March 2017

SPARK
R
Quarterly
Publication
of the
ADRInstitute
the key link between IDEAS and ACTION

UNDER DUTERTE’S
SHADOW:
PHILIPPINE
FOREIGN
POLICY
In TRANSITION

stratbase.com.ph
 UNDER DUTERTE’S SHADOW:
PHILIPPINE
FOREIGN
POLICY
In TRANSITION

Duterte’s foreign policy is telltale of how populist leaders will and often
can significantly alter the trajectory of, as well as re-conceptualize, the
underlying logic of a state’s foreign policy. The nexus between domestic
political and foreign policy decision-making has been extensively studied in
the international relations literature (Allison 1971; Moravscik 1997; Putnam
1998; Wendt 1997). The pursuit of strategic autonomy, often constrained
by great power politics, has also been a regular feature of foreign policy
formulation across Southeast Asia, beginning with fiercely independent-
minded regional states such as Indonesia, the cradle of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) in the mid-20th century (Weatherbee 2005).

Duterte has demonstrated the impact of strong-willed, self-confident

and single-minded leadership on foreign policy formulation in developing
countries, where institutions are weak or fragile and the strategic culture is
more reflective of short-to-medium-term tactical calculations rather than the
pursuit of core national interests based on a long-term strategy. Yet,
the ongoing reformulation of Philippine foreign policy hasn’t taken place
within a vacuum. Instead, it marks the combination of several factors
that have facilitated this largely unexpected phenomenon.

Image credit: indianexpress.com

02 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017

 Rejection of Liberal Elites
Duterte’s populism has been based on a
wholesale rejection of the liberal elite class,
which supplanted the Ferdinand Marcos
regime in 1986. Since his presidential
campaign, the Filipino president hasn’t only
questioned the foundational principles of
the existing political system, namely civil
liberties and human rights, but also
the foreign policy paradigm of the
previous ruling establishment.

Similar to other strongmen populists such

as Vladimir Putin (Russia), Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan (Turkey), and, most recently,
Donald Trump (United States), Duterte
isn’t only interested in overhauling the
domestic political landscape, but also the
foreign policy alignment of his country.
In the case of Putin, Russia gradually
moved away from the pro-Western
Image credit: newsdesk.ph
leanings of the Yeltsin administration.
Under Erdoğan, Turkey has diversified
its foreign relations by reaching out to
neighboring Arab countries, Iran, Russia
and China, in what has been dubbed as
a ‘neo-Ottoman’ rejection of a century-old
pro-Western foreign policy under Atatürk
and his secular heirs. As for Donald Trump,
we have so far seen signs of improved,
albeit surreptitious, relations with Russia
going hand in hand with uncertainties over
America’s commitment to its traditional
allies, particularly in Europe. Vindicated
by their electoral success, passionate
base, and high approval ratings (with
the exception of Trump), these populist
strongmen felt confident enough to
challenge strategic orthodoxies in their
respective countries’ foreign policies.

Backed by a well-organized propaganda

machine—particularly in the case of
Russia, Turkey, and increasingly in the
Philippines—these leaders have branded
Image credit: allthingspinoy.com
their critics as either part of the oligarchy,

1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 03

March 2017 volume 10 issue 1

features

05
Consolidation of Power in
the Presidency
Populists such as Duterte have been able to
swiftly consolidate power and concentrate strategic
decision-making in the office of the presidency.
14
Red Star on the Horizon
Throughout the 20th century, the Philippines
largely relied on the American security umbrella.
The latter enjoyed almost full-spectrum access
to civilian and military facilities across the
strategically-located Southeast Asian nation.

07
US Military Commitment
There is lingering concern in the Philippines over the
precise extent of the American military commitment
to the Philippines. The Southeast Asian country
has been the biggest recipient of American Foreign
Military Financing in Southeast Asia.

08
on the cover
Cover page: images from philstar.com and
fbcoverstreet.com

Beijing’s Carrots and Sticks

16
Towards an Interdependent
Foreign Policy
about the author Beijing has provided unequivocal sets of carrots
The essence of an equilateral balancing strategy,
and sticks depending on the actions of
Richard Javad Heydarian the Duterte administration. which is commonly employed by middle-sized
nations, is to maintain cordial and fruitful
is an academic, policy adviser, and relations with all key poles of power.
columnist. His most recent book is
“Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China, and
the Struggle for Western Pacific” (Zed,
London). He is currently a resident analyst
at ABS-CBN News Channel, a columnist
for Aljazeera English, and a regular
contributor to Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative of the Center for Strategic &
International Studies (CSIS) and Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington
D.C. He has written for or been interviewed
by the world’s leading publications.
He is currently working on two books,
one on “Obama’s Asia policy” and the
other on “Duterte and Rise of Asian
populism” (Palgrave, Macmillan).

04 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017

CONTENTS
 philippine
government
as elitists that are out of touch, and/or as unpatriotic stooges
of outside powers. The tactic of intimidating critics through
information warfare has been deployed effectively on
Erdoğan’s and Putin’s watch, and there are concerns that
the same could happen in the case of the Philippines
and the United States if—though highly unlikely—
the independent press is eased out of the media landscape.

The strength of their populism is anchored on the successful

optimization of simmering discontent among voters
vis-à-vis rising inequality and persistent rates of poverty
and unemployment. These structural elements have been
present in emerging markets such as Russia, Turkey and the
Philippines, as well as post-Great Recession USA, where
a tiny minority has benefited from the anemic economic
recovery, the median household income has barely increased
in four decades, and a growing proportion of the workforce has
dropped out of the labor market altogether (Piketty 2016).

