemented
through the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC).
o Qatari has shown interest in the opportunities offered under the ‘Make in India’
initiative for joint production of defence equipment in India.
 Commercial Relations:
o Energy relations: Qatar is the largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for over 65%
of India's global import and 15% of Qatar's export of LNG. A long term contract between
Petronet of India and RasGas of Qatar has been signed for ensring regular supply of
LNG.
o Trade: The balance of trade continues to be heavily in Qatar’s favour. India’s exports
amounted to nearly $1 billion out of two-way trade of nearly $16 billion in 2014-15.This
is due to huge import of LNG. India is the third largest export destination for Qatar
(behind Japan and South Korea) and ranks at 10th position for Qatar’s imports.
o Investment: While the current volume of Qatar's FDI in India is modest, Qatar’s
Sovereign Wealth Fund and private investors in Qatar are keenly looking at attractive
investment options in infrastructural sectors in India in various sectors. During PM’s
visit to Qatar in June, 2016, a MoU for investment in India’s National Investment and
Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) was signed with QIA.
o Presence of India’s corporate sector in Qatar: A number of reputed Indian companies,
particularly in construction/infrastructure and IT, have operations in Qatar, including
L&T; TCS; Wipro; SBI, ICICI etc.
o India-Qatar Business Forum: The setting up of an India-Qatar Business Forum
comprising senior representatives of a number of Indian companies and Qatari
businessmen is another positive development.
 Indian Community:
o With nearly 6.5 Lakh Indians living in the Qatar, India has the largest expatriate
community in Qatar, making up around 24% of Qatar’s population.
o Annual remittances from Qatar in 2015 were estimated to be nearly $ 4.2 Billion.
o Indian Community Benevolent Forum (ICBF): Several volunteers from the Indian
community are also helping Indian workers, mainly through the Indian Community
Benevolent Forum (ICBF), functions under the aegis of Embassy of India, Doha. ICBF
was awarded Pravasi Bharatiya Samman in January, 2011.

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ASIA-AFRICA GROWTH CORRIDOR (AAGC)


In May 2017, at the 52nd annual meeting of African development bank held in
Gandhinagar, India and Japan unveiled a vision document for the development of Asia
Africa Growth Corridor.

ABOUT

 This Asia Africa Growth Corridor was first proposed by India and Japan in November 2016.
 Objective: It has two broad objectives:
1 Developing sea  First, Create a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” by rediscovering
corridors ancient sea-routes and creating/ new sea corridors that will link the
African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South-
East Asia.
 For instance, under the AAGC, there is a plan to connect ports in
Jamnagar (Gujarat) with Djibouti in the Gulf of Eden and Mombasa
with Zanzibar will be connected to ports near Madurai
 India is developing ports under the Sagarmala programme
specifically for this purpose.
2 Build  Apart from developing sea corridors , robust institutional, industrial
infrastructure and transport infrastructure will be developed in growth poles
among countries in Asia and Africa.
 This will integrate the two regions and will enable emergence of
Asia and Africa as a globally competitive economic bloc.

 Four key pillars: The vision document proposes


four key pillars that leverage the strengths of
India and Japan –
o Enhancing capacity and skills;
o Building quality infrastructure and
connecting institutions;
o Development and cooperation projects
in health, farming, manufacturing and
disaster management; and
o People-to-people partnerships.
 Five focal points: The AAGC consists of five remarkable focal points:
o Effective mobilisation of financial resources;
o Their alignment with socio-economic development and development strategies of partner
countries and regions;
o Application of high-quality standards in terms of compliance with international standards
established to mitigate environmental and social impact;
o Provision of quality of infrastructure taking into account aspects of economic efficiency
and durability, inclusiveness, safety and disaster-resilience, sustainability as well as
convenience and amenities; and
o Contribution to the local society and economy.

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 What are the proposed plans under this project?


o More details are likely to be firmed up by September, 2017 when Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe
will visit India.
 How will India and Japan contribute to the project?
o Japan will build quality infrastructure, while India will bring in its expertise of working in
Africa.
HOW WILL IT BE A WIN-WIN SITUATION FOR INDIA, JAPAN AND AFRICA?

1. Synergy between act east policy and Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: As the
Indo-Pacific region will be “the key driver for prosperity of the world”, the two leaders have
decided “to seek synergy” between India’s “Act East Policy” and Japan’s “Expanded Partnership
for Quality Infrastructure”. Thus launching of AAGC is a right step in this direction.
2. This will turn the 21st century into an Asian-African century, and not just an Asian century.
3. Participate in Africa’s growth story: It is a key step in participating in growth story of some African
nations.
4. Increasing footprint in Africa: Another objective is to curtail the Chinese presence on the
continent by increasing their investment in Africa. In 2015-16, the country invested a whopping
USD 38.4 billion (24 per cent of total green-field investment). In comparison, India invested just
USD 2.2 billion (1.3 percent of total green-field investments). Japan investments at present are
minuscule.
5. To counter china’s OBOR: The vision document was unveiled days after China's ambitious One
Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative took off. Thus experts are seeing it as a step to counter china’s
OBOR initiative. India has great trade and network experience in Africa, and Japan has very
advanced technology. This combination will give China tough competition for market share.
6. Benefits for Africa: It will also contribute towards achieving the “High priorities” which according
to African Development Bank are crucial for accelerating Africa’s economic transformation. These
high 5 priorities are (i) Light up and power Africa, (ii) Feed Africa (food security), (iii) Industrialize
Africa, (iv) Integrate Africa (transportation), and (v) Improve the quality of life for the people of
Africa (skill development, health and sustainable development).
HOW IS IT DIFFERENT FROM CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD (OBOR) PROJECT?

1. Land vs water: OBOR mainly entails development of a land corridor, whereas AAGC entails
development of a sea corridor.
2. Coverage: Europe is not a part of AAGC, But in OBOR, Europe is a major focus area.
3. Cheaper and less carbon footprint: The project stakeholders believe that the sea corridors will be
“low-cost” and have “less carbon footprint” when compared to a land corridor.
4. More open: As compared to OBOR, AAGC is more open. It will be based on more consultations as
opposed to government funded OBOR (OBOR was presented with least consultations).
5. More inclusive: As compared to OBOR, AAGC is more inclusive. It will keep people as the centre
piece rather than just trade and economic ties.
WAY AHEAD?

 India and Japan should realise that they do not have the luxury of time in view of China’s rapidly
expanding footprint in Africa.

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 An urgent need exists for them to increase the scope of their development projects, create
synergy among themselves, engage proactively with other willing partners, and thus turn the
concept of the AAGC into a viable reality.
 In this direction, India and Japan should initiate a few joint pilot projects along with Kenya,
Ethiopia and Mozambique in identified areas such as health care, agriculture and blue economy.

DJIBOUTI
President Ram Nath Kovind paid a visit to Djibouti and Ethiopia. This was his maiden trip abroad
since taking office.

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Key highlights of the visit:

 He is the first Indian leader to visit Djibouti.


 The two sides signed an agreement on institutionalisation of foreign office consultation.
Significance of Djibouti:

The four different states constituting the Horn of Africa— Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti —
along with Yemen across the Red Sea have long been described as one of the world’s pivotal regions.

While Djibouti’s population is less than a million and its land is largely barren, Djibouti’s location has
made it a very attractive piece of geopolitical real estate.

 Economic: Lying on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the tiny African nation of Djibouti serves as a
gateway to the Suez Canal, one of the world's busiest shipping routes.
 Strategic: Djibouti's proximity to restive areas in Africa and the Middle East and its relative stability
have made it a prized location for foreign military bases and ensured a steady flow of foreign
assistance.
 Political stability: IsmaIl Omar Guelleh, the current President of Djibouti, is in office since 1999
has provided stability to the region. His “all are welcome” approach has drawn many powers to
set up military bases in Djibouti.
Increasing Chinese presence:

 Djibouti is the first ever foreign military base for China. Under an accord signed in 2016, China can
host up to 10,000 soldiers on Djibouti until 2026.
 In September 2017, Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops conducting their first live-fire
military drills overseas on their base in Djibouti.
 China is developing a 750 km-long rail link between landlocked Ethiopia and Djibouti.
 Later in 2017, China and Djibouti forged ‘Strategic’ ties.

Present status of India-Djibouti relations:

 Post-independence India followed a policy of non-alignment and military isolationism.


