According to the National Transportation Safety Board, the New Mexico accident

resulted from the decision by the pilot to fly in remote and hilly landing site
during a dark and windy night. Some of the contributing factors to this accident
included situational stress, personal pressure to fly the aircraft, fatigue and a
toxic organizational culture that valued mission completion over safety. The
probable cause of the Alaska accident, on the other hand, was a decision by the
pilot to continue flying into worsening weather conditions. Thus, this decision
contributed to the pilot’s spatial disorientation thereby losing control of the
aircraft. Some of the contributing factors to this accident included the low safety
management and punitive culture in the Alaska Department of Public Safety, which
prevented risk management and paid little attention to pilot training. The
determination of the pilot to finish the search and rescue operation influenced his
decision making. Henceforth, this response determines the similarities and
differences of error chains and ways in which the dynamics of the SMS could have
prevented the two accidents.
Similarities and Differences in Error Chains
Similarities
Both accidents depicted similarities in the pilot’s decision making and
organisational issues with regards to risk assessment and safety management
systems. Foremost, the pilots in these accidents made a decision to continue their
flight in deteriorating weather conditions and fly remotely in mountainous landing
sites according to the AAR1403 and AAR1104 respectively. For the AAR1403 accident,
the pilot flew the helicopter between 1100 and 1200 ft msl. Thus, this means that
cloud ceiling was at 700 ft agl when the pilot first landed the helicopter. During
the accident flight, the pilot flew at 700 ft msl, meaning that visibility of the
search and rescue area had substantially deteriorated. For safety measures, the
pilot could have conducted a precautionary landing and determine various openings
that could be used for emergency landing. Nevertheless, the poor visibility clouded
the pilot’s judgement and visibility of the open areas. The pilot, therefore,
decided to continue the VFR flight in the bad weather since he was motivated to
conduct the mission and accomplish the rescue process. Despite most of the co-
workers terming the pilot as safety oriented, the section commander had spoken to
the pilot concerning the risks of flying in the deteriorating weather. However, the
pilot claimed that he would accomplish the mission irrespective of the poor weather
conditions. The increased tolerance to risks could also have influenced the
decision of the pilot to continue the VFR flight and accomplish his mission. The
pilot has experienced an accident seven years earlier due to poor visibility, but
his tolerance enabled him to navigate obstacles throughout his career. Hence, the
previous successful mission conducted in deteriorating weather conditions also
influenced his decision to continue the VFR flight.
Similarly, in the AAR1104 accident, rescuing the stranded hiker consumed much of
the time for the pilot, according to the spotter. Besides, the incoming weather as
demonstrated by the strong winds made this rescue operation risky. By the time the
pilot had rescued the hiker, it was already dark, making it dangerous to return to
the SAF safely. The pilot had an option of sheltering in the helicopter until the
weather was desirable. Nonetheless, the pilot was airborne within nine minutes
after the rescue.
Secondly, organisational issues also contributed significantly to these two
accidents. For instance, a risk assessment conducted in the AAR1403 depicted that
the helicopter had one engine and had a nonIFR-certified platform. Additionally,
the helicopter was operated by only one pilot with NVGs but no instrument-current
process. Therefore, although the helicopter could operate on dark nights, it was
risky to fly in IMC conditions, and this contributed to the accident. Inadequate
risk assessment at the Alaska DPS contributed to this accident. Likewise, AAR1104
stated that the NMSP did not have an SMS program during the period which the
accident occurred. Notably, the department also failed to enable its pilots to
conduct a structured and systematic risk assessment or reassessment before flights.
Such initiatives could have influenced the pilot’s decision making during the
flight.
Differences
The main difference in error chain between these two accidents is that pilot
training contributed to the AAR1403 accident while aspects such as fatigue,
situational stress and self-induced pressure influenced the pilot’s decision in the
AAR1104 accident. In the AAR1403 accident, the pilot did not attain a formal NVG
training despite being a requirement by the FAA. Hence, the pilot could not conduct
a risk assessment and situational awareness due to the lack of this training.
Surprisingly, the Alaska DPS enabled its pilots to fly without this qualification.
The same pilot was involved in an accident in 2006 while using the NVGs during a
flight. Henceforth, incompetence in pilot training contributed to the chain errors.
For the AAR1104, the pilot experienced fatigue after spending almost an hour while
rescuing the hiker. Besides, the pilot experienced a self-induced pressure to
complete the mission. Thus, situational stress prevented him from pinpointing and
assessing alternatives. The pilot then decided to take off from a remote and hilly
landing site, leading to the accident.
How SMS Dynamics Could have Prevented the Accidents
SMS dynamics are critical in the management of safety and include policies and
procedures, organizational structures and accountabilities. Foremost, policies and
procedures could have helped with the organisational issues experienced in both
accidents. For instance, the AAR1403 demonstrated that the pilot had no NVG
training, as a requirement to fly bad weather and poor visibility. Likewise,
AAR1104 outlined that the NMSP did not implement the SMS program, therefore
limiting safety measures like risk assessment for pilots. Thus, if the organisation
has implemented policies and procedures to ensure that all pilots underwent the NVG
training and implemented the SMS program earlier, then the accident could not have
occurred.
The organisational structures in both accidents valued a culture that promoted the
completion of missions as opposed to appreciating safety. Hence, both pilots became
motivated to complete their missions without identifying an alternative course of
action. Changes in the organizational structure to promote safety orientation could
have prevented the accidents, while also supporting the completion of the mission
at hand.
Lastly, accountability, as an SMS dynamic was not evident in both accident reports.
Accountability could have influenced the pilots’ decision-making in both situations
because everyone could be accountable for the actions taken. Accountability is a
safety measure, which could have forced the pilots to appreciate the risks and
explore alternatives, as opposed to completing the mission on time. Henceforth, all
these SMS dynamics could have helped in preventing these accidents.