Consolidation of Power in the Presidency

Populists such as Duterte have been able to swiftly consolidate
power and concentrate strategic decision-making in the office of
the presidency. Similar to Trump, Duterte won despite having
the lowest trust ratings on record during the campaign; unlike
Trump, his trust and approval ratings reached new heights
as soon as he was inaugurated. Almost overnight, there was a
massive outpour of public support amid rising expectations of
swift and meaningful political change under the new president.
Amid this avalanche of public support, Duterte managed
to dramatically expand his legislative base and
build a supermajority in the Philippine Congress.

Moreover, with Duterte expected to appoint the bulk of the

justices at the Supreme Court in coming years, he is in a unique
position to place institutions of checks and balances into
hibernation. In fact, the highly underfunded and underequipped
judiciary failed to stand up to Duterte when the latter included

1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 05

several judges in its notorious list of
suspected drug traffickers. After a faint
attempt to remind the president of the
necessity to observe due process, Duterte
immediately pushed the Supreme Court,
namely Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno,
into ‘dignified silence’ by openly threatening
Martial Law and executive disobedience
(Adel 2016).
Duterte has also managed to build a strong
following among law enforcement agencies,
particularly the Philippine National Police
(PNP), by promising better equipment,
increased salaries and benefits, and his
unconditional moral and political support. To
06 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017
appease the military, Duterte, visited as many 14 military camps from July 21
to August 12, 2016, or less than a month.1 The visits were a calculated effort
to win the hearts and minds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), who
were also promised increased salaries, improved health facilities, and better
benefits for themselves and their families (Ranada 2016b). By appointing
former President Fidel Ramos to be his Special Envoy to China, who as army
chief and defense minister built a long-lasting following among the military
brass, Duterte ensured direct communication channels with the men in the
barracks as to preserve functional if not cordial civil-military relations.
The result is a president with humongous political capital, a robust base of
support among key sectors of the society, and the gradual ‘authoritarianization’
of the Philippine political system, all of which provides Duterte significant wiggle
room to unilaterally mold Philippine foreign policy (Taylor & Frantz 2016).
Image credit: philstar.com
US Military Commitment
There is lingering concern in the Philippines
over the precise extent of the American
military commitment to the Philippines.
The Southeast Asian country has been the
biggest recipient of American Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) in Southeast Asia, with the
bulk of the newly-launched Maritime Security
Initiative also expected to be channeled to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The United States has also been an
indispensable strategic partner when it
comes to Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in the
Philippines. This was poignantly clear during
the aftermath of the Haiyan (Yolanda)
super typhoon, which displaced millions of
individuals across Central Visayas; claimed
the lives of thousands of individuals; and
inflicted billions of dollars in damages.
Throughout the whole crisis, the United
States government and its various organs
were at the forefront of HADR operations,
with thousands of American troops
deployed to assist victims in far-flung
areas unreachable by the AFP, which
lacked requisite capabilities.
Yet, there are two specific concerns as far
as Philippine-America relations are
concerned. On one hand, the quantity and
quality of American FMF to the Philippines
pales in comparison to that of the United
States’ non-treaty allies and non-democratic
nations such as Egypt, which has received a
billion dollars in annual aid for the purchase
of modern—and in some cases state-of-
the-art—American military hardware, from
advanced fighter jets to tanks. Unlike the
Philippines, Egypt faces no credible external
threat, while domestic terrorism concerns are
nowhere near those of Jordan or Pakistan,
which have also received of billions of dollars
of FMF in the past two decades alone.
Astonishingly, the United States’ FMF to the Philippines was larger in 2010,
prior to the announcement of the Obama administration’s much-touted Pivot to
Asia (P2A) policy, than in 2015, when China engaged in massive reclamation
activities in the Spratly chain of islands and stepped up its pressure against the
Philippines’ arbitration case at The Hague. More fundamentally, in contrast to
Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and, of course, Israel, the Philippines has
largely received outdated, decommissioned military equipment
from America, many dating back to the Vietnam War era.
Given the depth of the Philippines’ security challenges, both domestic and
regional, there should have been some significant change in the quality and
quantity of American military assistance to the Philippines (Council on Foreign
Relations 2016). The other area of concern was—and continues to be under the
current administration—whether the Obama administration would have come
to the Philippines’ rescue in the event of military escalation over the disputed
land features and maritime zones within the Philippines’ EEZ, particularly near
the Reed Bank and Scarborough Shoal. While previous American leaders,
particularly under the Carter and Clinton administrations, were clear on the
parameters of the applicability of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, this was
not necessarily the case under Obama administration, which repeatedly
equivocated on the exact circumstances under which Americans could come to
the assistance of the Philippines in the South China Sea (Batongbacal 2014).2
It must be noted, however, that the Obama administration had commendable
‘strategic signaling’: deploying aircraft carriers, conducting freedom of
navigation operations, deploying fighter jets and electronic warfare equipment,
and conducting surveillance missions, particularly A-10 flights close to
hotly disputed areas. It made these efforts after China’s usurpation of the
Scarborough Shoal, specifically in 2016 as concerns over possible Chinese
reclamation activities on the disputed land feature gained traction (Cooper and
Douglas 2016). Yet, there was a perceptible gap between the United States’
promise of an ‘ironclad commitment’ to the Philippines, on one hand,
and its relatively subdued, if not patently inadequate, pushback against
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, on the other.
The White House, namely then U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice,
seemed more interested in calling for calm rather than compliance after the
Philippines secured a landmark legal victory against China based on the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These factors not
only crystallized Duterte’s simmering doubts about American reliability, but
also helped him to convince the public accordingly. Surveys have consistently
shown that America is atop the list of Filipinos’ most favored nations. But
Duterte’s open interrogation of America, “Are you with us or not?”, seems to
have gained traction among the public. In the December 6-11, fourth quarter
1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 07
 Pulse Asia survey, commissioned by
the Stratbase ADR Institute (ADRi),
50 percent of respondents either
disagreed (17 percent) or were
undecided (33 percent) when asked if
“security/defense relations with
the US have been beneficial to
the Philippines” (see Table 1).
Duterte’s dramatic shift in Philippine
foreign policy, namely setting aside the
arbitration case, hasn’t cost him too
dearly, mainly because only 6 percent
of respondents identified “Defending
