MAURICIO, OMAR KAREEM V.

Case Digest | Evidence | Sat. 8:00 am to 12:00 pm

People vs. Santos

G.R. Nos. 10022526, May 11, 1993

Topic: Conduct and Character, Sec. 24, Rule 130 – Previous Conduct as Evidence

Facts: Glicerio Cupcupin (“Cupcupin”) was driving a jeepney with Alberto Bautista (“Bautista”)
on board. They were at a stop at the corner of Estrella and Yango Streets in Navotas and were
about to make a right turn when two persons with firearmes approached the jeep and fired at
them. The shooters were later identified as Raul Santos and Mario Morales.
Bautista survived after having escaped despite receiving grave injuries. On the other
hand, one PO1 Victorino Bohol (“Bohol”) witnessed the said shooting and was able to call for
other policemen to respond to the scene.
Sworn statements and testimonies of Bautista and PO1 Bohol were admitted as
evidence to identify Santos and Morales.
Prosecution also submitted the sworn statement of Ronaldo Guerrero (“Guerrero”), a
witness in another criminal case wherein Santos was charged with the murder of Daniel
Nuguera, in order to show criminal propensity on the part of appellant Santos.
On appeal, Santos avers that the sworn statement of Guerrero is hearsay evidence,
considering that prosecution did not present Guerrero himself as a witness during the trial.
While defense objected to its admission on the first time it was presented, it nevertheless failed
to object when the trial court later admitted the same.

Issue: W/N the trial court should not have admitted the statement of Guerrero for being
hearsay in nature.

Held: No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in
admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose of proving the following: (1) Santos’
criminal propensity, knowledge or plan or scheme and (2) that Santos knew the particular
streets in Manila which was a good place or spot to ambush a vehicle and its passengers.
In its ruling, the trial court even held that the Guerrero affidavit falls within one or more
of the exceptions set out in Sec. 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which reads:
“Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evifence. — Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.”
Appellant also had waived the hearsay character of this evidence by failure seasonably
to object to the admission of the affidavit; it is too late to raise the hearsay rule after
prosecution and defense had presented their respective cases and had made their respective
offers of evidence.