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[G.R. No. 136142.

October 24, 2000]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR and BENITO GENOL, accused (Acquitted)
PASTOR TELEN, accused-appellant.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733
convicting the appellant of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68[2] of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,[3] in an Information that reads:

That on or about the 29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, in barangay Laboon, municipality of Maasin, province
of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 1,560.16 board feet of
assorted lumber flitches valued at TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (23,500.00), Philippine Currency, without any legal
document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon being arraigned on May 27, 1994, Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, assisted by counsel,
separately entered the plea of “Not guilty” to the charge in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala,
were on board a police patrol vehicle heading towards Barangay San Rafael, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of
the same municipality, they noticed a Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward the town proper of Maasin. Suspicious
that the cargo was illegally cut pieces of lumber, Police Station Commander Rojas maneuvered their police vehicle and gave chase.[4]
Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte, they ordered the driver, accused Benito
Genol, to pull over. Benito Genol was left alone in the truck after his companions hurriedly left. When asked if he had the required
documents for the proper transport of the pieces of lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol informed the police authorities that the
pieces of lumber were owned by herein appellant, Pastor Telen, while the Isuzu cargo truck bearing Plate No. HAF 628 was registered in the
name of Southern Leyte Farmers Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc. (SLEFAICO) which is a local cooperative.Consequently, Police Officers
Rojas and Bacala directed Benito Genol to proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin, Southern Leyte for further investigation.[5]
On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his office at the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas Bacala to inspect the pieces of lumber that were confiscated on October 29, 1993
in Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found that the cargo
consisted of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber of different dimensions with a total volume of
1,560.16 board feet.[6]
Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt [7] covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and
one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3
Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian, Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO,
Maasin, Southern Leyte.[8]
The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the Information. Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial
Health Office, Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his
grandparents in Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing that it was prohibited by law to cut trees
without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain
Lando dela Pena who was an employee at the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena accompanied Telen to the office of a certain Boy
Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve of the plan of Telen to cut teak or hard
lumber from his (Telen) mother’s track of land in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed Telen to
cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could cut
the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the
renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings. [9]
On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire for him a cargo truck in order to haul the sawn lumber
from the land of his mother in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. His cousin obliged after Telen assured him that he had already
secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before cutting the said lumber.[10]
After having been informed by Vicente Sabalo on October 29, 1993 at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon that a cargo truck was
available for hire, Telen instructed his cousin to personally supervise the hauling of the sawn lumber for him inasmuch as he was busy with
his work in the office. At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Telen learned from his daughter that the sawn lumber were confiscated by the
police in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[11]
Upon arrival in Barangay Soro-Soro, Telen was accosted by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded from him DENR
permit for the sawn lumber. After confirming ownership of the sawn lumber, Telen explained to Rojas that he had already secured verbal
permission from Boy Leonor to cut Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, to be used in the renovation of his house and that he had
already replaced the sawn Dita trees with Gemelina seedlings, but to no avail. Rojas ordered that the pieces of lumber and the Isuzu cargo
truck be impounded at the municipal building of Maasin, Southern Leyte for failure of Telen to produce the required permit from the
DENR.[12]
Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in Maasin, Southern Leyte for investigation in connection with the
confiscated pieces of lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-in-Charge Boy Leonor of the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte after the
confiscation of the sawn lumber on October 29, 1993 and even during the investigation conducted by the CENRO hearing officer for three