the integrity of Philippine territory
against foreigners” as among their
top three most urgent national issues
(see Table 2). In short, a combination
of teeming doubt (towards American
reliability as an ally) and indifference
(towards foreign policy issues) explains
why Duterte has managed to pull off
a huge swing in Philippine foreign
policy without, so far, suffering a
serious political backlash.
Philippine Public Opinion on the Reliability of the US as a Security Partner,
December 2016
Table 1
Source: Pulse Asia
08 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017
Beijing’s Carrots and Sticks
Beijing, in contrast to Washington, has
provided unequivocal sets of carrots
and sticks depending on the actions
of the Duterte administration. It is
common knowledge that the Filipino
president has met the Chinese
ambassador, Zhao Jianhua, more than
any other foreign envoy by far. In fact,
Western diplomats routinely quip
about how their Chinese counterpart
has turned into an ‘adviser’
to the Filipino president.
At the height of the Scarborough Shoal
crisis in 2012, China made it clear that
there would be costs for any resistance
by the Philippines. This was clearly
manifested when China imposed non-
tariff barriers on Filipino agricultural
exports, particularly bananas, as well
as a travel advisory to discourage
Chinese tourists from visiting the
Philippines. More hardline elements in
Beijing called for even more punitive
economic, if not military, sanctions
unless Manila relented. In late 2013,
officials within the Chinese foreign
ministry offered economic carrots if the
Philippines postponed the submission
of its memorial at The Hague. There
were even suggestions of a mutual
disengagement agreement from
the Scarborough Shoal.3
Up until the end of the Aquino
administration, China made it clear
that any revival in bilateral ties would
be contingent on the Philippines’
Filipino’s Urgent Issues, December 2016
Duterte’s dramatic shift in Philippine foreign policy, namely set-
ting aside the arbitration case, hasn’t cost him too dearly, mainly
because only 6 percent of respondents identified “Defending the
integrity of Philippine territory against foreigners” as among
their top three most urgent national issues
abandonment of its arbitration case consider joint development as part
and adoption of a more ‘pragmatic’ of an alternative strategy in the
(i.e. acquiescent) policy in the disputed waters. Binay proved more
South China Sea. China also raised vulnerable to backlash on those
the option of a joint development points than Duterte, who leveraged
agreement throughout the years. his ‘macho’ (siga), patriotic image
During the 2016 presidential to deflect any accusation
elections, at least two candidates, of acquiescence/submission
then Vice President Jejomar Binay to a foreign power, namely China.
and then Mayor Rodrigo Duterte,
expressed their inclination to
Table 2
Source: Pulse Asia
1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 09
Contrary to initial expectations, the arbitration award was released after decision-making structure under the
Aquino stepped down, not before. As the announcement of the final award Aquino administration, the Philippines has
approached, and shortly after, China made its sticks clear by deploying moved towards, in Weberian parlance,
nuclear-bomber-capable aircrafts and jet fighters to the vicinity of the a more Sultanistic-charismatic style of
disputed land features, particularly the Scarborough Shoal. China also governance, where one man has managed
stepped up its naval exercises in the area, while deploying a large to define foreign policy almost unilaterally
flotilla of military and para-military forces across the South China Sea. and with limited consultation with and
deference to the bureaucracy and veterans,
The message was clear: China has the requisite military capability to severely including former president Ramos, who
restrict the Philippines’ military of freedom over flight and navigation in the area. repeatedly broke his silence to express
When China expanded its military facilities across reclaimed land features exasperation with his protégé.
across the Spratly and Paracel chain of islands, it implied, through a series
of reports by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, that the In particular, Duterte’s seemingly adverse
Scarborough Shoal could be next target (Chan 2016a; Chan 2016b). experiences with America, tracing back to
his days in Davao, have affected his foreign
By now, China didn’t only have the momentum to push ahead with incorporating policy as a president. A self-described
the Scarborough Shoal into a ‘strategic triangle’ at the heart of the South China ‘socialist’ with long-established ties to
Sea, but also the ability to impose an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in leading Islamist and communist ideologues
the area. In fact, from 2015 onwards, senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and rebel leaders, namely Nur Misuari
officials and foreign ministry officials repeatedly threatened to do so, probably and Jose Ma. Sison, Duterte seems to
in order to project their strength and intimidate smaller claimant states, such as have nurtured ideological reservations
the Philippines, against pressing their claims. Upon Duterte’s election victory, with the Philippines’ American-leaning
China likely communicated carrots (e.g., large-scale infrastructure investment foreign policy. But what seems to have
deals, expanded trad, low-interest loans) and sticks (e.g., restriction of Philippine crystallized his apprehensions towards
access to disputed land features in the area, imposition of an ADIZ, America are the 2002 “Meiring incident”
reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal) in clear and unequivocal terms. and suggestions, though unverified, that his
visa was repeatedly rejected by American
Unsure about the outgoing Obama administration’s wherewithal and immigration officers, both of which occurred
commitment, the then newly-elected Filipino president calculated that the best during the George W. Bush administration.
course forward was engagement, dialogue and retrenchment in the South China
Sea and the reopening of communication channels with China (Akita 2016; Gady Over the succeeding years, Duterte managed
2016). Duterte repeatedly argued, ahead of his inauguration and ahead of the to convince the Davao City Council to pass
final arbitration award, that conflict was likely if the Philippines didn’t change a resolution cancelling the Balikatan joint
course and abandon the ‘resistance’ strategy of the Aquino administration, military exercises in his backyard, while
while huge economic benefits would be reaped if a more acquiescent position blocking Americans from accessing the
was adopted. To the pragmatically-minded general populace, who had begun to Davao air base for drone operations in
warm up to the new president, Duterte’s ‘reasonable’ position seemed far from 2013. Once he became the president, he
crossing a red line. Duterte successfully framed the South China Sea issue as a first tried to find accommodation with the
choice between two options: conflict (via resistance) or peace (via engagement). Obama administration, which gently advised
Meanwhile, Duterte-leaning propagandists systematically vilified those who called him against radically changing course in
for continuation of a strategy of resistance initiated by the Aquino administration.4 the South China Sea. But when the Obama
administration openly criticized Duterte’s
The final factor is the rapid ‘personalization’ of Philippine foreign policy under signature policy, the war on drugs, there was
Duterte’s watch. Unlike any of his predecessors, including the late dictator an immediate eruption of animosity wherein
Ferdinand Marcos, Duterte repeatedly injected his feelings, experiences and the Filipino leader personally insulted
preferences into a flurry of high-profile diplomatic statements. The words “I, me, both the American Ambassador Philip
my” have frequently sprinkled Duterte’s speeches. From a more institutionalized Goldberg and President Barack Obama.

