5. ABAD VS.

FIL-HOMES

THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN G.R. No. 189239

ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO AND ERWIN
COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO AND Present:
FELITA ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER
LAS PIAS, LINDA LAYDA, RESTITUTO CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J.,
MARIANO, SPS. ARNOLD AND MIRIAM BRION,
MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND BERSAMIN
WENCESLAO A. RAPACON, SPS. VILLARAMA, JR., and
ROMEO AND EMILYN HULLEZA, LUZ SERENO, JJ.
MIPANTAO, SPS. HELEN AND
ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE TUAZON,
SPS. ZALDO AND MIA SALES, SPS.
JOSEFINA AND JOEL YBERA, SPS.
LINDA AND JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS.
WILMA AND MARIO ANDRADA, SPS.
RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA LELIS,
FREDY AND SUSANA PILONEO,
Petitioners,

- versus -

FIL-HOMES REALTY and

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and Promulgated:
MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondents.
November 24, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation

(respondents), co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City and covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21712 and 21713, filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners before the Paraaque
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots
since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.

Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years;
and that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had
no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the question of ownership must first
be settled before the issue of possession may be resolved.

During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed
expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to
the occupants including petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a
Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.

Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the

unlawful detainer case against petitioners, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendants Leticia and Ervin Abad et. als.
ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them
to VACATE and SURRENDERpossession of the premises (Lots covered
by TCT NOS. (71065) 21712 and (71066) 21713 otherwise known as
Purok I Silverio Compound, Barangay San Isidro, Paraaque City to
plaintiff and to PAY the said plaintiff as follows:

1. The reasonable compensation in the amount of P20,000.00 a

month commencing November 20, 2002 and every month
thereafter until the defendants shall have finally vacated the
premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to the
plaintiff;
2. P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, and finally
3. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[1] (emphasis in the original)

The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they still
maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by
virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be
named.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4,
2008,[2] reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint in this
wise:

x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents
herein) is unlawful detainer as shown by the allegations of the Complaint.
The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not the allegations of
the Complaint that finally determine whether a case is unlawful
detainer, rather it is the evidence in the case.

Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of tolerance.

Tolerance of the occupation of the property must be present right from the
start of the defendants possession. The phrase from the start of
defendants possession is significant. When there is no tolerance right
from the start of the possession sought to be recovered, the case
of unlawful detainer will not prosper.[3] (emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)

The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City
bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had
already been rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over
the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the . . . final judgment and
writ of possession due to non-payment of just compensation:

The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties

subject of this case had already been given to the City of Paraaque since
January 19, 2006 after they were expropriated. It is serious error for the
court a quo to rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang
Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development
Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which
were already expropriated in favor of the City of Paraaque.

There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo
that the case for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court would not bar,
suspend or abate the ejectment proceedings. The court a quo had failed
to consider the fact that the case for expropriation was already decided by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 way back in the year 2006 or 2 years
 before the court a quo rendered its judgment in the unlawful detainer case
in the year 2008. In fact, there was already a Writ of Possession way back
in the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation case by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 196. The court a quo has no valid reason to
disregard the said final judgment and the writ of possession already
issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the City of Paraaque
and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty
Development Corporation and make another judgment concerning
possession of the subject properties contrary to the final judgment
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196.[4] (emphasis in the original)

Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they
maintained that respondents act of allowing several years to pass without requiring
[them] to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts to acquiescence or
tolerance of their possession.[5]

By Decision of May 27, 2009,[6] the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not
present evidence to rebut respondents allegation of possession by tolerance, and
considering petitioners admission that they commenced occupation of the property
without the permission of the previous owner ─ Pilipinas Development Corporation ─ as
indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor-in-interest, ruled in favor of
respondents. Held the appellate court:
Where the defendants entry upon the land was with plaintiffs
tolerance from the date and fact of entry, unlawful detainer proceedings
may be instituted within one year from the demand on him to vacate upon
demand. The status of such defendant is analogous to that of a tenant or
lessee, the term of whose lease, has expired but whose occupancy is
continued by the tolerance of the lessor. The same rule applies where the
defendant purchased the house of the former lessee, who was already in
arrears in the payment of rentals, and thereafter occupied the premises
without a new lease contract with the landowner.[7]

Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the

appellate court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,[8] held the same does not signify the
completion of the expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is

GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court a quo is REVOKED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March 3,
2008 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION [by] deleting the
award for attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26, 2009,
hence, the filing of the present petition for review.
The petition fails.

