G.R. No.

120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared
the rightful governor of Sorsogon -

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast
in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number
of valid votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.

The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution 5granting the petition with the following disposition 6:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on
the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is canceled.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes 8dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

Raul R. Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29,
1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening
of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which
he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy
said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore

RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law,
he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and
he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold
the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the
Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.

On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996,
the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court
issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain
the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions" 15:

First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance
to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in
effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
deciding said petition;

Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing

condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the
Office of Governor;
 Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect
thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of
Governor; and

Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity
of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995,

disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995
elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995

suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not
rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the
election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
 The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar
to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a

qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or,
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or

member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor
or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election
day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore

incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of
several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of
his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-
Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision
from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully
passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No.
725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of
his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of
allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected
governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said
date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections
and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted
for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as
defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy
furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words,
the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to
deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said
so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise
of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other
interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court
by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common
sense as well.

Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and)
was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and
evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation
with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by
the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995,
when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he
filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it
could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained
during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there
were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was
submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo
have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded
up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all,
the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they
tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement
the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since,
unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-timeentry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who
openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United
States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the
dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his
country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should
have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President,
pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when
the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both
the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run
and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in
said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date
thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant
for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we
shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he

intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-

three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-
assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day 32 the term of office of governor (and
other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short,
at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the
"elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez
vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure
that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that
matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the
official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that
the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the
law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an
elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence,
registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained
as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted
again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8, 1995." 37

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including
the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can
be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo
was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon
of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably
garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had
already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation.
Agpalo, 42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . .
(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past
events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which
would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of
statutes. 43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and
who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of
the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-
acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedyand a new right in favor of
other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former
Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General 44 argues:

By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA
342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and
curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative.

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that
the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to
the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions
not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held
that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty
of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to
P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute
must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that
if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it
will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair
some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D.
725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted
therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect,
but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed
to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should
apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into
being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of
any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time,
then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his
American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-
making body intended right and justice to prevail. 47

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The
fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect
of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his
being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a
situation that is not present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now
prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17,
1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether
at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing
his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?" 49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran
for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or
abuse. 52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship

a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No.
95-028 as affirmed in totoby Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final
and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued
by this Honorable Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June
30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds
that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring
Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and
these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for
all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution: 55

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and
1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the
Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25,
1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court,
however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence,
in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or

administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee
reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary
period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or
a quo warranto action."

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one. 58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled:

The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases
holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the
COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs.
Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro
vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to
make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten
(10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days
after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction
over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not
the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . .
just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in
the aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law
of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy
of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their
votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected.

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an
ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On
the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself
in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as
its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome
of this case.

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in
the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally
wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has
any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in
losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people"
of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee --
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the

Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond
the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads
as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded
by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc 63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)

Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal,
as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz.,
"(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe
reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to
remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our
two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery.
The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there
may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such
retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of
such previous rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement
with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that
Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated
on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No.
120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6
of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the
elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely
directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No.
120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due
course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present
case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And
we hold that it may be decided even after thefifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here,
we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid
but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no
inconsistency nor conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation
has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic
in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are
the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that
Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical.
Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two
previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?

Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not
elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the
rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should
be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.

Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and
intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather
extensively earlier in this Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the
Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The
issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it
can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the
context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon
the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable
assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force
and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus
valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting
him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his
unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of
the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having
given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement
of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been
proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to
August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of
said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of
the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the
Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country
to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws must
be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:

. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (citations omitted). 67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the
1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's
gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger
social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine
political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve
his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and
during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak
more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention
and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81
years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this
Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he
opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but
beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be
applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable
people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's
Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of

Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati
City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that
he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is
born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
 The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office
he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo

Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC,
the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended
the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's
motion was opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor
of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5The pertinent portions of the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,

California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle ofjus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At
the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship,
as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he

registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine
 hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws,
it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA
727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of

the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a

candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,

upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent
Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati
City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening
of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en
banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City. Petitioner contends that —

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of

majority when he was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered

himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of
the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second
Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner
may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to
run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano —
whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion
for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to
intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for

intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion,
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati
City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from
the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in
several cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and
the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared
the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's
purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective
local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which
provides:
 Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.
As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly
deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive
issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati. 8

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with
him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office."

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
 (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship.
I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a
dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more
threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship
at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional

cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what
happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers
of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is
a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the
Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the
Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland
China in the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative
Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some
European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after
several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese
were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of

allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I
also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners
yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the
lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner
Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.

Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is
 of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we
have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation,
worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship
which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP
AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus: 11

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual

citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to
citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State
when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted
the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in
1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei
every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the
occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated.
And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty
and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left
to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the
problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit,
in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission

was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in
R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of
the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective
local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born
citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen,
upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to
the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the

moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of
his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the

country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as
a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino
citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of
the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen,
and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship
invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall
under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen
of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he

renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read
into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has
thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign
will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September
4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was
a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en
banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is
solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR

"NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN

xxx xxx xxx

 10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A

FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL

SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC it was held: 17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would
the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running
for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there
is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988.
In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his
US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his

American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath
of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age
of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority
age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no
merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar v.COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss
of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or
"implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL, respondents

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the
question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation
that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public
respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition
for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.

It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but
of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable
requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular
verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was
indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be
granted and the challenge abated.

The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January
20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26,
1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or
twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the
filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the
reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as
follows:

SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of a
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the result of the election.

The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the
Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that —

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the
payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the
legal research fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is
essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to
this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he
says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto
with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on
January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it
as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on
February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988.
He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his
petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by
the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the
said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not
retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the
payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450
of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980,
respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for
the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections,
which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996
took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as
required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became
effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. — The rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh
day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-
day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC
as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we
reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees
in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was
even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days
after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.

