G.R. No.

205228 July 15, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y ADRIANO,
JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
04028, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009, convicting
accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No.
13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the crime of Murder (Crim. Case No.
13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano
y Sales."

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:

Crim. Case No. 13159-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together,
with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted
firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different parts of her body, resulting in her death to the
damage of her heirs.3

Crim. Case No. 13160-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together,
with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted
firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of his body, resulting in his death to the
damage of his heirs.4

Version of the Prosecution:

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and
P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.5

While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla
(Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in
front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.6

When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot
the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4)
armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who
was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near
the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the Corolla and
immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the Corolla but lost track
of the latter.7

Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced dead
on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on the
left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head.

During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of
Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but
clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he
leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where he was
identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from the
passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately arrested
and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.8

In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered one (1)
deformed fired bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm.9

Version of the Defense

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he was at his
house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the laundry, he
took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there.10

At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a
lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went
home and brought his child to his mother. On his way to his mother's house, he met his brother-in-
law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his mother's house, Adriano went to the
cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he
left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.11

After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At
around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia
(Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from him, which he rented from Rivera.12

At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano went to
Rivera to return the Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the Corolla's
trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured.13

The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon corroborated
Adriano's testimony.14

When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden," Abba
Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3)
Police Senior Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6)
P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky Flores.

On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as witnesses.
 Ruling of the Lower Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the ground
that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to the RTC, Adriano's alibi
cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively identified Adriano as one of
the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full
credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI Garabiles and P02 Santos. The RTC
determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate that PO1 Garabiles and
P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify against Adriano. The RTC found as proven
the assessment of damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay the heirs
of Cabiedes the amount of P222,482.00 based on the following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Pl00,000.00) as funeral expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as expenses for the food
served during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as
groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) for the parts
and service repair of the CRV.15

The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as
charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
that attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the
amount of Php 50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as actual damages.

And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the
death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the offense, he is further sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00.16

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred when it failed to appreciate
his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies of the other defense's witnesses. Adriano contended
that the RTC erred when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are
inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano referred to the following particulars: 1) whether the
culprits started shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did
the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal shot; 4) whether the trip
of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the
precise distance of the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise
minutes of the shooting incident.

The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of
Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in their
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.

On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R TC that Adriano's claim that
he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince because it
was not impossible for Adriano to be physically present at the crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in less than an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City,
Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the
Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of
Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00). In addition, the
Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.18

Our Ruling

In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1)
the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of
perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating
circumstances.

Death of Cabiedes

The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure that
the victim is killed and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or
retaliation from the victim—19ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two
elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or
forms of attack employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself."21

Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the time of
the attack. Adriano, together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the
unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and
then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds. When
the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn to the right and on to
the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped, precluding all
possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush
committed by Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy
with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed
was deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate.22

All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending
himself.

Death of Bulanan

We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was killed by a
stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the unknowing
victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill
Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random
and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no
means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for
the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not
exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct
consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera24 citing People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that accused killed a
person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to
kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed
Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the
import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.26

As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.27 In the aforesaid
case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate
crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of
the victims were not the result of a single act but of several acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is
apt and applicable.

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a
complex crime.

As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6)
cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst.
Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed
Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in two separate and
distinct crimes.

Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery may be
appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder:
for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray
bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both
killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora
doctrine.

Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not established, a perusal of the
records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the prosecution offered in
evidence Bulanan's death certificate.31

On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak and
unreliable because they can easily be fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must
convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed and that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.33 In the case at bar, Adriano claimed he
was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed to persuade. As
admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the crime scene,
Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not physically impossible for Adriano to be
at the crime scene at the time of the incident.

It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by credible
witnesses but by the accused's relatives and friends. Therefore, the defense's evidence which is
1âwphi1

composed of Adriano's relatives and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's positive
identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
In the case at bar, as the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the
former is absorbed in the latter. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the
lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must establish with a
reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means of competent proof or the best
evidence obtainable.34Documentary evidence support the award of actual damages in this case. The
RTC computed the amount of actual damages as P222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records
reveals that the amount of award of actual damages should be P232,482.00 as duly supported by
official receipts.35 Therefore, we hereby increase the award of actual damages from P222,482.00
to P232,482.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y
SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for
the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of DANILO
CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos
{P232,482.00) as actual damages.

Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO
y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA BULANAN in the amount of the amount of
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of finality until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196005 October 1, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.

DECISION

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case

On appeal is the Decision1 dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03943, affirming with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 3 November 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053, U-10054, and U-
10055.

The Facts

Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were
charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and for camapping.

The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:

The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:

That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention
prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto kill, treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa
inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO2 Reynaldo
Gamboa.

CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.3 The
Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:

The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the
use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:

That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention
prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting
upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.

CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.4

The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:

The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN
CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping committed as
follows:

That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having just escaped from the BJMP Compound,
Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to
gain, conspiring with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal,
and carry away one (1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Bau[z]on
without the latter’s knowledge and consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle. CONTRARY
to R.A. 6539, as amended.5

Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante
Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto Ganceña, Dionisio Badua,
Police Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes, SPO1
Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres, Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector
Reyland Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen,
Warden Romeo Jacaban, SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.

The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa
(JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were
inside the nipa hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned
inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and
instructed the latter to open all the cells for the routine headcount.

Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing
scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the
administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to
answer the phone.

After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he
turned his head towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa,
who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.

Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite.
Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad,
armed with JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from
JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the
main gate. After seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gateand returned to his cell.

Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw
jeep with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’sknowledge and
consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached
Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up
truck. When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group
abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field
and arrested appellants and their companions.

Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the
death was caused by shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno
also testified that based on the injuries sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting
was preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.

Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that
the death was caused by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot wound that damaged the heart.

Versions of Appellants

Appellants denied any criminal liability.

Fieldad’s Testimony

At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and
ordered him to clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the offices, he was told to fix a vehicle
parked inside the jail compound. He needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find the
jack handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1
Bacolor. JO2 Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2 Gamboa
handed Badua the key of the jail compound. Badua went out of the compound, while Fieldad
continued to look for the jack handle.

While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the
other inmates playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.

Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired
towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the outpost. He peeped through the
windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard the
exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people
calling for help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the people pushing it
dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the
main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took
cover.

While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed the latter to go with him.
Fieldad, along with other inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal to a Tamaraw jeep parked
outside. Leal pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive the vehicle.
Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they picked up Delim and Chan.

Pimentel’s Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed to go out of his cell. He
proceeded to the basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or three gunshots, but did not
immediately mind it because he was used to the guards firing their guns in the morning. When he
saw Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house
outside the jailcompound. He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange of fire.
Inmates were running in different directions.

Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to the latter by pointing his
armalite downward several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who ordered him to remove the stone
blocking the tire of the jeep parked near the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep
because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other
companions were. Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to alight
from the jeep, and to board the other vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.

Cornista’s Testimony

Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning
the jail compound. He was shocked and confused when he heard three rapid gunfires followed by
consecutive gunfires coming from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal and
Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2 Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail
guards lying down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.

Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and
Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot him if he did. Fieldad drove
the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined them along the way.
Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to
transfer to the other vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in Tarlac.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista
are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual damages
and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning capacity.

Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.

2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista
are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual
damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.
 Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.

3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan
Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING and
each is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS AND EIGHT MONTHS
to SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of Php15,000.00
and moral damages of Php25,000.00.

For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since Chan had died.7 They assigned
the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN

THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE
ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.

IV

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’

TESTIMONIES.8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with respect to the penalties
imposed upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054, taking into account the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the
penalties of imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054.
Accordingly the penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9

The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts."10 The
Court of Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:

x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the latter’s head
clearly demonstrated his discernment. He took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also
grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would
weaken the latter’s defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he
usedin opening the main gate clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established
discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted with discernment may not be excused from criminal
liability.11

Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals’ decision. In the interim,
Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw Appeal12 dated 15 June 2011, which the Court granted in a
Resolution13 dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and executory as to Cornista on 5
October 2011.14 The instant appeal thus pertainsto Fieldad and Pimentel only.

Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs15 filed before the Court of Appeals as their
supplemental briefs in this case.16

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Nature of the Killings

Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued with firearms to
protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound."17 This
argument is untenable.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.18

In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, we held:

x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk
of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life
where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the
case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the
shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above
the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr.
and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless.
He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In the case of People v. Tabaco,21 treachery was appreciated in the killing of three peace officers,
one of whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and order. They were attending an
event where many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order. In that case, the
victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the
sudden attack.

In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending
themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan
held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista
to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun
and shot JO1 Bacolor.

Fieldad’s Identity was Established

According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a participant in the killings of JO1
Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings were not established. However,
contrary to his contention, Fieldad’s identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was
proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the testimony of Badua, who categorically identified
Fieldad and recounted in detail his participation in the incident:

Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo?

A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath there
were persons grappling possession of the armalite, sir.

Q With whom?

A Charlie and Cornista, sir.

Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and brought the water to the place where (sic) the
guards used to take a bath and you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with whom?

A Bacolor, sir.

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO

You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point to him, you step down?

A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand (sic) with accused and who when
asked his name he answered Felmer Fieldad).

Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?

A Yes, sir.

COURT

Do you know Charlie?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is he in the courtroom?

A Yes, sir.

Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?

A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie Fieldad).

COURT

Warden what is the name?

BJMP WARDEN JACABAN

Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO

How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point to him?

A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when asked his name he answered Ryan
Cornista).

Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling possession of the armalite of
Jail Guard Bacolor?

A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.

Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?

A Cornista, sir.

Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back of his head?

A Bacolor fell down, sir.

xxxx
Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?

A He fell down, sir.

Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?

A They got his gun, sir.

Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?

A Charlie, sir.

COURT

What kind of firearm?

A 9 MM, sir.

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO

What did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa?

A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.

Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?

A Two (2) times, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)

It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.23 Positive
identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the
accused.24

In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldad’s self-serving defense of denial and alibi must fail.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.25 True, the
conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of
accused beyondreasonable doubt, conviction is in order.

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is corroborated by circumstantial evidence.

A careful examination of the record reveals that the following evidence establish Fieldad’s active
participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:

1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of the latter’s armalite gun, and JO1 Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him
at back of the head;26
 2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun
and usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor;27

3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor,
testified that because of the abrasions, the shooting of the victim may have been preceded
by a fight between the victim and the shooter;28

4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa
hut before heading out the main gate;29

5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but
moments before the gun shots rang;30

6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin casts31 of the hands of
Fieldad;32 and

7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that the paraffin test done on
Fieldad’s hands was positive for the presence of gun powder nitrates,33 as contained in her
report.34 In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We note that Fieldad’s
counsel manifested duringtrial that the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance
of counsel, contrary to the right of the accused.35 However, all the exhibits offered by the
prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results, wereadmitted in the Order dated 3
March 2000.36 To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the
accused against self incrimination. In People v. Gamboa,37 we held:

As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth
assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not
be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent
counsel of his own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not
when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test
proved positively thathe just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of
the prosecution.38 (Emphasis supplied)

Conspiracy in the Killings

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.39 Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.40 Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.

Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor,
Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the
felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that
points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail
guards.

Penalty and Damages for Murder

Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it must be stated
that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs
of each deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
however, the amount of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00.41 Exemplary
damages are recoverable due to the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery in the commission of the crimes.42

The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the funerals of JO2
Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00 and P87,349.45, respectively, are
supported by receipts and are in order.

The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and P178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa
and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the formula

Net earning capacity = {2/3 x [80 – age at the time of death] x [gross
annual income– reasonable and necessary living
expenses]}43

However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed the net earning capacity using
the monthlyincome. Hence, we multiply the amounts by twelve in order to arrive at the amounts
of P1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.

Elements of Carnapping

Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.44 The
elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than
the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.45

All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded
the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he
did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.

Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered
for being hearsay because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.

Appellants’ argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he arrived home, his
Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the place where he parked it, and that he had to retrieve it from
Bactad:

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO

When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was parked what did you do?
A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.

xxxx

COURT

What is the description of your tamaraw?

A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO

What is the color of your tamaraw jeep?

A Red, sir.

Q Plate number?

A CDY 255, sir.

Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?

A In my name, sir.

Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep was in Bactad?

A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.

COURT

Did you leave the key?

A Yes, sir, at the ignition.

Q Is it visible?

A Yes, sir.

xxxx

COURT

Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?

A Yes, sir.46 (Emphasis supplied)

As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:47

Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain"
is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may
be derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was
taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.48

Defense of Uncontrollable Fear

To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that Leal forced them to take the
Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.

Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.49 For such defense to
prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done.50 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.51 It is
necessary that the compulsion be of such a character asto leave no opportunity to escape or self-
defense in equal combat.52

In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed
when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle
stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In
addition, according to appellants’ testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the
Court ofAppeals is quoted with approval:

x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could
have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have
been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape
individually. Bynot availing of this chance to escape, accused-appellants’ allegation of fear or duress
becomes untenable.53

To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstance.54The circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any way their claim that they acted under an
uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the
fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take
the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.

Penalty and Damages for Carnapping

The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539:

SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping.— Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation
of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than the minimum
prescribed.55 Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and
eight months to sixteen years and two months is in order.

The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.

No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be
adjudicated.56 Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.57 Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury.58

The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order. However, we delete the award of moral
1âw phi1

damages since there was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, or any similar injury.

Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in the carnapping case, we
also impose on all the ·amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.59

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3 November 2008 Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;

2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased

to P30,000.00; 3. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is
increased to P30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded
to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to P1,836,336.00;

5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1
Bacolor in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to P2,142,000.00;

6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-10055 is deleted; and

7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 he highest respect. This is based on the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to assess
the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before his sala as he had personally heard them and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[65] Especially, where issues
raised involve the credibility of witnesses, the trial courts findings thereon will not be disturbed on
appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts, or
circumstances of weight or substance, which could have affected the result of the case.[66] Succinctly
put, findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great
weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in
court.[67]
Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence against him. The findings
of the forensic biologist on the examination of the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsas
death inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy report revealed that Elsa
was stabbed at least three times on the chest. This, taken together with Demetrios testimony that
accused-appellant kept the kitchen knife inside his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the
inescapable fact that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the
hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.[68] For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest
order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[69]
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa, the confluence of the
testimonial and physical evidence against accused-appellant creates an unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-
appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others. Circumstantial evidence may
be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence is not available,
otherwise felons would go scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection.The
rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2)
the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces
a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[70]
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the prosecution
without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants
condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-appellants
housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it
was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993, accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected
the dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that
accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that
accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road going to Bagac,
Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were
found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found
inside accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas
head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and in the trunk of
his car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Mendez, did
not examine the pancreas of the deceased notwithstanding Demetrios statement that, according to
accused-appellant, Elsa died of bangungot, or hemorrhage of the pancreas. Because of this,
accused-appellant insists that the cause of death was not adequately established.Then, he relied on
the controverting testimony of his witness, lawyer-doctor Ernesto Brion, who was himself a
Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI for several years, to the effect that the autopsy report prepared
by Dr. Mendez was unreliable and inconclusive. The trial court noted, however, that Dr. Brion was
a biased witness whose testimony cannot be relied upon because he entered his appearance as one
of the counsel for accused-appellant and, in such capacity, extensively cross-examined Dr.
Mendez. Accused-appellant counters that there is no prohibition against lawyers giving
testimony. Moreover, the trial courts ruling would imply that lawyers who testify on behalf of their
clients are presumed to be lying.
By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean that he perjured himself
on the witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was presented as expert witness. His testimony and the
questions propounded on him dealt with his opinion on the probable cause of death of the
victim. Indeed, the presentation of expert testimony is one of the well-known exceptions to the
rule against admissibility of opinions in evidence.[71] In like manner, Dr. Mendez was presented on
the stand to give his own opinion on the same subject. His opinion differed from that of Dr. Brion,
which is not at all unusual. What the trial court simply did was to choose which --- between two
conflicting medico-legal opinions --- was the more plausible. The trial court correctly lent more
credence to Dr. Mendezs testimony, not only because Dr. Brion was a biased witness, but more
importantly, because it was Dr. Mendez who conducted the autopsy and personally examined Elsas
corpse up close.
In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact that Elsas body was
found mutilated inside accused-appellants bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was accused-
appellant who cut up Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-appellant would be the only suspect
to her killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut up Elsas body as if to conceal the real cause of
her death?
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was convincing. Accused-appellant attempts to
refute Demetrios statements by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for
discourteous and reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender his
resignation. Thus, accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas death on him in order to
get back at him. This Court finds the cruel treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive for the
employee to implicate him in such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather than entertain an
accusation of ill-motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo, this Court views his act of promptly
reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the authorities, as a genuine desire to bring justice
to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a warrant and, therefore, illegal. In
this regard, the rule is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[72] In other words, it is too late in the day for
accused-appellant to raise an issue about his warrantless arrest after he pleaded to a valid
information and after a judgment of conviction was rendered against him after a full-blown trial.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening letters which, according
to Elsa, were written by the latters husband. There is nothing in these letters which will exculpate
accused-appellant from criminal liability. The threats were directed at accused-appellant, not
Elsa. The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive in accused-appellants condominium unit, and
subsequently discovered dead in accused-appellants bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead
body was found does not support the theory that it was Fred Castillo who was probably responsible
for her death.
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime.[73] The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish
that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be
enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim.[74]
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself.[75] In this
case, nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated
in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his
superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the
photograph of accused-appellant[76] that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved and cannot be
appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was
correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder.[77] In this
case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat.
Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving
them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted
in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the
viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.
In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:

Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because
of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of
murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at
(the) person or corpse of the victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy
Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off of the head and
limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs and liver. The
killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and hung around
Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were facetiously described
as pulutan. [78]

Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder,
qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse.[79] This circumstance was both
alleged in the information and proved during the trial. At the time of its commission, the penalty
for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.[80] No aggravating or mitigating
circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period.[81] Therefore, the trial courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct,
and need not be modified.
However, the damages awarded by trial court should be modified. Elida Santos, Elsas sister,
testified that the funeral expenses was only P50,000.00.[82] Hence, the trial court erred when it
awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining
actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork
but must depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of
the loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable certainty.[83]
The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of the physical suffering and
mental anguish brought about by the felonious acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal offenses
resulting in death.[84] It is true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the victims heirs or to
penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the heirs.[85]Considering, however, the
extraordinary circumstances in the case at bar, more particularly the unusual grief and outrage
suffered by her bereaved family as a result of the brutal and indecent mutilation and disposal of
Elsas body, the moral damages to be awarded to them should be more than the normal amount
dictated by jurisprudence. However, the amount of P3,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court as
moral damages is rather excessive. The reasonable amount is P1,000,000.00 considering the
immense sorrow and shock suffered by Elsas heirs.
The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved,[86] and thus should be affirmed.
Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for her death. In murder, the
civil indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The grant of civil indemnity in
murder requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-
appellants responsibility therefor.[87]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in
Criminal Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo
actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
and attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINADOR MALANA and G.R. No. 173612
RODEL TIAGA,
Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
Promulgated:

March 26, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The petitioners Dominador Malana (Dominador) and Rodel

Tiaga (Rodel), together with their acquitted co-accused Elenito Malana (Elenito),
were charged with the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12. The
charges[1] stemmed from an incident on 28 May 2000 that left Betty Capsa-Roxas
(Betty) dead, and her daughter and granddaughter injured. The appellants pleaded
not guilty during the arraignment.

The prosecution presented the two adult survivors of the ghastly crime, Vicente
Roxas Jr., (Vicente) and his daughter Suzette Roxas (Suzette), as its main witnesses.
 They testified as follows: In the evening of 28 May 2000, Vicente, his wife,
Betty, Suzette, and the latters infant daughter, Jenny Rose de la Cruz (Jenny), were
asleep inside their house in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Their house is a single-
storey structure with spaces apportioned for the living room, the kitchen, and one
bedroom.[2] Vicente and Betty slept at the living room, while Suzette and Jenny
occupied the bedroom. [3]

Vicente testified that at around 11:30 p.m., he was awakened by the sound of dogs
barking. He saw the kitchen door of their house on fire. He tried to douse the flames
with water, but the fire fuming of the smell of gasoline, spread out instead. Vicente
woke Betty and told her to fetch help. As Betty opened the main door of their house,
Dominador, Rodel, and a third man whom he identified as Ronnie Malana, suddenly
appeared and entered the house.[4] Since these
individualshad previously threatened to kill Vicente and his entire
family, Vicente, upon seeing them, ran through the burning kitchen door and out of
the house to seek help from his brother-in-law, Roberto Oredero, whose house was
merely 30 meters away.[5] After escaping several meters from his house, Vicente
heard an explosion and saw the fire engulf his entire house.[6]

Meanwhile, Suzette, who was awakened by her parents panicked reaction to

the kitchen fire, cradled Jenny and saw the three men enter their house when her
mother opened the main door. Dominador and Rodel were standing behind the third
man.[7] She testified that the third man carried a round one-gallon container with a

wick of three to four inches in length. Rodel lit the wick with a match, and the third
man threw the container into Suzettes bedroom. After that, the three men
simultaneously ran away. Suzette saw the container burst into flames and explode.[8]

The explosion killed Betty instantly, blowing apart her legs and one of her
arms. Her body, from the waist down, was burned. The explosion also shattered and
exposed the bone of Suzettes left leg and
knocked her front teeth out. The doctors could not save Suzettes
shattered left leg so the same was amputated from below the knee. Had it
not been for the prompt medical attention she received, Suzette would have died
from the injuries she had sustained from the explosion.[9] Jenny survived the blast
with barely any injury.

Vicente also testified that appellants had been threatening to liquidate him and his
family, due to their belief that he was in the practice of witchcraft by which he had
caused the deaths of Rodels parents-in-law.[10]

Appellants proffered the defenses of denial and alibi. Dominador testified that
on the date and time of the crime, he was working as a construction worker in Parian,
Calamba, Laguna and that

he had been in Laguna since 11 May 2000 until the end of the month.
He claimed that he was implicated by Vicente because the latter
thought that he had something to do with the elopement of
Suzette.[11] He pointed to Salvador Villafuerte, Roman Villafuerte, Boyet
Villafuerte, and Mondring Erederos as the perpetrators of the crime.[12] Rodel
testified that he was recuperating from illness in Binahaan, Pagbilao, Quezon when
the incident took place. He claimed that he was implicated because he helped
Dominador in engaging the services of a counsel.[13] Elenito similarly gave the alibi
that he was engaged as a construction worker together with Dominador in Laguna
when the crime occurred. He also denied that his alias is Ronnie, the name of the
third perpetrator identified by Vicente.[14]

The RTC, in a Decision[15] dated 21 February 2003, found Dominador and

Rodel guilty of two (2) separate crimes of murder and frustrated murder, and
acquitted Elenito on the ground of reasonable doubt. The trial court gave credence
to the eyewitness accounts of Vicente and Suzette who positively identified the
appellants as two of the three perpetrators of the crime. However, the trial court
acquitted Elenito as he was not positively identified by Suzette as the third man and
his physical appearance does not fit the description of the tall fat man seen by
Suzette.

Appellants appealed from the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court, in a Decision[16] dated 20 April 2006, affirmed the guilt of
appellants but modified their sentences such that each of them is liable for the
complex crime of murder with frustrated murder and attempted murder; hence, it
sentenced each of the appellants to suffer the penalty prescribed for the most serious
crime which is death. The Court of Appeals denied appellants motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution[17] dated 20 July 2006.

Hence, the present Petition[18] before this Court.

Except as to the penalty of death, now commuted to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,[19] we affirm appellants conviction.
There is no cogent reason to disturb the finding of guilt made by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court. The issues raised by appellants involve weighing of
evidence already passed upon by the trial court and the appellate court. Appellants
question the credibility of the testimony of Vicente and Suzette and the weight given
by the trial court to the testimony of the bomb specialist. The age-old rule is that the
task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses in the stand and weighing
their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions
as a witness testifies before it. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony.[20]

Vicente positively identified appellants as two of the three assailants who

barged into his house and committed the heinous crime. He testified on direct
examination as follows:

Q: When you saw your kitchen door of your house was on fire, what
did you do then?
A: I tried to put off the fire by tossing it with container of water, sir.

Q: Were you able to stop the fire?

A: No, sir, because I smell[ed], it was a gasoline.

Q: when you were not able to stop the fire, what did you do?
A: Because my wife then was awake[d] I instructed her to sought [sic]
for [sic] help, sir.

Q: Did she accede, as you directed?

A; Yes, sir. When my wife opened the door to ask for help
Dominador Malana, Rodel Aliaga and Ronnie Malana
suddenly appeared at the door.

Q: This Ronnie Malana is he present?

A: he is not present inside the courtroom, sir.

Q: What about Dominador Malana?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Point to him.

COURT:

Stand up. Witness pointed to Dominador Malana inside the

courtroom.[21]

xxx

FISCAL:

Q: How about this other one Rodel Aliaga?

A: Yes, sir.

BRANCH CLERK OF COURT:

Witness pointed to Rodel Aliaga, the accused, inside the

courtroom.[22]

xxx
 FISCAL:
Q: Which door of your house did they enter?
A: The main door, sir.

Q: When they entered these three persons: Rodel, Dominador and

Ronnie, what did they do inside your house?
A: When I saw them, because I received several threats from them,
I immediately ran towards the kitchen door which was then
burning, which was then on fire, sir.

xxx

Q: When you ran towards the burning kitchen door which was on fire,
where was your wife, your grandchildren and your daughter?
A: They were inside our house in the living room, sir.

Q: What happened when you ran towards the kitchen door which was
burning?
A: After I ran out of the house, sir, I heard an explosion and when I
looked back I saw that my house was on fire.[23] (Emphasis ours.)
Suzette testified on what occurred after her father ran out of their house to seek help
leaving her and her mother to face the two appellants and a third person. She
testified, thus:

Q: And after the bombing what transpired next if anything did transpire
and your have carried your child?
A: My mother then ran towards the main door, sir.

Q: Was she able to reach the main door?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So what if anything did happen when your mother reached the main
door?
A: She opened the door, sir.

Q: And thereafter when she opened the door, what transpired

next?
A: As soon as she opened the door, three (3) men entered our house,
sir.
Court:
Thru that door?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Fiscal:
Q: Were you able to recognize these three (3) men?
A: I only recognize two of the three (3) men, sir.

Q: These two (2) whom you claimed you came to know, are they
present before this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you point to them one by one?

A: The first one was Rodel Tiaga (witness pointing to the accused
inside the courtroom) and the second one is Dominador
Malana (witness pointing to the accused inside the
courtroom)

Q: The other one whom you claimed entered the main door of your
house after the same was opened by your mother, is also around,
will you be able to recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: So what happened when three (3) men including that person

who is not around together with these two (2) persons that
you have just pointed out entered your house?
A: One of them was carrying a gallon container with dynamite
inside and he threw it inside the house, sir.

Q: Who in particular was carrying that content with dynamite?

A: A fat tall man with dark complexion, sir.

Q: You mean the one who is not present before this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about these two (2) persons that you have just pointed
out? What did they do immediately after they entered the house?
A: They were the ones holding the matchstick and the matchbox, sir.

Q: Whey you say they were the one holding the match, you mean both
of them?
A: No, sir.

Q: Who was the one holding the match?

A: Rodel, sir.

Q: What about the other one, what was he doing?

A: I did not notice anymore because that happened too fast, sir.

Q: Were you able to know what did Rodel do with the match?
A: He lit it, sir.

Q: With what? What was the that he lit?

A: The dynamite, sir, inside the container.

Q: How did you come to know that that was a dynamite?

A: The one gallon container with a wick, sir.[24]

xxx

FISCAL:

Q: Immediately after the wick was lighted according to you by Rodel,

what happened next?
A: He then threw it, sir.

Q: In what direction he threw it?

A: In my room, sir.

xxx
Fiscal:

Q: And after they threw this Exh. E, what transpired next?

A: I saw the gallon burst into flame, sir. (nagliyab)

Court:

Q: When you said they threw that gallon container to your room,
did they do that together, the three (3) of them?
A: The tall fat man only who threw it towards my room, sir.

Fiscal:

Q: At that precise time that tall fat man threw that Exh. E to your
room, where were the other two (2), Rodel and Dominador?
A: They were behind him, sir.

Q: What were they doing?

A: I did not notice anymore, sir.

Q: And after they threw that Exh. E to your room, what did they do
after the burning?
A: I did not see anymore, sir, because there was an explosion.

Q: Explosion of what?
A: the dynamite they threw, sir.

Q: So when that dynamite marked as Exh. E which you drew exploded,

what happened next?
A: I then saw my mother beside me burned and with her legs both cut
off and half of her body burned and one of her arm also cut off,
and her body from waist down she was burned. Also my left leg
was also cut off and my front teeth were missing and both arms
of my baby were slightly burned.

COURT:
 Make it of record that the witness has her left leg also amputated or cut
off up to the above the knee and it was wrapped with bandage
and she has scratches with her.[25](Emphasis ours.)

The Court agrees with the appellate courts following observations:

We have no doubt in Suzettes testimony as she would not have

lightly accused the herein accused-appellants if they were not the true
malefactors of the crime committed. Indeed, as a direct victim, who lost
her left leg to the crime; as mother, who had to bear the sight of her eight-
month old baby injured by burns; and as a daughter, who witnessed her
own mother burn to death, Suzette could never have just pinpointed to
anyone to the crime.

Under her circumstances, surely, there could have been no other

overriding reason for Suzettes damning testimony against the accused-
appellants save for the purpose of making sure that justice was done and
the culprits of the crime be held accountable and meted their proper
punishment for their dastardly deed. Suzettes relationship to the victim of
this case, including her personal injury, in accord with human nature,
ensured that she would have the most interest in telling the truth, rather
than prevaricate and send innocent men to rot in jail.

On the other hand, while Vicente did not actually see the accused-
appellants perpetrate the crime, Vicentes testimony lends credence to the
fact that the accused-appellants were present in the place, time, and date
of the crime. The previous life threats made by the accused-appellants on
Vicente and his family, and the exploding of the Roxas residence
following Vicentes escape from his house, served to corroborate and shed
light to Suzettes account of the crime.[26]

There is no merit in appellants assiduous assertion that they should be

acquitted under the equipoise rule in view of what to them are doubts as to their
guilt. This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales
in favor of the accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly
balanced.[27] Said rule is not applicable in the case before us because the evidence
here presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where
the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.

Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the prosecution,
appellants could only offer denials and uncorroborated alibi. It is elementary that
alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[28] The
prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of
the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place
when the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. [29]This they failed
to prove.

Appellants tried to sow reasonable doubt on their guilt by harping on minor

factual matters and engaging in semantics. Their effort is futile. This Court cannot
be led to a different result. The Court of Appeals correctly resolved all the issues
raised by the appellants.

The appellate court correctly found appellants guilty of the

complex crime of murder[30] with frustrated murder and attempted

murder under Article 48[31] of the Revised Penal Code. The explosion
killed Betty instantly,[32] while Suzettes left leg was amputated from below the
knee[33] and she would have died from the injuries she sustained had it not been for
the prompt medical attention she received.[34] Appellants intent to kill is apparent
when they threw the explosive device towards the direction of the victims. The
killing of Betty by means of an explosive device qualifies the crime to murder under
Article 248(3) of the Revised Penal Code. With respect to Suzette, appellants are
guilty of frustrated murder inasmuch as all the acts necessary that would
consummate the crime of murder were complete but she nevertheless survived due
to causes independent of appellants will.[35] Jenny survived the blast with barely any
injury. However, this is not to say that the crime committed against her was merely
slight physical injuries because the appellants were motivated by the same intent to
kill when they lobbed the explosive device inside Vicentes house. Since the injuries
inflicted are not fatal, the crime committed is merely attempted murder.

The case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of Article 48 because
by a single act, that of lobbing an explosive device inside Vicentes house, appellants
committed three grave felonies, namely, (1) murder, of which Betty was the victim;
(2) frustrated murder, of which Suzette was the injured party; and (3) attempted
murder, of which Jenny was the injured party. A complex crime is committed when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. Appellants single
act of detonating an explosive device may quantitatively constitute a cluster of
several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should
be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
because the offenders were impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows their
lesser degree of perversity.[36]

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,the same to be applied in its m
aximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying
circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for
the most serious crime (murder) is death.[37] However, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346,[38] the penalty of death properly imposed on the appellants by the Court of
Appeals is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua.

To recapitulate the three acts done by appellants in tandem with a third man
loom large in the prosecution evidence, namely: first, their dousing of Vicentes
kitchen door with gasoline and setting it ablaze;[39] second, their subsequent entry to
the house when Betty opened the main door to seek help; and thence, third, their
lobbing an explosive device inside the house, followed by their escape. The trial
court and the appellate court did not anymore address the treacherous manner by
which the crime was committed, as alleged in the Information. We reiterate our
holding in People v. Comadre[40] that:
 Coming now to Antonios liability, we find that the trial court
correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime. For
treachery to be appreciated two conditions must concur:
(1) the means, method and form of execution employed gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such
means, methods and form of execution was deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the adoption of ways to
minimize or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up by the
offended party.

Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace

where the unsuspecting victims were having a drinking spree. The
suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous combustion and
the tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the victims
sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus
insuring the execution of the crime without risk of reprisal or resistance
on their part. Treachery therefore attended the commission of the crime.

It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information

also alleges the use of an explosive as an aggravating circumstance. Since
both attendant circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, we should determine which of the
two circumstances will qualify the killing in this case.

When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means

of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying
circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence[[41]] support this view but also,
since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates
that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of
treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance.[[42]][43]

xxx

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or

more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances,
 including the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this
case.[[44]] Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty
for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore,
correctly imposed the death penalty.[45]

Regarding damages, we affirm the monetary award granted by the Court of

Appeals. Appellants judicially admitted the actual loss of the victims house and their
appliances and implements contained therein, subject to the courts consideration of
depreciation value, amounting to P300,000.00; and of the victims medical and burial
expenses amounting to P15,340.15 and P9,610.00, respectively. Appellants are
ordered to pay the heirs of Betty Capsa-Roxas civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.

00138 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellants are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole.

SO ORDERED.
The Vizconde murder case, colloquially known as the Vizconde massacre, was the multiple
homicide of members of the Vizconde family on 30 June 1991 at their residence in BF Homes,
Parañaque City, Metro Manila, Philippines.[1] Estrellita, 49, had suffered thirteen stab wounds;
Carmela, 18, had suffered seventeen stab wounds and had been raped before she was killed; and
Jennifer, 6, had nineteen stab wounds.[1] Lauro Vizconde, Estrellita's husband, and the father of
Carmela and Jennifer, was in the United States on business when the murders took place.

The lead suspect was Hubert Webb, whose father Freddie Webb was famous as an actor, former
basketball player, and former Congressman and Senator. The other defendants were Antonio
Lejano II, Hospicio Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, Joey Filart and
Artemio Ventura.[2] In the Trial Court (People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Webb, et al., G.R. No.
176864), it became one of the most sensational cases in the Philippines, being described as a "trial
of the century".[3] The men were convicted by the Parañaque Regional Trial Court which the Court
of Appeals affirmed. Except for Filart and Ventura who had been convicted in absentia, the men
were later acquitted by the Supreme Court on 14 December 2010 for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents,
LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.

G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995

MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents.

G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995

ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1)
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E.
de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from
conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case
or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. 1

From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, 2 with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation 3 of those charged with the
rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; 4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, 5 and
her sister Anne Marie Jennifer 6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Parañaque,
Metro Manila.

During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn statement dated
May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission
of the crime; 7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the
persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola; 8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who
alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York
and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4) the sworn
statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how
Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar; 9 (5) the sworn statements of Belen
Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal White, a
security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also
submitted and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer
nineteen (19). 10 The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa. 11

Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for
Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following:

(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and
stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;

(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A.
Cabanayan, M.D.;

(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7,
1991);

(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the
investigation;

(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;

(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated
September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;

(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro
(other than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police
agencies;

(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by
Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;

(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their
respective positions and duties;

(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.

The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It
alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner
Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the
purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the
course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said original in
compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner Webb to
the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to
obtain from the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request
for its production.

Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar
as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27,
1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque,
Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela Francisco. 13 To further support his defense, he submitted
documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on said
dates 14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14,
1991. 15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal
Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San
Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.

The other respondents — Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy"
Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong — submitted sworn statements,
responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the
Vizcondes. 16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong" Ventura failed to file their counter-
affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address. 17In his sworn statement,
petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the
morning of the following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was with him.

On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against
petitioners and their co-respondents, 18 On the same date, it filed the corresponding
Information 19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by respondent judge
Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano,
who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily
inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment
with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by
Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused.
On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo
Papa Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the
authorities after filing their petitions before us.

In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel
denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4)
the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in
the Information as an accused.

We find the petitions bereft of merit.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22,
1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They
hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair
as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn
statements of the witnesses for the NBI.

We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule

112 provides that a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation, thus:

Sec. 3. Procedure. — Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or

information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following
manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two
(2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the
respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall
have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the

respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof
and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit

counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base
his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may
set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit
questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or
witnesses concerned.

(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating
officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus
 adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall
certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ."

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature . . ." 20 An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the
privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. 21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not
an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 22 Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of
reasonable caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. 24 The terms are legally synonymous and their
reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average
man on the street. 25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable
men have an abundance.

Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused
its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the
truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner
Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2)
sworn statement, thus: 26

xxx xxx xxx

To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn
statements of Alfaro:

On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question

First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.

Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."

On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies

First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night.
She just said "on the following day I read in the newspaper that there
were three persons who were killed . . ."

Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw
two bodies on top of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert
on top of Carmela."

On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde

 First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.

Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top
of Carmela and pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning
and I saw tears on her eyes."

On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little
more than a meter high."

Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."

On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: She never entered the house.

Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty
kitchen."

In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies
did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.: 27

xxx xxx xxx

As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument

merely that she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-
conspirator may be taken as evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's
participation in the commission of the crime (see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil.
1084).

Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by

direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would
such a prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal
undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert or in
unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA
699).

Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two
sworn statements. In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a
witness accusing therein petitioner for the slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even
though said witness failed to name Angelo in his affidavit which was executed five (5)
months earlier. Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony is
untrue, such circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the
witness.

On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his

memorandum suggesting that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the
 month to give time to the NBI to coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the
whereabouts of Hubert Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based witnesses."

In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's
statements, among others. This is untenable. As held in Angelo:

There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of

the testimony of a witness as worthy of belief and from
simultaneously rejecting other parts which the court may find
incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is
not a rule of law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally
applicable. It is not a legal presumption either. It is merely a latinism
describing the conclusion reached by a court in a particular case after
ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that the court
deemed proper.

In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having
reservations when she first executed the first statement and held back vital
information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes
that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently
explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies
were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of
Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it has been often noted, ex
parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when
the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to
comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents which
transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been
committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by
the complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the
perpetration of the imputed offense.

We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of
counsel 28 and consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime was planned
and then executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the supporting sworn
statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a
passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The Panel
assayed their statements as follows: 29

xxx xxx xxx

According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June

29, 1991, between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home
inside his room with two male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-
housemaid, Loany, were instructed by Hubert to bring them three glasses of juice. It
was the last time she saw Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that
Hubert was in the United States.

While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served
as a laundry woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa
Rosales, that on June 30, 1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as
what she used to do, she entered the rooms of the Webbs to get their clothes to be
washed. As a matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered Hubert's room and
saw Hubert, who was only wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while he
was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them
together with the clothes of the other members of the family to the laundry area. After
taking her breakfast, she began washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was
washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After
she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But feeling uneasy, she
decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was doing. In
the said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door
there is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on
something. She observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from
inside his room.

On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and
came back at around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the
secret door of the house. It was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the
Webb family.

On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00
in the morning, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then
scheduled to take the United Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New
York. At the airport's lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie Webb with a male
companion. He greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko
ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often watched
him then in a television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom
Freddie Webb referred to as his son, was of the same height as Freddie. The son
referred to has fair complexion with no distinguishing marks on his face. He (son of
Webb) was then wearing a striped white jacket. When he and his children were
already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie anymore, but he noticed his son was
seated at the front portion of the economy class. He never noticed Freddie Webb's
son upon their arrival in San Francisco. He claims that, while watching the television
program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her
lawyer being interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small
built, with a height of five feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for
United States on March 9, 1991, he nurtured doubts because such description does
not fit the physical traits of the son of Freddie, who left with him for United States on
the same flight and date.

Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with
him for almost three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four
(4) years old. Their relationship started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him
in September 1993. She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong
invited her to play mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the back
of the Parañaque Municipal Hall.

At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the
Parañaque police told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio
room, she was instructed to take him over and after somebody won the game, she
followed Biong at the radio room where she overheard him uttering,
"Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o
sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong
rerespondehan, ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen
apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived
with a male passenger sitting at the backseat and parked near the canteen. After it
made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat
beside the driver and then, they left. She was not able to recognize the male
passenger because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around
7:00 of the same morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands
and face, and took his handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the trash can.
She asked him why he threw his handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy
tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and he replied, "Putang inang mga
batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."

Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she
observed him doing something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy.
Moments later, Galvan, another policeman of Parañaque, arrived and said, "Oy
Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to which Biong answered, "Oo
susunod na ako." Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who offered to
accompany him and with whom she asked permission to go with them. Before they
proceeded to the place where the killings happened, she asked Biong if he knew the
exact address and the latter immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was
surprised because Galvan never told him the place of the incident.

As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the

housemaids to contact the victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the
barangay chairman and the president of the Homeowners Association. When all
these persons were already in the house, Biong started recording the wounds of the
victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry
box. Because she could not tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out
of the room and proceeded to the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the
scattered contents of a shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room
and proceeded to the front door to remove the chain lock; asked the keys from the
housemaid and it was only then that the main door was opened. Biong noticed a
stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go
inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they heard
nothing unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the
door panel. Bartolome then came out of the room and told Biong that he can hear the
sound of the glass being broken. At the garage, Biong also noticed same marks on
the hood of the car.

On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with
the Vizconde housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him
remove from his pocket the things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit:
calling cards, driver's license, ATM card, a crossed check worth P80,000.00,
earrings, a ring, bracelet, necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry box
inside the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong
for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue,
Parañaque. The next day, she saw Biong took from his locker at the Parañaque
Police Station an imported brown leather jacket, which the latter claimed to have
been given to him by the person who called him up in the early morning of June 30,
1991.

Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in
1993. She observed that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of
the Vizconde case. In fact, when Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian
 and brought him to the Parañaque Police Station, she was surprised that Biong
halted the investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being
interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called
up and instructed Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the
last thing she remembered regarding this case.

The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence of
petitioners. It ruled:30

xxx xxx xxx

The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his

defense of denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough
evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted
by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a
prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive
identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and
relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA
316 and a long line of cases).

Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary

weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters
(People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and
becomes even more weaker when arrayed against the positive identification by the
witness for the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]).

Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he

claimed was with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than
claiming that he "was not and could not have been at or near the area of the
Vizconde residence at the time of the alleged commission of the crime,"
respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi
in the form of documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when
the incident occurred. We have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence
submitted by respondent Webb in support of his absence from the country since
March 9, 1991 to October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to exonerate him of
the offense charged. The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While
respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a
California driver's license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not
have been in the country on the dates above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in
the allegation that respondent Webb personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in
California in view of his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of
the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country on said dates.
Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California
is no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the
merchandise.

Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the
DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, 31 while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to
call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for
clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator
need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In
the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced
to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.

II

We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners support their stance by
highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a matter of few hours;
(2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to the trial
court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause; and
(4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a mere accessory had a
"NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to
conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and evaluation of the documents" on the part
of said judges.

The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect
to issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their
requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave
and Israel, thus: 32 "It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But each
requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus
one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by
substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also
necessary that a particular person be implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it,
which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at
premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a
similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants. With
respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." In
contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections
3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.

Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is thereupon satisfied of
the facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
form prescribed by these Rules.

We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search
warrants in Soliven vs. Makasiar, 33 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
 and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination
of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners'
contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There
is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2)
sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita
Birrer 35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and
analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is
probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before
issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The
sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours.
The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence
attached to the records of the case. 36

Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno 37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is
predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not even
the corpus delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case.
Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, we stressed the necessity for the trial
judge to make a further personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses to reach a
correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable cause before issuing warrants
of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests on a different factual setting. As
priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide
substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the
crime is a given fact. There is an eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The
alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by sworn statements of their former maids. It
was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the further step of examining ex
parte the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions.

III
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and
malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove
lack of probable cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the
Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.:

Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the
opportunities to be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary
investigation by appearing in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the
second hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply
to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and
Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14,
1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous
letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel
requesting the latter to furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI
concerning the petitioner's whereabouts during the material period (Annexes "L", "L-
1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact, not
satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not to issue subpoena duces tecum to
Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a "Petition for Injunction, Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Makati in
order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro
for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed the petition
after Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of
Alfaro, without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and
inconsistent sworn statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a
copy of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated July
28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."

It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the
preliminary investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14,
1995, the panel continued to conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the
photo-copies of the submitted documents with the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7,
Petition) The panel even entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel
Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even
announced that any party may submit additional evidence before the resolution of the
case. (p. 8, Petition) From the time the panel declared the termination of the
preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995, twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before
the resolution was promulgated, and the information eventually filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque on August 10, 1995. This notwithstanding the directive of
Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence
in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This
directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with
indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-
seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present additional evidence
before the DOJ Panel.
 Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the
conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated
the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.

Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them
for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in
accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We
quote its pertinent sections, viz.:

Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a

resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been
arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said
appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause,

however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.

Sec. 2. When to appeal. — The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period
shall be interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10)
days from receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run from the time the
resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the movant or his counsel.
(Emphasis supplied)

Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court
after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise
the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.

Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering
her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion
of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program
And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10,
which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a
crime and desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined
in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the
following circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under
the R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;

(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

 (c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;

(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in

order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the
discharge of an accused so that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-
inclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. — The certification
of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit
by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE
WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included
therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a
State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused
from the information.

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from
criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or
used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.

The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they
constitute ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness."
The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 38which gives the court the prerogative to
approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for
it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution
of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power
to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A.
No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a
witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. 39 Section 9 of Rule
119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a
state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an
inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond
change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981
is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime,
one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well
put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation,
usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases.
Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or
lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to
pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their
appearance in investigative bodies/courts." 40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A.
No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.

Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during
their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it
urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under preliminary investigation it
deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not
expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a
criminal proceeding. 41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move
for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the
prosecution.42 But these provisions apply after the filing of the Complaint or Information in court
and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at
arraignment and to prepare for trial. 43

This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not,
however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his
constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a
stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a
potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to
determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or
diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for
they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation
conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. 44 As this Court emphasized
in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 45 "the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration
or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right." A
preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional
right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage. We uphold the
legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of
the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary
investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the
issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due process
which we rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It
is also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the
filing of a sworn complaint, which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other
jurisdictions. In the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States Supreme Court held
that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt
or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney
v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to procure conviction
violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory
evidence in its possession. 48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady 49 — "society wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should
not treat litigation like a game of poker where surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is
not punished.

But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their
favor, we are not prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn
statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted in the reasonable likelihood that
the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause. To be sure, the NBI, on July 4, 1995,
upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately,
petitioners, on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo
Mercader in the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099. 50 As petitioners admit,
the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement as a part of their
evidence. 51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the DOJ Panel then still conducting
their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement. Unfortunately for
petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them despite the alleged material
discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements of Alfaro. For reasons we have
expounded, this finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with grave abuse of
discretion. 52 On the other hand, the FBI Report while corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb
cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding of the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of
evidence presented by the NBI.

Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to
the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary
investigation.

In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in
constitutional law where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the
public's right to information, and an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial collide and
compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing where the balance should be struck has
divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on the side of liberty or on the
side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance of
balance is a difficult act to follow.

In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high
velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily
diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even
the principal actors in the case — the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers — have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and
their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the
press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 53 it was
wisely held:

xxx xxx xxx

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American
justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open,
thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned
and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of
public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of
outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process "satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14,
99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe
such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as
valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of
justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication
on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such
as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of
trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also
relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a
catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which
it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally — and
representatives of the media — have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees
to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of
enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press
could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., 54 we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is
a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the
parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the
DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.

It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners
will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not
synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good disinfectant of
unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right to fair trial. Without
imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating to
the case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. 55 The Court
reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every
criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the
guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is done — and that is the only way for the judiciary to get
an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, J., concurs.

Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved
the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
"Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo
Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the
public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.1

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at
large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household,
police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was
then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses
as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented
witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court
found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative,
accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped
her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she
needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and
Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s
testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000,
after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty
as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on
Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to
Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that
the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing
Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five
members voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s
cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court
granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a
correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that
the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the
case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit
him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on
Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela
and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
 1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons
who committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either
by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist
and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot
possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two
persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the
DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that
simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying
that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at
this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by
the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does
not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused
unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State
presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought
to have the same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had
as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither
Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed
by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the
appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the
Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s
lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that
it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

 Alfaro’s Story

Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi
Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center
parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu
house in Parañaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December
1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a
girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the
group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes,
Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda
pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached
Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about
Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro
gave her Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go
out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed
this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only
Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up,
with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a
while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate,
the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that
she had arrived.

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro
trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was
Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmela’s instructions to
Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro
told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion,
Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes,
Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang
mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the
parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time.
They arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight
from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer
near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito").
But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line
up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay
lang kami."

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the
Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small
group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a
moment and, together, headed for the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was
going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the
kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden.
After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro
immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it.
Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same
route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro
saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was
looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted
and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she
found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also
did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the
dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed
off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom from where the noise came, opened the
door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw
Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the
bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and
in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the
dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro
rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk.
She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main
door, breaking its glass frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the
house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked.
They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an
old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw
something out of the car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long
driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the
"blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde
house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and
finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied
that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders,
and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed
her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called
up someone on his cellular phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean
up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang."
Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We don’t know each other. We haven’t seen each
other…baka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house.12

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her
conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She
was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who
earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She
had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and
Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since
November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug
pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug
pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader
of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very
special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of
the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone
to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told
him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case?
Will you tell the Honorable Court?

xxxx

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances,
I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. That’s what she told me, Your
Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what did you say?

xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she
promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to
convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

xxxx

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to
me. She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…"

COURT:

How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan."

xxxx

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang
yan?"

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
 Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the
physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was
talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about
them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged them with
the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up
with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI handlers who were doing
their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and
practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain
access to the documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned
by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime
investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical
evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel
of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line
since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash
her front door to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of
the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door
of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s narration, Webb
appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get
away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise
was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the
Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical
evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another
point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key
and the car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the
ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they
left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key,
spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the
crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered
that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed
the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to
rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some
passersby might look in and see what they were doing.

Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed
that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-
bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They
supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not
make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position
instead of going straight into the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work. After
lavvphil

claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her
sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming
a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation.
As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a
cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the
circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the
Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to
Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget
your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill
me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score
with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging
the wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will
help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were
supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb
proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including,
if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they
got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was
parked on the street between Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the
car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to
watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house.
Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-
rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his
friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her
gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick
it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb
decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she
stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only
she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think
clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details
that only a drug-free mind can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that
she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro
returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to
Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s
boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since
she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak
out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight,
she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now,
this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and
his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a
woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of
Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if
Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her
car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela
became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because,
obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her
frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the
house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is
what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor
of the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her young sister
whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another
shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful
look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart
who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her
boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know
where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house,
knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know
where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own
lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnesses:

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims,
testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmela’s
genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of
June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something
untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the
master’s bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television
set.16

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in
and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered
Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of
vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not
notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.

But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually
saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in
and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the
direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without
stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the
early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders.
What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaro’s first visit that night.
Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not
notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s
testimony about the movements of the persons involved.

Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle
convoy,17White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he
would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security
guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony. 1avvphi 1

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb
around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines
when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the
subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would
see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said
that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb.
Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture
and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged
in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard
to challenge a Congressman’s son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the
guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitor’s entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID but
not in recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive
Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991
when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She
saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts,
passing through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4
p.m. of the same day.19

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the
other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four
years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the
details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective
photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed
bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it
when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel
Muñoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from
January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the
clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the
rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to
collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at
four in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful
and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence
against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place.
Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the
early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to
De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When
Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he
threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover
from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into
the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His
departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had
cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the
following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators
and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his
return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the Vizconde
residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around
and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and
the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two
daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a
Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding
out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that
Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted
Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter
the house.

5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and
Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that
Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that would be
news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those
who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to
win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had
become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’ friends would
testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in
Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and
unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed
to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding
pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal
histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger,
Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important
reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmela’s relatives, friends,
or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come
forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her
death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a
special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of
Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son
to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria
Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United
Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy,
Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March
8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took
girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball
buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards
went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo
Santos and Jay Ortega.24

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on
board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine
Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer,
Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest.27

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that
country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-
immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb
presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9,
1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa Keame,
who brought them to Gloria’s house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met
Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a
certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same
month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’
hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills,
California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week
with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control company.35 Webb presented the
company’s logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment
papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license38 and wrote three letters to his friend
Jennifer Cabrera.39

On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the
same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the following
day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look
for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s, Louis
Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb
presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW
WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange
Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991,
Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.49

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August
4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There,
he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching
movies, and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a
friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the
Rodriguez’s home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas.
He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations
on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that
confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed
letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the
US-INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And
when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified
by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival
stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was
authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webb’s reentry.56 Upon his
return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw
Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is
uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and
killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this,
to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a
mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick
stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really
innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive
declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically
cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible
who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to
one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and
makes bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had
been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with
criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered
to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she
promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in
her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames
even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene
feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody
needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had
Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not
need to darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light and
foot prints on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference,
exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to
rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up
her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes
incredulity.

To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to
watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the
role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape
Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her
swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of
absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also
quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony
cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial
and an alibi.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when the
Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if
he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime,
erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal
way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into
the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and
inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since
there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a
foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that
had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two
dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the
U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical
and plausible answer to these questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to
be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that
the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of
Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an
important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated
among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from
that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the
State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that
Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was
unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under
international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in
that passport are presumed true.60

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have
been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and
departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same
evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to
testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached
to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of
the record.61

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S.
Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated
it in his dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no
evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less
than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary
of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper
diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure
governing such request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated
with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services
Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer,
State Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not
exhaustive and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the
Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by
Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on
individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation
concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system. Since
appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have
produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the
names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of
evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they
state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s
passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to
the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in
the lower court’s minds.

7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but
also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court
accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will
not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat
lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI
asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre
that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005
and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and
ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
ANTONIO LEJANO, G.R. No. 176389
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

x --------------------------------------------- x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 176864

Appellee,
- versus -

HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,

ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL
A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,
PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO Promulgated:
BIONG,
Appellants. December 14, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen
years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home
in ParaaqueCity. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were
aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde
massacre.
 Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI
announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro,
one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to
accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Tony Boy Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging
Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer,
Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's
testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape
with homicide against Webb, et al.[1]

The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura
and Joey Filart remained at large.[2] The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main
witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-
legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong
Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police
officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime
and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the
strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States
of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and
object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show
Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by
grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant
discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused
Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she
did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that
she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she
disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb,
Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according
to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony that other witnesses and the physical
evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous
hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as
charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and
Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison
term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also
awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.[3]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying
the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum
and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.[4] The appellate court did
not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was
biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in
raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special

Division of five members voted three against two to deny the motion,[5]hence, the
present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the
semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed
still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to
section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence[6] to give the accused and the prosecution
access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to
a correct decision in the case.
 Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer
has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial
court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on

the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has
resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not

the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to produce the
semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of
evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb,
acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and
sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and

identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two
others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and
rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
 The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up
the crime after its commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,[7] that he is entitled to outright

acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the States
failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression
the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and,
consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious questions
had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility
that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela
cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or
financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the
exception of identical twins.[8] If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen
does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the
Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying
that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce
the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v.
Maryland[9] that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood,[10] where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to
the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution
or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the
existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to
DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure
even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come
up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving
the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA
testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two
occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge
alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.[11] They raised
the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the
trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion
with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their
appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules
allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such test
done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaros Story

Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica
Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to
the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio
Dong Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio Tony Boy Lejano, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez,
Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at
a shabu house in Paraaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known
earlier in December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a
message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde.Alfaro
agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmelas house at 80
Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City. Riding in her
car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and
Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol
car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street,

alighted, and approached Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman
came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before
in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webbs message that he
was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she
had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes.Alfaro relayed
this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to
the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime,
they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela
lived.The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked
somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached
Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house
for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would
leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen
door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her cars headlights twice when she
approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.
 Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house
in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off
a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group,
found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. They then all went back
to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group
about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmelas male companion,
Webbs mood changed for the rest of the evening (bad trip).

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After
about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He
said, Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna. Lejano said, Ako ang
susunod and the others responded Okay, okay. They all left the parking lot in a
convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third
time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting
for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a
suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizcondes residence to
cause a brownout (Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito). But Alfaro
shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, Malakas lang ang tama mo. When Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again
that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, O
sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami.

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left
open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the
garage, Venturausing a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and
loosened the electric bulb over it (para daw walang ilaw). The small group went
through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other
in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area.
 As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked
her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to smoke.As she
eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen
drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she
was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, Sino yan? Alfaro immediately walked
out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around
it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, Okay ba?

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde
house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some light
filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a ladys bag
that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he
said: Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi. She asked him what key he wanted
and he replied: Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng
kotse. When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door
but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was
at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that
remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the
masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked
inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on
top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on
the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was
gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She
met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, Prepare an escape. Aalis na
tayo.Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who
were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and
turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano,
and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone
and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that
he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in
anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove
away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at
the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone
threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence,
steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound
and gathered at the lawn where the blaming session took place. It was here that
Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what
happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then Jennifer, and finally,
Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, Bakit naman pati yung bata?Webb
replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on
him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed
her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to
use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his
cellular phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb

ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, Pera lang ang
katapat nyan. Biong answered, Okay lang. Webb spoke to his companions and told
them, We dont know each other. We havent seen each otherbaka maulit
yan.Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers house.[12]

1. The quality of the witness

 Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four
years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come
forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story,
working for the NBI as an asset, a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by
fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She
had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-

Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had
been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an asset. She
supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal
elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers
like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of
the leader of the Martilyo gang that killed a police officer. Because of her talent,
the task force gave her very special treatment and she became its darling, allowed
the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her
about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she
knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing
showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his
story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told
him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified
thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the
Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to
her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the
Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?

xxxx

A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me

that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me
the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to
act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

xxxx

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to
bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and
the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, easy lang kayo, Sir, if I may quote, easy lang Sir, huwag
kayong

COURT:
How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang
yan.

xxxx

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
papapelan ko na lang yan?

WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness.
 ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which
even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying
details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and
there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some akyat-bahay group in Paraaque and
charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they
apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene
provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of
these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived
there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain
access to the documents.
 Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso akyat
bahay gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the
crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true
by matching some of its details with the physical evidence at the crime
scene.Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmelas house by
breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden
the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb
was Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see
her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming
that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue,
hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really
made no sense. From Alfaros narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It
was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to
avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise
was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected
confessions of the Barroso akyat-bahay gang members said that they tried to rob
the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one
point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a
handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the
car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the

physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having
taken some valuables with him when they left Carmelas house. And why
would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the
contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in
with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and
his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found
that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso
gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked cars hood to reach up and
darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob the place and they
needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby
might look in and see what they were doing.

Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage
light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to turn the
light off. But, unlike the Barroso akyat-bahay gang, Webb and his friends did not
have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that
Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense
for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood and be seen in such an awkward
position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent
investigative work. After claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the
NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her
all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute
witness. She was their darling of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As
pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed
this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this
is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong
effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel Ging
Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a
certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation
Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro
at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: How
can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you
told me then that you will kill me. As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez,
the accused in this case.[13]

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate
to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name she already
gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers
from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the
common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence
in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,

and Filart, who were supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made
it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of
Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her
own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to
Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around

Alfaros car, which was parked on the street between Carmelas house and the
next. Some of these men sat on top of the cars lid while others milled on the
sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch them,
particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby
house. Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions out on the street did not
figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her
life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to
act as Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her
home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with
Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it
came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly,
there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset
would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an
asset then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think
clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember
so much details that only a drug-free mind can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time,
Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should
come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to
drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenuewhere she
supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaros
trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she
was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for
Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third
time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian
gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who
decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him
to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger
to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of
Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only
make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about
twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, Sino yan? On hearing this, Alfaro immediately
walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she
knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the
presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously,
she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation.This was supposedly
her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge
of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of
boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back
into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the masters
bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her young sister
whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she
got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb
supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak
to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the
engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few
minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they
were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where
to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with
her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution

presented six additional witnesses:
 Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the
bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained[14] and the
presence of semen in Carmelas genitalia,[15] indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan
Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on
the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde
residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the masters bedroom, the
bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set.[16]
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of
whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them
along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car
convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall
the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice
anything suspicious about their coming and going.

But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be
inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan
Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro
testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction
of Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse
without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not
notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting

the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly cleaned up
Vizconde residence on Webbs orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela
arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left
with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice
it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually
discredited Alfaros testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
 Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart
that led the three-vehicle convoy,[17] White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with
Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in
without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did
not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified

that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to
prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He
was manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan
when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet
Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker
and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had
a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son
of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb
grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan
returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their
Standard Operating Procedure required.[18]

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not
common for a security guard to challenge a Congressmans son with such
vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did
he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing
Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house
at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents house
on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that
he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor
at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through
a secret door near the maids quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4
p.m. of the same day.[19]

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished

June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb household as to
enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did
and at what time. She could not remember any of the details that happened in the
household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory
and this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30,

1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.[20] She did not call the attention of
anybody in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that
Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May
1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola
worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further
testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2ndfloor
bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there
for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her
employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were
asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that
Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde
residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring
his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to
collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde
massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from
the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call
at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to
BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned
at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he
threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with
aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.[21]

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator
flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at the
unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained
unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene
shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following
morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police
investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the
Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do
it earlier?
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from
the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the
crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrers
testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her
wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called
Bagyo, because he was a Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not
appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow
was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela
and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela
wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen
door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core
theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful
to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house
to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young

Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town. But,
here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to
affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would
surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become
sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her
friends friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them
together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros claim of a five-
hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and
Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape
on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It
has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their
personal histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house
with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also
Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for
wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or people who
knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come
forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome
news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented
himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X
did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a
living informing on criminals.

Webbs U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife,
Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of
independence, hard work, and money.[22] Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied
him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines.Josefina
Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his
basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited
them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati
Ave.[23] On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros
Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy
Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They
afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present
were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.[24]

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California,
with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.[25] Before boarding his
plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to
have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol
checked Webbs visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.[26] He was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger Manifest.[27]

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where
his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization
Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's
entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS
Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,[28] the
computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9,
1991,[29] and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995
Certification.[30]

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter,
Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Glorias house in Daly
City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi
Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne
Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.[31] In the same
month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the
Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines.[32]

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved

to Anaheim Hills, California.[33] During his stay there, he occupied himself with
playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler[34] and working at his
cousin-in-laws pest control company.[35] Webb presented the companys logbook
showing the tasks he performed,[36] his paycheck,[37] his ID, and other employment
papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license[38] and wrote three letters
to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.[39]
 On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with
the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son
when he came to visit.[40] On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of
his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought
an MR2 Toyota car.[41] Later that day, a visitor at the Brottmans, Louis Whittacker,
saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car.[42] To prove the purchase, Webb
presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle[43] and a
car plate LEW WEBB.[44] In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic
citations.[45]

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and

Aragon,[46] bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.[47] The Center issued Webb a
receipt dated June 30, 1991.[48] On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the
Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.[49]

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less
than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the
spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.[50] There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom
he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and playing
billiards.[51] In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a
friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguezs
house.[52] He left the Rodriguezs home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and
stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for
the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and
Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S.was
confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry.[53] Furthermore, a
Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting
Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-
INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate
statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine
Airlines Flight No. 103,[54] certified by Agnes Tabuena[55] confirmed his return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine

Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his
return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio,
the immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry.[56] Upon his return, in
October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again
saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs
alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive
identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer
as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts,
Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the
accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how
can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled
into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the face of a witness
positively swearing, I saw him do it.? Most judges believe that such assertion
automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype
thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is
really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard
against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish
the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the
accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accuseds claim
that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a
truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
unequivocally, He did it! without blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two

criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past
experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she
never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet
the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her
conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool
pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets
are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions worst possible choice for
a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a
witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised
to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the
details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her
familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible
act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were
trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this crime scene
feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door
key that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its
scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the cars hood, risking being seen
in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force
open the front doorjust so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car
hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela
is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house,
milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no
interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape
Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve as Webbs messenger to Carmela,
using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were
practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.

To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela
to the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably,
although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was
establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from
an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of
absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a
grim scene is also quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently

unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence
acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.

f. A documented alibi
 To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence[57] that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration
of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime.[58]

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in
Paraaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March
9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually
returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return
to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations,
smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal
way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and
his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts
must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that
Webb, with his fathers connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a
March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival
stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication
that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines
passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in
the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S.
Immigrations record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as
the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime
in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and
plausible answer to these questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did
not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of
a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the
adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle
said in his dissent,[59] the practice when a party does not want to leave an important
document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and
stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations
in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs

arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than the
Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of
Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to
present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was
unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government,
which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to
whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true.[60]

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official

certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S.
Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The
officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on
them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty
attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such
statement and in the publicity of the record.[61]

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier
certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb
entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the
U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting
opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by

the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding no evidence of lawful admission
of Webb, this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less
 than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim,
Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy
in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper
diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on
protocol and standard procedure governing such request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner

Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate
in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which
is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief
of the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter
addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State
Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and
erroneous as it was not exhaustive and did not reflect all available
information. Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the
appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that the
INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering
the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation
concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant
Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere
tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the
desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into
contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-
IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..[62]

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the
accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign
records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have
been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly
left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return
to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and
the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
 If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as
well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises,
or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records,
which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to
attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the
entries in Webbs passport and the certifications of the Philippine
and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The
prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the
lower courts minds.

7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others

Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only

with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez,
Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that
Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold
together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the
evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court
entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing
to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt
as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail
where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat lodged
immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on
the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role
of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
 WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for
another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO LEJANO, G.R. No. 176389
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

x --------------------------------------------- x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 176864

Appellee,
- versus -

HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,

ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL
A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,
PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO Promulgated:
BIONG,
Appellants. January 18, 2011
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

ABAD, J.:

On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack
of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate

relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it
denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts;
unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous
decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice;
or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses.[1]

But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the

accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III,
that:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for

the same offense. x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy

of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is
reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the
State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the
accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and
capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually
overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:[2]

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign
freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense
would arm the government with a potent instrument of
oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not
be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense,
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy
personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a
 single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the
enforcement of criminal laws.[3]

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is

possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that
absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction,
or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the
decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.[4]

Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable
to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers
that the Court must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is
no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence.[5] But
he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse
of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that the highly
questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts
the validity of the decision[6] is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from
personal perception.

Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan[7] as

authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present
case. But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of
due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was dictated, coerced and
scripted.[8] It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the
Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that
the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who
voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited
themselves did not really go through the process.

Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of

the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes
grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails
the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words,
private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render
another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally
allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The
judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G.

Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.

For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to
intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio
L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED.
Kuratong Baleleng is an organized crime syndicate in the Philippines that once was
an anti-communist vigilante[2] group. They received nationwide attention due to
their alleged end in a shootout with the Police in May 1995 in Quezon City.

he group was originally established by the Botanical Youth Club in 1986 to guard against the spread
of communist guerrillas in Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur
provinces. The first leader, chosen directly by the military, was Ongkoy Parojinog, who allegedly
used the group both for its official purpose as well as to conduct illegal activities. Parojinog was later
killed by Philippine soldiers. When the group disbanded in 1988, they continued to operate as an
organized crime syndicate.
In early 2014, the film Sa Ngalan ng Ama, Ina, at mga Anak about Kuratong Baleleng, starring
actor Robin Padilla, was released.[3] In April 2014, a long-time Kuratong Baleleng fugitive, Edgar
Digamo, was shot and killed by police after Digamo started shooting at them in Lapu-Lapu,
Philippines after hiding for 13 years.[4]

Mindanao mafia[edit]
At times other gangs used the name Kuratong Baleleng to cover their own activities. Eventually, the
group splintered into multiple, smaller groups around the region. The groups are involved in a variety
of illegal activities, including robbery, smuggling, kidnapping, murder, extortion, drugs and illegal
gambling. The gang is rooted in the Christian Cebuano community, but has ties to Maguindanao
guerillas, which led Muslim Maguindanao clans to become members of the Kuratong Baleleng.
According to military intelligence, part of the group's strength is that it is protected by both local and
national government officials.

1996 PACC Murder case[edit]

In 1996, 11 members of Kuratong Baleleng were killed by the forces of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission, led by Panfilo Lacson. In 2003, the High Tribunal ordered the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court to try Lacson and 33 other police officials. The trial court dismissed the criminal case, for
lack of probable cause.[5] The special prosecuting team later asked the High Tribunal to remand the
case to the trial court to present new evidence against Senator Lacson, inter alia. On May 2, 2008,
the Supreme Court resolved to consider the appeal.

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL

PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are
as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation. 1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by
the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together
with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one
or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
of at least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299 10 and No. 1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales),
were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8,
1996."

On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved
it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson,
and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has
been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4
with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating
his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that
the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and
a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
to procedural due process.

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation
and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng
case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of
the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject
amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed
the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which provides:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as

Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in
Article XI, Section 4:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No.
7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang

panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;
 (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the

position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-

owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders
Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
 The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals
and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A,
issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang

panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;
 (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-

owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees

mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from

the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused"
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to
this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is
a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is
not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4.
The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to
the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed
into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. 34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

 (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form
of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision
in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived
as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in
the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by
23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one —
 (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was

committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment

than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to

which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in
the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion
in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and
the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall
now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner
and entervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to
their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed
in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.

In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the

offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen: 69

The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such
a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and
second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is
presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations
for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of
the offenders.

In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:

AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
 SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage
of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during
the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

CONTRARY LAW.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the
crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein
that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of
the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.

In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized

groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him
with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . .
at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control
where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as
such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense
and the office of the accused.

Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of
P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their
common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to
public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
said cases. 1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
 tion 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given
retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements
for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the
following:

... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the
accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3)
whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any
justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to
the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed
by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the
relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against
respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.

The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be
first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the
various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new
rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year
bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with
the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize
the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in
court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons
to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that
(a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-
bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.

I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679
TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29,
1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir,
Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent
allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during
the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even
agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were
allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge
Agnir, Jr.According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the
provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims
of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be
remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified
of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the respondents motion for judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause. The records allegedly
indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of
the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private
prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the
private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that
Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he
did not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its
Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved
for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused filed
separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should the
trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the
public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing
thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present
during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of
the existence of probable cause because criminal actions are always
prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants merely
prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the
petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and

before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves
for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;

4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application
of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for
the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional
dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the
revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. [5]

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without
the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the
order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
[6]

prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served

with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of
[7]

a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my

conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused
[8]

to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a

[9]

provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent.

[10]

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express

consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally
[11]

dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived
only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or
over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused
to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or
[12]

refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. [13]

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same
offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of
a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the
[14]

provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the

prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have
died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have
emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an
[15]

Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary

investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons
are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has
been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the
accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The
accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and
evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in
ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do
justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice. [16]

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second
requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said
criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of
this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the
[17]

trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecutions
witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent
contended therein that until after the trial court shall have personally determined
the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against
the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be
recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that:

1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the

Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be
issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and

2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in
the meantime until the resolution of this incident.

Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for. [18]

The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in
his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that:

... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused
in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal
of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a
judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if
issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A
copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex A. [19]

During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent,
through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he
did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset
was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest
 issued.Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses,
particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion
that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance
of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any
statement, which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on
other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice
in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on
this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward,
and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional
dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good
Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect
of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the
provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause
what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we
asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer
before the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present the private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for
that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if
issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your
prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the
net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is
plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked
to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for
reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had
already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was
concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to
benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking
the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice
the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[20]
 In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of
Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the

Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the
QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others
promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He
asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of
the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim. [21]

The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the

Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred
from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making
such admissions. [22]

To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689

would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not
expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and should not
do.[23]

The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at
least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private
interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of
the victims must be given adequate a priorinotice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the
offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there
is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the
offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before
the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service
must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of
the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or
the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment
on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between
the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case
thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten
and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from
Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the
prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the
offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment
or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of
probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce
as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to
the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the
respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on
March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public
prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that
notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that
subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed
their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Pian,
Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof in the
[24]

records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion
or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, he did so only for some but not all the close
[25]

kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas,
Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who
(except for Rufino Siplon) executed their respective affidavits of
[26]

desistance. There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico
[27]

Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the
heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of
the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all
the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon and
of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were
thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion and to protect
their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were
not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred
by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for
multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
 The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent
expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the
respondents motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar
in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time
limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair,
reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for
multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against
the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from
notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said cases. When the new
rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three
months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period
for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that
in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former
should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the
prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not
accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond the two-year
period by a retroactive application of the new rule. Petitioners thus pray to the
[28]

Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired
by its application to the criminal cases in question since [t]he States witnesses
were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed
to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them
to do so. According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or
[29]

substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the

accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29,
[30]

1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity
for the State to fairly indict him. In any event, the State is given the right under
[31]

the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy
to the prejudice of the State because the prohibition against the revival of the
cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is a legal
concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally
dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover,
he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify
or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes
irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or
information has already been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the
running of the prescriptive period under Article 90. [32]

The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of
limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a
surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at
its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty
founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment
endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and
proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time
passed beyond availability. The periods fixed under such statutes are
[33]

jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered. [34]

On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making
the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that
the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused. [35]

The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the
[36]

right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the
Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused.Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new
rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its
right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso
facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or
another crime necessarily included therein. He is spared from the anguish and
[37]

anxiety as well as the expenses in any new indictments. The State may revive
[38]

a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is
a justifiable necessity for the delay. By the same token, if a criminal case is
[39]

dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within
the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are
not thereby diminished. But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is
[40]
barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new
rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:

This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the
state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto be
deprived of his libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action
which the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime
had created in the offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper
than statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the
remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy
would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute
is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offenderthe right to
punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred, and declares that this
right and this liability are at an end. [41]

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied
retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates
the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
[42]

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable.The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been
held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other
than the existing rules of procedure.

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively
if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision
in Cipriano v. City of Houma, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
[43]

where a decision of the court would produce substantial inequitable results if

applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the injustice of hardship
by a holding of nonretroactivity. A construction of which a statute is fairly
[44]

susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,

indefensible, wrongful, and injurious consequences. This Court should not
[45]

adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable,

unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation could be avoided. Time and
[46]

again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a
statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the statute
should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. [47]

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed

to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal
proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon
several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and
whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular
conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of
justice and of criminal laws in particular. In a per curiam decision in Stefano v.
[48]

Woods, the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in

[49]

determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should
be given retrospective or prospective effect:

(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration
of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two
years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a
time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable
compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights
of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that
the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended
parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown
that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial
of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency
[50]

of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the
State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or
the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a
specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were
times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes
beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy
or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State
and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to
expedite criminal proceedings. [51]

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it

usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences
[52]

of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which
dominant cases have been known to expire. [53]

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or
reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been
lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of
time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive
[54]

from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the
dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal
case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be
revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the
accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life
because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with
[55]

the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend
himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system. [56]

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise
that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of
the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively
so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the
public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new
rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed
cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March
29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied
the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three
months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The
period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other
hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years
from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the
cases.This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the
time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration
of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in
the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not
yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the
time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the
criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them
within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States Supreme
Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People: [57]

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the
law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights .

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State
and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the
accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and
adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to
the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is
obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This
would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year
or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal
case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the
case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the
accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of
Massachussetts, the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed
[58]

to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon, this Court
[59]
emphasized that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. This
Court further said:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been
wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily
a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then
must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other.

In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to

01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within
the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28,
2002, is SET ASIDE.The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24,
2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent
with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81,
is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 with deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F.
CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR
O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO,
JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T.
LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS,
JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO,
REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO
B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER
FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected members of the Kuratong
Bale/eng Gang, is once again before this Court this time questioning, among other things, the trial
qmrt's determination of the absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions.1

The Facts and the Case

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC]
led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal Investigation Command
(led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M. Acop ), and National Capital Region Command
(headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press
that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were slain. After
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved,
including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia,
Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28 others (collectively, the respondents).3 On
review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder
against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except
that in the cases of respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were downgraded to mere
accessory. On arraignment, Lacson pleaded not guilty.

Upon respondents’ motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s
motion for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) 8249 that
expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase
"principal accused" to apply to all pending cases where trial had not begun. As a result of this new
law, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.
Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R. 1280964 but this Court
upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered the transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of
Quezon City since the amended informations contained no allegations that respondents committed
the offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions as required by R.A.
8249.

Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr.,
could arraign respondents in the re-docketed Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2
Delos Reyes and the other prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims’ heirs
also executed affidavits of desistance. These prompted the respondents to file separate motions for
the determination of probable cause before the issuance of warrants of arrests.

On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack
of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution
witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.

Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza sought to revive the cases
against respondents by requesting the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another preliminary
investigation in their cases on the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp.
Abelardo Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez constituted a panel of
prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation.

Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his co-accused filed a petition
for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case 01-100933. In an Order dated June 5, 2001, that court denied
the plea for temporary restraining order. Thus, on June 6, 2001 the panel of prosecutors found
probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-accused liable as principals for 11 counts of murder,
resulting in the filing of separate informations against them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now presided over by respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L.
Yadao.

On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA),
assailing the RTC of Manila’s order which allowed the renewed preliminary investigation of the
murder charges against him and his co-accused. Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause. But on June 13, 2001 he sought the suspension
of the proceedings in that court.

In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC of Quezon City
from issuing warrants of arrest or conducting any proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
before it. On August 24, 2001 the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the ground
of double jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89 was
provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years after when they were not revived.

Upon the prosecution’s appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,5 the Court ruled that, based on the
record, Lacson failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 governing
provisional dismissals. The records showed that the prosecution did not file a motion for provisional
dismissal and, for his part, respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases.
Furthermore, the heirs of the victims had no notice of any motion for such provisional dismissal.

The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed the RTC of Quezon City
to try the cases with dispatch. On motion for reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the Court
ordered the re-raffle of the criminal cases to a heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle, however, the
cases still went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now presided over by Judge Yadao.

On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that they
were minors. Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the informations to show such
minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the assignment of
the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall was denied.

On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion before Branch 81, praying for the re-
raffle of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to12 to the family courts in view of the changes in the two
informations. On October 24, 2003 the prosecution also filed its consolidated comment ex-abundanti
cautela on the motions to determine probable cause.

On November 12, 20036 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution’s motion for re-raffle
to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. She also
granted the motions for determination of probable cause and dismissed the cases against the
respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those they
submitted in the preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.

On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to recuse or disqualify Judge Yadao
and for reconsideration of her order. It also filed an administrative complaint against her for
dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, manifest partiality, and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment.7On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an urgent supplemental
motion for compulsory disqualification with motion for cancellation of the hearing on motion for
reconsideration.

On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to recuse her, prompting the
prosecution to appeal from that order. Further, on January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued another
order, denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003
that dismissed the action against the respondents. In response, the prosecution filed a notice of
appeal from the same. Finally, on January 26, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of its January 16, 2004 Order not only for lack of merit but
also for having become moot and academic.

On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the notices of appeal that it
filed in the cases. Subsequently, on March 3, 2004 it filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The prosecution presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her discretion in allowing Criminal
Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-raffled to other than among the RTC of Quezon City’s family
courts.

2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she took cognizance of
Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the prosecution’s view that such cases fell under
the jurisdiction of family courts.

3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she did not inhibit and
disqualify herself from taking cognizance of the cases.
 4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the
criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause and barred the presentation of
additional evidence in support of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.

5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she adopted certain
policies concerning the conduct of hearings in her court.

The Court’s Rulings

Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents’ contention that the prosecution’s
resort to special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Since the trial court dismissed the
criminal actions against respondents, the prosecution’s remedy was to appeal to the CA from that
order of dismissal.