(3) times but to no avail, for the reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at a reforestation site in Danao, Cebu province. [13]
Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local cooperative engaged in buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator
testified that on October 29, 1993 at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a certain Vicente Sabalo, accompanied by their company driver, Benito
Genol, proposed to hire the Isuzu cargo truck owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of coconut lumber from Barangay San Jose to
Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin, Southern Leyte. He readily acceded to the proposal inasmuch as the owner of the alleged coconut lumber,
according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who is a long time friend and former officemate at the provincial office of the Department of
Health. Besides, the fee to be earned from the hauling services meant additional income for the cooperative. [14]
At about 6:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu cargo truck of SLEFAICO, Inc. at the Canturing bridge in
Maasin, Southern Leyte, being escorted by a police patrol vehicle, heading towards the municipal town proper. At the municipal hall building
of Maasin, he learned that the Isuzu truck was apprehended by the police for the reason that it contained a cargo of Dita and Antipolo
lumber without the required permit from the DENR. He explained to the police authorities that the Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to
transport coconut lumber, however, it was impounded at the municipal building just the same. [15] Due to the incident Dator lost his job as
accounting manager in SLEFAICO, Inc.[16]
For his defense, Benito Genol testified that he was employed by the SLEFAICO, Inc. as driver of its Isuzu cargo truck. Aside from
transporting abaca fibers, the Isuzu cargo truck was also available for hire. [17]
While Genol was having the two tires of the Isuzu cargo truck vulcanized on October 29, 1993 in Barangay Mantahan, Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Vicente Sabalo approached him and offered to hire the services of the cargo truck. Genol accompanied Sabalo to the
residence of the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., Alfonso Dator, which was nearby, and the latter agreed to the proposal of Sabalo
to hire the Isuzu cargo truck to haul pieces of coconut lumber from San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte, for a fee. [18]
At 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, Genol, Sabalo and a son of Alfonso Dator, proceeded to San Jose after fetching about
six (6) haulers along the way in Barangay Soro-soro. Upon arrival in San Jose, Genol remained behind the steering wheel to take a rest. He
was unmindful of the actual nature of the lumber that were being loaded. After the loading, Genol was instructed to proceed to Barangay
Soro-soro in front of the lumberyard of a certain Jimmy Go. Before the lumber could be unloaded at 8:00 o’clock in the evening Genol was
approached by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded DENR permit for the lumber.The pieces of lumber were
confiscated by Rojas after Genol failed to produce the required permit from the DENR office. [19]
Vicente Sabalo corroborated the testimonies of the three (3) accused in this case. He testified in substance that he was requested by
his cousin, Pastor Telen, to engage the services of a cargo truck to transport sawn pieces of lumber from San Jose to be used in the
renovation of his house in Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte; that he approached Benito Genol and offered to hire the services of the Isuzu
cargo truck that he was driving; that both of them asked the permission of Alfonso Dator who readily acceded to the proposal for a fee of
P500.00;[20] that he saw Genol remained behind the steering wheel as the loading of the lumber was going on in San Jose; and that the
lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck were confiscated in Barangay Soro-soro for failure of his cousin, Pastor Telen, to show to Police Station
Commander Alejandro Rojas any written permit from the DENR for the subject lumber. [21]
After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. CONVICTING the accused PASTOR TELEN beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and there being no modifying
circumstances, and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable, the herein accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees
higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. His bail for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and he shall be committed to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila thru the
Abuyog Regional Prisons, Abuyog, Leyte via the Provincial Warden, Maasin, Southern Leyte;
2. ACQUITTING co-accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol on reasonable doubt for insufficiency of evidence; and cancelling their
bail;
3. CONFISCATING and SEIZING the 1,560.16 board feet of illegal lumber worth P23,500.00 and ORDERING the CENRO Maasin,
Southern Leyte to sell the lumber at public auction under proper permission from the Court, with the proceeds thereof turned
over to the National Government thru the National Treasury under proper receipt, and to REPORT the fact of sale to this Court
duly covered by documents of sale and other receipts by evidencing the sale within five (5) days from the consummation of
sale; and
4. DIRECTING the CENRO authorities to coordinate with its Regional Office for immediate administrative proceedings and
determination of any administrative liability of the truck owner, SLEFAICO Inc. if any, otherwise, to release the truck to its
owner.

SO ORDERED.

In his appeal Pastor Telen interpose the following assignments of error:


I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P.
D. 705, AS AMENDED, BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FOR BEING NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH DENR
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 79, SERIES OF 1990.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR THE ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, IT BEING A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS PENALTY NOT WARRANTED BY ANY PROVISION OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR JURISPRUDENCE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED LUMBER IS P23,500.00 FOR NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH
VALUE WAS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
It is not disputed that appellant Pastor Telen is the owner of the fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber with a total
volume of 1,560.16 board feet. He alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose,
Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. After having
been confiscated by the police, while in transit, in Barangay Soro-soro, appellant Telen failed to produce before the authorities the required
legal documents from the DENR pertaining to the said pieces of lumber.
The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his
subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. [22] Section 68 of the code provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License .-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case
of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found.
Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin,
Southern Leyte before cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that written permit was not anymore necessary
before cutting soft lumber, such as the Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to be used in renovating appellant’s
house, provided that he would plant trees as replacements thereof, which he already did. It must be underscored that the appellant stands
charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, a special statutory law, and which crime is considered mala
prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been
violated.[23] The motive or intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of the
confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his criminal
liability.
In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-
CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact that he had no legal documents to support valid possession
of the confiscated pieces of lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort during the trial to avail
of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative evidence, the trial court did not commit an error in
disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant on this point which is, at best, self-serving.[24]
The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990 [25] which
prescribes rules on the deregulation of the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber planted in private
lands. Appellant submits that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within
titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra,
molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak,
tindalo and manggis.
Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium
species enumerated under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987. However, under the same DENR administrative order, a
certification from the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and
disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section
68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and “legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.” The pertinent portion of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990, is quoted hereunder, to wit:

In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to promote the planting of trees by owners of private lands and give incentives
to the tree farmers, Ministry Administrative Order No. 4 dated January 19, 1987 which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting
and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and Falcate (Albizzia falcataria) is hereby amended to
include all other tree species planted in private lands except BENGUET PINE and premium hardwood species. Henceforth, no permit is
required in the cutting of planted trees within the titled lands or tax declared A and D lands with corresponding application for patent or
acquired through court proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of
1987, provided, that a certification of the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared
alienable and disposable land is issued accompanying the shipment.

Appellant Telen next contends that proof of value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is indispensable, it being the basis for the
computation of the penalty prescribed in Article 309 in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code; and that in the absence of any
evidence on record to prove the allegation in the Information that the confiscated pieces of lumber have an equivalent value of P23,500.00
there can be no basis for the penalty to be imposed and hence, he should be acquitted.
The appellant’s contention is untenable. It is a basic rule in criminal law that penalty is not an element of the offense. Consequently,
the failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of its allegation in the Information with respect to the value of the confiscated
pieces of lumber is not necessarily fatal to its case. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as
appearing in the official transmittal letter[26] of the DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte addressed to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of the same province, is P23,500.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, the said transmittal letter cannot serve as
evidence or as a valid basis for the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber for purposes of computing the proper penalty to be
imposed on the appellant considering that it is hearsay and it was not formally offered in evidence contrary to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
In the case of People vs. Elizaga,[27] the accused-appellant therein was convicted of the crimes of homicide and theft, and the value of
the bag and its contents that were taken by the accused-appellant from the victim was estimated by the prosecution witness to be
P500.00. In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its contents at
P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes,[28] this Court held that if there
is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.
In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials
as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may also be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere
janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his
house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending criminal case involving
violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this
case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article
309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple
theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two
degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.[29] Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[30] the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable of
violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,1 as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720
which affirmed in all respects the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this petition is the September 22, 2006
Resolution4 denying petitioners’ Motion for

Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

In a Criminal Complaint6 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto),
Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of
Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No.
705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.7

Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Resolution 8 dated March 13, 1996 recommending
the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo
Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria was likewise
recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through a Resolution9 dated May 9, 1996
ordering the filing of the Information in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information10 was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:

That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary
grade below 27, taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named
accused, all private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada, confederating and mutually helping one
another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging
to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued atP108,150.00, without
any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. 12 They alleged that the Joint Affidavit13 of the personnel
of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while
the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted that their
indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared
to have participated in the commission of the crime charged.

Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order14 dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to
file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. On
March 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation15 but same was, however, denied by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
in an Order16 dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or
irregularities that are prejudicial to the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined that Villarin was directly implicated by
Latayada, his co-accused.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty.17Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On December 31, 1995, at around five o’clock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public utility
jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons, one of
whom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified by Granada.18 They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15
meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala
(Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber. 19 Being then the president of a
community-based organization which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,20 Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count
the timber.21

At six o’clock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon) 22 noticed that the pile of timber was already
placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that the
timber would be used for the repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac delivered
the timber.23

Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven o’clock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a
stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the
pile with coconut leaves.24

On January 13, 1996, at around ten o’clock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality of
RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber25 hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a bodega at
the other side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches
and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet26 and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.

Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan,
Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that the
timber was already delivered on December 31, 1995.27

On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office, received and signed for the confiscated
timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense

In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin,
decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.

Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability of
timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and
Boyatac to attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber
flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, the security guard on
duty.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatac’s demise.28 However, the trial court did not act on
such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners and
the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The dispositive portion of the
Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and
Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences
each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.29

In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who
procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by transporting the
flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were
intended for the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The
Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it
a laudable motive. The fact remains though that the said forest products were obtained without the necessary authority and legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.30

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration31 which was denied by the

RTC in its Order32 dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano
Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to cost.1avvphi1

SO ORDERED.33

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 which the appellate court denied for lack of merit in its Resolution 35promulgated on
September 22, 2006.

Issues

Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD
WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT,
TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE
GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].36

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. As
Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force
Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who appear to be
equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse
of discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in refusing
and to equally prosecute the guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutor’s Certification 37 contained
in the Information to the effect that a preliminary investigation was conducted in the case.

Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had no intention to
possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present
the timber, which were the object of the offense.

Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with violation
of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.38 The said complaint did not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither was the
notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits
were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said infirmities do not constitute
denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused
participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.39 They knew about the
filing of the complaint and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity to submit
countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarin’s motion for
reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was properly conducted in
this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who is presumed to have regularly
performed his official duty.40 Besides, it aptly noted that "Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996
before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration
of witnesses."41
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial
court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily
"involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial
finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation." 42

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the
Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during
his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and
testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the
preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.43 Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a
preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have
waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of the offense. However, whether
Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in
questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria. 44 Having failed to avail of
the proper

procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.

Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case
of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.

"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations." 45

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents.

We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the

burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners
were in custody of timber without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)
were not submitted by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing TSNs. Notwithstanding the incomplete TSNs, we still
find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners’ culpability.

The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet46 to prove
that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised value of said timber
were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in the custody of
Alarcon47 and eventually taken to the DENR Office.48 There was a photograph of the timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas. 49

The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that Latayada and
Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.50

More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the timber 51 for the repair of the Batinay
bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him
of the delivery of timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and pursuant to
existing forest laws and regulations.

Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:

Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain
Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.
Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi even
up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A That’s true because he even has a record with the police.
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in
Lumbia, kilometer 5.
Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to load illegally cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.
Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan transacted
with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to build his house and he told me he will sell it for
the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.
Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.
Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?
A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me sign it.
Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?
A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.
Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you ordered on
board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already there. So, it was delivered.
Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?
A Boyatac.
Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.
Q To whom did you give the advance?
A To Latayada.
Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?
A No, Sir.
Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How much?
A P2,000.
Q And you gave this to the conductor?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did the conductor say?
A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber from Tagpangi.52(Underscoring ours.)

Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is

malum prohibitum.