 Things began to change in the 1990s as Delhi turned to economic globalisation and declared that
its national interests were no longer limited to the Subcontinent but stretched from the “Aden to
Malacca”.
 But still nothing much changed in the context of Djibouti.
o Till now India does not have an embassy in Djibouti and no president or prime minister
paid a visit to the region till now.
o India’s bilateral trade with Djibouti stands at mere $284 million in 2016-17.
Hopefully after the recent visit of President, India sustains the momentum. India must also take larger
responsibility by acting a “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean.

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DECLINE IN GULF JOBS


According to latest statistics, the number of Indian workers emigrating to the Gulf has
dropped from 7.7 Lakhs in 2014 to 5 lakhs in 2016.

REASON OF DECLINE IN JOBS:

● Gulf countries are witnessing economic slowdown due to lower oil prices, discovery of shale gas
and increasing focus on cleaner fuel resources.
● Saudi Arabia, under Vision 2030, plans to employ more Saudi nationals than foreigners. Imposition
of new 'family tax' for non-resident workers and higher cost of living has resulted into lesser
remittances from Indian workers, which reduces the incentive to work there.
● Low paid workers from Pakistan and Bangladesh pose a further challenge to Indian workers.
Presently, these two countries constitute around 78 percent workforce in GULF countries as
compared to 22 percent Indian workforce.
● The region is witnessing geopolitical turmoil due to Shia- Sunni conflict and increased presence
of ISIS which further acts as a deterrent to Indian workers.
IMPACT:

● This has led to decline in remittances from the region, which can increase India’s Current Account
deficit, less foreign exchange earnings and consequently lesser investment on social security
program and infrastructure development.
● Limited job opportunities for the returned workers may increase poverty, as India is already
struggling to create job opportunities for its workforce.
● It will also impede success of India’s LOOK WEST POLICY for enhanced strategic and security
cooperation with Gulf countries through unique soft power asset in the form of diaspora.
WAY AHEAD:

● As Gulf jobs and remittances decline, government must attract investments from the Gulf
sovereign wealth funds for infrastructure investments which will ensure infrastructure
development and create more jobs in the economy.
● Sustained low oil prices also provides India an opportunity to reduce its current account deficit
and redirect the gains to spur economic activity.

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REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE (AMENDMENT) BILL OF 2017


On December 18, 2017, the Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill, 2017 was
introduced in Lok Sabha.
Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1950 and 1951:

 RPA, 1950: It provides for allocation of seats and delimitation of constituencies for elections,
qualifications of voters, and preparation of electoral rolls.
 RPA, 1951: It provides for the conduct of elections and offences and disputes related to elections.

Background:

 Section 20A of the Representation of the People Act, 1950: It provides for registration and
enrolment of overseas electors in the electoral rolls.
 Registration of Electors Rules, 1960:
o These rules require the overseas electors to be present in India (in their polling station)
on the day of polling.
o This causes hardship to the overseas electors in exercising their franchise.

Representation of the People (Amendment) bill, 2017

 In this background, Government has introduced the Representation of the People (Amendment)
Bill, 2017 to amend the
o Representation of People Act, 1950 and
o Representation of People Act, 1951.
 Appointment of Proxy:
o It amends section 60 of the RPA, 1951 to enable the overseas electors to appoint a proxy
to cast the vote in an election on their behalf, subject to certain conditions to be laid down
in the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
 Gender neutral provisions:
o It amends section 20 of the RPA, 1950 and section 60 of RPA, 1951 to make these
provisions gender neutral.

HURDLES IN EU-INDIA FTA


Recently PM Modi and German Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed about finalising the
long standing EU-India Foreign Trade Agreement (FTA) because such an agreement
would be beneficial for both countries.
BACKGROUND:

● India and the EU first started negotiations in 2007 on an FTA to cover trade in goods, services,
intellectual property and foreign investment.
● The proposed EU-India FTA was later renamed as Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement
(BTIA).
BENEFITS OF CONCLUDING AN FTA:

● Benefits for EU: For the EU, greater access to the Indian market is critical in view of the economic
slowdown in Europe.

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● Benefits for India: Concluding an FTA with the EU would mitigate some of the export losses that
India may suffer on account of trade diversion due to mega FTAs like the Trans Pacific Partnership
agreement; it would also increase India’s exports to EU which are far below their potential.
WHAT ARE THE HURDLES IN NEGOTIATING EU-INDIA FTA?

However, even after 10 years, the set of negotiations have not yielded a treaty. The last set of
negotiations were carried out in 2013 after which further negotiations were stalled. The contentious
areas in the negotiations are as follows:

Trade in Goods:

● Tariff barriers: EU wants India to lower its tariff rates on European goods (automobiles and wines
and spirits) as EU tariff rates are already quite low. However if India lowers the tariff rates then it
may mean more imports than exports because there will be a greater opening in the Indian market
for European goods than in the European market for Indian goods.
● Non-tariff barriers: EU is imposing stringent non-tariff barriers (such as sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, and technical barriers to trade) which have dented India’s exports of agricultural
products. For example, in 2014, India’s export of Alphonso mangoes to the EU suffered due to
stringent non-tariff barriers.
Trade in services: India wants liberalization of services in Mode 1 and Mode 4.

● Liberalization under Mode 1 would mean a legal


commitment by the EU to outsource its services The Four Modes of Services Trade under
General Agreement on Trade in Services
which would create many jobs in India.
(GATS):
● Liberalization under Mode 4 would mean the EU
allowing more Indian professionals preferential Mode 1: Cross-border trade,
access to the European labour market, which could Mode 2: Consumption abroad,
boost remittances from the EU to India.
Mode 3: Commercial presence,
● However, given the high unemployment rates in the
EU due to economic slowdown, EU is not willing to Mode 4: Presence of natural persons.
make commitments to liberalise trade in services.
● EU also wants India to liberalize accountancy and legal services which India opposes at present.
Investment (Bilateral Investment Treaty):

● India’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty excludes matters relating to taxation. Also it states that
foreign investors investing in India can seek the option of international arbitration only when all
domestic legal routes have been exhausted.
● Given the experiences of major European companies such as Vodafone and Cairn, who are
battling the imposition of retrospective taxes by India, the EU wants to negotiate the bilateral
investment treaty before negotiating the EU-India FTA.
IP protection standards:

● The EU wants India to adopt stringent IP protection standards by going beyond the WTO specified
standards.
● Now, India will not and should not agree to additional protection measures as this
could compromise public health and raise other compelling concerns.

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WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA:

● Given the fact that negotiations at the WTO are stalled, India should start FTA negotiations with
EU to reap the benefits of international trade.
● Along with this, India should make its goods & services globally competitive and improve ease of
doing business by bringing internal reforms to benefit from the FTAs.

CATALONIA
A controversial independence referendum was held in Catalonia on 1 October 2017 for
making catalonia an independent republic.
In the results declared, 91% of voters favoured in split from Spain. The voter turnout was
43%. However Spanish government opposed it and reacted with a massive crackdown.

ABOUT CATALONIA:

ARGUMENTS FOR DEMANDING INDEPENDENCE:

 Catalonia has a distinct history, culture and language. First referenced in the 12th century, a
defined region of Catalonia had existed for more than 250 years before it joined Spain in the 16th
Century.
 From 1939-1975, under the military government of Francisco Franco, Catalan culture was
suppressed.
 Since Spain's 2008 debt crisis, the push for full autonomy have gathered pace. It is argued that
Catalonia, which is one of Spain's wealthiest regions, offers more financial support to Spain than
it receives from the central government.

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WHY IS SPANISH GOVERNMENT OPPOSED TO IT’S INDEPENDENCE?

 It will be a major blow to


Spain as Catalonia
accounts for 15 percent of
Spain's population and 20
percent of its economic
output. About 1.6 million
people live in Barcelona
which is a major tourist
destination.
 The referendum held is
unconstitutional. Spain's
1978 constitution decrees
that the country is
indivisible, and grants the
national government
exclusive power to hold
referendums.
 It has its own Catalan parliament & police force and have powers over affairs such as education,
healthcare and welfare.
 There are also provisions in place to protect Catalan identity, including joint language status for
Catalan and Castilian and a law that requires teachers, doctors and public sector employees to use
the Catalan language in their places of work.

WOULD CATALONIA PROSPER ON ITS OWN?

 An independent Catalonia
would be a midsize
European nation.
 Must would depend on the
financial and political
terms, including how
Spain’s debt burden would
be split and whether Spain
would impose economic
sanctions on Catalonia for
withdrawing unilaterally.
 At previous times of
tension, Spanish
consumers have boycotted
Catalan consumer goods
like Cava, the region’s
sparkling wine.