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project
falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions
on social justice.[9]

As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not
suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action
regarding ownership.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538[10] enlightens, however:

Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through

purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or
chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants
occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as
may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary
negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period
of suspension shall not exceed one year.

To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants

shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due
or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has
been instituted. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the
benefits of the suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of
expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better right of
possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation
proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to
continue staying there.

Petitioners position does not lie.

The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section
19 of the Local Government Code (LGC):

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through

its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless
 a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value of the property.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation[11] clearly outlines the stages of
expropriation, viz:

Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners x x x .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just
compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this
case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate
the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property
owners the final just compensation.[12] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation
proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance
was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit
had been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys possession of the lots,
contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.

Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots,
the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state
so.[13] Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance.

Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for
petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries
thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they can be
considered to be beneficiaries.

In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their
possession is by mere tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v.
Pascual:[14]

In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to

vacate the premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have
acquiesced to defendants possession and use of the
premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land
of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the
date of the demand to vacate. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They
stepped into the shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners. Even
if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action against petitioners to eject
them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed petitioners
possession by tolerance.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, p. 150.

[2] Id. at 169-176.
[3] Id. at 172.
[4] Id. at 174-176.
[5] CA rollo, Petition for Review, p. 20.
[6] Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal with the concurrence of

Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Rosalinda Asuncion-

Vicente, rollo, pp. 64-76.
[7] Id. at 71-72 (citations omitted).
[8] G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 474.
[9] Vide Antonio v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 124779, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 340-

341.
[10] Took effect on May 26, 1940.
[11] G.R. No. 158609, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 287.
[12] Id. at 287.
[13] Vide rollo, pp. 227-228
[14] G.R. No. L-22645, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 146, 148.

Zacarias vs. Anacay

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014

AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO
ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons claiming
authority under them, Respondents.
 DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated June 20, 2012
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which reversed the
Decision2 dated August 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch
18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision3 dated October 8, 2010 of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil Case No. 862.

The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment with

Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias
thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named
respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the
occupants of a parcel of land with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square
meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo
L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.

The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to
Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was
unsuccessful and thus the case was returned to the court.5

After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of

defendants Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and Cynthia
Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda Yalo, and all persons acting under them, and
against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Cesar C.
Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with damages, Unlawful Detainer is,
hereby, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.6

The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential
elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or
tolerated respondents’ occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted
that the averments in the demand letter sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents
entered the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own "Sinumpaang
Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for forcible entry which should have been
filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was
deprived of the physical possession of her property through illegal means and the
complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC
ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the proper remedy
considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the premises after demand to
vacate was made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and she
was only forced to take legal action when respondents reneged on their promise to
vacate the property after the lapse of the period agreed upon.

In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not
state that respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that
petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the request of respondents to stay in
the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the
property by that time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the
respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to
stay there for one year.

With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that
respondents’ occupation ofthe property without petitioner’s consent can be converted to
a contract, such agreement not being prohibited by law nor contrary to morals or good
customs. Having satisfied the requisites for an unlawful detainer action, the RTC found
that petitioner’s complaint was filed within the prescribed one-year period counted from
the time the final demand to vacate was received by the respondents on July 24, 2008.

The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Silang-Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered ordering the defendants and all claiming under their rights to: (1)
vacate the subject property and surrender possession and control over the same to the
plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos each as rentals or
compensation for the use thereof starting from July 2008 until the same is paid in full,
with interests thereon at twelve (12%) percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.7

With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period,
the above decision became final and executory.8

On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At
the hearing heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were given a period of ten days within
which to file their comment. At the next scheduled hearing on February 6,
2012,respondents’ counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearancewith
Manifestation informing the court that on the same day they had filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA, copies ofwhich were served to
petitioner thru her counsel and to the RTC. Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6,
2012, the RTC stated that said manifestation was "tantamount to [a] comment to the
pending motion" and thus gave petitioner’s counsel a period of ten (10) days within
which to fileher Reply and thereafter the incident will be submitted for resolution. 9

On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated August
22, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 8, 2010
rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 17 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.10

The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint
did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since
the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could
not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to
file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property.

Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of
the subject property,she availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession but
nevertheless may still file an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper
regional trial court.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC
which has long become final and executory. She argues that the suspension of the
strictadherence to procedural rules cannot be justified by unsupported allegationsof the
respondents as to supposed non-receipt of documents concerning this case.

On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the proceedings before
the RTC and were not furnished a copy of the said court’s adverse decision. They also
stress that resort to certiorari was proper and the suspension of procedural rules was
justified by compelling circumstances such as the imminentdestruction of the only
property possessed by respondents who are indigent, respondents’ lack of awareness
of unfavorable judgment rendered on appeal by the RTC, substantive merits of the case
insofar as the jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack of showing
that resortto certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and there being no prejudice
caused to the other party.

After a thorough review of the records and the parties’ submissions, we find neither
reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.

The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment
cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary
remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol evidence.13 Such remedy is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In forcible
entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any
contract, express or implied.14

The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a
case for forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.

In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

toleranceof the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination ofthe latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.16

In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:

3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang,
Cavite with an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of
Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B";

4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She had it
planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she
discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the
same;

5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The defendants
requested for time toleave and she acceded to said request. The defendants committed
to vacate the subject property by the end of May, 2008;

6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the

subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote
them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable
compensation for their illegal use and occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the
DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as Annex "C";

7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st
for possible conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still refused to vacate the
subject property. Thus, the said Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION,
as evidenced by a copy thereto attached as Annex "D";

x x x x17

The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does
not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the
petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful
possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued
occupation after her discovery of their entry into the subject premises is incorrect. As
she had averred, she discovered respondents’occupation in May 2007. Such
possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or
consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the
possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal
due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.18

In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts
of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v.
Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,
distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not

doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior
court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to
vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our
view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge
tothe right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the
inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to
lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second,if a forcible
entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the
result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how
long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in
- and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable.
Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action
which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal
but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is

necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the
party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the
court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publicianaor an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional
trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer
case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land
through intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of
petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not
petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under
TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was
by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they
had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to
vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful
detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This
is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the
MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her
death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and
not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to
occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and
consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into
the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently,
it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona
vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must
be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

xxxx

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact
that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation
of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that
"respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession
thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the
parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry
was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she
discovered that the defendants have enterep the subject property and occupied the
same", as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered
the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's consent,
which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the
MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower
court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory
judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.

It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action.20 Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant
to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
final and any writ of execution based on it is void.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 20,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITEO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1Rollo, pp. 30-43. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and
concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Edwin D.
Sorongon.
2 Id. at 100-107. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Emma S. Young.
3 Id. at 66-87. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero.
4 Records, pp. 1-6.
5 Id. at 54-56.
6 Rollo, p. 87.
7 Id. at 107.
8 Records, p. 202.
9 Id. at 203-209, 212-229.
10 Rollo, p. 42.
11 Pagadora v. Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 14, 30.
12SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. − Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
13Pagadora v. Ilao, supra note 11, at 30-31, citing Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R.
No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334 and Sarmienta v. Manalite
Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA), G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010, 632
SCRA 538, 545-546.
14 Del Rosario v. Sps. Manuel, 464 Phil. 1053, 1057 (2004).
 15 604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009).
16 As cited in Canlas v. Tubil, 616 Phil. 915, 925 (2009).
17 Records, pp. 2-3.
18Canlas v. Tubil, supra note 16, at 924, citing Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 523
Phil. 39, 46 (2006).
19 Id. at 47-51.
20Sales v. Barro, 594 Phil. 116, 123 (2008), citing Figueroa v. People, 580 Phil.
58, 76 (2008).
21 Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, 417 Phil. 303, 318 (2001).