10 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017

Over decades, Duterte has openly criticized Americans as arrogant, insensitive as Erdoğan’s tilt to Sunni Arab countries,
and overbearing, serving more as a source of conflict rather than peace and including support for extremist elements,
development in Mindanao (Moss 2016; Tordesillas 2016). In contrast, Duterte amid the Syrian civil war and his continuous
seems to have been impressed by Chinese and Japanese displays of deference threat of downgrading military cooperation
and respect towards him, especially during his visits to Beijing and Tokyo, not with North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In
to mention their open support of his war on drugs, a policy close to his heart both cases, Erdoğan and Putin managed
and a central campaign promise, and their offer of billions of dollars of to refashion their country’s foreign policy
economic assistance, particularly in Mindanao. Many observers suggest that orientation along their personal preferences
Duterte’s headline-grabbing announcements in Beijing (specifically when just as they concentrated state power in
he even suggested joining China’s ‘ideological flow’ along with Russia their respective offices (Taylor, Franz &
‘against the world’) were mainly due to his hosts’ extraordinary Wright 2016). Considering Duterte’s high
display of hospitality to the grateful visitor from Manila. regard for leaders like Putin, who he has
repeatedly described as his ‘hero’, it is
Studies show that proto- or full-fledged Sultanistic administrations tend to engage instructive to take into consideration the
in wild swings in foreign policy formulation, since there are limited constraints legacy of populist leaders in Russia and
on the strong-willed populist leaders who have little respect for diplomatic ritual Turkey in the past decade (CNN 2016).
and conventional wisdom. The most potent expressions of this phenomenon are
Putin’s unexpected invasion of Georgia and Ukraine in the past decade as well