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal.8 Here, the
prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an order issued in the subject cases. But it
reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy,
and adequate remedy.9 In other words, the prosecution’s move was not a case of forgotten remedy
but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused
her discretion in issuing her various orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-
encompassing remedy for the prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy is
altogether implausible as to throw out the petition outright.

Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action directly with this Court,
ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the
RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does not give the
People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.10 In any case, the immense public interest in
these cases, the considerable length of time that has passed since the crime took place, and the
numerous times these cases have come before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such
procedural lapse.

1. Raffle of the Cases

The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge gravely abused her
discretion when she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 under a separate category which did
not restrict their raffle to the city’s special criminal and family courts in accordance with SC
Administrative Order 36-96. Further, the prosecution points out that she violated Administrative
Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the raffle. The presiding judges of these
two branches, both heinous crimes courts eligible to receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed
to the CA.

The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raffle of the subject cases. The
raffle maintained a separate list for criminal and civil cases. Criminal cases cognizable by special
criminal courts were separately listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a separate
heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was nothing irregular in this since it merely indicated that the cases
were not being raffled for the first time.

The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from raffle since these
branches remained without regularly appointed judges. Although the pairing judges of these
branches had authority to act on incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this did not mean that
such branches should already be included in the raffle of cases.
Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle yet it did not then object to the
manner by which it was conducted. The prosecution raised the question only when it filed this
petition, a clear afterthought.

2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts

The prosecution points out that, although this Court’s October 7, 2003 Resolution directed a re-raffle
of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime amended the informations
to reflect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive Judge
should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts
jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a
minor. Thus:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less
than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate
sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred. (Emphasis
supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need
for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases,11 for
instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in
hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a
family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder cases
that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as
party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who had
become the real private offended parties.

3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to inhibit
herself from hearing the cases against the respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. – A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;

xxxx

(e) the judge knows the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the compulsory
disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his
voluntary inhibition.

The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part
of the judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly
affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and
prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the
presumption that the judge will perform his duties according to law without fear or favor. The Court
will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judge’s
rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12

Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for improperly
submitting to a public interview on the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against the
respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadao’s
dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into
frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply accommodated, not sought, the requests for such
an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false
information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public disclosures
regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao’s statement that a very close relative
stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondents. But this
statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How
can this constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she referred to was her
spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration when she
said in her comment to the administrative complaint against her that such motion was merely the
prosecution’s stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the respondents. The
comment could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely
already issued an order holding that the complainant’s evidence failed to establish probable cause
against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for
reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao did not
characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.

4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions
for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and
allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to determine probable cause for
the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of the investigating prosecutor’s
resolution as well as the informations and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts
as to the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to
present additional evidence to support the finding of probable cause within five days from notice.

Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the
Ombudsman’s findings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery
in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary investigation
when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the cases. The prosecution
added that the affidavits of P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably
explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.

The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.13

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits
the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable
cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and
related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. Besides,
she received no new evidence from the respondents.14

The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents along with the criminal
informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine the presence of probable cause against the
respondents:

1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu’s affidavit of March 24, 200115 in which he said that on May 17, 1995
respondent Canson, NCR Command Head, ordered him to form two teams that would go
after suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the Superville
Subdivision in Parañaque City. Yu headed the assault team while Marlon Sapla headed the
perimeter defense. After the police team apprehended eight men inside the safe house, it
turned them over to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu just learned that the men
and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police in Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City.

2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos’ affidavit of March 24, 200116 in which he said that he was part
of the perimeter defense during the Superville operation. After the assault team apprehended
eight male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos then went to the
office of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles,
Villacorte and other police officers.
 According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought to
Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-out and that this action had been
cleared with higher authorities, to which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval. Before
Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly told him, "baka may mabuhay pa diyan." Ramos
then boarded an L-300 van with his men and four male suspects. In the early morning of May
18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A few minutes later, P/S
Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed responsibility for the incident.

3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes’ affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which he corroborated Ramos’
statements. Medes said that he belonged to the same team that arrested the eight male
suspects. He drove the L-300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects
were killed.

4. Mario C. Enad’s affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he claimed having served as TMC
civilian agent. At around noon of May 17, 1995, he went to Superville Subdivision together
with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car and
observe what went on in the house under surveillance. Later that night, other police officers
arrived and apprehended the men in the house. Enad went in and saw six men lying on the
floor while the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left Sucat in the early
morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but was awaken by gunshots. He saw
Dumlao and other police officers fire their guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended
suspects.

5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno’s affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which he corroborated what Ramos
said. Seno claimed that he was part of the advance party in Superville Subdivision and was
also in Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang were killed.

6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 199520 which narrated the events
that took place on May 17 and 18, 1995. This report was submitted by Lacson, Zubia, Acop
and Canson.

7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.

The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports, taken together with the
other documents of record, fail to establish probable cause against the respondents.

First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of Ramos, corroborated by
those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly heard the commanders of the various units plan
the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City and actually execute such plan. Yu’s testimony is limited to the capture of the gang
members and goes no further. He did not see them killed.

Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the prosecution’s own
evidence—the PNP ABRITG’s After Operations Report of May 31, 1995—shows that these men
took no part in the operations against the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included a
comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson), Traffic Management
Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command (Acop), and National Capital Region Command
(Canson) who were involved. The names of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that list.
Notably, only Yu’s name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that list. Since an after-battle
report usually serves as basis for commendations and promotions, any omitted name would hardly
have gone unchallenged.

Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence against the respondents,
submitted in the course of the preliminary investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman conducted
in a related robbery charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit. He claimed in that
counter-affidavit that he was neither in Superville Subdivision nor Commonwealth Avenue during the
Kuratong Baleleng operations since he was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May
18.22 Notably, Medes claimed in a joint counter-affidavit that he was on duty at the TMC
headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23

Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and giving credence to Ramos
and Medes’ statements, dismissed the robbery case. More, it excluded Ramos from the group of
officers that it charged with the murder of the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
Under the circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge Yadao was in doubting the
sudden reversal after six years of testimony of these witnesses.

Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he narrated, his role was limited
to cornering and arresting the suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in
Superville Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to an investigating unit, he no longer
knew what happened to them.

Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members
tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. But this finding cannot have any legal significance for the
purpose of the preliminary investigation of the murder cases against the respondents absent
sufficient proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang members down.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should
have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause.24

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s
first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case here.
Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that
presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP Director
Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years after it happened. It would have
been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the five days
required of the prosecution by the rules.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should
be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.25

5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one public prosecutor and one
private prosecutor for all the offended parties but allowed each of the counsels representing the
individual respondents to be heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited
the prosecution’s use of tape recorders.

But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and administrative
powers to effectively control the conduct of its proceedings. Thus:

Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:

xxxx

(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a
judicial investigation under its authority;

xxxx

(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons
in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;

xxxx

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;

xxxx

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one
private prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for determination of probable cause but
permitting counsels representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.26 The burden of establishing probable cause
against all the accused is upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in
their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common position
on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses
that are personal to him.

As for the prohibition against the prosecution’s private recording of the proceedings, courts usually
disallows such recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could
prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on
being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official recording of
the proceedings by the court’s stenographer has been insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion in Judge Yadao’s policy against such extraneous recordings.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the following assailed Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:

1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for re-raffle, granted the
motions for determination of probable cause, and dismissed the criminal cases;

2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of the respondents for the
immediate resolution of the three pending incidents before the court;

3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to recuse and the urgent
supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification;

4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated November 12, 2003; and

5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
January 16, 2004 Order.

SO ORDERED.
The Escalante massacre was an incident on September 20, 1985 in Escalante City, Negros
Occidental, Philippines where para-military forces of the government gunned down civilians engaged
in a protest-rally in commemoration of the 13th anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law. It is
also called Escam - shorthand for "Escalante massacre", and sometimes Bloody Thursday, though
the massacre really happened on a Friday.[1]

GENEROSO N. SUBAYCO, ALFREDO T. ALCALDE, and ELEUTERIO O.

IBAEZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The year was 1985, the month, September. The Marcos government was
fast sliding into its sunset days. Yet, it was again set to celebrate with pomp,
September 21, the day it proclaimed martial law some thirteen (13) years
ago. The people, however, were not in the mood to be joyous. They planned
massive public protests in different parts of the country. One of the biggest
protest rallies was blueprinted as a Welga ng Bayan at Escalante, Negros
Occidental. It ended in tragedy which will not easily recede in the mist of our
history. Twenty (20) demonstrators were shot dead and twenty-four (24) others
were wounded by the military and para-military forces of the Marcos
government. Of several persons charged with various counts of murder and
frustrated murder, only three (3) were convicted Generoso N. Subayco, Alfredo
T. Alcalde and Eleuterio O. Ibaez were convicted by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. They now come to this Court insisting on their innocence and
pleading to be set free.We deny their petition and we warn our military and
police authorities that they cannot shoot people who are exercising their right
to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance. [1]

As aforestated, twenty (20) demonstrators were killed and twenty-four (24)

others were seriously wounded by gunshots during the Welga ng Bayan held
on September 20, 1985 at Escalante, Negros Occidental. Twenty (20) counts
of Murder and twenty-four (24) counts of Frustrated Murder were filed with [2]

respondent Sandiganbayan against those allegedly responsible for the death

and injuries of the victims. Charged were several civilian government officials,
personnel from the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police,
and from the para-military group Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), namely:
 1. Ex-Mayor Braulio P. Lumayno,
2. Ex-Governor Armando C. Gustilo,[3]
3. Danilo Nonoy Jimenez,
4. Capt. Modesto E. Sanson, Jr.,
5. CIC Alfredo T. Alcalde,
6. CIC Eleuterio O. Ibaez,
7. C2C Rufino L. Lerado,
8. C2C Carlos L. Santiago,
9. T/Sgt. Generoso N. Subayco,
10. S/Sgt. Quirino L. Amar,
11. Sgt. Rolando A. Braa,
12. P/Capt. Rafael C. Jugan,
13. P/Pfc. Mariano C. Juarez, Jr.,
14. P/Pfc. Alfonso Birao,
15. P/Pfc. Wilfredo Carreon,
16. P/Pfc. Rogelio Pea,
17. P/Pfc. Iluminado D. Guillen,
18. Pat. Ludovico Cajurao,
19. Pat. Luisito T. Magalona,
20. Pat. Alex Francisco M. Liguaton,
21. Pat. Porfirio Q. Sypongco,
22. Pat. Prudencio M. Panagsagan,
23. Pat. Danilo P. Antones,
24. Pat. Elmer Sinadjan,
25. Pat. Grant L. Batomalaque,
26. Pat. Lino F. Mercado,
27. F/Cpl. Casimiro Pandongan,
28. Fmn. Gene Legaspina,
29. Fmn. Giomar D. Gale,
30. Fmn. Edwin T. Gustilo,
31. Fmn. Joel B. Rosal,
32. Chdf Teddy Magtubo,
33. Chdf Elias Torias,
34. Chdf Jose Boy Parcon,
35. Chdf Jeremias Villanueva,
36. Chdf Dante P. Diaz,
37. Chdf Amador O. Villa,
38. Chdf Antonio A. Caete,
39. Chdf Jimmy Mayordomo,
40. Chdf Jerry L. Espinosa,
41. Chdf Francisco A. Morante,
42. Chdf Bernie C. Muoz,
43. Chdf Ernesto V. Olaera,
44. Chdf Dione L. Sesbreno, and
45. Chdf Alfredo A. Quinatagcan alias Pidong Bagis.

All of the accused were part of the police-military group which undertook the
dispersal operation during the rally.
 Only twenty-eight (28) of the above accused were arrested and tried as the
others remained at large. The twenty-eight (28) were all members of the
Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police, viz:
1. Modesto Sanson,
2. Alfredo Alcalde,
3. Eleuterio Ibaez,
4. Rufino Lerado,
5. Carlos Santiago,
6. Generoso Subayco,
7. Quirino Amar,
8. Rolando Braa,
9. Rafael Jugan,
10. Mariano Juarez,
11. Alfonso Birao,
12. Wilfredo Carreon
13. Rogelio Pea,
14. Iluminado Guillen,
15. Ludovico Cajurao,
16. Luisito Magalona,
17. Alex Francisco Liguaton,
18. Porfirio Sypongco,
19. Prudencio Panagsagan,
20. Danilo Antones,
21. Elmer Sinadjan,
22. Grant Batomalaque,
23. Casimiro Pandongan,
24. Gene Legaspina,
25. Socrates Jarina,
26. Giomar Gale,
27. Edwin Gustilo, and
28. Joel Rosal.

Upon conclusion of the trial, respondent court acquitted all the accused except
petitioners Alfredo Alcalde, Eleuterio Ibaez and Generoso Subayco. The
dispositive portion of the Decision held:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court finds the evidence against the
following accused to be insufficient to establish their liability in the instant charges
and therefore ACQUITS them in all the herein cases:

1. Modesto Sanson
2. Rufino Leado
3. Carlos Santiago
4. Quirino Amar
5. Rolando Braa
6. Rafael Jugan
7. Mariano Juarez
 8. Alfonso Birao
9. Wilfredo Carreon
10. Rogelio Pea
11. Iluminado Guillen
12. Ludivico Cajurao
13. Luisito Magalona
14. Alex Francisco Liguaton
15. Porfirio Sypongco
16. Prudencio Panagsagan
17. Danilo Antones
18. Elmer Sinadjan
19. Grant Batomalaque
20. Casimiro Pandongan
21. Gene Legaspina
22. Socrates Jarina
23. Giomar Gale
24. Edwin Gustilo
25. Joel Rosal, and
26. Francisco Morante.

The same evidence, however, has established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
following accused who stood trial:

1. Alfredo Alcalde
2. Eleuterio Ibaez, and
3. Generoso Subayco

and the Court hereby renders judgment CONVICTING them and imposing upon them
the corresponding penalties, to wit:

A. FOR MURDER in the following Criminal Cases:

of Rodolfo Montealto in No. 12063

of Claro Monares in No. 12064
of Edgardo Salili in No. 12065
of William Alegre in No. 12066
of Rovena Franco in No. 12067
of Cesar Tejones in No. 12067
of Juvely Jaravelo in No. 12070
of Rodney Demigilio in No. 12071
of Manuel Tan in No. 12072
of Michael Dayanan in No. 12073
 of Maria Luz Mondejar in No. 12074
of Aniano Ornopia in No. 12076
of Nenita Orot in No. 12077
of Johnny Suarez in No. 12078
of Ronilo Sta. Ana in No. 12080
of Angelina Lape in No. 12081
1) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of seventeen (17)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to a maximum of reclusion perpetua for
EACH of the above sixteen cases;
2) to jointly pay indemnity to the heirs for the death of the above mentioned victims at
P50,000.00 for each victim, or a total of P800,000.00;
3) to jointly pay moral damages to the heirs of the above victims at P20,000.00 for each
victim of a total of P320,000.00;

B. FOR FRUSTRATED MURDER for the injuries sustained under the following
Criminal Cases:

No. 12039 by Buenaventura Jaravelo

No. 12041 by Alejandro Bocabal
No. 12042 by Elias Hermogenes
No. 12046 by Luvimin Leones
No. 12047 by Gloven Gabrido
No. 12051 by Henry Sernal
No. 12053 by Virgirita Mabuyao
No. 12059 by Federico Dogomeo
No. 12060 by Wenefreda Loquinario
No. 12062 by Luzviminda Gemola
1) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor to a maximum of fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal for EACH of the above ten (10) cases;
2) to jointly pay actual damages incurred only by the following victims, as follows:

Alejandro Bocabal (No. 12040) - P800.00

Luzminda Gemola (No. 12062) - P700.00

or a total of P1,500.00; no other damage having been actually proven at

trial;

3) to jointly pay moral damages to the following victims:

Buenaventura Jaravelo (No.12039) P10,000.00
 Alejandro Bocabal (No. 12040) P10,000.00
Elias Hermogenes (No. 12042) P10,000.00
Luvimin Leones (No. 12046) P10,000.00
Gloven Gabrido (No. 12047) P10,000.00
Henry Sernal (No. 12051) P10,000.00
Virginita Mabuyao (No. 12053) P10,000.00
Federico Dogomeo (No. 12059) P15,000.00
Wenefrida Loquinario (No. 12060) P15,000.00
Luzminda Gemola (No. 12062) P10,000.00
or a total of P110,000.00.

C. FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER for the injuries sustained under the following
Criminal Cases:

No. 12041 of Celso Saburdo

No. 12043 of Eduardo Latosa
No. 12044 of Nelly Artajo
No. 12045 of Renato Tapel
No. 12048 of Joel Quiamco
No. 12049 of Magdalena Hemola
No. 12050 of Lucia Ravanes
No. 12052 of Ernesto Caro
No. 12054 of Renato Saratobias
No. 12055 of Elisa Zarraga
No. 12056 of Julio Iwayan
No. 12057 of Nelson Cabahug
No. 12058 of Felix Almonia
No. 12061 of Abundia Caraat-Petrano
1) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of four (4) years,
one (1) month and one (1) day of prision correccional to a maximum of eight (8) years
of prision mayor for EACH of the above fourteen (14) cases;
2) to jointly pay actual damages incurred by the victims, as follows:
Celso Saburdo (No. 12041) P800.00
Renato Tapel (No. 12045) P300.00
Joel Quiamco (No. 12048) P15,000.00
Lucia Ravanes (No. 12050) P2,000.00
Renato Saratobias (No. 12054) P2,000.00
Elisa Zarraga (No. 12055) P300.00
Nelson Cahabug (No. 12057) P2,000.00
Abundia Petrano (No. 12061) P200.00
or a total of P22,600.00
 3) to jointly pay moral damages to the victims at P5,000.00 for each of the victims in the
fourteen cases or a total of P70,000.00.

These three accused, namely, Alfredo Alcalde, Eleuterio Ibaez and Genoroso Subayco
are, however, ACQUITTED in the four murder cases (No. 12069, No. 12075, No.
12079 and No. 12082 charging the deaths of Alex Lobatos, Rodolfo Mahinay,
Rogelio Magallen, Jr. and Norberto Locanilao, respectively) for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

LET an alias warrant of arrest issue for the following accused who, up to this time,
had eluded arrest:

1. Ex-Mayor Braulio Lumayno

2. Danilo Nonoy Jimenez
3. Pat. Lino F. Mercado
4. CHDF Teddy G. Magtubo
5. CHDF Elias Torias
6. CHDF Jose Boy Parcon
7. CHDF Jeremias Villanueva
8. CHDF Dante P. Diaz
9. CHDF Amador O. Villa
10. CHDF Antonio A. Caete
11. CHDF Jimmy Mayordomo
12. CHDF Jerry L. Espinosa
13. CHDF Bernie C. Muoz
14. CHDF Ernesto V. Olaera
15. CHDF Dione L. Sebreno, and
16. CHDF Alfredo M. Quinatagcan alias Pidong Baguis.

In the meantime, the cases with respect to the above-named accused who remain at
large shall be archived pending their arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of this Court.

SO ORDERED. [4]

Petitioners now come before us by way of certiorari raising the following

issues:
1. Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting
the petitioners based merely on alleged implied conspiracy to perpetrate the crimes
charged and not on clear, positive and convincing proof of conspiracy; and
 2. Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting
the petitioners despite that the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt that
is proof beyond reasonable doubt was not satisfied.[5]
The petition must fail.
The undisputed facts are summarized by the respondent court in its
exhaustive Decision, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

There was a rally held at Escalante, Negros Occidental that started on September 18,
1985. It was planned to go on until September 21, 1985, the anniversary of the
proclamation of martial law by then President Marcos. This rally was participated in
by members of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or BAYAN, the National
Federation of Sugar Workers, the Kristianong Katilingban, the CYO, the KMU, the
League of Filipino Students, and others. It was spearheaded by the BAYAN whose
leader at Escalante was Rolando Ponseca.

The rally was without permit from the local authorities, although the plan was not
kept secret from them. In fact, this planned demonstration was taken up at a
conference called by the Provincial Command and attended by the accused Capt.
Sanson of the 334th PC Company stationed at Sagay, among other unit
commanders. At that meeting, the operational guidelines were laid down on how to
deal with the planned demonstration as well as with contingencies in connection
therewith. The local command headed by Capt. Sanson had met with the leaders of the
projected Welga ng Bayan in order to agree on ground rules for the conduct of the
rally.

The Welga ng Bayan started as scheduled on September 18, 1985. It started with a
torch parade that evening. The demonstrators came to Escalante and stayed,
occupying the national highway in front of the Rural Bank of Escalante and the other
converging point at the market site. By the 20th, the crowd was at its
thickest. Estimates of the attendance therein ranged from 3,000 to 10,000.

At around noontime on that day, there were speeches delivered by speakers from
among the demonstrators using the public address system on an improvised platform,
addressing the crowd assembled in front of the Rural Bank. The crowd also shouted
anti-Marcos and anti-Military slogans, among others.

Capt. Sanson had been constantly apprised of the activities of the demonstrators by
reports coming from Capt. Rafael Jugan, the Station Commander of the INP at
Escalante. He was informed by the latter that the rallyists had failed to honor their
commitment not to barricade the entire portion of the national highway so as not to
obstruct traffic. He was likewise informed that the demonstrators were collecting
money from passing motorists and that the demonstrators were becoming unruly.

Capt. Sanson in turn reported these pieces of information to the Provincial

Command. As he was in charge of the area, Capt. Sanson took it upon himself to
personally talk to Ponseca, when he believed that his Station Commander had failed to
get in touch with Ponseca, to remind him of his commitment. After Ponseca had failed
to effect a dispersal of the crowd or to open at least half of the road to allow passage
to vehicles, he had prepared a dispersal operation and had called fire-fighting
personnel and equipment from the towns of Sagay and Escalante, as well as from the
cities of San Carlos and Cadiz. He had also summoned his men under Capt. Jugan of
the Escalante INP, the CHDF headed by Sgt. Subayco and another team headed by Lt.
Supaco.

After a last-ditch effort to peacefully disperse the crowd by Ponseca through a letter to
the demonstrators in front of the Rural Bank had failed, the dispersal operation by
Capt. Sanson began. Four firetrucks were dispatched to the crowd of demonstrators,
two of them the Cadiz and Escalante firetrucks towards the demonstrators massed in
front of the Rural Bank of Escalante. These hosed the demonstrators with water but
even after the water from them had been exhausted, the demonstrators stayed
put. Capt. Sanson then ordered the throwing of teargas to the demonstrators by two of
his men, Amar and Mercado. The tear gas caused the demonstrators to lie face down
on the ground; they persisted in their places rather than disperse.Then, a single shot
rang out followed by successive gunfire from different directions. As one witness had
described it, it was like New Years Eve (TSN, February 7, 1994, testimony of accused
CHDF Morante). This firing lasted for a few minutes.

Capt. Sanson had been heard by some of the witnesses to have shouted Stop firing
repeatedly and, after some time, the firing had stopped, but not soon enough for men
and women from the rallyists group who died and others who were wounded as a
result of the gunfire.
[6]

It was the thesis of the prosecution that the whole dispersal operation was
an unlawful conspiracy, that the firing at the crowd was part of the dispersal
operation, and that all those who took part in the dispersal operation should be
held liable for each death and each injury that resulted therefrom. [7]

The accused denied the existence of conspiracy. Subayco and Ibaez

claimed that they merely fired into the air but not toward the crowd. On his part,
Alcalde admitted that he fired his weapon to prevent the rallyists from climbing
the Cadiz City firetruck. [8]
 In its Decision, the respondent court ruled there was no sufficient evidence
to prove general conspiracy of the forty-five (45) accused as alleged by the
prosecution. It then examined the individual acts of the accused during the
[9]

dispersal operation to determine their liability for the death and injuries of the
victims. It found implied conspiracy only on the part of all the accused who fired
at the demonstrators.
Per finding of the respondent Sandiganbayan, the firing came from the
Cadiz City firetruck and the jeep which witnesses referred to as a weapons
carrier. After the rallyists were hosed with water, the Cadiz City firetruck
attempted to move back, but was trapped by the logs and rocks ostensibly put
by the rallyists under its wheels. The weapons carrier was then maneuvered
behind the Cadiz City firetruck. Thereafter, teargas canisters were lobbed at the
rallyists. Jovy Jaravelo, a rallyist, picked up one of the canisters and threw it
back where it came from. Hell broke loose. CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan (a.k.a.
Pidong Bagis) shot Jaravelo. Successive gunfire followed. Several witnesses
saw the CHDF personnel and the PC men on board the Cadiz City firetruck and
the weapons carrier fire their guns. Some fired into the air while the others
directed their gun shots at the rallyists. When the dust settled down, twenty (20)
of the demonstrators were dead, twenty-four (24) others were wounded and
seventy-nine (79) empty shells were recovered from the scene of the
crime. They were later traced to four firearms belonging
to CHDF Caete, CHDF Parcon, C2C Lerado and CIC Ibaez. [10]

The following were identified by witnesses to have fired their

guns: CHDF Alfredo M. Quinatagcan alias Pidong Bagis, CHDF Elias
Torias, CHDF Jimmy Mayordomo, CHDF Teddy Magtubo, CHDF Jeremias
Villanueva, CHDF Jose Boy Parcon, Roming Javier, C1C Eleuterio O. Ibaez,
T/Sgt. Generoso N. Subayco, C1C Alfredo Alcalde. [11]

On the basis of the evidence adduced and following its theory of implied
conspiracy, the respondent Court held petitioners liable for the deaths and
injuries of all the victims. It is this finding of implied conspiracy that petitioners
[12]

assail in the petition at bar.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed. The
concerned acts of petitioners to achieve the same objective signify
conspiracy. In the case of People vs. Guevarra, we enunciated the doctrine
[13] [14]

of implied conspiracy as follows:

xxx xxx xxx
Although there is no well-founded evidence that the appellant and Romero had
conferred and agreed to kill Joselito, their complicity can be justified by
circumstantial evidence, that is, their community of purpose and their unity of design
in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act of assaulting the
deceased.

xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question that the appellants act in holding the victim from behind
immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and overt
act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be
classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the
moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting the criminal design of the
slayer immediately before the commission of the offense. That is termed as implied
conspiracy. The appellants voluntary and indispensable cooperation was a
concurrence of the criminal act to be executed. Consequently, he is a co-conspirator
by indispensable cooperation, although the common desire or purpose was never
bottled up by previous undertaking. (italics supplied)

We therefore uphold the respondent court in ruling that the following

circumstances proved the existence of an implied conspiracy among the
petitioners in the cases at bar:
1. After the Escalante firetruck exhausted its supply of water, it withdrew from the scene.
2. The Cadiz City firetruck took over hosing the crowd. It also ran out of water, tried to
back out but was prevented by the logs and rocks strewn behind it.
3. The weapons carrier then moved behind the Cadiz City firetruck.
4. Teargas canisters were thrown into the crowd. Jovy Jaravelo, a rallyist, picked up one
of the canisters and threw it back to where it came from. At this juncture, CHDF
Alfredo Quinatagcan a.k.a. Pidong Bagis shot Jaravelo. Successive gunfire followed.
5. The seventy-nine (79) empty shells recovered from the scene of the crime were traced
to four M-16 rifles issued to CHDF Caete, CHDF Parcon, C2C Lerado and C1C
Ibaez.Caete and Parcon were on board the weapons carrier while Lerado and Ibaez
were on board the Cadiz City firetruck.
6. The other personnel who were also on these two vehicles were also scene to have
fired at the crowd.

All these circumstances intersect to show a community of purpose among the

petitioners and their companions, that is, to fire at the demonstrators. This common
purpose was pursued by the petitioners and their companions who used firepower
against the rallyists. As proved, the plan to disperse the demonstrators did not include
the use of guns, yet, petitioners and their cohorts did. At the first crack of gunfire
coming from CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis), petitioners and their
companions commenced firing at the demonstrators, as if on signal. They fired
indiscriminately toward the demonstrators who were then already lying prone on the
ground. There was no imminent danger to their safety. Not just one or a few shots
were fired but several. The firing lasted a few minutes and cost the lives and limbs of
the demonstrators. We agree with the respondent court that the collective acts of the
petitioners and their companions clearly show the existence of a common design
toward the accomplishment of a united purpose. They were therefore properly
[15]

convicted for all the crimes they were charged with.

The use of bullets to break up an assembly of people petitioning for redress

of grievance cannot but be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as
abuses in government abound. Precisely to help put a brake on official abuses,
people empowerment was codified in various provisions of the 1987
Constitution. It is high time to remind our officials that under our Constitution
power does not come from the barrel of a gun but from the ballots of the
people. It is thus important to know the unexpurgated will of the people for in a
republican government, it is the people who should truly rule. Consequently, the
right of the people to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of
grievance should not be abridged by officials momentarily holding the powers
of government. So we expressly held in the early case of US v. Apurado. [16]

It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of
the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such
occasions feeling it always brought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a
seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and
to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the
attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable
manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most
unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to
be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on
such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but
the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
uprising.

The Constitution did not engage in mystical teaching when it proclaimed in

solemn tone that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. It should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits
[17]

that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances,
all should listen, especially the government. For in a democracy, it is the people
who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Our affirmance of the conviction of the petitioners does not give complete
justice to the victims of the Escalante massacre, subject of the cases at
bar. Until today, sixteen (16) of the other accused have successfully eluded
arrest by the authorities. Not until they have been arrested and tried will justice
emerge triumphant for justice cannot come in fraction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated
October 3, 1994 is affirmed. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Interior and Local Government that
they may undertake the necessary efforts to effectuate the early arrest of the
other accused in the cases at bar. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting
of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with:
MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on
October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against
accused was amended to MURDER. 1

The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and shoot with the said handgun Roland
John Chapman who war hit in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Roland John Chapman.

Contrary to law. 2

The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation, and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly
caused the death of the said Maureen Hultman.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Jussi Olavi Leino,
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or
 causes independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.

Contrary to law. 4

In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail was set at twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for the murder of Roland John
Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his
arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.

At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution manifested that it would
present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on the
circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending that day was hearing of the
evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He
opined that Leino's testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of Leino
and Hultman would be irrelevant. 5

Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if the testimony of
Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused were
charged involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify on
all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two
(2) frustrated murder charges. 6

By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to present Leino to
testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused on August 14,
1991. The defense pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution would
still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it could present Leino. 7

The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until after arraignment of
accused on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the
petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded. 8

Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The prosecution then started
to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 9

A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman,
Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party
started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where
students of International School hang out. 10 After an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in
Makati, where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up
a friend of Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11

After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmariñas Village,
Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along
Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the rest
of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in going back to her house. She did not want her
parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed
in the car and listened to the radio. 13

Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street. When they reached the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road.
Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D."
Leino thought accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14 Accused did not
15
bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it.

Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and inquired what was
going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?"
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his
upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on
the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and
leave Chapman alone. 16

Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do you want a trouble?"
Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came
to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh,
my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?"

All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut
up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move
away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without being shot by
accused.

Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused's
car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying to put some
distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. 17

Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and directly in front of them
stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness.
Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening
and saw accused return to his car and drive away. 19

Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3) people looking on
and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a
private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at
#1352 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a
private security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner
Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village. 23

Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their employer, while driver
Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses
heard the first gunshot while at their respective posts.

Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was happening, while
Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's house and looked out to
Caballero Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino) sitting
on the sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They saw the
gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's
distance from the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the
control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the gateway car as a box-type Lancer, its
color somewhat white ("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car
and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat
saw the gunman's face. They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters away
from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters away from the scene of the
crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took
place was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29

After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and went near the scene
of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by
and Mangubat requested him to report the shooting incident to the security officers of Dasmariñas
Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what
he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit
"B"). He also jotted down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as 566. 31

The security guards of Dasmariñas Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and
Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32

The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES BALDADO of the Makati
police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their initial
investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number
566. They checked the list of vehicles registered with the village Homeowners' Association and were able
to track down two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was registered in the name of
JOSE MONTAÑO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmariñas Village, with plate number PKX 566, and another
was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, with
plate number PDW 566.

SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, was also tasked by
then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately
proceeded to the house of Jose Montaño 35 where they found ahead of them the Makati police and
operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from Mrs. Montaño whether the white
Lancer car registered in the name of Mr. Montaño and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's car.
Mrs. Montaño denied and declared they had already sold the car to Saldaña Enterprises. She averred the
car was being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon
City. Mrs. Montaño called up her husband and informed him about the investigation. She also called up
Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36

Jose Montaño came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car. Ranin brought them to the
NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer car. At the NBI Ranin inquired from Montaño the
whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montaño informed him that the car was at the
residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July
12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaña Enterprises.
Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI agents who
made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montaño left his car at the NBI
parking lot pending identification by possible witnesses. 37

On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation and neighborhood
inquiry of the shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their
office the next day for further investigation. 38 They also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was
reluctant to divulge any information and even denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his
reluctance, they returned to Cadenas' post at Dasmariñas Village that night and served him a subpoena,
inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next day. 39 The NBI agents also talked with
Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, near the
scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car was not white but light gray. A
foreign national, Asliami was afraid and refused to give a statement about the incident. The agents
exerted every effort to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a
representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40

On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as summoned. Florece readily
executed a sworn statement. 41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his
knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents informed
SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in
his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was apprehensive that the
gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas
relented. 42

The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He described the gunman's
car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where
Montaño's white Lancer car was parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if
Montaño's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was different. Ranin directed him to
look around the cars in the parking lot and to point the color that most resembled the color of the
gunman's car. He pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to
was not white but light gray. 43

Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in the affirmative. Ranin
led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-
10) taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture (Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the
gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the
NBI then took down Cadenas' statement. 44

Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to apply for a search
warrant. After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search
warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983
Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number PDW 566. Ranin and his agents
drove to accused's house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, to implement the
warrant. 45

At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of accused, of their search
warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to
the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the house at
that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and called up someone on the phone. 46

In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured accused's car.
After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but she told him that
the keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with accused on
the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to the NBI for investigation. Accused
assured Ranin that he would report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car of
accused to the NBI office. 47

At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI office and waited for
accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them
that he just came from the Makati police station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that he
was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin
test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his Lancer car at the
time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks back
and was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's house at Dasmariñas
Village since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the group decided to continue the
investigation the following day. 49

The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on what really
happened at Dasmariñas Village. Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that
he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence. 50

Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to join the lineup
composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining room 51 and
Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to
accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53

On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other agents brought
accused to Forbes Park for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just
been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his
safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the gunman in Forbes Park where the
Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54

House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and escorted him and his
father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was
brought out of the house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about
five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief
Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of
the house and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55

A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied house, into the
street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not
yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a
request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request
to his father. The men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes,
they again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino identified accused
as the gunman. 56

The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the cases of murder and
double frustrated murder against accused to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the
inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was
concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57

The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went to see security
guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer in Dasmariñas Village.
Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police station where his statement
(Exhibit "D") was taken. 58

The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his house and
brought him to the Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would
be coming and see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at
the second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs,
passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused was
going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat
initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also
confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by a police
Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60 Accused, together with Major
Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at
Dasmariñas Village by other Makati
policemen. 61

Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked him again if
accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado
told Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado) earlier
prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63

In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents. Director Lim
asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown
twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was asked to identify the gun
gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of accused, and identified him as the
gunman. Mangubat's statement was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make
a personal identification. 64

When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of the media. At that
time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director
Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused to identification. They pointed out that
since the cases against accused had already been filed in court and they have secured a court order
for the transfer of accused to the Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made
in the courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their on-going
investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that identification be made
without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is not
identified n the lineup, the media coverage would favor accused. 65

All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's office and
remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing the lineup
and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat
pointed to accused as the gunman.

With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its investigation. 66

JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:

FINDINGS:

= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.

= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter,

located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed
backwards and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and central
and lateral incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then lacerating
the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right palatine,
tongue and tonsillar region.
 SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991

No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign

body (bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the
right. No remarkable findings.

CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991

Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the

right palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with associated soft tissue
swelling.

Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.

Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.

Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.

Intact bone calvarium.

xxx xxx xxx 67

Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After entering Leino's head,
it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and
tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the covering
of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence of the gunshot wound because of the
fractured upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper portion of
his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty in speaking. 68

Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He opined that the muzzle
of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the victim's head. He
concluded that the gun must have been pointed above Leino's head considering the acuteness and
downward trajectory of the bullet. 69

Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center, operated on MAUREEN
HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was
bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the eyebrow.
Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the left side of the forehead where the bullet
entered. 70

They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was also given a CT scan.
The examination revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. There were several
splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged
beneath her right jaw. 71

Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team who operated on her
brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the
splintered bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain and her
very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After
the surgery, Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was wheeled
to the ICU for further observation.

Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's nostrils due to the
unpatched undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A
second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used the fascia
lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen
remained unconscious. The trickle of brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen
developed infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed brain
abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to remove brain abscess and all
possible focus of infection. 73

Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that Maureen
was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon
entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went from the left to the right side of the
temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw of
Maureen. 74

The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of the body, the
brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the
bullet hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second
covering of the brain. 75

The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath the forehead brought
about by edema in the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by the
fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen. 76

A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal bleeding and
remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet was
recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet.
Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77

With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen survived, she would have
led a vegetating life and she would have needed assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary
routines. 78 She would have been completely blind on the left eye and there was possibility she would
have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses would have been modified and the same would
have affected her motor functions. There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79

Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in the hospital, she
ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991.

For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that on said
date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his
house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and
woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning. Accused avowed his two (2) maids could
attest to his presence in his house that fateful day. 80

Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the Dasmariñas shooting when
he read the newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino
Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number
PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its
involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting, his
Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in Dasmariñas Village. He has not
used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded that although the car was not in good running
condition, it could still be used. 82

Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around 5:00 p.m. upon
invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the
ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati
police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied
by the Makati police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI for he
84
had earlier committed to his mother that he would present himself to Director Lim.

He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with the statement
he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will. 85

The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel for breakfast.
When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On his way, he saw a lineup
formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the
number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him was already in the room.
As soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. 86

A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents
brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as the
gunman in a lineup. 87

A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the office of Ranin for
he refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the
identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was
identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any
stage of said investigation. 88

The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He
testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using his father's Lancer car bearing
plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89

In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a bicycle driver and two (2)
trucks parked at the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the bicycle driver and
damage to his father's car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a little off and the
car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city.
After a month, he brought the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmariñas
Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon
City. He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they
preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that from that time on, he
was prohibited by his father from using the car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the
car and since he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been made. 91

Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman, adoptive father of
deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may
have been an overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness allegedly
overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The defense
presented Anders Hultman as a hostile witness.

ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian Hultman were married in
the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous marriage, one of whom was
Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3)
children of their own. 92

The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial stage of the
investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag,
Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have uttered those words for Maureen never
spoke Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93

On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but instructed her to be
home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate
with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at
around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their house and informed them
about the killings. 94

Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused at the Makati
municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered that accused was
not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was
investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention, headed by Congressman
Concepcion. 95

The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F. BALDADO and SPO3
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.

Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose Montaño that
he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaña Lending Investors in February
1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations Manager of said company and was in the
residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed that
Montaño's white Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montaño's residence at the time of the
incident. 96

SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat saw the
gunman and the get-away car but could not give the central letters of the car's license plate.
Fernandez went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked
the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call, the maid told him that he saw the
gunman and heard one of the victims say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get
the maid's name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the
court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of the maid included in the
Progress Report (Exhibit "13") prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97

SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and Baldado fetched the
latter at Dasmariñas Village for identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.

At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After a few minutes,
accused and company arrived. When accused passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look
around and see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat told
Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It was
signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement, Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo
puti" (somewhat white). 99

ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified on the paraffin test
she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No. C 274-
91, 101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report, she
noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting
incident. She explained that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may not be
removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person who has fired a gun. 102

ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the stand for the
defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada,
Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed
him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and was compelled to execute a
statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did
not compel the attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture
story.

Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the irregularities committed in
the off-court identification of their client. When asked what he did to remedy this perceived
irregularity, Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he
filed a petition for review raising this issue with the Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases
therewith, he said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal
counsel of accused at that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment would
mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation and preliminary
investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103

The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress in the
investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor
Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Elena Aben of
the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the
testimonies of the news reporters, thus:

NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2) news reports as
having been partly written by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS
PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of the
Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually the product of collaborative work
among several reporters. They follow the practice of pooling news reports where several reporters are
tasked to cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports they file and
summarizes them into one story. 105

The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in evidence as follows:

Exhibit "1-A":

Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the investigation of
the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and three members of a
family — Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie
Jennifer, 7.
 Exhibit "1-B"

Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when Hultman, a
10th grader at the International School in Makati was escorted home by Chapman
after going to a disco.

Exhibit "1-C"

The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman.

Exhibit "l-D"

The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried to escape.

Exhibit "1-E"

Other angles

Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.

One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive" matter that
might involve influential people. 106

Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of the news items marked as
Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them from previous news reports of other newspapers. He
admitted that the only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director Velasco
was Exhibit "I-E."

Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila Times, entitled:
"NBI INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2."
Certain portions thereof, which were not written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and
offered in evidence, viz:

Exhibit "2-a"

Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital region,
claims, however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before the
police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his companions.

Exhibit "2-b"

The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on Teehankee's
hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory indicated that he may not
have fired the gun. 108

MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2) newspaper clippings
which were partly written by him.

One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was
entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3", thus:

Exhibit "3-a"

Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy" shortly
before Chapman's shooting.

Exhibit "3-b"

But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a dancer before
she was adopted by her foster parent.

Exhibit "3-c"

Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside the village
after the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward Forbes Park using the
Palm street gate.

On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c". He just reiterated
previous reports in other newspapers. They were based on speculations.

Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR DASMA
SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:

Exhibit "4-B"

According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when the witness
showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-metallic Lancer.

Exhibit "4-C"

The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car and was
talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several times. 110

Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that
the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on information available
at that time. 111

NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON
HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified
that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her information were
several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:

Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was arrested
at his house.

They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control number
566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police headquarters upon
invitation of Makati police chief Superintendent Remy Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort of the investigators
to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside from accused and
that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c) that the initial police
investigation showed that the gunman's car was a white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after
the NBI took over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray Lancer
of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.

ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she wrote in the news
item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's
Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114

The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:

Exhibit "6-a"

"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman said the
day after his 17-year old daughter was cremated. 115

Exhibit "6-b"

The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman family's request
for permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of their choice."

Exhibit "6-c"

"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the curtain,"
Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down and jail authorities
will pull him out." 116

ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked as Exhibit "6".
Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:

Exhibit "6-d"

"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was quoted as
telling Vergel de Dios.

Exhibit "6-e"

BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-Hultman, Vizconde
and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a secret but very influential multi-
sectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other crimes in high levels of
government and society. 118

Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by BIR insiders for
the latter refused to be identified. 119

Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and consuming personal
rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure, prejudice and
prejudgment by some congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the news account which
appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT
IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his
information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:

Exhibit "7-c"

Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number
"566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters. 121

Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue of the Inquirer,
entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The
portions of said news item which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:

Exhibit "8-a"

At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked not to be

identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has taken over the case
from the CIS.

Exhibit "8-c"

He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described as
"resembling Teehankee but looks much younger."

Exhibit "8-e"

The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as Mangubat, saw
everything that happened in the early morning of July 13. The witness, however,
failed to identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122

Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which
appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire
news account, 124 portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence, thus:

Exhibit "9-a"

The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise witness" picked
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.

He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to interview Mangubat
himself. 125

Exhibit "9-b"

Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby
(Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang
ituturo, said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want to be
identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article, entitled: "US
DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin
(Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:

Exhibit "10-a-1"

The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a diplomat's
plate number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566 blocked its path.

Exhibit "10-a-2"

US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a

communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an altercation
on the street. 127

Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news account he wrote which
appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL"
(Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item were marked by the defense as follows:

Exhibit "22-b"

. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of Mahogany and
Caballero Sts. in Dasmariñas Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.

Exhibit "22-c"

The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who was killed
in front of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed men, on board a
white Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes Benz car inside the
village before the shooting.

Exhibit "22-a-1"

The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered Chapman to alight
from the car. They shot Chapman several times in the body, while his companions
identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were seriously wounded when
the gunmen sprayed the car with bullets.

The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later the names
of the detained suspects after their initial investigation. 128

Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"), which appeared
on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in evidence as
follows:

Exhibit "23-a-1"

The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's car on
Mahogany St. in the subdivision.

Exhibit "23-a-2"
 Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two companions,
Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of their car.

Exhibit "23-a-3"

They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate No. PDW
566. They added that they saw the same car in the garage of the Teehankee
family. 129

On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories was the NBI and they
were based on information available to the NBI at that time 130

The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its rebuttal witness.
Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police
station. Her reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his place of work
in Dasmariñas Village and asked him if he was sure about the identity of the gunman. He told
Baldado he was positive. Baldado then said him he would no longer require him to sign the
statement he prepared for him earlier. 131

LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, was also presented as
a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of hands or excessive
perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued washing
with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate residue embedded in the skin pores.
Application of vinegar on the hand can register the same effect. 132

She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect within 72 hours
from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still
be found. 133

She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the paraffin test. She related
that she once attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin
test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his hands. They
then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative
result. Thus, she opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative
evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134

The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the presentation by the
defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a
Constancia 135manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the same being
unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its
evidence in the trial proper should the same be necessary.

At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The prosecution moved in
open court that the main cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision in view of the
absence of defense counsels who had manifested that they would no longer present their sur-
rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten (10) days from receipt of
the Order within which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the
defense objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a motion asking for
additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both parties submitted their respective
Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes
charged. 138The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:

(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
fatal shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer
imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00), Philippine Currency, plus moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), Philippine Currency;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
fatal shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of
Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and
Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages;
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of earning
capacity of the said deceased; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages;

(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery,
for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent
in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of said offended
party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages.

(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the offended parties the
sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and

(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.

Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for
New Trial, 139alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in considering as submitted for decision not
only the petition for bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to adduce further
evidence was violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE
ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.

II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE

ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS
MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY
DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF CHAPMAN
AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY
TREACHERY.

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL AND

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE

MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS

AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE
ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.

Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses who positively
identified him as the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these
eyewitnesses.

He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving victim of the
crimes at bar. Appellant urges:

First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly
irregular.

Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him.

Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.

Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was
suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned
over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting lasted for only five
(5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman's face. His
senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.

It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses
in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most
cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is
significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence
such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as
"inherently suspect." 141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime,

whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually
occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the
witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability
in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people
attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by
normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-
ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-
court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given
by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. 143

Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did
not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's
identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode
was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that
Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and
brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the
identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear for
his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive,
supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations
Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are
identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the
crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. 146

Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the
shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while
Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators.
He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that,
before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report
relative to the shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification
was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the
admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.

We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of the
crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot
Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify
against appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal
cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant.
When asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied:
"I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody else." 148

Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement
the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that
Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he
identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a
tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the
testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on
the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was
acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding that the
prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in important details," there being
no investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.

We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the
basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was
turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is not evidence. It is
unmitigated guesswork.

We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have
remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5)
minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals. 151 We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face
end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime
to appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If
Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.

Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not witness the
crime. He stresses that when the Dasmariñas security force and the Makati police conducted an on-
the-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in the
afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He
merely replied: "Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he
supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the
NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI.
Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.

We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he
witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his family's
safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by
appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding
and assurance of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the
authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in
the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the
court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as
an authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this ruling.

Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the records.
Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his torture.
The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand.
Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the
fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise
extended protection. 155

Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the testimony of defense
witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to
identify appellant as the gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati police station.
Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he positively identified appellant as the
gunman at the Makati police station. He averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat.
Baldado returned to his place of work in Dasmariñas and asked him again whether appellant was
the gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he would no longer
ask him to sign a statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement
previously prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at the
Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find
nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous
to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including some of its
jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less
than a congressional investigation.

II

We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in not holding
that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting
incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time.
Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene
of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses
described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth,
appellant could not have been the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that
he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me and don't
kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the
crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth,
the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmariñas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was
not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was
negative of nitrates.

Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the
eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman:
"Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO, another resident of Dasmariñas Village, who had a
white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.

Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res
inter alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a
specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's
error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost
automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English
appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion, some
substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this
approach especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate court
to "give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical
errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 160 We have
likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted
in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the
impact is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly
admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161

In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of
appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence
appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted
mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.

The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at
the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison
cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.

There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in running condition.
Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmariñas Village where it
was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said
car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of
appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's
evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III,
drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmariñas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked. 162

Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description of the color of
the gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white
("medyo puti"); 163Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic
gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not
meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the
speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of
credence.

Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen
Hultman, deserves scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen was
allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on record,
however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established
that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog,
and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." 167Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this
suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this
possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific
experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It
cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge
of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses
tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in
the products of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several
factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when
the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the
direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic
Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with
the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined
that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting
may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by
washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist
Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours
has already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.

III

In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the
publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on
the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as
no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary Franklin
Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen
Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect
him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.
He claims there were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the
courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In another instance,
he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom
on his way back to his cell.

We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just
like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism." 173

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that
the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they
happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is
not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the
jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when
he observed: "When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that
testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports
based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal
chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-
court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et
al. v. Alejandro, et a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of
actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result
of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not disclose that the trial
judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the
case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:

1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the attention of the
court to the visible display of a placard inside the courtroom. Acting on the
manifestation, the trial judge immediately directed that the placard be hidden. Only
then did he order the start of the arraignment of accused. 176

On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the media after they
had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court granted defense's request, noting that
the courtroom was also too crowded. 177

2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued between the defense
lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience clapped their hands, the defense
counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion
of the public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the public
was not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the
Supreme Court regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating
defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by spectators
inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also manifested that
he personally saw that when accused was being brought back to his cell from the
courtroom, a group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view of
policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could not be dissuaded by public
sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a reaction at the
spur of the moment. He then admonished the audience not to repeat it. 179

3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the coverage of the trial by
the press. The defense alleged that the media coverage will constitute mistrial and deny
accused's constitutional right to due process. It invoked the provision in the Rules of
Court which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the
organic personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public can be
ordered only in prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases. He
 added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public offenses. He quoted
the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell180 where it was held: "A responsible press is
always regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the
criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the courtrooms
public property." The trial judge then ruled that the media should be given a chance to
cover the proceedings before the trial proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from
taking pictures during the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but
were ordered to desist from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181

4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial judge gave the
media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no more. Trial then ensued. 182

5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media two (2)
minutes to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the reporters were duly
admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the proceedings and just take down
notes. 183

6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session, the judge
184
admonished the media people present in the courtroom to stop taking pictures.

Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial
coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper
reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the
case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to
appellant at the same time.

Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge voluntarily inhibited
himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and
partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we
directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of justice. 186 We found
nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.

IV

In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman
and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and
deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant
asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.

The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at bar with treachery
and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for,
admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street
since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It, however, appreciated the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness
Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent
reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were
then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D.
After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going
on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong.
There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The
gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.

Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend
himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without
risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was
by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the
shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We have consistently
ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute
treachery. 187Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for
Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.

As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly
attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold
blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to
the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried
to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered
her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two
were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely
defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the
killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which appellant used to
prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of
Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.

V and VI

We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that the awards of
moral and exemplary damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland
Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of
attorney's fees was excessive.

In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of victims Hultman and Chapman
the following damages:

1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity
for death and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate
or temperate and exemplary damages.

2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity
for death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos
and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for
loss of earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate
and exemplary damages.
 3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay: Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
(P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both
as actual damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for
loss of earning capacity of Jussi Leino; and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
moral, moderate and exemplary damages.

4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the offended parties
the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million pesos) for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.

5. Costs of litigation. 188

The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter of damages
recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:

When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising
therefrom are governed by penal laws, ". . . subject to the provisions of Art. 2177,
and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations,
and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)

Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (Art. 100,
Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes
indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential
damages in turn include ". . . those suffered by his family or by a third person by
reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as
above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said
provisions.

The general rule in the Civil Code is that:

In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all

damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen by the
defendant. (Art. 2202)

When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which
provides thus:

The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-

delict shall be at least three thousand pesos even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;
 (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
descendant's inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and

ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by
this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to
P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, promulgated
October 11, 1968 190, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of
moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the
assessment of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court, according to
the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)

Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the
crime has been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such
damages being "separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of
right; the court will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)

In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the
sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases wherein exemplary damages are
awarded precisely because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art.
2230) ". . . damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) "but the party
suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203)
"Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the
discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation,
the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art.
2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a separate civil action.

Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the
deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:

1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense —

P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without the need of any evidence or
proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.

2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased — an

amount to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the
deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and
awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had
no earning capacity at said time on account of permanent disability
not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give
support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir,
 may demand support from the accused for not more than five years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court.

3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be fixed by

the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased.

4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or

more aggravating circumstances, — an amount to be fixed in the
discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from
fines.

5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, — the actual amount

thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability
has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).

6. Interests in the proper cases.

7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning

capacity of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now
P50,000.00) corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death,
and that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or
lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons. 191

We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN in light of the
law and the case law.

Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos as moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman was baseless.

We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together the awards for
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
without specifying the particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind.
We shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.

The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as temperate or
moderate damages for the records do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be
given as exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by either evident
premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered as one for moral
damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be at least
(fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the

deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by appellant, we increase
the amount of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.

We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.

Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to her mother,
Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code,
Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the parents by
nature of Maureen should inherit from her.

We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at the time of Maureen's
death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article
190 of the Family Code provides:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate descendants of the
adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;

It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural father. During the
trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we
find that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.

Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and
should be reduced.

We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by the
circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen recovered between life and death for ninety-seven
(97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that time,
she underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was never stable and remained critical. It
was always touch and go with death. She could not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to
be perpetually by her side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings
had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family's business took a
downspin. Soon, her family's assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23)
doctors attended to her and their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely on the
goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving contributions from other people to defray the
medical expenses and hospital bills. 193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her demise on
October 17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus find the
award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.

Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the circumstances of the
case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or
corrective damages may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future. The
award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an
offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman, a girl in
the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood,
for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims and their
families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant
to deter others from taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since the
killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the new Civil
Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against
appellant for the death of Maureen Hultman.

We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.

From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive injuries as a result of the
shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to restore
it. His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds were also
affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed
through a tube running down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off
and the raw nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and suffering.
More devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a
vacation at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2)
days for his father to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in peace at night.
The traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the night. Black memories of the incident kept
coming back to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was
tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt they would
be safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an award of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is justified and reasonable.

As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery and pursuant to
Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino
of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.

We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.

To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of
injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of
earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 199 we
awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his earning capacity although he was still a
medical student at the time of injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a
fourth year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at the trial,
justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish his course and pass the board in due time;
and a doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga would
have earned had he finished his medical studies.

In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos, of Forty
capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly speculative and should
be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the International School,
Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and has just arrived in Manila in
February 1991 to pursue his ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991,
he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his
first year, first semester, in said school and was practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the
foregoing circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to justify a
reasonable assumption that Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club
and ultimately become a professional pilot.

We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of
earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by the
records.

In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court incorrectly used the
monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a
month, as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear that, at
the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills needed for a secretarial job or that she
intended to take a secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself
testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:

ATTY. VINLUAN:

Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she
continued her studies, what professional career would she (sic) like to
pursue considering her interests and inclinations?

WITNESS:

A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our
projection is that, certainly she would have been an artist in the
creative side. She would have become an actress or a movie
producer or probably she would have been a college graduate.

ATTY. VINLUAN:

Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in

Sweden, how much would she have much earned?

A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month. 200

Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million (P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs
of Maureen far loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.

In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high school, Maureen took up
a short personality development course at the John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the
John Roberts Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just received her
first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However,
neither the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to
compute the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum
wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991), i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos
(P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net
income per annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by this
Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 — age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which
would have been received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning as capacity of
deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that
the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased,
and not the beneficiary. 205

Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is exorbitant.

We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the ACCRA law firm, with
Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases
were consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings having both morning and
afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost one and a half years. More than forty (40) witnesses
testified during the hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the trial of the cases
came up to this Court for review at least twice during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these
circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial court's
award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears
just and reasonable.

VII

In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases, where no less
than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were merely hearings on the petition
for bail concerning the murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all
three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce
evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered all the
cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present its surrebuttal evidence.

Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of the cases on
August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the murder of
Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one murder charge against appellant
since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course of the proceedings on October 17,
1991.

Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was appellant's petition for
bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3)
charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one continuing
incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2)
frustrated murder charges (with respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He
argued that since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of
Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were recommended was
irrelevant.

After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present Leino to testify on all
three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991. 208 The
prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing
on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209

As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its first
witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the hearings conducted by the
trial court were limited to the petition for bail, viz:

1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary evidence relative
to the shooting incident, including evidence in support of the claim for damages.
These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the defense counsels. The
defense never objected that evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its
intention was really to limit presentation of evidence to appellant's petition for bail.

2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court issued an
Order 211directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after which "the main case as
well as the petition for bail are respectively submitted for Decision and Resolution." After
receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file
the defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's
Order submitting for decision the main case and the petition for bail. Neither did it move
for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still had witnesses to
present.

3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying for accused's acquittal. This
is inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing conducted was only on the
petition for bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for decision was only
his petition for bail, he would have only prayed that he be granted bail.

4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial court, the
defense did not interpose any objection to the intended promulgation. In fact, the
defense attended the promulgation of the Decision and manifested that they were
ready therefor.

All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard simultaneously
and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present additional evidence was not
abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court afforded the
defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the defense almost one and a half years to
submit its evidence. The defense presented more than twenty (20) witnesses and several
documentary evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he
filed a motion for new
trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that the joint decision
of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance to
present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did
not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it
shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence. Appellant's
motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial
court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court,
dated December 22, 1992, thus:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty
 Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand
Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning
capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery,
for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended
party the following amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred
Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos
as exemplary damages.

(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3) offended
parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million
[P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and

(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27401 October 31, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIEGO BALONDO, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for plaintiff-appellee.
Justo R. Albert counsel de officio for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Leyte found the defendant Diego Balondo guilty of the crime of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of death. This case is now before this Court on
automatic review of the decision of the trial court.

On October 21, 1966 the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte filed the following information against the
defendant:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Diego Balondo of the crime of murder, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of September, 1966, in the municipality of Kawayan,
Subprovince of Biliran, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and strangle one Gloria Bulasa and inflicting upon the said Gloria Bulasa the following
injuries, to wit:

1. Liver mortis of the face, anterior abdominal wall, and anterior chest wall;

2. Semi-circular marks at the lateral portion of the neck, both sides;

3. Circular incision around the upper third of the thigh at the level of the inferior border of the
gluteal muscles of both thighs;

4. Complete loss of the soft tissues of the thighs and legs in such manner that only the bones
of the parts mentioned were left;

5. Both feet were missing from the ankle joints downwards;

6. All digits of the left hand were missing from the carpal-metacarpal joints downward;

7. Incised wound from the left shoulder along the medial border of the left scapula to the
inferior angle of the right scapula, upwards along its lateral border to the right shoulder,
medially towards the base of the neck posteriorly to the left shoulder, with loss of the skin
and the underlying tissues.

thus causing the instantaneous death of the aforementioned Gloria Bulasa.

 That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing another wrong not necessary for its commission; that means was employed or
circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act; that the act
was committed in utter disregard of sex; and also the aggravating circumstance of
relationship, the victim being the niece of the accused.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The record shows that when this defendant was apprehended after the discovery of the dead body
of Gloria Bulasa, upon being investigated by the Chief of Police of Kawayan, he readily admitted
having killed Gloria Bulasa. His admission was reduced to writing in the Visayan dialect understood
by him, and signed by him. Subsequently, a more lengthy investigation was conducted by the Chief
of Police, and again the defendant admitted having killed Gloria Bulasa and narrated in detail how he
killed Gloria Bulasa and what he did with the body of Gloria Bulasa. The defendant was taken to the
place where the crime was committed and he even reenacted what he did with the deceased Gloria
Bulasa. The statements made by the defendant in this detailed examination by the Chief of Police,
including his statements during the reenactment of the crime, were reduced to writing, and were
subscribed and sworn to by him before the municipal Judge of Kawayan. The statements made by
the defendant in his written admissions were corroborated in important details by Meliton Bulasa,
father of the victim and by Anatalio Bulasa, an uncle of the victim who both signed sworn statements
before the municipal judge. A post mortem examination of the body of the deceased Gloria Bulasa
was made by Dr. Jose J. Tupaz, the municipal health officer of Kawayan, and the injuries found by
the medical officer on the body of the deceased indicated the brutal acts committed by the defendant
on his victim, as narrated by the defendant himself in his sworn statements.

The corresponding criminal complaint was filed by the Chief of Police of Kawayan, Leyte, before the
municipal court of the said municipality. During the preliminary investigation of the case, the
defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of murder when he was arraigned. He not only admitted his
guilt, but he narrated before the municipal judge the circumstances attending the killing of Gloria
Bulasa.

On October 24, 1966 the defendant was arraigned before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The
trial court appointed Atty. Delia Tantuico counsel de officio for the defendant. Atty. Tantuico
conferred with the defendant, and after the conference the counsel manifested before the court that
the defendant was ready for arraignment. The information was read to the defendant in the local
dialect, called the Waray-Waray dialect, which is understood by the defendant. After the reading of
the information the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charge of murder alleged in the
information. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the decision which is now before this Court on
review.

We have carefully examined the record of this case, and We fully agree with the findings and
observations of the trial court in its decision, as follows:

From the records and varied written admissions of the accused, Diego Balondo, that on
Sept. 29, 1966, at about 6:00 o'clock a.m., he was in his farm in the barrio of Balacson,
Kawayan, Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte. That he stayed in his farm for about three hours
clearing his camote plantation; that at about 9:00 o'clock in that same day, he went home to
take his breakfast; that at about 1:00 o'clock, he saw Gloria Bulasa going to the direction of
the nipa grooves of the Ayono Asilo, behind the Aglipayan church; that upon seeing her, he
followed behind surreptitiously; that upon seeing her cutting the banana leaves he told her,
"why, you are here again to cut the banana leaves?", that the late Gloria Bulasa answered, 'it
 is none of your business for it's the property of the government'; that he got furious and
immediately grabbed her by his left hand strangled her by the neck and pushed her violently
to the ground face downward; that he firmly held her left arm and neck; rode on her back and
pinned her down with his knees and then continuously lifting her head and smashed her face
against the mud; that he choked and buried her face in the mud for about an hour until she
died.

And that when she was already dead, he lifted her from the mud and laid her flat on her
back, and then he held her by the feet, dragged her to a place from where he killed her, at a
distance of thirty brazas; that he covered the body with nipa leaves to keep her from the
sunlight; that the deceased was carrying a knife for cutting the banana leaves, and she was
a niece of the accused from a second degree cousin; that he sliced and took the flesh from
the thighs, legs and shoulder by the use of the knife of Gloria Bulasa because his bolo was
dull, after which he threw the knife away; that he cut away also the feet; that he intended to
slice all the flesh of the cadaver but he was caught by the darkness of the night; that he put
the sliced flesh with a piece of rattan, tied it and brought it to his farm; that upon reaching his
farm, he started to build a fire and barbecued the sliced pieces of human flesh (roasted it)
and he ate the barbecued pieces of human flesh and used it as a viand for the roasted
banana fruits; that the taste of the human flesh was bitter and poignant like a gall bladder;
that he killed Gloria Bulasa first to taste the human flesh if its good; that after doing all those
atrocious acts, he went home at about 7:00 o'clock in that evening.

xxx xxx xxx

In passing judgment to the accused, Diego Balondo, the Court has this lamentable
observation with this peculiar case.

The spectacle of knowing a human being killed and slaughtered in this island, subprovince of
Biliran, Leyte, for unknown motivation is not a news at all in this jurisdiction because such
incidents are too common and numerous for the court to recall. But when one, like in this
case, choked a maiden to death just 16 years old for the simple reason that she was getting
leaves from the banana plants of the accused to wrap local cookies, the said accused after
killing her, sliced the flesh of the legs, shoulder and the thigh, cooked those human flesh;
devoured them like an ancient cannibal; the accused, Diego Balondo went bizarrely beyond
the extreme of a carnivorous wild beast.

Counsel de officio, Atty. Justo R. Albert, in his brief for the defendant, urges that the trial court
should have subjected the defendant to some psychiatric test to determine his sanity before
rendering judgment, and prays this Court "that the judgment of the lower court be set aside and this
case be remanded for trial with admonition to the lower court to order the submission of the accused
to a psychiatric test to determine his sanity." We do not find merit in the plea of counsel de officio.
We find in the record sufficient justification for the conclusion that the defendant was not insane at
the time of the commission of the crime. The defendant had made several statements, which were
reduced to writing and duly signed by him. We find that the facts and circumstances narrated by the
defendant in those different statements tally in important details. The defendant voluntarily admitted
his guilt before the municipal court during the preliminary investigation. He likewise voluntarily
pleaded guilty when arraigned before the trial court. Considering that the defendant is charged of
having killed Gloria Bulasa way back on September 29, 1966 — or more than three years ago — it is
not possible now to ascertain the mental condition of the defendant as of the time when he
committed the crime of which he is charged.
The trial court has correctly found that in killing the deceased Gloria Bulasa, the defendant had taken
advantage of his superior strength. This attendant circumstance qualifies the crime committed as
murder, defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

We agree with the trial court that the commission of the crime by the defendant was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of (1) disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her
sex, and (2) that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for its commission.

The trial court, however, erred when it declared that two other aggravating circumstances attended
the commission of the crime; namely, that means was employed or circumstance brought about
which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act, and that the victim was the niece of the
accused. We find nothing in the record which shows that before the deceased Gloria Bulasa died
she was subjected to such indignities as would cause her shame or moral suffering. Under Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code, the alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into
consideration only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offended (U.S.
vs. Insierto, 15 Phil, 358).

One mitigating circumstance can be considered in favor of the defendant, namely, the circumstance
of his having made a voluntary plea of guilt in court before the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution.

We, therefore, find that the defendant had committed the crime of murder, with two aggravating
circumstances that should be counted against him, and one mitigating circumstance in his favor.
However, for lack of the required number of votes by the members of the Court, for the imposition of
the maximum penalty of death, the Court has resolved to modify that portion of the judgment of the
trial court which imposes the penalty of death, by imposing on the defendant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is modified. The defendant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Gloria Bulasa in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay
the costs. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE VS NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO
LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO, ROGER BEDAÑO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO
VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,

FACTS:
On 11 April 1985, morning, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo
Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one
Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio
Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2)
unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers were
discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA, starring
Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr.
Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is
Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo
Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the
conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias,
another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.

Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with
assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the
vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name was
included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead, he asked "Bantil" if he had any
qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of
"Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear
were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray.
But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil"
however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr., ordered
his men to surround the house and not to allow anyone to get out so that "Bantil" would die of
hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the
face and accused him of being a communist coddler, while appellants and their cohorts relished the
unfolding drama.
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire
from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back
of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00
o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez.
While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of
the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the
motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. 12

Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang
gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want
me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As
Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto
if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the
prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered
the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to
the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their
comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance.

ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellants’ defenses of Alibi will prosper, and if not, was it proper that they were
indicted of murder, attempted murder and arson.
RULING

Affirmative. From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely
innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the
attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants
all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the
fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants
from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27 Undoubtedly, these were overt
acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the
conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of
Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their
collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias
whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the
murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the conspirators expressly agreed. Conspiracy or action
in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act of one is the act of all
the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary damages of
P100,000.00; however, the award of moral damages is deleted.
G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 24, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA affirmed, with modification on the amount of
damages, the joint decision3dated April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
Cauayan City, Isabela, finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

Factual Antecedents

Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide under
two Informations which read:

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times
with a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and
stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the
said Erwin Ordonez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said
Erwin Ordonez, which prevented his death.4

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times
with a sharp pointed bolo one David Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and
stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.5

Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the true date
of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through the records.6 The parties
failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.7

On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases were jointly tried with
the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial, the petitioners interposed self-
defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of the case.9
During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that transpired on November 8,
2000.

Version of the Defense

To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the testimonies of Rodolfo,
Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.

Testimony of Rodolfo

Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00 p.m., on November 8,
2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together with their companion, Philip Vingua,
forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his house and tricycle. Through the back
door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to
stop. David saw him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm
of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house, and
hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin
and David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He
stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.

Testimony of Joey

Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on November 8,
2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia,
Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip breaking into their gate, which was
made of wood and interlink wire and located five ( 5) to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He
then heard his father Rodolfo say to the three men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin
pag-usapan,"10 and David retorted in their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin
taka."11

Testimony of Balbino

Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around 10:00 p.m.,
on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside saying "Sige banatan ninyo na."12 He
opened his door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones at the house of his neighbor
Crisanto Briones. Briones got mad and scolded the three men, "Why are you hitting my house? Why
don't you hit the house of your enemy, mga tarantado kayo!"13 David, Erwin and Philip then aimed
their stones at the petitioners' house. Balbino heard David calling out to Joey, "Joey, kung tunay
kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan,"14 but no one came out of
Rodolfo's house. The stoning lasted for about thirty (30) minutes.

Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the gate towards
the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako at papasok kami."15 David,
Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and
their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about their
problems with him the following day. But David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a
''panabas." Rodolfo parried the blow with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for
the possession of the ''panabas."

Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right foot,
causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from where Rodolfo got "something
shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two brothers fall to the ground.
 Version of the Prosecution

As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the
hacking.

Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and
Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound. He was walking
twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David
was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was
three (3) meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then
hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the
petitioners' compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He
became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's
tricycle. They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was only damaged when his
1âwphi 1

brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound.
While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them
and people outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come
out."16

After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in
the hospital while being treated for his wounds.

The RTC's Ruling

In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's version of the
incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due to material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of self-
defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.

The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of
proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification for his act";17 that self-defense is an
affirmative allegation which must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.18 The
RTC held that the petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims, Erwin and David.

Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance/s that attended the commission of the crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of the
accused to suffer -In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Three (3) years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9)
years of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordonez moral damages in
the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8)
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00)
Pesos plus Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Costs against the accused.

The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19

The CA's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the crimes charged.
As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to
provoke the actions of the petitioners; that "aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent,
such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others
whom that person is seeking to defend."20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims that
David challenged Joey to a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the
CA held that these acts do not constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no
real or actual danger existed as the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.

The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on his arm and back, and David,
who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and stomach causing his death. These
wounds logically indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined
homicidal aggression on the part of the petitioners.21

The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the
RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim. Case No. Br.
20-1561, appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are each ordered to pay the
heirs of the deceased David Ordonez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P.50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.22

The Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO

APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-
DEFENSE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL

CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.

C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.23

Our Ruling

We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October 24, 2005.

At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a petition for review
under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-
settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject
only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court's
judgment or the appellate court's misapprehension of the adduced facts.24

The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case. Factual
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court
and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.25 We find that both
the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense,
and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the
petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts and
circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present case, we uphold the rulings
of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of these crimes fully established during the trial.

The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present."26

On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which
is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder,
or by that of parricide or infanticide.27

The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained
by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other
things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of,
or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim.28 The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered
and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained,
confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and
Erwin.29

In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordonez
would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical attendance."30

By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which
they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With
this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated
killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to
self-defense.31

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person.32 The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order
for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to
self-defense.33

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the
petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey
while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the
petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by
which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who
was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances,
coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the
petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
fact, the real aggressors.

As to the penalties and damages

awarded

We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the ranges provided by
law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.

In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the CA, we
award P25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate damages, in lieu of the actual damages they
sustained by reason of the crimes. Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or moderate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.

Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six percent (
6%) per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are also ordered to pay Erwin
Ordonez and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity,
moral and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82
of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads
as follows:

That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and
assisting one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of
their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a
combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda
which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the
means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission
of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the
burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.

CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).

Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial
court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of
the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y

Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating
the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison
term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The
accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P5,000.00.
 Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.

Cost against both accused.

SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).

Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY

THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE

TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used
to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town
fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one
was a ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and
reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the
group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased
dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can
of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the
former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the
gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags
to extinguish the flame.

The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police
officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who
were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and
Samson as the authors thereof.

The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police
officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for
interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two
accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.

After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for
the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.

It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a
can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused
Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement
that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy
of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the
commission of the offense.

While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging
that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting
authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the
commission of the offense.

Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis
for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even
without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony
which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay
and Samson" (p. 247, Records).

Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case.
They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their
testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.

There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In
fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and
one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of
gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open
court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their
testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does
not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797). Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
<äre||anº• 1àw>

Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was
the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his
absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an
unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.

Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify
and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never
talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried.
Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other
accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion
had no reason to testify falsely against them.

In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline
on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote
Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the
deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was on
fire that he noticed a commotion.

However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:

Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were
reading comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani
Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that
incident while you were reading comics?

A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they
were doing.

Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and
lighted and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?

A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to

prevent him from doing so.

Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk

with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline.
That is what I want to know from you, if that is true?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you
mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto
him?

A. I do not know that would be that incident.

Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline
before he did that actually?

A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.

Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you
tried according to you to ask him not to and then later you said you
asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour
gasoline on Bayani?

A. I was not told, sir.

Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going
to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him?
 A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it
was water but it was gasoline.

Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his
ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you
told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the can of
gasoline.

A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.

Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was
already in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?

A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).

It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion
stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw
Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was
in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to
do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused
Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal
responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is
individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs.
Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken
the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the
body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this
flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed
to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act
that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et.
al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:

A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that
"his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing
that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left
completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not
agree.

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the
deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was
merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack
must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body
of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act
of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded
that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act,
however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would
cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised
Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must
be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a
fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused
Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp.
16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence,
the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as
moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN SOTTO,
RADEL MONTECILLO and ALEX MONTECILLO, accused.
AGUSTIN SOTTO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellant Agustin Sotto, together with accused Radel Montecillo

and Alex Montecillo, were charged with the so-called crime of highway robbery
with homicide before Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in
Criminal Case No. CBU-15792, in an indictment which alleges --

That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1989, at around 6:30 oclock in the morning,
more or less, along the road at Sitio Suwangan, Barangay Ibabao, Municipality of
Sogod, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against and intimidation upon
persons, with abuse of superior strength, and armed with a paltik .38 caliber revolver
and a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away cash in the amount of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,900.00), Philippine Currency, and one (1) Cornavin Wristwatch worth TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to NIDA M.
SULTONES, to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the amount aforestated; that
by reason or on occasion of said robbery and for the apparent purpose of enabling the
said accused to take, steal and carry away the above-mentioned amount and article,
herein accused, in pursuance of their intention to rob and to gain, using said home-
made paltik revolver, caliber .38, with intent to kill, did then and there treacherously
attack, assault and shoot Maximo Monilar, Jr., a 12 year old brother and companion of
Nida M. Sultones, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds on the vital part of his
body which caused his death shortly thereafter.[1]

The three accused, duly assisted by their counsel, all entered pleas of not
guilty during their arraignment on August 3, 1989. After trial, the court a
[2]

quo found appellant and the Montecillo brothers guilty beyond reasonable
[3]

doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide defined under paragraph 1, Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to solidarily indemnify the heirs of Maximo Monilar,
Jr. in the amount of P50,000.00, in addition to paying Nida Sultones P700.00
representing the value of the unrecovered cash forcibly taken from her.
 Radel and Alex Montecillo accepted their fate under the verdict of the lower
court, while herein appellant refused to acknowledge his guilt and filed a notice
of appeal with the trial court, eventuating in the appellate proceeding now
[4]

before us.
In the court below, the prosecution presented the surviving victim of the
special complex crime, Nida Sultones, to testify on the facts surrounding the
[5]

taking of her personal properties and the killing of Maximo Monilar,

Jr. According to Nida, she and her said eleven year-old brother, Maximo, were
walking towards the poblacion of Sogod, Cebu at around 5:30 A.M. on May 2,
1989. They planned to buy goods in the town for Nidas store in Pansoy, Sogod,
Cebu.
While at still some distance from the town proper, they saw Radel Montecillo
exercising and jumping along the road of Sitio Magtakop, Ibabao, Sogod. Upon
seeing the siblings, Radel followed them and asked if they were going to the
market. When they reached Sitio Suwangan of Ibabao, Radel suddenly grabbed
Nida and proceeded to strangle her. While Nida was struggling on the ground
against her attacker, Radel took her wristwatch and the money in her pocket in
the sum of P1,900.00.
Meanwhile, Alex Montecillo came out from behind a pile of firewood lying
along the road and tried to help his brother, Radel, in subduing Nida. On the
other hand, the youthful Maximo gallantly came to the aid of his elder sister by
hitting Radel with the plastic container he was carrying.
Thereafter, a man with a piece of black cloth over his face and holding a
handgun appeared from nowhere. Maximo ran away but was shot by this
masked man whom Nida recognized as appellant through the similarity in the
assailants and herein appellants physique, height, general appearance and
other physical features. Maximo was hit on the head and died as a
consequence of his wound. [6]

After Maximo fell, the Montecillo brothers dragged Nida to a nearby

creek. With Radel poking a knife on her neck, Alex pointed a gun at the helpless
victim. Despite the promptings of Radel, Alex did not shoot Nida after she
promised to them that she would not tell the police. Before the two assailants
left Nida, they threatened to kill her and her family if she would not keep her
promise. At the trial, Nida clarified that the guns used by the masked man and
Alex were of the same color.
Subsequently, Nida nevertheless reported the incident to the police of
Sogod. The authorities wasted no time and on that very same day, they arrested
the Montecillo brothers in their residence at around nine oclock in the
morning. After a search was conducted on the persons of Radel and Alex, a
[7]

policeman discovered and retrieved the amount of more than P600.00 each [8]

from the underwear of the Montecillo brothers. [9]

The records show that during his investigation by the law enforcers of
[10]

Sogod, Radel inculpated appellant in the perpetration of the composite

crime. With this information, Station Commander Salustiano Comaingking of
the Sogod Police Station, immediately organized a team to search the house of
appellant for the instruments of the crime on a tip-off by Radel. Before
proceeding to appellants house, Comaingking ordered two of his men to invite
Obdulio Bregente, Barangay Captain of Ibabao, to stand as a witness to the
impending search.
Comaingking, Bregente and several policemen arrived at the house of
appellant at around 4:00 A.M. on May 3, 1989 and found appellant walking
around in front of his house. After the policemen explained their purpose to
appellant, he acceded to their request and offered to have his house searched
by them. Appellant went with them around the house, bared his personal
belongings and opened every drawer and cabinet for the policemen to
see. While the search was going on, Pat. Gualberto Arnado talked to one of the
children of appellant. The child pointed to a partition in the double walling of
appellants bedroom and there, inserted between the sawali walls of the room,
a .38 caliber revolver was discovered by Pat. Arnado.
[11]

Bregente corroborated this narration of Comaingking during his own

testimony in court, with the additional revelation that he heard appellant
[12]

explaining to the policemen that the gun was in his house for repair.
Appellant was immediately brought thereafter to the police station and
placed in a cell intended for female detainees, separate from the cell occupied
by the Montecillo brothers. Later, while Comaingking was outside the station
attending to his personal needs, he saw a watch being thrown out of the window
of the cell where appellant was detained alone. Nida Sultones would later
identify this watch in court as her Cornovin wristwatch forcefully taken from her
[13]

by the robbers on May 2, 1989.

The gun found in appellants house turned out positive for gunpowder
residues after chemical analysis conducted by Myrna Areola, a forensic analyst
of the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory. Paraffin tests made upon the
[14]

persons of appellant and the Montecillo brothers yielded positive findings of

gunpowder residues on appellants left hand, with negative results on both
[15]

hands of the Montecillo brothers and the right hand of appellant. When the
[16]

gun was presented in court for identification, Nida declared that it was the same
gun that the masked man used in shooting her brother. [17]
 In his testimony, appellants co-accused, Radel Montecillo, placed
[18]

appellant at the locus criminis in a peculiar manner. In trying to exculpate

himself, Radel said that he was merely jogging along the road when he saw
Nida and her brother walking towards the poblacion.
He followed the duo allegedly at a distance of about one meter behind
them. Without any warning, he heard gunfire and saw Maximo fall to the
ground. When he turned around, he saw appellant walking towards
him. Appellant fired at him but missed because he stumbled to the ground at
the precise time that appellant took the shot at him.
The first bullet that hit Maximo was also meant for Radel. He surmised that
appellant was angry at him for refusing to help in a case appellant filed against
a relative of Comaingking. Radel declared that appellant was not wearing a
mask or cover on his face when he fired at him and the boy.
In his turn on the witness stand, appellant denied any involvement in the
[19]

crime, claiming that he was at his house tending his store when the crime was
committed.
His wife, Felicitas Sotto, attempted to support his defense of alibi by
declaring that appellant and their children went with her to the jeepney stop and
waited until six oclock in the morning when she was able to get a ride to the
school where she was teaching. However, on cross-examination, she admitted
that her husband and children were left behind in their house when she took a
ride to the school.
[20]

Appellant likewise denied that he threw Nidas wristwatch from his cell. He
asserted that the discovery and recovery of the watch from him was a mere
fabrication by the police, just like the finding of the revolver in his house. That
gun, according to appellant, was only planted by Pat. Arnado in his room.
Appellant insisted that he never agreed to the search of his house. After he
objected to the search for failure of the searching party to exhibit a search
warrant, a policeman brandished a rifle and forced him to allow them to enter
and search the house.
He revealed in court that Radel was his former employee in his store whom
he dismissed for misappropriating money from him. When they were able to talk
in the police station, Radel allegedly told him that he was beaten and forced by
the police to implicate appellant in the commission of the crime.
Based on the results of the paraffin test, appellant contended that a mistake
was made in involving him in the crime. It was impossible for him to shoot the
boy as the gunpowder residues were found on his left hand while he is actually
right-handed. He theorized on the possibility of an interchange of his paraffin
casts with those of the Montecillo brothers who were subjected to the same
tests simultaneously with him.
He blamed Comaingking for his misfortunes at the hands of the
police. Allegedly, Comaingking caused all the false charges to be made against
appellant in order to get even with him for suing one of the relatives of said
station commander.
Appellant attributed three errors to the lower court in convicting him of the
special complex crime. In sum, appellant faults the court a quo for concluding
[21]

that he participated in the commission of the crime based on unreliable,

unacceptable and incredible evidence presented before it.
He posits that the lower court should not have believed Nida and Radel in
view of their conflicting testimonies as to whether or not his face was covered
during the shooting. Additionally, his having dismissed Radel from his
employment and the fact that Radel was coerced by the police to testify against
him should have made the lower court doubt the veracity of Radels testimony.
Appellant reiterates in his brief that the results of the paraffin test were
interchanged, hence no reliance can be placed on such evidence. He maintains
in his brief, as he did during the trial, that he never allowed the policemen to
search his house without a warrant. The revolver then should not have been
accepted in evidence by the lower court as mandated by the Constitution.
We find appellants asseverations to be flawed in fact. En contra, we are
persuaded that the Peoples case merits acceptance in law.
When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, as in the present case, the
consistent rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of
the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value, that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [22]

After a meticulous scrutiny and conscientious evaluation of the records of

this case for those substantial and valuable facts, we find no oversight or
omission on the part of the court below in concluding that appellant is truly guilty
of the crime imputed to him. Direct and circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution, together with the testimony of appellants own co-accused,
point and lead to appellants complicity in the commission of the crime.
Nida was able to positively identify appellant as the member of the group of
robbers who shot her brother, since only his face was covered by a piece of
cloth. It was no longer dark when the crime was committed at around six oclock
in the morning. There can be no mistake in her identification as she knew
appellant very well. She often passed by his house to buy goods from his
store. Appellants wife is a relative of Nida. Given these circumstances, Nida
[23]

had become familiar with the other physical features of appellant so as to be

able to identify him even from the configuration of his body alone, aside from
his hair or his gait and other distinctive bodily movements.
This eyewitness for the prosecution testified in a categorical, forthright and
sincere manner. She was not fazed or rattled by the extensive cross-
examination of two lawyers for the accused since all she had to do was to recall
and relate the true facts. Her court declaration was consistent with the
testimonies of the forensic analyst and the physician who attended to the
medical needs of her brother.
Appellant was not able to show any improper motive on the part of Nida to
falsely incriminate him in such a serious offense. On the contrary, he and Nida
were on cordial speaking terms before the commission of the robbery. The [24]

fact that prosecution witnesses have no possible motive to make false

imputations against the accused shows that their identification of the latter is
credible. Nidas identification of appellant as the killer of her brother can only
[25]

be explained by an offended partys honest desire to have the real culprit, and
not just anybody, apprehended and punished to give justice to the victim.
[26]

Then there is the testimony of Radel who apparently turned against his co-
conspirator to secure his own exoneration. This desire to free himself at the
expense of appellant yields light on his statement that appellant was not
wearing a mask or cover on his face at the time of the commission of the
felony. Obviously thinking that the People would no longer be interested in his
prosecution if the identity of the assailant is revealed, Radel lied in order to
convince the court of the killers identity. Thus, we have the resultant
inconsistency on this aspect in the testimonies of Nida and Radel, but both of
which nonetheless conjoin in the identification of appellant as the malefactor.
We find nothing irregular on the part of the lower court when it disregarded
Radels profession of innocence while giving credence to his statement that it
was appellant who shot the boy. Even where a witness has been found to have
deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the
whole of his testimony be rejected. [27]

As we have held, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a positive
rule of law, is not an inflexible one of universal application, and no longer
[28]

warrants a rigid application in our legal setting. Under modern jurisprudence,

the testimony of a witness may be believed in part, depending upon the
corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. It [29]

was thus within the sound and judicious discretion of the trial court to accept
portions of the testimony of a witness as it may deem credible and reject those
which it believes to be false.
There is nothing in the records to show that Radel Montecillo was holding a
grudge against appellant for his dismissal. The presence of personal motives
on the part of witnesses to testify in favor of the victim or against the accused
should be supported by satisfactory proof in order that the credibility of said
witnesses will be impeached. Lacking in this necessary proof, it can be
[30]

presumed that Radel was not maliciously actuated at least when he identified
appellant, and his testimony as to the identity of the boys assassin can be given
weight and credit.
The empty and uncorroborated denials of appellant are not sufficient to
overcome the evidence proving him guilty. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. Between the self-serving testimony of appellant and the positive
[31]

identification by the eyewitness, the latter deserves greater credence. [32]

The defense utterly failed to show that the paraffin results were
interchanged. Even appellant himself is not sure if there was indeed any error
in the paraffin test results involving him and his confederates. During his
testimony, he stated that he did not complain about the switching because
he thought it was still part of the test. This is a contrived and specious
[33]

explanation.
Withal, SPO3 Rodito Comeras was able to rebut this improbable
[34]

pretension of appellant. As the officer responsible for the actual conduct of the
diphenylamine test, Comeras assigned to the three accused a definite seating
arrangement. When he started taking casts, the accused were sitting on their
respective assigned seats. And to be doubly sure, he asked each of the
accused to sign a paper acknowledging the identity of the casts respectively
taken from them. Forensic analyst Areola explained that it is impossible that the
casts could be interchanged because each cast bears the name of the
respective subject or specimen.
The fact that only the left hand of appellant was found positive for nitrates is
of minor significance. He may have fired the gun while holding it with both hands
and its recoil or the wind direction may have prevented any residue from
attaching to his right hand, or he may have removed the same during the
interval between the firing and the paraffin testing. Besides, the investigative
result of the diphenylamine test is only one of the number of circumstances
establishing the positive identification of appellant as the culprit.
 We cannot, therefore, reject the testimonies of Comeras, Areola and
Comaingking in order to indulge appellant in his unsupported disclaimer. Courts
accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities as they
are presumed to be in the regular performance of their duties, in the absence
of convincing proof to the contrary. [35]

We also cannot give credence to the claim of appellant that Radel was
compelled by the police, particularly Comaingking, to testify against him. A
perusal of the testimony of Radel on October 30, 1990 reveals that he himself
did not state that he was forced by the law enforcers to implicate appellant and
he even denied having involved appellant as a perpetrator of the crime during
his investigation. Instead, he figuratively passed the buck to Nida Sultones by
claiming that it was she who informed the police about appellants participation
in the robbery with homicide. [36]

The discovery by Comaingking of the watch when appellant tried to get rid
of it definitely clinched appellants association with the crime. Without any
sufficient or plausible explanation as to how he had come into the possession
of the Cornovin wristwatch, appellant cannot escape the operation of the
presumption of his culpability in the offense pursuant to Section 3, Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court. [37]

In the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to
falsely impute a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty, as well as the principle that the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, must
prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that he had
been framed. We have ruled that like alibi, a frame-up should be established
[38]

by clear and convincing evidence for it is easy to concoct but hard to prove. [39]

Finally, it is accepted dictum that when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizure, the exclusionary rule provided in
the Bill of Rights of our Constitution finds no application. When one voluntarily
[40]

submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he

is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may be waived either expressly or impliedly. [41]

Since appellant acquiesced to the search, the .38 caliber revolver is

admissible in evidence against him. Appellants bare assertion that he objected
to the warrantless search is a feeble afterthought to exculpate himself after
realizing the damaging consequence of his approval. Furthermore, the
testimony of Barangay Captain Bregente reinforces the presumption of
regularity enjoyed by law enforcers with regard to the consented search, a
presumption which appellant dismally failed to overcome.
 WHEREFORE, on the foregoing considerations, the assailed judgment of
the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs in all instances against
accused-appellant Agustin Sotto.
SO ORDERED.
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 213886

JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated December 6,
2013 and the Resolution3 dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac
Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts

In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional Trial
Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of one ELNER ARO y
LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death
thereafter.

That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4

According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of
April 11, 2004, he was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay,
Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus
was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at
Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.5

At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the
jejunum" and was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his
ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and
that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro
suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.6
Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and
eventually, died the next day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his

death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis
secondary to mauling," an autopsy performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death
was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic injuries."7

In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They
averred that while playing pool, they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly
and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a stone to throw at Aro but
Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not for
Quibac' s intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground.
Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered
and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a fist fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and told
Wacoy to go home.8

The RTC Ruling In a Judgment9 dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of
the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as maximum, and ordered them to pay Aro's heirs the
amounts of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.10

The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy
and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in
stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to his death. 11

In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show
the extent and effect of injury [that Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his
death xx x," Wacoy and Quibac should be held criminally liable for the crime of Death Caused in a
Tumultuous Affray and not for Homicide.12

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.13

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of
Homicide under A1iicle 249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their prison term to an indeterminate period of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one ( 1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA also imposed a legal interest of six percent ( 6%)
per annum on the damages awarded by the RTC pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.15

In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this
relation, it observed that the mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his
credibility since there was no proof that his testimony was driven by any ill motive.16 However,
contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be convicted of the
crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm
on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead, they were
convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to
maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.17

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. 18 In a Resolution19 dated July
21, 2014, the CA denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration;20 hence, the instant petitions.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.21

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac' s
conviction from Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained
hereunder.

Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as
follows:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and
assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by
prision mayor.

If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall
have used violence upon the person of the victim.

The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several
persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one
another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.22 Based on
case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.23
On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC,
which reads:

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of
Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying
circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.24

In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of
which Aro died. On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2)
1âwphi1

persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion
and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful
incident.25 Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's
death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray.26 Therefore, the CA correctly held
that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause27 of the latter's death; and as
such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the crime of Homicide.

On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to
inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore
in its maximum period,28pursuant to Article 49 of the RPC. The said provision reads:

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that
intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended
to commit, the following rules shall be observed.

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the
offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall
be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the
one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its
maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts
committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another
crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the
penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in the maximum
period.

Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different
from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and
not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his
felonious act (praeter intentionem),29

as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed.30 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.31
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due
to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under
Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In
determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental
process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and
external overt acts.32 In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and
Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the
stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or
inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the penalty
of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, taking into
consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of P50,000.00 each
are increased to P75,000.00 each in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.33 All other
awards, as well as the imposition of interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully paid, are retained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution
dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to
pay the heirs of Elner Aro the amounts of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and P75,000.00 as moral damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14783 April 29, 1961

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARCIAL AMA Y PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
MARCIAL AMA Y PEREZ, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Honorio V. Garcia and Bernardo Abesamis for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

On October 16, 1958, Marcial Ama y Perez, Ernesto de Jesus and Alejandro Ramos were charged
with murder before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in an information the pertinent portions of
which read:

That on or about the 27th day of August, 1958, in the New Bilibid Prison, municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with deadly weapons to wit: sharp-pointed instruments, with intent to kill and
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Almario Bautista, thereby inflicting upon the latter
stab wounds on the different parts of his body an as a result of which, said Almario Bautista
died instantaneously.

That the accused are quasi-recidivist having committee the above-mentioned felony while
serving their respective sentences after having been convicted of final judgment.

That the crime was committed in the presence of public authorities who were then engaged
in the discharge of their duties.

After the accused pleaded not guilty, upon arraignment, the trial court set the case for hearing on
November 25, 1958. On the same date, however, De Jesus and Ramos moved for postponement on
the ground that they were asking the fiscal to reinvestigate their case, which motion was granted.
Marcial Ama y Perez, on the other hand moved that he be permitted to withdraw his former plea of
not guilty and substitute it for that of guilty. Granting said motion, the court directed that the
information read and explained again to him, after which Marcial Ama, with the assistance of his
counsel de oficio, sponstaneously and voluntarily pleaded guilty as charged.

Then, counsel for the accused moved that the minimum penalty be imposed in view of his plea of
guilty, which motion was objected to by the prosecution, contending that since the special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present which cannot be offset by the mitigate
circumstance of plea of guilty, the imposable penalty should be the maximum or death. And after the
fiscal had submitted proof relative to the presence of the aggravating circumstance alleged in the
information, the court rendered decision sentencing Marcial Ama y Perez to death penalty, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Whereupon, the case was elevated to this Court for review
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.

The main error assigned by counsel is that the lower court erred in allowing appellant to change his
plea of not guilty to that of guilty without informing him that his plea cannot offset the aggravating
circumstance of quasi recidivism alleged in the information as to obviate imposition of death penalty.
According to defense counsel, had the trial court informed appellant that despite his plea of guilty he
would still be sentenced to death, he would have chosen to go to trial no matter how slim might be
his chance of being acquitted. Counsel further avers that the attorney who assisted appellant in the
lower court committed an oversight in advising him to plead guilty overlooking the provisions of
Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code on quasi-recidivism, while the lower court erred in sentencing
him to death relying merely on his plea of guilty.

There is no merit in this appeal. When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge
the only duty of the court is to inform him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to
comprehend it, as well as the circumstances attendant thereto.1 And when the charge is of a serious
nature it becomes the imperative duty of his counsel not only to assist him during the reading of the
information but also to explain to him the real import of the charge so that he may fully realize the
gravity and consequences of his plea. But there is nothing in the law that imposes upon the court the
duty to apprise him of what the nature of the penalty to be meted out to him might be if he would
plead guilty to the charge, its duty being limited to have him informed of the nature and cause
thereof. In the instant case, the lower court did just that. In fact, it did even more. Considering the
gravity of the charge it asked the fiscal to produce the evidence in his possession relative to the
aggravating circumstance alleged in the information so that appellant's counsel may peruse it, and
this was done without any objection on his part, and thereafter, the court rendered its decision. The
error that counsel now imputes to the lower court is, therefore, untenable. Indeed, if appellant
expressed his desire to plead guilty, it is for no other reason than that his conscience persuaded him
to do so, and so he has to suffer its consequences.

With regard to counsel's contention that the lower court erred in convicting appellant merely on his
plea of guilty without requiring the fiscal to produce evidence in support of the charge, suffice it to
quote hereunder what we said in a recent case:

We are fully convinced that before the appellants entered their plea of guilty, they were
apprised of the import a consequences thereof. They did not plead, without the assistance of
counsel. Counsel de oficio was all the time at hand. The presumption of regularity and
faithfulness in the performance of official functions, on the part of counsel de oficio, has not
been overcome. No evidence appear on record that he ha failed in his duty to advice the
appellants of what to do. It would be creating a dangerous precedent to say now that the
advice to plead guilty by the appointed counsel de oficio improvident.

The issues raised by counsel in his brief were already answered by us in a number of cases.
In U.S. v. Barba, 29 Phil. 206, and U.S. v. Santiago, 35 Phil. 20, it was held that plea of guilty
is an admission of all the material fact alleged in the complaint or information. In subsequent
cases we ruled that a plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient to
sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information, without the necessity of
requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the
necessary proof (People v. Valencia, 59 Phil. 42; People v. Palupe, 69 Phil. 702.) It matters
not even if the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime as
well as its attendant circumstances (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. L-7449, March 23, 1956).
The allegation that the defendants did not get any practical benefit in pleading guilty to the
crime charged, is not a plausible argument to dub the plea of guilty, as improvidently made.
As well observed by the Solicitor General, "The matter of pleading guilty to a charge is not a
game. An accused pleads guilty because he believes that he is guilty. The advantages that
he may get by so pleading are mere secondary considerations. Using the very argument of
appellants that their plea of guilty did not improve their situation, we ask, what advantage
would appellant achieve by undergoing a trial?"
 xxx xxx xxx

Undoubtedly, . . . the trial judge must have been fully satisfied that the appellants entered the
plea of guilty, with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of their act, more so
when, as in this case, the lives of the appellants were involved. The record does not reveal
that appellants or counsel ever complained or protested at the time of arraignment that they
did not understand the information and the effect of their plea of guilty. (People v. Yamson
and Romero, G.R. No. L-14189, October 25, 1960.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDILBERTO DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., defendants,
ANTONIO MARCOS, FRANCISCO FLORES, FELIX JASON, EDILBERTO DE LOS SANTOS,
BENJAMIN ARMOBIT, ALEJANDRO MACASO, CARLOS REBANO, JOSE GARCHITORENA,
CIPRIANO CASTRO, JOSE CRUZ, JR., MARCIAL AMA, ALFREDO PERALTA, CONRADO
BELEN and BENIGNO CASULLA, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Fidel A. Santiago for defendants-appellants Flores and De los Santos.
Raymundo A. Armovit for defendant-appellant Benjamin Armobit.
Ananias C. Ona for other defendants-appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), in its Criminal Cases Nos.
7703-7704, imposing the death penalty on fourteen (14) inmates of the New Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinglupa, Rizal, for the crime of multiple murder.

Originally indicted in the two cases were forty-five (45) and forty-six (46) prisoners, respectively. On
agreement of the parties, the cases were jointly tried, and, in due course, the cases against some
inmates were dismissed, other defendants were acquitted, while fourteen (14) were convicted,
namely: Antonio Marcos, Francisco Flores, Felix Jason, Edilberto de los Santos, Benjamin Armobit,
Alejandro Macaso, Carlos Rebaño, Jose Garchitorena, Cipriano Castro, Jose Cruz, Jr., Marcial
Ama, Alfredo Peralta, Conrado Belen and Benigno Casulla.

The impressions of the trial judge, Hon. Andres Reyes. of the situation obtaining in the penitentiary
(he made an ocular inspection and held sessions there) were described by him in the decision, as
follows:

The whole compound was a scene of one big congestion, made more repulsive by the fact
that as one enters its steel gates which lead to the cell buildings, the smell of human flesh
and perspiration owing to the congestion contaminates the air. The overflow of prisoners in
each cell was no ordinary one total count shown by the prison records reveals that there
were 8,304 prisoners all packed up in the six prison buildings which were supposed to house
only a little more than 5,000 inmates at it, full capacity. In Brigade 1-B of Building I alone, 263
prisoners were all packed up in a cell house which can take only a load of 116 prisoners. In
Brigade 1-D, the bartolina just beneath Brigade 1-B, there were 350 prisoners as compared
to its capacity of only 33 inmates.

The cell of Brigade 1-B was a big hall-like structure with six or five grilled gates and a narrow
corridor on its right side. Inside the cell were triple decked steel buildings all lined up one
after another such that they occupy the whole cell itself. These arrangements were good only
for 116 prisoners at most. What happened when 350 prisoners were all made to live within
this cagelike confines is unimaginable. There was hardly any space for anyone to move;
more so in Brigade 1-D, which houses the bartolina, where a two-man cell was filled with ten
or more prisoners. The beddings certainly will not accommodate everybody. A lot of
prisoners had to sleep — if they sleep at all — on the cold cement floor. The whole cell itself
is one big sleeping, dining, living, toilet and drainage room where some of the inmates,
finding no space, had to live, sleep and eat in the toilet and drainage rooms of the cell
houses. In the bartolina, conditions were even worse. The prisoners were actually sleeping
and stepping over each other like a bunch of canned sardines. And what is more, the food
 allowances were no allowances at all. Each prisoner has an allocation of thirty centavo,
worth of food per day — it is needless to speculate on what a ten-centavo meal could do.
The prisoners were given each two or three pairs of clothing, for the cleaning and washing of
which they were made responsible. It is hardly possible, however, to do any washing under
the obtaining conditions. Those who were fortunate enough to receive gifts in food and
clothing from friends or relatives were hardly able to touch or make use of them for fear that
the rage of the less fortunate among the inmates would be turned against them.

Hardened criminals were mixed with light offenders. Extortions and all sorts of crimes were
being committed sometimes right under the very noses of the guards who, to top it all, could
not maintain even a semblance of order and/or discipline as they were so outnumbered and
themselves afraid that they might also be stabbed or liquidated. Because of these situation,
helpless, inmates by reason of their physical build have been abused and could not complain
for fear of reprisal.

All these contributed to augment the growing feeling of the inmates that they are living in a
world of outcasts where only the mighty and the strong survive, where hope of redemption is
illusory and where life has been subjected to the law of the jungle or the law of the survival of
the fittest.

And so like all humans with little sense of order left in their mind, they formed themselves
into bands or into groups and finally into big organizations upon which each and every
member looked for protection, security and, most important of all, for food and means of
survival. The bold and outspoken assumed leadership of the gang. At first there were many
of these groups, popular among them were the Flower gang, the Tira-Tira gang and the
Rose Tattoo gang. But as time went on after discipline continued to be lax, these small
organizations started to foment rivalries among themselves until finally these small gangs
grouped themselves into two big organizations and called themselves the Sigue-sigue and
the Oxo gangs.

None of the witnesses of the prosecution as well as the accused themselves could tell with
certainty the significance or meaning of the words sigue-sigue and oxo, but the evidence is
clear that the Sigue-sigue organization counted with the support of inmates coming from
Luzon particularly from the Tagalog regions, while the Oxo was generally composed of
inmates coming from the South or the Visayas.

The enmity and rivalry that grew between the two big organizations became worse as time
went on. A reading of the consolidated incident report prepared by inspector Meliton
Geronimo OYCZ, security and custodian of the New Bilibid Prisons as received by the Court
during, the ocular inspection conducted in the penitentiary, shows that as early as 1957
cases of stabbing, assault and all sorts. of crime frequently happened whenever the
members of these two organization, came in contact with each other. As time went on the
incident became more frequent indicating thereby that the situation was going out of control.
By January, 1958 the die has been cast; the rivalry that persisted between the two
organizations has grown to enormous proportions. Almost daily free-for-all fights occurred
between the two rival organizations. Killing became almost a daily occurrence ... .

On 17 January 1958, the Sigue-Sigues held a meeting where they decided to liquidate their rivals.
They met again on the night of 15 February 1958, and decided that the next day, a Sunday, would
be the appointed day.
Thus, pandemonium broke loose in the penitentiary at between eight and nine o'clock on Sunday
morning, 16 February 1958, when the Sigue-Sigues staged a riot against their enemies. This started
with a commotion on the upper floor of the cell house. A mass of about 150 prisoners, many of
whom were armed with improvised weapons, forcibly opened the door to the cell house, liberated
their companions from their individual cells and then opened the cells where the Oxos were, took
them out by force or deception, and then clubbed and stabbed them to death one after the other.
Five (5) died when the riot was quelled.

At about the same time on the following day, 17 February 1958, another riot, carried out in the same
fashion as the day before, accounted for four (4) more deaths.

Two drums of weapons, consisting of icepicks, sharpened instruments improvised from nails and
parts of a steel drum, and wooden and iron clubs made from broken windows and beds (tarima)
were collected from the site after each day's riot,

The findings of the medical officers of the Bureau of Prisons on the corpses of the nine (9) victims
portray eloquently the shocking extent of the carnage, brutality, and cannibalism of these riots.

The findings on those who died on the 16th of February, 1958 are as follows:

Cresenciano Borromeo

(1) Lacerated wound of the scalp 6 inches in length with a crack of the skull and brain
substance coming out.

(2) Right ear amputated.

(3) Lacerated wound of the right eyebrow 8 inches in length and 2 cms. in depth.

(4) Bruises at both right and left legs.

Cause of death: Fracture of skull.

Martin Dorado

(1) Two lacerated wounds of the head 4 cms. in length 1 cm. in depth.

(2) Nine punctured wounds of the chest two cms. in length, five of which are penetrating, 4
puncturing the lungs, one cutting the big blood vessels.

(3) Lacerated wound of the left hand 3 cms. in length, one cm. in depth. Cause of death:
Internal hemorrhage from multiple fatal wounds of the chest.

Pablo Callares

(1) Lacerated wound left front temporal region 4 inches in length and fracture of the skull;

(2) Punctured wound right scapular region 2 cms. in length 3 cms. in depth;

(3) Bruises — right arm, left hand and abdomen;

 (4) Bruises at left and right knees;

(5) Punctured wound left leg 2 cms. in length 3 cms. in depth position portion;

Cause of death: Fracture of skull.

Marcelino Javier Baltazar

(1) Lacerated wound of the head occipital region 3 inches in length 1 cm. in depth;

(2) Lacerated wound of the left eyelids 4 cms. in length 2 cms. in depth;

(3) Lacerated wound of the mouth left angle 4 cms. in length 3 cms. in depth;

(4) Lacerated wound at the left parotid region 4 cms. in length 2 cms. in depth;

(5) Lacerated wound left mandibular region 4 cms. in length 2 cms. in depth;

Cause of death: Cerebral contusion due to head blow.

Jesus Garcia Dizon

(1) Lacerated wound left occipital parietal region 5 inches in length 1 cm. in depth with
cracked skull;

(2) Lacerated wounds right eye upper lid parallel to each other 4 cms. in length 1/2 cm. in
depth each;

(3) Lacerated wound behind left ear 3 inches in length 1/2 cm. in depth;

(4) Punctured wound left chest 1-1/2 cms. in length 5 cms. in depth penetrating the left lungs:

(5) Presence of bruises on both left and right hands;

(6) Punctured wound left forearm 1-1/2 cms. in length 3 cms. in depth;

Cause of death: Fracture of the skull.

The findings on those who died on the 17th of February, 1958 are also as follows:

Francisco Manalo

(1) Head — 7 wounds lacerated & fractured;

(2) Neck — 1 wound lacerated 5 inches long;

(3) Abdomen — 10 wounds stab and penetrating;

(4) Left hand — 1 wound lacerated;

 (5) Left thigh — 1 wound thru and thru.

Ernesto Cruz alias Matias

(1) Head — burned

(2) Neck — 1 wound stab 1 inch

(3) Chest — 1 wound stab 1 inch

(4) Abdomen — 2 wounds stab 1 inch

(5) Lower extremities — both burned.

Alfredo Gabieta

(1) Head — beheaded

(2) Chest — 4 wounds stab

(3) Abdomen — 7 wounds cut

(4) Pelvic region — wounds cut

(5) Tabia febula — 1 wound lacerated.

Porfirio Sanchez

(1) Head — 11 wounds with lacerated big round chin, right ear (2-1 /2) inches

(2) Neck — 3 wounds 1-1/2 inches

(3) Chest — 10 wounds 1 inch stab

(4) Abdomen — 6 wounds 1 inch stab

(5) Right thigh — 7 wounds 1 inch.

Ernesto Cruz, alias Matias, and Alfredo Gabieta met their death differently from the others.

Ernesto Cruz was one of those who joined in the attack. After the door of their intended victims was
opened, Cruz was pulled inside and killed by the inmates therein. Enraged by this incident and by
the refusal of the inmates to come out of their cell, the attackers gathered pieces of wood and
newspapers, poured gas and set the cell on fire, thus burning the head and lower extremities of the
dead Ernesto Cruz.

Alfredo Gabieta, also known as "Pilay," came out voluntarily from his cell after receiving assurance
that he was not an enemy. Upon coming out, however, he was clubbed, smack on the face, stabbed,
placed on a bench and beheaded kempeitai-style. Alfredo Peralta, alias "Shane," took the severed
head by the hair, took it to a typewriter of the warden and pretended to investigate it, after which
Peralta ran with the head to the fire escape and from there threw it to his companions.

The meetings on 17 January 1958 and 15 February 1958 of the Sigue-Sigues and the conduct of the
riots — the mass movement of the mob, the timing, the generally uniform manner in the killings, the
obedience to, and execution of, the commands or instructions of the leaders — are direct proofs of
the existence of a conspiracy.

Apart from the medical testimony, the prosecution presented the following witnesses with respect to
the participation of each of the accused in the conspiracy and in the commission thereof: Leon
Catbagan, Joventino Garces, Marcelino Quirabo, Sotero Bautista, and Isidoro Lizardo, all serving
terms in the penitentiary, and Francisco Roxas, keeper-in-charge of the cell house.

The credibility of these witnesses is the only issue.

Catbagan's testimony is assailed because, when he was presented as a defense witness about six
months after he testified for the prosecution, he recanted his previous testimony against the
accused, on the excuse that he was maltreated by prison authorities. The recantation and the
excuse cannot be believed: his sworn testimony as a prosecution witness remained clear and
straightforward for four (4) session days, on 5, 11, 12, and 30 June 1958, without detectable hint of
untruth or fabrication, or lack of voluntariness.

That this prisoner's testimony for the prosecution was spontaneous also appears from certain details
of that testimony. He pointed out that one of the ring leaders was a prisoner who had since been
released; and that he was able to talk to a guard and reveal what he knew, without danger to
himself, by employing the ruse of insulting the guard. On the other hand, when much later he
recanted his previous statements, he was vague, sought support from an employee who had since
gone A.W.O.L., and refused to enter into details unless all those whom he hid previously implicated
were present to hear him; and the reason given for his recantation (that he was about to complete
serving his term) was wholly unsatisfactory, for this reason already existed when he first testified.
Since Catbagan's original testimony was corroborated by other witnesses and evidence for the
prosecution, we can see no error in the trial court's refusal to accept his recantation; particularly
since the trial judge had opportunity to closely observe the behavior of the witness on both
occasions.

The observation of this Court is that the testimony of each prosecution witness, when not
corroborating another, dovetails into the narrative of the others, such that, taken together, the
completed whole generates belief even unto its parts. The inconsistencies or faults in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are minor, but uncommon, and do no damage to the
substance of the evidence. It would have been extraordinary indeed if in the observation and
narration of rapidly changing events of high emotional content no inconsistencies had developed.

That the Court a quo acquitted some accused also implicated by the witnesses of the prosecution,
because it felt that the incriminating evidence lacked adequate corroboration, does not establish that
the testimony was false or fabricated. It merely emphasizes a commendable caution in weighing the
proof in a capital case.

The involvement of each one of the fourteen (14) remaining accused is as follows:

Antonio Marcos
He is the recognized leader of the Sigue-Sigue gang; presided over the meetings on 17 January and
15 February 1958; was seen sharpening instruments; gave the instructions to raid the cell house and
threatened those who would not follow; was seen opening the door of Brigade 1-D, the cell house;
clubbed and/or stabbed Cresenciano Borromeo and another victim; set fire to the cell where Matias
was killed; opened the cell door of Quirabo, an Oxo and a prosecution witness.

Francisco Flores

Armed with a sharp instrument, he was seen coming from the upper floor, opened the cell door of
Pablo Callares, then clubbed and stabbed him; did the same to Jesus Dizon and Marcelino Javier
Baltazar and another victim. He is one of the leaders of the gang and gave the order to retreat:
"Nandiyana mga guardia, magsi-akyat na kayo" (the guards have arrived; go upstairs).

Felix Jason

He is another leader of the Sigue-Sigue gang; attended its meetings; was seen sharpening
instruments on 15 February 1958; participated in the clubbing and stabbing of Jesus Dizon,
Marcelino Javier Baltazar, alias Tikboy and Martin Dorado. He possessed the power to pardon
certain supposed enemies.

Edilberto de los Santos

Armed with an iron pipe, he was seen among the mob coming from the upper floor to the cell house;
shouted to open the door of the Oxos; joined in the clubbing, stabbing, and beheading of Gabieta
and in the clubbing and stabbing of Callares. He gave the command in front of the cell where Matias
was killed: "If we cannot enter, we burn them." He attended the meetings of the Sigue-Sigues and
was seen sharpening a weapon on 15 February 1958.

Benjamin Armobit

A member of the top brass of the gang; he attended both meetings, was one of those who attacked
Gabieta.

Alejandro Macaso

He joined the rampage and participated in the clubbing and stabbing of Porfirio Sanchez and
Cresenciano Borromeo. He pulled Dorado from his cell.

Carlos Rebaño

He is one of the leaders of the gang and attended one of its meetings. He clubbed and stabbed
Gabieta and helped in beheading him; also clubbed Dorado. He released his companions in the cell
house before the attack on the Oxo started.

Jose Garchitorena

He clubbed both Callares and Dizon and joined in the beheading of Gabieta. He was one of those
who opened the cells of their companions in order to release them.

Cipriano Castro
He brought out Callares from his cell and clubbed him; he clubbed also another victim.

Jose Cruz, Jr.

He was seen with an ice-pick coming from the upper floor to the cell house; opened the door of the
cell of Callares; joined in clubbing and stabbing him; he also clubbed and stabbed Dizon and
Baltazar.

Marcial Alma

He was confined in the cell house but was released by the rioters who came from upstairs. He took
part in the clubbing and stabbing of Callares and Gabieta.

Alfredo Peralta

He admitted in open court his participation in the decapitation of Gabieta in the manner hereinafter
narrated.

Conrado Belen

He is a Sigue-Sigue member and was among those who came from the upper floor of and to the cell
house. He entered and participated in the burning of cell 10 — where Matias was burned. He
clubbed Baltazar.

Benigno Casulla

He took part in clubbing and stabbing Porfirio Sanchez and Jesus Dizon.

In view of the limited distance which is but a stone's throw from the place where the crimes were
committed to the place where the accused-appellants claim to have been at the time of commission,
their common defense of alibi is incredible.

The evidence compels us to agree with the trial court that the accused-appellants are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. But the members of the Court cannot in conscience concur
in the death penalty, imposed, because they find it impossible to ignore the contributory role played
by the inhuman conditions then reigning in the penitentiary, vividly described by the trial Judge in his
decision. It is evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed facilities beyond
measure and the starvation allowance of ten centavos per meal for each prisoner, must have rubbed
raw the nerves and dispositions of the unfortunate inmates, and predisposed them to all sorts of
violence to seize from their owners the meager supplies from outside in order to eke out their
miserable existence. All this led inevitably to the formation of gangs that preyed like wolf packs on
the weak, and ultimately to pitiless gang rivalry for the control of the prisoners, abetted by the
inability of the outnumbered guards to enforce discipline, and which culminated in violent riots. The
government cannot evade responsibility for keeping prisoners under such subhuman and dantesque
conditions. Society must not close its eyes to the fact that if it has the right to exclude from its midst
those who attack it, it has no right at all to confine them under circumstances that strangle all sense
of decency, reduce convicts to the level of animals, and convert a prison term into prolonged torture
and slow death.
WHEREFORE, and there being no sufficient number of votes as required by law, the death penalty
imposed on appellants is automatically reduced to life imprisonment. The civil indemnity and costs
fixed by the appealed decision are affirmed.
Washington v. Glucksberg
Facts: It is a crime to assist suicide in Washington. Petitioners are the State of
Washington and its Attorney General. Respondents are physicians who practice
medicine in Washington. Respondents occasionally treat terminally ill patients and
claim that they would help these patients end their lives if not for Petitioners’ ban
on assisted suicides. In January 1993, Respondents, along with three terminally ill
patients (who have since died), and a non-profit organization that counsels people
considering physician assisted suicide sued in the United Stated District Court
claiming that Petitioners’ assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional. The District Court
invalidated the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, but then reversed itself en
banc and affirmed the District Court. The en banc decision held that “the
Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and
manner of one’s death” and the state’s assisted suicide ban was unconstitutional.
Issue. Whether Washington’s prohibition against “causing” or “aiding” a suicide
offends the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Held. No. The en banc judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. There is
consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right
of assisting suicide. To hold that such a right is fundamental in nature would be to
reverse centuries of legal doctrine. Therefore, assisting suicide is not a
fundamental right. The Constitution requires the state ban to be rationally related
to legitimate government interests. Petitioners have an “unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life.” Suicide is a serious health problem. Further,
Petitioners have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession, as well as an interest in protecting vulnerable groups from abuse,
neglect and mistakes. The ban on assisting suicide is thus rationally related to
these legitimate state interests.
Concurrence. There is no generalized right to commit suicide. There is no need to
address Respondent’s question whether a mentally competent person who is
experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling
the circumstances of his or her imminent death.
The majority’s holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of
the law addressed in the case may be invalid and thus the constitutionality of such
a law could prevail in a more particularized challenge.
The legislature has more competence to address this issue than the Court.
The Court’s formulation of the “liberty” interests is incorrect. Additionally, the
majority’s holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the
law addressed in the case may be invalid, and thus the constitutionality of such a
law could prevail in a more particularized challenge.
 GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 166863
INSURANCE SYSTEM, Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
PERALTA,** and
-versus- PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

JUM ANGEL, July 20, 2011

Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal by certiorari[1] from the Decision[2] of the First Division of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61304 dated 31 May 2004, granting the Petition
of Jum Angel (respondent) to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision[3] and
Order of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) denying payment of
death benefits due to private respondent as widow of Sergeant Benjamin Angel (Sgt.
Angel) under Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known as Employees'
Compensation and State Insurance Fund.

The relevant factual antecedents of the case, as gathered by the court, are the
following:

The late Sgt. Angel started his military training on 1 July 1974. On 7 October
1977, he was admitted into active service. He was later promoted to the rank of
Corporal in December 1982 and to the rank of Sergeant in July 1986. He was in
active service until his death on 3 March 1998.
 On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was fetched/invited from his post by a certain
Capt. Fabie M. Lamerez (Capt. Lamerez) of the Intelligence Service Group of the
Philippine Army to shed light on his alleged involvement in a pilferage/gunrunning
case being investigated by the Philippine Army.[4]

On or about 2 p.m. of the same day, he was placed inside a detention cell to
await further investigation.

The following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside
his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. According to the Autopsy Report
conducted by the Crime Laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the
cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.

Respondent, the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the PNP
Criminal Investigation Command, alleging that her husband was murdered and
named the elements of Intelligence Service Group led by Capt. Lamerez as suspects.
On 8 April 1998, upon investigation, the Office of the Provost Marshal
reported that Sgt. Angel died under suspicious circumstance while in line of
duty.The Provost Marshal found it incredible that Sgt. Angel would take his life, in
view of his impending retirement and being a father to four (4) children. The Provost
Marshal concluded that foul play may have been committed against Sgt. Angel and
recommended that the case be tried by a court martial.

On 25 April 1998, the Inspector General, upon referral of the case, held that
there is no evidence suggesting foul play in the death of Sgt. Angel and maintained
that the detention of Sgt. Angel could have triggered a mental block that caused him
to hang himself.

The case was referred to a Judge Advocate General, to determine whether or

not Sgt. Angel died while in line of duty. On 3 December 1999, Judge Advocate
General Honorio Capulong in his report recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared
to have died in line of duty.

On 15 March 2000, the Philippine Army through Chief of Staff Brig. General
Pedro V. Atienza, Jr., issued General Order No. 270 declaring the line of duty status
in favor of Sgt. Angel. Section 1 of the Order states:

I. Declaration of in Line of Duty Status the death of the late Sgt. Benjamin
R. Angel 633863, Philippine Army formerly assigned with SBTM, ASCOM who
 died on March 3, 1998 at ISG, Fort Bonifacio, Makati is declared IN LINE OF
DUTY STATUS.[5] (Emphasis ours)

By reason thereof, respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for death
benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended.
On 29 September 1999, the GSIS denied the respondents claim on the ground that
Sgt. Angels death did not arise out of and in the course of employment. A motion
for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by the GSIS.

On appeal before the ECC, the ECC in its Decision[6] dated 13 April 2000 likewise
denied the claim for want of merit. The relevant portion of the decision states that:

After careful deliberation of the facts attendant to this case, this Commission
believes that the death benefits prayed for under P.D. 626, as amended, cannot be
granted. It has been stressed time and again that the thrust of Employees
Compensation Law is to secure adequate and prompt benefits to the employee and
his dependents in the event of a work-related disability or death. In this connection,
Rule III, Section 1(a) of the Implementing Rules of PD 626, as amended, defines
when an injury or death is considered compensable, to wit: For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of
accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The circumstances
surrounding this case do not meet the aforementioned conditions. Clearly, the
deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of the incident. On the
contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged involvement on a
pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell, an activity which is
foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective mantle
of the law cannot be extended to him as the documents appear bereft of any showing
to justify a casual connection between his death and his employment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent System

appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this case DISMISSED for want of
merit.[7]
Respondent appealed the case before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Before the appellate court, she raised the issue
that the ECC erred:

1. In declaring that the death benefits prayed for under P.D. 626, as amended,
cannot be granted, as the deceased was not performing his official duties at
the time of the incident.
2. In declaring that the subject matter of the investigation, during which he
was found dead in his cell, is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a
soldier.
 3. In declaring that the mantle of the law cannot be extended to the deceased
as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify a causal connection
between his death and his employment.[8]

On 31 May 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the ECC ruling. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed

decision dated April 13, 2000 of respondent ECC is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the GSIS [is] ORDERED to pay the death benefits due the petitioner
as widow of Sgt. Angel under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.[9]
The appellate court in its decision pointed out that Sgt. Angel was manning his post
at the Army Support Command when invited by Capt. Lamerez of the Intelligence
Service Group to undergo an investigation concerning a gunrunning/pilferage case
in the Philippine Army. Sgt. Angel was never arrested; he went with Capt. Lamerez
to shed light on the investigation.[10] It was never shown that Sgt. Angels subsequent
detention was a punishment for any wrong doing.[11]Furthermore, the appellate court
recognized the peculiar nature of a soldiers job as decided by the Supreme Court. To
quote:

x x x a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status
and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject
to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week,
except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be
presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on an
approved vacation leave.[12]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner GSIS raises the issue whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the
law and jurisprudence when it set aside the ECC Decision dated 13 April 2000 that
for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must
be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Courts Ruling

GSIS contends that the death of Sgt. Angel did not arise out of in the course of
employment as provided by Section 1, Rule III of the Implementing Rules of
Presidential Decree No. 626, otherwise known as the Employees Compensation and
State Insurance Fund. The widow, on the other hand, counters that her husband died
in line of duty so that such death is compensable under the Fund.
The contentions bring out the issue whether or not the declaration by the Philippine
Army that the death of Sgt. Angel was in line of duty status confers compensability
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known as Employees
Compensation and State Insurance Fund.

We rule in favor of petitioner GSIS.

For the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the law provides:

Implementing Rules of P.D. 626,[13] RULE III COMPENSABILITY, Section

1. Grounds.

(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment.(Underscoring supplied)

Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an

employment accident satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must have been
injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have
been performing his official functions; and 3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere,
the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.[14]

It is important to note, however, that the requirement that the injury must arise out
of and in the course of employment proceeds from the limiting premise that the
injury must be the result of an accident.

The term accident has been defined in an insurance case.[15] We find the definition
applicable to the present case. Thus:

The words accident and accidental have never acquired any technical signification in
law, and when used in an insurance contract are to be construed and considered
according to the ordinary understanding and common usage and speech of people
generally. In substance, the courts are practically agreed that the words accident and
accidental mean that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The definition that has
usually been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an event that takes place
without ones foresight or expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown cause,
or is an unusual effect of a known case, and therefore not expected.

An accident is an event which happens without any human agency or, if happening
through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not
expected by the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an injury which
 happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured without his design,
consent, or voluntary cooperation.
Significantly, an accident excludes that which happens with intention or design, with
ones foresight or expectation or that which under the circumstances is expected by
the person to whom it happens.

The exclusion of an intentional or designed act which exclusion refines the definition
of accident that we find applicable to the provisions of the implementing rules of the
law is specifically provided for in Article 172 of the law, Presidential Decree No.
626. Thus:

Art. 172. Limitation of liability The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for
compensation to the employee or his dependents, except when the disability or
death was occasioned by the employees intoxication, willful intention to injure or
kill himself or another, notorious negligence or otherwise provided under this title.
(Underscoring supplied)

The factual foundation of respondents claim is that on the day following Sgt. Angels
detention for investigation of his alleged involvement in a pilferage/gunrunning
case, his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied
around his neck. The autopsy report stated that the cause of death as asphyxia by
strangulation.

With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result
from an accident which is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. It was
on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the
resulting death from the coverage of the State Insurance Fund. It is unexpected that
the discussion below by the GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals, veered away
from the indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident and,
instead, focused on the requirement that the death must arise out of or in the course
of employment. Such that, the ECC denied compensability because:

Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of
the incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged
involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell, an
activity which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus, the
protective mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as the documents appear
bereft of any showing to justify causal connection between his death and his
employment.[16]
Led into a confined debate, the Court of Appeals merely met the ECCs reasons and
said that even during the investigation, Sgt. Angel was still in the performance of his
duties. The Court of Appeals alluded to the ruling that a soldier is on active duty
status 24-hours a day and concluded that the ECC should not have ignored the
official findings of the military that the deceased sergeant died while in the
performance of his duties.

We should undo the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the ECC ruling.

1. The finding of the military authorities that Sgt. Angel died while in the line of
duty is not binding on the ECC. This is not a new ECC doctrine. Apropos is the case
of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,[17] even if the case
concerns the PNP and not the AFP. Thus:

x x x the proceedings before the PNP Board and the ECC are separate and distinct,
treating of two (2) totally different subjects; moreover, the PNP Boards conclusions
here may not be used as basis to find that private respondent is entitled to
compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended. The presumption afforded by the
Order relied upon by the PNP Board concerns itself merely with the query as to
whether one died in the line of duty, while P.D. No. 626 addressed the issue of
whether a causal relation existed between a claimants ailment and his working
conditions. Plainly, these are different issues calling for differing forms of proof or
evidence, thus accounting for the existence of a favorable presumption in favor of
a claimant under the Defense Department Order, but not under P.D. No. 626 when
the disease is not listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation.

Paraphrasing the above ruling, we find that the proceedings before the Philippine
Army which finally resulted in the issuance by the Chief of Staff of General Order
No. 270 that the death of Sgt. Angel was in line of duty status may not be used as
basis for the finding that the widow of Sgt. Angel is entitled to compensation under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Death in line of duty is not equivalent to
a finding that the death resulted from an accident and was not occasioned by the
sergeants willful intention to kill himself. It is not enough, as erroneously pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to support the conclusion that the
sergeant died while in the performance of his duties since he was not arrested but
was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which was part of xxx official
duties to cooperate with the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine Army. There
must be evidence that the sergeant did not take his own life considering the fact that
he was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck.
2. The scene and setting of apparent suicide was contested by herein respondent,
wife of the sergeant through a complaint before the PNP Criminal Investigation
Command alleging that her husband was murdered and named the elements of
Intelligence Service Group led by Capt. Lamerez as suspects. The alleged murder
vis--vis the apparent suicide is precisely the determinant of compensability, with
death in line of duty as a given factor. The sergeant was fetched from his post for
investigation and he died in a detention cell while awaiting further investigation. The
findings regarding his death provided by the Provost Marshall and the Inspector
General are conflicting. The former found it incredible that the deceased would take
his life in view of his impending retirement and being a father to four children and
concluded that foul play may have been committed. The latter held that there was no
evidence suggesting foul play maintaining that the detention of Sgt. Angel could
have triggered a mental block that caused him to hang himself. The conflict was not
resolved by subsequent official actions. The Judge Advocate General recommended
that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died while in line of duty which declaration was
done by the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army. Noticeably, the declaration went
no further than state that Sgt. Angel died on March 3, 1998 at
ISG, Fort Bonifacio, Makati. There was no mention about the cause of death. There
was nothing in the declaration that would resolve the contradiction between the
conclusion of foul play reached by the Provost Marshall and the finding of the
Inspector General that there is no evidence suggesting foul play. The senior officers
merely declared the fact that death occurred inside Fort Bonifacio.

From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in favor of the positive finding
that there is no evidence of foul play over the inference that foul play may have been
committed. The circumstances of Sgt. Angels death his lifeless body was found
hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck − taken together
with the unrebutted finding that there is no evidence of foul play negate respondents
claim of murder of her husband and of compensability of such death. It was not
accidental death that is covered by Presidential Decree No. 626.

3. We are not unmindful of the fact that liberality of the law in favor of the working
man and woman prevails in light of the Constitution and social justice.[18]But, as
stated in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, it is now the
trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who
are not entitled under the law. There is now an intention to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and
the employees right to receive separation for work connected death or disability. [19]
 There is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon
undeserving claims for compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases or
death not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly
included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for
the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families
look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths
occur.[20]

This Court sympathizes with the sad predicament of respondent, the widow
of Sgt. Angel. Such, however has already been considered in fixing the equilibrium
between obligation and right in employees compensation cases. It can no longer tilt
the balance in respondents favor.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated 13 April 2000 of the
Employees Compensation Commission is REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 AGILE MARITIME RESOURCES INC., ATTY. IMELDA LIM BARCELONA AND PRONAV SHIP
MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioners, v. APOLINARIO N. SIADOR, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the decision2 dated September 25, 2009
and resolution3 dated January 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101211.

The Antecedents

On December 18, 2000, Dennis Siador (Dennis), son of respondent Apolinario Siador (Apolinario), entered
into a seven-month contract of employment, as Ordinary Seaman4 on board the vessel LNG ARIES, with
petitioner Agile Maritime Resources, Inc. (Agile) – the local manning agent of petitioner Pronav Ship
Management, Inc.

On December 12, 2001, Apolinario filed a complaint for death benefits, damages and attorney’s fees against
the petitioners, including Agile’s President, Imelda Lim Barcelona (Barcelona), for the death of Dennis “who
fell from the vessel [on June 28, 2001] and who died in the high seas x x x,”5 while the vessel was cruising
towards Sodegaura, Japan. Dennis’ body was never recovered.

Apolinario claimed that Dennis’ employment was governed by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and supplemented by the International
Transport Workers Federation-Total Crew Cost (ITF-TCC) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Under the POEA-SEC,6 in case of death of a seafarer, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine
currency equivalent to Fifty Thousand United States dollars (US$50,000,00).7 The ITF-TCC CBA,8 on the
other hand, grants Sixty Thousand United States dollars (US$60,000.00) to the immediate next of kin of the
seafarer who lost his life.9 As the sole heir of Dennis, Apolinario prayed for the upgraded death benefits
under the ITF-TCC CBA.

The petitioners did not deny that the incident happened. Based on the “Master’s Statement on S.A.R.
Operation for Mr. Dennis Siador”10 (Master’s Statement), they contended that at about 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of June 28, 2001, Able Seaman Gil Tamayo (AB Tamayo) saw Dennis jump overboard. Tamayo
immediately informed Third Officer Milan Crnogorac who sounded the man-overboard alarm – seven short
blasts, followed by one long blast.

The Master of the vessel immediately ordered a life ring thrown into the water and put into motion the
vessel’s man-overboard maneuver by turning the vessel to a reciprocal course on her starboard side. Fitter
Rolando Moreno (Moreno) was ordered to keep an eye on Dennis with the use of binoculars. Allegedly,
Moreno saw Dennis floating on his back, making no effort to swim towards the life ring. He then saw Dennis
sink in the water and disappear from sight despite the effort to rescue him by a team led by the Chief
Officer. At 5:15 p.m., with the horizon darkening and the temperature remarkably dropping, the search and
rescue effort was called off.

Agile notified Apolinario of Dennis’ death through a letter dated July 30, 2001.11 With the assistance of a
counsel and the ITF, Apolinario demanded death and burial benefits, Dennis’ accrued salary and leave pay
from the petitioners who turned down the claim, particularly for death benefits under the CBA.12 This refusal
led to the filing of the complaint.

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

In his decision13 of January 12, 2004, Labor Arbiter (LA) Edgardo M. Madriaga (Madriaga) dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action. LA Madriaga found that Dennis – saddled by heavy personal and
psychological problems – took his own life by jumping overboard.

On Apolinario’s appeal, the National Labor Relations (NLRC) affirmed LA Madriaga’s ruling in its resolution
dated January 24, 2007.14 It found no sufficient justification to disturb the appealed decision. Apolinario
moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion. The denial prompted Apolinario to elevate the
case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 The CA Proceedings

Apolinario charged that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed LA Madriaga’s finding that
Dennis took his own life and thus is not entitled to death benefits. He decried the NLRC’s “narrow-minded
view of the incident;” it failed to consider that “days prior to his death, Dennis was already afflicted with
mental disability and could not be blamed for jumping overboard.”15 Apolinario also assailed the NLRC’s
failure to apply the jurisprudential principle that self-destruction is not presumed.

The CA Decision

The CA partially granted the petition. It reversed the labor tribunal’s dismissal of the complaint and awarded
Apolinario Sixty Thousand United States dollars (US$60,000.00) as death benefits, but denied his claim for
damages. It sustained Apolinario’s position that prior to his death, Dennis had been suffering from mental
instability, and therefore could not be considered to have intentionally taken his life. It cited the personal
accounts of the Filipino crewmembers on Dennis’ unusual behavior days before the incident, which narrated
that Dennis appeared to be very disturbed, anxious, depressed and restless. These personal accounts are
contained in the “Statement on Mr. Dennis Siador”16 (Crewmembers’ Statement) that Master Capt. Dragan
Tataj, the Master of the vessel, prepared on the very day the incident happened; the Filipino crewmembers
affirmed the statement through their signatures.17 cralaw red

The CA opined that without the report of Dennis’ previous unusual behavior, it would have been safe to
presume that he willfully took his life, but the report on record cannot be disregarded.18 cralaw red

The Petition

The petitioners ask the Court to set aside the CA ruling on the ground that the CA gravely erred in reversing
the decision and the resolution of the LA and the NLRC, respectively, as they committed no grave abuse of
discretion in deciding the case. They insist that there is “ample and convincing evidence” showing that
Dennis took his own life and that his death was not caused by his mental problems.

The evidence, they point out, is found in the Crewmembers’ Statement, where the crewmembers in contact
with Dennis narrated that on the day of the incident “he was just depressed, that he was not ill and that he
just wanted to be alone.” 19 According to the petitioners, Dennis’ statement negates the CA’s finding that
Dennis was mentally ill.

The Case for Apolinario

In his Comment,20 Apolinario prays for the dismissal of the petition. The CA’s finding that Dennis was
suffering from unsound mind days before the incident is fully supported by the records of the case,
particularly by the petitioners’ own evidence. Apolinario submits, too, that the CA ruling coincides with legal
principle in labor compensation cases that self-destruction is not presumed.21 cralaw red

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition.

Preliminary considerations

a. Certiorari under Rule 65 and appeal under Rule 45

In a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling rendered pursuant to Rule 65, the Court determines the legal correctness
of the CA decision based on its determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC decision that the CA reviewed, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case
was correct. In other words, in testing for legal correctness, the Court views the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it.

We draw attention at this point to the basic postulate that in the judicial review of labor tribunals’ rulings,
their factual findings and the conclusions from these findings are generally accorded respect by the courts
because of the tribunals’ expertise in their field. There is also the reality that the ruling brought under Rule
65 to the CA is already a final and executory ruling and can only be disturbed if it is void because the NLRC
acted without jurisdiction.
This postulate should be related to the intrinsic limitations of a certiorari proceeding: it is a limited remedy
aimed solely at the correction of acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; it does not, and cannot, address mere errors of judgment.

Of course, the rule that a certiorari proceeding normally precludes an inquiry into the correctness of the
labor tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence on which its decision is based, is not absolute; circumstances may
exist that would allow the court’s review of the tribunals’ factual findings and the supporting evidence. One
instance is when there is a showing that the NLRC’s factual findings and conclusions were arrived at
arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. Another instance is when the tribunal, such as the NLRC
in this case, made factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. By established
jurisprudence, these kinds of rulings are tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

In the present case, the labor tribunals agree that Dennis committed suicide by jumping from the ship
because of his heavy “personal and psychological problems,”22 as shown by the unusual behavior he
exhibited days before the incident. The CA disagreed with the labor tribunals and ruled that even with
Dennis’ unusual behavior, the “willfulness to take his own life could not be presumed when he jumped
overboard” and in fact “cast serious doubt” on the petitioners’ claim of willfulness. It added that AB
Tamayo’s statements that he saw Dennis jump overboard and thereafter make no effort to reach the life
ring “are not conclusive proof” of suicide.

As matters stand, the Court needs only to determine whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in holding that substantial evidence exists to support its conclusion that Dennis willfully
took his own life.

b. Burden of proof in death benefits cases;

burden of evidence

In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the NLRC’s finding that Dennis committed
suicide, we find it necessary to discuss the burden of proof and the corresponding shift in the burden of
evidence in death benefits cases under the POEA-SEC. The relevant provision of the POEA-SEC pertinently
reads:chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of

the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties,
provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or
death is directly attributable to the seafarer.23

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.24 As a claimant for death benefits, Apolinario
has the burden of proving that the seafarer’s death (1) is work-related; and (2) happened during the term
of the employment contract.25 Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this burden of proof.

In the usual course, such proof would have rendered the petitioners automatically liable, except that the
same provision of the POEA-SEC allows an exemption from liability for death benefits if the employer can
successfully prove that the seafarer's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or
willful act. That the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act is a matter of defense that the employer
has to prove. In legal parlance, the employer carries the burden of proof to establish its claim that it should
not be held liable.

Whether it is the employer or the seafarer, the quantum of proof necessary to discharge their respective
burdens is substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.26 c ralaw red

Since Apolinario has initially discharged his burden of proof, the petitioners, in order to avoid liability, must
similarly establish their defense. If the petitioners are able to establish their defense by substantial
evidence, the burden now rests on Apolinario to overcome the employer’s defense. In other words, the
burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer’s heirs.

While the rules of evidence are not controlling in the proceedings of the labor tribunals,27 a structured
approach as described above is necessary if the courts were to observe the limitations to their own power of
review. Otherwise, as we hinted at in our preliminary consideration, resort to the courts will amount to the
review of the intrinsic merits of the NLRC’s ruling, in effect a review on appeal that statutory law does not
(and, hence, the courts cannot) provide.

We shall proceed to determine whether the CA correctly determined if the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion based on the above considerations.

Substantive considerations

There was substantial evidence to prove

that Dennis’ death was directly attributable to his own action
In the present case, the LA, NLRC and the CA28 uniformly found that Dennis jumped from the ship.
Additionally, the petitioners cited the following personal circumstances that may have driven Dennis to do
what he did: his dysfunctional family; the death of his mother after a lingering illness; the bitter parting with
his father whom he had not seen for three (3)29 after he and his two (2) brothers were thrown out from their
home in Talisay, Cebu; and his disappointment with his sister whose medical education he supported, only
to learn that she got married and did not even invite him to the wedding.30 cra lawred

Based on these facts and the legal presumption of sanity, we conclude that the NLRC did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it affirmed the LA’s dismissal of the complaint; we hold that the seafarer’s death was due
to his willful act, as the employer posited and proved.

Two analogous cases may be cited in support of this conclusion. In Great Southern Maritime Services Corp.
v. Leonila Surigao,31 the seafarer was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room with a belt tied
around his neck. In denying the claim for death benefits, the Court ruled that substantial evidence suffices
for the employer to show that the seafarer committed suicide even if there was no eyewitness to its
commission and the possibility of a contrary conclusion existed. In Crewlink, Inc. v. Teringtering,32 the
seafarer, who had already previously jumped in the open sea, jumped again, resulting in his death due to
drowning. In holding that it was a case of suicide, the Court ruled that the employer “was able to
substantially prove that [the seafarer’s] death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by
jumping into the sea.”

With the company’s discharge of the burden to prove its defense, the burden of evidence shifted
to Apolinario to rebut the petitioners’ case. In other words, Apolinario has to prove by substantial
evidence that Dennis may be insane at the time he took his life.

By holding that willfulness “could not be presumed” from Dennis’ act of jumping overboard, we observe that
the CA cluttered its appreciation of the evidence, contrary to the rules on the burden of proof and the
burden of evidence that must be observed since the issue before the CA was not the intrinsic correctness of
the NLRC’s ruling but the existence of grave abuse of discretion.

As the LA and the NLRC found, the petitioners have discharged by substantial evidence the burden of
proving willfulness through the cumulative consideration of the following circumstances: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

1. Just a few hours before the incident, Filipino crew members spoke with Dennis in his cabin
and asked him if there was anything wrong with his state of health; Dennis replied that
everything was in order.

2. After Dennis jumped from the ship, he was seen calmly floating on his back and was not
swimming towards the life ring or the lifeboat while floating on the ocean.

3. Even the labor federation to which Dennis belonged, agreed that Dennis committed suicide.

Since the burden of evidence was shifted to Apolinario, the reversal of the NLRC’s ruling could only be
premised on Apolinario’s successful proof by substantial evidence of Dennis’ insanity or mental
illness. The CA, however, instead of proceeding in this manner, imposed the burden of evidence on the
petitioners on the ground that “willfulness x x x could not be presumed when [Dennis] jumped overboard.”

By doing so, the CA acted as if the petition before it was part of an appellate process rather than an
independent civil action of certiorari that is limited to questions of grave abuse of discretion.
Properly, the question for the CA to answer was whether Apolinario established by substantial evidence his
claim of insanity.

b. Apolinario did not sufficiently meet the burden of evidence

i. inapplicability of Lapid and Naess

In an attempt to establish Dennis’ mental illness, Apolinario relied on portions of the Crewmembers’
Statement describing through the narration of several crewmembers, Dennis’ demeanor and actuations a
few days and moments before the incident. It reads: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

According to all present, the behavior of Mr. Siador in the last few days was different from his previous one.

- On June 24th[,] Mr. Siador was together with Mr. Canones at the swimming pool and he was telling him
some strange things about the future, Jesus, Angels, some visions/predictions that he have. He stated that
he will write with his finger something on Mr. [Canones’] back and on the swimming pool bulkhead. His
writing will be guided by Jesus. On June 25th, Mr. Siador wrote and draw some unclear messages on two
paper napkins and handed them to Mr. Canones. Again he stated his hand is guided by Jesus. These napkins
are available for closer look.

- He confided with Mr. Nobleza that there is a gap between him and his father. Yesterday[,] he ‘predicted’
the future of Mr. Nobleza.

- Today[, at] around 1340 LT[,] Mr. Dela Cruz spotted from the main deck Mr. Siador on the swimming pool
deck. Mr. Siador was half naked and holding something in his hands. Mr. Dela Cruz called him but he just
[retreated] out of sight. Together with Mr. Tamayo, Mr. Dela Cruz went to swimming pool to locate Mr.
Siador but with no avail. He disappeared. After that they went forward to see the Bosun and report this
unusual behavior. Bosun decided to go to Engine room and find Mr. Moreno who is [a] good friend of Mr.
Siador and try to [find] him and eventually find out the reason for such unusual behaviour.

- Today[, at] around 0500 LT, Mr. Siador called on the phone Mr. Moreno and asked to join him in his cabin.
Mr. Moreno went and Mr. Siador said to him “Jesus win, Evil [lose], Bosun [lose].’ Mr. Moreno replied OK
and returned to his cabin.

- Mr. Alcantara noticed that Mr. Siador in last few days is taking less food than before and that he declined
in his personal appearance/hygiene. Furthermore[,] Mr. Siador started to take his food later than the rest of
the crew, apparently avoiding other persons. On [Mr. Alcantara’s] enquiry about these changes, Mr. Siador
said that he [had] one problem but he didn’t specify anything.

- Mr. Ave, Mr. Moreno and Mr. Santos, today after lunch [at] around 1245 LT[,] spoke with Mr. Siador in his
cabin and asked him if there is anything wrong with his state of health but [Mr. Siador’s] reply was
everything is in order.

According to Apolinario, the statements describing Dennis’ actuations can only point to the conclusion that
Dennis was already mentally disturbed a few days before he plunged into the ocean and drowned. Since
Dennis was no longer in his right mind, his act of jumping into the open sea cannot be considered willful on
his part.

The CA recognized merit in this argument, adding that Dennis’ assignment to the Gas Cargo Engineer to
perform work outside of his regular duties “obviously took a toll on his mental condition.”33 The CA cited the
cases of Lapid v. NLRC34 and Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC35 in upholding the presumption of
self-preservation over the employer’s claim of suicide.

We find the cited cases inapplicable to the present case.

In Naess,36 the Court affirmed the award of death benefits to a seafarer who “jumped or fell overboard” as
he ran towards the deck after fatally stabbing a co-worker. The Court reasoned out that the parties’ contract
makes Naess “unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for [the seafarer’s] death while in its
service.” Given this conclusion, the Court only “parenthetically” observed that the “events surrounding the
death of [the seafarer] have not been established with any degree of certitude.” In short, the employer was
liable without qualifications for death benefits because the employer’s liability arises solely from the fact of
the seafarer’s death.
The contract in Lapid is different from Naess. It provides, as in the present case, that if the death of the
seafarer is due to his own willful act, then the employer is not liable for death benefits.

The seafarer in this case was found dead while hanging in an abandoned warehouse. While the employer
presented a report, stating that the cause of death was asphyxia by hanging, the employer failed to
investigate and, consequently, to present evidence on the circumstances surrounding the seafarer’s death to
indicate that it was a suicide rather than a crime.

The employer tried to bolster its theory of suicide by relying on the seafarer’s co-employees’ assertion that
the deceased had an unidentified family problem. But this claim ran counter to the seafarer’s own letters to
his family showing his excitement to go home. Under this evidentiary situation, the Court ruled: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

On these equivocal avowals, this Court is not prepared to rule that Ariel took his own life. The records are
bereft of any substantial evidence showing that [the] respondent employer successfully discharged its
burden of proving that Ariel committed suicide, so as to evade its liability for death benefits under POEA's
Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seaman.

Unlike these cases, the circumstances surrounding Dennis were duly proven by the employer. That Dennis
jumped, instead of fell, from the ship is a uniform finding of the labor tribunals and the CA. The employer
also showed by substantial evidence what prompted Dennis to act as he did, without any contrary evidence
submitted by Apolinario to dispute the employer’s evidence.

ii. Shift in the burden of evidence;

proof of insanity

Since the POEA-SEC requires the employer to prove not only that the death is directly attributable to the
seafarer himself but also that the seafarer willfully caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental sickness
may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counter-defense. Since the
willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of the seafarer (his jump into the open sea), the
insanity or mental illness required to be proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his
senses; in other words, there must be sufficient proof to negate voluntariness.

In this regard, selected circumstances prior to and surrounding his death might have provided substantial
evidence of the existence of such insanity or mental sickness.37 In Crewlink,38 we observed: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

xxx Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily
equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind
not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another,
the state or condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the
insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was
insane based on the witness’ own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support the respondent's claim.

But his strange behavior cannot be the basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion because
portions of the Crewmembers’ Statement itself rendered the basis for a finding of insanity
insufficient. To recall, a few hours before the accident, Filipino crew members approached Dennis to ask
him if anything was wrong with him and Dennis simply replied that everything was in order. No proof was
ever adduced as well showing that whatever personal problems Dennis had were enough to negate the
voluntariness he showed in stepping overboard.

The Court observes that, more often than not, the question of willfulness in causing one’s death is explained
away as arising from insanity because the very nature of the defense that the employer is allowed to put up
is mentally tough to grasp. Differences of opinion can arise and have arisen, as in this case; hence, it
becomes imperative for the courts to proceed on the basis of a correct framework of review if stability and
consistency in rulings can be approximated.

In the present case, as the petitioners correctly argued, the CA did not expressly find any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC. What is clear is that the CA simply disagreed with the NLRC’s
conclusion of willfulness. Unless the CA’s basis for its disagreement, however, amounted to grave abuse of
discretion, it is in legal error in reversing the final and executory ruling of the NLRC on certiorari.

By erroneously proceeding in its appreciation of the parties’ respective burdens of proof and burden of
evidence, the CA erroneously, too, required the petitioners to show “conclusive proofs”39 of willfulness or
establish it “with absolute certainty.”40 As a result, the CA itself had to engage in speculation to debunk the
required willfulness that the petitioners already established. The CA held: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

The Master’s Statement that Able Seaman Tamayo saw Siador jump overboard and thereafter made no
effort to reach the life ring after it was thrown to him are not conclusive proofs that Siador took his own
life.

His alleged jumping overboard from a height equivalent to a five storey building might have caused undue
pressure for him to temporary lose his composure which prevented him from seeking the life ring. A life ring
may likewise be not that visible at a distance of 25 meters from Siador’s position considering the waves at
the sea. [Emphasis ours]

While the NLRC may have erred in declaring that there is “no doubt”41 that Dennis committed suicide by
jumping overboard, this error does not amount to grave abuse of discretion since conclusive proof is not
necessary to establish willfulness.

Lastly, we must point out that this case is not one of doubt reasonably arising from the evidence. In that
case, we would have resolved the case in favor of the seafarer. From the prism of the initial Rule 65 petition
that the CA faced, and eventually the Rule 45 petition now before this Court, we find that the petitioners
sufficiently established that Dennis willfully caused his death while Apolinario’s evidence fell short of
substantial evidence to establish its counter-defense of insanity. In other words, Apolinario’s complaint
must be dismissed not because of doubt but because of the insufficiency of his evidence to
support his claim of insanity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-24444-45 July 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO DORIQUEZ, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Gregorio M. Rubias for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

The appellant Romeo Doriquez, on August, 28, 1964, was charged with the offense of grave oral
defamation before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, by virtue of an information which recites: .

That on or about April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named defendant, with deliberate intent of
bringing Attorney Sixto Demaisip into discredit, disrepute and public contempt, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter in a loud voice and in the presence
of many persons against the said Attorney Demaisip the following insulting and defamatory
words and expressions to wit: "Tonto ka nga klase sang tao, quin pierde mo ang asunto ko,
nagastohan ako sing linibo sang ulihi nag pabakal ikaw kay Purita; pasuguiron ka P30.00
lang ang nabayad ko pero linibo ang gasto ko," which, translated into English runs as
follows: "You are a foolish class of person, you had to lose my case, I spent thousands of
pesos and later you allowed yourself to be sold to Purita; you had been telling people that I
paid you only P30.00 when I spent thousand of pesos for my case," and other similar words
of import.

Six days later, or on September 3, 1964, the same Doriquez was indicted before the same court for
discharge of firearm, committed, in the language of the information, as follows:

That on or about April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, armed with a revolver and without
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously discharge twice said
revolver at one Attorney Sixto Demaisip.

Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. On December 3, 1964 he moved to
dismiss both informations, claiming that (1) the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the offense of
grave oral defamation in virtue of Republic Act 3828 which enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction
of city and municipal courts; and (2) the institution of the criminal action for discharge of firearm
places him in double jeopardy or he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of
Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of
alarm and scandal, allegedly based on the self-same facts relied upon by Fiscal Simeon A. Barranco
in support of the aforesaid information for discharge of firearm.

In its order of March 8, 1965 the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court in its order of March 20, 1965. From these
two orders, the present appeal was interposed.

It is our view, in the first instance, that the appeal is premature.

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

 Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental
judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of an appeal
until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.

Construing the aforequoted section, this Court has repeatedly and uniformly held that a judgment or
order may be appealed only when it is final — in the sense that it completely disposes of the cause
and definitively adjudicates the respective rights of the parties, leaving thereafter no substantial
proceeding to be had in connection with the case except the proper execution of the judgment or
order; and that, conversely, an interlocutory order or judgment is not appealable for it does not
decide the action with finality and leaves substantial proceedings still to be had.1 It is an elementary
rule of adjective law that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, hence not appealable,
because it "does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose of the contentions of the
parties."2 An order, for example, rejecting a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction3 is
interlocutory because after such denial proceedings of substance are still to be had by the trial court,
such as hearing of the case on the merits and rendition of final judgment.

The latest unequivocal restatement of the rule that interlocutory orders are not appealable was made
in Ramos vs. Ardant Trading Corporation.4 Concluding that the appeal therein was premature, Mr.
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion emphasized that "the orders denying defendant's motion for
dismissal and its subsequent motion for reconsideration are interlocutory in nature, and hence, not
appealable until after the rendition of judgment on that, merits. Defendant's appeal contravenes the
explicit provisions of Rule 41, Section 2, of the Rules of Court ... which, moreover, incorporates a
well-established rule of practice and procedure, constituting one of the main tenets of our remedial
law." In order to stress its disapproval of appeals from interlocutory orders, this Court, in the
aforementioned case, assessed treble costs against the appellant therein, jointly and severally, with
its counsel.

The rationale underlying the rule that an interlocutory order is not appealable is, basically, the
avoidance of "multiplicity of appeals in a single case." If very interlocutory order or judgment may be
appealed, and the appeal stays the progress of the action, there could arise countless appeals in a
single case, and the magnitude and extent of the delay in the final disposition thereof will be such
that, conceivably, in a number of instances, the parties may not survive the case.5 This Court has
consistently frowned upon — and has firmly stricken down — piecemeal appeals, "because it [piece-
meal appeal] delays the speedy disposition of the case, and is often resorted to as a means of
draining the resources of the poorer party and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion,
even if its demands should be conformable to reason and justice."6

Two alternative remedies were forthwith available to Doriquez after the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, namely, (1) proceed immediately to trial on the merits and interpose as integral part
of his defense the grounds stated in his motion to dismiss, and, in the event of an adverse decision,
appeal to the proper Court for resolution of all pertinent issues, including those he has posed in the
present appeal; (2) interpose a petition for certiorari to enable this Court to dispose, on the merits,
the issues raised herein, anchoring said petition on the twin grounds that (a) the court a quo acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the offense of grave oral
defamation, and (b) the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the
information for discharge of firearm in the face of his avowal that the said indictment places him in
peril of a second jeopardy. This latter action should of course be availed of with candor and absolute
absence of deviousness, with no intention (howsoever disguised) of causing undue delay.

Because, however, all the cogent issues are now before us, we will treat the instant appeal as a
petition for certiorari. This positive and pragmatic approach will definitively resolve the contentions of
Doriquez and thus dissipate any and all speculation on the part of all concerned as to the
correctness of their respective positions. 1äwphï1.ñët

1. Doriquez maintains that the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, not the Court of First instance of Iloilo,
has original exclusive jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation which, under article 358
of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, reasoning that the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and
city courts has been enlarged by Republic Act No. 3828 to include offenses for which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine.

The appellant is in error.

The rule is now beyond all area of dispute that in view of the latest amendment to section 87(c) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 and also taking into account the unaltered provisions of section 44(f) of the
same Act, the zone of concurrent jurisdiction of municipal and city courts and courts of first instance
has been considerably widened. This jurisdictional parity embraces all offenses for which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months but not exceeding three years (for six
years with respect to city courts and municipal courts in the capitals of provinces and sub-
provinces vis-a-vis the courts of first instance), or a fine of more than two hundred pesos but not
exceeding three thousand pesos (or six thousand pesos in the proper cases), or both such
imprisonment and fine. This confluence of jurisdiction was first clearly etched in Esperat vs. Avila, et
al,.7 and the rule in that case was affirmed in Le Hua Sia vs. Reyes,8 and Andico vs. Roan, et al.9

In Esperat vs. Avila, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes delineated with specificity the respective jurisdictional
boundaries of the various trial courts. Said Mr. Justice Reyes:

The fallacy in petitioner's argument lies in his failure to consider section 44(f) of the same
Judiciary Act of 1948, in conjunction with its section 87(c). Note that notwithstanding the
various amendments received by section 87, section 44(f) remained unaltered, thereby
indicating the intention of the legislators to retain the original jurisdiction of the court of first
instance in certain cases. The fact that the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts was
enlarged in virtue of the amendment of section 87(c), cannot be taken as a repeal or
withdrawal of the jurisdiction conferred on the court of first instance. Not only is implied
repeal disfavored by the law, but also, it is a cardinal principle that a statute must be so
construed as to harmonize all apparent conflict's, and give effect to all its provision whenever
possible.

Actually, there is nothing irreconcilable between sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act.

As therein provided the court of first instance was given original jurisdiction over cases where
the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for fore more than 6 months or fine of more
than P200.00; the justices of the peace and municipal or city courts of chartered cities, over
cases where the penalty is imprisonment for not more than 3 years, and fine of not more
than P3,000.00. In other words, where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for more than
6 months, but not exceeding 3 years, or fine of more than P200.00 but not exceeding
P3,000.00 the justice of the peace or municipal court only has concurrent (and not exclusive)
original jurisdiction with the court of first instance. And, it may be stated that this concurrent
jurisdiction between the inferior courts, and the court of first instance was not provided for the
first time in Republic Act No. 3828. Under Republic Act 2613, crimes the penalties for which
do not exceed 3 years, or fine of not more than P3,000.00, were specifically placed within the
 jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, concurrent with the court of first
instance.

It follows, therefore, that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and
municipal courts is confined only to cases where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for 6
months or less, or fine of P200.00 or less, whereas, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
court of first instance covers cases where the penalty is incarceration for more than 3 years
(or 6 years in the case of city courts and municipal courts in provincial capitals), or fine of
more than P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 in proper cases), or both such imprisonment and fine.
Between these exclusive jurisdictions lies a zone where the jurisdiction is concurrent. This is
the proper construction to be placed on the provisions involved herein, regardless of what
may have been the prior rulings on the matter.

The offense of grave oral defamation which carries a maximum penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period (or incarceration not exceeding 2 years and 4 months) falls within the above-
described zone of concurrent jurisdiction. Consequently, the court a quo did not err in assuming
jurisdiction.

2. Doriquez likewise contends that the filing of the information for discharge of firearm has placed
him in peril of double jeopardy as he had previously been charged with the offense of alarm and
scandal in a complaint filed in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, upon the same facts which
constitute the basis of the indictment for discharge of firearm. The said complaint, which was
allegedly dismissed without his consent, recites:

That on or about 12:00 p.m, April 21, 1964, at the gate in front of the Municipal Building,
Poblacion, Batad, Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate
intent to cause alarm in the public, discharge his License Revolver caliber .22 SN-368383
one on the ground and one into the air within the town limits and without any justifiable
purpose thus causing alarm upon the general public.

This plea of Doriquez is obviously untenable.

For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things, that there is
"identity of offenses," so that, in the language of section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court,
his "conviction or acquittal ... or the dismissal of the case (without his express consent) shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to, commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogether evident, however, that the
offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a
frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm
produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less
grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal
which is a light felony.

Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code
and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely
related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by
the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments
do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while
discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former
crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the
gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to
kill.

The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly
distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact.10

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense11 or identical offense.12 A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not
bar prosecution under the other.13 Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the
same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.14

In the case at bar, granting that the two indictments arose from the same act — a contention
traversed by the State — they describe and constitute, nevertheless, essentially different felonies
having fundamentally diverse indispensable elements. Hence, there can be no such "identity of
offenses" as would support the suggestion that double jeopardy has ensued. The trial judge,
therefore, did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of
firearm.

In sum, we hold that the instant appeal is premature, and that — even if it were treated as a petition
for certiorari — the contentions and arguments of the appellant cannot be accorded credit.

ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the
court of origin for immediate trial on the merits. Costs against the appellant.
House Bill 5387, filed by retired PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) director and ACT-CIS party-list Rep. Samuel Pagdilao, seeks to
reclassify indiscriminate gun firing into Illegal Discharge of Firearms, a
violation of Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The act is punishable by
imprisonment from six years and one day to 12 years.
G.R. No. L-44096 April 20, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL MORALES y ALAS, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Alfredo L. Nieva for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

The criminal perversity exhibited in these charges for Infanticide and Rape, which were jointly tried,
argues strongly against the abolition of capital punishment from our statute books.

In Criminal Case No. 906 filed on April 1, 1976 before the former Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro, Branch II, the accused was charged with the rape of his own daughter, with the Information
alleging:

That sometime in the month of December, 1974, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, in
the Barrio of Maluanluan, Municipality of Pola, Province of Oriental Mindoro, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, thru force
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay and have
carnal knowledge with his own 14 years old daughter Maria Morales against the will
on consent of the latter.

CONTRARY TO Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pinamalayan, Or. Mindoro, April 1, 1976. 1

In another Information filed in Criminal Case No. 904 against the same accused on the same date
and before the same Court, he was charged with Infanticide committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March, 1976, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
in the barrio of Maluanluan, Municipality of Pola, Province of Oriental Mindoro, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, motivated with his diabolical desire to conceal the offense of
rape he had committed against Maria Morales his very own daughter, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bury alive a baby girl, christened Mary
Morales y Morales, a child born out of his carnal relationship with Maria Morales, who
then was only an hour old from birth, as a result of which caused the former her
unexpected and untimely demise.

CONTRARY TO Article 255 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pinamalayan, Or. Mindoro, April 1, 1976. 2

The accused pleaded guilty to both charges upon arraignment. Notwithstanding, the lower Court
followed the proper and prudent course and ordered the taking of the accused's testimony pursuant
to the doctrines enunciated by this Court.

Considering that the accused then gave conflicting testimonies as to whether or not the baby was
still alive when he buried her, 3 the lower court substituted pleas of not guilty in both cases and set them
jointly for trial. At the trial, the accused again admitted the commission of the charges as alleged in the
Information as well as the contents of his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "E").

After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a joint Decision, with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Manuel Morales y Alas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal under Criminal
Case No. P-905 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify Maria Morales, the offended party in the amount of
P10,000.00. Said accused is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of infanticide in Criminal Case No. P904, as defined and penalized in Article 255 of
the Revised Penal Code, with evident premeditation and qualified by the use of
superior strength of the accused and by nocturnity, with only one mitigating
circumstance which is his plea of guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the capital
punishment of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mary Morales y
Morales the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in view of the nature of the principal penalty. The said accused is
condemned likewise to pay the costs in both cases.

xxx xxx xxx

IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

The accused did not appeal from the conviction for Rape. It is the imposition of the death penalty in
the Infanticide case that is now before us on automatic review.

We quote the evidence for the prosecution from the People's Brief:

Sometime in the month of December, 1974, at around midnight at Maluanluan, Pola,

Oriental Mindoro, accused-appellant Manuel Morales, through force and intimidation,
was able to have carnal knowledge of his unmarried daughter Maria Morales.
Thereafter, the appellant repeated his misdeeds several times (p. 5, tsn, April 30,
1976; Answer to Question No. 3, Affidavit of Maria Morales, Record, p. 14).
Consequently, Maria Morales got pregnant and on March 19, 1976, at around 7:00
o'clock P.M., with the help of the appellant, she gave birth to a live baby girl named
Mary Morales inside their house in Barrio Maluanluan. About an hour later, the
appellant took the baby from the mother, brought her out of the house, and buried
her alive near their house (Answer to Questions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, and 11, Affidavit of
Manuel Morales, Record, p. 13; pp. 3-4, 8, tsn, April 20, 1976; pp. 5-8, tsn, April 30,
1976). To cover the place where he buried the baby, the appellant built a fire over it
(p. 14, tsn, April 21, 1976; Answer to Question No. 4, Affidavit of Delfin Dris, Record,
p. 15).

At about 7:00 P.M. of the following day, Jesus Aytona, an uncle of Maria Morales
went to the office of Orlando Lara, the Station Commander of Pola, Oriental Mindoro
and reported to him that as per information his niece delivered a baby but that the
latter could not be found. Then Lara, together with some members of the police,
proceeded to Barrio Maluanluan. A neighbor of the appellant, Delfin Dris, reported to
Lara that in the night of March 19, 1976, he heard the crying of a baby but that later it
stopped (pp. 12-13, tsn, April 21, 1976).

In the morning of the next day, Lara invited the appellant to the station to which the
latter agreed (p. 14, tsn, Ibid). Thereafter, Lara returned to the scene of the crime
and investigated the matter. With the help of Dris, Lara found the baby buried a foot
deep in a place about 15 meters from the appellant's house (pp. 14-16, tsn, Ibid).

Lara then summoned the help of Dra. Alamar who conducted an autopsy on the body
of the baby. He also ordered a sergeant to fetch the appellant so that the latter could
Identify the body of the baby (p. 15, tsn, April 21, 1976).

Appellant arrived and then Identified the body of the baby as his daughter by Maria
Morales, his own daughter, whom he buried alive to cover the shame of his family
because of what he did to the latter (pp. 17-18, tsn, Ibid). Pictures were also taken at
the scene of the crime (pp. 13-21, tsn, April 21, 1976; Exhibits 'C' and 'D').

The 'Post Mortem Findings' on baby Mary Morales stated:

I. EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

a) A dead new born baby girl with the placenta still attached was dug up
approximately 100 meters away from the residence of Manuel Morales under a
banana tree.

b) Purplish black cynosis of the face, neck and all parts of the body were clearly
observed.

c) At the early stage of decomposition, there is still the evidence of the caput
succedanum and the baby is covered with vernix cascosa. The head is covered with
fine lanuge hair and the nails projected from the fingers.

d) CHEST-There is arching of the chest.

II. INTERNAL FINDINGS:

a) Lungs filled the thoracic cavity and overlaps the heart. Edges are rounded and
vermillion red (pinkish mottled color) in color. It crepitates on pressure: On section it
exudes froth. A piece of the lungs floated on water showing that air had probably
entered in the lungs air sacs. It is spongy. It weighs more or less 900 gms.

b) Stomach and intestines-contains mucus and air bubbles and saliva.

III. CONCLUSION:

MOST PROBABLY CARDIO RESPIRATORY FAILURE DUE TO ASPHYXIATION

CAUSED THE DEATH OF THE CHILD. (Exhibit 'A', Record, p. 9).
 Thereafter, the appellant was brought back to the municipal building where he
executed an affidavit admitting that he buried his baby daughter alive (pp. 19, 21-22,
tsn, April 21, 1976; Exhibit 'E', Record, p. 13).

On August 22 and 23, 1976, the affidavit of Maria Morales, declaring, among others,
that on March 19, 1976 she gave birth to a live baby girl whom the appellant took
away from her and whom she was not able to see thereafter, and that of Delfin Dris
about the hearing of the crying of a newly born baby in the house of the appellant on
the evening of March 19, 1976 were taken by the police, respectively (pp. 25-26, tsn,
April 21, 1976; Exhibits 'F' and 'G', Record, pp. 14-15). 5

In this appeal, de officio counsel maintains:

I. The Court erred in finding that the accused mercilessly killed the baby girl Mary Morales by burying
her alive.

II. The Court erred in giving credit to the testimony of Dr. Mercedes Alamar, that the baby girl when
buried was still alive.

III. The Court erred in not appreciating the unstable mind of the accused, which fact could have been
favorably interpreted in his favor.

IV. The Court erred in imposing the capital punishment of death.

We are far from persuaded.

That the accused had killed baby Mary Morales by burying her alive is admitted by him in his
extrajudicial confession, given two days after the incident, or on March 21, 1976, as follows:

3. T Ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa aming Tanggapan at iniimbestigahan

sa isang kaso na naganap sa Maluanluan, Pola, Silangang Mindoro,
nalalaman mo ba kung ano ang nagawa mong kasalanan?

S Opo, nabuntisan ko po iyong aking anak na si MARIA MORALES

at noong ito'y umanak ay ibinaon ko iyong bata.

4. T Kailan naman nanganak itong si Maria?

S Noon pong ika-19 ng Marso, 1976, humigit kumulang sa ika- 7:00

ng gabi.

5. T Kailan mo naman ibinaon ang nasabing bata?

S Noon din pong gabing iyon, humigit kumulang sa ika-8:00 ng gabi.

6. T Noon bagang ibaon mo ang naging anak nitong si Maria ay

patay na ito

S Buhay pa po ang bata.

 7. T Anong tauhin itong anak na ito ni Maria?

S Babae po. 6

On the witness stand, the accused also admitted:

Q Likewise, stated in that information is the allegation that after your

daughter Maria Morales have delivered that baby daughter of whom
you are the father and finding that she was delivered alive, you buried
your own daughter to hide your wrongdoing, is that the true or
untrue?

A That is true, sir. 7

Orlando Lara, the Station Commander of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, who investigated the case, also
testified that the accused admitted that he buried his child while still alive. Lara testified as follows:

Q After Manuel Morales, the accused, had Identified the child as his,
did you ask Manuel Morales in your capacity as investigator, who
buried that child?

A I asked him and he told me that he was the one who buried the
child, sir.

Q Did you ask him why he buried the child?

A He told me that to evade the shame of his family, he does not like
that the baby live, sir.

Q Did you ask Manuel Morales if he buried the child already dead or
still alive?

A He told me that when he buried the child, the latter was still alive,
sir. 8

In addition to Lara's foregoing corroborative testimony, Dr. Mercedes Alamar, the medico-legal
officer, declared:

Q In your autopsy findings, can you determine or were you able to

determine that at the time of burial of the child she was still alive?

A There were evidence that the baby was alive when she was buried.
In the first place in the 'External Findings' there is one stated there
that there is arching of the chest and arching of the chest means that
respiration had been established. In the 'Internal Findings' 'Lungs
filled the thoracic cavity and overlaps the heart'- showing also that
respiration had been established. Edges are rounded and vermillon
red (pinkish mottled color) in color. It shows again that the lungs had
expanded. It crepitates on pressure, it shows again that there is
presence of air in the lungs. On section it exudes froth. This is also an
evidence that there had been a respiration. A piece of lung was
 floated on water showing that air had probably entered in the lungs
air sacs. That the lungs when floated on water show that air entered
the lungs. Stomach and intestines contains mucus and air bubbles
and saliva. These are all evidence that respiration had been
established before the baby's death and that the baby was still alive
when she was buried. 9

The sworn statement of Maria Dolores further disclosed that the baby girl she delivered on that night
of March 19, 1976, without her father calling a "hilot" despite her request, was "buhay po at mabilog
at malakas ang uha na malusog ..."; that her father, the accused, took away said baby from her; and
that, thereafter, she was not able to see her baby anymore. 10

There is not the shadow of a doubt, therefore, that the infant girl, who was subsequently called Mary
Morales, was buried alive by the accused, her father, approximately one hour after her birth.

With the exception of evident premeditation, the lower Court correctly appreciated, for having been
proven at the trial although not alleged in the Information 11, the aggravating circumstances of
advantage taken of superior strength and nocturnity.

Evident premeditation, however, has not been sufficiently established. There is no evidence of
planning on the part of the accused to kill his infant daughter. It is not enough that premeditation be
surmised; the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the
determination to commit the crime. 12 There should be evidence of a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect on the result of his act. 13 Such evidence is wanting
herein. The baby was born about 7:00 o'clock in the evening and was buried alive about 8:00 o'clock that
same night. Where the accused had only about an hour or half an hour for meditation and reflection, there
is no evident premeditation. 14

But the accused took advantage of his superior strength when he took the infant from her mother
immediately after her birth, naked, placenta and all, and subsequently buried the baby alive.
Nighttime was likewise properly appreciated for although, subjectively, it was not purposely sought,
objectively, it was a circumstance that facilitated the commission of the crime and which the accused
took advantage of for purpose of impunity. 15 He could not have buried the infant with facility and with
minimum fear of detection had it not been for the cover of night.

The accused's testimony that he had suffered a mental blackout and did not know what he was
doing at the time he buried his daughter, which condition, it is alleged, should have impelled the
lower Court to order his confinement in a hospital for treatment and for determination of whether or
not he was insane, is untenable. The act of the accused in refusing to call a "hilot" to help his
daughter deliver, and his insistence to act as such himself, betrays a conscious and deliberate intent
to hide the fact of birth from other eyes. The act of the accused in building a fire over the grave
where he buried his infant daughter in order to camouflage it and to deflect it from suspicion belies
his protestations that he had suffered a mental blackout at the time. On the contrary, they show
deliberateness and full possession of his mental faculties to prevent discovery of a dastardly crime. It
is more likely that the accused was wavering between remorse of conscience and a lurking desire to
disown the crime and go scot-free if it could be proven that the child had been born dead and
lifeless. Besides, the law presumes every man to be sane. 16 When a defendant in a criminal case
17
interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him.

With two aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the
imposition of capital punishment is inescapable 18 for this heinous, outrageous and cruel crime without
parallel in Philippine jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, except with respect to the finding by the lower Court of evident premeditation, the
judgment in Criminal Case No. P-904 is hereby affirmed.

Costs against the accused Manuel Morales y Alas.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

In an information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion, committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court the accused
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence on MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the
lawfully wedded wife of the accused, by then and there boxing and stranging her,
causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the
same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at
the time 8 months on the family way, the accused likewise did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the death of the child while still in its
maternal womb, thereby committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL
ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the
Revised Penal Code, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said woman and
child in the amount as the Honorable Court shall assess.

CONTRARY TO LAW

Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged.

After trial the lower court rendered a decision ** dated 9 August 1978, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman guilty beyond

reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For
unselfish, valuable and exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty.
Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him
subject to the availability of funds

SO ORDERED.

The accused having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, this case is on automatic review
before this Court.

At the trial in the court a quo, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Juan L.
Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines Norte, testified
that, after passing the Board Examination, he was employed as a Resident Physician of La Union
Provincial Hospital, then as Junior Resident Physician of Bethane Hospital in San Fernando, La
Union and that later, he joined the government service, starting from 1968 up to the time of the trial;
that as a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed about ten (10) post mortem examinations; that he
was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-
Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in the Municipal Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00
o'clock in the morning of 11 December 1974; that his post mortem examination lasted from 12:30
o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. He reduced his findings of injuries into
writing. (Exhibit "A"), which, together with their probable cause, as testified to by him, are as follows:

Injury Cause

1) Multiple abrasions "Blunt object or friction by

with

contusion, left leg, hard object" (tsn., Aug. 20,

middle part, posterior

covering an area of 1976, p. 7)

about 2 & 1/2 by 5

inches.

2) Abrasions, 1/2 by 2 Friction on a hard object"

inches, medial side of (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)

the cubi

tal fossa (back left

leg)

3) Multiple pinhead Hard pinhead sized

sized material

wounds, right face, (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)

starting

from the side of the

right eye

down to mandibular
bone

(right check)

4) Upper right eyelid No cause given

more prominent than

the left

eyelid ("the right

upper eyelid a
 little bit bulging than
the left

eye "and" sort of

"swollen") (tsn.,

Aug. 20, 1976, pp. 7-

8)

5) Tongue protruding Usually, the main cause of

bet

ween the lips, about 1 protruding tongue during

inch teeth

line. death is (by) strangulation.

(tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 8)

6) Deceased is
pregnant

with a baby boy about

7-8

months old (tsn., Aug.

20,

1976, p. 8).

Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification
thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano
Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the basis of the information
relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without mentioning the cause of
death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after
the post mortem examination on 11 December 1974.

The other witness for the prosecution was Pedro Salufrania, son of herein appellant and of the
deceased. The lower court's decision states that, by reason of interest and relationship, before
Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, he was
carefully examined by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision
of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of
receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether he was compelled
and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his father-accused. 1

The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to be determined and intelligent. He convincingly declared
that he was not threatened by any of his uncles on his mother's side to testify against his father,
because it was true that the latter killed his mother. Then, formally testifying as the prosecution's
lone eyewitness, he stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo
quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, in their small house at a far
away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte; that during said quarrel, he saw his father box
his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death;
that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot
where she fell.

Pedro Salufrania further testified that after killing his mother, the accused- appellant went out of the
house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed how the
accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were already asleep when the
horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly woke up after the
death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers body while their father was away; that their
father arrived early the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead mother on the
hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of his
sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse was
transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.

Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now living with his uncle Eduardo Abuyo
and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has threatened to
kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.

The third witness for the prosecution was Narciso Abuyo, a resident of Gabon, Talisay, Camarines
Norte. He testified that the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his sister, the deceased Marciana
Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband and wife as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exhibit "C").
He declared that his sister was more or less seven (7) months pregnant when she died; that he first
came to know about his sister's death on 4 December 1974 thru his nephews Pedro and Alex
Salufrania who first informed him that their mother died of stomach ailment and headache; that he
went to Tigbinan to request for the body of his sister so that it may be buried in Talisay, Camarines
Norte and, as intended, Marciana Abuyo was buried in the Talisay Cemetery on 6 December 1974.

Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his
deceased sister went to his house and refused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that
when asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex Salufraña told him that the real cause of death of
their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and
strangled to death by their father; that immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his
sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities of Talisay, Camarines Norte,
who investigated Alex and Pedro Salufirania and later, to that of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Norte.

The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the
accused Filomeno Salufrania.

Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania. He declared that Marciana
Abuyo died at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 in her house at Sitio
Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines Norte; that he happened to pass by said house because his
attention was attracted by the bright light in the fireplace and he saw Filomeno Salufrania boiling
"ikmo" and garlic as medicine for his wife who was about to deliver a child; that he helped the
accused by applying "ikmo" to the different parts of the body of Marciana Abuyo and by
administering the native treatment known as "bantil", that is, by pinching and pulling the skin with two
fingers of his closed fist; that when the condition of Marciana Abuyo worsened, he told Filomeno
Salufrania to go and get Juanita Bragais who is known as a healer but the latter arrived at about
7:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 and that at that time Marciana Abuyo was already
dead.

Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of Filomeno
Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974. He further testified that when
he reached the house of the Salufranias, Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he just helped
Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's brother-in-law at
Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.

Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte testified that she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock
in the morning of 4 December 1974 after being called by one of the latter's sons; that she saw
Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was
suffering from an old stomach ailment.

The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased
Marciana Abuyo; that at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December 1974, Marciana arrived
home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for about a week; that she was hungry upon her
arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food and after eating their lunch, he proceeded to his work while
his wife rested in their house; that when he returned home at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that
same day, his wife complained to him of stomach pain and he was told to prepare the beddings
because she was already sleepy; that at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974, he
was awakened by his wife who was still complaining of stomach pain, and that she asked for a drink
of hot water; that while he was boiling water, Geronimo Villan arrived and assisted him in
administering to his wife the native treatments known as "hilot" or massaging and "banti" that
Geronimo Villan and Francisco Repuya alternately applied "bantil" to his wife but when her condition
worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro and Alex to fetch Rico Villanueva who might be able to
,save the life of their mother; that his children left and returned without Rico Villanueva but the latter
arrived a little later.

Accused-appellant then went on to say that he sent for Juanito Bragais but the latter was not able to
cure his wife, since the latter was already dead when he arrived; that after the death of his wife, he
ordered his children to get the hammock of Kaloy Belardo whose house was about two (2)
kilometers away from their house, and upon the arrival of the hammock, he placed the body of his
wife thereon and brought it to the house of his sister Consolacion Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while
the corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan he sent Chiding and his elder son to inform the
brothers and sisters of his wife at Talisay about her death and that Leonila Abuyo and Salvador
Abuyo came; that he informed the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan of the cause of death of his wife;
that upon the suggestion of the brothers and sisters of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador Abuyo,
the body of their sister was brought home to Talisay and thereafter buried at the Talisay Cemetery;
that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and that during
the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her burial, his son Pedro Salufrania
was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his son until
during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside from the members of his family,
Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.

The case was considered submitted for decision by the trial court on 18 July 1978. As aforestated,
the trial court found the appellant guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced him to the penalty of
death.

The appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF AN INCOMPETENT WITNESS, AND ON INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION, THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE THAT THE ACCUSED IS
ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS SHOWN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS CREDIBLE AND
SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE COMPLEX
CRIME OF PARRICIDE WITH INTENTIONAL ABORTION.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED.

Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania before
he was allowed to testify. Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender age, being only thirteen (13)
years old when he testified, and only eleven (11) years old when the offense charged occurred, he is
presumed incompetent under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, which includes
among those who cannot be witnesses:

Children who appear to the court to be of such tender age and inferior capacity as to
be incapable of receiving correct impressions of the facts respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly.

Therefore, according to appellant, for failure of the trial court to determine Pedro's competence, the
presumption of incompetency was not rebutted and Pedro's testimony should not have been
admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that there is no basis for the trial court's finding that Pedro is
intelligent.

Appellant's contention is without merit. The record shows that the trial court determined Pedro
Salufrania's competency before he was allowed to testify under oath. 2 The trial court's conclusion that
Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully supported by Pedro's responsiveness to the questions
propounded to him when he was already under oath:

A. Did you go here in court to testify voluntarily?

Q. Yes, Your Honor.

A. Were you not forced by your uncle to testify in his case?

Q. No, I was not forced by my uncle.

xxx xxx xxx

A. The accused is your father?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Do you love him?

Q. No, sir.
 A. Your father is accused now of crime which carries the penalty of
death, are you still willing to testify against him?

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why did you say that you don't love your father

A. Because he killed my mother.

Q. And that is the reason why you hate your father now?

A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17, Nov. 12, 1976).

Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell the truth, even though it should lead to his father's
conviction, shows that he fully appreciated the meaning of an oath, which likewise proves that he
was no longer a child of tender years at the time of his testimony.

Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro changed his answer from no to yes when he was asked
whether he was threatened by his uncle to testify against his father, shows that Pedro was lying and
proves that he did not appreciate the meaning of an oath at all. 3

Again, this contention is without merit, Pedro became confused when the trial court ordered that the
original question be reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent from the fact that when asked the third
time, he affirmed his first answer,

Q. Isn't it that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will
not give statement before the police?

A. No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. But later you actually went with your uncle to the police because
you were threatened by him with bodily harm if you will not follow
him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is it true that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will
not give statement to the police?

A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7, Nov. 12, 1976)

Appellant next lists the following alleged inconsistencies to discredit the testimony of Pedro. First,
Pedro testified on direct examination that his mother died in the evening of December 3. while on
cross-examination he said that she died in the morning of December 4. It must be noted that he
affirmed twice during cross-examination that his mother died on December 3, just as he had testified
during direct examination. Significantly, he did not mention December 4 as the date when she died,
as appellant would make it appear. Pedro merely answered 'yes' to the question "And isn't it that
your mother died in the early morning on that day (December 4) and not on the evening of
December 3?" 4 Thus, Pedro's answer could have resulted only from a misapprehension of the a
question, and for no other reason.

Second, appellant alleges that Pedro testified on direct examination that he saw appellant leave the
house to get a hammock after strangling the victim and then came back the following morning.
However, upon cross-examination, Pedro testified that appellant left at noon or in the afternoon of
December 4. Moreover, Pedro allegedly testified on re-direct that he saw appellant sleep beside the
dead body of his mother. Again Pedro misapprehended the question propounded to him. Ajudicious
reading of the transcript will bear this out:

Q. When did your father leave to get the hammock?

A. In the afternoon.

Q. That may be when the body was brought to Talisay. When your
father, rather, when you said that your father left to get a hammock so
that your mother may be brought to Tigbinan what time was that?

A. About 12:00 o'clock noon. (Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12, 1976)

One may discern that the court itself noticed that there was a missapprehension when it commented
"that maybe when the body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro answered "In the afternoon". When
Pedro answered "about 12:00 noon' he must have been referring to the time when appellant carried
his dead wife to Tigbinan. It must be noted that the question was so worded that it could have misled
Pedro to think that what was being asked was the time when appellant brought his dead wife to
Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing inconsistent with Pedro's testimony that he saw his father leave in
the evening of December 3 and again saw him asleep and thus not noticed appellant's coming back
after securing a hammock and sleeping beside the deceased. Pedro was therefore telling the truth
when he said that, upon waking up, he saw his father sleeping beside his dead mother. By then,
appellant had already returned with the hammock.

Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that the corpse was carried to Tigbinan in the
morning of December 4, while on cross-examination, he said it was in the evening. 5 It must be
pointed out that Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question purportedly mentioning the time when the
victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan. The question is as follows: "The corpse of your mother was
brought to the Tigbinan proper when the vigil was had in the evening of December 4, is that right?" It is to
be noted that the question's thrust is whether or not the victim's body was brought to Tigbinan. The time it
was brought was merely incidental. Thus, Pedro may not have paid attention to the part of the question
involving time. Moreover, the phrase "in the evening" may have referred either to the time of transport of
the body or to the vigil, which could have definitely confused Pedro.

Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that he, together with his brothers and sister,
kept vigil beside their mother's dead body that night, while on cross-examination, he testified that
they just kept lying down and pretended to sleep. 6 There is nothing inconsistent here. The children
could have kept vigil while lying down with their deceased mother.

Appellant further cites other alleged improbabilities to discredit Pedro's testimony. Appellant
contends that it was improbable for Pedro to have seen the attack on his mother since he testified
that the room was dimly lighted, and that, while the attach was going on, he closed his eyes
pretending to sleep. 7 This contention is without merit. Even though the room was dimly lighted, Pedro
was only two (2) meters away from his parents; thus, he could easily see, as he saw, the attack on his
mother. 8 Also, although he pretended to be asleep, it was unlikely that he kept his eyes closed all the
while, as he was aware that a fight was going on. Rather, it was to be expected that he had his eyes open
and, thus, he saw the heinous crime unfold and ultimately consumated.

Appellant alleges that he does not believe that it was fear of him that caused the delay in Pedro's
divulging the real cause of his mother's death until 10 December 1974. According to appellant, such
fear could no longer have influenced Pedro from December 6, the date he started to live separately
from him. This contention is untenable. Even though Pedro started to live separately from his father
from December 6, it cannot be said that the influence of appellant's threat suddenly ceased from that
time. It must be noted that Pedro was young and was still very much under appellant's influence and
control. The thought and memory of his father's viciousness were still too fresh even after three days
from his mother's death. The fear that he too could be killed by appellant in like manner must have
deterred him from divulging the truth earlier.

Appellant also alleges that it was improbable for Pedro to have just watched the killing of his mother.
This contention is untenable. At that moment, when his mother was being assaulted and strangled,
Pedro must have been so shocked as to be rendered immobile and powerless to do anything. This is
a normal reaction in such a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that different people react differently
to the same types of situations. 9 One cannot overlook that there is no standard form of behaviour when
one is confronted by a shocking occurrence. 10

Appellant next alleges that since the prosecution has failed without satisfactory explanation to
present Pedro's brother Alex who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to the killing of the victim, it is
presumed that Alex's testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if presented. This contention is
without merit. First, Alex, who is younger than Pedro by 3 years, may not have been competent to
testify due to his tender age. Second, even assuming that he was competent to testify, his testimony
could be merely corroborative. Corroboration is not necessary in this case because the details of the
crime have already been testified to by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure to present all the
eyewitnesses to an act does not necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption, especially
when the testimony of the witness sought to be presented is merely corroborative. 11Witnesses are to
be weighed, not numbered, and it is a well established rule that the testimony of a single witness, even if
uncorroborated, but positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction. 12 In any event, it is not for
the appellant to say how many witnesses the prosecution should have presented. 13

The inconsistencies magnified by appellant in the testimony of Pedro Salufrania have been
satisfactorily explained. In fact, some of them are not material since they neither touch upon the
manner of death of the victim nor question the identity of the killer, both of which were unwaveringly
testified upon by Pedro. Thus, with the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities explained away,
Pedro's testimony remains unperturbed. Even if there were discrepancies, such discrepancies were
minor and may be considered as earmarks of verisimilitude. 14

The trial court's assessment of Pedro's testimony, as quoted hereunder, deserves more than
passing consideration:

... The testimony of eye-witness Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of the victim
Marciana Abuyo and her killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania, appears to be very clear,
convincing and truthful. It is vivid as to the details of the horrible occurence that took
place at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of December 3, 1974 in their small house
at a far away sitio of Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, resulting in the untimely and
cruel death of her (sic) mother. He and his brother Alex were the only eyewitnesses
to the gory crime committed by their father. The credibility of this witness (Pedro
Salufrania) and his testimony was invested when, despite rigid cross-examination,
the veracity of his testimony in chief was not impeached. He remained firm and on
 the verge of crying, when he pointed an accusing finger at his father during the trial.
He was unshaken notwithstanding a long and detailed cross-examination. And, there
is reason to bestow complete credence to his testimony because he had the
opportunity to closely observe how his father had deliberately and cruelly ended the
life of his mother. Despite his tender age and apparent childish innocence, this Court
believes that he can clearly perceive and perceiving, make known his perception,
precluding the possibility of coaching or tutoring by someone. His declaration as to
when, where and how the horrible incident complained of happened is the believable
version. 15

Appellant questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, since this is the first
time that the doctor conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which had been buried for about a week. It
must be noted, however, that although this was the doctor's first autopsy under circumstances
present in this case, he had, however, conducted similar post-mortem examinations on ten (10)
other occasions. This would constitute sufficient experience. Significantly, appellant did not object to
the doctor's expression of medical opinions during the trial. Being an expert in his field, the doctor is
presumed to have taken all pertinent factors into consideration with regard to the autopsy, including
embalming and the state of the cadaver's decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco Jr., was a
disinterested witness in the case, and a reputable public official in whose favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties must be applied.

Appellant further alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro Salufrania
do not tally. Suffice it to say that the Court finds no inconsistencies between the findings of Dr.
Dyquiangco and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are consistent on material points. Thus, the
Court sees no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the trial court insofar as their credibility
and the appellant's guilt are concerned.

Appellant's third assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in discrediting his evidence
simply because the testimonies of the defense witnesses were consistent on material points.
Moreover, there is no showing, according to the appellant, that said testimonies were rehearsed so
as to dovetail with each other.

This contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even bother to
discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to an
admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana Abuyo's death. The trial
court's reasons for rejecting the defense version, as hereunder quoted, are tenable and sound. Thus
—

On the contrary, the testimonies of defense witnesses Geronimo Villan, Angeles

Liling Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania suspiciously dove-tailed in every
detail as to when, where and how .Marciana Abuyo died at 6:00 o'clock in the
morning of 4 December 1974, in their house at sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo,
Carnarines Norte, of stomach pain. On these points, these witnesses and the
accused made statements which seemed to be very fresh and clear in their minds,
despite the lapse of four long years. Their exact and uniform declarations on these
points, their phenomenal recollections, without sufficient special or uncommon
reason to recall, rendered their testimonies unconvincing. If at all, their testimonies
appeared to this Court to be an eleventh hour concoction. And, as defense
witnesses, after observing them and their declarations on the witness stand, they
appeared to the Court to be untruthful and unreliable. For, despite the
synchronization of time when, the place where and how the incidence happened,
their testimonies on other material points revealed their tendency to exaggerate and
 their propensity to falsehood, thus-Aside from the accused Filomeno Salufrania,
there are three other witnesses for the defense Geronimo Villan Angeles Liling Balce
and Juanita Bragais. There is nothing in the testimony of Juanito Bragais because he
did not witness how and when Marciana Abuyo died. Francisco Repuya, who was
also alleged by Filomeno Salufrania to be present when Marciana Abuyo died, did
not testify. Accused Filomeno Salufrania never claimed that he summoned for
Angeles Liling Balce. According to him Angeles Liling Balce was not present during
the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo, for she was fetched by him only after the
death of his wife. Logically, therefore, there is no basis for the presentation of
Angeles Liling Balce that she was present during the moment of death of Marciana
Abuyo. She was merely play-acting. Geronimo Villan who claimed he passed-by the
house of Filomeno Salufrania and saw the latter boiling water with "ikmo" and garlic,
as medicine for his wife Marciana Abuyo, who was about to give birth was
discredited by accused himself who declared he was merely boiling water for the hot
drink of his wife, who was suferring from her old stomach ailment. In like manner,
witness Geronimo Villan discredited the accused Filomeno Salufrania, about the
presence of Francisco Repuya, who allegedly alternated with Geronimo Villan in
applying the native treatments of 'hilot' and 'bantil' to Marciana Abuyo, when
throughout his testimony he (Geronimo Villan) never mentioned the presence of
Francisco Repuya.

After closely observing defense witnesses Geronimo Villan and Angeles Liling Balce,
this Court is convinced that their testimonies and accounts of the incident are
fabricated, untruthful and not worth of credence. Certainly, they were not present
immediately before and during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo. ...

Added to these, there is one scandalous circumstance, which to the mind of this
Court, betrays the guilty conscience of the accused. If there was nothing revealing in
the face of the deceased Marciana Abuyo, why was her face covered by a piece of
cloth by the accused. ...

Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony of
witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in giving their
testimony. 16 Such rule applies in the present case.

Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that
he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be
held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of
Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:

1. That there is a pregnant woman.

2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.

3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.

4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom. 17

The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because
he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find
that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the
stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to
show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim
but not necessarily to cause an abortion.

The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno
Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused the death of
Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim.

It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband
accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the foetus in
her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused should be
punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its
maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished
the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is

hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded
to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent
decisions of the Court. With costs against the appellant,

SO ORDERED.
HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179035
Appellee,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES.
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
JESUS PAYCANA, JR.,
Appellant. Promulgated:
April 16, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged[1] with the complex

crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37. Appellant pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment.[2] Pre-trial ensued, in which appellant admitted that the
victim Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife.[3]

Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense,

claiming that it was his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of self-
defense, it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-
month pregnant wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child.

The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim;
Angelina Paycana (Angelina), appellants eldest daughter who personally witnessed
the whole gruesome incident; Barangay Tanod Juan Paraal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen Beltran,
who conducted the autopsy; and Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer who
removed the fetus from the deceaseds body.

The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at

around 6:30 in the morning, appellant, who worked as a butcher, came home from
the slaughter house carrying his
[4]
tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener. His wife was

preparing their children for school and was waiting for him to come home from his
work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times. [5] Tito,
whose house is at back of appellants house, heard his daughter shouting for help.
When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the door and her feet were
trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped back. Angelina told Tito
by the window that appellant had held her mothers neck and stabbed her. [6]

Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed
him first. According to him, they had an altercation on the evening of 25 November
2002 because he saw a man coming out from the side of their house and when he
confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer. On the following morning,
he told her that they should live separately. As appellant got his things and was on
his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in wresting the
knife from Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not aware of the
number of times he stabbed his wife because he was then dizzy and lots of blood
was coming out of his wound.[7]

The trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated 14 April 2005.[8] The case
was automatically appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 122 Section
3(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[9] The appellate court denied
appellants appeal in a decision dated 30 May 2007.[10] Appellant filed a notice of
appeal

dated 14 June 2007 before the Court of Appeals.[11]

The Court is not convinced by appellants assertion that the trial court erred in not
appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor.

Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed by the trial

[12]
court. In the absence of any showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the
court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better
position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, exists for
this Court to disturb the trial courts finding that appellant did not act in self-defense.

Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense. An accused

who interposes self-defense admits the commission of the act complained of.The
burden to establish self-defense is on the accused who must show by strong, clear
and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no criminal
liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code[13] requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to
prevent or repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[14]

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, that can validly be invoked.[15] Appellants claim of self-defense was
belied by the eyewitness testimony of his own daughter Angelina, which was
corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law Tito and the
medical findings. Angelinas testimony was very clear on how her father strangled
and stabbed her mother just as she was about to greet him upon arriving home. She
begged her father to stop, and even tried to grab her fathers hand but to no
avail.[16] Tito ran to appellants house as he heard his daughter Lilybeths screaming
for help, and he saw her lying prostate near the door with her feet trembling. He
moved back as he saw appellant armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the
window that appellant had held her mothers neck and stabbed her.[17]

Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to appellants wound,
testified on cross-examination that the injuries suffered by appellant were possibly
self-inflicted considering that they were mere superficial wounds.[18]

In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the physical
evidence in the case. Specifically, the number of wounds, fourteen (14) in all,
indicates that appellant's act was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined
effort to kill his victim.[19] The victim died of multiple organ failure secondary to
multiple stab wounds.[20]

The Court agrees with the trial courts observation, thus:

Angelina who is 15 years old will not testify against her father were it not
for the fact that she personally saw her father to be the aggressor and stab
her mother. Telling her grandfather immediately after the incident that
accused stabbed her mother is part of the res gestae hence, admissible as
evidence. Between the testimony of Angelica who positively identified
accused to have initiated the stabbing and continuously stabbed her
mother and on the other hand, the testimony of accused that he killed the
victim in self-defense, the testimony of the former prevails.[21]

The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven
(7)-month pregnant wife.
 Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide[22] is
committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. The testimony of the
accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken as an admission
against penal interest.[23]

As distinguished from infanticide,[24] the elements of unintentional

abortion[25] are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is
used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence
is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either
in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it
is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent
existence.[26] However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and
deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus
with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable.[27] In the present case, the unborn
fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.

The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 48[28] because by
a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of
parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime
is committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its m
aximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances. Applying
the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the
most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of
Appeals properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant
to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.[29]

Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing

jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the offended party, or
his/her heirs incase of the formers death, without need of

further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the aforementioned
crimes (murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages may
be separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only
upon sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art.
2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances duly proved. The amounts
thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts.[30] Hence, the civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Lilybeth is in order. They are
also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as awarded by the trial
court.[31]
In addition to the civil liability and moral damages, the trial court correctly made
appellant account for P25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of relationship,
a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and proved, in the crime of
parricide.[32]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED.
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4729 - AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE, DISPENSATION, AND/OR
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACEPTIVE DRUGS AND DEVICES

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless
such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Sec. 2. For the purpose of this Act:

(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

Sec. 3. Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or
more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

 of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand
twelve.

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10354 ]

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A NATIONAL POLICY ON RESPONSIBLE

PARENTHOOD AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as “The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012”.

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Pursuant to the declaration of State policies under Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, it is the duty of the State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution and equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of women especially mothers in particular and of the people in general and instill
health consciousness among them. The family is the natural and fundamental unit of
society. The State shall likewise protect and advance the right of families in particular
and the people in general to a balanced and healthful environment in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature. The State also recognizes and guarantees the
promotion and equal protection of the welfare and rights of children, the youth, and the
unborn.

Moreover, the State recognizes and guarantees the promotion of gender equality,
gender equity, women empowerment and dignity as a health and human rights concern
and as a social responsibility. The advancement and protection of women’s human
rights shall be central to the efforts of the State to address reproductive health care.
The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of
the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall
defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood;

(b) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;

(c) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

(d) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs

The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,

effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods,
devices, supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and relevant information and
education thereon according to the priority needs of women, children and other
underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those identified through the
National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) and other
government measures of identifying marginalization, who shall be voluntary
beneficiaries of reproductive health care, services and supplies for free. ■ •

The State shall eradicate discriminatory practices, laws and policies that infringe on a
person’s exercise of reproductive health rights.

The State shall also promote openness to life; Provided, That parents bring forth to the
world only those children whom they can raise in a truly humane way.

SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. – This Act declares the following as
guiding principles:

(a) The right to make free and informed decisions, which is central to the exercise of
any right, shall not be subjected to any form of coercion and must be fully guaranteed
by the State, like the right itself;

(b) Respect for protection and fulfillment of reproductive health and rights which seek to
promote the rights and welfare of every person particularly couples, adult individuals,
women and adolescents;

(c) Since human resource is among the principal assets of the country, effective and
quality reproductive health care services must be given primacy to ensure maternal and
child health, the health of the unborn, safe delivery and birth of healthy children, and
sound replacement rate, in line with the State’s duty to promote the right to health,
responsible parenthood, social justice and full human development;

(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-
abortifacient, effective and quality reproductive health care services and supplies is
essential in the promotion of people’s right to health, especially those of women, the
poor, and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a component of basic health
care;

(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all
methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have
been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and
approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR
and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State
shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions;

(f) The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have
the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of
women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with
existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions: Provided, That no one shall
be deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have children; (2) achieve equitable
allocation and utilization of resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among national
government, local government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design,
implementation, coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered
programs to enhance the quality of life and environmental protection; (4) conduct
studies to analyze demographic trends including demographic dividends from sound
population policies towards sustainable human development in keeping with the
principles of gender equality, protection of mothers and children, born and unborn and
the promotion and protection of women’s reproductive rights and health; and (5)
conduct scientific studies to determine the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines
and methods for reproductive health care development;

(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority to
poor beneficiaries as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures
of identifying marginalization must be the primary responsibility of the national
government consistent with its obligation to respect, protect and promote the right to
health and the right to life;

(h) The State shall respect individuals’ preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs,
taking into consideration the State’s obligations under various human rights instruments;
(i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women’s and people’s
organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women,
the poor, and the marginalized;

(j) While this Act recognizes that abortion is illegal and punishable by law, the
government shall ensure that all women needing care for post-abortive complications
and all other complications arising from pregnancy, labor and delivery and related
issues shall be treated and counseled in a humane, nonjudgmental and compassionate
manner in accordance with law and medical ethics;

(k) Each family shall have the right to determine its ideal family size: Provided, however,
That the State shall equip each parent with the necessary information on all aspects of
family life, including reproductive health and responsible parenthood, in order to make
that determination;

(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion
and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health;

(m) Gender equality and women empowerment are central elements of reproductive
health and population and development;

(n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, especially
the poor, and allocations thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life
of the unborn is protected;

(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and
integration of policies, plans, programs and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life
of the people, more particularly the poor, the needy and the marginalized; and

(p) That a comprehensive reproductive health program addresses the needs of people
throughout their life cycle.

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother’s womb upon determination of the FDA.

(b) Adolescent refers to young people between the ages of ten (10) to nineteen (19)
years who are in transition from childhood to adulthood.
(c) Basic Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care (BEMONC) refers to lifesaving
services for emergency maternal and newborn conditions/complications being provided
by a health facility or professional to include the following services: administration of
parenteral oxytocic drugs, administration of dose of parenteral anticonvulsants,
administration of parenteral antibiotics, administration of maternal steroids for preterm
labor, performance of assisted vaginal deliveries, removal of retained placental
products, and manual removal of retained placenta. It also includes neonatal
interventions which include at the minimum: newborn resuscitation, provision of warmth,
and referral, blood transfusion where possible.

(d) Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care (CEMONC) refers to

lifesaving services for emergency maternal and newborn conditions/complications as in
Basic Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care plus the provision of surgical delivery
(caesarian section) and blood bank services, and other highly specialized obstetric
interventions. It also includes emergency neonatal care which includes at the minimum:
newborn resuscitation, treatment of neonatal sepsis infection, oxygen support, and
antenatal administration of (maternal) steroids for threatened premature delivery.

(e) Family planning refers to a program which enables couples and individuals to decide
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the
information and means to do so, and to have access to a full range of safe, affordable,
effective, non-abortifacient modem natural and artificial methods of planning pregnancy.

(f) Fetal and infant death review refers to a qualitative and in-depth study of the causes
of fetal and infant death with the primary purpose of preventing future deaths through
changes or additions to programs, plans and policies.

(g) Gender equality refers to the principle of equality between women and men and
equal rights to enjoy conditions in realizing their full human potentials to contribute to,
and benefit from, the results of development, with the State recognizing that all human
beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. It entails equality in opportunities, in the
allocation of resources or benefits, or in access to services in furtherance of the rights to
health and sustainable human development among others, without discrimination.

(h) Gender equity refers to the policies, instruments, programs and actions that address
the disadvantaged position of women in society by providing preferential treatment and
affirmative action. It entails fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits and
responsibilities between women and men, and often requires women-specific projects
and programs to end existing inequalities. This concept recognizes that while
reproductive health involves women and men, it is more critical for women’s health.

(i) Male responsibility refers to the involvement, commitment, accountability and

responsibility of males in all areas of sexual health and reproductive health, as well as
the care of reproductive health concerns specific to men.
(j) Maternal death review refers to a qualitative and in-depth study of the causes of
maternal death with the primary purpose of preventing future deaths through changes or
additions to programs, plans and policies.

(k) Maternal health refers to the health of a woman of reproductive age including, but
not limited to, during pregnancy, childbirth and the postpartum period.

(l) Modern methods of family planning refers to safe, effective, non-abortifacient and
legal methods, whether natural or artificial, that are registered with the FDA, to plan
pregnancy.

(m) Natural family planning refers to a variety of methods used to plan or prevent
pregnancy based on identifying the woman’s fertile days.

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which
is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation
of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is
a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midwife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily
renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guideline’s
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH).

(o) Poor refers to members of households identified as poor through the NHTS-PR by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or any subsequent system
used by the national government in identifying the poor.

(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to
the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. This implies that people are
able to have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so. This
further implies that women and men attain equal relationships in matters related to
sexual relations and reproduction.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities,
services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
(1) Family planning information and services which shall include as a first priority
making women of reproductive age fully aware of their respective cycles to make them
aware of when fertilization is highly probable, as well as highly improbable;

(2) Maternal, infant and child health and nutrition, including breastfeeding;

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

(4) Adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and counseling;

(5) Prevention, treatment and management of reproductive tract infections (RTIs), HIV
and AIDS and other sexually transmittable infections (STIs);

(6) Elimination of violence against women and children and other forms of sexual and
gender-based violence;

(7) Education and counseling on sexuality and reproductive health;

(8) Treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;

(9) Male responsibility and involvement and men’s reproductive health;

(10) Prevention, treatment and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction;

(11) Reproductive health education for the adolescents; and

(12) Mental health aspect of reproductive health care.

(r) Reproductive health care program refers to the systematic and integrated provision
of reproductive health care to all citizens prioritizing women, the poor, marginalized and
those invulnerable or crisis situations.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide
freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing
of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of
discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and
to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided,
however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.

(t) Reproductive health and sexuality education refers to a lifelong learning process of
providing and acquiring complete, accurate and relevant age- and development-
appropriate information and education on reproductive health and sexuality through life
skills education and other approaches.
(u) Reproductive Tract Infection (RTI) refers to sexually transmitted infections (STIs),
and other types of infections affecting the reproductive system.

(v) Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the
needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility
between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and
timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns
consistent with their religious convictions.

(w) Sexual health refers to a state of physical, mental and social well-being in relation to
sexuality. It requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual
relationships, as well as the possibility of having pleasurable and safe sexual
experiences, free from coercion, discrimination and violence.

(x) Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) refers to any infection that may be acquired or
passed on through sexual contact, use of IV, intravenous drug needles, childbirth and
breastfeeding.

(y) Skilled birth attendance refers to childbirth managed by a skilled health professional
including the enabling conditions of necessary equipment and support of a functioning
health system, including transport and referral faculties for emergency obstetric care.

(z) Skilled health professional refers to a midwife, doctor or nurse, who has been
educated and trained in the skills needed to manage normal and complicated
pregnancies, childbirth and the immediate postnatal period, and in the identification,
management and referral of complications in women and newborns.

(aa) Sustainable human development refers to bringing people, particularly the poor and
vulnerable, to the center of development process, the central purpose of which is the
creation of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy long, healthy and productive
lives, done in the manner that promotes their rights and protects the life opportunities of
future generations and the natural ecosystem on which all life depends.

SEC. 5. Hiring of Skilled Health Professionals for Maternal Health Care and Skilled Birth
Attendance. – The LGUs shall endeavor to hire an adequate number of nurses,
midwives and other skilled health professionals for maternal health care and skilled birth
attendance to achieve an ideal skilled health professional-to-patient ratio taking into
consideration DOH targets: Provided, That people in geographically isolated or highly
populated and depressed areas shall be provided the same level of access to health
care: Provided, further, That the national government shall provide additional and
necessary funding and other necessary assistance for the effective implementation of
this provision.

For the purposes of this Act, midwives and nurses shall be allowed to administer
lifesaving drugs such as, but not limited to, oxytocin and magnesium sulfate, in
accordance with the guidelines set by the DOH, under emergency conditions and when
there are no physicians available: Provided, That they are properly trained and certified
to administer these lifesaving drugs.

SEC. 6. Health Care Facilities. – Each LGU, upon its determination of the necessity
based on well-supported data provided by its local health office shall endeavor to
establish or upgrade hospitals and facilities with adequate and qualified personnel,
equipment and supplies to be able to provide emergency obstetric and newborn
care: Provided, That people in geographically isolated or highly populated and
depressed areas shall have the same level of access and shall not be neglected by
providing other means such as home visits or mobile health care clinics as
needed: Provided, further, That the national government shall provide additional and
necessary funding and other necessary assistance for the effective implementation of
this provision.

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – All accredited public health facilities shall provide
a full range of modern family planning methods, which shall also include medical
consultations, supplies and necessary and reasonable procedures for poor and
marginalized couples having infertility issues who desire to have children: Provided,
That family planning services shall likewise be extended by private health facilities to
paying patients with the option to grant free care and services to indigents, except in the
case of non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group, but they have the option to provide such full range of modern family
planning methods: Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the
person seeking such care and services to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible: Provided, finally, That the person is not in an emergency condition or
serious case as defined in Republic Act No. 8344.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when
the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

SEC. 8. Maternal Death Review and Fetal and Infant Death Review. – All LGUs,
national and local government hospitals, and other public health units shall conduct an
annual Maternal Death Review and Fetal and Infant Death Review in accordance with
the guidelines set by the DOH. Such review should result in an evidence-based
programming and budgeting process that would contribute to the development of more
responsive reproductive health services to promote women’s health and safe
motherhood.

SEC. 9. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System and Family Planning Supplies.
– The National Drug Formulary shall include hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System (PNDFS) shall
be observed in selecting drugs including family planning supplies that will be included or
removed from the Essential Drugs List (EDL) in accordance with existing practice and in
consultation with reputable medical associations in the Philippines. For the purpose of
this Act, any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient.

These products and supplies shall also be included in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals: Provided, further, That the foregoing
offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or
equivalent.

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. – The DOH shall
procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the
whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies
to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and
budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections
of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring
program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

SEC. 11. Integration of Responsible Parenthood and Family Planning Component in

Anti-Poverty Programs. – A multidimensional approach shall be adopted in the
implementation of policies and programs to fight poverty. Towards this end, the DOH
shall implement programs prioritizing full access of poor and marginalized women as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization to reproductive health care, services, products and programs. The DOH
shall provide such programs, technical support, including capacity building and
monitoring.

SEC. 12. PhilHealth Benefits for Serious .and Life-Threatening Reproductive Health
Conditions. – All serious and life-threatening reproductive health conditions such as HIV
and AIDS, breast and reproductive tract cancers, and obstetric complications, and
menopausal and post-menopausal-related conditions shall be given the maximum
benefits, including the provision of Anti-Retroviral Medicines (ARVs), as provided in the
guidelines set by the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC).
SEC. 13. Mobile Health Care Service. – The national or the local government may
provide each provincial, city, municipal and district hospital with a Mobile Health Care
Service (MHCS) in the form of a van or other means of transportation appropriate to its
terrain, taking into consideration the health care needs of each LGU. The MHCS shall
deliver health care goods and services to its constituents, more particularly to the poor
and needy, as well as disseminate knowledge and information on reproductive health.
The MHCS shall be operated by skilled health providers and adequately equipped with
a wide range of health care materials and information dissemination devices and
equipment, the latter including, but not limited to, a television set for audio-visual
presentations. All MHCS shall be operated by LGUs of provinces and highly urbanized
cities.

SEC. 14. Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. – The

State shall provide age- and development-appropriate reproductive health education to
adolescents which shall be taught by adequately trained teachers informal and
nonformal educational system and integrated in relevant subjects such as, but not
limited to, values formation; knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms
of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes
in adolescents; women’s rights and children’s rights; responsible teenage behavior;
gender and development; and responsible parenthood: Provided, That flexibility in the
formulation and adoption of appropriate course content, scope and methodology in each
educational level or group shall be allowed only after consultations with parents-
teachers-community associations, school officials and other interest groups. The
Department of Education (DepED) shall formulate a curriculum which shall be used by
public schools and may be adopted by private schools.

SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. – No marriage license shall be issued by the Local
Civil Registrar unless the applicants present a Certificate of Compliance issued for free
by the local Family Planning Office certifying that they had duly received adequate
instructions and information on responsible parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding
and infant nutrition.

SEC. 16. Capacity Building of Barangay Health Workers (BHWs). – The DOH shall be
responsible for disseminating information and providing training programs to the LGUs.
The LGUs, with the technical assistance of the DOH, shall be responsible for the
training of BHWs and other barangay volunteers on the promotion of reproductive
health. The DOH shall provide the LGUs with medical supplies and equipment needed
by BHWs to carry out their functions effectively: Provided, further, That the national
government shall provide additional and necessary funding and other necessary
assistance for the effective implementation of this provision including the possible
provision of additional honoraria for BHWs.

SEC. 17. Pro Bono Services for Indigent Women. – Private and nongovernment
reproductive healthcare service providers including, but not limited to, gynecologists and
obstetricians, are encouraged to provide at least forty-eight (48) hours annually of
reproductive health services, ranging from providing information and education to
rendering medical services, free of charge to indigent and low-income patients as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization, especially to pregnant adolescents. The forty-eight (48) hours
annual pro bono services shall be included as a prerequisite in the accreditation under
the PhilHealth.

SEC. 18. Sexual and Reproductive Health Programs for Persons with Disabilities
(PWDs). – The cities and municipalities shall endeavor that barriers to reproductive
health services for PWDs are obliterated by the following:

(a) Providing physical access, and resolving transportation and proximity issues to
clinics, hospitals and places where public health education is provided, contraceptives
are sold or distributed or other places where reproductive health services are provided;

(b) Adapting examination tables and other laboratory procedures to the needs and
conditions of PWDs;

(c) Increasing access to information and communication materials on sexual and

reproductive health in braille, large print, simple language, sign language and pictures;

(d) Providing continuing education and inclusion of rights of PWDs among health care
providers; and

(e) Undertaking activities to raise awareness and address misconceptions among the
general public on the stigma and their lack of knowledge on the sexual and reproductive
health needs and rights of PWDs.

SEC. 19. Duties and Responsibilities. – (a) Pursuant to the herein declared policy, the
DOH shall serve as the lead agency for the implementation of this Act and shall
integrate in their regular operations the following functions:

(1) Fully and efficiently implement the reproductive health care program;

(2) Ensure people’s access to medically safe, non-abortifacient, legal, quality and
affordable reproductive health goods and services; and

(3) Perform such other functions necessary to attain the purposes of this Act.

(b) The DOH, in coordination with the PHIC, as may be applicable, shall:

(1) Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies to ensure safe, high quality,
accessible and affordable reproductive health services and commodities with the
concurrent strengthening and enforcement of regulatory mandates and mechanisms;
(2) Facilitate the involvement and participation of NGOs and the private sector in
reproductive health care service delivery and in the production, distribution and delivery
of quality reproductive health and family planning supplies and commodities to make
them accessible and affordable to ordinary citizens;

(3) Engage the services, skills and proficiencies of experts in natural family planning
who shall provide the necessary training for all BHWs;

(4) Supervise and provide assistance to LGUs in the delivery of reproductive health care
services and in the purchase of family planning goods and supplies; and

(5) Furnish LGUs, through their respective local health offices, appropriate information
and resources to keep the latter updated on current studies and researches relating to
family planning, responsible parenthood, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.

(c) The FDA shall issue strict guidelines with respect to the use of contraceptives, taking
into consideration the side effects or other harmful effects of their use.

(d) Corporate citizens shall exercise prudence in advertising its products or services
through all forms of media, especially on matters relating to sexuality, further taking into
consideration its influence on children and the youth.

SEC. 20. Public Awareness. – The DOH and the LGUs shall initiate and sustain a
heightened nationwide multimedia-campaign to raise the level of public awareness on
the protection and promotion of reproductive health and rights including, but not limited
to, maternal health and nutrition, family planning and responsible parenthood
information and services, adolescent and youth reproductive health, guidance and
counseling and other elements of reproductive health care under Section 4(q).

Education and information materials to be developed and disseminated for this purpose
shall be reviewed regularly to ensure their effectiveness and relevance.

SEC. 21. Reporting Requirements. – Before the end of April each year, the DOH shall
submit to the President of the Philippines and Congress an annual consolidated report,
which shall provide a definitive and comprehensive assessment of the implementation
of its programs and those of other government agencies and instrumentalities and
recommend priorities for executive and legislative actions. The report shall be printed
and distributed to all national agencies, the LGUs, NGOs and private sector
organizations involved in said programs.

The annual report shall evaluate the content, implementation, and impact of all policies
related to reproductive health and family planning to ensure that such policies promote,
protect and fulfill women’s reproductive health and rights.

SEC. 22. Congressional Oversight Committee on Reproductive Health Act. – There is

hereby created a Congressional Oversight Committee (COC) composed of five (5)
members each from the Senate and the House of Representatives. The members from
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Senate
President and the Speaker, respectively, with at least one (1) member representing the
Minority.

The COC shall be headed by the respective Chairs of the Committee on Health and
Demography of the Senate and the Committee on Population and Family Relations of
the House of Representatives. The Secretariat of the COC shall come from the existing
Secretariat personnel of the Senate and the House of Representatives committees
concerned.

The COC shall monitor and ensure the effective implementation of this Act, recommend
the necessary remedial legislation or administrative measures, and shall conduct a
review of this Act every five (5) years from its effectivity. The COC shall perform such
other duties and functions as may be necessary to attain the objectives of tins Act.

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. – The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/or

intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of
legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

(2) Refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any
person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following
persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: Provided, That in case of disagreement,
the decision of the one undergoing the procedure shall prevail; and

(ii) Parental consent or that of the person exercising parental authority in the case of
abused minors, where the parent or the person exercising parental authority is the
respondent, accused or convicted perpetrator as certified by the proper prosecutorial
office of the court. In the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be
required only in elective surgical procedures and in no case shall consent be required in
emergency or serious cases as defined in Republic Act No. 8344; and

(3) Refuse to extend quality health care services and information on account of the
person’s marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or
nature of work: Provided, That the conscientious objection of a health care service
provider based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs shall be respected; however, the
conscientious objector shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and
services to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible: Provided, further, That the person is not in an emergency
condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act No. 8344, which penalizes the
refusal of hospitals and medical clinics to administer appropriate initial medical
treatment and support in emergency and serious cases;

(b) Any public officer, elected or appointed, specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions hereof, who, personally or through a subordinate, prohibits or
restricts the delivery of legal and medically-safe reproductive health care services,
including family planning; or forces, coerces or induces any person to use such
services; or refuses to allocate, approve or release any budget for reproductive health
care services, or to support reproductive health programs; or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program as mandated by this
Act;

(c) Any employer who shall suggest, require, unduly influence or cause any applicant for
employment or an employee to submit himself/herself to sterilization, use any modern
methods of family planning, or not use such methods as a condition for employment,
continued employment, promotion or the provision of employment benefits. Further,
pregnancy or the number of children shall not be a ground for non-hiring or termination
from employment;

(d) Any person who shall falsify a Certificate of Compliance as required in Section 15 of
this Act; and

(e) Any pharmaceutical company, whether domestic or multinational, or its agents or

distributors, which directly or indirectly colludes with government officials, whether
appointed or elected, in the distribution, procurement and/or sale by the national
government and LGUs of modern family planning supplies, products and devices.

SEC. 24. Penalties. – Any violation of this Act or commission of the foregoing prohibited
acts shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) month to six (6) months or
a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the competent
court: Provided, That, if the offender is a public officer, elected or appointed, he/she
shall also suffer the penalty of suspension not exceeding one (1) year or removal and
forfeiture of retirement benefits depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice
and hearing by the appropriate body or agency.

If the offender is a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the president or
any responsible officer. An offender who is an alien shall, after service of sentence, be
deported immediately without further proceedings by the Bureau of Immigration. If the
offender is a pharmaceutical company, its agent and/or distributor, their license or
permit to operate or conduct business in the Philippines shall be perpetually revoked,
and a fine triple the amount involved in the violation shall be imposed.
SEC. 25. Appropriations. – The amounts appropriated in the current annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for reproductive health and natural and artificial family
planning and responsible parenthood under the DOH and other concerned agencies
shall be allocated and utilized for the implementation of this Act. Such additional sums
necessary to provide for the upgrading of faculties necessary to meet BEMONC and
CEMONC standards; the training and deployment of skilled health providers; natural
and artificial family planning commodity requirements as outlined in Section 10, and for
other reproductive health and responsible parenthood services, shall be included in the
subsequent years’ general appropriations. The Gender and Development (GAD) funds
of LGUs and national agencies may be a source of funding for the implementation of
this Act.

SEC. 26. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). – Within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of this Act, the DOH Secretary or his/her designated representative as
Chairperson, the authorized representative/s of DepED, DSWD, Philippine Commission
on Women, PHIC, Department of the Interior and Local Government, National
Economic and Development Authority, League of Provinces, League of Cities, and
League of Municipalities, together with NGOs, faith-based organizations, people’s,
women’s and young people’s organizations, shall jointly promulgate the rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of this Act. At least four (4) members of the
IRR drafting committee, to be selected by the DOH Secretary, shall come from NGOs.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
BSTANTIVE ISSUES:
A. On the constitutionality of RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law
1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
right to life:
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Ponente’s view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It
shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The
RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation
but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb.
The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty
to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must
be struck down.

2. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
right to health
NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion
of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They
cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the
status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA
4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
freedom of religion and right to free speech
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s
dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners
NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of
any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article
III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health
practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections
YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions
violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2),
Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and
penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate
information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation
to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by
law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective
implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also
violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers
and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of
conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-
threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate
state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health
is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna
Carta of Women).
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type
of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to
accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family
life without the intervention of the State.
4. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of
the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the
right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this
mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority
or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and
may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
freedom of expression and academic freedom
NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates
the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their
youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in

developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
due process clause
NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the
RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.”

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause
NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH
Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.

8. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
prohibition against involuntary servitude
NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but
also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as
amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section
17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs
and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of
basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.
G.R. No. 1878 March 9, 1907

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANTONIO NAVARRO, defendant-appellant.

Chikote, Del-Pan, & Sutro for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila sentencing the accused
Antonio Navarro to suffer the penalty of death by hanging.

The facts as brought out in the trial are as follows:

That on November 19, 1903, during the early hours of the morning of that day, Ricardo Garces and
Antonio Navarro, the accused, after having had an altercation in the bar or saloon of the Paz
Theater, district of Binondo of Manila, and in the presence of other persons, left the saloon together
for the purpose, as has been proven in this case by the testimony of various witnesses, or fighting in
another place.

The facts most important in connection with this case are testified to by the accused himself, who
states that he and Garces left the theater together, and taking a carromata went as far as Calle
Rosario, where they stopped for the purpose of purchasing two knives, one for each. The knives
purchase, as is stated by the accused, were known as "marineros," having a blade about one foot in
length; that after making the purchase they then paid for the carromata and separated, each taking a
conveyance, both going in the direction of Santa Mesa, the extreme end of the district of Sampaloc;
that when about halfway on the road the accuse stopped at a store for the purpose of asking a piece
of ice, but without losing sight of the vehicle of Garces, which he had taken the head; that the
accused, not being able to maintain the ice, followed to the place of meeting.

The prosecuting attorney in this case, in alleging the acts of the accused, sets forth the same in the
following words: ". . . That they fought there, during which fight the accused was slightly wounded on
the upper lip, Ricardo Garces receiving a large and deep wound on his right arm; that after the fight
they left the place, proceeding to a small house wherein live Ambrosio del Rosario and Hilaria
Bernardo, husband and wife, respectively; that while at this house the accused requested and
obtained from Hilaria Bernardo a piece of an old skirt with which he bound the wounded arm of
Ricardo Garces, which wound was then bleeding profusely; that immediately thereafter they left the
house, Garces being assisted to some extent by the accused; that upon arriving at the Santa Mesa
road the accused was detained by a policeman who had been called by the witness Ambrosio del
Rosario; that the policeman rang up from the alarm box for the police ambulance, and after having
waited some time for the ambulance, which ambulance arrived a half hour later, conducted in the
said ambulance the accused, Navarro, to the police station and Ricardo Garces to the Civil Hospital,
where, about the hour of 1:30 of the afternoon, Garces was operated on by the hospital surgeons in
the operating room of said hospital, that, notwithstanding the assistance and attendant of the
hospital surgeons, Ricardo Garces died in the said hospital at the hour of 5 on the morning of the
following day." (Allegation 2.)

In view of the fact that it was impossible to secure the testimony of Garces on the presence of the
accused and Garces on the ground where the fight took place, this court is compelled to take into
consideration the evidence given by the accused, and Ambrosio del Rosario, in whose house the
cloth was obtained with which the accused bound the arm of the wounded man; but this witness,
Ambrosio del Rosario, does not testify to more than the fact that he heard the taller man, Garces, cry
out, and whom he saw with doubled arm, which arm was then bleeding, and a shorter man, Navarro,
with raised arm holding high an instrument which he could not distinguish as a knife, but which
instrument he saw was one foot in length and white, and that when he saw blood flowing he left to
the purpose of calling the police (p. 59 of the record)

Benford Warren, a member of the police, who was in charge of the ambulance wagon, testifies that
he saw the wounded man assisted to the ambulance on the arm of the policeman who had been
called; that the wounded man then had his right arm doubled up and bandaged at the elbow; that the
wounded man's coat and all of his clothing were covered with blood; that he removed this bandage,
leaving it hanging from the sleeve below the elbow; that the wounded man, after having been
assisted into the ambulance, remained on his feet with arm doubled up; that upon the arrival at the
hospital the witness, assisted by a Filipino, took the wounded man from the ambulance and
thereafter these two assisted the wounded man up the stairs of the hospital; that when taken from
the ambulance the wounded man was in a faint and weak condition, not being able to hold up his
arm, which arm had then fallen, causing another flow of blood from the wound, which flow continued
profusely while ascending the stairs and on the way to the operating room (p. 123 of the record).

Joseph J. Keith, a member of the secret-service police, who was detailed to go out the place where
the fight occurred for the purpose of making investigation, testified that he found there but one knife,
and that this knife was closed when found, and belonged to Garces.

A pool of blood was found by this witness running from the spot or place where the fight evidently
took place to the spot where the knife was found, and that in the latter place there were several
spots or pools of blood which would evidence the fact that the wounded man had stood there several
minutes; that there were also spots of blood running from the place where the knife was found to the
Santa Mesa road; that the place where the fight took place had been pointed out to him, the witness,
by the wife of Ambrosio del Rosario, and that the witness saw there during his examination the signs
of the fight as evidenced by the crushed and disturbed vegetation and much blood, this being a
distance of about 25 yards from the house of the woman, the wife of Ambrosio del Rosario (p. 136 of
the record).

The wound of Garces was, as testified to by Dr. G. B. Cook, a cut or incision about one inch in
length, made above the elbow, and on the inner part of the arm, running from the outer part of the
arm of the center of the same that the wound extended in depth to the bone, cutting or severing the
main artery; also that the wound or cut was directed or ran from the inside in an upward direction,
and that the artery mentioned was completely severed — that is to say, leaving a small connecting
thread of said artery (p. 4 of the record).

Dr. Stafford, physician in charge of the Civil Hospital, testifies that: "The wound was an incision
reaching to the bone, and of about the length of one inch, just above the joint of the forearm (elbow
joint); that the wound or cut was incisive in character and had been inflicted or caused by a sharp
instrument; that the wounded man was almost dead when received at the hospital, by reason of
having lost so much blood; that the wounded man was unconscious when received at the hospital,
being absolutely without pulse notwithstanding the fact that an hour afterwards he, the wounded
man, recovered his senses and his pulse became somewhat perceptible; that there was much blood
on the bandage, and that the arm or wound was bleeding at the time that the policeman carried the
wounded man to the operating table; also that there was a great deal of blood in the office." (p. 65 of
the record).
And, as is testified to by Dr. William, J. Mallory: "The face of the wounded man was pallid, you might
say white; he seemed to me to be unconscious. His eyes were closed and his face and hands wet
with perspiration; the cuticle or skin fresh; respiration short and rapid, and the cheeks fallen and
loose; I saw a wide wound on the right arm, of an inch or an inch and half approximately, above the
turn or curve of the elbow — that is to say, above the bend and to the front" (p. 104 of the record).

These three doctors give as an immediate cause of death that of hemorrhage and nervous
convulsion or condition, all of which is corroborated and admitted by three other doctors who have
testified for the defense and as appears from the evidence of the latter given and bearing on a
hypothetical case as presented by said defense.

The conclusion of the court below as set forth in its judgment is: "That Antonio Navarro took the life
of the deceased willfully, unlawfully, criminally, and with malice aforethought and deliberate
premeditation and treachery, fighting a duel without seconds in a retired and isolated place, all of
which the court is convinced is without reasonable doubt and has been proven; there are no
mitigating circumstances connected with this case, but to the contrary aggravating circumstances.
The conclusion or finding of the court below relative to the qualifying circumstance of treachery is set
forth in these words: "I believe that after the arrival of the accused on the ground, and at the moment
the deceased was in the act of taking off his coat for the purpose of preparing himself for the fight,
the accused availed himself of such occasion and opportunity and attacked him, the deceased, with
the knife, wounding him in the right arm, all of which is set forth in the proofs herein as well as from
the fact that the deceased never at any time succeeded in taking his coat off of his left arm; that it
was the intention of the deceased to take his knife from an inner pocket, but only after the removal of
his coat; also that the deceased could not prepare himself for the fight for the reason that the
accused wounded him before he could remove his coat from his right arm; that upon leaving the spot
where fight occurred, the knife of the deceased fell from deceased's inner pocket to the ground,
where it was afterwards found by the policeman Keith, It is natural to believe and this court does
believe that at moment the deceased removed his coat from his right arm and shoulder first, the
accused finding the deceased in such a position and being afraid to fight with the deceased, he, the
accused, availing himself of the same, inflicted the wound upon the deceased from which wound the
deceased died." (Record, 113.)

But this court has no way of knowing, from the proofs and evidence in the case, as to just how the
strife was fought. There is no proof whatever as to how or in what manner the deceased was
wounded, nor could the doctor who examined such wound testify positively with regard thereto.
Taking into consideration the proofs which are referred to in the judgment of the court below, it is
impossible to arrive at any other than deductions, more or less logical; it is true that no certain
conclusion can be arrived at. It is an established doctrine of jurisprudence, again and again
reiterated by this court, that qualifying and aggravating circumstances should appear proven during
the progress of the trial, with equal certainty and clearness as the act, itself. (U.S., vs. Candido
Ulat, 1 No. 3255, February 27, 1907; U.S., vs. Barbosa, 1 Phil. Rep., 741.)

Therefore it follows that, taking into consideration the basis as to the circumstances, whether
qualifying or aggravating, pertaining to treachery, this court can not consider in any way or manner
nor can it accept the conclusion of the court below with respect to the same.

In order to take into consideration the existence or circumstance of known premeditation, whether as
a qualifying or aggravating circumstance, the court says: "An hour approximately must have elapsed
from the time that he, the accused, and the deceased left the Paz Theater until the time the accused
arrived at the place indicated for the fray. There was not a moment during this entire period in which
the accused, could not have stopped his prosecution of the deceased and retired from the fight. If
the accused had felt sorry as he testifies to and as he states he expressed himself to the deceased
upon his arrival there, he would not have gone to the place, and after his arrival on the ground, being
at that time, as he says, some distance from the deceased, he could have abandoned his purpose
and retired from the ground" (p. 111 of the record).

The prosecuting attorney, in the Court of First Instance, said: "The fact of the accused having
provoked the quarrel, challenged the deceased to a fight, purchased a dangerous and fatal
instrument, proceeding thereafter a long distance to a chosen place for the purpose of fighting, and
there insisting that he had the deceased proceed with the fight, is direct and positive proof of the
existence of known premeditation" (p. 86 of the record).

And finally the Solicitor-General in this instance says in the following terms: "If the premeditation be
characterized and shown, not so much by the time of the lapse of time from the moment of
conceiving the idea of a crime to the moment of its accomplishment, but by the persistency of this
same idea and the voluntary and firm intention of carrying out the same, it is evident that this said
premeditation is shown and is in accordance with the fact in the records herein, in that the accused
first challenged the deceased, the election and acquisition or securing of the arms, the designation
of a place of combat, and finally in his selection for such a place, a spot retired and secluded, for
such combat. This signified clearly that from the moment he conceived and intended the same to a
criminal end he carried out and executed a series of acts to overcome all obstacles and difficulties
which he might encounter in so doing. The accused and deceased did not go together in the
same carromata to the place of the duel; as is testified to by the accused himself during the trial, the
deceased went on ahead in a different carromata, and he, the accused, stopped at a bar or saloon
situated on the San Sebastian Plaza and there asked for and drank a small quantity of ice water.
This shows that the accused had more than enough opportunity to find and adopt means for refusing
or reiterating from the duel agreed upon. But no, the accused was firm and had already decided to
carry out his criminal design and intent. Nothing could have caused him to desist from such idea and
intent" (p. 5 of the record).

According toe interpretive jurisprudence, and in this case applicable to the aggravating
circumstances of paragraph 7, article 10 of the Penal Code: "Known premeditation should not be
taken into consideration when the proven facts and the execution of the same were carried out
within a time sufficient to give place to serious thought, meditation, or cool reflection — all of which if
proven constitute the essence of aggravating circumstances, and as it connected with the idea and
the intent to kill the other the same night, the acts of the accused evidence this intent toward the
accomplishment of the criminal act." (Judgment of the supreme court of Spain, November 16, 1888).

Navarro and Garces left the Plaza Theater, each with the deliberate intention to fight outside of such
place. Both had criminal intent (no matter which one of the two provoked or quarrel), from that time
and moment, to carry out the purpose of fighting in another place. Both of them agreed and decided
to do this, and immediately thereafter, without loss of more time, and which criminal intent, went to
an isolated place designated for the encounter and this in the accomplishment of a criminal design
and intent which encounter took place one hour thereafter, as is shown in the judgment of the court
below. It is also shown that during this time nothing occurred to induce them to desist from carrying
out their original purpose, and, notwithstanding this, Navarro proceeded with and insisted in carrying
out his design of fighting — all of which was necessary to show cool meditation, reflection, and
known premeditation, whether with qualifying circumstances or aggravating, all of which goes to
show the serenity and coolness in the intent to do ill, and consequently more malignity or obstinate
wickedness on the part of the delinquent, Navarro. The acts that intervened from the time of the
quarrel and fight as first had to the time of the wounding of the deceased were nothing more than
acts carried out for the purpose of the realization of a design or intent cause by the passion of a
moment and while exited and rash, and during the fever of such moment; that these were the
circumstances and conditions which existed between two exited and angry parties, and who, excited
by such passion and anger, and without anything happening within this short space of time to cause
them to recover their serenity went to the place for the purpose of carrying out a crime.

Inasmuch as known premeditation, the same as any other aggravating circumstance, should not be
inferred but proven, which in this case has not been proven by acts clearly showing such
aggravating circumstance and premeditation, or which imply that such determination was meditated
or after reflection with respect to carrying out the offense in a manner or form first thought of, and
this accused himself, the court below in its judgment fails to take into consideration these attendant
conditions or characteristics, and there are not fit terms or reasons by which the court could accept
or find that such circumstances were either qualifying or aggravating.

The crime committed in this case is not that of dueling, "A duel implies or means an agreement to
fight under determined conditions and with the participations and intervention of seconds, who fix
such conditions; and the code has taken same into account and fixes the penalty therefor according
to the result of said duel. And even though the act could be qualified as that of dueling, if, in the duel,
there was no participation of seconds, there should be taken into consideration, by all means, the
provisions of paragraph 2, article 446 of the code (art. 431 of the Philippine Code), according to
which the general penalties of the same should be applied, in the event of death, or injuries, with a
limitations as to the aggravating circumstances but restrictive in that the punishment or penalty be
not less or come below that of prision correccional." (Judgment of the supreme court of Spain,
October 9, 1890.)

Notwithstanding the fact be taken as proven and as is alleged by the defense in this instance, to wit;
That Navarro repeatedly expressed his desire and wish Garces not to fight between them, and that
Garces, that heed to such request and attacked Navarro (p. 52 of the record), this aggression or
attack could not be considered as one of the requisites or elements of self-defense, because "in a
fight arranged under agreement like the one that has taken place, the result of provocation and an
accepted challenge, the aggression is reciprocal and legitimate as between two contending parties,
though the same can not be qualified as a duel, for the reason that the conditions and elements
necessary to constitute this crime are not present." (Judgment of the supreme court of Spain, July
11, 1871.)

It is held in the decision of date May 30, 1892, as follows: "That in accordance with the many
findings of Sala Segundo, the acceptance of a personal fight excludes the application of paragraph 4
of article 8 of the Penal Code, which application and law relieves from all responsi thetirial of the
case, but we find is prror in the proceedings prejudicial to the real rights of the accused, and it is
unnecessary to discuss the assignments of error based on these objections.

The crime of which the accused was convicted is defined and penalized in paragraph 5 of article
535, read together with paragraph 3 of article 534, of the Penal Code, and the penalty prescribed is
that of presidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees. There being no aggravating or
extenuating circumstance to be taken into consideration, this penalty should be imposed in its
medium degree ,which, in accordance with the provisions of article 82 of the said code, is from one
year eight months and twenty-one days to two years eleven months and ten days of presidio
correccional. The trial court imposed the penalty of one year and six months of imprisonment in
Bilibid, and failed to impose the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and this sentence should
therefore be reversed, and is hereby reversed, and instead thereof we impose the penalty of one
year eight months and twenty-one days' imprisonment ( presidio correccional), together with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and the payment to the agents of the China Mutual Life
Insurance Company, Limited, of the sum of 1,550.30 pesos, Philippine currency, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs in both instances. After the expiration of ten days
let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded
to the lower court for proper action. So ordered.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 10735. August 5, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO MENDAC, Defendant-Appellant.

Rovira and Amorsolo for Appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. HOMICIDE; SELF DEFENSE. — When two armed disputants mutually enter into the fight for which they
have prepared themselves, and for this purpose confront each other in the middle of the street, the fact that
one of them through the instinct of self-preservation is beforehand in attacking the other, without waiting to
be attacked, is a mere accident of the struggle, so it would be improper to apply to the case the exempting
circumstance of self-defense, established in No. 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code; nor can the affair be
classified as a duel, even though both disputants exhibited a decided willingness to quarrel and attack each
other, for the conditions fixed by the law for the crime of dueling, especially penalized by the Code, were not
present.

2. ID.; EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES; LACK OF INTENTION. — When the assailant with a definite and
perverse intention of doing injury inflicts upon his victim a serious and fatal wound in the abdomen, he
cannot be given the benefit of the third circumstance of article 9 of the Code, for it is not to be believed that
he had no intention of killing his victim.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

This case has been brought up on appeal filed by the defendant from the judgment of March 18, 1916,
whereby the Honorable W. E. McMahon, judge, sentenced him for the crime of homicide to the penalty of
fifteen years of reclusion temporal, to an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the victim, and to the costs.

Between 2 and 3 of the afternoon of March 8 of this year when, along with others, the victim Anselmo Badan
and the defendant Francisco Mendac had been gambling in the house of Nicolasa Piñol, situated in
Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, these two quarreled and started to fight but were separated by the lieutenant
of the barrio, Crispulo Patron, and others present. The disputants then retired to their respective houses;
but about an hour later the defendant Mendac, who lived on the hill beside the place where the gambling
had occurred, left his house and went along the road at the side of the house of the victim Badan, distant
some 20 brazas from the house in which they had been on the point of fighting, to a place opposite that in
which the defendant lived with respect to the house where the gambling occurred. At that moment when the
victim Badan saw the defendant coming he asked him if he was willing to fight, to which the defendant
replied affirmatively, whereupon the victim came down out of his house with a bolo for the purpose of
fighting with the defendant who was also armed with a bolo. Thereupon the defendant immediately attacked
the victim and inflicted upon him a serious and fatal wound in the abdomen, from which his intestines
protruded. He died an hour and a half later, and the physician who examined his corpse certified that he had
found a slash in the abdomen near the navel from which protruded a large portion of the intestines, and that
the victim had died as a consequence of this serious wound.

The facts set forth, duly proven in the present case, constitute the crime of homicide, provided for and
penalized in article 404 of the Penal Code, for after the altercation the defendant had with Anselmo Badan in
Nicolasa Piñol’s house, when they were prevented from coming to blows through the intervention of the
lieutenant of the barrio, Crispulo Patron, and others there present, the disputants returned to their
respective houses and at the end of an hour the defendant Mendac, who lived on the hill near by, came back
along the street beside the house of the victim Badan, who upon seeing him asked him if he was willing to
fight. The defendant replied affirmatively and waited, bolo in hand, for the victim to come down out of the
house, and when the latter reached the ground the two confronted each other, whereupon Anselmo Badan
immediately received a slash in the abdomen near the navel which made a serious wound that let out his
intestines and caused his death an hour and a half afterwards.

It has not been proven that in the commission of the homicide there concurred any of the qualifying
circumstances set forth in article 403 of the Code to determine the classification as murder. Nor does any
unlawful aggression, with the other requisites established in No. 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, appear to
have preceded the violent death inflicted upon Anselmo Badan: there is therefore no ground for the
allegation that the court incurred the fourth error assigned in the brief of the defense. If the defendant
Francisco Mendac, an hour after he had been separated by the lieutenant of the barrio from the deceased
when they were at the point of fighting on account of a violent dispute, had not left his home, which was
located some distance away from that of the deceased, and had not appeared in front of and close to this
latter house in the street, they would not have had the meeting that gave rise to the crime under
prosecution, because each had been on his guard against the other for some hours previous in the house
where the gambling occurred. When Anselmo Badan saw from his house the approach of the defendant and
immediately understood that the defendant was looking for a fight, he asked the latter if he was willing to
fight underneath his house, saying, according to the witnesses Crispulo Patron and Damian Barba: "Now
that we’re here, we can do as we like; so let’s end it now." This demonstrates that one was as anxious as
the other to fight, the defendant when he left his house and approached that of the deceased and the latter
in leaving his house when he saw his opponent in the street in front of it; and if it were true that the
defendant passed in front of the house of the deceased on his way to work he would have done so at the
usual hour when the laborers begin the work they are engaged in, and if he had not been looking for a
quarrel he would have turned aside and away from the scene of the occurrence when he saw Anselmo
Badan coming down out of his house to fight.

Both were armed with bolos, Anselmo Badan came down out of his house, the defendant Francisco Mendac
waited for him in the street ready to quarrel, so when the struggle between the two had begun the fact that
one of them was the first to attack. as is natural, is a mere accident of the contest. It would be improper to
apply to the case the exempting circumstance of self-defense, established by No. 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, for when the disputants were face to face mutually ready to attack, as occurred, it is improper to
admit unlawful aggression on the part of either of them and the need of self-defense, especially when both
by mutual consent made preparation and placed themselves ready to attack each other. Nor can the affair
be classified as a duel, although both disputants exhibited a decided willingness to quarrel and to attack
each other, because the conditions required by law to constitute the crime that of dueling, as especially
penalized by the Code, were not present.

We accept the ruling of the lower court and the classification it made in view of the evidence adduced at the
trial, because there is no ground or reason for making a different finding from the facts that occurred; and
as there did not concur in the perpetration of the homicide any extenuating or aggravating circumstance,
the penalty the law fixes for the crime must be imposed in its medium degree.

As for the first error assigned by the defense, it cannot be denied that the ruling of the lower court in
denying the motion to dismiss filed during the trial by counsel for the defendant is in accordance with law,
especially when such ruling is within the sound discretion of the court that tries the case and passes upon
the merits which the evidence developes; and the result of the trial has justified the correctness of said
ruling. Also the allegation is to be held groundless that the second error was incurred by the court in finding
that the defendant had appeared in the vicinity of the victim’s house, not in order to go to work in the town
of Dumaguete, but to continue the fight that had been interrupted some time before through the
intervention of the lieutenant of the barrio, and to kill the victim.

The trial court made no error in not holding in the defendant’s favor any extenuating circumstance, such as
Nos. 3 and 4 of article 9 of-the Code, for even though the defendant in attacking his adversary only inflicted
upon him a single wound the fact is that he slashed him in the abdomen with perverse intention and inflicted
upon him a serious and fatal wound; and therefore in doing so it is to be presumed that he definitely
intended to inflict upon him the greatest injury possible and even death. Nor can it be held that there was
provocation on the part of the victim, for if the defendant had not appeared in the street in front of the
victim’s house, perhaps the crime would not have been committed. Therefore it must be held that the two
were ready and willing to fight, for one sought the other and both at once confronted each other armed,
although the defendant, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, did not wait for his adversary’s attack
and was beforehand in striking him, thus inflicting a fatal wound.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, as we do affirm it, with the costs
of this instance against the defendant, with the further understanding that he be sentenced to the
accessories of article 59 of the Code. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.