MANALANG VS. BACANI

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015

RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS

MANALANG, Petitioners, v. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall decide
the appeal of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer or
forcible entry cases on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court
of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be required by the RTC. There is
no trial de novo of the case.cralawred

The Case

The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
68419,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, Branch 49, in Guagua, Pampanga, and reinstated the judgment rendered on
August 31, 2000 by the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga dismissing their complaint for
unlawful detainer and the respondents’ counterclaim. They also hereby assail the
resolution promulgated on January 24, 2003 denying their motion for
reconsideration.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M.
Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No 4236
with an area of 914 square meters of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by approved survey
plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents’ Lot No. 4235 covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners caused the
relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result
showed that the respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405
square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted by the Lands Management
Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) confirmed
the result on the encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the
encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the
petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of
Guagua (Civil Case No. 3309), and the case was assigned to Branch 2 of that
court.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of
jurisdiction based on its finding that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute
that should be properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.4 It stated that the complaint
did not aver any contract, whether express or implied, between the petitioners and the
respondents that qualified the case as one for unlawful detainer; and that there was also
no showing that the respondents were in possession of the disputed area by the mere
tolerance of the petitioners due to the latter having become aware of the encroachment
only after the relocation survey held in 1997.

On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for
further proceedings,5 holding that because there was an apparent withholding of
possession of the property and the action was brought within one year from such
withholding of possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the
jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the case was not a boundary dispute that could be
resolved in an accion reinvidicatoria, considering that it involved a sizeable area of
property and not a mere transferring of boundary.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1,7 ultimately dismissed the complaint and counterclaim
for lack of merit through the decision rendered on August 31, 2000, 8 ruling that the
petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondents
had encroached on their property and had been occupying and possessing property
outside the metes and bounds described in Bienvenido Bacani’s OCT No. N-216701;
that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the respondents’ right of
possession; and that the respondent’s counterclaim for damages should also be
dismissed, there being no showing that the complaint had been filed in gross and
evident bad faith.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.

At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to
determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the
surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel Limpin, then Acting Chief of the Survey Section of the
CENR- DENR.

On September 19, 2001,10 the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set
aside the MTC’s decision of August 31, 2000, observing that the respondents had
encroached on the petitioners’ property based on the court-ordered relocation survey,
the reports by Engr. Limpin, and his testimony;11 that the respondents could not rely on
their OCT No. N-216701, considering that although their title covered only 481 square
meters, the relocation survey revealed that they had occupied also 560 square meters
of the petitioners’ Lot No. 4236;12 that the petitioners did not substantiate their claims for
reasonable compensation, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and that,
nevertheless, after it had been established that the respondents had encroached upon
and used a portion of the petitioners’ property, the latter were entitled to
P1,000.00/month as reasonable compensation from the filing of the complaint up to time
that the respondents actually vacated the encroached property, plus P20,000.00
attorney’s fees.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The respondents moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for its lack
of merit.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The respondents appealed.

On October 18, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed

decision,15viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the appealed RTC decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the decisions of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branches 1 and 2, are REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The CA concluded that the RTC, by ordering the relocation and verification survey “in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction” upon motion of the petitioners and over the objection of
the respondents, and making a determination of whether there was an encroachment
based on such survey and testimony of the surveyor, had acted as a trial court in
complete disregard of the second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it amounted to the
reopening of the trial, which was not allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. It observed that the relocation and verification survey was inconclusive
inasmuch as the surveyor had himself admitted that he could not determine which of the
three survey plans he had used was correct without a full-blown trial.

The CA held that considering that the petitioners’ complaint for unlawful detainer did not
set forth when and how the respondents had entered the land in question and
constructed their houses thereon, jurisdiction did not vest in the MTC to try and decide
the case; that the complaint, if at all, made out a case for either accion
reivindicatoria or accion publiciana, either of which fell within the original jurisdiction of
the RTC; and that the RTC’s reliance on Benitez v. Court of Appeals16 and Calubayan v.
Ferrer17 was misplaced, because the controlling ruling was that in Sarmiento v. Court of
Appeals,18 in which the complaint was markedly similar to that filed in the case.

The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion for its lack of
merit in the resolution of January 24, 2003.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Issues

Hence, this appeal.

