Mina v.
Pascual, 25 Phil 540
REPUBLIC v. BAGTAS
Facts: Bagtas borrowed three bulls from the Bureau of Animal Industry for one
year for breeding purposes subject to payment of breeding fee of 10% of book
value of the bull. Upon expiration, Bagtas asked for renewal. The renewal was
granted only to one bull. Bagtas offered to buy the bulls at its book value less
depreciation but the Bureau refused. The Bureau said that Bagtas should either
return or buy it at book value. Bagtas proved that he already returned two of
the bulls, and the other bull died during a Huk raid, hence, obligation already
extinguished. He claims that the contract is a commodatum hence, loss
through fortuitous event should be borne by the owner.
Issue: WON Bagtas is liable for the death of the bull.
Held: Yes. Commodatum is essentially gratuitous. However, in this case, there
is a 10% charge. If this is considered compensation, then the case at bar is a
lease. Lessee is liable as possessor in bad faith because the period already
lapsed. Even if this is a commodatum, Bagtas is still liable because the
fortuitous event happened when he held the bull and the period stipulated
already expired and he is liable because the thing loaned was delivered with
appraisal of value and there was no contrary stipulation regarding his liability
in case there is a fortuitous event.
REPUBLIC VS BAGTAS G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962
FACTS: Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls
for a period of one year for breeding purposes subject to a government charge
of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the books. Upon the expiration of
the contract, Bagtas asked for a renewal for another one year, however, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved only the renewal for
one bull and other two bulls be returned. Bagtas then wrote a letter to the
Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls with
a deduction of yearly depreciation. The Director advised him that the value
cannot be depreciated and asked Bagtas to either return the bulls or pay their
book value. Bagtas neither paid nor returned the bulls. The Republic then
commenced an action against Bagtas ordering him to return the bulls or pay
their book value.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Trial court: After hearing, the trial Court
ruled in favor of the Republic, as such, the Republic moved ex parte for a writ
of execution which the court granted.
INTERVENING FACT: Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse and
administrator of Bagtas' estate, returned the two bulls and filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution since one bull cannot be returned for it was killed
by gunshot during a Huk raid. The Court denied her motion hence, this appeal
certified by the Court of Appeals because only questions of law are raised.
ISSUES & RULING: 1. WON the contract was commodatum; WON Bagtas
should be held liable for its loss due to force majeure.
NO, the contract is not commodatum. YES, he is liable for the loss.
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. Supreme Court held that
Bagtas was liable for the loss of the bull even though it was caused by a
fortuitous event. If the contract was one of lease, then the 10% breeding charge
is compensation (rent) for the use of the bull and Bagtas, as lessee, is subject to
the responsibilities of a possessor. He is also in bad faith because he continued
to possess the bull even though the term of the contract has already expired.
If the contract was one of commodatum, he is still liable because: (1) he kept
the bull longer than the period stipulated; and (2) the thing loaned has been
delivered with appraisal of its value (10%). No stipulation that in case of loss
of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be
exempt from liability.
The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan
of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950.
But the appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during a
Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered
to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls had each an appraised book
value, to with: the Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the
Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due
to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from
liability.
Francisco is the owner of land and he allowed his brother, Andres, to erect a
warehouse in that lot. Both Francisco and Andres died and their children
became their respective heirs: Mina for Francisco and Pascual for Andres.
Pascual sold his share of the warehouse and lot. Mina opposed because the lot
is hers because her predecessor (Francisco) never parted with its ownership
when he let Andres construct a warehouse, hence, it was a contract of
commodatum. What is the nature of the contract between Francisco and
Andres?
The Supreme Court held that it was not a commodatum. It is an essential
feature of commodatum that the use of the thing belonging to another shall be
for a certain period. The parties never fixed a definite period during which
Andres could use the lot and afterwards return it.
NOTA BENE: It would seem that the Supreme Court failed to consider the
possibility of a contract of precardium between Francisco and Andres.
Precardium is a kind of commodatum wherein the bailor may demand the
object at will if the contract does not stipulate a period or use to which the
thing is devoted.
Catholic Vicar vs. CA, 165 SCRA 515
Facts:- 1962: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (Vicar),
petitioner, filed with the court an application for the registration of title over
lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 situated in Poblacion Central, Benguet, said lots being used as
sites of the Catholic Church, building, convents, high school building, school
gymnasium, dormitories, social hall and stonewalls.
