Prepared By:

Mr.Simeon D Suan
RIDMD- NCRPO
Regional Investigation and Detective Management Division

ERNESTO MARTIN V. CA AND MERALCO

G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992

FACTS:

Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-
930. At around 2 o’clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor
Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal.
The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded
reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it as the
employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin was
not his employee. Meralco did not present any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin was
the employee of Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did not rebut such allegation.

ISSUE:

WON Ernesto Martin can be held liable.

HELD:

NO. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to present evidence on the fact
in issue necessary to establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action. As the employment
relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was
necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It was enough for the defendant to
deny the alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not
under obligation to prove this negative averment. This Court has consistently applied
the rule that “if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.”
Petition was granted.
Prepared By:
Mr.Simeon D Suan
RIDMD- NCRPO
Regional Investigation and Detective Management Division

ERNESTO SYKI, petitioner,

vs.
SALVADOR BEGASA, respondent.
(GR No. 149149, October 23, 2003, 3rd Division)

FACTS:Respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a

passenger jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While
respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside while his
left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Elizalde
Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger
jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone. Respondent filed a complaint
for damages for breach of common carrier‘s contractual obligations and quasi-delict
against Aurora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Ernesto
Syki, theowner of the truck;, and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver of the truck. After
hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena, the owner and
operator of the passenger jeepney, but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck
driver, Elizalde Sablayan, to pay respondent Salvador Begasa, jointly and severally

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner is liable for the act of his employee.

2. Whether he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family.

HELD:

In the present case, was respondent partly negligent and thus, should not recover the
full amount of the damages awarded by the trial court? We rule in the negative. In sum,
the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver
who, as found by the lower courts, did not slow down even when he was already
approaching a busy intersection within the city proper.[16] The passenger jeepney had
long stopped to pick up respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent
was already partly inside the jeepney, when petitioners driver bumped the rear end
ofrear-ended it. The impact was so strong such that respondent fell and fractured his left
thigh bone (femur), and suffered severely woundeds in his left knee and leg. No doubt
that respondentpetitioners driver was reckless speeding.

Since the negligence of petitioners driver was the sole and proximate cause of the
accident, in the present case, petitioner is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to
pay damages to respondent Begasa for the injuries sustained by latterhim. Petition
denied.
MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. Petitioner,

vs. PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK/MCGEE & CO., INC.,

Respondent.

(G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009, 2nd Division)

FACTS: Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) contracted petitioner Mindanao
Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. (Mindanao Terminal), a stevedoring company, to
load and stow a shipment of 146,288 cartons of fresh green Philippine bananas and
15,202 cartons of fresh pineapples belonging to Del Monte Fresh Produce International,
Inc. (Del Monte Produce) into the cargo hold of the vessel M/V Mistrau. The vessel was
docked at the port of Davao City and the goods were to be transported by it to the port
of Inchon, Korea in favor of consignee Taegu Industries, Inc. Del Monte Produce
insured the shipment under an open cargo policy with private respondent Phoenix
Assurance Company of New York (Phoenix), a non-life insurance company, and private
respondent McGee & Co. Inc. (McGee), the underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix.[4]

Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes aboard the M/V Mistrau. The vessel
set sail from the port of Davao City and arrived at the port of Inchon, Korea. It was then
discovered upon discharge that some of the cargo was in bad condition. The Marine
Cargo Damage Surveyor of Incok Loss and Average Adjuster of Korea, through its
representative Byeong Yong Ahn (Byeong), surveyed the extent of the damage of the
shipment. In a survey report, it was stated that 16,069 cartons of the banana shipment
and 2,185 cartons of the pineapple shipment were so damaged that they no longer had
commercial value.[5]

Del Monte Produce filed a claim under the open cargo policy for the damages to its
shipment. McGees Marine Claims Insurance Adjuster evaluated the claim and
recommended that payment in the amount of $210,266.43 be made. A check for the
recommended amount was sent to Del Monte Produce; the latter then issued a
subrogation receipt[6] to Phoenix and McGee.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Terminal is liable to pay for damages.

HELD: No.It was established that Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes of
Del Monte Produce aboard the M/V Mistrau in accordance with the stowage plan, a
guide for the area assignments of the goods in the vessel‘s hold, prepared by Del Monte
Produce and the officers of M/V Mistrau. The loading and stowing was done under the
direction and supervision of the ship officers. The vessel‘s officer would order the
closing of the hatches only if the loading was done correctly after a final inspection. The
said ship officers would not have accepted the cargoes on board the vessel if they were
not properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand the voyage in open seas. They
would order the stevedore to rectify any error in its loading and stowing. A foreman‘s
report, as proof of work done on board the vessel, was prepared by the checkers of
Mindanao Terminal and concurred in by the Chief Officer of M/V Mistrau after they were
satisfied that the cargoes were properly loaded.