The petitioners contend that the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on
appeal in an ejectment case because it was not absolutely confined to the records of
the trial in resolving the appeal; that the respondents were estopped from assailing the
relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC because they had actively
participated in the survey and had even cross-examined Engr. Limpin, the surveyor
tasked to conduct the survey;20 that Engr. Limpin’s testimony must be given credence,
honoring the well-entrenched principle of regularity in the performance of official
functions;21 that the RTC did not conduct a trial de novo by ordering the relocation and
verification survey and hearing the testimony of the surveyor; that the desirability of the
relocation and verification survey had always been part of the proceedings even before
the case was appealed to the RTC;22 that, in any case, the peculiar events that
transpired justified the RTC’s order to conduct a relocation and verification survey;23 that
the case, because it involved encroachment into another’s property, qualified as an
ejectment case that was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the respondents
were barred by laches for never questioning the RTC’s February 11, 1999 ruling on the
issue of jurisdiction.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In contrast, the respondents assail the relocation and verification survey ordered by the
RTC as immaterial, because (a) it could not vest a right of possession or ownership; (b)
the petitioners were mere claimants, not the owners of the property; (c) the petitioner
had never been in possession of the area in question; and (d) cadastral surveys were
not reliable. Hence, they maintain that whether or not the relocation and verification
survey was considered would not alter the outcome of the
case.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not
conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.26 In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership. — x x x.

xxxx

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony
of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The
violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on
the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin.

Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309 was an ejectment case within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the
complaint. Accordingly, the pertinent allegations of the petitioners’ complaint
follow:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2. Plaintiffs are co-owners of land known as Lot no. 4236 of the Guagua cadastre.
Plaintiffs inherited the said parcel of residential land from Tomasa B. Garcia-Manalang
who is the absolute owner of the said property and the same is declared for taxation
purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No. 07014906, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex “A”;

3. Lot No. 4236 is covered by an approved plan, Plan Ap-03-004154 (a copy made
Annex ‘B”) and it consists of 914 square meters;

4. Adjacent to plaintiff’s [p]roperty is Lot No. 4235 of the Guagua Cadastre and covered
by approved plan As-03-00533 (copy made Annex “C”) which is being claimed by
defendants and is the subject matter of Cadastral Case No. N-229 of the Regional Trial
Court of Guagua, Branch 53 where a decision (copy made Annex “D”) was rendered by
said court on August 28, 1996 confirming the title over said lot in favor of defendant
Bienvenido Bacani. The said decision is now final and executory …

5. On February 23, 1997, plaintiffs caused the relocation and verification survey of
cadastral Not No. 4236 of the Guagua Cadastre belonging to plaintiff and the adjoining
lots, particularly Lot No. 4235 being claimed by defendants;

6. The relocation and verification survey conducted by Engr. Rufo R. Rivera, a duly
licensed Geodetic Engineer per plan (copy made Annex “F”) revealed that defendants
had encroached an area of 405 square meters of the parcel of land belonging to
plaintiffs. In fact, the whole or part of the houses of the said defendants have been
erected in said encroached portion;
7. Sometime in June of 1997, plaintiffs through plaintiff Concepcion Gonzales lodged a
complaint before the Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga against
defendants regarding the encroached portion. A preliminary relocation survey was
conducted by the Lands Management Sector of the DENR and it was found that indeed,
defendants encroached into the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs. This finding was
confirmed by the approved plan Ap-03-004154;

8. Since defendants refused to vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful
possession thereof to plaintiff, the Barangay Captain of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga
issued a certification to file action (copy made Annex “G’) dated March 4, 1997 to
enable the plaintiff to file the appropriate action in court;

9. On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter (copy made Annex ‘H”) to
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of
the said encroached portion;

10. Despite receipt of said demand letter per registry return cards attached to the letter,
defendants failed and refused to vacate the encroached portion and surrender the
peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs;

11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable compensation in the amount of P 3,000.00

from defendants for the illegal use and occupation of their property by defendants;

12. By reason of the unjust refusal of defendants to vacate the premises and pay
reasonable compensation to plaintiffs, the latter were constrained to engage the
services of counsel for P30,00.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance and incur litigation
expenses in the amount of P10,000.00.27

Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly
held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria,
not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the
plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and
forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of
the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession
under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the
beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right
of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very
beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had
the prior possession de facto.

Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case.
The dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action
and the court that has jurisdiction over the action.28To be clear, unlawful detainer is an
action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. 29 To vest in the
MTC the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the respondents as the
occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful detainer.30 However, the
allegations of the petitioners’ complaint did not show that they had permitted or tolerated
the occupation of the portion of their property by the respondents; or how the
respondents’ entry had been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the
respondents had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents’ “illegal
use and occupation” of the property. As such, the action was not unlawful detainer.

Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners’ property
was also warranted. In contrast, the only basis for the RTC’s decision was the result of
the relocation and verification survey as attested to by the surveyor, but that basis
should be disallowed for the reasons earlier mentioned. Under the circumstances, the
reinstatement of the ruling of the MTC by the CA was in accord with the
evidence.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002;
and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 39-52; penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

(retired/deceased), with the concurrence of Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
(retired) and Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño (retired/deceased).
2 Id. at 61-67.
3 Id. at 79-83.
4 Id. at 91.
5 Id. at 96-98.
6 Id. at 98.
7The Presiding Judge of Branch 2 later voluntary inhibited herself from the case, which
was then re-assigned to Branch 1.
8 Rollo pp. 99-105.
9 Id. at 104.
10 Id. at 106-111.
11 Id. at 109.
12 Id. at 110.
13 Id. at 111.
14 Id. at 112.
15 Supra note 1.
16 G.R. No. 104828, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA 242.
17 No. L-22645, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 146.
18 G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 108.
19Rollo, pp. 61-65.
20 Id. at 23.
21 Id. at 24.
22 Id. at 25.
23 Id. at 26.
24 Id. at 33.
25 Id. at 118-121.
26Abellera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127480, February 28, 2000, 326 SCRA 485,
491.
27 CA rollo, pp. 31-33.
28Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, September 10,
2003, 410 SCRA 484, 493.
29Estateof Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA
81, 88-89.
30Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 108,
116.

SUPAPO VS. DE JESUS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198356 April 20, 2015

ESPERANZA SUP APO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, namely:

ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, all
surnamed SUPAPO, and SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ROBERTO and SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE
PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo
and Romeo Supapo2(Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision 3 and
August 25, 2011 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.

Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and
Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons
claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to
vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5
(subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-
284416 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo’s names. The land has an
assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (P39,980.00) as
shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of
the City Assessor of Caloocan.7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an
overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year.8 During one of their visits in
1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without
their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus
occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one. 9

The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the
subject lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The
Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for
failure of the parties to settle amicably.10

The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO DE
JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered
to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject
premises.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal was pending,
Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case. 15

On April 30, 1999, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case became final.16

Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the
respondents’ civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. The respondents
moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied
the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.

The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC’s
orders denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-
Squatting Law, the respondents’ criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished. 18 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5,
2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in
Criminal Case No. C-45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby
permanently ENJOINED from further executing or implementing its decision dated
March 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.

The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean
that people now have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and
that it was not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners. 19 In
cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be had in
court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.

The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana.20

After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1) there is another action pending between the
same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations;
and (3) the Spouses Supapo’s cause of action is barred by prior judgment.

The MeTC Ruling23

The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It
ruled that the arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which
at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the
respondents’ motion for reconsideration.

From the MeTC’s ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. 24

The RTC Ruling25

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has
prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has
jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year
from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of
possession should be filed before the RTC.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby declared NULL
and VOID.

The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245 for lack
of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.26
In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court’s
jurisdiction over an action involving title to or possession of land is determined by its
assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints
for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls within MeTC’s
jurisdiction.

The RTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the
subject lot, the Spouses Supapos’ cause of action had already prescribed, the action
having been filed beyond the ten (10)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the
Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to vacate was made, the
RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been filed
is counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to file
action was issued on November 25, 1992,while the complaint for accion publiciana was
filed only on March 7, 2008, or more than ten (10) years thereafter.

Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA.29

The CA Ruling30

The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should
have been lodged before the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.

The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and Order
dated October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the CA

decision; hence, they came to us through the present petition.

The Petition

In seeking reversal of the CA’s ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:

(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00,
or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila; and that

(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible
under the Torrens system.

The Respondents’ Case33

The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the
wrong court; (2) barred by prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.