As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. "However, the
prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi)" the timber. 53 "Possession, under the law, includes
not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate
physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found." 54

There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and
Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any competent authority.
Given these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was
not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been established. They assert that the failure to
present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

We disagree. "[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal
sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" 55 or, in this
case, to the seized timber. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single
witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence."56

Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. The
Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of
the petitioners themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were charged with were
likewise crucial to their conviction.
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings of a trial court are binding on us, absent
any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and substance. 57 The legal precept applies to this case in
which the trial court’s findings were affirmed by the appellate court. 58

The Proper Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:

Art. 310. Qualified Theft – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery,
or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x

The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the requisite legal documents measuring 4,326
board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this
amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber
exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its maximum, the range of
which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the
RPC was alleged in the Information, the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00. This
remainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to
the basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18)
years of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree lower from prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years
of prision mayor.

Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC rendered its Judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the modificationS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170589 April 16, 2009


OLYMPIO REVALDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review by petitioner Olympio Revaldo (petitioner) seeking to reverse the Decision 1dated 23 August 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22031 affirming the Decision2 dated 5 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Maasin, Southern Leyte (RTC-Branch 25), in Criminal Case No. 1652, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession
of lumber in violation of Section 683 of the Revised Forestry Code (Forestry Code).4
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code, in
an Information5 which reads:

That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, in the (M)unicipality of Maasin, (P)rovince of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess 96.14 board ft. of the following species of flat lumber:

1. Six (6) pcs. 1x10x7 Molave;


2. One (1) pc. 2x6x6 Molave;
3. Two (2) pcs. 2x4x6 Molave;
4. Two (2) pcs. 1x10x6 Narra;
5. Two (2) pcs. 2x8x7 Bajong;
6. One (1) pc. 1x6x6 Bajong;
7. Four (4) pcs. 1x6x6 Magkalipay; and
8. Three (3) pcs. 1x6x5 Magkalipay;

with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from
proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented SPO4 Constantino Maceda (Maceda), Sulpicio Saguing (Saguing), and SPO4 Daniel Paloma Lasala (Lasala) as
witnesses.

Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified that on 18
June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas (Rojas), SPO3 Melquiades Talisic (Talisic) and SPO3 Nicasio
Sunit (Sunit) to the house of petitioner to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the necessary
documents. They were not armed with a search warrant on that day. They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties lying
around the vicinity of the house of petitioner. Maceda asked petitioner who the owner of the lumber was and petitioner replied that he
owned the lumber. Petitioner stated that he would use the lumber to repair his house and to make furniture for sale. Maceda also testified
that the lumber were freshly cut. Maceda loaded the lumber on the patrol jeep and brought them to the police station. For coordination
purposes, Maceda informed the office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) of the confiscated lumber. The
DENR entrusted to the police custody of the lumber.6

Saguing, Forester II, CENRO-DENR, Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified that he went to the office of the PNP in Maasin, Leyte to scale the
confiscated lumber which were of different varieties. The total volume was 96.14 board feet belonging to the first group of hardwood
lumber.7

Lasala, Responsible Supply Sergeant, Finance Sergeant and Evidence Custodian, PNP, Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified that he received the
20 pieces of assorted sizes and varieties of lumber from the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, but only ten pieces remained
because some were damaged due to lack of storage space. 8

For the defense, petitioner presented Dionisio Candole (Candole), Apolonio Caalim (Caalim), and himself as witnesses.

Petitioner testified that he is a carpenter specializing in furniture making. He was in his house working on an ordered divider for a customer
in the morning of 18 June 1992 when policemen arrived and inspected his lumber. Maceda, Sunit and Rojas entered his house while Talisic
stayed outside. Petitioner admitted to the policemen that he had no permit to possess the lumber because those were only given to him by
his uncle Felixberto Bug-os (Bug-os), his aunt Gliceria Bolo (Bolo), his mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio (Tenio). The seven pieces of "magkalipay"
lumber were left over from a divider he made for his cousin Jose Epiz. He explained further that the lumber were intended for the repair of
his dilapidated house.9 The defense presented Caalim to corroborate the testimony of petitioner.10

Defense witness Candole testified that it was Bug-os who hired him to cut a "tugas" tree on his land, sawed it into lumber and delivered the
same to petitioner who paid for the labor transporting the sawn lumber. Candole further testified that while they were on their way to
Barangay Combado, Sunit stopped them but allowed the lumber to be brought to the house of petitioner. 11

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court stated that petitioner failed to present Bug-os, Bolo, and Tenio to attest to the fact that they sought prior DENR permission
before cutting the trees and sawing them into lumber. The trial court further stated that the Forestry Code is a special law where criminal
intent is not necessary. The Secretary of the DENR may issue a Special Private Land Timber Permit to landowners to cut, gather, collect or
remove narra or other premium hardwood species found in private lands. Transportation of timber or other forest products without authority
or without the legal documents required under forest rules and regulations is punishable under Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Petitioner
did not present any document as required by law.

The RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment on 5 September 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged and sentencing him as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused OLYMPIO REVALDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and,
crediting him with one mitigating circumstance before applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby SENTENCES him to an
indeterminate imprisonment term of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS ofPRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum, and to pay the costs.

The 21 pieces of flat lumber of different varieties, scaled at 96.14 board feet and valued at P1,730.52 are hereby ordered CONFISCATED
and FORFEITED in favor of the government particularly the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte which shall sell the same at public auction and
the proceeds turned over to the National Treasury.12

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals


On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that motive or intention is
immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability.
Hence, the present petition.
The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not
have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when they
went to his house to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the corresponding license. The police
officers who conducted the search in the premises of petitioner acted on the basis only on the verbal order of the Chief of Police. Sunit had
already informed the team of the name of petitioner and the location the day before they conducted the search. Petitioner argues that, with
that information on hand, the police officers could have easily convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
search warrant, but they did not. Because the search was illegal, all items recovered from petitioner during the illegal search were prohibited
from being used as evidence against him. Petitioner therefore prays for his acquittal. 1avvphi1.zw+

In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines (respondent) contends that even without a search warrant, the personnel of the PNP
can seize the forest products cut, gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 13of the Forestry Code.

There is no question that the police officers went to the house of petitioner because of the information relayed by Sunit that petitioner had
in his possession illegally cut lumber. When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the vicinity of
petitioner’s house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. This Court had the opportunity to
summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the case of People v. Doria, 14 to wit:

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.15

When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the
lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police
officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant.

The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the required permit to possess the forest products cut is sanctioned by Section
68 of the Forestry Code which provides:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in
the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be
liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.16

As the Court held in People v. Que,17 in the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting,
or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is
immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the
Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper documentation
as malum prohibitum.

On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the
forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or
is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Section 80 reads:

Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. - A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner
categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents
therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without
the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law.

On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem it necessary to discuss the matter. Violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is
punished as Qualified Theft with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, 18 thus:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal,
as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos
but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200
pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50
pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3
of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos,
and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding articles, x x x.

The trial court applied Article 309(3), in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the amount involved
was P1,730.52. However, except for the amount stated in the Information, the prosecution did not present any proof as to the value of the
lumber. What the prosecution presented were the Seizure Receipt19 and Confiscation Receipt20 stating the number of pieces of lumber, their
species, dimensions and volumes, with "no pertinent supporting document." These do not suffice.

As we have held in Merida v. People,21 to prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or
fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.

Accordingly, the prescribed penalty under Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
However, considering that violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code pursuant to the Forestry Code, the prescribed penalty shall be increased by two degrees, 22 that is, to prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum term shall be taken from anywhere within the range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months of arresto mayor, which is the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. We find it proper to impose upon petitioner, under the
circumstances obtaining here, the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision convicting petitioner for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code, as
amended, with MODIFICATION as regards the penalty in that petitioner Olympio Revaldo is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

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