The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective
"immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case
that publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may
have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in
the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the
timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this
Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case
only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow
the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-
compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above prescribed are
not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid
and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should
be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time
minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least,
that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What
is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary
period the petitioner insists upon.

This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the
timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the
subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more
important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it
now in this same action.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would
appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single
issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for
new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro forma. But going
over the extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed
that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case
upon such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations
and arguments of the parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by
evidently knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can
better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as
the record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to end the
basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with
procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their
respective claims. 6

xxx
 While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the
respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this
case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin,
(112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:

... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive

to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court
only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate
Court and from there to this Court. (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R.
No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:

... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate
the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in
referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal
propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment.
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time
that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733;
Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc.,
76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of
Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lâwphî1.ñèt Sound
practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the
disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked
characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand
... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34
Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and
act with finality. 7

xxx

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead
of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public
interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had
already received all the evidence of the parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for
stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:

In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly

adopted as "its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no
longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively
disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo
warranto filed by private respondent still pending before it? 9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.

Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the
petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12,
1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the
petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan
concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote,
while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been
made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged
naturalization as an Australian.

The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and
Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is
important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that
the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture,
which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an
Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon
his return to this country in 1980.

On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the
Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the
petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of

appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19
October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following
statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the
Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do
hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.

STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married
in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen,
 he was not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and
was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.

B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian

citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance.
The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..."
etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this
would depend on the citizenship laws of his former country.

C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on
27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.

D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.

E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of

Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false
or misleading information of a material nature in respect of an application for
Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful, he could be
deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.

F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian
citizenship:

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under

Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or

(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and

voluntary act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian
citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF

THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984.
DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul

This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private
respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that
inquiry made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the
Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following information:

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
 2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either
swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a
renunciation of "all other allegiance.

Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO
SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as
follows:

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully
observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 14

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:

AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and
declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the
Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that
I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian
citizen. 15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny
that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien
and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked
for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that
he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and.
even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a
foreigner. 18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did
not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined
in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person
who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by
counsel when he performed these acts.

The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses
Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.

There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine
of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was
properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked
only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of
the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.

The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that
he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified
in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his
duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot
stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also
worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled
after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country.
What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship
and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he
may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by

direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:

... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special
Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a
citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself
because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City,
under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:

Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the

Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino,
or any other local language or dialect.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and
thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-
placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution.
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege
over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief
that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost
but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as
he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio city.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in
1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for
his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported
by eight members of the Court then 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their
vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic
rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.
Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court
held:
 ... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental Idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes
were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and
cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to
grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting
it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his
own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer
his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect
to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is
himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to
public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He
is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once
this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31,
1989, is LIFTED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,

Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002

TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,1 dated July 19, 2001, of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar
in the May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en
banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.
He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.2 From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the
Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.3Otherwise, even after his retirement from the
U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on
July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.4 Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved
on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000
and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12,
2001.6 On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."7

On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who
was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein
for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14,
2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131)
against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner
was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. 8 He subsequently took
his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondent’s petition
and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following
findings:

Respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern
Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver
of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November
10, 2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of
compliance with the one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of the actual residence of a
Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected.

All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras,
Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A.
before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation]
cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14,
2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to
run for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever
formula of computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement
before the May 14, 2001 elections.9

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en
banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.

I.

Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a) whether the
30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration by petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to
decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.

A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this
case should be dismissed because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, §4 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day
period for filing this petition. He points out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution, dated
July 19, 2001, of the COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28, 2001, so that he had only until
August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the petition in this case was filed on
February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and should be
dismissed.

Private respondent’s contention has no merit.

Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a

decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling.
 Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. – A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-forma, suspends the
running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, §2 should be counted
from the receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC Division. 10 In this
case, petitioner received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELEC’s Second
Division on July 28, 2001. Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for
reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order, dated January 30, 2002,
of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration. Five days later, on February
11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question, therefore, that petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as well as his
petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed within the
period provided for in Rule 19, §2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), §7 of
the Constitution.

It is contended, however, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro
forma and, consequently, this petition should have been filed on or before August 27, 2001. It
was actually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of
the COMELEC en banc that —

An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that
the same [are] a mere rehash of his averments contained in his Verified
Answer and Memorandum. Neither did respondent raise new matters that would
sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This
makes the said Motion pro forma.11

We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and
its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere
reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon
by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a
reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.12 But, as we have held in
another case:13

Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the
evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed
upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be
confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion
was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,14 or (2) it did not comply
with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to
law or not supported by the evidence,15 or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,15 or (4)
it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,17 or (5) the adverse party was
not given notice thereof.18 The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the
COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the
COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma because
the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new
matters." Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the
petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided
by law.

B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondent’s petition for
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the
meantime, the votes were canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of
379 votes over private respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the
petition filed by private respondent?

R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. —

The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall
not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no
final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless,
on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds
for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile,
the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates
of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such
elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v. COMELEC19 and Salcedo II v.
COMELEC,20 the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for
cancellation were voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were duly
proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the
decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground
that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamation but on the
merits.

II.

On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at
least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate
of candidacy. We find that he had not.

First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
 Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" or "habitation,"21 but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, "the place where
a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."23 A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s
parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice).24

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after
enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title
8, §1427(a) of the United States Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization. – Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized

unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for
naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years
immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein
for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or
within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the
application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United
States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3)
during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and
well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of
a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a
foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American citizenship" only by
reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces.26 It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated
not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A.
No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any
event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and
with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on
November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.

Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in
1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a
Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his
intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. 27 The status of
being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the
status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one
acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under
§1328 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR)29 and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former
Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of
Congress,30 in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-
resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on
October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement
"Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on
August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay."31 Under §2 of
R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former
Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a
period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on
the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid
for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and
as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.32 He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the
mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections33 in support of his

contention that the residency requirement in §39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the
residency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue
in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question
in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day that his
term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the citizenship
requirement under §39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed even
on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, §39(a)
of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the
municipality "for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election."