Issues

The issues for resolution are:

I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;

II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and

III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has
not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.

Accion Publiciana and the Jurisdiction of the MeTC

Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of

possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.34

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession
of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property.35

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.36

Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo’s claim of ownership over the subject
property, we will only do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right
of possession. Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real
property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving
title to or possession of real property is plenary.38

RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.

Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 3 of the same law provides:

Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00)exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of

real property is now determined by its assessed value.40 The assessed value of real
property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to
taxable value.41

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:

[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of
the value of the property involved?

The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or
accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made
between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside
Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.43(Emphasis supplied.)

In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject
of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over
the action. This is required because the nature of the action and the court with original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.44

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject
lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax
declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do
not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.

Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we
hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for
accion publiciana. The cause of action has not prescribed

The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being
filed out of time.

They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states:

Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

xxxx

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost
till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)

The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion
publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file
action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses
Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the complaint having
been filed beyond the period provided by law.
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the
subject property, and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they
posit that the latter have lost their right to recover possession because of laches.

On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion
publiciana more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued.
Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible since the subject
property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.

We rule that the Spouses Supapo’s position is legally correct.

At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system.
The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. 46 Interestingly, the
respondents do not challenge the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the
Supapo’s TCT.47

In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly
been in actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in
the concept of an owner since 1992. The respondents contend that they built their
houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the subject lot for more than
ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed in their possession. 48

Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents’ contentions have
no legal basis.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of
acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because
of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 152950 ].51

The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the
Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section
47 of PD No. 1529 which states:

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.

In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is
also entitled to the possession thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy the land is an
attribute and a logical consequence of ownership.53Corollary to this rule is the right of
the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property.
Again, this right is imprescriptible.54
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens
Title were aware of the of other persons’ occupation of the property, regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if
at all.56

Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer
of the property, we still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant
cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title
proving the alleged transfer or sale.

A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater probative weight to the
plaintiff’s TCT vis-à-vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants.
Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents did not adduce a single
evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo’s TCT. With more reason therefore that we
uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo’s title.

By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo’s TCT,

this Court merely recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of
real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.

We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once
the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of
land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of
being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair
to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will
force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land
conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent.58

With respect to the respondents’ defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that the same is
evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings.60 In other words, the party alleging laches must adduce in court evidence
proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue;
especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.

Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the
Spouses Supapo's petition.61 On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show
the clear intentof the Spouses Supapo to exercise their right over and recover
possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the appropriate Lupon;
(2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the accion
publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo’s right to recover
possession of the subject lot is not barred by prescription.

The action is not barred by prior judgment

As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They
contend that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the
accion publiciana.

To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to
challenge the RTC’s issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the
subject property) arising from their conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA
granted the petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the respondents’
conviction because their criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal of the law
under which they were tried and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from
the crime had also been erased.

The respondents’ reliance on the principle of res judicatais misplaced.

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule
39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in
Rule 39, Section 47(c).62

"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried
on the merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or
order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of
action.63

The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and

(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.

Res judicata is not present in this case.

While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of
subject matter, parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted
under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject
property.

First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the
Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The
accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses
Supapo.

Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the
prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an
action to recover possession of the subject property.

And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the
criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons
who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect
their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.

Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res
judicata has still no basis.

The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of
causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.65

Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.66

As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint

under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason
alone, "conclusiveness of judgment" does not apply.

Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties,
"conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there is no identity of issues.
The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents (accused therein) committed
the crime alleged in the information, while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether
the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents to possess and occupy
the subject property.1âwphi1

For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.

Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of
determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication
is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a
bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the
issue of ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and consequently

REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 8-28. The petition is filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2Romeo Supapo is now deceased a;1d substituted by his heirs Rex Edward,
Ronald Troy, Romeo, .Ir., Sheila Lorence, all surnamed Supapo, and Sheryl
Fortune Supapo-Sandigan.
3Rollo, pp. 30-40. Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza penned the assailed
decision, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Florito S.
Macalino.
4 Id. at 42-43.
5Id. at 62-66. The complaint filed on March 7, 2008 was docketed as Civil Case
No. 08-29245 and raffled to Branch 52, MeTC, Caloocan City.
6 Id. at 327.
7 Id. at 328.
8 Id. at 63.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 329.
11The case docketed as Criminal Case No. C-45610 was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131.
12 Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts dated August 20, 1975.
13 Rollo, p. 335.
14The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 19538 and raffled to the 8th
Division.
15 Rollo, pp. 337-350.
16 Id. at 351. As shown in the Entry of Judgment.
17The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 78649 and raffled to the 4th
Division.
18 Rollo, pp. 353-357.
19
Citing the decision of this Court in Tuates v. Judge Bersamin, G.R. No.138962,
October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 458 (2002).
20 Rollo, p. 25.
21 Id. at 93-101.
22 Id. at 115-116.
23 Id. at 139 and 147-148.
24Id. at 149-160. Docketed as C-960 and filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
25 Id. at 276-279. The decision was promulgated on June 30, 2009.
26 Id. at 279.
27 Id. at 280-284.
28 Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

xxxx

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if

the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of
possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
29Rollo, pp. 298-310. The Spouses Supapo reiterated in their appeal arguments
previously raised in the RTC.
30 Supra notes 2 and 3.
31 Rollo, pp. 50-60.
32 Supra note 3.
33 Rollo, pp. 361-365.
34 Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 130, 140.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37Entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
For Other Purposes" approved on August 14, 1981.
38 Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 424.
39"An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the ‘Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980." Approved March 25, 1994.
40See Ouano v. PGTT International Investment, 434 Phil. 28 (2002); Hilario v.
Salvador, 497 Phil. 327(2005); Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla, 618 Phil. 395
(2009); Padre v. Badillo, G.R. No. 165423, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 50, 66.
41Hilario v. Salvador, supra note 40; BF Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R. No.
173351, July 29, 2010, 220 SCRA 220, 229.
42 557 Phil. 650, 657 (2007).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Supra note 7.
46
Supra note 6. The Registered of Deeds of Caloocan issued the TCT on
October 15, 1979.
47 Rollo, pp. 96-97 (Pages 3 and 4 of Spouses de Jesus’ answer to the complaint
for accion publiciana). The respondents merely note that there is allegedly a
pending case in which the Republic of the Philippines filed an action against the
Spouses Supapo’s predecessor-in-interest to annul the latter’s derivative title.
48 Id.
49 Article 1126 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary

prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a
third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall
begin to run from the recording of the latter.
50Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for
Other Purposes, dated June 11, 1978.
51Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., 503 Phil.
751,763 (2005).
52 Supra note 34.
53 See Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code.
54 Bishop v. CA, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641.
55 Id.
56 See Arroyo v. BIDECO, G.R. No. 167880, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA
430; Labrador v. Perlas, G.R. No. 173900, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 265,
Tolentino v. Laurel, G.R. No. 181368, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 561; Ungria
v. CA, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011, 654 SCRA 314. See also Tuason v.
Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106 (1954); Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-26083, May
31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196; and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-41233, November 21, 1979, 93 SCRA 146.
57 490 Phil. 118, 135 (2005).
58Casimiro Dev't. Corp. v. Mateo, G.R. No. 175485, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA
676, 686.
59 Rollo, p. 364.
60 Unguria V. CA, supra note 56.
61Id., citing Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009,
576 SCRA 70, 87.
62 SSS v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., 650 Phil. 50, 56 (2011),
citing Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Royal Cargo Corporation, G.R.
No. 179756, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 545, 557.
63Estate of Sotto v. Palicte, et al.,587 Phil. 586 (2008), citing Heirs of Panfilo F.
Abalos v. Bucal, 569 Phil. 582 (2008); Anillo v. Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems, 560 Phil. 499 (2007); Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Sandiganbayan, 556 Phil. 664 (2007).
64Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, 565 Phil. 766 (2007);
Estate of the Late Jesus Yujuico v. Republic, 563 Phil. 92 (2007); Estate of the
Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon, 562 Phil. 519 (2007); PCI Leasing &
Finance, Inc. v. Dai, 560 Phil. 84 (2007).
65Supra note 62, citing Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, 26 July
2010, 625 SCRA 472, 479.
66 Id., citing Antonio v. Sayman Vda. de Monje, 646 Phil. 90, 99 (2010).