- 1963: Heirs of Juan Valdez and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano claimed that they
have ownership over lots 1, 2 and 3. (2 separate civil cases)
- 1965: The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of Vicar to
lots 1 , 2, 3 and 4. Upon appeal by the private respondents (heirs), the decision
of the lower court was reversed. Title for lots 2 and 3 were cancelled.- VICAR
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2
and 3.
- During trial, the Heirs of Octaviano presented one (1) witness, who testified
on the alleged ownership of the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-
in-interest, Egmidio Octaviano; his written demand to Vicar for the return of
the land to them; and the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at P10,000
per month. On the other hand, Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Benguet, Atty. Sison, who testified that the land in question is not
covered by any title in the name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the heirs.
Vicar dispensed with the testimony of Mons. Brasseur when the heirs admitted
that the witness if called to the witness stand, would testify that Vicar has been
in possession of Lot 3, for 75 years continuously and peacefully and has
constructed permanent structures thereon.
Issue: WON Vicar had been in possession of lots 2 and 3 merely as bailee
borrower in commodatum, a gratuitous loan for use.
Held: YES.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was
borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed.
They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free
use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.
The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor
did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held
in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of
petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes.
The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title
by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner Vicar did not meet the requirement
of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither
did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive
prescription because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not
believe the findings of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez
by purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano
by petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to
support the same and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the
application for registration.
Republic vs CA
FACTS: The Heirs of Domingo Baloy, (private respondents), applied for a
registration of title for their land. Their claim is based on their possessory
information title acquired by Domingo Baloy through the Spanish Mortgage
Law, coupled with their continuous, adverse and public possession of the
land in question. The Director of Lands opposed the registration alleging that
such land became public land through the operation of Act 627 of the
Philippine Commission. On Nov 26, 1902, pursuant to the executive order of
the President of U.S., the area was declared within the US Naval Reservation.
The CFI denied respondents' application for registration. CA, reversed the
decision. Petitioners herein filed their Motion for Reconsideration, said MR
was denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents' rights by virtue of their
possessory information title was lost by prescription.
RULING: No. A communication which contains an official statement of the
position of the Republic of the Philippines with regard to the status of the
land in question recognizes the fact that Domingo Baloy and/or his heirs
have been in continuous possession of said land since 1894 as attested by an
"Informacion Possessoria" Title, which was granted by the Spanish
Government. Hence, the disputed property is private land and this
possession was interrupted only by the occupation of the land by the U.S.
Navy in 1945. The heirs of the late Domingo P. Baloy, are now in actual
possession, and this has been so since the abandonment by the U.S. Navy.
The occupancy of the U.S. Navy was not in the concept of owner. It holds of
the character of a commodatum. It cannot affect the title of Domingo Baloy.
One's ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of another's
possession if such possession be under claim of ownership, not where the
possession is only intended to be temporary, as in the case of the U.S. Navy's
occupation of the land concerned, in which case the owner is not divested of
his title, although it cannot be exercised in the meantime
Delos Santos v. Jarra Digest
G.R. No. L-4150 February 10, 1910 Facts: The Plaintiff Felix delos Santos filed
this suit against Agustina Jarra. Jarra was the administratix of the estate of
Jimenea. Plaintiff alleged that he owned 10 1st class carabaos which he lent to
his father-in-law Jimenea to be used in the animal-power mill without
compensation. This was done on the condition of their return after the work
at the latter’s mill is terminated. When delos Santos demanded the return of
the animals Jimenea refused, hence this suit.
Issue: W/N the contracts is one of a commodatum
Ruling: YES. The carabaos were given on commodatum as these were
delivered to be used by defendant. Upon failure of defendant to return the
cattle upon demand, he is under the obligation to indemnify the plaintiff by
paying him their value. Since the 6 carabaos were not the property of the
deceased or of any of his descendants, it is the duty of the administratrix of
the estate to either return them or indemnify the owner thereof of their value.
Quintos vs. Beck, No. 46240, November 3, 1939, 69 Phil 108
IMPERIAL, J.:
The plaintiff brought this action to compel the defendant to return her
certain furniture which she lent him for his use. She appealed from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered that the
defendant return to her the three has heaters and the four electric lamps found
in the possession of the Sheriff of said city, that she call for the other furniture
from the said sheriff of Manila at her own expense, and that the fees which the
Sheriff may charge for the deposit of the furniture be paid pro rata by both
parties, without pronouncement as to the costs.
The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff and as such occupied the
latter's house on M. H. del Pilar street, No. 1175. On January 14, 1936, upon the
novation of the contract of lease between the plaintiff and the defendant, the
former gratuitously granted to the latter the use of the furniture described in
the third paragraph of the stipulation of facts, subject to the condition that the
defendant would return them to the plaintiff upon the latter's demand. The
plaintiff sold the property to Maria Lopez and Rosario Lopez and on
September 14, 1936, these three notified the defendant of the conveyance,
giving him sixty days to vacate the premises under one of the clauses of the
contract of lease. There after the plaintiff required the defendant to return all
the furniture transferred to him for them in the house where they were found.
On November 5, 1936, the defendant, through another person, wrote to
the plaintiff reiterating that she may call for the furniture in the ground floor
of the house. On the 7th of the same month, the defendant wrote another letter
to the plaintiff informing her that he could not give up the three gas heaters
and the four electric lamps because he would use them until the 15th of the
same month when the lease in due to expire. The plaintiff refused to get the
furniture in view of the fact that the defendant had declined to make delivery
of all of them. On November 15th, before vacating the house, the
defendant deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to the plaintiff
and they are now on deposit in the warehouse situated at No. 1521, Rizal
Avenue, in the custody of the said sheriff.
In their seven assigned errors the plaintiffs contend that the trial court
incorrectly applied the law: in holding that they violated the contract by not
calling for all the furniture on November 5, 1936, when the defendant placed
them at their disposal; in not ordering the defendant to pay them the value of
the furniture in case they are not delivered; in holding that they should get all
the furniture from the Sheriff at their expenses; in ordering them to pay-half of
the expenses claimed by the Sheriff for the deposit of the furniture; in ruling
that both parties should pay their respective legal expenses or the costs; and in
denying pay their respective legal expenses or the costs; and in denying the
motions for reconsideration and new trial. To dispose of the case, it is only
necessary to decide whether the defendant complied with his obligation to
return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand; whether the latter is bound
to bear the deposit fees thereof, and whether she is entitled to the costs of
litigation.lawphi1.net
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum,
because under it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to
the defendant, reserving for herself the ownership thereof; by this contract the
defendant bound himself to return the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the
latters demand (clause 7 of the contract, Exhibit A; articles 1740, paragraph 1,
and 1741 of the Civil Code). The obligation voluntarily assumed by the
defendant to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand, means that he
should return all of them to the plaintiff at the latter's residence or house. The
defendant did not comply with this obligation when he merely placed them at
the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters and
the four eletric lamps. The provisions of article 1169 of the Civil Code cited by
counsel for the parties are not squarely applicable. The trial court, therefore,
erred when it came to the legal conclusion that the plaintiff failed to comply
with her obligation to get the furniture when they were offered to her.
As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture
to the plaintiff, upon the latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel
her to bear the expenses occasioned by the deposit of the furniture at the
defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was not entitled to place the furniture
on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the
furniture, because the defendant wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the
four electric lamps.
As to the value of the furniture, we do not believe that the plaintiff is
entitled to the payment thereof by the defendant in case of his inability to
return some of the furniture because under paragraph 6 of the stipulation of
facts, the defendant has neither agreed to nor admitted the correctness of the
said value. Should the defendant fail to deliver some of the furniture, the value
thereof should be latter determined by the trial Court through evidence which
the parties may desire to present.
The costs in both instances should be borne by the defendant because the
plaintiff is the prevailing party (section 487 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
The defendant was the one who breached the contract of commodatum, and
without any reason he refused to return and deliver all the furniture upon the
plaintiff's demand. In these circumstances, it is just and equitable that he pay
the legal expenses and other judicial costs which the plaintiff would not have
otherwise defrayed.
The appealed judgment is modified and the defendant is ordered to
return and deliver to the plaintiff, in the residence to return and deliver to the
plaintiff, in the residence or house of the latter, all the furniture described in
paragraph 3 of the stipulation of facts Exhibit A. The expenses which may be
occasioned by the delivery to and deposit of the furniture with the Sheriff shall
be for the account of the defendant. the defendant shall pay the costs in both
instances. So ordered.