Nor can petitioner invoke this Court’s ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.34 What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born
Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.

Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the
Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,35 however, registration as a voter
does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.

Petitioner’s invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As held
in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:36

A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican

government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their
representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government
positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for
membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality
of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.

Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his
motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646
(Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any
event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a
Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he
submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are
complete and intact in the records.

III.

The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in
his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus
Election Code provides:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks
to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
 time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.

Indeed, it has been held that a candidate’s statement in her certificate of candidacy for the
position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not
so37 or that the candidate was a "natural-born" Filipino when in fact he had become an
Australian citizen38 constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the
other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC39 that a candidate who used her husband’s
family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of misrepresentation
concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a
candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully
justified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the
Commission on Elections en bancare AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147909 April 16, 2002

MAUYAG B. PAPANDAYAN, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FAHIDA P. BALT, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated May 8, 2001, of the Second
Division1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B.
Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for municipal mayor of the Municipality of Tubaran, Province of
Lanao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections, and the resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
dated May 12, 2001, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao
del Sur, namely: petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr., respondent Fahida P. Balt, who was the
incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Maiko Hassan Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the
disqualification of petitioner in SPC Case No. 01-114 of the COMELEC, alleging that petitioner
was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of
Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

In support of her allegation, respondent submitted the joint affidavit,2 dated February 14, 2001,
of Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and two members of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Tangcal, Tubaran, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner never resided in
Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran as they personally knew all the registered voters of the said
barangay; that petitioner omitted to own nor lease any house in Barangay Tangcal; and that
petitioner’s father, the late Mauyag Papandayan, Sr., who was a school superintendent, and his
family were permanent residents of Bayang, Lanao del Sur. Respondent also submitted a
similar affidavit,3 dated February 17, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, a member of the Sangguniang
Barangay of Tangcal. She averred that petitioner did not state in his Voter Registration
Record,4 accomplished on May 8, 1999, the number of years and months (Annex D-1) he had
been a resident of the Municipality of Tubaran.

In his answer,5 petitioner claimed that he was a resident of No. 13 Barangay Tangcal in
Tubaran; that he was the son of the late Mauyag Capal Papandayan, Sr., a former school
superintendent, and Hadja Khalida Magangcong Balt; that both the Capal and Papandayan
clans were natives of Tangcal, Tubaran, and the Magangcong clan were from Boribid, Tubaran
while most of the Balt clan were residents of Bayang; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile
from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife Raina Guina Dimaporo, whose family
and relatives were residents and natives of Tangcal, Tubaran; that he managed an agricultural
land in Tubaran which he co-owned with his family; and that he filed in 1998 his certificate of
candidacy for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdrew.

To support his allegations, petitioner presented the following:

1. Affidavit,6 dated March 8, 2001, of Taha C. Ali, Municipal Election Officer of the Office of the
Assistant Regional Election Director of the COMELEC, Region XII, Iligan City, stating that,
based on the continuous verification of household members in Tubaran, petitioner and his wife
lived at No. 13 Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran.
2. Affidavit of Witness,7 dated March 8, 2001, of Delgado Caontongan, stating that he was an
elementary school teacher of Tubaran and that he was appointed Chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) of Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran in the May 8, 1999
registration of voters; that he personally received the Voter Registration Record of petitioner
whom he knew to be a resident of Tubaran; and that he knew petitioner to be a qualified voter
and, for that reason, he approved petitioner’s Voter Registration Record and included his name
in the master list of voters in Precinct No. 28-A.

3. Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor8 of petitioner, filed on January 11, 2001, with the
COMELEC stating, among other things, that he was born on October 14, 1964; that his place of
birth was Marawi City; that he was employed as a municipal employee of a local government
unit in Bayang; that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; that he was a
registered voter of Precinct No. 28-A in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; and that his
length of residency in the Philippines was 36 years and 10 months (Annex 3-A).

4. Affidavit of Witness,9 dated March 8, 2001, of Rafael Guina Dimaporo (brother of petitioner’s
wife), stating that his family and the family of petitioner were residents of Tangcal, Tubaran; that
his relatives on the maternal side (the Andag and the Guina clans) were natives of Barangays
Tangcal and Datumanong, both in the Municipality of Tubaran; and that during the May 11,
1992 national and local elections, he was one of the mayoralty candidates who garnered the
second highest number of votes.

5. Affidavit of Witness,10 dated March 8, 2001, of Sobair Tagtal, stating that he was a farmer and
one of the share tenants of an agricultural land located in Tubaran, co-owned by petitioner and
the latter’s siblings; that petitioner had been managing the land and residing in Tangcal,
Tubaran since 1990; and that he knew petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy in the 1998
mayoralty election in Tubaran.

6. Certification,11 dated March 7, 2001, by Salem Buzar, Election Officer in Bayang, Lanao del
Sur, certifying that petitioner was not registered as a voter of Bayang in the May 11, 1998 and
May 14, 2001 elections.

7. Affidavit of Desistance,12 dated March 8, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, stating that he was
withdrawing the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, which he had earlier executed, together
with Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, as he did not understand the consequences of
signing the said affidavit and its contents had not been explained to him; that he did not know
that the affidavit would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner who was a first
cousin of his grandchildren; that he knew petitioner to be a registered voter and a candidate for
municipal mayor in Tubaran; and that petitioner is a native of Tubaran because he is a
descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side and a legitimate
member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.

8. Affidavit of Desistance,13 dated March 8, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, stating that he was
withdrawing the affidavit, dated February 17, 2001, which he had earlier executed, as he did not
understand the consequences of signing the said affidavit and its contents had not been
explained to him; that he did not know that the affidavit would be used in a disqualification case
against petitioner; that he knew petitioner to be a registered voter and a candidate for municipal
mayor of Tubaran; and that petitioner is a native of Tubaran because he is a descendant of
Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side and a legitimate member of the
Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.
In its resolution, dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114
declared petitioner to be disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of
candidates and all votes cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes. Citing
the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe, and
Saadori Buat and the affidavit of Samoranao Sarip stating that petitioner had not at any time
been a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran, the COMELEC ruled that it was the fact of petitioner’s
residence, not the statement in his certificate of candidacy, which determined whether or not he
had satisfied the residency requirement of one (1) year preceding the May 14, 2001 elections. In
finding that petitioner never intended to relinquish his former domicile in Bayang, the COMELEC
took note of the testimony of petitioner in the exclusion proceedings against him before the
municipal trial court (Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T), in which petitioner stated
that he was living in Marawi City where he was the private secretary of Mayor Abdillah
Ampatua.

On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those voted by the
electorate for the position of municipal mayor. On May 15, 2001, he received a telegram 14 from
the COMELEC notifying him of the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en
banc which denied his motion for reconsideration.

On May 17, 2001, he filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, on May 19, 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division) in
SPC No. 01-039 seeking the issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his favor during the May 14, 2001
elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution N. 4116. The said resolution provides that if the
disqualification case has not become final and executory on the day of the election, the BEI
shall tally and count the votes of the candidate declared disqualified.

On the other hand, respondent filed a pre-proclamation case (SPC No. 01-259) in the
COMELEC.

On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order
suspending the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the
resolution of this present petition. However, despite the said order (in SPC No. 01-039), the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner on
June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent, therefore, the COMELEC (First Division), in an order,
dated June 25, 2001, set aside the proclamation of petitioner, without prejudice to the filing of
the appropriate charges against the members of the Board responsible for the
proclamation.15 Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, dated January 30,
2002, sustaining the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-
039 for being moot and academic. It appears that, as a consequence thereof, the incumbent
Vice-Mayor of Tubaran assumed the position of mayor pursuant to the COMELEC en
bancresolution dated January 30, 2002.

On May 22, 2001, this Court required the COMELEC and respondent Fahida Balt to comment
on the petition and, upon the posting of a bond by petitioner in the amount of P10,000.00,
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from implementing its resolutions
of May 8 and May 12, 2001.
In a manifestation,16 dated May 28, 2001, petitioner submitted the certificates of votes (Annexes
A to A-30), duly signed by the BEI Chairman and his two members, showing that in the 31
precincts of Tubaran, he obtained 1,744 votes [should be 1,730] votes, while respondent Balt
and Bantuas obtained 1,528 votes [should be 1,540 votes] and 974 votes [should be 967 votes],
respectively. Respondent countered that, despite these results, petitioner could not be
proclaimed mayor as she had appealed from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Tubaran, wherein she sought the exclusion and the annulment of the election returns from
certain precincts in Tubaran because of massive fraud, terrorism, and substitution of registered
voters.

After canvass of the election returns, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a Municipal
Certificate of Canvass17 showing the following results:

Petitioner – 1,744 votes

Papandayan
Respondent Balt – 1,540 votes
Maiko Hassan – 968 votes
Bantuas

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion in lieu of a comment, recommending that this
Court grant the present petition. It contends that the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of
Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Sangguniang Barangay members Hadji Taher
Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner had not at any time been a resident of Tubaran,
constituted hearsay evidence as the three affiants were never presented during the proceedings
of the case. In fact, one of the affiants, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, later executed an Affidavit of
Desistance, dated March 8, 2001, retracting his earlier statements. As for the statements made
by petitioner in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T, pending before the municipal
trial court, that he was then "not residing" in Bayang but in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur although
"living" in Marawi City, the Solicitor General says that the same does not necessarily mean that
petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran as such answer merely means that he was previously
living in Marawi City.

In her comment, respondent insists that petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran but of Bayang.
She contends that petitioner made misrepresentations in claiming that he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections and that he was a registered
voter in the May 11, 1998 elections; that when petitioner registered as a voter in Precinct No.
28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran on May 8, 1999, he refused to fill out the space corresponding to the
period of his residency in Tubaran; that it was unusual for the BEI Chairman to execute an
affidavit, stating therein that he allowed the registration of the petitioner because he had known
the latter to be a "legitimate resident of [Tubaran] even prior to the May 8, 1999 registration";
that it was doubtful if the election officer of Tubaran really conducted a continuous verification of
household members of Tubaran; and that the certification of the election officer of Bayang that
petitioner was not a registered voter in Bayang during the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001
elections does not prove that he was a registered voter in Tubaran. Respondent argues that the
COMELEC did not commit any "error of jurisdiction" to justify the grant of this petition for
certiorari but, if at all, only an "error of judgment," which is correctible by ordinary appeal.

In his reply to respondent’s comment, petitioner points out that respondent did not appear at the
March 9, 2001 hearing of the disqualification case before the COMELEC; that of the six
witnesses whom respondent said she was presenting, only two ¾ Hadji Taher Batawe and
Saadori Buat ¾ appeared, and both merely affirmed their joint affidavit; that, although the cross-
examination of the two was reset on March 12, 2001, they nevertheless failed to appear and
thus deprived petitioner’s counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine them; that respondent’s
four other witnesses ¾ Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Sultan Sarip Bilao, Osio Balbal, and Puno Balbal
¾ did not appear either; that instead Sultan Sarip Bilao later executed an affidavit18 denying his
earlier statement that the petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran; and that the Second Division
of the COMELEC and the COMELEC en banc did not conduct any hearing in the disqualification
case and merely relied on the recommendations submitted by the hearing officer. According to
petitioner, while he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998
elections, the same was later withdrawn on his behalf by Casim A. Guro, his brother-in-law. This
fact was corroborated by Macawaris P. Masanang, a sultan in Tubaran, who stated that he had
been an Election Assistant of the COMELEC since 1978 and that, as such, he received
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, which was later withdrawn by Casim A. Guro on behalf of
petitioner.

After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to be correct. Hence,
his petition should be granted.

First. Petitioner contends that the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en
banc was not yet final and executory when the elections were held on May 14, 2001.
Consequently, the Board of Election Inspectors of Tubaran, in the exercise of its ministerial
duty, had to count the votes cast in his favor. Respondent, on the other hand, avers that the
assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc had attained finality five (5)
days thereafter, on May 17, 2001, as its enforcement had not been restrained by this Court
within the said period. The temporary restraining order should thus be set aside, the same
having been issued by this Court only on May 22, 2001.

