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LEGAL SEPARATION

Q: Lucita left the conjugal dwelling and filed a petition for legal separation d A: No. Art. 56 (4) of the FC does not apply since the abandonment that is a
ue to the physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive condu ground for legal separation is abandonment without justifiable cause for m
ct she had suffered at the hands of Wiliam, her husband. William denied su ore than one year. In this case, Lucita left William due to his abusive condu
ch and claimed that since it was Lucita who had left the conjugal abode, th ct. Such act does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said
en the decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art.56 (4 provision. Since this is so, there is no mutual guilt between them as there i
) of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both s only one erring spouse. (Ong Eng Kiam v. CA, GR No. 153206, Oct. 23, 2
parties have given ground for legal separation. Should legal separation be 006)
denied on the basis of William’s claim of mutual guilt?
DEFENSES DENIAL OF PETITION FOR LS
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD A: Yes. Under Article 102, NCC, an action for legal separation can n
ot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff bec
Q: William filed a petition for legal separation in 1955 grounded on J ame cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the
uanita’s adulterous relations allegedly discovered by William in 1945. date when such cause occurred. In this case, William’s action is alre
Was William’s action already barred by prescription? ady barred because of his failure to petition for legal separation proce
edings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which w
as upon his release from internment in 1945. (Brown v.Yambao, G.R.
No. L‐10699, Oct. 18, 1957)

Note: This case was decided under the civil code not under the fami
ly code
Q: Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of Tarlac, Ta A:
rlac on January 5. 1988. In 1990, Ariel went to Saudi Arabia to work 1.Yes, the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more than one (1) year
. There, after being converted into Islam, Ariel married Mystica, Rosa is a ground for legal separation unless upon returning to the Philippi
learned of the second marriage of Ariel on January 1, 1992 when Ar nes, Rosa agrees to cohabit with Ariel which is allowed under the Mu
iel returned to the Philippines with Mystica. Rosa filed an action for le slim Code. In this case, there is condonation. The contracting of a su
gal separation on February 5, 1994. Does Rosa have legal grounds bsequent bigamous marriage whether in the Philippines or abroad is
to ask for legal separation? Has the action prescribed? a ground for legal separation under Article 55(7) of the Family Code.
Whether the second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having converted i
nto Islam, is immaterial.
2.No. Under Article 57 of the Family Code, the aggrieved spouse mu
st file the action within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause.
The subsequent marriage of Ariel could not have occurred earlier tha
n 1990, the time he went to Saudi Arabia. Hence, Rosa has until 19
95 to bring the action under the Family Code. (1994 Bar Question)
EXTENT OF INQUIRY OF PROSECUTOR A: The argument is untenable. It was legitimate for the Fiscal to brin
g to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that
Q: After learning of Juanita’s misconduct, William filed a petition for l Juanita's default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable him to o
egal separation. During his cross‐ btain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard to
examination by the Assistant Fiscal, it was discovered that William liv the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is the fact of Wil
ed with a woman named Lilia and had children with her after the libe liam's cohabitation with Lilia, since it bars him from claiming legal se
ration. The court denied the petition on the ground both of them had paration by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. S
incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred the right of acti uch evidence of misconduct is a proper subject of inquiry as they m
on under Art. 100, NCC. William argues that in cross‐ ay justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion betwe
examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia, who was en the spouses. Article 101 NCC, calling for the intervention of the st
not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for Juanita when t ate attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
he power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether o (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) emphasizes that m
r not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for t arriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in
he state. Is his argument correct? which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interrup
tion cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves. It is cons
onant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowe
d to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the pr
oceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. (Brow
n v.Yambao, G.R. No. L‐10699, Oct. 18, 1957)
Q: Mister, without Misis’ consent, executed a special power of attorn A: Yes. The settled rule is that the sale or encumbrance of a conjug
ey in favor of Drepa in order to secure a loan to be secured by a c al property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife (G
onjugal property, which loan was later obtained. When the loan was uiang v. CA, 353 Phil. 578). The absence of the consent of one ren
not paid, the mortgage was foreclosed and sold on auction. Misis see ders the entire sale or encumbrance null and void, including the porti
ks the declaration of the mortgage and sale as void invoking Art. 12 on of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted
4 of the FC. Will the wife’s action prosper? the sale. Neither would the conjugal partnership be liable for the loan
on the ground that it redounded to the benefit of the family. The sw
eeping conclusion that the loan was obtained by the husband in orde
r to finance the construction of housing units, without however adduci
ng adequate proof, does not persuade. (Homeowners Savings &Loan
Bank v. Dailo,G.R. No. 153802, Mar. 11, 2005)
Q: In a sale of a piece of land that she and her husband, David, o A: The register of deeds is incorrect. A wife, by affixing her signatur
wned, Lorenza, who witnessed the sale, signed on the page reserve e to a deed of sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed
d for witnesses to the deed. When the buyer sought to register the s to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. The conse
ale, it was denied by the Register of Deeds for lack of the wife's co nt need not always be explicit or set forth in any particular document
nsent to the sale. Decide. so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or app
roval was in fact given.(Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, Jun. 8, 2
005) Note: In this case, it will be noted that the sale was entered int
o prior to the effectivity of the FC. Because of such, Art. 173, in rela
tion to Art. 166 of the Civil Code, would have applied if there was a
finding of lack of the wife's consent. Under said provisions, the sale
would have been merely voidable, and not void.
Q: Andres sold a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal partnership A: It depends. The use of the jurat, instead of an acknowledgment,
to Pepito. Days before the sale, Kumander, his wife, assented to su does not elevate the marital consent into the level of a public docum
ch by signing a document entitled "Marital Consent" contained in a ju ent but instead consigns it to the status of a private writing. Hence, t
rat, which was then sworn to before the same notary public who not he presumption of regularity does not apply and the wife still needs t
arized the deed of sale, and then appended to the deed of sale itself o prove its genuiness and authenticity as required under the rules of
. Is the conveyance valid? evidence. (Pan Pacific Industrial SalesCo., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 125283,
Feb. 10, 2006 Note: The fact that the document contains a jurat, and not a
n acknowledgment, should not affect its genuineness or that of the related
document of conveyance itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale. In this instance,
a jurat suffices as the document only embodies the manifestation of the sp
ouse's consent, a mere appendage to the main document. (Pan Pacific Ind
ustrial Sales Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 125283, Feb. 10, 2006)
Q: In cases of alienation, disposition or encumbrance of the communi A: No. Both spouses must approve any dispositions or encumbrances
ty property, and one spouse is incapacitated or unable to participate i , and consent of the other spouse regarding the disposition must be
n the administration of the community property, is the approval of on in writing, otherwise, the matter should be brought to court and the c
ourt will give the authority, if proper. Such consent or court approval
e spouse enough for said alienation, disposition or encumbrance to b must be obtained before the alienation, etc., otherwise, such will be v
e valid? oid and obtaining such consent or court approval afterwards will not
validate the act. A void act cannot be ratified.
