Review of International Studies (1986), 12, 79-89 Printed in Great Britain

Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state

J. D. B. Miller

The title of this paper contains three terms which require definition?sovereignty,
vitality and the state. I shall begin by defining these, and shall then discuss various
reasons why the state acquires vitality from its possession of sovereignty. Finally I
shall ask whether sovereignty is likely to become less significant as a source of
vitality, and, if so, what is likely to take its place.

Definitions
For a political entity to possess sovereignty, it must appear to be independent in the
sense of not being subject to another state's control. The evidence for this will lie in
the operation of its governmental machinery, in its written constitution (if it has one),
and in any declarations that may have been made by the state which at some stage
acted as sovereign over it. Such declarations have been more precise in recent times
than they once were; there is, for example, no Act of the British Parliament which
declares Australia to be independent in the way that India was declared to be so.
However, the main requirement for a candidate for sovereignty is to look inde
pendent in terms of the power to make its own decisions.
The quality of apparent independence is not sufficient in itself to constitute
sovereignty. Sovereignty means the quality of being a sovereign state, accepted as
such by others. While this definition may look somewhat circular, it is the only one
which will conform to international political realities. We may have ideas about just
how far sovereignty extends in providing legitimization of the actions of individual
governments, to what extent it is divided in federal polities, and whether it comes
from God, from custom, from the will of the people, or from the historical process;
these are things to argue about endlessly. In political terms, however, the basic
question is whether a state is accepted as sovereign by other states. How many other
questions are needed is a matter of the political situation at the time, and of the
relative importance of those states which support and oppose it. In a very real sense,
sovereignty is something created or at any rate bestowed by the international
community. If other states do not accept a particular entity?as, in recent years, the
great majority of them have refused to accept Biafra, Taiwan and Rhodesia?then
the status of a sovereign state has not been bestowed, any more than upon the 'home
lands' in South Africa.
From this standpoint, and for the purposes of definition, it does not matter that
Taiwan could show some justification for sovereignty in terms of the formal
continuation of the republican government of China; or that Biafra had established
a government of its own; or that Rhodesia could claim that it had acquired inde

0260-2105/86/02/0079-11/S03.00 ? 1986 Review of International Studies

Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Apr., 1986), pp. 79-89.

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 80 Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state

pendence by similar means to those used by the United States. Nor does it matter that
in each of these three cases there was a government which exercised full domestic
control of a particular territory (in the Biafran case, not for very long). These aspects
of so-called 'internal' sovereignty are unimportant in comparison with the refusal of
large numbers of sovereign states, and through them of the United Nations, to
acknowledge that a sovereign state exists. Without this acknowledgment, a govern
ment of a particular area is in the position of a rebel province or a stultified inde
pendence movement: it exists and may seem to possess the loyalty of groups of
people, but its opportunities for intercourse with other communities are restricted,
and the likelihood that it will retain its position is remote, unless influential states give
it support.
Obviously, sovereignty does not provide absolute independence, in either political
or economic terms. Only the biggest and smallest states can be fully self-sufficient,
and neither chooses to be so. It is a very long time since anyone could say that major
states were able to operate on their own terms without regard for the welfare of others
or without recognizing that they depended on the welfare of others. Norman Angell's
thesis, in The Great Illusion,1 that war between major industrial powers leads to their
impoverishment and not to increased prosperity, has been amply proved. Even if
there is no intention on the part of one state to coerce another, states are inter
dependent. When that intention is present?as it often is in great powers whose
strategic demands require that smaller states conform to their will?the smaller states
may have little opportunity to preserve their sovereignty (although the case of North
Vietnam vs the United States indicates that there may be resources which some small
states can call into play). When we say that a state is sovereign, this is a separate
statement from saying that it is politically or economically viable. It is merely to say
that this state, however poor and ineffective, is accepted as a state by others, and
consequently can claim the privileges, opportunities, and the diplomatic equality
which those others have.
Sovereignty involves a Platonic form of equality which the international
community has adopted because of its convenience. Nobody believes that the
Maldive Islands is equal to the Soviet Union, but it is convenient for diplomatic
purposes to treat both as if they were the same. To do so provides a more effective
framework for diplomatic intercourse than the alternative, which would be to ask, at
every point of operation of the diplomatic system or of international governmental
organizations, whether this or that state was more important than this or that other.
The Soviet Union and the Maldive Islands are plainly limiting cases at the ends of the
spectrum of power and importance; there are scores of other states between them
whose relative power is often indeterminate, and which it is easier to treat as equally
sovereign than as unequal in strength. To decide in what measure they were unequal
would be extremely difficult and would need frequent revision. This sort of revision
occurs in practice through circumstance, especially through war, which is the great
decider of relative status; in between major wars, the diplomatic practice of regarding
each state as conforming to the Platonic model of equality is an efficient way of
conducting international relations in a relatively civilized manner.
Vitality is a more contentious term, because it derives from living creatures, a
category in which the state can be included only because it includes large numbers of
human beings. However, its meaning is clear enough. Vitality in this context means
the quality of active life, implying a capacity for vigorous movement and for adapta