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INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS CONSIDERED


‘MIGRANTS’ IN BRITAIN
Experts have criticized the present British policy of considering international students as
migrants.

Reasons for criticism?

 Firstly, majority don’t see them as migrants. Research published by Universities U.K. last week
found that just 26% thought of international students as “immigrants” in international policy.
 Secondly, with government aiming at reducing the migration, this acts as a incentive. Now this
hurts the British Economy.
How do international students contribute to U.K.?

According to research by Oxford Economics for Universities U.K., International students contributes
to the U.K. economy immensely.

 They add around £25.8 billion to the U.K. economy, with their contribution spread across the
country, including the more deprived regions.
 international students paid £4.8 billion pounds in tuition fees, and billions on goods and services
and activities on and off campus.
 They also helped support around 2,06,600 jobs in the year 2014-2015.
 This might change their attitude towards international students who are now preferring other
nations.
Reduction in number of international students in U.K

 Present status?
o According to immigration figures published by the official statistical agency in
february2017, 41,000 fewer international students came to study in the U.K. in 2016, the
lowest since 2002.
o Indians accounted for just 6% of student visas granted in 2016. Many were now choosing
other countries, including the U.S., Germany, Australia and France.
 Reasons for this drop?
o While there is no cap on the number of students who can come to the U.K., there are a
number of factors that are making Britain a less-attractive destination for Indian students,
including restrictions on their ability to work here following the end of their degree.
o International student numbers are also counted in net migration figures although
generally international students are not considered as migrants. Now with the
government set on reducing net migration figures, there is little incentive for it to take a
more welcoming approach towards students.
o Last year Home Secretary Amber Rudd announced that the government was considering
a tougher regime for international students.

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GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA


In Las Vegas, a shooter opened fire at a country music concert, reportedly killing more
than 50 and injuring hundreds. This led to discussions about gun control.
A ROUTINE:

Americans have heard these types of calls before: After every mass shooting, the debate over guns
and gun violence sparks up once again. Maybe some bills get introduced. Critics respond with concerns
that the government is trying to take away their guns. The debate stalls.

So why nothing seems to change? To understand that, it's important to grasp America's very unique
relationship with guns.

AMERICA'S UNIQUE GUN PROBLEM:

 No other developed country in the world has anywhere near the same rate of gun violence as
America.
 The US has nearly six times the gun homicide rate as Canada, more than seven times as Sweden,
and nearly 16 times as Germany, according to UN data.

WORSE THAN YEMEN:

 To understand why that is, there's another important statistic: The US has by far the highest
number of privately owned guns in the world.
 Estimated in 2007, the number of civilian-owned firearms in the US was 88.8 guns per 100 people,
meaning there was almost one privately owned gun per American and more than one per
American adult.
 The world's second-ranked country was Yemen, a quasi-failed state torn by civil war, where there
were 54.8 guns per 100 people.

REASONS:

1. Federal law prohibits certain people from owning firearms: those with certain kinds of criminal
records or mental illness. However the system has major holes like incomplete listing of these
people, no background check.
2. In fact, most gun controls exist at the state level. However, the laws on carrying weapons vary
enormously. Most states allow anyone who legally owns a gun to carry it openly, in public, without
requiring a license or permit.
3. Gun rights advocates see weapon possession as a matter of individual rights i.e. people having the
right to arm themselves for hunting, self-defense, sport – or just because they want to.
4. In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in a 5-to-4 decision, that the “Second Amendment” protects the
individual right to have firearms.
5. The gun lobby also argue that the weapons actually make society safer, giving people the power
of self-defense, and dissuading criminals from victimizing people who might be armed.
6. Gun rights advocates, led by the National Rifle Association, form a powerful lobby that politicians
fear to cross.

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DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA)


On September 5, 2017, U.S. Administration announced that it would begin phasing out
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programme on March 5, 2018.
ABOUT DACA:

 It is an American immigration policy established by the Obama administration through an


executive action in 2012.
 It allows some individuals who entered the country illegally as minors to receive a renewable two-
year period of deferred action from deportation and eligibility for a work permit.
 The DACA programme has helped around 8,00,000 beneficiaries, a group that is commonly
referred to as the ‘Dreamers’.

REPEAL OF DACA:

 The move is another step in trump’s America first policy.


 The trump administration argues that that the DACA executive order was unconstitutional as
President doesn’t have the authority to waive immigration law.
 Criticism of this step:
o Several lawmakers have opposed this decision on the ground that children who were
illegally brought into this country through no fault of their own should not be forced to
return to a country they do not know.
o Critiques have further argued that there are no known major adverse impacts from DACA
on native-born workers' employment. Infact most economists say that DACA benefits the
U.S. economy.

RAISE ACT
Recently, RAISE (Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment) Act has
received the support of President Donald Trump.
ABOUT IT:

● RAISE Act is a bill introduced in the United States Senate in 2017.


● The bill seeks to
o Reduce levels of legal immigration to the United States by 50% by halving the number of
green cards issued,
o Impose a cap of 50,000 refugee admissions a year and
o End the visa diversity lottery system (which aims to diversify the immigrant population in
the United States).
● Those promoting the legislation, argue that the bill would increase economic growth and increase
wages. On the other hand economists "overwhelmingly predict" that cuts in immigration would
have a negative impact on GDP growth.
● Impact on Indian IT sector:
o If implemented, it can also potentially increase the cost of employing an Indian software
engineer in the US.
o But experts also feel that it could favour Indian and global IT firms, as it focuses on
higher skills.

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NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)

WHAT IS NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)?

 What is NSG? NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that frames and implements agreed
rules for exporting nuclear equipment, with a view to controlling the spread of nuclear weapons
 When was it established? NSG was established in 1974 in the background of the Pokhran I
peaceful nuclear explosion conducted by India in 1974.
 Task: To lays out guidelines for exports of nuclear and related sensitive items.
 Membership:
o How many members: 48
o Guidelines were evolved in 2001 at Aspen for admitting new members to the
organisation.

INDIA’S QUEST FOR NSG MEMBERSHIP

 Since 2008, India has been trying to join the group.


 India submitted its membership application to the NSG in May 2016, a month before the Seoul
plenary of the Group. However at the Seoul plenary group, India’s membership was blocked by
China
WHY INDIA WANTS TO BECOME MEMBER OF NSG?

India is keen to become a member of the NSG ( and other export control regimes such as the
Wassenaar Agreement and Australia Group) due to various reasons:

 Expansion of nuclear power generation: It will significantly expand its clean and green nuclear
energy programme.
 Short-comings in NSG waiver:
o Although the 2008 NSG waiver allows India to engage in civilian nuclear trade with other
countries, but still this allows india to enter into an agreement with each country
separately. Its a piece-meal approach.

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o Membership of the NSG will provide a legal foundation for India's nuclear regime and thus
greater confidence for those countries investing in nuclear power projects in India.
 Nuclear export:
o It will enable India’s entry in the export market in the coming years.
o India would like to make effective commercial use of its nuclear expertise in building
pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) of 220 MW or 540 MW capacity as well as its
possible role as a supplier of special steels, large size forgings, control instruments and
other nuclear components and services.
o Indigenous development of nuclear reactors got further boost with the Indian
government’s recent decision to set up 10 indigenous PHWRs of 700 MWe capacity
each. This would strengthen India’s credibility as a manufacturer and potential supplier of
nuclear reactors that are safe and cost-effective.
 A rule-creating nation instead of rule-adhering: Membership of NSG will move India into the
category of international rule-creating nations rather than stay in the ranks of rule-adhering
nations.
 International prestige: With its expanding international prestige and profile, India's membership
of NSG is of vital significance.
 Integrating into the global export control regimes: Joining NSG is a part of larger goal of getting
admission into the four global export control regimes – NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and Australia Group (AG). India is already a member of the
MTCR.

WHAT ARE THE ROADBLOCKS IN INDIA’S MEMBERSHIP TO NSG?

Since all decisions at NSG (including on membership) are taken by consensus, any country, small or
big, can stand in the way of a consensus.

Now majority of the countries support India’s membership (In June 2016, India became a Member of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). All 34 members of MTCR are members of the NSG.
Thus India is assured of support of these 34 members in its quest for NSG membership. China is not a
member of MTCR).