Q: During his lifetime and while he was married to Epifania, Joseph A: No. The proscription against the sale of property between spouses
acquired a piece of land which he then subsequently conveyed, by w under Art. 1490 applies even to common law relationships. In an ear
ay of a purported sale, to his other woman, Maria. Is the sale of the lier ruling, the SC nullified a sale made by a husband in favor of a
piece of land by Joseph to his mistress proper? concubine, after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal h
ome where his wife and children lived, and from whence they derived their
support, for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was regar
ded by the court as subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social in
stitution which public policy cherishes and protects (Ching v. CA, GR No. 1
65879, Nov. 10, 2006).
Q: Yamane asserts that the parcel of land, which was purchased at A: Conjugal. In this case the provisions of the Civil Code would appl
auction, belonged to the conjugal partnership of him and his late wife y since the purchase took place before the FC took effect. Under Art
. In the title, his name appeared to be merely descriptive of the civil . 160 of the NCC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
status of the registered owner, his late wife. The purchase took plac to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclu
e prior to the advent of the Family Code. Is the property conjugal or sively to the husband or the wife. In this case, there was no proof t
paraphernal property of his late wife? hat the property had been acquired exclusively by Yamane's late wife.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse doe
s not destroy its conjugal nature in the absence of strong, clear and
convincing evidence that it was acquired using the exclusive funds of
said spouse. (Spouses Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 20
06)
Q: Dolores seeks to recover a parcel of land, alleging that she and A: Recovery is not warranted. The rule is all property of the marriag
her husband acquired such during their marriage, that it formed part e is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this presumptio
of their conjugal properties and that he sold it without her consent. S n to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that it was acqui
he presents as evidence their marriage contract and the initial tax de red during the marriage. Here, Dolores's evidence consisted of her m
claration over the property. Decide. arriage contract and the initial tax declaration over the property. She
did not identify when she and her husband first occupied and posses
sed the land. Neither did she present any witness to prove that they
first occupied the property during their marriage and that they both,
worked on the land. (Pintiano‐
Anno v. Anno,G.R. No. 163743, Jan. 27, 2006)
Q: Josefina, purchased a parcel of land using, according to her, her A: Yes. Since Josefina failed to prove that she acquired the propertie
own funds. Although the titles to the lots were issued in the names s with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo, it sh
of the spouses, the dorsal portions thereof contained an entry showin ould be presumed and considered as belonging to the conjugal partn
g that Eduardo had waived any right over the properties as they wer ership. Art. 105 of the FC, which provides that the Code shall apply
e bought out of the savings of Josefina. When a complaint for sum o to conjugal partnerships established before it took effect, without preju
f money against her husband, Eduardo, prospered, the lot was levied dice to vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or o
upon. Does the parcel of land belong to the conjugal partnership? ther laws, applies in this case. There was no evidence adduced by J
osefina showing that she had acquired a vested right in this regard.
Thus, as it appears that the properties were acquired during the subs
istence of the marriage of Josefina and Eduardo, under normal circu
mstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. (Fr
ancisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp., G.R. No. 151967.
Feb. 16, 2005)
Q: Josefina’s petition for nullity of her marriage to Eduardo was gran A: No. Art. 148 of the FC does not apply since, in said article, a co‐
ted on the ground of existence of a prior marriage. She now asserts ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, on
that since her marriage to Eduardo is void, their property relation is t e party has a pre‐
o be governed by the rules on co‐ existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their actual joi
ownership under Art. 148 of the FC and not by Art. 144 of the Civil nt contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent
Code. In this regime, Eduardo has no share at all in the properties si of their proportionate interest thereon. Petitioner failed to adduce prep
nce no proof was adduced by him as regards his participation in thei onderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industr
r purchase. However, she did not prove that she acquired the proper y in the acquisition of the subject property and, hence, is not a co‐
ties using her personal funds and prior to her cohabitation with Eduar owner of the property. Since the subject property was acquired durin
do. Is her contention correct? g the subsistence of the first marriage of Eduardo, under normal circu
mstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property of
Eduardo and Josefina. (Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction
Corp.,G.R. No. 151967. Feb. 16, 2005)
Q: Francisco and Erminda’s marriage was nullified by the trial court A: No. The property relation between the parties is governed by Art.
due to psychological incapacity. He did not contest the decree of nulli 147 of the FC. Under this article, there is a presumption that the pro
ty but he assailed the division in the properties which was contained perties which they acquired during their cohabitation were acquired thr
in the decree. He asserted that the properties were acquired through ough their joint efforts, work or industry. It further provides that a par
his efforts and that she had no contribution whatsoever in their acqui ty who did not participate in the acquisition thereof shall be deemed t
sition and maintenance; hence, she should not be entitled to a joint s o have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if his or her effort
hare in their properties. Is Francisco’s contention correct? s consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the hou
sehold.

Note: In this case, Francisco himself testified that his wife was not a
plain housewife but one who helped him in managing the family's bu
siness. Hence, Erminda is rightfully entitled to a joint share in their pr
operties. (Gonzales v. Gonzales,G.R. No. 159521, Dec. 16, 2005)
Q: Romeo and Juliet lived together as husband and wife without the A: No. Under Art. 147 of the FC, the property is co‐
benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired a house. owned by the parties. Under said provision, in the absence of proof
When they broke up, they executed an agreement where he agreed t to the contrary, any property acquired by common‐
o leave the house provided Juliet will pay his entire share in their pr law spouses during their cohabitation is presumed to have been obtai
operties. She failed to do so but she also ignored his demand for he ned thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Th
r to vacate. Romeo sued her for ejectment which the court granted. eir property relationship in such a case is essentially governed by the
Was the court correct in granting the same? rules on co‐
ownership. Thus, Romeo cannot seek the ejectment of Juliet therefro
m. As a co‐owner, she is as much entitled to enjoy its
possession and ownership as him. (Abing v. CA,G.R. No. 146294, Ju
l. 31, 2006)
Q: In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the US Government, co A: Carol's action to recover both the rice land and the house and lot
ntracted a bigamous marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his fir is well‐
st wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975, Mauricio and Erlinda jointly bo founded. Both are conjugal property, in view of the failure of Erlinda,
ught a parcel of rice land with the title being placed jointly in their na the wife in a bigamous marriage, to prove that her own money was
mes. Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house an used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case applied
d lot) which was placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1981, M Art. 148, Family Code, despite the fact that the husband's death took
auricio died and Carol promptly filed an action against Erlinda to reco place prior to the effectivity of said law. However, even under Art. 14
ver both the rice land and the house and lot, claiming them to be c 4, Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been reached in view
onjugal property of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and t of the bigamous nature of the second marriage. (1998 Bar Question
he late Mauricio were co‐
owners of the rice land, and with respect to the house and lot she cl
aims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to prove that sh
e had actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you
decide the case?