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 J. D. B. Miller 81

tion. It is no more absolute or equal in practice than the independence of sovereign

states. Vitality is not the same in all living creatures of the same species; this is also
true of states. Some are more obviously alive and active than others. Some,
historically, have been on the wane at particular periods; others have increased in
power, confidence and resources, but may have later receded in international signifi
cance. Vitality is seen here very much in terms of the opportunities which political
units need in order to sustain their position. It is distinguished from viability, which is
much more a matter of economic resources and the uses to which they can be put.
Definition of the state should by now be fairly clear. As seen in terms of inter
national politics, the state is neither the Platonic nor the Hegelian form, but is any
sovereign state accepted as such by others. No province, colony or protectorate will
qualify. The context will normally indicate which state is meant, and how important
it is. There is great variety amongst states in terms of extent, population, wealth,
military power, and prestige. There are, however, certain characteristics common to
states at large, whatever their size or significance. One is that each pursues its own
interests, these interests being seen in terms of the preservation of its territorial
integrity and the prosperity of its people; the latter interest may be viewed in terms of
either the people at large or the regime at the time, or both. Another is that these
interests are sought sometimes in cooperation with other states and sometimes in
competition with them. A third is that each state normally aims at approximating its
diplomatic performance to that of the more established states; this is not so in the
case of professedly revolutionary regimes, though it is remarkable how soon a revolu
tionary mode may become conformist in terms of international standards. A fourth
characteristic of states is that they tend to observe international conventions in such
matters as travel, trade, shipping, airline movements and the like, thus recognizing
the interdependence of the contemporary world. A fifth is that, in similar vein,
they join international governmental organizations and behave as if these were
significant bodies. A sixth, subsuming most of the others, is that they tend to keep
their promises to one another, to international organizations and to transnational
bodies such as banks, because of the disadvantages likely to accrue if they do not. The
relative and absolute significance of these characteristics varies from state to state;
but they will be present unless the state is in a highly abnormal situation.
Putting the three definitions together, in this paper the state is viewed primarily as
an entity within the international system. Its sovereignty derives from its acceptance
by other states which have already attained that quality. There is, of course, also an
internal dimension of great importance to sovereignty: the observance of domestic
laws depends on it, and the orderly government of any society demands some form of
legitimate rule-making authority if order is to be sustained. But much domestic order
and the machinery of government required for it have historically depended, not
upon there being a local sovereign state to enforce it, but upon there being some form
of sovereignty present, whether local or not. For example, the courts and police in
India functioned in much the same way under the British Raj as they have functioned
since India became a sovereign state, just as the courts and police of Soviet Central
Asia function in spite of an absence of local sovereignty. What the British Raj could
not do was to justify India's being regarded as a sovereign state, in spite of its
membership of the League of Nations and later of the UN before it became
independent. The sovereign state is an international actor in a way that no formal
dependency can be; moreover, the domestic consequences of being a sovereign state

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 82 Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state

go well beyond the observance of law and order. Sovereignty provides opportunities
and incentives which its absence makes impossible.
The next section of this paper considers why and how sovereignty confers vitality
upon a state.