At the time the elections were held in May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, dated May 12,
2001, had not become final and executory. Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was
duty bound to tally and count the votes cast in favor of petitioner. As R.A. No. 6646, §6
provides:

Effect of disqualification. ¾ Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.

On the other hand, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, promulgated on May 7, 2001, in pertinent
parts reads:

RESOLUTION NO. 4116

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or

division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification cases).
 Sec. 13, Rule 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions or
Resolutions provides:

"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. ¾ (a) In ordinary actions, special

proceedings, provisional remedies, and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.

(b) In Special Actions and Special cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a

Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special
Actions and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings,
following its promulgation."

Special Actions cases refer to the following:

a) Petition to deny due course to certificate of candidacy;

b) Petition to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate;

c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and

d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

....

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions
or resolutions on Special Actions cases (disqualification cases); the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

1. the decision or resolution of the en banc of the Commission on disqualification cases

shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court;

2. the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final

and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed;

3. where the ground for the disqualification case is by reason of non-residence,

citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the
election the resolution has not become final and executory, the BEI shall tally and count
the votes of such disqualified candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent, therefore, is in error in assuming that the issuance of a temporary restraining order
by this Court within five (5) days after the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on
May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc is the operative act that prevents it from attaining
finality. The purpose of temporary restraining order was to enjoin the May 12, 2001 resolution of
the COMELEC from being enforced despite the fact that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
4116, par. 3, as above quoted, the said resolution had not attained finality.

Second. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him
disqualified on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran. On the other hand, respondent
argues that whether or not petitioner is a resident of Tubaran is a factual issue which has been
thoroughly passed upon and determined by the Second Division of the COMELEC and later by
the COMELEC en banc. Respondent echoes the ruling of the COMELEC in its resolution of May
12, 2001, which said that, as an "administrative body and a specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, it has more than enough
expertise in its field, and its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given
finality."

With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be insufficient to
sustain its resolution. We agree with the Solicitor General, to the contrary, that petitioner has
duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his actual and
physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other language or dialect.

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a
candidate has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle
of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to
return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether
there has been an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart
therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court set aside the appealed orders of the
COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal
Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent’s immigration to the United States
in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on
January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,20 respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was not a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling
of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino,21 applied the concept of animus revertendi or
"intent to return," stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or
practice his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter
other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The fact that
respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoang revealed that he always
had animus revertendi.

In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections,22 it was

explained that the determination of a person’s legal residence or domicile largely depends upon
the intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner
Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of
February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was
disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being a
resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of
petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the election by registering at
Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province of Leyte was
proof that she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the
COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc City, not
in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor
of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she and her husband
maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City.
The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an
intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,23 the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are
synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G.
Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980’s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the
EDSA People’s Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until
favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an
abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendicoupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990,
they resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part of
petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his
wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that
petitioner was relinquishing his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended
Tubaran to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of the
mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is proof of animus
manendi.

Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was registered as a
voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidacy although he later withdrew
the same. In the May 8, 1999 registration of voters, he was again registered as a voter in
Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran.

In addition, the following bolster petitioners’ claim that since 1990 he has been a resident of
Tubaran: (a) the continuous verification of household members in Tubaran conducted by the
election officer showed that petitioner and his wife were members of household No. 13 in
Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran; (b) petitioner co-owned an agricultural land in Tubaran; and (c)
Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip retracted their previous affidavits which they had
earlier executed and said that they did not understand the contents thereof and did not know
that the affidavits would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner.

Indeed, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residency qualification requirement. In holding
petitioner not to be a resident of Tubaran, the COMELEC said:

Three (3) disinterested senior citizens, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and
Saadori Buat, all from Tangcal, Tubaran executed a joint affidavit (Exhibits A to A-1)
stating that the respondent has not at any time resided or lived in said barangay.
Moreover, in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T, the respondent admitted
that he was living in Marawi City and was private secretary to Mayor Abdillah Ampatua
(T.S.N., Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T). As opined by Hearing Officer
Atty. Cristeto J. Limbaco, these statements made by the respondent in open court are
considered judicial admissions which do not require proof and cannot be contradicted
unless proved to have been made through palpable mistake, citing Sta. Ana vs.
Maliwat (L-23-23, August 31, 1968). On May 3, 2001, respondent through counsel
submitted a Motion to Admit Supplemental Memorandum alleging that "respondent could
be a domicile of Tubaran even if he has lived and maintained residences in different
places citing the case of Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300, 302." The fact remains
though that respondent in open court admitted that he was living in Marawi City. (T.S.N.
of Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T).24

A candidate running for an elective office should at least have resided in the place where
he seeks election for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Herein respondent is wanting in this respect.

In citing the joint affidavit of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, the
COMELEC overlooked the fact that Hadji Bashir Ayonga subsequently repudiated his affidavit
on the ground that the same had not been explained to him and he did not know that it would be
used to disqualify petitioner. Hadji Bashir Ayonga affirmed that petitioner was a resident of
Tubaran. Indeed, in its findings of fact, the COMELEC stated:

On March 8, 2001, witness for petitioner Hadji Bashir Ayonga executed an Affidavit of
Desistance thereby withdrawing his affidavit and stated that he did not know the
consequences of signing the affidavit he executed on February 14, 2001 as the same
was not explained to him and would be used in a disqualification case against the
respondent. A similar affidavit was also filed by Samoranao Sarip withdrawing his prior
affidavit and stating that he did not know the consequences of his signing said affidavit
of February 17, 2001.25

Apparently, the COMELEC (Second Division) forgot its own findings.

Respondent claims that in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T for exclusion of
petitioner as a voter of Tubaran, petitioner admitted that he was not a resident of that
municipality but of Marawi City. Petitioner’s testimony is as follows:

Atty. P. Dimaampao: MAUYAG PAPANDAYAN, Jr., what is your job now?

WITNESS: I’m the private Secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.

Atty. P. Dimaampao: For how long?