Q: Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively A: Art. 147 of the Family Code provides in part that when a man an
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, d a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
Luis is gainfully employed, Rizza is not employed, stays at home, an with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
d takes charge of the household chores. After living together for a littl
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned b
e over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary earnings y them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them th
during that period the amount of P200,000.00 presently deposited in rough their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of co‐
a bank. A house and lot worth P500,000.00 was recently purchased f ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquire
or the same amount by the couple. Of the P500.000.00 used by the d while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
common‐ by their joint efforts, worker industry, and shall be owned by them in
law spouses to purchase the property, P200.000.00 had come from th equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by th
e sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned by Luis and P30 e other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed joi
0,000.00 from the rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In fine, th ntly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the c
e sum of P500.000.00 had been part of the fruits received during th are and maintenance of the family and of the household. Thus: 1. 2.
e period of cohabitation from their separate property, a car worth P10 3.
0.000.00 being used by the commonlaw spouses, was donated just the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000.00 shall b
months ago to Rizza by her parents. Luis and Rizza now decide to t e divided equally between Luis and Rizza. the house and lot valued
erminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them your legal at P500.000.00 having been acquired by both of them through work o
advice on how, under the law should the bank deposit of P200,000.0 r industry shall be divided between them in proportion to their respectiv
0 the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 and the car worth P100.0 e contribution, in consonance with the rules on co‐
00.00 be allocated to them? ownership. Hence, Luis gets 2\5 while Rizza gets 3\5 of P500.000.00
. the car worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza, the
same having been donated to her by her parents. (1997 Bar Questio
n)
Q: In 1989, Rico, then a widower forty (40) years of age, cohabited A: 1. Rico and Cora are the co‐
with Cora, a widow thirty (30) years of age. While living together, the owners of the riceland. The relations is that of co‐
y acquired from their combined earnings a parcel of riceland. After Ri ownership (Art. 147, Family Code, first paragraph). Addendum: However,
co and Cora separated, Rico lived together with Mabel, a maiden six after Rico's marriage to Letty, the half interest of Rico in the riceland will th
teen (16) years of age. While living together, Rico was a salaried em en become absolute community property of Rico and Letty. 2.
ployee and Mabel kept house for Rico and did full‐ Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The relation is a sole/singl
time household chores for him. During their cohabitation, a parcel of cocon e proprietorship (Art. 148. Family Code, first paragraph is applicable, and n
ut land was acquired by Rico from his savings. 55 U N I V E R S I T Y O F ot Art. 147 Family Code). Addendum: However, after Rico's marriage to L
S A N T O T O M A S Facultad de Derecho etty, the coconut land of Rico will then become absolute community proper
Civil ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II VICE CHAI ty of Rico and Letty.) 3. Rico and Letty are the co‐
RS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. ME owners. The relations is the Absolute Community of Property (Arts, 75, 90
NDOZA VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELL and 91, Family Code).(1992 Bar Question)
E C. LEE VICE CHAIRS FOR LAY‐
OUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTI
NEZ After living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel separated. Rico
then met and married Letty, a single woman twenty‐
six (26) years of age. During the marriage of Rico and Letty, Letty bought a
mango orchard out of her own personal earnings. 1.
Who would own the riceland, and what property relations governs the own
ership? Explain. 2.
Who would own the coconut land, and what property relations governs the
ownership? Explain. 3.
Who would own the mango orchard, and what property elations governs th
e ownership? Explain.

Q: In a complaint filed by Manolo against his brother, Rodolfo, it was allege A: The case will prosper. There was in fact substantial compliance with Art.
d that the case "xxx passed through the Barangay and no settlement was f 151 of the Family Code since the spouses alleged in the complaint for ejec
orged between the plaintiffs and defendant as a result of which Certificatio tment that the case "xxx passed through the Barangay and no settlement
n to File Action was issued xxx". Rodolfo moved to dismiss for failure to co was forged between the plaintiffs and defendant as a result of which Certifi
mply with a condition precedent ‐ that earnest efforts for an amicable settle cation to File Action was issued by Barangay 97, Zone 8, District I, Tondo,
ment among the parties had been exerted but that none was reached. Deci Manila xxx". It bears stressing that under Sec. 412 (a) of R.A. 7160, no co
de. mplaint involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be instit
uted or filed directly in court for adjudication unless there has been a confro
ntation between the parties and no settlement was reached. Moreover, th
e phrase "members of the same family" found in Art. 151 of the Family Cod
e must be construed in relation to Art. 150 thereof. (Martinez, et al. v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 162084. Jun. 28, 2005) Note: A sister‐in‐
law or a brother‐in‐
law is not covered by these two provisions. Being an exception to th
e general rule, Art. 151 must be strictly construed. (Gayon v. Gayon,
G.R. No. L‐28394, Nov. 26, 1970)
Q: A complaint for damages was filed against Hinahon in 1986 when A: It is not exempt. Under Art. 155 of the FC, the family home shall
she incurred liabilities as early as 1977, which action prospered in 1 be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, am
989. The house and lot that she owned was levied upon and sold at ong other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
auction. She assails the levy and sale on the ground that it was her home. In the case at bar, the house and lot was not constituted as
family home and therefore exempt from execution. Decide. a family home, whether judicially or extra‐
judicially, at the time that the debtor incurred her debts. Under prevail
ing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such by operation of la
w only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, th
us, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family hom
e. (Gomez‐
Salcedo, et al. v. Sta. Ines, et al.,G.R. No. 132537, Oct. 14, 2005)
Q: Rosanna, as surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits wit A: No. Under Art. 164 of the FC, children conceived or born during t
h the SSS upon the death of her husband, Pablo. She indicated in he marriage of the parents are legitimate. This presumption becomes
her claim that the decedent is also survived by their minor child, Jeyl conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility
ynn, who was born in 1991. The SSS granted her claim but this wa of access under Art. 166. Further, upon the expiration of the periods
s withdrawn after investigation, when a sister of the decedent informe for impugning legitimacy under Art. 170, and in the proper cases und
d the system that Pablo could not have sired a child during his lifeti er Art. 171, of the FC, the action to impugn would no longer be leg
me because he was infertile. However in Jeylynn’s birth certificate, P ally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fix
ablo affixed his signature and he did not impugn Jeylynn’s legitimacy ed and unassailable. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo, w
during his lifetime. Was the SSS correct in withdrawing the death be ho has the right to impugn the legitimacy of Jeylynn, challenged her
nefits? status during his lifetime. Furthermore, there is adequate evidence to
show that the child was in fact his child, and this is the birth certifica
te where he affixed his signature. (SSS v. Aguas, et al.,G.R. No. 16
5546, Feb. 27, 2006)
Q: In an action for partition of estate, the trial court dismissed it on t A: No. The trial court erred in relying upon the said birth certificate i
he ground that the respondent, on the basis of her birth certificate, w n pronouncing the filiation of the respondent. However, since she wa
as in fact the illegitimate child of the deceased and therefore the latt s listed therein as “adopted”, she should therefore have presented ev
er's sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners. However, trial court faile idence of her adoption in view of the contents of her birth certificate.