Sovereignty and the vitality of the state

The first and most important way in which sovereignty does this is by guarding the
formal independence of the state and enabling it to stand firm?if the circumstances
are propitious?in the face of even the greatest power. I hasten to add that there is
nothing automatic about this process. History is full of small states which have been
unable to withstand the pressure of greater powers and which have been forced into
obscurity or oblivion. In modern times, these cases range from the Baltic states in
relation to the Soviet Union in 1940, to the weak states of Central America and the
Caribbean in relation to the United States at various times in this century. Yet we
should not regard such cases as typical. Given the fact that there are now more than
150 sovereign states, they are exceptional. Moreover, they have become fewer. The
19th century assumption that a great power could do what it liked with small states
and territories unless some other great power prevented it, has given way to the
assumption that great powers must find good reason for interfering in other states'
affairs. The change of assumption has not prevented interference, as the contempo
rary cases of Nicaragua and Afghanistan show; but interference has become harder
to justify, because there is a larger audience of states looking on, and because there
are more international institutions which provide a venue for opposition. The key to
the current situation is that there are many more small and medium-sized states than
ever before in history, and that these can make common cause in stigmatizing a great
power for its approach to another small state.
The active or tacit support of other states was one of the reasons why North
Vietnam was able to outface the United States, and why Afghanistan has not yet been
fully pacified by the Soviet Union. In both cases the intervening power apparently
considered that, if it were to remain in good standing with other states (including its
allies and associates as well as those of the Third World) it would need to moderate its
excesses and not use its full strength. In neither case was this a recipe for success. A
simple-minded 'power politics' view of events would assume without question that, if
a great power wished to subdue a small one, it could and would do so; but these two
cases indicate that the situation is more complex, and that some at least of its
complexity arises because two sovereign states are involved, and because other
sovereign states wish to see the principle of sovereignty respected.
Thus, although sovereignty cannot guarantee that a state will remain in being, it
can guard against the possibility of the state's extinction: it can create problems for
greater states when they try to impose their will on smaller ones. The gradual and then
headlong application of sovereignty in the second half of this century to the former
colonial areas of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East and the Pacific has
given many weak and backward countries the opportunity to function as sovereign
states, and to avail themselves of the protection which sovereign status bestows.
The domestic counterpart of this situation provides the second reason why
sovereignty confers vitality upon states. The government of a sovereign state?an
indigenous government which, whether it holds elections or not, has roots in the local

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 J. D. B. Miller 83

community?is given by means of sovereignty the legal capacity to use coercion,

persuasion and provision upon the population. There is a whole variety of ways in
which this provides the state with vitality. In raising armies, for example, it can
appeal to local patriotism to an extent that imperial authorities could not. Problems
may be inherent in this, as the Biafran example shows, but they have not always
proved so difficult as those which colonial powers have experienced when their levies
mutinied and drifted away.
It can be argued in opposition to sovereign status that indigenous governments
may be less prepared to raise necessary taxation and impose stringent economies than
colonial governments, in spite of the power to do so, and that much of the economic
difficulty of Third World states in the 1970s and 1980s has been due to reluctance to
be unpopular. As against this, the examples of the green revolution in India and the
improvement in rural production in China suggest that governments with local
support can get better economic results than those which depend on external
electorates. This is a chancy matter, like the military service question. What one can
say with some assurance is that, while colonial government may provide the orderly
management necessary for economic advance (as in Ghana, the Sudan and Zambia
before independence, or Hong Kong in the past three decades), this process is
unlikely to continue for long, partly because of internal pressures and partly because
of the impact of the world economy with its price changes and variations of invest
ment. Just as there may be a limit to the taxation which a local government is
prepared to raise, so there are certainly limits to the subsidies which colonial govern
ment will provide, and to the investments which they are prepared to encourage in
their colonies rather than in domestic industries and in other developed countries.
Sovereignty also gives an indigenous government the opportunity to exploit
national symbols and national sentiment in ways which an empire cannot match. The
power of persuasion, coupled with the provision of goods and services, makes a
national government something which citizens can regard as indispensable because of
the benefits which it confers or seems to confer. There is nothing new about this
situation: for centuries the governments of European states have told their peoples
that they were better off than those in other countries, and that they should cling to
their own institutions and customs in preference to those of foreigners. Local
institutions, centred upon the governmental practices of the state?in military
matters, economic policy, education, religion, justice, etc.?have constantly been
extolled as the best available. Moreover, economic policies have usually been
consciously directed towards some form of protectionism in order to stimulate local
industries, increase employment, and provide a stake in the country for as many
people as possible.
These opportunities to persuade and provide are not to be seen as simply exercises
of state power in the interests of particular regimes. They do have that quality, but
they also involve advantages for the people, and a means of canalizing loyalty and
affection. Here is to be found a further reason why sovereignty produces added
vitality for a state. In empires, loyalty can be given to a distant monarch, sometimes
to a very great degree, but this is less easy to encourage and retain than loyalty to local
people and institutions which, while they may not be fully autochthonous, can be the
objects of local pride because they belong to the local scene. They involve a sense of
community as well as the obligation to obey. A state and its machinery cannot be
ignored or avoided: its claims upon loyalty are largely exclusive, and can be