But china and china backed nations are openly opposed to India’s membership on following grounds:

 Non-signatory to NPT: India is not eligible to become a member of the NSG as it is not a member
of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), adherence to which latter is necessary for
membership in the former.
 Norm-based entry: China has also averred that for non-NPT members some definite criteria
should be evolved rather than granting country specific waivers. No single country waiver should
be granted to India as was done in 2008.
 Linking India’s membership with Pakistan: At other times, china has stated that Pakistan also has
similar credentials to join the NSG; and that if India is admitted, Pakistan should also be admitted
simultaneously.

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 Will fuel nuclear arms race in South Asia: If only India were to be admitted, it would disturb the
nuclear-arms balance in South Asia as India will engage in a massive nuclear weaponisation
programme.
WHAT IS INDIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINESE APPREHENSIONS?

According to India, most of the questions raised by China against India’s membership have little
validity.

 Grossi process:
o In December 2016, Rafael Mariano Grossi, the former NSG Chair, circulated a new draft
formula among Nuclear Suppliers Group member states.
o Thus draft formula proposes "nine general commitments" that non-NPT countries "would
need to make" in order to receive the "fullest" atomic trading privileges.
o According to analysts, India already fulfills all these nine criteria for becoming a NSG
member.
 NPT membership not mandatory: According to the guidelines adopted in 2001 at Aspen,
membership of NPT is not a pre-condition for becoming a NSG member. It is only a guiding
principle to which consideration needs to be given.
 Impeccable track record: If the NSG granted waiver to India in 2008 on the basis of its past
performance, then it should it should have no objection in admitting India as a member because
of India’s impeccable track-record in observing the provisions of the NPT and NSG, even though it
has not been a member of either any of them.
 India’s view on Pakistan’s membership to NSG: Pakistan’s credentials for NSG membership are
highly flawed and inadequate. Pakistan has a blemished and flawed proliferation record as it has
engaged in illicit supply of nuclear technology and materials to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
 On nuclear arms race: Since 2008, as per its commitment, India has separated its civilian and
military nuclear programmes, and put the civilian part under International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards.
 India’s view on criteria-based membership: India maintains that rather than evolving criteria, its
performance should be the basis of it’s track record.
WHAT SHOULD BE THE WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA?

 Explain NSG about the benefits to NSG by India’s inclusion:


o Two objectives feature prominently in the NSG’s agenda. These are: First, expand the
Group to include all nuclear suppliers in order to enhance its credibility; Secondly,
including countries that are committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to
improve its efficacy.
o Including India would help NSG enhance its credibility as well as efficacy simultaneously.
 Dealing with china:
o Convince china: India should convince china and other countries that It’s interest in NSG
membership is not guided by any strategic considerations but only to expand its clean
green nuclear energy programme. It should convince these countries to take decision on
it’s membership based on merit instead of political considerations.
o Use Member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a bargain: For more
than a decade, china is trying to get entry into MTCR. India which became member of

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MTCR in June 2016 can enter into some kind of bargain, whereby china is given entry to
the MTCR in return for India’s entry into the NSG, where it wields a veto.
o All depends on how well India bargains — and how much Pakistan’s NSG membership
actually means to China.
 Join Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia group (China is not it’s member)
o But joining these groups or even making significant progress in gaining membership would
also help India lobby better for membership in the NSG, said experts, because as many as
30 countries belong to all four export control clubs.
o Being inside some of these tents gives you an additional opportunity to lobby members
on your NSG bid.

WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT (WA)


Export control regime Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) has admitted India as its new
member.
AGREEMENT OR ARRANGEMENT

 Wassenaar Agreement should not be confused with the Wassenaar Arrangement.


 The Wassenaar Agreement was an agreement reached in 1982 between employers'
organisations and labour unions in the Netherlands to restrain wage growth in return for the
adoption of policies to combat unemployment and inflation.
 The International Labour Organization describes the Wassenaar as "a groundbreaking
agreement, setting the tone for later social pacts in many European countries".
Dual use technologies:

 Goods and technologies are considered to be dual-use when they can be used for both civil and
military purposes, such as special materials, sensors and lasers, and high-end electronics.
MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIME (MECR)

MECR is an international body that countries use to organize their national export control systems.
These regimes regulate the conventional, nuclear, biological and chemicals weapons and
technologies.

There are currently five such regimes (refer Infographic). Of these India is now a member of

1. Missile technology control regime (joined in 2016) and


2. Wassenaar Arrangement (joined in 2017)
India is also reported to be in advanced stage of entering Australia group.

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WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: SUMMARY FACTS

 Origin of the name: The name comes from Wassenaar, a suburb of the Hague, the Netherlands,
where an agreement was reached in 1995 to start a new type of multilateral co-operation.
 Establishment: 1996. WA became operational in 1996 and succeeded the Cold War-era
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls.
 Members: it has 42 countries, the latest entrant being India.
o With the exception of China, all the other permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council are signatories of the WA.
o All Wassenaar Arrangement decisions are taken by Consensus.
 Secretariat: Vienna (Austria).
 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary:
o It is the decision-making body of the Arrangement.
o It is composed of representatives of all Participating States and normally meets once a
year, usually in December.
o The position of Plenary Chair is subject to annual rotation among Participating States. In
2017 the Chair was held by France.
o All Plenary decisions are taken by consensus.
 Vienna Points of Contact (VPOC): These are called for periodic meetings under the Plenary Chair
to facilitate intersessional information flow and communications between/among Participating
States and the Secretariat.

Membership Criteria:

Unlike the NSG or the MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement has defined criteria for participation.

The eligibility of a state to participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement is based on following four criteria

1. whether it is a producer/exporter or arms or industrial equipment respectively.


2. whether it has taken the WA Control lists as a reference in its national export controls.
3. whether it is adhering to non-proliferation policies.
4. Whether it is adhering to fully effective export controls.
In early 2017, India approved SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment, and
Technologies) items, mandatory under the Wassenaar Arrangement to get the membership.

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OBJECTIVES

1. To promote transparency in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies,
thus preventing destabilising accumulations.
2. To prevent the acquisition of these items by terrorists.
Dual Use Technologies

 Dual use technologies can be used for both civil and military purposes - in aerospace,
telecommunications, navigation, computing, electronics, sensors and lasers.
How the WA works?

1. WA Control Lists
a. The Arrangement works according to what it calls WA Control Lists.
b. There are two broad categories of control list under the WA:
i. Munitions list.
ii. Lists of dual-use goods and technology (Items placed in this list are referred to as
the General Technology)
2. The WA Participating States:
a. have agreed to maintain national export controls on items included in the WA Control
Lists. These controls are implemented via national legislation;
b. exchange information on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.
BENEFIT OF WA’s MEMBERSHIP to INDIA:

1. Import of technology:
a. Entry into WA does not guarantee access to all the items that fall under its Control lists
because the transfers will be subject to India’s bilateral negotiations with supplier
countries.
b. What it will do is increase the probability of India receiving high technology, which will
help address the demands of Indian space and defence sectors.
2. Boost to defence: It also helps India to build up its capabilities as a counter-weight to countries
such as China and its allies like Pakistan who are serious challengers to India as a power in South
Asia.
3. Export of technology: India will also be able to sell its indigenously produced equipment without
attracting adverse reactions. It will also be in a better position to collaborate with other countries
in developing such capabilities.
4. Victory for India's non-proliferation track record: It enhances its credentials in the field of non-
proliferation despite not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
5. Push to join other groups:
a. Gaining it’s membership would also help India lobby better for membership in the NSG
and Australian Group as many of its members are also members of NSG and will further
give credibility.
b. Being a part of major groups like WA enhances India’s chances to get a permanent seat in
United Nations Security Council in future.

Benefits to WA from India’s membership:


 Apart from this, Bringing India into these will also go a long way in enhancing the credibility of the
grouping.

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 India’s entry into the Arrangement would be mutually beneficial and further contribute to
international security and non-proliferation objectives.
WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA: QUIET DIPLOMACY

 The Wassenaar Arrangement membership is also a lesson on the need for quiet diplomacy in
sensitive nuclear issues, compared to the loud botched attempt to gain entry to the NSG in 2016.
 While India’s efforts at the NSG were stopped by China, which is not a member of the Wassenaar
Arrangement, raising the pitch publicly at the time came with costs.
 It made the task of forging a consensus on membership to the NSG more difficult.
 Nonetheless, now that more and more countries are signing on to India’s steadily strengthening
credentials in the nuclear area, there is hope that a fresh momentum will be imparted to a future
bid for the NSG, although it won’t be easy.
 The Australia Group, which focusses on biological and chemical weapons, may be easier to crack
given that China is not a member.