d to see that in said birth certificate, she was listed therein as “adop In this case, there is no showing that she undertook such. It is wells
ted”. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the action for partition? ettled that a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the fac
ts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness
of the statements made there by the interested parties. (Rivera v. Hei
rs of Romualdo Villanueva, GR No. 141501, July 21, 2006)
Q: In a complaint for partition and accounting with damages, Ma. Th A: Yes. Citing the earlier case of De Jesus v. Estate of Juan Dizon,
eresa alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of Vicente, and ther (366 SCRA 499), the Supreme Court held that the Ma. Theresa was
efore entitled to a share in the estate left behind by the latter. As pr able to establish that Vicente was in fact her father. The due recognit
oof, she presented her birth certificate which Vicente himself signed t ion of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement bef
hereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. Is the proof presente ore a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consu
d by Ma. Theresa sufficient to prove her claim that she is an illegiti mmated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court acti
mate child of Vicente? on is required. The rule is, any authentic writing is treated not just a
s a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recog
nition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. (E
ceta v. Eceta,G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004)
Q: Gerardo filed a complaint for bigamy against Ma. Theresa, allegin A: The first marriage being found to be valid and subsisting, whereas
g that she had a previous subsisting marriage when she married him that between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void and non‐
. The trial court nullified their marriage and declared that the son, wh existent, the child should be regarded as a legitimate child out of the
o was born during their marriage and was registered as their son, as first marriage. This is so because the child's best interest should be
illegitimate. What is the status of the child? the primordial consideration in this case.
Q: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa, however, admitted that the child was t A: No. The admission of the parties that the child was their son was
heir son. Will this affect the status of the child? in the nature of a compromise. The rule is that the status and filiati
on of a child cannot be compromised. Art. 164 of the FC is clear tha
t a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parent
s is legitimate. (Concepcion v. CA,G.R. No. 123450. Aug. 31, 2005)
Q: What is the effect of Ma. Theresa’s claim that the child is her ille A: None. This declaration – an avowal by the mother that her child i
gitimate child with her second husband to the status of the child? s illegitimate – is the very declaration that is proscribed by Art. 167
of the Family Code. This proscription is in consonance with, among o
thers, the intention of the law to lean towards the legitimacy of childr
en. (Concepcion v. CA,G.R. No. 123450. Aug. 31, 2005)
Q: In a petition for issuance of letters of administration, Cheri Bolatis A: No. Since the birth certificate was not signed by Cher's alleged p
alleged that she is the sole legitimate daughter of decedent, Ramon arents but was merely signed by the attending physician, such a cert
and Van Bolatis. Phoebe, the decedent's second wife, opposed the p ificate, although a public record of a private document is, under Secti
etition and questioned the legitimate filiation of Cheri to the decedent, on 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact whi
asserting that Cheri’s birth certificate was not signed by Ramon and ch gave rise to its execution, which is, the fact of birth of a child. A
that she had not presented the marriage contract between her alleged birth certificate, in order to be considered as validating proof of pater
parents which would have supported her claim. In said birth certificat nity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the fath
e, it was indicated that her birth was recorded as the legitimate child er and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. Th
of Ramon and Van Bolatis, and contains as well the word "married" ere having been no convincing proof of respondent's supposed legiti
to reflect the union between the two. However, it was not signed by mate relations with respect to the decedent, the presumption of legiti
Ramon and Vanemon Bolatis. It was merely signed by the attending macy under the law did not therefore arise in her favor. (Angeles v.
physician, who certified to having attended to the birth of a child. Do AngelesMaglaya, G.R. No. 153798, Sept.2, 2005)
es the presumption of legitimacy apply to Cherimon?

Q: On the basis of the physical presentation of the plaintiff‐ A: No. In this age of genetic profiling and DNA analysis, the extreme
minor before it and the fact that the alleged father had admitted havi ly subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will
ng sexual intercourse with the child's mother, the trial court, in an act not suffice asevidence to prove paternity and filiation before courts of
ion to prove filiation with support, held that the plaintiff‐ law. This only shows the very high standard of proof that a child mu
minor is the child of the defendant with the plaintiff‐ st present in order to establish filiation. Note: The birth certificate that
minor's mother. Was the trial court correct in holding such? was presented by the plaintiff‐
minor appears to have been prepared without the knowledge or cons
ent of the putative father. It is therefore not a competent piece of evi
dence on paternity. The local civil registrar in this case has no autho
rity to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information
of a third person. Similarly, a baptismal certificate, while considered a
public document, can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified therein but not the veracity of th
e entries with respect to the child's paternity (Macadangdang v. CA, 1
00 SCRA 73). Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evid
ence to prove the same (Jison v. CA, 350 Phil. 138). (Cabatania v.
CA, G.R. No. 124814. Oct. 21, 2004)
Q: Roderick and Faye were high school sweethearts. When Roderick A: The marriage was void because there was no marriage license. T
was 18 and Faye, 16 years old, they started living together as husba heir marriage was not exempt from the requisite of a marriage licens
nd and wife without the benefit of marriage. When Faye reached 18 e because Roderick and Faye have not been cohabiting for at least
years of age, her parents forcibly took her back and arranged for her 5 continuous years before the celebration of their marriage. Their lov
marriage to Brad. Although Faye lived with Brad after the marriage, ers’ trysts and brief visitations did not amount to “cohabitation”. More
Roderick continued to regularly visit Faye while Brad was away at wo over, the Supreme Court held that for the marriage to be exempt fro
rk. During their marriage, Faye gave birth to a baby girl, Laica. Whe m a license, there should be no impediment for them to marry each
n Faye was 25 years old, Brad discovered her continued liaison with other during the entire 5 years of cohabitation. Roderick and Faye co
Roderick and in one of their heated arguments, Faye shot Brad to d uld not have cohabited for 5 years of cohabitation. Roderick and Fay
eath. She lost no time in marrying her true love Roderick, without a e could not have been cohabited for 5 continuous years without impe
marriage license, claiming that they have been continuously cohabitin diment because Faye was then legally married to Brad. (2008 Bar Q
g for more than 5 years. Was the marriage of Roderick and Faye val uestion)
id?

What is the filiation status of Laica? A: Having been born during the marriage of Faye and Brad, she is
presumed to be the legitimate child of Faye and Brad, she is presu
med to be the legitimate child of Faye and Brad. This presumption h
ad become conclusive because the period of time to impugn her filiat
ion had already prescribed.
Can Laica bring an action to impugn her own status on the ground t A: No, she cannot impugn her own filiation. The law does not allow
hat based on DNA results, Roderick is her biological father? a child to impugn his or her own filiation. In the problem, Laica’s leg
itimate filiation was accorded to her by operation of law which may b
e impugned only by Brad, or his heirs in the cases provided by law
within the prescriptive period.
