CASES ON PROBATION – CRIMINAL LAW 1
ALMERO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Petitioner is accused for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries. MTC
found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. RTC
immediately released Almero upon posting of property
bond for provisional liberty, because of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of MTC on some procedural
issues. The CA ruled that the trial court erred in taking
cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the
judgment of conviction, because an application for
probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the
judgment of conviction and effectively renders the same
final. The CA also found that petitioner filed his
application for probation only on 7 September 2007, or
more than one month after he received notice of the
judgment of conviction.
RULING OF SC: NO PROBATION.
LEGAL BASIS. The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on
the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation
as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the
appellate court's affirmation of his conviction. The
rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation as
mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on
diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused
applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the
judgment. The application for probation is an admission
of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime, which led
to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why
the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop
to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction
– even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose
of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation
only if the accused fails in his bid.
APPLICATION. Similarly, in the present case, petitioner
cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily
deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not
file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed
the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing,
he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended
by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and
probation mutually exclusive remedies. The assignment
of errors in the Petition before us reflects the
diametrically opposed positions taken by accused
petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects
committed by the trial court during the promulgation of
the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself.
Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application for
probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt
implicit in any procedure for probation – precisely the
unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.
COLINARES v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Around 7:00PM of June 25, 200, Rufino and
Jesus went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store.
Jesus urinated by the roadside, and while Rufino was
just waiting, Arnel struck Rufino twice on the head with a
huge stone unexpectedly. Ananias testified that he saw
Rufino lying by the roadside and he tried to help but
someone knocked him out. Apparently Arnel hit him.
Paciano saw the incident because he was smoking
outside his house. He sought help from the barangay
tanod and they rushed Rufino to the hospital. The
offending party claims self-defense. Rufino, Jesus, and
Ananias were drunk, and upon asking about the
whereabouts of the Mayor he was was pushed by
Rufino, boxed by Jesus and Ananias, and was alsmot
stabbed by Rufino. Thus, he picked up a stone and hit
Rufino on the head. Ananias saw this and tried to stab
him with a gaff. He avoided the attack and hit Ananias
with the same stone, and then he fled and hid in his
sister’s house. He then voluntarily surrendered. He was
charged with frustrated homicide.
RTC: Guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, did not
qualify for probation.
CA: AFFIRMED
RULING OF THE SC: GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE, CAN APPLY FOR PROBATION WITHIN
15 DAYS FROM NOTICE THAT THE RECORD OF
THE CASE HAS BEEN REMANDED FOR EXECUTION
TO THE RTC.
ON SELF-DEFENSE. No unlawful aggression, an
indispensable element in self-defense. No evidence
shows that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias started the
physical attack.
ON FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. Attempted homicide
only. The victim’s wounds are not fatal. No indication
that his skull incurred fracture or had bled internally.
ON PROBATION. Since attempted homicide only, his
penalty is lowered to 2 years and four months of prision
correctional as maximum. He has the right to apply for
probation, but he does not have the right to such
privilege because he appealed his own conviction for
frustrated homicide. Thus, in line with the dissenting
opinions, he should be deemed permanently disqualified
from applying for probation. However, the court finds that
he should not be deprived of such right due to the
erroneous judgment of conviction by the RTC. The stiff
penalty by the RTC denied him the choice of whether to
appeal or to apply for probation.
SUYAN v. PEOPLE
FACTS: An information was filed against the petitioner,
charging him with the violation of Sec. 16, Art. 3 of R.A.
No. 6425. He pleaded guilty, and was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 years of prison
correctional and to pay the costs. Then he filed his
application for probation. RTC issued a probation order
covering a period of 6 years. While on probation, he was
arrested on two occasions for violating the same law.
Atty. Navarro, the Chief Probation and Parole Officer of
the area, alleged that the petitioner has been
apprehended twice for drug possession while on
probation. The commission of other offenses while on
probation was a serious violation of the terms. Thus, it
was pointed out that Suyan could no longer comply w/
the conditions of the probation. RTC revoked his
probation and directed him to serve the sentence
imposed upon him. He assailed the revocation of his
probation with the CA, saying that he was denied due
process on some procedural grounds. The CA agreed
and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. To comply, the RTC conducted a hearing
on the Motion to Revoke. After a while, the RTC once
more revoked the probation because there was no
rebuttal of the Violation Report and no rebuttal of the
commission of another offense and conviction therefor
while on probation. He appealed to the CA once more,
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional right to
due process when his probation was ordered revoked
because he was given no time to refute the allegations.
CA denied his appeal. It held that the petition wasted this
opportunity when, instead of rebutting the allegations
mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned
the absence of such report when the probation was first
revoked. Furthermore, the CA ruled that because he was
apprehended twice for the commission of two offenses
similar in nature, petitioner violated one of the conditions
prescribed in the Probation Order. He even admitted to
having served out his sentence for those offenses.
RULING OF THE SC: PROBATION WAS VALIDLY
REVOKED.
PROCEDURAL. The court adopts the ruling of the CA in
that petitioner wasted the opportunity to rebut the
allegations mentioned in the Violation Report.
SUBSTANTIAL. There was sufficient justification for the
revocation. The petitioner did not even deny the fact that
he has been convicted and served out his sentence for
another offense—which is a direct violation of Condition
No. 9 of his Probation Order, the effects of which are
clearly outlined in Sec. 11 of the Probation Law.
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation
order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which time
the court shall inform the offender of the consequences
thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply
with any of the conditions prescribed in the said
order or his commission of another offense, he shall
serve the penalty imposed for the offense under
which he was placed on probation.
As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner
was bound to observe full obedience to the terms and
conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the
risk of revocation of this privilege. Regrettably, petitioner
wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to
remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the
consequences of his violation.
PEOPLE v. CA & VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE
FACTS: VILLAREAL CASE. In February 1991, seven
freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join
the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). The
neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected
to initiation rites. The night before the commencement of
such, they were briefed on what to expect—both
physical and psychological beatings, all of which would
last for three days. On their first night, they were
subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the
Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies
Privilege Round. During these, the beatings were
predominantly directed at the neophytes’ arms and legs.
In the morning of the second day, they were made to
present comical plays and to play rough basketball.
Furthermore, they were required to memorize and recite
the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Late in the afternoon,
they were once again subjected to traditional initiation
rituals. When such were officially reopened on the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were
subjected to another traditional ritual padding by the
fraternity. In light of all this, there were auxiliaries
present to assist and protect the neophytes. Lenny Villa
was heard complaining, saying that he is suffering from
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After a while, he
can no longer walk, so he was carried to the carport.
After an hour of sleep, Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings roused the neophytes. Initially, Villareal and
Dizon dismissed such as mere overreaction. When they
realized, though, that Lenny was abnormally cold, some
of the Aquilans began to help him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep
him warm. When his condition worsened, Lenny was
rushed him to the hospital. Unfortunately, was
pronounced dead on arrival.
FACTS: PEOPLE v. CA. Respondents Tecson et al.,
filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially
seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision
insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence
are concerned. According to respondents, they
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered
its Decision (CAG. R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal
liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-
probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which
carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al. contend
that, as a result, they have already been discharged
from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by
virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates
in January 2002 pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation
Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October
2002 and, upon their completion of the terms and
conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and
declared the criminal case against them terminated on
various dates in April 2003. To support their claims,
respondents attached certified true copies of their
respective Applications for Probation and the RTC
Orders granting these applications, discharging them
from probation, and declaring the criminal case against
them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision
in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality,
insofar as they were concerned, when they waived their
right to appeal and applied for probation.
RULING OF THE SC:
ON PROBATION
Jurisdiction of RTC Branch 130, where the
application for probation was filed. BRANCH 130
HAD NO JURISDICTION. THE PROBATION SHOULD
NOT BE FILED IN THAT COURT. The court rules that
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law requires that an application
for probation be filed with the trial court that convicted
and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of
origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al. of the crime of homicide was
Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City
RTC. The court stressed that applicants are not at
liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek
probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the
Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural.
Jurisdiction is still with the Court of Appeals, and
not the RTC. CA STILL HAS JURISDICTION. THE
RECORDS ARE NOT YET REMANDED TO THE RTC.
Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which
the criminal action has been properly instituted. If a party
appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,
jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The
execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the
appealing party is concerned. The court of origin then
loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the
other party’s time to appeal has expired. A perusal of the
case records reveals that the CA had not yet
relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that
the accused filed their respective applications while a
motion for reconsideration was still pending before the
CA and the records were still with that court.
Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the
time they applied it. NO APPEAL FOR ANY
CONVICTION MUST TAKE PLACE FOR THE
OFFENDER TO AVAIL OF THE PROBATION. The OSG
pointed out that when they appealed to the CA their
homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation
Law). This was affirmed by the court.
OFFENDERS CANNOT AVAIL OF PROBATION IF
THEY APPLY FOR SUCH ONLY ON APPEAL AS A
RESULT OF THE DOWNGRADING OF THEIR
SENTENCE FROM NON-PROBATIONABLE TO
PROBATIONABLE. RTC Branch 130, therefore, should
not have granted the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al.,, as they had appealed their conviction to
the CA. We recall that respondents were originally found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them
to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence
fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC
should have nonetheless found them ineligible for
probation at the time.
Discharge from probation does not extinguish
criminal liability. PROBATION IS NOT THE SAME AS
SERVING THE SENTENCE. IT MERELY SUSPENDS
THE EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE. An order
placing defendant on “probation” is not a “sentence” but
is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
“interlocutory judgment” in the nature of a conditional
order placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be
followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.
They may now reapply for probation due to the
downgrading of sentence, as referred to in Colinares
v. People. The Court set aside the RTC and the CA
judgments and found Tecson et al. ultimately liable for
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum
period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión
correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4
months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more
favorable to Tecson et al., the court rules that they are
now eligible to apply for probation. While the court
cannot recognize the validity of the Orders of RTC
Branch 130, which granted the Applications for
Probation, it also cannot disregard the fact that Tecson
et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their
previous probation program and have eventually been
discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for
probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider
their antecedent probation service in resolving whether
to place them under probation at this time and in
determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
MORENO v. COMELEC
FACTS: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from
running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the
latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months by the RTC. Moreno answered by arguing that
there was no cause of action because he was already terms and conditions of his probation, his case was
granted probation. Since the Probation Law restores him deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or
to all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his suspended as a result of his conviction were
conviction, he should be able to vote and be voted for. restored to him, including the right to run for public
The investigating officer recommended that Moreno be office.
disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
COMELEC 1st division adopted the recommendation
and was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc because
the Local Government Code provides that those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude punishable by 1 year or more of
imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Since Moreno was released from probation on Dec. 20,
2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and
end two years thence. It only suspended the sentence,
not the disqualification. Moreno counterargued saying
that this law is not applicable to him because he did not
serve his sentence. He was already granted probation.

RULING OF THE SC: THE COMELEC ERRED IN ITS

JUDGMENT.

The court held that the grant of probation to petitioner

suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office, from the right
to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period
imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon
the grant of probation. It appears then that during the
period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because
the accessory penalty of suspension from public
office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation.

The court clarifies that those who have not served their
sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we
reiterate, should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from
running for a local elective office because the two (2)-
year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not even begin to run. During
the period of probation, the probationer does not
serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but
is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.

Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that the final

discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to
him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted. Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged
upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the