QUAD
An indo-pacific “Concert of Democracies”
In November 2017, on the Sidelines of the 12th East Asia Summit in Manila, India, Japan,
Australia and the US, engaged in a four-way dialogue about an open and transparent
maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region.

Timeline

 Such a quadrilateral dialogue had originally been mooted by Prime Minister Abe of Japan about a
decade ago.
 The motivation was to
o uphold the principles of a rule based regional order and
o promote free trade along with freedom of navigation in the region.
 Indeed, in 2007 the Malabar Exercises held by India with the US were a step in this direction by
involving also the Japanese and Australian navies.
 However, in deference to strong Chinese demarches Australia opted out of these exercises and
India restricted the same only to the US till 2015 from when it began to also invite Japan on a
regular basis.

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 The recent initiation of the Quad talks comes once again upon Japan's call for a dialogue amongst
these democracies for substantive cooperation in defence, maritime security and infrastructure
development.
Highlights of first meeting:

 The first meeting was held around the theme of a “free and open Indo-Pacific’.
 Seven core themes were identified which are:
o Rules-based order in Asia,
o freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime commons,
o respect for international law,
o enhancing connectivity,
o maritime security,
o North Korean threat and nonproliferation, and
o terrorism.

Importance of quad for India:


 Countering china: According to analysts, the big democracies in Asia are again trying to address
both the security related and belt and road challenges posed by a rampaging China. Many
analysts welcomed quad which while non-threatening could be counterweight.
 Multilateralism: The quad champion’s multilateralism as against unilateralism, quad is not only a
formulation of strategic deterrence but a mechanism to provide more and better options to
regional powers.
 Act East policy: it will further India’s Act East policy by enhancing proximity to the emerging zone
of importance for the future.
 Emergence as a key Regional Player: It also provides an avenue for India to perform the role of
net security provider’ in the region.
 Move towards Pragmatic Diplomacy: India’s increasing engagement in the Indo-Pacific shows
that it is steadily leaving behind its Cold-War non-alignment philosophy and is seeking ways to
actively influence major geopolitical outcomes in the region.
All this makes it important for India to link up with like minded democratic countries

AN ELUSIVE MARITIME-QUAD?

According to sceptics, a closer look at the emerging naval dynamics in Asia and other factors make it
clear that the maritime 'quad' isn't still a wholly viable proposition

 Lack of clarity on security agenda: Firstly, neither Japan nor the US has given any indication that
the new grouping will have a China-centric security agenda. Rather they are more concerned with
finding an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
 U.S. indifference to South Asia: Secondly, U.S. has remained indifferent to the geopolitics of
maritime South Asia as its main concern lies in the Western Pacific.
o It is yet to address India’s key concerns in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and
strengthening China-Pakistan nexus in the Arabian Sea.
 U.S. dependence on China: Thirdly, with a growing dependence of Trump administration on China
to deal like North Korea, it is losing out leverage it in shaping China’s strategic choices in the Indian
Ocean.

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 Will ASEAN support? Many South-East Asian states are openly acknowledging China’s role in
regional security and development. Thus it seems unlikely that a proposal aimed at the
containment of Chinese naval power in Asia will find much support.
 Members themselves have close ties with china - All the parties in quad are interlinked
economically with china sizeable proportion of their respective trade volumes, thus the subtle
objective of China’s containment may not be achieved.
 Unpredictable U.S.: Furthermore, it is difficult to depend on U.S. led by Trump administration
whose policies are in a flux.
 Is china really a threat in Indian ocean? Finally, according to critiques, despite an expansion of
PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) activity in the Indian Ocean Region, China hasn’t challenged
Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters, nor they have impeded the passage of Indian
merchantmen in the regional sea-lanes and choke-points.
This does not mean India’s grievances with China are invalid. But Beijing is going about its business
carefully. Thus China’s naval expansion in South Asia does not constitute an intrusion for which Beijing
can be held legally, politically or militarily accountable.

Thus sceptics conclude that for the moment, the maritime-quad remains an idea whose time still
hasn’t arrived.

Way ahead

 The future of Quad will depend upon the level of ambition of the foursome.
 Formalise it: Take steps to formalise the group by setting up a charter, devising a roadmap of
action and hold it regularly at a much higher level.
 Don’t project it as Anti-Chinese: Quad should not be projected as an anti-China bloc as in the past
it led to Chinese backlash and thus led to the Quad’s demise. Focus on common regional interests
like security, connectivity and freedom of navigation.
o Out of quad members, only India shares border with China. A malevolent neighbor can
be far more irksome than benevolent friends far abroad and India must never lose sight
of this strategic reality.
 Countering BRI: To counter the belt and road initiative, it would need to devise more attractive
alternatives which are
o locally driven and not externally dictated,
o provide a greater fillip to the domestic economy and not that of an external player,
o enjoy complete transparency and are not opaque and
o are financed on the most liberal terms and not with onerous conditions.
 Future Expansion? After formalising the charter, it should then decide whether or not to take new
members. it will also be useful to open a dialogue with the ASEAN on Indo-Pacific security
architecture.
 Develop blue economy: India should additionally reach out on its own to all the countries in the
region on developing the blue economy. It is most appropriate as
o it would have enormous spin off benefits and
o the oceans are integral to region in which nearly all countries have long coastlines or are
island nations.

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SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION (SCO)


In June 2017, India and Pakistan became full members of SCO.
ABOUT SCO:

● SCO is a Eurasian political, economic, and military organisation


which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
● After the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the members renamed
the organisation.

BENEFITS FOR INDIA:


● It gives India an opportunity to enhance relations with Central
Asian Republics (CARs) which are of economic and strategic
importance.
● India would be introduced to the Eurasian political, security and
economic environment via SCO which is one of the most
influential regional organizations in the Eurasian region.
● India can cooperate with the SCO members in terms of counter-
terrorism efforts, and providing security in Afghanistan in the IMPORTANCE OF CENTRAL ASIAN
aftermath of the withdrawal of US and NATO, ISAF forces. COUNTRIES:
● SCO provides an opportunity to Pakistan and India to cooperate 1. Being centrally located it links
other regions of Asia, making it
on multiple issues under the SCO framework, which can have a extremely important in
positive impact on Indo-Pak relations. connectivity projects.
CHALLENGES FOR INDIA: 2. This region is abundant in
natural resources including oil,
● Presence of big powers like Russia and China along with Pakistan natural gas, and minerals.
3. Three CARs share border with
may lead to formation of China-Pakistan-Russia axis, which could
Afghanistan, making them a key
be disastrous for India. player in resolving the conflict.
● Being a member of SCO, India might be forced to endorse Belt 4. Four of the Five Central Asian
Road Initiative (BRI). It is because China-led SCO was the key Republics (CARs) are the
members of SCO, which puts
motivator behind China’s BRI concept.
Central Asia at the key position
WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA: within the organization.

● India should use the SCO atmosphere for building better


convergences with China and Russia as well as to minimise the intensity of China-Pakistan
alignment.
● Apart from this, India should ensure early commissioning of International North South Transport
Corridor (INSTC) and Chabahar project to enable better access to central Asia.

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US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNESCO


On 12th October, 2017, the Trump Administration announced that United States would
withdraw from its membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).
Israel made a similar announcement shortly afterwards.
NEW STATUS:

 The US becomes a “non-member observer state” in


UNESCO. i.e. it is allowed to send representatives to
UNESCO meetings but not vote in them.
EARLIER INSTANCE OF U.S. WITHDRAWL:

 This is not the first time that the United States had
pulled out of UNESCO.
 President Ronald Reagan withdrew in 1984, accusing
the organisation of pro-Soviet bias and graft.
 It took until 2002 for the US to rejoin under Bush Administration.
REASON:

 The US and UNESCO have actually been at loggerheads since 2011 due to Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
 In 2011, UNESCO admitted the Palestinian territories to the organization as an independent
member-state called Palestine.
 This triggered a US law which cut off American funding for any organization that recognized an
independent Palestine. The US had previously paid for 22 percent of UNESCO’s annual budget.
 Finally, in 2013, after the US missed several rounds of payments to UNESCO, the organization
suspended US voting rights in its core decision-making bodies.
 Washington’s arrears on its $80 million annual dues are now over $500 million. Clearly, the Trump
Administration was looking for a way out to avoid payment.
 So the US hasn’t been a real UNESCO member for a while. Trump is just making that status official
— and in the process scoring a domestic public relations coup with pro-Israel, anti-UN
conservatives.
 It is also a manifestation of Trump’s “America First” policy which puts US economic and national
interests ahead of international commitments esp. those which follow anti-American policies.
o Under Trump, U.S. has recently abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and has
formally withdrawn from the Paris Climate Deal.
o It is also reviewing its membership of the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council, which
it also accuses of an anti-Israeli bias.
IMPACT:

 Some experts argue that it won’t impact global affairs much as the organization isn’t as
geopolitically significant as the UN Security Council or UN Peacekeeping.
 But others argue that UNESCO, admitting Palestine as a member has produced little progress on
an Israeli-Palestinian peace process agreement but the subsequent aid cutoff have triggered a
“financial crisis” which impacts valuable environmental and educational activities run by it.
 There is also fear that other countries funding UNESCO might follow U.S. example.
 It might also encourage UNESCO members to antagonizing U.S. further on Israel-Palestine issues.