Can Laica be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents? A: No she cannot be legitimated by the marriage of her biological pa
rents. In the first place she is not, under the law, the child of Roderi
ck. In the second place, her biological parents could not have validly
married each other at the time she was conceived and born simply
because Faye was still married to Roderick at that time. Under Article
177 of the Family Code, only children conceived or born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the child we
re not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, may be l
egitimated. (2008 Bar Question)
Q: Spouses Primo and Monica Lim, childless, were entrusted with the cust A: Yes. Section 7 Article 3 of R.A. 8552 reads: Sec. 7 – Husband and wife s
ody of two minor children, the parents of whom were unknown. Eager of ha hall jointly adopt, xxx. The use of the word “shall” in the above‐
ving children of their own, the spouses made it appear that they were the c quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the
hildren’s parents by naming them Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude Lim. wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint pa
Subsequently, Monina married Angel Olario after Primo’s death of her hus rental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child
band. She decided to adopt the children by availing the amnesty given und to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it but na
er R.A. 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. She file tural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also ensures ha
d separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle, then 25 years old and Mic rmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for
hael, 18. Both Michelle and Michael gave consent to the adoption. The tri ambiguity. Monina, having remarried at the time the petitions for adop
al court dismissed the petition and ruled that Monina should have filed the tion were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption we
petition jointly with her new husband. Monina, in a Motion for Reconsiderati re filed only by Monina herself, without joining her husband, Olario, th
on argues that mere consent of her husband would suffice and that joint ad e trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
option is not needed, for the adoptees are already emancipated. Is the trial ground. (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, In Re: Petitio
court correct in dismissing the petitions for adoption? n for Adoption of Michael Jude P. Lim, Monina P. Lim, G.R. Nos. 16
8992‐93, May 21, 2009)
Q: Bernadette filed a petition for adoption of the three minor children A: No. The rule is adoption statutes must be liberally construed in or
of her late brother, Ian. She alleged that when her brother died, the der to give spirit to their humane and salutary purpose which is to u
children were left to the care of their paternal grandmother, Anna, wh plift the lives of unfortunate, needy or orphaned children. However, th
o went to Italy. This grandmother died however, and so she filed the e discretion to approve adoption proceedings on the part of the court
petition for adoption. The minors gave their written consent to the ad s should not to be anchored solely on those principles, but with due
option and so did all of her own grown‐ regard likewise to the natural rights of the parents over the child. Th
up children. The trial court granted the decree of adoption even thou e written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the vali
gh the written consent of the biological mother of the children was no dity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent t
t adduced by Bernadette. Was the trial court correct in granting the o his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his par
decree of adoption? ental rights and duties may be terminated and vested in the adoptive par
ents. In this case, since the minors' paternal grandmother had taken custo
dy of them, her consent should have been secured instead in view of the a
bsence of the biological mother. This is so under Sec. 9 (b) of R.A. 8552, ot
herwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Diwata failed in this
respect, thus necessitating the dismissal of her petition for adoption. (Landi
ngin v. Republic,G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006)
A: No, there is no legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by An
Despite several relationships with different women, Andrew remained unm drew. While a person of age may not be adopted, Amy falls within t
arried. His first relationship with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy, now 3 wo exceptions: (1) she is an illegitimate child and she is being adopt
0 years old. His second, with Carla, produced two sons: Jon and Ryan. His ed by her illegitimate father to improve her status; and (2) even on t
third, with Donna, bore him two daughters: Vina and Wilma. His fourth, whil he assumption that she is not an illegitimate child of Andrew, she ma
e Elena, bore him no children although Elena has a daughter Jane, from a y still be adopted, although of legal age, because she has been con
previous relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but sistently considered and treated by the adopter as his own child sinc
they informally adopted without court proceedings, Sandy, now 13 years ol e minority. In fact, she has been living with him until now. There is
d, whom they consider as their own. Sandy, now 13 years old, whom they c a legal obstacle to the adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena. And
onsider as their own. Sandy was orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to rew and Elena cannot adopt jointly because they are not married.
them by the midwife who attended to Sandy’s birth. All the children, includi
ng Amy, now live with Andrew in his house. Is there any legal obstacle t
o the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew? To the legal adoption of Sa
ndy by Andrew and Elena?
In his old age, can Andrew be legally entitled to claim support from A: Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina and Wilma can ask support from each othe
Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina, Wilma and Sandy assuming that all of them r because they are halfblood brothers and sisters, and Vina and Wil
have the means to support him? ma are full‐
blood sisters (Art. 195 [5], Family Code), but not Sandy who is not r
elated to any of them.
Can Jon and Jane legally marry? A: Jon and Jane can legally marry because they are not related to e
ach other. Jane is not a daughter of Andrew. (2008 Bar Question)

Q: Sometime in 1990, Sarah, born a Filipino but by then a naturalize A: It depends. If Sonny and Sarah have been residing in the Philippi
d American citizen, and her American husband Sonny Cruz, filed a p nes for at least 3 years prior to the effectivity of R.A. 8552, the petit
etition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the adoption of the ion may be granted. Otherwise, the petition cannot be granted becaus
minor child of her sister, a Filipina, can the petition be granted? e the American husband is not qualified to adopt. While the petition f
or adoption was filed in 1990, it was considered refiled upon the effe
ctivity of R.A. 8552. This is the law applicable, the petition being still
pending with the lower court. Under the Act, Sarah and Sonny must
adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where
one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt j
ointly, the Supreme Court has held in a line of cases that both of th
em must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah, an alien, is qualified to
adopt, for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relativ
e within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, Sonny, an alien, i
s not qualified to adopt because he is neither a former Filipino citize
n nor married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, their p
etition has to be denied. However, if they have been residents of the Philip
pines 3 years prior to the effectivity of the Act and continues to reside here
until the decree of adoption is entered, they are qualified to adopt the neph
ew of Sarah under Sec 7(b) thereof, and the petition may be granted. (200
0 Bar Question)
Q: Belen, in behalf of her minor children, instituted a petition for decl A: Yes. There appears to be no dispute that the children are indeed
aration of legitimacy and support against Federico, their alleged father the daughters of Federico by Belen. Under Art. 199 of the FC, “Whe
, and Francisco, father of Federico. It appears that the marriage of t never two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability s
he two was annulled due to the minority of Federico. May Francisco hall devolve upon the following persons in the following order herein
be ordered to give support? provided: 1. 2. 3. 4.
The spouse; The descendants in the nearest degree; The ascendant
s in the nearest degree: and The brothers and sisters. The obligation
to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the
recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to should
er the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are cal
led upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. Here,
since it has been shown that the girls' father, Federico, had no mea
ns to support them, then Francisco, as the girls’ grandfather, should
then extend the support needed by them. Note: The second option in
Art. 204 of the FC, that of taking in the family dwelling the recipient
, is unavailing in this case since the filing of the case has evidently
made the relations among the parties bitter and unpleasant. (Mangon
on, et al. v. CA, et al.,G.R. No. 125041, Jun. 30, 2006)
Q: Marcelo and Juana called Dr. Arturo to their house to render med A: Her husband, not her father and mother‐ inlaw. The rendering of
ical assistance to their daughter‐in‐ medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
law who was about to give birth to a child. He performed the necess obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual suppor
ary operation. When Dr. Arturo sought payment, Marcelo and Juana r t. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or
efused to pay him without giving any good reason. Who is bound to not doing something (Art. 1088), and spouses are mutually bound to
pay the bill for the services rendered by Arturo? support each other, there can be no question but that, when either o
f them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance,
the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary
services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he
or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized.