Image credit: news.abs-cbn.com

1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 11

 Strategic Rupture
After his landslide election victory,
Duterte declared: “I will be
chartering [sic] a [new] course [for
the Philippines] on its own and will
not be dependent on the United
States” (Telasur 2016). This was
his most poignant foreign policy
statement after securing the highest
office in the country. With those few
audacious words, Duterte signaled his
preference for a radical break from his
predecessors, who had largely placed
America at the center of the
Philippine foreign policy calculus.
On the surface, there was nothing
controversial with Duterte’s
pronouncements. The pursuit of
an ‘independent’ foreign policy
has been at the center of almost
every administration’s diplomatic
pronouncements. In fact, the
Philippines’ 1987 constitution
enshrines the principle in Article II,
Section VII: The [Philippine] State
shall pursue an independent foreign
policy. In its relations with other states,
the paramount consideration shall
be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest and the
right to self-determination. What was
unique with Duterte’s foreign policy
pronouncement was his emphasis
on a foreign policy that ‘will not be
dependent on the United States.’
It is a matter of interpretative
divergence. The current Filipino
president doesn’t seem to recognize
a full convergence between the core
national interests of the Philippines
and the United States. In contrast,
previous administrations, particularly
that of President Benigno Aquino
III, saw America as the bedrock of
Philippine foreign policy and a key
source of reassurance in its national
security. The two allies, in the view of
Duterte’s predecessor, had almost
12 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017
perfect convergence of interests
on core issues such as the South
China Sea disputes. For Duterte, in
contrast, America is pursuing its own
autonomous interest, which may or
may not overlap with the Philippines’.
In short, the president views the
Philippine-American alliance as one
that is built on convenience and
temporary strategic synchronicity
rather than a special, eternal bond.
Duterte’s ideology reflects shades
of the Cold War-era Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM). But, given his
recognition of the thick layers of
interdependence between America and
the Philippines, Duterte seems to have
adopted, almost by default, a more
transactional approach to the country’s
relations with Washington. This is the
fundamental shift in Philippine foreign
policy under Duterte. This rupture has
been accompanied with sound and
fury, which has placed Duterte
on global headlines for not
necessarily the best reasons.
It started with Duterte telling the
American and Australian ambassadors
to ‘shut their mouths’ after the two
Western diplomats criticized, either
openly or obliquely, his inappropriate
‘rape joke’ during the presidential
campaign. Duterte, as a candidate,
threatened to cut off relations with
the two major allies if and when
elected into office (Maranon 2016).
Duterte’s apprehensions about the
West, particularly America, were
evident during his lukewarm, if not
awkward, meeting with the American
Ambassador, Philip Goldberg, right
after his election victory. Relations
suffered another setback when Duterte
openly lashed out at the envoy,
calling him a “gay son of a bitch”,
just two months into office.
Over the succeeding months, as
traditional partners stepped up their
criticism of Duterte’s war on drugs,
the Filipino leader responded with
characteristic cusses and undiplomatic
remarks. Even the leaders of the
United Nations (UN), the then
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, as
well as the European Union found
themselves at the receiving end of
Duterte’s foul-mouthed rebuttals. In
one speech, Duterte literally flashed
his middle finger at his foreign critics in
another unorthodox sign of defiance.
Duterte’s offensive rhetoric reached
a crescendo when he insulted no less
than President Barack Obama ahead
of their scheduled bilateral meeting on
the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit
in Vientiane, Laos. Later on, when
asked about whether he regretted his
invective-laced tirades against the
Philippines’ closest partners,
Duterte nonchalantly remarked,
“I don’t give a shit about anybody
observing my behavior” (Chen 2016).
The message was clear: Duterte is in
no mood for criticism from abroad,
especially from the West on human
rights issues. For him, this is nothing
short of (i) blatant hypocrisy, given
the West’s military interventions
across the world that have generally
been accompanied by large-scale
humanitarian crises, and (ii) direct
interference in the domestic affairs
of the Philippines, which contradicts
the conventional understanding of
Westphalian principles that undergird
the modern international system.
Duterte pushed the envelope by
questioning the fundamental logic
and functional utility of the UN
system, which he accused of
being useless and overbearing.
At the heart of Duterte’s assault
against the UN are his profound
reservations with the liberal
Duterte’s ideology reflects shades of the Cold War-era Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). But, given his recognition of the thick
layers of interdependence between America and the Philippines,
Duterte seems to have adopted, a more transactional
approach to the country’s relations with Washington.
international order, which he
believes isn’t in tune with law and
order challenges across developing
countries. In a strange turn of events,
the president of the Philippines
has increasingly come to sound
like autocratic leaders such as
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and
Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia. In
previous decades, these leaders
enthusiastically presented the
doctrine of ‘Asian values’, which
supposedly puts collective interests
above individual civil liberties, as
a justification of their poor human
rights record. In particular, Duterte
and his impresarios have criticized
the universal doctrine of human rights
as a Western construct. This line of
argumentation, of course, ignores the
fact that Filipino diplomats, namely
Salvador Lopez (as Chairman of the
UN’s Commission on Human Rights)
and Carlos P. Romulo (as President of
the United Nations General Assembly),
played a critical role not only in the
development of the UN system,
but also the global human rights
regime embodied by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
(Claudio 2016).
As anticipated by the author,
disagreements over human rights
became a key bone of contention
between the Duterte administration
and Western allies.5 Perturbed by
Duterte’s scorched-earth campaign
against illegal drugs, which claimed an
average of 1,000 lives every month,
the Obama administration withheld
the shipment of 26,000 assault rifles,
part of an earlier aid package for
law enforcement, to the Philippine
National Police (PNP). Amid
growing media scrutiny as well as
pressure by the American Senate,
Washington also postponed
the renewal of the $400 million
Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), which is conditioned
on good governance.
Meanwhile, the Duterte administration
has barred American warships from
utilizing Philippine bases for conducting
Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPs) in the South China Sea,
while cancelling earlier plans for joint
patrols within the Philippines’ EEZ. Two
major joint military exercises, namely
the U.S.-Philippine Amphibious Landing
Exercise (PHIBLEX) and Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training exercise
(Carat), were also cancelled. The fate of
the Balikatan exercises currently hangs
in the balance, but it will likely resume