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 84 Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state

accentuated by the efforts of governments to build national sentiment. 'Nation

building' has not been a success in some new states, often because of intractable
differences between local ethnic communities; but it is sufficiently evident to show
that national sentiment is easier to inculcate than imperial sentiment.
Another aspect of sovereignty which helps to give vitality to states is that it
provides the state with an identity distinguishing it from other states and especially
from provinces and colonies. On the international scene, this identity enables a state
to play a role going well beyond that which it might have appeared to play before it
became sovereign. In those times it would have been something of a separate entity so
far as trade was concerned, and would have had its own postage stamps and system of
taxation; but in these and other respects it would have been in a state of tutelage and
surveillance from its colonial power, with little or no freedom to treat with other
states in matters of common concern. The identity brought by sovereign status
extends further than a distinguishing mark; it is the entree to diplomacy and to the
acceptance of formal equality. The state is distinguished from other states and from
transnational actors, even though it may be small and largely powerless in military
terms. Its capacity to make treaties and to subscribe to multilateral agreements gives
it importance in the eyes of other states, since it can frustrate or advance their
interests in ways which are not open to provinces or colonies.
The identity is linked closely to nationalism and national sentiment, as discussed
above. A province or colony can have a clear identity in the eyes of its inhabitants,
one which arises from historical development, from geographical location and
characteristics, from economic interest and sometimes from ethnic and linguistic
qualities, but it cannot command either the attention of foreigners or the political
loyalty of its citizens to the same extent as a sovereign state. It is sovereignty which
separates one state from another and especially from some conglomeration of
possessions such as the former British and French Empires and the present Soviet
Union. Only through sovereignty can nationalism be finally expressed as a creative
factor and not a protest against alien rule.
A further reason why sovereignty provides vitality is that it enables states to choose
the company they will keep. A sovereign state is free to join this or that alliance or
association, whereas a colony or province is tied to the imperial power in the one case
and to association with fellow provinces in the other. Since wholesale de-colonization
began in the 1950s and 1960s, we have seen the emergence of a variety of associations
which new states can join, and which give them extra strength and vitality?ASEAN,
the Arab League, the OAU, the non-aligned movement, the Group of 77, the South
Pacific Forum, and the like. These bodies rarely have the character of alliances:
instead, they concentrate upon achieving common policies and then pressing these
upon major powers by direct diplomacy or, more often, by activity in international
governmental organizations such as the UN. There is a sense in which many small
states would be lost in the crowd if they did not have the opportunity to join such
associations. The island states of the South Pacific are a case in point. One of the
difficulties facing the former British dependencies in the Caribbean is that they have
not been able to agree on a form of association which would maximize their
negotiating strength; only some of them have done so, and then with opposition from
the others. This was painfully apparent when the United States intervened in Grenada
in 1983.
In spite of the fact that many new states have not been prepared to join existing

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 J. D. B. Miller 85

military alliances or seek new ones, the alliance continues to be a form of group
insurance which appeals to sovereign states with longer experience of the inter
national system. NATO, ANZUS, the Warsaw Pact and the American guarantees to
Japan and Thailand are examples. Each of these is in practice an association between
a superpower and others, mostly medium powers. Such a disproportion of power
does not attract many new states (except for the former French African depen
dencies, which have special arrangements with France), but is regarded by the states
in NATO as an advantage. This attitude may be shaken from time to time, when
proposals for individual neutrality become attractive because they seem to promise
safety in the event of a clash between the superpowers; but so far the smaller powers
in these alliances have regarded them as safety nets which neutrality could not
provide. It is the sort of safety that involves continued vitality, if not an increase in it.
Sovereignty thus confers vitality, not simply through formal independence, but
through the ability to combine one state's independence with those of others in order
to produce a result which none could achieve on its own. Cooperation between states,
in a variety of civil as well as military fields, is withheld from colonies, protectorates
and provinces except with the authority of the colonial power or the central govern
ment. Civil aviation is a good example of how rights and opportunities are conferred
by sovereign status: the smallest sovereign state can make lucrative arrangements
which British Columbia, Texas, Queensland and Hong Kong cannot. The sovereign
state may, of course, make mistakes or find that it cannot agree with other small
states about how to run a joint airline, as occurred in both the British Caribbean and
the South Pacific. But this is a case of insufficient viability, not of diminished
sovereignty. Sovereignty, like human maturity, includes the right to make one's own
mistakes; there will be increased vitality if the right choices are made, an increase
which cannot be organized on their own account by non-sovereign political entities.
The point can be seen in higher relief when we recognize that sovereign states
become part of 'the international community', usually symbolized by their member
ship of the UN. There are ambiguities in the term, arising from the extent to which
one considers states to form a community, and from the obvious disparities in power
between them. But it would be impossible to deny that most new states have benefited
considerably from the aid which they have received from international organizations.
They also gain from the opportunity of participation in debate and negotiation,
which is involved in membership of the UN and its specialized agencies. These
bodies are all organs of interdependence, in the sense that they enable member-states
to cooperate on a wider front and to exploit the opportunities inherent in the system
of international aid for development, opportunities for trade, and access to
investment.
None of this should be regarded as unadulterated advantage. The point is simply
one of opportunity. A state's vitality is increased if it is able to capitalize upon its
position as an independent entity with resources (e.g., minerals, access to its fishing
zone, tourist potential because of climate, etc.) which can be developed to its
advantage. These resources enable it to obtain investment, technical assistance, infra
structure, etc., on a privileged basis through one or other of the international
agencies, provided its diplomacy is effective. Colonies are not debarred from this sort
of opportunity, and neither are provinces; but the opportunity can come only if a
superior authority seeks it, usually after consideration of whether one of its other
colonies or provinces is more worthy.