Her husband denies liability on the ground that it was not he who re A: That it was not the husband who called and requested his assista
quested Dr. Arturo’s assistance. Decide. nce for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as
Marcelo, in view of the imminent danger to which the life of the patie
nt was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance
was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his
wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical mo
ments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and co
mpliance therewith is unavoidable.(Pelayo v. Lauron, et al., GR No. L
‐4089, Jan. 12, 1909)
Q: After 1 month of marriage, husband repeatedly demanded from wi A: No. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate hi
fe to perform "unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals." Because s obligation to support his wife if she is driven away from the conjug
of her refusal, he maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting bodily i al home because of his own wrongful acts. In this case, she was for
njuries on her. To escape his lewd designs and avoid further harm, s ced to leave the conjugal abode because of her husband’s lewd desi
he left the conjugal home and took refuge in her parent's house. Sh gns and physical assaults. She may claim support from him for separ
e filed an action for support which was dismissed on the ground that ate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home. (Goitia v. Camp
the husband could not be compelled to give support if his wife lived os Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, Nov. 2, 1916)
outside of the conjugal home, unless there was legal separation. Is t
he dismissal proper?

Q: Edward abandoned his legitimate children when they were minors. A: No. Edward could not possibly expect his daughters to demand s
After 19 years from the time Edward left them, they, through their m upport from him considering their tender years at the time that he ab
other, finally sued him for support, which the court granted. The cour andoned them. In any event, the mother of the girls had made the r
t ordered him to pay 2M pesos as support in arrears. Edward assails equisite demand for material support although this was not in the sta
the grant of the support in arrears as erroneous since under Art. 20 ndard form of a formal written demand. Asking one to give support o
3 of the FC, there was never any demand for support, judicial or extr wing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand just becaus
a‐judicial, from them. Rule on his contention. e it came by way of a request or a plea. (Lacson v. Lacson, et al.,G
.R. No. 150644, Aug. 28, 2006)
Q: Noel helped Lea by extending financial help to support Lea’s chil A: Yes. Pursuant to Art. 207 of the FC, Noel can rightfully exact rei
dren with Edward. May Noel seek reimbursement of his contributions mbursement from Edward. This provision reads that "[W]hen the pers
? If yes, from whom may he do so? on obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support
when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish sup
port to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the per
son obliged to give support." The resulting juridical relationship betwe
en the Edward and Noel is a quasi‐
contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching
himself at the expense of another. (Lacson v. Lacson, et al.,GR No.
150644, Aug. 28, 2006)
Q: Fe and her son Martin sued Martin’s alleged biological father Arn A: The assailed order did not convert the action for support into one
el for support. Arnel denied having sired Martin arguing that his affair for recognition but merely allowed Fe to prove their cause of action.
and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in long before Martin’s co But even if the order effectively integrated an action to compel recog
nception. As a result, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an o nition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance
rder directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity te with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 665), th
sting. The said motion was granted by the court. Did the order of th e Supreme Court allowed the integration of an action to compel reco
e court convert the complaint for support to a petition for recognition? gnition with an action to claim one's inheritance. A separate action wil
l only result in a multiplicity of suits. Furthermore, the declaration of f
iliation is entirely appropriate to the action for support. (Agustin v. CA,
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005).
Q: Can DNA testing be ordered in a proceeding for support without A: Yes. In People v. Yatar (428 SCRA 504), the Supreme Court had
violating the constitutional right against self‐incrimination? already upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and th
e admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. Moreover, it has m
ostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizure and in the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional rig
ht to privacy has been critically at issue. If, in a criminal case, an ac
cused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DN
A testing, so much more so may a party in a civil case, who does n
ot face such dire consequences, be likewise compelled. DNA testing
and its results is now acceptable as object evidence without running
afoul self‐
incrimination rights of a person. (Agustin v. CA,GR No. 162571, Jun.
15, 2005)
Q: The petition for declaration of nullity filed by Crisanto against his wife in A: Yes. The petitioner failed to overcome the so‐called "tender‐
cluded a prayer for custody pendente lite of their 4‐ age presumption" rule under Art. 213 of the FC. There was no compelling e
year old son. The supplication for custody was based on the alleged immor vidence of the mother's unfitness. 'Sexual preference or moral laxity alone
ality of the mother who, the husband asserted, was a lesbian. However, th does not prove parental neglect or incompetence – to deprive the wife of cu
e trial court citing Art. 213 of the FC, denied Crisanto's prayer for temporar stody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had a
y custody of his son, there having been no compelling reason to so order it. n adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the errant sp
Was the trial court correct in denying Crisanto’s prayer for temporary cust
ouse from exercising proper parental care. Note: The general rule that chil
ody? dren less than seven years of age shall not be separated from the mother fi
nds its raison d'etrein the basic need of minor children for their mother's lov
ing care. This is predicated on the "best interest of the child" principle whic
h pervades not only child custody cases but also those involving adoption,
guardianship, support, personal status and minors inconflict with the law.
(Pablo‐
Gualberto v. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994/G.R. No. 156254, Jun. 28,
2005)
Q: In a petition for habeas corpuswhich he filed before the Court of A: Yes. Under Art. 176 of the FC, parental authority over an illegitim
Appeals, Joey sought custody of his minor son from his former live‐ ate child is vested solely in the mother, and this is true notwithstandi
in partner, Loreta. Joey alleged that the child's mother was abroad m ng that the child has been recognized by the father as his offspring.
ost of the time and thus, he should be given joint custody over their At most, such recognition by the father would be a ground for orderi
son. The CA however denied the petition, and on the basis of Art. 2 ng the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child (David v
13, par (2) of the FC, awarded custody of the child in favor of the . Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 82). Custody over the minor in this c
mother. Was the CA correct in denying Joey’s petition for habeas cor ase was therefore awarded correctly to the mother, and this is all the
pus for the custody of his minor son? more so in view of Art. 213 of the FC which lays down the Matern
al Preference Rule. There is also no showing that Joey was able to
show proof of any compelling reason to wrest from the mother parent
al authority over their minor child. Note: However, the CA erred in a
pplying Sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision applies
only when the parents of the child are married to each other but are
separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because
they are leaving separately de facto. In this case, the child's parent
s were never married. Hence, the portion of the CA decision allowing
the child, upon reaching the age of ten, to choose which parent to li
ve, should be deleted therefrom. (Briones v. Miguel, et al., G.R. No.
156343. Oct. 18, 2004)
Q: In a petition for habeas corpus that was filed by Loran against hi A: No. The assailed order of the trial court did not grant custody of t
s estranged wife, as well as against his parents‐in‐ he minor to any of the parties but was merely a procedural directive
law whom he alleged were unlawfully restraining him from having cus addressed to the petitioners for them to produce the minor in court a
tody of his child, the trial court issued an order directing the aforesai
nd explain why they are restraining his liberty. Moreover, Art. 213 of
d persons to appear in court and produce the child in question and t the FC deals with the adjudication of custody and serves as a guideli
o show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restr ne for the proper award of‐
aint. Does trial court's order run counter to Art. 213 of the FC? custody by the court. While the petitioners can raise it as a counter
argument in the custody suit, it may not however be invoked by the
m to prevent the father from seeing the child. Note: Habeas corpus
may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from
a person entitled thereto. Under Art. 211 of the FC, both parents in t
his case have joint parental authority over their child and consequentl
y joint custody over him. Further, although the couple is separated d
e facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court.
In the absence of a judicial grant of custody, both parents are still e
ntitled to the custody of their child. (Salientes, et al. v. Abanilla, et a
l.,G.R. No. 162734, Aug. 29, 2006)
Q: The tug of war over custody of their minor son resulted in Ivy's fi A: The RTC. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals still
ling of a petition for habeas corpus against Ernesto before the RTC. retain jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving minors despite
The trial court then granted temporary custody over the child to Erne the passage of Rep. Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) ‐
sto. Who has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases? the law conferring upon family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such
cases. SC had earlier ruled that it would be difficult for persons see
king the whereabouts of minors to seek redress from family courts w
hose writs are enforceable only within their respective territorial jurisdi
ction. This lack of recourse could not have been the legislative intent
, and thus R.A. 8369 did not effectively divest the High Court and C
ourt of Appeals of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involvin
g custody of minors. The primordial consideration always is the welfa
re and best interest of the child. As it stands then, the RTCs, thru th
e appropriately designated Family Court branches, the CA and the S
C have concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions. Since in this case,
the petition was first filed before the RTC of Quezon City, then the l
atter acquired jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion of the Cour
t of Appeals and the Supreme Court. To hold otherwise would be to
risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might issue confli
cting orders. (Reyes‐
Tabujara v. CA, et al., GR No. 172813, July 20, 2006)
Q: W filed a petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Jud A: No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, ther
icial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code, e is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precis
for the declaration of the presumptive death of her absent spouse, H, ely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
based on the provisions of Art. 41 of the Family Code, for purposes Art. 247, Family Code, are “immediately final and executory”. An app
of remarriage. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the p ellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by ex
resumptive death of H. The Republic received a copy of the decision press provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The right t
on Nov 14, 2001. Subsequently, the Republic filed a Notice of Appe o appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it i
al on Nov 22, 2001. The RTC held that the appeal was filed within t s merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 2
he reglementary period and thus, elevated the records to the Court of 47 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial pr
Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals denied the Republic’s appe oceedings in Family Law are “immediately final and executory”, the ri
al and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision. Did the Court ght to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Rep
of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and execut ublic, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death
ory judgment of the RTC? , should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. The RTC's decision was immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties. (Republic v. Bermudez

Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005) Note: However, an aggri
eved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discr
etion amounting to lack of discretion. (Republic v. Tango, G.R. No. 1
61062, July 31, 2009)
Q: The petition filed by the parents in behalf of their minor son Julian Lin Ca A: No. Petitioners’ justification for seeking the change in the name of their
rulasan Wang sought the dropping of the latter's middle name, "Carulasan. child, that of convenience, was characterized by the Supreme Court as am
" The parents averred that their plan for Julian to study in Singapore and ad orphous, to say the least, and would not warrant a favorable ruling. As Julia
just to its culture necessitates the drop since in that country, middle names n is only a minor and has yet to understand and appreciate the value of any
or the mother's surname are not carried in a person's name. They therefor change in his name, it is best that the matter be left to his judgment and dis
e anticipate that Julian may be subjected to discrimination on account of hi cretion when he reaches legal age. The State has an interest in the name
s middle name, which is difficult to pronounce in light of Singapore's Mand s borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a
arin language which does not have the letter "R" but if there is, Singaporea change of name is a privilege and not a right, such that before a person ca
ns pronounce it as "L." Should the petition for the dropping of his middle na n be allowed to change the name given him either in his birth certificate or c
me be granted? ivil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling r
eason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request would be de
nied. (In Re: Petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of
entry in civil registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966, Mar.
30, 2005) Note: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that th
ere be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.
Q: Can a person change his registered first name and sex on the basis of A: No. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must presen
a sex reassignment? t proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such cha
nge. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his tr
ue and official name. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a hi
storical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex
of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering t
hat there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination
of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by err
or, is immutable. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, Oct. 22, 2007)
Q: Virginia Remo, a Filipino citizen, is married to Francisco Rallonza. A: No. A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the s
In her passport, the following entries appear: "Rallonza" as her surna urname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 o
me, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle n f the Civil Code. However, R.A. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act
ame. Prior to the expiration of her passport, Virginia applied for the r of 1996 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may e
enewal of her passport with the DFA, with a request to revert to her xercise the option to revert to the use of her maiden name. These ar
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. Virginia, rely e death of husband, divorce, annulment, and declaration of nullity of
ing on Article 370 of the Civil Code, contends that the use of the hu marriage. In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may eith
sband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. Is er adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden na
Virginia correct? me. However, once she opted to use her husband’s surname in her
original passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name
, except if any of the four grounds provided under R.A. 8239 is pres
ent. Further, even assuming R.A. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, t
he provisions of R.A. 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing
with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of the Civil C
ode which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet
in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general
law. (Remo v. Sec. of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, Mar. 5, 201
0)
Q: Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Steph A: No. The name of an individual has two parts – the given name o
anie. Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surna r proper name and the surname or family name. The given name m
me. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name be changed from "Astor ay be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
ga" to "Garcia," which is her mother's surname and that her surname which the child is entitled is fixed by law. The Civil Code (Arts. 364
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," which is his surname. This the tri to 380) is silent as to the use of a middle name. Even Art. 176 of
al court denied. Was the trial court correct in denying Honorato’s req the FC, as amended by R.A. 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Childr
uest for Stephanie’s use of her mother’s surname as her middle nam en to Use the Surname of Their Father) is silent as to what middle
e? name a child may use. An adopted child is entitled to all the rights p
rovided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind
, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her moth
er. As she had become a legitimate child on account of her adoption,
it follows that Stephanie is entitled to utilize the surname of her fath
er, Honorato Catindig, and that of her mother, Gemma Garcia. Since t
here is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stepnanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname,
the High Court found no reason why she should not be allowed to d
o so. Note: The Supreme Court, in granting the petition, predicated it
s ruling upon the statutory principle that adoption statutes, being hum
ane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the benefi
cent purposes of adoption. The modern trend is to consider adoption
not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiati
on, but also as an act which endows a child with legitimate status. (I
n the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia,G.R.
No. 148311. Mar. 31, 2005)
Q: Giana was born to Andy and Aimee, who at the time of Giana’s A: A judicial action cannot be maintained to change the status of Gi
birth were not married to each other. While Andy was single at that anna from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” child of Andy and Aimee. Whil
time, Aimee was still in the process of securing a judicial declaration e it is true that Gianna is the biological daughter of Andy and Aimee
of nullity on her marriage to her ex‐ conceived and born without marriage between them, Gianna is presu
husband. Gianna’s birth certificate, which was signed by both Andy a med, under the law as the legitimate child of Aimee and her husband
nd Aimee, registered the status of Gianna as “legitimate”, her surnam . This filiation may be impugned only by the husband. To correct the
e carrying that of Andy’s, and that her parents were married to each status of Gianna in her birth certificate from “legitimate child of Andy
other. Can a judicial action for correction of entries in Gianna’s birth and Aimee” to “illegitimate child of Andy and Aimee” will amount to
certificate be successfully maintained to: a. indirectly impugning her filiation as the child of Aimee’s husband in a
Change her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate”; and proper action. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectl
y.
b. A: A judicial action to change the surname of Gianna from the surna
Change her surname from that of Andy’s to Aimee’s maiden surnam me of Andy to the maiden surname of Aimee is also not allowed. Gi
e? anna, being presumed to be the legitimate child of Aimee’s husband i
s required by law to be registered under the surname of Aimee’s hus
band. While it is true that Gianna’s registered surname is erroneous,
a judicial action for correction of entry to change the surname of Gia
nna to that of Aimee’s maiden surname will also be erroneous. A ju
dicial action to correct an entry in the birth certificate is allowed to c
orrect an error and not to commit another error.
Alternative Answers:
It may be noted that the problems does not show whether Gianna w
as born while Aimee was living with her ex husband. Neither does it
show who filed the judicial action to correct the entries. 82 CIVIL LA
W TEAM: If the problem is intended only for purpose of determining
whether factual changes are in order, then the answers are: a. b.
A change from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” is proper upon proof of la
ck of marriage between Andy and Aimee. If the child is considered illegi
timate, then she should follow the surname of her mother.
Instead of a judicial action, can administrative proceedings be brough A: Under R.A. 9048, only typographical errors are allowed to be corr
t for the purpose of making the above corrections? ected administratively. The change of status from legitimate to illegiti
mate is not a typographical error and even assuming that it is, its ad
ministrative correction is not allowed under R.A. 9048. Typographical
errors involving status, age, citizenship, and gender are expressly excl
uded from what may be corrected administratively. The change of the
surname is also not allowed administratively. R.A. 9048 provides for
an administrative procedure for change of first name only and not for
change of surname.
Assuming that Aimee is successful in declaring her former marriage A: No, Gianna will not be legitimated. While the court may have decl
void, and Andy and Aimee subsequently married each other, would G ared the marriage void ab initio and, therefore, no marriage took plac
ianna be legitimated? e in the eyes of the law, Gianna will still not be legitimated. This is
because at the time she was conceived and born her biological pare
nts could not have validly married each other. For their marriage to b
e valid, the court must first declare the first marriage null and void. I
n the problem, Gianna was conceived and born before the court has
decreed the nullity of her mother’s previous marriage. (2008 Bar Que
stion)
Q: Juana married Arturo on January 1973. However, because the lat No. Since the marriages were both celebrated under the auspices of
ter was unemployed the spouses constantly argued . Thus, Arturo lef the Civil Code it is the Civil Code that applies to this case not Art.
t the conjugal dwelling on October 1975. Years passed without any w 41 of the FC. Under the Civil Code, proof of well founded belief is n
ord from Arturo. Juana didn’t hear any news of Arturo, his whereabo ot required. Juana could not have been expected to comply with the
uts or even if he was alive or not. Believing that Arturo was already requirement of proof of "well
dead, Juana married Dante on June 1986. Subsequently, however, D founded belief" since the FC was not yet in effect at the time of her
ante's application for naturalization filed with the United States Govern marriage to Dante. Moreover, the enactment of the FC in 1988 does
ment was denied because of the subsisting marriage between Juana not change this conclusion. The FC shall have no retroactive effect i
and Arturo. Hence, on March , 2007, Juana filed a Petition for declar f it impairs vested rights. To retroactively apply the provisions of the
ation of presumptive death of Arturo with the RTC. The RTC dismiss FC requiring Juana to exhibit "well‐
ed the Petition on the ground that Juana was not able to prove the founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second
existence of a well‐ marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situ
grounded belief that her husband Arturo was already dead as require ation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that th
d under Article 41 of the Family Code. a. Was the RTC correct in d e Family Code wishes to achieve.
ismissing the petition based on Article 41 of the Family Code?

b. Will the petition for declaration of presumptive death, therefore, pr No. Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by
osper? law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, Art. 83 of the Civil Code,
it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee. The law only requires that the former spouse has been a
bsent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriag
e, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse t
o be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the s
eventh year of absence, Arturo is to be presumed dead starting Octo
ber 1982. Further, the presumption of death cannot be the subject of
court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee’s es
tate. In case the presumption of death is invoked independently of su
ch an action or special proceeding there is no right to be enforced n
or is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent
husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his ri
ght or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the peti
tion does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is d
ead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead be
cause he had been unheard from in seven years. In sum, the petition
for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead,
even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, b
ecause such a presumption is already established by law. (Valdez v.
Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009)
Q: John Lloyd Cruzada filed a petition for the change of his first na A: No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals
me and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC. He alleged that his n and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a pri
ame was registered as “John Lloyd Cruzada” in his certificate of live vilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by sta
birth. His sex was registered as “male”. Further, he alleged that he i tutes. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. RA 9048 pro
s a male transsexual. Prior to filing the petition, he underwent sex re vides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
assignment surgery Thailand. Thus, he seeks to have his name in hi (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, t
s birth certificate changed from “John Lloyd” to “Joanna,” and his se ainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2The
x from “male” to “female” on the ground of sex reassignment pursua new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously u
nt to Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of th sed by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first na
e Rules of Court and RA 9048. me or nickname in the community; or
(3)The change will avoid confusion. RA 9048 does not sanction a ch
1.May a person's first name be changed on the ground of sex reassi ange of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than a
gnment? voiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared pu
rpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and th
e public interest. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compellin
g reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that hewill
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.
2.May a person's sex as indicated in his certificate of birth be chang A: No. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
ed on the ground of sex reassignment? change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a su
bstantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of th
e Rules of Court. The entries correctable under Rule 108 of the Rul
es of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code. These acts, events and judicial decrees provided in Articles 40
7 and 408 of the Civil Code produce legal consequences that touch
upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effe
cts are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignm
ent is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neit
her is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or imp
liedly. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family re
lations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In thi
s connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that, all other m
atters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines gov
erning sex reassignment and its effects. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. N
o. 174689, October 22, 2007)
Note: The jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is no
w primarily lodged with the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of N
ame) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Regi
stry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. Hence, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are pri
marily administrative in nature, not judicial. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R.
No. 174689, October 22, 2007)

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