in a location other than the South China
Sea. In terms of number of soldiers, as
well as type of weapons and exercises
involved, there will likely also be a
downgrade in the Balikatan exercises,
if they push through at all. Reports also
suggest that the number of American
warships visiting Subic Bay has
dramatically declined during Duterte’s
first six months in office (Gomez 2016).
The downgrade in bilateral security
cooperation between the Duterte and
Obama administrations, however,
has gone hand in hand with growing
discussions of a de facto strategic
partnership between the Philippines
and Eastern powers, namely Russia
and China, which have offered
affordable, advanced weaponries to
modernize the AFP.
1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 13
Duterte has criticized the West as brazenly
as he has praised the East. During the 2016
ASEAN summit, he declared, “I am ready
to not really break ties [with America] but
we will open alliances with China and...
Medvedev [Russia].” During his high-profile
state visit to Beijing, his first major one,
Duterte declared that America had ‘lost’ the
battle for global leadership and expressed his
desire to join China’s ‘ideological flow’ along
with Russia ‘against the world’ (Zhen 2016).
Over the succeeding months, the two Eastern
powers, particularly Russia, have also offered
intelligence-sharing, joint military exercises
and long-term security cooperation
to the Southeast Asian country.
By all measures, these are significant
developments considering the low quality
of Philippines-China relations in recent
years and the historically lukewarm state of
Philippines-Russia relations. While previous
Filipino presidents gazed at Moscow
and Beijing through a prism of either
apprehension or/and short-term pragmatic
calculations, Duterte was ideologically
determined to broaden the horizons of
Philippine foreign policy beyond the Western
episteme. Yet, a careful look at Philippines-
China relations in recent years reveals the
depth of the South China Sea disputes,
as well as the attendant risks of
accommodation and confrontation.
Red Star on the Horizon
Throughout the 20th century, the Philippines
largely relied on the American security
umbrella. In exchange, the latter enjoyed
almost full-spectrum access to civilian and
military facilities across the strategically-
located Southeast Asian nation. The
asymmetric alliance was undergirded by
three foundational security agreements: The
Military Bases Agreement (1947); the US-
Philippines Military Assistance Pact (1947):
14 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017
and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. Collectively, these
agreements transformed the United States into the de facto guarantor
of Philippine national security, specifically against external threat.
Throughout the Cold War, particularly during the Korean and Vietnam wars,
the Philippines, host to the largest overseas American bases in Subic and
Clark, served as the vortex of Washington’s forward-deployed presence and
military operations in the East Asian theatre. The collapse of the Soviet Union,
however, injected a new dynamic into the bilateral relationship by removing
the common enemy that bound the two Cold War allies. As the George Bush
administration welcomed a ‘new world order’, the focus shifted
to the peace dividends of the post-Cold War period.
As economic globalization–the ever-growing trade and investment linkages
among nations–gained pace, and post-Mao China largely integrated into the
Western-Japanese-led international market, it became increasingly difficult to
justify America’s gargantuan military presence in Southeast Asia. As a result,
Washington refused to commit large-scale strategic rents to maintain access
to its Philippine bases. Meanwhile, a nationalist wave overtook the Philippine
political landscape, as an increasingly influential bloc, led by then Senator
Jovito Salonga, refused to renew the Military Bases Agreement. The cataclysmic
Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991, which severely damaged American
facilities in Subic and Clark, compounded the dilemma faced by the US.
The result was the exit of American troops from the Philippines in 1991, which
immediately created a dangerous power vacuum that was exploited by China.
By 1994, China usurped the Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation that is claimed
by the Philippines and lies well within its 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ). The euphoria of patriotism was soon followed by the nightmare of
territorial loss and the creeping maritime incursion of Asia’s largest military.
In response, the Ramos administration adopted a four-pronged strategy.
First, he accelerated defense spending under the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Modernization Act, which provided additional funds for
defense acquisitions and the modernization of the country’s decrepit military
hardware. Second, he successfully pushed for the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), which served as a legal framework for upgraded American military
assistance, enhanced inter-operability through expanded joint exercises, and
institutionalized intelligence-sharing and mutual logistical support.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, which prompted the Clinton administration
to deploy two carrier battle groups to the area, convinced Washington that
it had to maintain robust forward deployment in Southeast Asia. The mere
return of American troops, Ramos reckoned, would serve as latent deterrent
against further Chinese incursions into Philippines-claimed waters. Third,
Ramos engaged in multilateral diplomacy by encouraging ASEAN to develop a
unified and coherent position on the regional maritime disputes, culminating
in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea. Finally,
Ramos also engaged in high-stakes bilateral
engagement with China, even going so far
as adopting a so-called ‘karaoke diplomacy’
with China’s flamboyant leader, Jiang
Zemin, who visited the Philippines in
1996 amid much fanfare (Lourdes 2006).
By the mid-2000s, under the Arroyo
administration, the Philippines and China
commenced what would be later dubbed
as a short-lived ‘golden age’ of bilateral
relations. Eager to diversify the Philippines’
strategic relations, partly due to growing
disagreements with Washington over
the Philippines’ armed participation in
the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq,
Manila established a de facto strategic
partnership with Beijing. After President
Arroyo’s September 2004 state visit to
Beijing, the two sides heralded a new era in
their bilateral relations. The two neighbors
signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on Defense Cooperation, with Beijing
offering USD 1.2 Million in an unprecedented
defense assistance package to the
Philippines. The two sides also agreed to
expand their trade, which exploded from
USD 17.6 Billion in 2005 to USD 23.4 Billion
in 2006 and USD 30.6 Billion in 2007.
In a characteristic exercise of checkbook
diplomacy, China offered two massive
infrastructure investment packages, one in
the telecommunications sector (the NBN-ZTE
deal), while the other one concerned the
development of the Philippines North Rail
project using Chinese capital and know-how.
Buoyed by their booming economic relations,
the two neighbors made a crucial step
towards negotiating a joint development
agreement in the South China Sea. This
was achieved via the Joint Maritime Seismic
Undertaking (2005-2008), which provided
a preliminary framework for exploration of
potential natural resources in contested
areas of the South China Sea. The problem, however, is that almost all
major agreements with China were later exposed as potentially
unconstitutional, if not treasonous, or were embroiled in corruption and