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 86 Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state

This sort of vitality for the sovereign state is not confined to the new states of the
post-colonial era. Britain has benefited from access to the IMF, as have a number of
other developed countries. Every state uses the services of ICAO, WHO and the
international telecommunications and meteorological organizations. More
prominence is given to aid for under-developed countries because these now have
formal majorities in the assemblies of the UN and the specialized agencies, except in
the case of the IMF and the World Bank; but there are advantages also for the
developed countries.
The international governmental organizations are, in fact, 'networks of inter
dependence',2 even when they do not result in interpretations of interdependence
favourable to the interests of the United States and the other western countries. Inter
dependence does not, of course, depend solely (or even, in many cases, mainly) upon
the operation of these bodies. Much of what is important in the interdependent
activities of states is essentially bilateral in character, depending upon good relations
with this or that neighbour or this or that major power, and resulting in favourable
arrangements for concessions and opportunities in a variety of fields. But the
essential point is that these too are arrangements between states: it is the sovereignty
which both parties enjoy and which each recognizes in the other that constitutes the
basis for agreement. Even when it is a matter of arrangement between a superpower
and a lesser power, the Platonic fiction of equality is usually preserved.
In war, of course, naked power is what counts: traditionally, sovereignty has been
adjusted, blotted out or enhanced in the interests of the victors. There are limits,
however, to this process in all except major wars involving the greatest powers. The
Vietnam war, for example, resulted in some change of sovereignty (most notably in
the recognition by the western powers of the extension of what was formerly North
Vietnamese sovereignty over the whole of Vietnam), but its results also included an
international debate about the status of Kampuchea, and, in particular, the
legitimacy of the contending regimes there. Vietnamese control in practice of much
of Kampuchea and of major decisions in Laos has not been accompanied by any shift
in the sovereignty of those states.
The reasons for regarding sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state which
have been discussed in this section include, in sum, the formal protection of inde
pendence, the legal capacity to control and influence a people, the creation of an
object of loyalty and attachment, the identity in international terms which comes
from recognition by other sovereign states, the opportunity to join with other states
in regional and other associations and alliances, and the participation in the inter
national community which provides not only a demonstration of formal equality but
also access to a variety of resources and connections.
No attempt has been made to suggest that peace and prosperity arise automatically
from sovereignty, or that any of the reasons why sovereignty confers vitality is likely
to operate entirely to the benefit of the state concerned. Sovereignty is a concept
greatly affected by the course of world politics. When the international system is at
peace, with an expanding world economy in operation, sovereignty can be accepted
by all the forces at work in the system: it can be turned to the advantage of each, can
expedite and increase interdependence, and can be made the basis for widening
networks of interdependence through the expansion of existing international
organizations and the creation of new ones. In war, however, or in the hectic
conditions of enmity between the major international actors, the concept may be at a