WITNESS: Since he was elected Mayor of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

Atty. P. Dimaampao: Are you residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

WITNESS: No, I’m in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. And I was living in Marawi City.26

Petitioner’s statement that "[he] was living in Marawi City" cannot be read as saying he was a
resident of Marawi City, because, when asked whether he was residing in Bayang, Lanao del
Sur, he replied: "No, I’m in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur." What he seems to be saying is that
although he worked as a private secretary of the Mayor of Bayang, he was not a resident of
Bayang, because he was living in Tubaran.

When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective
position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be
thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate should be
respected.27 For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of
the voters.28 To successfully challenge petitioner’s disqualification, respondent must clearly
demonstrate that petitioner’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.29 Respondent failed
to substantiate her claim that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the COMELEC (Second
Division), dated May 8, 2001, disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate
for municipal mayor in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, and the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137329 August 9, 2000

ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M.

SERIÑO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding
elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their
constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications
and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he,
together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de
Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of
Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter in
the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer"
when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally
construed to give effect to the popular mandate.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
January 18, 1999 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No.
98-298, which upheld the July 14, 1998 Resolution2 of the Comelec First Division. The assailed
Resolutions ruled that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of
residence to be eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.

The Facts

The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows.

During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial
governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In
his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in
Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter
Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis
Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25,
1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence
for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano
Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.

Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B.
Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr.,
Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Seriño, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a
Petition before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to
meet the one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec
proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998,
petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,3 in which they
sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of
Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly elected
mayor of the city.

In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division denied the Petition for
Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the
two cases were consolidated.4

Ruling of the Comelec

As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings and conclusions of the First Division,
holding that "[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de
Oro City for such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is
clearly established by the respondent having a house in the city which has been existing therein
since 1973 and where his family has been living since then."

Additionally, it ruled:

"There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or
registering as a voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote
for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such highly urbanized city as long as
he has complied with the requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.

"Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence for the petitioners showing that the
respondent was a registered voter as of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No. 12, Barangay
Poblacion, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental bolster the petitioner's argument that the respondent is
not a resident [or a] registered voter in Cagayan de Oro City since registration in said Precinct
No. 12 does not preclude the respondent from registering anew in another place."

Hence, this recourse5 before this Court.

Issues

In their Memorandum,6 petitioners submit that the main issue is whether the "Comelec gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolutions."
Allegedly, the resolution of this issue would depend on the following:7

"1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's

(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he filed his certificate of

candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City on March 25, 1998 in the May 11,
1998 election;
 (b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act as governor of said
province until said date; and

(c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a resident of Misamis Oriental,

precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in
Cagayan de Oro City prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a
candidate for city mayor of said City.

2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing a residence certificate in Cagayan

de Oro City, holding offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building
located in Cagayan de Oro City and having a house therein where [he had] stay[ed]
during his tenure as governor, and registering as a voter in said City in June 1997, would
be legally sufficient, as against the undisputed facts above enumerated, to constitute a
change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental in favor of a new domicile
of choice in Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1) year for purposes of qualifying him
to run for city mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.

3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City in
the May 11, 1998 elections, who received the second highest number of votes, can be
declared winner, considering that respondent Emano was disqualified to run for and hold
said office and considering that his disqualification or ineligibility had been extensively
brought to the attention and consciousness of the voters prior to the May 11, 1998
election as to attain notoriety, notwithstanding which they still voted for him."

Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two questions: (1) whether private
respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to
the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and (2) if not,
whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate who had received the second highest number of
votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners

Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by
the Court. We note that petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty. Erasmo B.
Damasing as entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections in
Cagayan de Oro City."8 And yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition
for Certiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65" brought before us.

Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the solicitor general or (2)
a public prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another.9 A reading of the Rules shows that petitioners, none
of whom qualify under any of the above three categories, are without legal standing to bring this
suit.
However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1)
SPC 98-298 for disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws
and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on
grounds provided by law,10 or to contest the election of a city officer on the ground of ineligibility
or disloyalty to the Republic.11 The petitioners herein, being "duly-registered voters" of Cagayan
de Oro City, therefore satisfy the requirement of said laws and rules.12

Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy

Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental,
not in Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run and won
as governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately
preceding the 1998 elections; (2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest
against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor until he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998.

Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent
remained a resident of the province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that
an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could not have
changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental.

Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to constitute a change of
domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office
as governor (the city being the seat of government of the province), securing a residence
certificate and registering as voter therein.

Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in
Cagayan de Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the
seat of the provincial government was located at the heart of that city. 13 He also avers that one's
choice of domicile is a matter of intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the
best position to make a choice. In this case, Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as
his place of residence after the May 1995 elections. In fact, in January 1997, he secured his
Community Tax Certificate at the City Treasurer's Office, stating therein that he was a resident
of 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. During the
general registration of voters in June 1997, he registered in one of the precincts of Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the time, Emano had been a voter of the city for the
minimum period required by law. No one has ever challenged this fact before any tribunal.

Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest
him of his position as provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official
from transferring residence while in office. Second, an elective official's transfer of residence
does not prevent the performance of that official's duties, especially in private respondent's case
in which the seat of government became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled
in Frivaldo v. Comelec,14 the loss of any of the required qualifications for election merely renders
the official's title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano's case, no one challenged his
right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro
City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed his candidacy for
mayor in March 1998.
Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the people's will, as expressed in the election result,
must be respected. He is not, after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its voters. During his
three terms as governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and actuations have been closely
interwoven with the pulse and beat of Cagayan de Oro City.

Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially on Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec15 in its

Memorandum16 which supports the assailed Resolutions, and which has been filed in view of
the solicitor general's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment.17 Thus, the poll body
argues that "x x x the fact of residence x x x ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the Constitution's residency qualification requirement."

Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991,18which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:

"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which
they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community." 19 Such
provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain."20 Establishing residence in a community merely to
meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This
purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given
period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."21

Facts Showing Change of Residence

In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec,22 this Court ruled that private respondent
therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly
proven his change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of the Third District in which he sought election as congressman).
He proved it with the following facts: (1) in July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential
apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2) in July 1995, he leased another
residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, 1998
Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the
Certificate of Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his
family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one year immediately
preceding the May 1998 elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of much importance
that in his [Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988,
1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran."23

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been
residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in
1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis
Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was
located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling
in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of
Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein.
Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of
residence.

Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city
whose voters cannot participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and
voting restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation. The
classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that matter,
does not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the
entire province -- and vice versa -- especially when the city is located at the very heart of the
province itself, as in this case.

Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a
geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it
is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who
carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted
with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis
Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period,
could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when
he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.

Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-Perez that "although private respondent
declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a
resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not
just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since
July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible
considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for
him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of Cagayan."

Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan
de Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in
the city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and
registered as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a
resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof.

To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial governor
if he was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court
is whether Emano's residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not
whether he could have continued sitting as governor of the province. There was no challenge to
his eligibility to continue running the province; hence, this Court cannot make any
pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process prevent us from adjudging
matters not properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the facts proven before the
Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law for the
mayorship of the city.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or
localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more
important, with the constituents themselves -- their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for
growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period
would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and
likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they
seek.

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in
Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and
for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic,
academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple,
practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.

Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate

There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of
Cagayan de Oro City.1âwphi1He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.24 Thus, we find it apt
to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must
be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to
the popular mandate.25 Verily, in Frivaldo v. Comelec,26 the Court held:

"x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues
in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy
to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote."

In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec27 that "election cases involve public interest;
thus, laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections."

Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex
but little understood legalisms."28

In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be faulted with abuse, much less grave
abuse, of discretion in upholding private respondent's election.

Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second Placer

With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious that the second one posited by
petitioners has become academic and need not be ruled upon.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec

Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157526 April 28, 2004

EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 157527 April 28, 2004

SALVADOR K. MOLL, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When a mayoral candidate who gathered the highest number of votes is disqualified after the
election is held, a permanent vacancy is created, and the vice mayor succeeds to the position.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions for Certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the nullification of the March 19, 2003 En Banc Resolution issued by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) in SPA No. 01-272. The Comelec resolved therein to disqualify Salvador K.
Moll from the mayoralty of Malinao, Albay, and to proclaim Avelino Ceriola as the mayor-elect of
the said municipality. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. It is affirmed

that private respondent Salvador K. Moll is DISQUALIFIED from holding the office of the
Mayor of Malinao, Albay. His proclamation as the winning candidate for such office is
declared VOID AB INITIO. Consequently, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Albay is
directed to immediately convene the municipal board of canvassers of Malinao, Albay
and PROCLAIM petitioner Avelino Ceriola as the Mayor-Elect of the municipality."1

In GR No. 157526, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare seeks the nullification of the March 19, 2003
Resolution insofar as it authorized the proclamation of Ceriola as the mayor-elect of Malinao. In
GR No. 157527, Petitioner Moll prays for the annulment of the entire Resolution.

The Facts

Petitioner Moll and Private Respondent Ceriola were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of
Malinao, Albay, during the elections of May 14, 2001.

Moll obtained the highest number of votes cast for the position while Ceriola came in second,
with a total of nine hundred eighty-seven (987) votes separating the two. Kare was elected vice
mayor in the same election.
On May 18, 2001, Ceriola filed a "Petition to Confirm the Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of
Dindo K. Moll to Run for Any Elective Position." The Petition alleged that the latter had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1)
year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, for the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.

In its May 28, 2001 Resolution,2 the Comelec First Division dismissed the Petition. Ceriola filed
his Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec en banc which, on August 31, 2001, set aside
the said Resolution. It thereafter directed the clerk of the Comelec to remand the Petition to the
provincial election supervisor of Albay for hearing and reception of evidence.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

On March 19, 2003, after the provincial election supervisor of Albay submitted the report and
recommendation, the Comelec en banc issued the questioned Resolution affirming Moll’s
disqualification and proclaiming Ceriola as the mayor-elect of the municipality.

As earlier adverted to, the Comelec ruled that Moll had indeed been disqualified from being a
mayoral candidate in the May 14, 2001 local election, and that his subsequent proclamation as
mayor was void ab initio. Consequently, he was disqualified from holding that office.

The Comelec further ruled that the trial court’s final judgment of conviction of Moll disqualified
him from filing his certificate of candidacy and continued to disqualify him from holding office.
Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor were stray or invalid votes, and Ceriola -- the candidate
who had obtained the second highest number of votes -- was adjudged the winner. Thus, the
Comelec ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim him as the mayor-elect of the
municipality.

Before Ceriola’s actual proclamation, Kare filed a Petition before this Court with a prayer for a
Status Quo Order, which was granted on April 1, 2003.3 In this Order, the Comelec, the
provincial election supervisor of Albay, and the municipal canvassers of Malinao (Albay) were
required to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the Petition.

The other Petition was filed by Moll.4

The Issues

After going through the Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court has determined that the
following are the two issues that have to be resolved:

1. Should Moll be disqualified from running and/or holding the position of mayor?

2.) If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, who should become the mayor --
Ceriola, the second placer in the mayoral election? Or Kare, the elected vice mayor?

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition in GR No. 157526 is partly meritorious, but the Petition in GR No. 157527 has no
merit.
First Issue:

Disqualification

Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since his judgement of
conviction5 -- the basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly not yet attained finality. He
contends that while the said judgment "promulgated on May 11, 1999 was not appealed by filing
the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary course of the proceedings, he still filed a ‘Motion for
Reconsideration’ dated May 28, 1999 within the reglementary period."6Thus, according to him,
the filing of such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.

We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads thus:

"Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. -- A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the

accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right
to appeal, or has applied for probation." (Italics supplied)

In turn, Section 6 of Rule 122 provides:

"Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins
to run." (Italics supplied)

It is clear that the period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of either a motion for
reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. Moll makes it appear that his filing of a motion for
reconsideration should have stayed the running of the period for filing an appeal. What he did
file, however, was a "Motion to Quash the Information"; and when it was denied, he filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the denial.