bidding anomalies, such as the NBN-ZTE and the North Railway projects.
Moreover, the Arroyo administration’s ‘pragmatic’ engagement with China
failed to prevent the latter from upping the ante in the late-2000s, first by
the official release of the notorious ‘nine-dashed line’ claim in 2009, then
by growing Chinese paramilitary patrols and harassment of fishing and oil
exploration activities by smaller claimant states, particularly Vietnam and
the Philippines, in 2010 and 2011. It was precisely China’s rising maritime
assertiveness, which extended even to the East China Sea over the Japanese-
administered Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, that provided the strategic impetus
for the Obama administration’s much-touted Pivot to Asia policy
(Morada 2006; International Crisis Group 2012a; b; Pillsbury 2015).
Benigno Aquino III stepped into office on a moralistic campaign against the
perceived corrupt practices of the previous administration. Almost inevitably,
this had a negative impact on bilateral relations with China, which was
implicated in the most controversial agreements of the Arroyo administration.
Nonetheless, Aquino tried to appease China by, first, refusing to attend the
2010 Nobel Prize Ceremony in honor of Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, in a move
that was deeply appreciated by Beijing, and, second, by making a high-profile
state visit to China in 2011, where the two sides agreed to find a mutually-
acceptable compromise and double their bilateral trade to
$60 billion before the end of Aquino’s term.
The mid-2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis, which revealed the extent of Chinese
territorial ambitions in the area, undermined initial efforts to find a reasonable
compromise in the South China Sea. In response, the Aquino administration
made the decision to file an arbitration case at The Hague, which represented
the first rules-based effort to force China to respect the rights of smaller
claimant states. Cognizant of the Philippines’ continued struggle to develop
minimum maritime domain awareness and military deterrence, the Aquino
administration pushed for the extension of the AFP Modernization Act and
negotiated the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which
allows the United States to gain expanded rotational access to and develop
facilities and preposition equipment in select Philippine bases.
Concomitantly, the Aquino administration also stepped up its strategic
cooperation with like-minded American allies such as Japan,
which offered maritime security assistance.
The lawfare (legal warfare) maneuver, the EDCA and enhanced spoke-to-spoke
cooperation with US allies, and the Revised AFP Modernization Act collectively
represented the key pillars of Aquino’s resistance strategic in the South China
1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 15
Sea. The biggest achievement of the Aquino administration, however, was fishermen. Chinese Coast Guard vessels
the successful conclusion of its lawfare against China. On July 12, 2016, continue to exercise administrative
the Arbitral Tribunal at The Hague, constituted under Article 287 and Annex VII control over the area.
of UNCLOS, made a final and binding judgment, which, among other things,
nullified the legal basis of China’s ‘historic rights’ claims across the South China Moreover, concerns over imminent Chinese
Sea; censured the ecological damage caused by China’s massive reclamation reclamation activities over the contested
activities in the South China Sea; and ruled that China and the Philippines shoal haven’t gone away. Meanwhile,
have no overlapping EEZ, since neither the land features in the Spratlys, which China’s rapid reclamation activities in the
hosts several large-scale artificially-created Chinese-occupied land features, Spratlys are creating a sprawling network of
nor the Scarborough Shoal, which is currently administered by airfields and military facilities, which could
China, are naturally-formed islands capable of generating maritime eventually be translated into the foundation
entitlement claims beyond 12 nautical miles of territorial sea. of a de facto exclusion zone or an ADIZ in
the area, and private companies continue
The arbitration award presented the Philippines a unique opportunity to: to shun the energy-rich Reed Bank due
rally multilateral diplomatic pressure on China, especially as the current to concerns over Chinese harassment. In
ASEAN chair; call upon American and likeminded countries to implement the short, despite all the talk of friendship and
ruling’s relevant provisions through FONOPs; encourage and assist fellow rapprochement, there hasn’t been any
ASEAN states such as Vietnam to engage in similar maneuvers against tangible compromise on the ground.
China; and threaten additional arbitration if China took further
unilateral action against the Philippines (Carpio 2016). As Jay Batongbacal, arguably the
Philippines’ leading maritime law expert,
argues, Duterte’s overture towards China
Towards an Interdependent Foreign Policy “has not diminished the real problem, which
is China’s expansion of all its activities into
No less than Ramos, Duterte’s de facto mentor-minister, has consistently called Philippines’ EEZ, creating major negative
for an ‘interdependent’ foreign policy, which recognizes the deep roots and impact such as overfishing, loss of coral
indispensable value of existing alliances and networks of cooperation without habitat, degradation of marine environment,
precluding the pursuit of new strategic partnerships in an increasingly multipolar and a general diminution of [Philippines’]
world. As Ramos—known as the Philippines’ most travelled president—made it exclusive control and loss of security.”6
clear, improved relations with one superpower shouldn’t come at the expense
of existing relations with the other. The essence of an equilateral balancing Duterte’s decision to set aside the
strategy, which is commonly employed by middle-sized nations, is to maintain arbitration award, Batongbacal explains,
cordial and fruitful relations with all key poles of power. Across Southeast Asia, risks “diminution of [the Philippines’
most countries have pursued improved economic relations with China while available strategic] options and [its] ability
maintaining robust security cooperation with America as a hedging strategy. to substantially influence or create a more
favorable outcome of any future settlement
In the case of the Philippines, which lacks sufficient military deterrence and of its disputes with China.” As for Duterte’s
continues to be embroiled in a territorial dispute with China, the United States pivot to Russia, there is more symbolism
represents not only a tried-and-tested hedging option, but also arguably the than substance, since Manila has, so far,
country’s best and only insurance policy under current circumstances. Despite focused more on limited arms purchases,
Duterte’s charm offensive vis-à-vis China, including a decision to effectively particularly drones and rifles, rather than
set aside the arbitration award in regional fora and seemingly even in bilateral frigates, tanks, and submarines. At this
discussions, the two sides have struggled to find a common ground in the point, the Duterte administration is more
disputed waters. As of this writing, China and the Philippines are yet to begin keen on developing trade, investment and
negotiating even a framework of modus vivendi in the South China Sea: Filipino low-grade security cooperation with Russia
fishermen aren’t allowed to enter the lagoon within the Scarborough Shoal, in order to signal to America that it has
which is fisheries-rich and serves as a crucial haven for stranded or recuperating alternative options and isn’t beholden to