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 J. D. B. Miller 87

discount. Major powers and superpowers are likely to decide that the existence of a
particular sovereign state, or the protection which its sovereignty appears to provide
for political forces unfavourable to them, is against their interests. In such circum
stances the lesser power?the Finland, Poland, Estonia, Nicaragua, Egypt or Chad
will be lucky if it emerges with its sovereignty intact.
This does not destroy the concept, but it does make it harder to apply to all except
those states which, in a condition of war or near-war, can physically sustain them
selves. Even so, the concept may remain. The case of Poland is historically
instructive, so is that of Korea. If the international system produces a balance of
forces favourable to the restoration of a sovereign state which has been in abeyance,
that restoration may take place?though not necessarily over the whole of the
territorial area which the sovereignty originally covered. Without the concept of
sovereignty and the arguments to which it gives rise, such a restoration would be
more difficult.
Sovereignty's role in providing vitality to a state has no parallel. Systems of
federalism, colonialism and trusteeship cannot give the same sort of life nor can they
so obviously and in so many ways augment it. The limits of tutelage are soon reached.
Sovereignty is open to all sorts of objections?notably those of the free trader and the
opponent of nationalism?but there is no substitute for it. So far, no other form of
social organization has been able to do so much or command such loyalty.

Conclusions
One may ask, in conclusion, whether this source of vitality is likely to become less
significant, and, if so, what is likely to take its place. A convenient point of departure
is Harold Jacobson's formulation, to which reference has already been made.
Jacobson argues that, in an era of interdependence,

. . . Sovereign states are not being superseded as the principal actors in world politics.
Sovereignty, however, is being rapidly eroded. More and more states are bound in webs
of networks of international organisations, and in more and more functional areas the
freedom of states to make unilateral decisions is restricted. Some of the ties are universal,
but for most states the greater number of ties and the stronger commitments are with
limited membership IGOs [international governmental organizations]. Clusters of states
are bound together in organisations, but these groups of states do not seem to be merging
into new territorially defined units, larger states; or if they are, the process appears to be
so slow that it will not reach fruition in the future with which we are concerned . . .
What we have, then, is a global political system that is already complex and growing even
more complex. Nation-states retain sovereignty and consequently remain the principal
actors in international politics. But all states are enmeshed in complex webs of inter
national organisations, both governmental and nongovernmental, and their societies,
rather than being sealed from one another, are linked by growing transnational connec
tions. Although political authority continues to be centred in governments of nation
states, in reality it is widely dispersed. With respect to countless issues, to be effective
governments must act together, but different issues elicit cooperation by different
combinations of states. States entangled in webs of international organisations is the
proper simile to describe the contemporary global political system, and international
organisations, both IGOs and INGOs, are best seen as sophisticated communication

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 88 Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state

devices, instruments for transmitting and relaying messages and coordinating actions.
The global political system continues to consist of multiple sovereign centres of decision
making, but effective power is increasingly being organised in a non-hierarchical
manner.3

This moderately expressed point of view is fairly widespread amongst those who
emphasize growing interdependence and the significance of international organiza
tions in making that interdependence effective, at the expense of complete inde
pendence on the part of the participating states. I find myself only partly in agree
ment with it. Here I shall criticize some of the ideas which appear to lie behind the
point of view, and then discuss what it has to say about the future of sovereignty.
Like many others of this kind, Jacobson's statement seems to imply that there is
something new, not simply in the degree of interdependence which states now
experience, but in the fact of interdependence itself. Perhaps this is a natural reaction
to come from the United States, with its background of near self-sufficiency, its
history of great unused areas of land, and its comparative political isolation. To the
extent that the United States has found itself since World War II in a more inter
dependent position, both politically and economically, the view is understandable.
But it does not chime with everyone else's experience. There is nothing new about
interdependence in Western and Central Europe. Every European knows that Europe
is something of a unity, that goods and money and people have traditionally crossed
frontiers, and that one country's destitution might spread to another. The essence of
European politics of the past three or four hundred years was not whether inter
dependence suddenly happened at some particular time, but who should be top dog,
i.e. which power or combination of powers would benefit most from the inter
dependence that existed?taking possession of rich agricultural areas, gaining access
to major trade routes, and later getting control of mineral deposits and manufactur
ing resources.
This longstanding discord has now ceased, so far as Western Europe is concerned,
because another concept of how to deal with interdependence?that of sharing the
spoils through a European Community?has taken its place. But interdependence as
a concept or as a shared experience is not new: it is essentially commonplace. It was
markedly present as an influence in much 19th century diplomatic bargaining and
trade arrangements, and found its institutional expression in the Public International
Unions created in the latter part of the century. These were not considered inimical to
sovereignty. Rather, they were seen as a use of the member-states' sovereignty to
create organs of cooperation. The situation now is more complex and involves more
functions of states and communities, but it is not essentially different.
One reason is that states have never been 'impermeable' or 'impenetrable', to use
the terms often employed to suggest that there was a time when states were 'sealed
from one another'. These terms are inapplicable to real life. States have always been
permeable and penetrable?by traders and financiers, by religious groups, by ideas
and technology, and by other influences sometimes independent in themselves and
sometimes under the control of other states. The United States itself has never been
impervious to the influences represented by immigration. Impenetrability has not
been the experiences of actual sovereign states. Once we grasp this point, there is no
difficulty in recognizing that interdependence is not new, but has merely come under
formal international regulation in such fields as epidemics, civil aviation,