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o Earlier in this year (2017), UNESCO designated an important religious site for Jews and
Muslims in the West Bank city of Hebron as a Palestinian World Heritage Site.
o UNESCO in future can take more actions like this in the future.
 Withdrawing from an international cultural organization makes the US look bad, at a time when
the world’s opinion of the US is already free-fall. China will trumpet that this is a sign of US
disengagement from the world.
 It is believed that Influence of Non-Western countries in UNESCO will increase further.
CONCLUDING REMARK:

 As a founder Member of UNESCO, India too has vital stakes in the sound financial health and
political stability of the Organisation.
 Given its close and strategic partnership with the US and Israel, India could persuade both to
return to an Organisation of seminal importance for international peace. Its Preamble simply
notes: “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace
must be constructed.”

DALVEER BHANDARI RE-ELECTED TO ICJ


On 20 November 2017 Justice Dalveer Bhandari was re-elected for a second term to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) after UK's nominee Christopher Greenwood withdrew
his nomination.
About ICJ:

 The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations.


 Location: The Hague, Netherlands. ICJ is the only principal organ not located in New York.
 Composition: It has a total of 15 judges, five of whom are elected triennially for a nine-year term.
 Selection procedure: To be elected, the candidate must receive an absolute majority in both the
General Assembly and the Security Council. Voting takes place in both houses simultaneously but
separately.
 Allocation of seats:
o The seats are distributed on the basis of geographical regions which correspond to the
membership of the Security Council.
o As per the current configuration, three seats are allotted to Africa, three to Asia, two to
Latin America and the Caribbean, five to Western Europe and two to Eastern Europe.
COMPARISON OF ICJ AND ICC

ICJ ICC
International Criminal Court
When In 1946 In 2002 by Rome statue.
formed It replaced the Permanent Court of
International Justice
HQ Hague, Netherlands. Hague, Netherlands.
The Court's official seat is in The Hague,
Netherlands, but its proceedings may
take place anywhere.
Function 1. Settle legal disputes between Criminal prosecution of individuals
parties &
2. Advisory opinion to other organs,
bodies

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Subject Sovereignty, boundary disputes, Genocide,


matter maritime disputes, trade, natural War crimes,
resources, human rights, treaty Crime against humanity
violations, treaty interpretations and Crimes of aggression
more.
Parties to States. It acts against individual (not against
dispute Individuals cant be party to a dispute state)
Members All UN members are its members 123.
Prominent Non Members:
 Not even signed: India and china
 Signed but not ratified:USA, Russia
and Israel
Judges 15 18
Elected for 9 year term
Relation Part of United Nations Independent of UN
to UN ( although it has some relations with UN
i.e. it may receive referrals from UNSC)

Recent election:
 Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf (Somalia), Cancado Trindade (Brazil), Christopher Greenwood (UK),
Dalveer Bhandari (India), Nawaf Salam (Lebanon), and Ronny Abraham (France) were the six
candidates for the nine-year term beginning in February 2018.
 Out of the six, four (Ronny Abraham, Cancado Trindade, Ahmed Yusuf, and Nawaf Salam) were
elected in the fifth round of voting.
 This placed Bhandari and Greenwood in a fierce fight, which extended to six more rounds of voting
and ended only with the withdrawal of the latter and election of the former as the fifth judge to
the bench.
Prospects for Security Council Seat and freedom of Kulbhushan Jadhav?
Many analysts have observed that Justice Bhandari's victory is vital for two reasons.
First, since India is campaigning for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, the ICJ election is a
litmus test indicating the quantum of support for New Delhi in the world body.
However, this assumption is unfounded.
 Security Council reform and ICJ election are entirely different matters with unique methods and
processes. One will not ensure the other.
 In contrast to the ICJ election process, in the case of Security Council reform, the P-5 enjoys veto
power to block any decision that hurts their interests. The position of the P-5 during the voting
and their responses after the election show that nothing has changed in this regard.
 For instance, while congratulating Justice Bhandari, a State Department Spokesperson echoed the
US' opposition to any alteration or expansion of the veto.
Second, is the assumption that Justice Bhandari's win will be a big boost for India in dealing with the
Kulbhushan Jadhav case.
 It is true that the Kulbhushan Jadhav case had influenced India's steadfast campaign and its
commitment to remain in the contest even after eleven rounds of voting.
 However, this assumption is also unfounded. It is because once elected, a member of the ICJ
cannot act as a delegate of any government or state. They are obliged to act impartially.
 Even in the context of voting to settle the final verdict, it is not possible for a government or state
to instruct a judge on how he/she should vote.

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 Moreover, there have been many cases in which judges voted contrary to the submissions of their
respective countries.
Significance of re-election:
Inspite of this his re-election is historic in many ways.
 Diplomatic Victory: His re-election of Justice Bhandari was a great diplomatic victory for India,
especially since the opponent was a P-5 nation.
 Symbolic victory: For India it was not only an impressive diplomatic success but a symbolic victory
against its former colonial master, Britain, as well. It reflects the changing global order
 It highlighted the success of India’s multilateral diplomatic outreach. For the past few months,
from lobbying by Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister to the creation of a separate cell at
the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India put great efforts for his re-election.
 Bhandari’s win reiterated the huge backing that India enjoys in the General Assembly. He got
115 votes against 76 for Greenwood in the sixth round of voting held on November 9.
 Displeasure against P5: This voting record also highlighted the displeasure of the majority of the
UN member states against the P-5, which is unwilling to surrender any of the privileges they enjoy,
including the tradition of holding the ICJ seats.
o This is the first time in the 71-year history of the ICJ that Britain, one of the five permanent
members (P-5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has no judge on the bench.
 European resentment against Britain after Brexit and India's wide acceptability among the
developing and underdeveloped countries also worked in the numbers game in the General
Assembly.
 Moreover, it is a matter of prestige of having an Indian judge on the ICJ bench.
Faults to Rectify
However, the whole process of the election kindled some grave concerns as well.
1. Indian policymakers need to seriously think as to why Justice Bhandari could not secure an
absolute majority in the Security Council during the first eleven rounds of voting. This opposition
by the P-5 states raises doubts about their often professed support for India's UNSC bid as well.
2. Surprisingly, among the non-permanent members of Security Council, Japan, one of the G-4
countries and a close friend of India also voted against Bhandari
3. India was also unable to solicit support from its trusted friend Russia.
4. Further, India contested in the 'Europe and Other ' category because the Asian position was filled
by the Lebanese candidate during the very first round of the election. This was partly because of
India's very late announcement of Bhandari’s candidacy, only four months back. In contrast,
Lebanon had been campaigning for the last two years. A longer term strategy and preparation
would help to minimize similar occurrences in future.
Concluding remark:
 The final takeaway of the ICJ election is that it is a triumph of India’s pragmatic multi-lateral
diplomacy worked well for India in the General Assembly.
 Therefore, to ensure such victories in future in global multilateral forums, India should continue
to focus on its relationship with small and middle powers and not neglect them in the process of
pursuing relationships with the great powers.
Dalveer Bhandari (born 1947) is an Indian member of the International Court of
Justice and was a judge of the Supreme Court of India.
Bhandari was first elected to the ICJ in 2012 for the remainder term of a judge who
quit prematurely. His new full term of nine years will begin on February 6, 2018.
In 2014, President of India conferred Bhandari with Padma Bhushan, third highest
civilian award in India.