16 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017

any specific power. Above all, any major purchase of Russian and/or Chinese defense equipment not
only raises concerns over quality, maintenance and training, but also compatibility with the
heavily American-Western configuration of the AFP’s existing military hardware.

Meanwhile, there is an opportunity for the Philippines and the new government in the United States
to reset bilateral relations. By all indications, the Donald Trump administration will likely take a less
strident position on human rights and democracy-promotion abroad. Instead, the focus will be on
common strategic interests and maintaining a robust regional network of alliances to rein in Chinese
maritime assertiveness. This means a major bone of contention in Philippine-American relations during
the Obama administration could be mitigated, though the American media, civil society, and legislature
will most likely continue their outright condemnation of Duterte’s scorched-earth war on drugs.

China’s expanding strategic footprint across disputed waters simply reinforces the necessity for the
Philippines to maintain comprehensive security cooperation with the United States. Emerging domestic
security challenges will also likely reinforce the fundamental logic of the Philippine-American military
alliance. The virtual collapse of the peace negotiations between the Philippine government and
communist rebels, as well as the growing threat posed by Islamic State affiliates in Mindanao, have
deepened the AFP’s necessity for logistical, intelligence, and financial support from traditional allies
such as America. No wonder then, despite expressing his deep reservations with existing security
agreements with the United States, Duterte has given the green light for the implementation of
EDCA, a potential prelude to the restoration of bilateral security ties to status quo ante.

Relishing its historically deep and increasingly cordial relations with Durterte, the Shinzo Abe
administration in Japan is also in a unique position to facilitate recovery of bilateral Philippine-American
ties, credibly counter China’s economic charm offensive vis-à-vis the Philippines, and continually
enhance Philippine maritime security capabilities. The Philippines’ newly-appointed Ambassador
to China, Chito Santa Romana, best describes what a balanced, reasonable, and optimal independent
foreign policy should (and could) look like under the current administration:7

“There are several key pillars of [the new] diplomatic strategy: improving relations with China
and Russia; moving away from the country’s tight alignment with the US; and strengthening ties
with ASEAN, Japan and other neighboring countries. However, this strategic shift does not mean
that the Philippines will abandon its treaty alliance with the US or cut off its historic, cultural and
economic ties with the US, nor does it mean that it will form a military alliance with China or
Russia. Instead, the Philippines will mainly focus on promoting political relations and economic
partnership with China and Russia while exploring limited forms of military cooperation. Under
this new approach, economics, trade and commerce--and not territorial and maritime disputes--
will be the key driver of Philippines-China relations. The disputes will still be subject to negotiations
but they will not be at the front and center of bilateral relations [with China], nor will they [serve as]
an obstacle to the improvement of bilateral ties.”

Ultimately, Duterte’s foreign policy will not only depend on the carrots and sticks offered by major
powers, since he largely employs a transactional logic to foreign relations, but also his domestic
popularity and ability to rein in opposition and keep institutions of checks and balances in a state of
hibernation. A year from now, Duterte may find himself in a radically different situation, where he will
have to consider the interest of domestic constituencies, cope with diminishing political capital,
and perilously confront a more expansive Chinese strategic footprint in the South China Sea.

1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 17

 Image credit: philstar.com
18 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2017
references
1
Specifically, he visited the following camps respectively: 104th Infantry Battalion in Isabela City, Basilan (July
21); Western Mindanao Command headquarters in Zamboanga City (July 21); Camp Siongco in Awang Datu
Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao (July 22 and August 18); Fort Magsaysay in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (July 26); Camp
Guillermo Nakar in Lucena City, Quezon (July 28); 60th Infantry Battalion headquarters in Asuncion, Davao del
Norte (July 29); Camp Victoriano Luna or AFP Medical Center in Quezon City (August 2); Camp General Macario
Peralta in Jamindan, Capiz (August 5); Camp Panacan, Davao City (August 6); Camp Lapu-Labu in Cebu City
(August 5); Camp Lukban in Catbalogan, Samar (August 8); Camp Edilberto Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City
(August 9); Camp Major Cesar Sang-an (1st Infantry Division or Tabak Division) in Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur
(August 10); Camp Teodulfo Bautista in Jolo, Sulu (August 12);

2
Corroborated by the author during his on-the-record exchanges with senior American officials, namely
former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg during the 2015 US-Taiwan-Japan Security Dialogue and US
Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris during the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue.

3
The media has reported this portion and when the issue was raised by the author with Chinese officials,
there was no denial.

4
Among those targeted were Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and, to a lesser degree, the author.

5
For instance see the author’s presentation at ISEAS, National University of Singapore, August 23, 2016.

6
Interview with author, February 28, 2017.

7
Interview with the author, January 22, 2017.

1ST QUARTER 2017 SPARK 19

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