The petition is GRANTED.

People, appellee, vs. Danny Delos Santos, appellant403 SCRA 153, GR No.
135919, May 9, 2003

Facts: On November 1997, De Leon witnessed the gruesome killing of Flores, while
drinking with 3 men, onewas the witness Tablate. The two were positive of Delos
Santos as the perpetrator but testified only on January1998. Despite Delos Santos’s
alibi, he was found guilty of murder.

Issue: WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after the 2-monthperiod

Held: Yes. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal
proceeding particularly when thecrime committed is of such gravity as to show the
cruelty of the perpetrator, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the
witnesses. Besides, settled is the rule that positive identification x x x prevails over
alibiand denial. Decision is affirmed with modification.

VICTORINO D. MAGAT, petitioner, versus HON. LEO D. MEDIALDEA and

SANTIAGO A. GUERRERO, respondents. (G.R. No. L-37120 April 20, 1983 2nd
Division) ESCOLIN, J.:

FACTS: Defendant Santiago Guerrero entered into a contract with the U.S. Navy
Exchange, Subic Bay, Philippines for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs. Guerrero and
his aforesaid agent Isidro Aligada were able to import from Japan with the assistance of
the plaintiff Magat and his Japanese business associates the necessary taximeters for
Guerrero‘s taxicabs in partial fulfillment of commitments with the U.S. Navy Exchange,
Subic Bay, Philippines.

Guerrero and his agent have repeatedly assured Magat of his financial capabilities to
pay for the goods ordered by him and in fact he accomplished the necessary application
for a letter of credit with his banker, but he subsequently instructed his banker not to
give due course to his application for a letter of credit and that for reasons only known to
him, he failed and refused to open the necessary letter of credit to cover payment of the
goods ordered by him.

Meanwhile, Guerrero has been operating his taxicabs without the required radio
transceivers and when the U.S. Navy Authorities were pressing defendant for
compliance with his commitments with respect to the installations of radio transceivers
on his taxicabs, he impliedly laid the blame for the delay upon Magat, thus destroying
 his reputation with the said Naval Authorities of Subic Bay, Philippines, with whom he
transacts business.

Victorino Magat filed a complaint for alleged breach of contract against Santiago
Guerrero.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for breach of contract states a valid cause of
action.

HELD: Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: ―those who in the performance of their
obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.

The phrase "in any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation includes any ilicit act
or omission which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of the obligation and every
kind of defective performance.

The damages which the obligor is liable for includes not only the value of the loss
suffered by the obligee (daño emergente) but also the profits which the latter failed to
obtain (lucro cesante). If the obligor acted in good faith, he shall be liable for those
damages that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at
the time the obligation was constituted; and in case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
attitude, he shall be liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.

In the case at bar, petitioner had fulfilled his part of the bargain while private respondent
failed to comply with his correlative obligation by refusing to open a letter of credits to
cover payment of the goods ordered by him, and that consequently, petitioner suffered
not only loss of his expected profits, but moral and exemplary damages as well.
Therefore he is liable for the damages he caused to the petitioner.

FIDELA DEL CASTILLO Vda. DE MISTICA, petitioner, versus Spouses

BERNARDINO NAGUIAT and MARIA PAULINA GERONA-NAGUIAT, respondents.
(G.R. No. 137909 December 11, 2003 1st Division)
Art. 1182. Potestative Condition
Facts
 Predecessor-in-interest of Petitioner and herein Defendants entered into a contract to
sell in which the latter prayed the initial payment and undertake to pay the remaining by
installment within 10 years subject to 12% interest per annum
 Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission alleging failure and refusal of Defendants to
pay the balance constitutes a violation of the contract which entitles her to rescind the
same
 Petitioner argues that period for performance of obligation cannot be extended to 10
years because to do so would convert the obligation to purely potestative
 ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the application of Article 1191 of
the Civil Code, as it ruled that there is no breach of obligation inspite of the lapse of their
stipulated period and the failure of the respondent to pay.

Held
 Under Art. 1191 of Civil Code, the right to rescind an obligation is predicated on
violation between parties brought about by breach of faith by one of them.
Rescission, however, is allowed only when the breach is substantial and
fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation
 In this case, no substantial breach – in the Kasulatan, it was stipulated that payment
could be made even after 10 years from execution of contract, provided they will pay the
12% interest
 Civil Code prohibits purely potestative, suspensive, conditional obligation that
depend on the whims of the debtor. Nowhere in the deed that payment of purchase
price is dependent whether respondents want to pay it or not, the fact that they already
made partial payment shows that parties intended to be bound by the Kasulatan

HEIRS OF GAITE VS THE PLAZA INC.