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BHUTAN’S EXIT FROM BBIN AGREEMENT


Bhutan has backed out of BBIN. It asked the other members of the ‘BBIN’ grouping to
continue to operationalise it without Bhutan.

What is BBIN?

 It is a proposed sub-regional motor vehicle agreement (MVA) between Bhutan, Bangladesh, India
and Nepal.
 BBIN was mooted by the Indian government after Pakistan rejected the MVA at the SAARC summit
in Kathmandu in 2014.
 Objective: To allow trucks and other commercial vehicles to ply on one another’s highways to
facilitate trade.
 Timeline and Present status of BBIN?
o The BBIN MVA agreement was signed on June 15, 2015.
o India, Bangladesh and Nepal have already ratified it.
o In Bhutan, it was ratified on its second attempt in the lower house in July 2016, but the
upper house in Bhutan voted it down in November 2016.
Reason for Bhutan backing out?

 It is because of fear among the Bhutanese people that there will be environmental degradation
and vehicular pollution if trucks from neighboring countries are given access to Bhutan.
 Bhutan prides itself on its “carbon neutrality” and preserving the environment.
What should India do?

 Down to just three countries, Bangladesh, Nepal and India will have to decide
o whether to wait for Bhutan to reconsider or
o to press ahead with a truncated ‘BIN’ arrangement.
 The first option will not be easy because the country prides itself on ecological consciousness.
 Despite the setback, New Delhi must persevere with its efforts. It is because
o First, Bhutan’s objections are environmental, not political, and its government may well
change its mind as time goes by because of it’s economic benefits (the road links could
end up circumventing shipping routes by up to 1,000 km).
o Second, Bhutan’s concerns may be addressed if India considers the inclusion of waterways
and riverine channels which are a less environmentally damaging substitute.
o Thirdly, Bhutan’s objections may even spur an overhaul of emission standards for trucks
currently plying in Bangladesh, Nepal and India.
o Most importantly, the BBIN pact denotes a “can-do” attitude on India’s part.
 Connectivity is the new global currency for growth as it secures both trade and energy lines for
countries en route. Thus Indian should go ahead.

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G-20 HAMBURG SUMMIT


In July 2017, the G20 Summit was held in Hamburg, Germany.

KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SUMMIT:

The G20 Hamburg Action Plan:

It was unveiled at the end of the summit. It’s key highlights are:

● The theme of this year's summit was 'shaping an interconnected world'. Leaders adopted a
declaration focusing on sharing the benefits of globalisation, building resilience improving
sustainable livelihood and assuming responsibility
● Terrorism: They also adopted an action plan to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation and tackle
foreign terrorist fighters.
● Climate change: Regarding energy and climate, leaders took note of the United States' withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement. The leaders of the other G20 members stated that the Paris Agreement
is irreversible and they endorsed the G20 Hamburg climate and energy action plan for growth.
● G20 Africa partnership: Africa's development remained a high priority for the G20. Leaders
launched the G20 Africa partnership to boost growth and jobs in the continent. This includes the
G20 initiative for rural youth employment which will contribute to creating 1.1 million new jobs
by 2022.
● Leaders also agreed to take further action to achieve gender equality. They stressed the role of
digitalisation and ICT to support women's empowerment.
● It also praised India for promoting ease of doing business and labour reforms.
G20 Welcome to Hell:

“G20 Welcome to Hell” protests were organised by


Left-wing organisations, environmentalists and other
anti-globalisation organizations in Germany.

● The summit saw around 13000 protesters from all


across Europe, US, Canada & other countries.
● The protesters later resorted to vandalism and
clashes erupted between protesters and police
officers.
ABOUT GROUP OF TWENTY (or G20):

What it is not?

● It is not an international organization. It neither has any administrative board nor a permanent
secretariat.
● Thus, it does not adopt decisions that have a direct legal impact.
What it is?

● It is an informal forum for international cooperation on financial issues to ensure international


“financial stability”.

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● Members: It comprises 19 countries plus the EU. These countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, South Korea, Turkey, UK and USA.
● Background: The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors had been meeting regularly
since 1999. However, since 2008 (when the financial crisis broke out) G20 has met annually at
head of state and government level.
● Presidency: It rotates on an annual basis. Germany took over G20 presidency in December 2016.
In December 2017, Argentina will take over.

SIGNIFICANCE OF G20:

1. Highly influential body:


● The G20 countries are home to almost two thirds of the world’s population, accounting for more
than three quarters of global trade and four fifth of gross world product. International
organizations like IMF, world bank, WTO also participate
regularly in G20 Summits. Region MEMBERS
North Canada
● Thus, decisions taken by G20 are influential and help to
America USA
bring about reform at national & international level (Even Mexico
though its decisions are not legally binding). South Brazil
2. Role in Financial regulation: America Argentina
● The first two G20 Summits (in 2008 and 2009) played a Europe France, Germany, UK,
seminal role in preventing a global economic crisis. Italy (all these 4 are
● Since then it plays a key role in regulating the international also G8 members)
EU (represented by
financial market and in strengthening national banking
rotating council
systems (At the Seoul Summit in 2010, Basel III were
presidency and
launched). European central
3. Combating tax evasion: bank)
● It has also proven successful in combating tax evasion Africa South Africa
through regular exchange of information among the Asia Turkey
members on taxation. Saudi Arabia
● In Antalya in 2015, the G20 agreed on a 15-point Base Russia
China
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan which it
Japan
reaffirmed at the Hangzhou Summit in 2016. South Korea
4. Other key roles in international diplomacy: India
Indonesia
● Other issues of global significance like climate change, Oceania Australia
spread of digital technology, refugee policy issues and
counter-terrorism are also discussed by G20. It has contributed to conclusion and implementation
of various UN agreements (Paris Climate change, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).
● It has replaced G8 (although still in existence) as the premier forum of global economic
governance, thereby representing a Multi–polar world.
● Unlike the institutions of Bretton wood system (IMF, World Bank), it is based on equality of
membership and collective decision making.
● It also provides an opportunity for countries to engage bilaterally on the side-lines of summit.

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G-20 PROTESTS: WELCOME TO HELL

G-20 summits, over the years, has seen protests with citizens believing that the international
organisation has largely failed to find solutions to many of the international issues.

Reasons for protest:

Protesters are critical of G20 as they allege the following –

1. A capitalist grouping: The topic of discussion between the nations remains largely focused on
“capitalist” agendas of the nations.
2. Environmental concerns: Some environmental groups argue that G20 countries are responsible
for approximately 75 per cent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions.
3. Transparency: Others have protested against the lack of transparency as all G20 meetings
between world leaders are closed door. Some believe the Summit is often held in countries with
relatively lesser press freedom.
4. Globalization: Other believe that the G20 was founded to make “globalization for the benefit of
all”, but that is not happening.
5. Talking shop: G20 has become a talking shop because of lack of consensus on major global issues.
There is a feeling that G-20 is too big to arrive at a consensus.
Concluding remark: Despite it’s faults G20 is one of the best organization for resolving global
economic and political problems. So it should pay heed to the genuine demands of protesters to take
concrete actions on major global issues.

STRENGTHENING INDO-RUSSIA RELATIONS


RECOMMENDATIONS
In 2017, India and Russia celebrated 70 years of their diplomatic relations.
India is Russia’s long-standing and reliable partner. However, the current model of ties has largely
exhausted itself, and cooperation should be taken to a qualitatively new level.

Political

 Apart from the annual bilateral summit between the leaders of the two countries, hold top level
ministerial and bureaucratic dialogue at greater frequency.

Economic

 Remove Trade barriers: Remove administrative barriers hindering the movement of capital,
services and labour. For this a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)
and India should be thoroughly discussed.
 Investment: Stimulate investment flows by having dispute settlement mechanism, property
protection regime and revenue repatriation guarantees for investors.
 Strengthen B2B: Encourage direct contacts between the business communities of the two
countries.
 Strengthen industrial cooperation and create integrated manufacturing chains. Particular
attention should be paid to promoting innovation in Russia–India cooperation.

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Military: Seller–buyer to joint production

 Transition from the “seller–buyer” model to large-scale joint breakthrough projects such as Fifth
Generation Fighters Aircraft (FGFA) and BrahMos missiles.
 These weapons could both significantly enhance the defence potential of both countries and have
excellent export prospects.
 Russia should actively participate in India’s Make in India programme in defence manufacturing,
with more technology transfers, as that would consolidate Russia’s dominant position as India’s
defence partner.

Soft Power

 Media: Russian and Indian media should be more pro-active in covering events of great
importance for bilateral relations. It is important that the media shape a positive image of Russia
in India and vice versa.
 Education: Priority attention should be paid to academic mobility, educational exchanges,
creating joint masters programmes, and even setting up joint universities. The Russian–Indian
Association of Universities and the SCO and BRICS network universities.
 Culture: Expand the range of cultural events; larger audiences should be involved.

Foreign Policy

 It is necessary for India and Russia to prevent third countries from exerting significant influence
on their bilateral ties.
 Bilateral to multilateral: The two countries should not limit their relations just to the bilateral
aspect but look at doing more on the global arena through
o Strengthening influential international groups such as the SCO and BRICS.
o trilateral partnerships – for example Russia – India – China, India – Russia – Israel, India –
Russia – USA, etc. As a starting point, Track 2 dialogues serve well for discussing such
interaction.
 Cooperation in Third countries: India and Russia can profitably cooperate with each other in
economic projects in third countries, primarily in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as well as in
Central Asia.
 Connectivity projects: Russia and India have a geopolitical interest in actively promoting the
North-South Corridor through Iran so that connectivity projects in the region get diversified and
single-country domination is avoided.
 Take care of neighbourhood concerns: The two sides should not pursue policies in the
neighbourhood of either country that are geopolitically against their respective interests.
 Terrorism:
o On the issue of terrorism which is of concern to both sides, the two countries should give
more visible mutual support to each other.
o It is also advisable to seek India-Russia-Iran cooperation against terrorism in Afghanistan.
 Russia should continue to actively support India’s claim for greater participation in international
affairs, particularly in
o reforming the United Nations; expanding the number of permanent members in the
Security Council and
o membership of technology-related international regimes of which Russia is a member.

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100th ANNIVERSARY OF RUSSIA’S OCTOBER REVOLUTION


October 24-25, 2017 marks 100 years of the Russian Revolution.
The October 24-25 anniversary of the revolution is officially celebrated on November 7 in Russia
because the country switched from the Julian calendar to the Gregorian calendar following the
revolution.

The Russian Revolution – an attempt to create a more just nation – sealed the fate of the Romanov
dynasty, formed the Soviet Union and led to more than 70 years of communist rule.

Below is a brief timeline of the revolution:

FEBRUARY REVOLUTION:
 Jan-Feb: Food riots and protests in capital Petrograd (St
Petersburg) demand end of autocracy and of Russian participation in
World War I
 Feb 26-27: Soldiers mutiny after Tsar orders use of force to quell
riots.
 Duma (parliament) refuses Tsar’s order to disband, setting up Provisional Government led by
liberals and moderate socialists
 Petrograd Soviet (elected council of workers and soldiers) created.
 Mar 2: Tsar forced to abdicate – ending 300-year-old Romanov dynasty.
BOLSHEVIK RISE:
 Mar-Apr: Revolution gives rise to short-lived national unity across Russia.
 Apr: Lenin returns from exile, galvanizing small Bolshevik party into action with demands for
bread, land, worker control and end to war.
 Jun: New government war offensive against Germany fails – troops desert en masse to join
revolution.
 Aug: Army chief General Kornilov mounts coup to restore order and crush radicals in
government.
 Coup put down after Red Guards (Bolshevik militia) come to aid of government led by Prime
Minister Alexander Kerensky.
 Sep: Bolsheviks gain majority in ruling committees of Petrograd and Moscow Soviets – Lenin
urges Bolsheviks to seize power.
OCTOBER REVOLUTION:
 Oct 24-25: Bolshevik forces stage coup engineered by Leon Trotsky, chairman of Petrograd
Soviet
 Signalled by blank shot from cruiser Aurora, Bolsheviks assault Winter Palace – seat of
government – with little resistance. Kerensky flees.
 Council of People’s Commissars set up with Lenin as chairman, Trotsky as foreign commissar
and Joseph Stalin (right) as commissar of nationalities.
AFTERMATH:
 1918: Russia exits World War I, giving up vast tracts of territory under humiliating Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk.
 Treaty unleashes civil war between outraged anti-Bolshevik “White” Russians – backed by
Western Allies – and Red Army. Bolsheviks execute Tsar and his family, fearing they will be
liberated by insurgents.
 1922: Bolshevik victory brings end to civil war – conflict, disease and starvation claim around
10 million lives. Soviet Union declared.

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CARMICHAEL PROJECT
Adani cancels a Billion Dollar Deal with Australian mining giant Downer EDI Ltd. It will
now develop and run the Carmichael project on its own.
About:

 The Carmichael coal mine is a


proposed thermal coal mine in
the Galilee Basin in Queensland,
Australia.
 Mining is planned to be
conducted by both open-cut and
underground methods.
 The mine is proposed by Adani
Mining, a wholly owned
subsidiary of India's Adani Group.
 Project components:
o Mine: The mine is
planned to contain six
open-cut pits and five
underground mines.
o Rail line: A new rail line is needed to transport coal to port facilities. The proposal includes
a new 190 km rail line to connect with the existing Goonyella railway line.
o Port expansion: Exports are to leave the country via port facilities at Hay Point and Abbot
Point after being transported to the coast via rail. Most of the exported coal is planned to
be shipped to India. This requires significant port expansion.
 Proposed benefits:
o It would be the largest coal mine in Australia and one of the largest in the world. At peak
capacity the mine would produce 60 million tonnes of coal a year. Over the 60 years, the
mine is expected to produce 2.3 billion tonnes.
o The mine would be the first of a number of large mines proposed for the Galilee Basin and
would facilitate their development.
o The development represents a $16.5 billion investment.
 Opposition to project: The mine has drawn immense controversy about its
o claimed economic benefits,
o financial viability,
o plans for government subsidy and
o the potential damaging environmental impacts upon the Great Barrier Reef, groundwater
at its site and its carbon emissions.
 Thus the project has been delayed for years due to numerous court challenges from green groups.

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Recent development:

 The Adani Group has cancelled plans with Downer EDI Ltd to develop and run its Carmichael coal
mine in Australia.
 his was announced after it to failed to secure a cheap government loan for the Carmichael project.
 This is the latest blow to the long-delayed Carmichael mine, which is yet to get financing as a
growing list of Australian and international banks have said no to backing the project.
 The company said it remained committed to the project.

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ANTARCTICA POLICY & LAW


Ministry of earth science has constituted a committee chaired by Biman Patel to draft a
dedicated Antarctica policy & law, which are expected to be tabled in the winter session of
Parliament.

WHY IS INDIA PREPARING THEM?


1. To prepare itself for a populous future in which Antarctica may see (a) More tourists, (b) Over-
exploited fisheries and (c) Disputes & crimes.
2. Being a signatory to Antarctica treaty, India is expected to have a clear policy on the consequences
of its initiatives in the region.
ANTARCTICA TREATY SYSTEM:

● The Antarctic Treaty (came into force in 1961) and related agreements are collectively known as
the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Other agreements (with their year of signing) include:
o Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (1964)
o The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972)
o The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1982)
o The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (1988)
(signed in 1988, not in force)
o The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991)
● It’s objective is to regulate international relations with respect to Antarctica.
● Salient features of the treaty:
o Antarctica is defined as all of the land and ice shelves south of 60°S latitude.
o The treaty sets aside Antarctica as a scientific preserve,
o It establishes freedom of scientific investigation.
o It bans military activity on that continent.
● Location of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat: Buenos Aires, Argentina.
● Members: As of June 2017, the treaty has 53 parties (29 including all 12 original signatories to the
treaty, have consultative (voting) status).

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● Following two conventions are appended to this treaty for it’s protection
o Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972)
o Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980)
INDIA’S ANTARCTIC PROGRAM:

● It is a multi-disciplinary, multi-institutional program under the control of National Center for


Antarctic and Ocean Research, Ministry of Earth Sciences.
● It was initiated in 1981 with the first Indian expedition to Antarctica.
● The program gained global acceptance with India's signing of the Antarctic Treaty and subsequent
construction of the Dakshin Gangotri Antarctic research base in 1983.
● It was superseded by the Maitri base from 1990.
● The newest base commissioned in 2015 is Bharati.
● Under the program, Atmosphere, Biology, Earth, Chemical, and Medical sciences are studied by
India, which has carried out 30 scientific expeditions to the Antarctic as of 14 October 2010.

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