The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. It necessarily
follows that this period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment or of the final order being appealed.

Neither Moll’s Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was directed at
the judgment of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment.
Hence, they cannot affect the period of appeal granted by the Rules of Court in relation to the
conviction.

Moll himself admitted that "no regular appeal was filed because he was still questioning the
propriety of the denial of his Motion to Quash the Information and the propriety of the conduct of
the promulgation of his sentence despite his absence x x x."7 Aside from not interrupting his
judgment of conviction, the motion to quash was even belatedly filed. Such a motion may be
filed by the accused at any time before entering a plea8 and certainly not on the day of the
promulgation, as Moll did.

As to his contention that the promulgation of judgment was not valid because it was done in his
absence, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General, which argues as follows:

"It was not contested that Moll received a notice of the promulgation, in fact his counsel
was present on the day of the promulgation - to file a motion to quash. Hence, because
of Moll’s unexplained absence, the promulgation of the judgment could be validly made
by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof to his
last known address or thru his counsel (Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court)."9

Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, the judgment
against him has become final.10 Thus, the Comelec en banc correctly ruled that he was
disqualified from running for mayor, under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (RA No.
7160), which provides:

"Section 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;

xxx xxx x x x."

Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and
nine (9) months of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for
any elective local position.

Second Issue:

The Lawful Mayor

In allowing Ceriola -- the second placer in the mayoralty race -- to be proclaimed mayor-elect
after the disqualification of Moll, the Comelec applied Section 211(24) of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC), which provides:

"Sec. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of
ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason
to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules,
bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s
will:

xxx xxx xxx

24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment
shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the
ballot."
The poll body interpreted the phrase "disqualified by final judgment" to mean "disqualification by
a final judgment of conviction," which was the ground upon which Moll was disqualified. It ruled:

"In this case, the disqualification is based specifically on the final judgment of conviction
by a court against private respondent. This final judgment disqualified private respondent
from filing his certificate of candidacy in the first instance, and continues to disqualify
private respondent from holding office. Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor were stray
or invalid votes and the general rule in the Sunga Case does not apply. Consequently,
petitioner, having obtained the highest number of valid votes, is entitled to be proclaimed
the winning mayoralty candidate."11

Further, it said:

"x x x As such, this instance constitutes an exception to the general rule enunciated in
the Sunga Case. In the language of the said case, the foregoing provision of law is a
statute which clearly asserts a legislative policy contrary to the rule that the candidate
with the second highest number of votes cannot be declared the winner, given that the
votes for the disqualified candidate, though of highest number, are deemed stray and
invalid. Consequently, the so-called ‘second placer’ shall be declared the winner
because he or she in fact obtained the highest number of valid votes."12

Such arguments do not persuade.

In every election, the choice of the people is the paramount consideration, and their expressed
will must at all times be given effect.13 When the majority speaks by giving a candidate the
highest number of votes in the election for an office, no one else can be declared elected in
place of the former.14 In a long line of cases, this Court has definitively ruled that the Comelec
cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes,
should the winning candidate be declared ineligible or disqualified.15

The Comelec, however, asserts that this case falls under the exception declared by the Court
in Sunga v. Comelec,16 from which we quote:

"x x x The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into
office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless."17

According to the Comelec, Section 211(24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is
contrary to the rule that the second placer cannot be declared winner.

We disagree.

The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the second placer as
winner in the mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section
72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:

"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to
 the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.

"Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office." (Italics supplied)

When read together, these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a
candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground
therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only
to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.

Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the
law lists other grounds for disqualification.18 It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section
211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is
clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the election code.

More important, it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued
Resolution No. SPA No. 01-272. The Resolution adopted the recommendation of the provincial
election supervisor of Albay to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate in Malinao,
Albay. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the electorate voted for him as mayor, they were under the
belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that they agreed to the subsequent
invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of his disqualification.

A subsequent finding by the Comelec en banc that Moll was ineligible cannot retroact to the
date of the election and thereby invalidate the votes cast for him.19

Moreover, Moll was not notoriously known to the public as an ineligible candidate. As discussed
above, the Resolution declaring him as such was rendered long after the election. Thus, on the
part of those who voted for him, their votes are presumed to have been cast with a sincere
belief that he was a qualified candidate, and without any intention to misapply their franchise.
Thus, their votes cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.20

The Comelec’s interpretation of a section in the OEC cannot supplant an accepted doctrine laid
down by this Court. In Aquino v. Comelec,21 we said:

"x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is
just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority
or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances."22

To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection
by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the
importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their
choice.23

Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be absurd
to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’ choice. Moreover, there are instances
in which the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically
insignificant. In such situations, if the equation changes because of the disqualification of an
ineligible candidate, voters’ preferences would nonetheless be so volatile and unpredictable that
the results for qualified candidates would not be self-evident.24 The absence of the apparent
though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other
than the second placer.25 Where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or a
plurality of the votes, by no mathematical formulation can the runnerup in the election be
construed to have obtained the majority or the plurality of votes cast.26

We reiterate that this Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the
people of Malinao, Albay, to accept Ceriola as their mayor.27 The law on succession under
Section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then
apply. This provision relevantly states:

"SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,

Mayor, and Vice Mayor. —

(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor,
or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be.
Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

xxx xxx x x x.

"For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office."

The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal. Thus, it admits no room for
interpretation, but merely for application.28 Accordingly, when Moll was adjudged to be
disqualified, a permanent vacancy was created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the
office.29 In such eventuality, the duly elected vice mayor shall succeed as provided by law.30

For violating the law and the clear jurisprudence on this matter, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion.31

WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No 157526 is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed

Resolution MODIFIED. Petitioner Salvador K. Moll is DECLARED ineligible for the position of
municipal mayor of Malinao, Albay. In view of the vacancy created in that office, Petitioner
Emiliana Toral Kare, the duly elected vice mayor, shall succeed as mayor, following the rule on
succession. The status quo order of this Court dated April 1, 2003, is made permanent.
Petitioner Kare shall continue discharging the duties and powers of the mayor of Malinao, Albay.
The Petition in GR 157527 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.