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 J. D. B. Miller 89

meteorology, telecommunications and shipping?though not in a great many others

of major importance including investment, technical knowledge, migration, military
alliances and the trade in arms.
The significance of these comments for Jacobson's statement is that, while the
statement is broadly true, some of its implications are not. These include such ideas
as that states have only recently experienced permeability and interdependence, and
that their participation in international organizations somehow diminishes their
sovereignty. They also include the suggestion?again, implied and not fully stated?
that the diminution of sovereignty will continue with the enlargement of the responsi
bilities of international governmental organizations. To take this latter position is to
argue that here is a zero-sum element in the activities of states and in the exercise of
their sovereignty. On the contrary, there is ?o necessary diminution of sovereignty
through participation in international bodies. States can withdraw from inter
national agreements, and can simply ignore the demands of international bodies, as
so many states ignore the resolutions of the UN General Assembly or UNESCO. A
major power like the United States can exercise significant control over the agendas
of the ILO and UNESCO through the threat or the fact of withdrawal. Small states
which depend on the bounty of international aid programmes are certainly con
strained to some extent, but deft diplomacy can often find substitutes in the aid
sphere, especially when it is a matter of pitting one superpower against another or of
giving the former colonial power an opportunity of raising its subventions. Middle
range powers are hardly .affected by the regulatory capacity of international
organizations, unless they become subject to IMF discipline after acting as the
financial equivalent of the drunken sailor.
If IGOs are to be regarded as the forerunners of some sort of world government
which will replace the state as the prime element in mankind's political life, then there
is little sign that it will happen soon. The past ten years have seen the almost total
failure of the campaign for a New International Economic Order, which was
generated in IGOs and was expected to operate through them. The last decade has
also seen the failure of the more ambitious and institutional aspects of the proposed
Law of the Sea convention, and the refusal of the superpowers to take effective notice
of the General Assembly's schemes for disarmament. There are certainly networks of
interdependence, but it is hard to see how states can be said to be enmeshed in them.
States can pick and choose to a remarkable degree. When they fit in with the pro
grammes of IGOs it is because they think that their interests are served. Those pro
grammes are created, partly by the policy preferences of international civil servants,
but to a far greater extent by the political impact of debate, finance and voting upon
the members. In this sense the state continues to be the deciding element in what
appear to be international decisions.

References and notes

1. Norman Angel?, The Great Illusion (London: 1909).
2. See Harold Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence (2nd ed, New York: 1979).
3. Ibid., pp. 386-7.

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Review of International Studies (1986), 12, 91-93 Printed in Great Britain

Comment on J. D. B. Miller

Alan James

In the opening paragraphs of his article Professor Miller argues that to become
sovereign a political entity must satisfy two requirements. In the first place, it must
'appear to be independent in the sense of not being subject to another state's control.
... [It must] look independent in terms of the power to make its own decisions'.
And, secondly, the entity in question must be 'accepted as such by others'. This, 'in
political terms [is] the basic question' inasmuch as the lack of acceptance restricts 'its
opportunities for intercourse with other communities'.
In my view there are two sorts of problems with this analysis. The first is that in its
own terms it is unsatisfactory; the second that it does not accord with state practice.
Professor Miller's argument that a political entity is only in the running for
sovereignty if it is not controlled by another entity immediately comes up against the
familiar difficulty of where the line between independence and its lack should be
drawn. Is Afghanistan or East Germany able to make its own decisions? What about
Bhutan or Kampuchea? Is El Salvador or Botswana subject to another state's
control?and so on. All of which suggests that a concept which rests on the criterion
of independence, as used by Professor Miller, is very shakily based. What one
observer sees?or purports to see?as independence may look to another as virtually
the opposite.
The second part of Professor Miller's criterion?an entity's acceptance as
sovereign by others?also gives rise to difficulties. The touchstone here seems to be
the existence of regular and normal international relations. But what if a political
entity has such relationships with some established states but is shunned by others?
Professor Miller suggests that the amount of acceptance which is needed depends on
'the political situation at the time', but that is hardly a precise guide to the issue of
whether an entity is or is not to be categorized as sovereign. Was the Soviet Union in
this condition in its early years? What about China between 1949 and the early 1970s?
South Africa today has restricted opportunities for international relations: are we
therefore to say that it is perhaps not sovereign?
There is one further difficulty here. Professor Miller allows that an independent
entity is not sovereign if it is not accepted as such by others. But he does not say what
conclusion is to be drawn about entities which are so accepted but appear not to
satisfy the criterion of independence. On his definition this surely presents a knotty
problem.
My understanding of state practice?and it is state practice alone that I am
considering?is rather different from Professor Miller's. It seems to me that states
handle the issue of sovereignty in a manner which avoids the difficulties to which his
analysis gives rise. They do so by distinguishing between sovereignty on the one hand

0260-2105/86/02/0091-03/S03.00 ? 1986 Review of International Studies

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 92 Comment on J. D. B. Miller

and participation in international relations on the other. Moreover, they treat

sovereignty as a legal status, thus making its presence easily identifiable.
The question of whether one state has intercourse with another, like the extent of
that intercourse, is essentially a political?and hence a subjective?matter. This is so
with regard to such formal issues as the giving of recognition, the establishment of
diplomatic relations, and the further step of exchanging ambassadors. No state is
obliged to do any of these things in relation to another state, and may, for a variety of
reasons, decide to refrain from the last, the last two, or all three. Equally, the extent
to which substantive relations are built up depends on a state's perception of its
interests and on its political disposition. I believe that Professor Miller would not
disagree with this contention. But whereas he says that sovereignty is bestowed by a
sufficient number of states acccepting another entity as a proper international
partner, I say that decisions of this nature have nothing to do with sovereignty.
It seems to me that in the practice of states, sovereignty is what makes a territorial
entity eligible to participate in international relations. The extent to which it actually
participates will depend on its own wishes and capacities together with those of its
hoped-for partners. But its eligibility to engage in international relations on a full and
regular basis depends upon its possession of sovereignty. Those who do possess it,
however small or weak, have what is required for participation in the international
game: tiny Tuvalu, for example, or not much bigger but vastly richer Brunei. They
can move about on the international stage because they have the necessary entrance
requirement?sovereignty?and others are happy to do business with them. But
those without sovereignty, however large or powerful?New South Wales, for
example, or Texas?are not eligible for admission.
What is it, therefore, which enables states to treat 9000-strong Tuvalu as sovereign
but to deny this accolade to 14 million-strong Texas? The answer is that Tuvalu is, in
terms of its constitutional law, an independent entity, whereas Texas is part of a
wider constitutional arrangement. Constitutional independence is thus what states
treat as the content of sovereignty. On a certain day in 1978 Tuvalu did not enjoy this
status: it was, as the Ellice Islands, a colony of Britain. But on the next day, as a result
of legal changes instituted by Britain, it was a constitutionally independent entity?
and hence a sovereign state. Thus it was eligible to do all the things sovereign states
may do, which are outlined by Professor Miller in the second part of his article. In
practice it has not done many of them, because of its size. But it is eligible to do them
all.
Therefore, so far as the study of international relations is concerned, sovereignty
consists of constitutional independence. It is only with territorial entities enjoying
this status that other such entities contemplate regular intercourse. The actual
development of international relations brings an entity into the life of the inter
national society. But the existence of those relations do not bestow sovereignty.
Rather, they can be developed only because the entity in question already exists in a
sovereign condition. It is in this sense that sovereign statehood can be identified as the
basis of international society, in that it denotes those territorial entities which are
eligible to participate in the international society.
In practice, almost all such entities do participate, in one degree or another. But
this draws attention to one qualification which I must make to my argument.
Occasionally, although a territorial entity satisfies the test for sovereignty which
states customarily use, states may shy away from describing it as a sovereign state.

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 Alan James 93

Rhodesia between 1965 and 1979 is a case in point, as are the four constitutionally
independent black homelands in southern Africa, the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, and Taiwan. The reason for this reluctance is clear: states do not wish to give
the entities in question the sort of political standing which might accrue from
referring to them as sovereign. It is a reminder that states are as willing as individuals
to be inconsistent when it serves their purposes and can be got away with. But this
response is an exception to their usual practice. As I see it, that practice treats
sovereignty as an objective condition and separates it from the issue of the extent to
which an entity is welcomed into the life of the international society.
Let me say in conclusion that although I have taken issue with Professor Miller's
opening remarks, I could not agree more fully or strongly with everything else which
he says in his article.

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