G.R. No. 177685 January 26, 2011

FACTS: On July 16, 1980, The Plaza, Inc. (The Plaza), a corporation engaged in the
restaurant business, through its President, Jose C. Reyes, entered into a contract with
Rhogen Builders (Rhogen), represented by Ramon C. Gaite, for the construction of a
restaurant building in Greenbelt, Makati, Metro Manila for the price of P7,600,000. On
July 28, 1980, The Plaza paid P1,155,000 down payment to Gaite and soon after
Rhogen commenced construction of the restaurant building. 2 Months later, Engineer
Angelito Z. Gonzales, the Acting Building Official of the Municipality of Makati, ordered
Gaite to cease and desist from continuing with the construction of the building for
violation of The National Building Code.

The Plaza’s Project Manager Architect Roberto evaluated the Progress Billing and
Tayzon stated that actual jobsite assessment showed that the finished works fall short
of Rhogen’s claimed percentage of accomplishment and Rhogen was entitled to only
P32,684.16 and not P260,649.91 being demanded by Rhogen. On the same day, Gaite
notified Reyes that he is suspending all construction works until Reyes and the Project
Manager cooperate to resolve the issue he had raised to address the problem.

Gaite informed The Plaza that he is terminating their contract based on the Contractor’s
Right to Stop

Work or Terminate Contracts as provided for in the General Conditions of the Contract
and demanded the payment of P63,058.50 representing the work that has already been
completed by Rhogen. Reyes also informed Gaite that The Plaza will continue the
completion of the structure utilizing the services of a competent contractor but will
charge Rhogen for liquidated damages as stipulated in Article VIII of the Contract The
Plaza filed a civil case for breach of contract, sum of money and damages against Gaite
and FGU in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. The RTC Makati rendered its
decision granting in favor of the Plaza against Gaite. The Court of Appeals affirmed
such decision with modification.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Rhogen had factual or legal basis to terminate the General
Construction Contract.

HELD:The construction contract between Rhogen and The Plaza provides for reciprocal
obligationswhereby the latter’s obligation to pay the contract price or progress billing is
conditioned on the former’s specified performance. Pursuant to its contractual
obligation, The Plaza furnished materials and paid the agreed down payment. Rhogen,
having breached the contractual obligation it had expressly assumed specifically to
comply with all laws was already at fault. Respondent The Plaza, on the other hand,
was justified in withholding payment on Rhogen’s first progress billing. Upon the facts
duly established, Rhogen committed a serious breach of its contract with The Plaza,
which justified the latter in terminating the contract. Article 1170 of the Civil Code
provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are
liable for damages. Petition DENIED

VALENTIN MOVIDO, substituted by MARGINITO MOVIDO, Petitioner, versus LUIS

REYES PASTOR, Respondent. (G.R. No. 172279 February 11, 2010 3rd Division)
CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Luis Reyes Pastor filed a complaint for specific performance in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, praying that petitioner Valentin Movido be
compelled to cause the survey of a parcel of land subject of their contract to sell. In his
complaint, respondent alleged that he and petitioner executed a kasunduan sa bilihan
ng lupa where the latter agreed to sell a parcel of land located in Paliparan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite with an area of some 21,000 sq. m. out of the 22,731 sq. m.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 362995 at P400/sq. m. Respondent
further alleged that another kasunduan was later executed supplementing the
kasunduan sa bilihan ng lupa. It provided that, if a Napocor power line traversed the
subject lot, the purchase price would be lowered toP200/sq. m. beyond the distance of
15 meters on both sides from the center of the power line while the portion within a
distance of 15 meters on both sides from the center of the power line would not be paid.
Respondent alleged that he already paid petitioner P5 million out of the original
purchase price of P8.4 million stated in the kasunduan sa bilihan ng lupa. He was willing
and ready to pay the balance of the purchase price but due to petitioner‘s refusal to
have the property surveyed despite incessant demands, his unpaid balance could not
be determined with certainty.

ISSUE: Whether or not rescission is tenable.

HELD: No. Rescission is only allowed when the breach is so substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in entering into the contract. We find
no such substantial or material breach. It is true that respondent failed to pay the 7th
and 8th installments of the purchase price. However, considering the circumstances of
the instant case, particularly the provisions of the kasunduan, respondent cannot be
deemed to have committed a serious breach. In the first place, respondent was not in
default as petitioner never made a demand for payment.1avvphi1 Moreover, the
kasunduan sa bilihan ng lupa and the kasunduan should both be given effect rather
than be declared conflicting, if there is a way of reconciling them. Petitioner and
respondent would not have entered into either of the agreements if they did not intend
to be bound or governed by them. Indeed, taken together, the two agreements actually
constitute a single contract pertaining to the sale of a land to respondent by petitioner.
Their stipulations must therefore be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful