CHINESE AND INDIAN ENGAGEMENT IN

AERICA: COMPETITIVE OR MUTUALLY

REINEORCING STRATEGIES?

Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

TJiis article explores the strategies used by China and India to build a strong relationships
with Africa. It analyzes China and India's competing interests and strategies around
four broad issues: access to Africa's potentially vast markets, development cooperation,
diplomatic influence and energy security. Several questions are raised based on the nature,
similarities, differences and impacts of Chinese and Indian strategies. Will these create
a new dynamism in South-South relations, or lead to a new form of asymmetrical rela-
tions between Africa and its Asian giant friends? Wliat are the likely implications of
closer Sino- and Indo-African ties for the continent's relations with the West, Africa's
traditional trading partner, with which it has long-established relations, economic ties
and strategic interests? In seeking explanations or answers, we caution that the differences
between Chinese and Indian strategies of engagement are more of form than intent, under-
scoring the primacy of the competing national interests that do not completely foreclose
mutually reinforcing strategies. We note that India's strategies presently swing between
playing "catch up" with China—which has deaHy made greater inroads—and pragmati-
caHy accommodating Chinese and other interests in Africa. There are even instances, as
in the case of the Sudanese oil industry, in which Chinese and Indian oil companies are
cooperating as partners in an oil-producing consortium, despite competing in other African
countries. Wltile the emerging scenario is one of competition that is moderated to some
extent by accommodation, we conclude, based on certain conditions, that in the medium
to long term, India may turn out to be more competitive than China in its engagetnent
strategies with Africa.

O ver the last decade, China and India, two emerging global economies, have
become Africa's most important economic partners, and their growing engage-
ment with the continent is transforming Africa's international relations in a dra-
matic way. This relationship has evolved over time, but is currently dominated by

Fantu Cheru is research director at the Nordic Africa Institute and professor emeritus of African and
Development Studies at American University. Until recently, Cyril Obi was a senior resarcher and
¡eader of the Research Cluster on Conflict, Security and Democratic Transformation at the Nordic
Africa Institute.

Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2. SPRING/SUMMER 2011 | 91
© The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York
 Eantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

competing interests in trade, investment, economic cooperation and the quest for
influence. Trade between China and Africa is believed to have grown from about
$20 billion in 2001 to $120 billion in 2009.' In the same regard, estimates suggest
that trade between India and Africa rose from $9.9 billion in 2004-05 to $39.5
billion in 2008-09.^ While securing energy resources is a critical factor in China's
and India's expanding relations with Africa, both countries are also strength-
ening trade, investment and aid ties with Africa through various bilateral and
multilateral forums such as the Asia-Africa Summit, the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), the China-Africa Business
China's and Council (CABC), the India-Africa Forum Summit
Tndia's PrOwinP (IAFS), the India-Africa Project Partnership and the
° ?, India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum.
engagement with Africa, with an estimated population of about
tne continent 900 million, is a potentially huge market for invest-
is transforming ments and manufactured commodities. In addition,
AT- ' given its vast natural resource wealth, including oil,
the continent offers a trove of natural and energy
lnLernatlOnai resources—raw materials in high demand by the
relations in a rapidly industrializing Asian giants. Also, given the
d Til m a t i r WÍÍV socioeconomic and security challenges facing Africa,
including the poverty of a vast majority of its peoples,
the continent offers a developmental opportunity for aid, cooperation and peace
support operations based on Southern solidarity.
This article explores the competitive and mutually reinforcing strategies used
by China and India in Africa. It also provides explanations for the ways competi-
tion between them has to some extent been moderated by accommodation as they
pursue their interests in Africa. In setting about its task, this article is divided into
four broad sections. The introduction addresses the background and key issues,
including how the rising profile of China and India in Africa affects the continent's
relations with its traditional trading partners in the West, who are concerned about
what it could mean for their own interests and influence in Africa. It is followed
by an analysis of Africa's embrace of China and India. The third section explores
the similarities and differences between Chinese and Indian strategies of engage-
ment and their implications for Africa's development. The last section discusses
how competing strategies have been moderated by accommodation. It concludes
that under certain conditions in the medium to long term India may turn out to
be more competitive than China in Africa.

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

AFRICA: THE "BIG PRIZE"

China and India have, in the context of their respective global activism, con-
tinued to open up and expand investment and trade opportunities, as well as to
pursue strategic, energy and food security interests in Africa. This feeds into a
view of Africa as a "big prize," partly because the continent is seen as a source of
new growth in a highly competitive yet interdependent world. This perception,
along with the quest for influence in the continent, underpins the competing
interests of both countries in Africa. These competing interests and corresponding
strategies revolve around four broad issues: access to
Africa's markets, opportunities for development coop- The
eration, strategic and diplomatic influence and energy rnntinpnt offpr«;
and resource security. . .. .
Some recent figures suggest that China has ^ developmental
overtaken the EU as Africa's second largest trading Opportunity lOr
partner and is the largest source of African imports, aid COOüeration
in a context where EU-Africa trade is in decline and j ,
,,,.,, , . . and peace support
beset with troubles linked to protracted negotiations ^ ^^
over a new trade agreement, seen by many Africans as Operations
unfairly skewed in Europe's favor.^ Europe is therefore on
keen to regain its place of prominence in Africa's trade,
partly by seeking ways of addressing the competition
from China, including what it considers to be the dire implications of China's
tactics in the "new scramble for Africa.""* Other commentators are of the view that
it is the United States that has been displaced by China as Africa's second largest
trade partner.^ U.S.-Africa trade is concentrated in select African countries and is
largely dominated by oil. Thus, there are concerns about the likely implications
of China's aggressive search for oil deals in Africa for U.S. energy security, even
though it has been noted that China's oil companies lag far behind the Western
and especially U.S. multinationals that dominate the African oil sector.^
China-Africa and India-Africa trade have also raised some concerns in Japan,
which seeks resources from Africa, even though Africa accounts for only about 2
percent of Japan's total global trade. Japan, using cooperation and trade forums
such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is
intent on closing the gap in the competition for Africa's resources by doubling trade
with the continent in a context where the rate of growth in China's and India's
trade with Africa has far outpaced Japan-Africa trade.'
It is important to note that the United States, the EU and Japan, faced with a
rapid rate of expansion in China-Africa and India-Africa trade—a rate that exceed
theirs—are critical of China's methods. In their view, these give China undue

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 Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

advantages and block political and economic reforms in Africa.^ What is clearly
at stake are competing Western and Eastern interests in Africa, and the ways in
which Eastern expansion is likely to threaten or undermine medium- to long-term
Western strategic, economic and political interests in Africa. What is not usually
mentioned is that the emerging Eastern powers are also key partners of the West in
the global market, and a force to be reckoned with within the post-Cold War inter-
national political economy. In other words, Africa is at the center of competing
interests. These dynamics will shape the development
The differences ^f African countries and Africa's international rela-
betWeen Chinese '^'^"^ ^""^ ^'^'^^ '"^ ^" emerging global order.
J J. Africa's position as a center of East-West compe-
dllU. lllU-ldll tition raises the question of whether there exists a
strategies tor coherent African strategy for harnessing the poten-
enffaffin? Africa '''^' developmental spin-offs that could accrue from
r r increased investments, trade and aid from the Asian
a r e m o r e or r o r m . ^. ^ • ^ ^, ^^r, ^
giants, and ir one does not exist, what should be done
intent. to create one. Another related question is whether
new engagement between Africa, China and India
will amount to the continent replacing Western economic domination with
Eastern economic domination.
Out of the two Asian giants, China's engagement in Africa has attracted more
attention. According to Naidu, this is because India is a democratic state and is
thus viewed as less of a threat.' Apart from possible ideological concerns, some
Western commentators are critical of China's "no political strings attached" aid
and its non-interference policies, which they note are largely "supportive of illib-
eral regimes" and "undermine efforts by international organizations to promote
accountability, sustainable development, and environmentally sensible projects in
Africa."'" Others are less enamored of the view that China's resource diplomacy
often thrives on supporting regimes with poor human rights records such as Sudan
and Zimbabwe, or undercuts Western businesses by selling at low prices in Africa.
They argue that Western anxieties are partly driven by perceived threats to their
own competing interests in African resources, markets and spheres of influence."
Although China's economic ties with Africa are more extensive in comparison
to India's, the latter is moving quickly to expand its presence in Africa and close
the gap with its Asian neighbor. The April 2008 India-Africa Forum Summit
held in New Delhi—though modest by comparison to the China-Africa Forum
of November 2006 and attended by fewer African heads of government—demon-
strates India's commitment to putting its own footprint in Africa as it competes
with China and other developed countries to secure energy and other raw material

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

resources in order to fuel its growing economy.'^

The relations between tbe two countries in Africa are ratber complex and, in
some cases, problematic. This article argues that the differences between Cbinese
and Indian strategies for engaging Africa are more of form tban intent, under-
scoring the importance of competing national interests that do not foreclose mutu-
ally reinforcing strategies or forms of cooperation and accommodation of each
others' interests. This is partly because botb countries and those in Africa are all
responding to the challenges of surviving in a highly competitive and rapidly glo-
balizing world. It is also noted tbat both China and India are keen to ensure that
their engagement with Africa does not alienate their own international partners
nor undermine their broader global interests and relationships.

W H Y HAVE CHINA AND JNDIA BECOME AFRICA'S PREFERRED PARTNERS?

China and India are not newcomers to Africa. Botb countries have had long
historical, political and economic relations with the continent.'^ The most recent
pbase in relations has been cbaracterized by the determination of both countries
since the end of the Cold War to articulate and pursue clear Africa strategies
hinged on South-South solidarity, win-win equal partnership and mutual respect
and benefits. Tbis new policy thrust is also directed at enhancing China and
India's global status as great powers in their own right. In the case of China, this
was in furtherance of its "Go Out" policy aimed at ending the country's isolation,
winning more friends (while promoting the view that Taiwan is part of China and
not a separate entity) and promoting its peaceful rise as a global power. On India's
part, it marked a turn from its ratber political approach to a more pragmatic eco-
nomic one that sought to connect the needs of its rapid industrial growth with its
global aspirations, including support for its quest for a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council.
As far back as 2000, China establisbed FOCAC as a platform for dialogue on a
just and equitable international order and cooperation between China and Africa.
In January 2006, the government of China issued its African Policy Paper.''' In the
white paper, the Chinese government declared its commitment to a new strategic
partnership with Africa in the long term on the basis of five principles: peaceful
coexistence, respect for African countries' independent choice of development
path, mutual benefit and reciprocity, interaction based on equality, and consulta-
tion and cooperation in global affairs.'^ Tbe release of the first African Policy Paper
coincided with a landmark third FOCAC summit held in Beijing in November
2006 (tbe second was beld in Addis Ababa in 2003) and attended by more tban
forty-five African heads of states. Since then, the frequency of official exchanges
between Africa and China has multiplied and two-way trade between China and

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 Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

Africa now exceeds $120 billion annually.

In the case of India, the establishment of the IAFS did not take place until
2008, eight years after China had kicked off its forum for engaging Africa. Like
FOCAC, the IAFS emphasized a new partnership based on equality, mutual respect
and understanding between both sides. Since 2008, India has intensified its efforts
to engage Africa at the regional, bilateral and people-to-people levels.
China and India were warmly welcomed to
China and India Africa amid an emerging shift in attitudes toward
^^^ Western world on the part of a growing propor-
tion of Africans. Disenchantment with the poor track
LO record of Western development cooperation over the
Africa amid an past fifty years, the double standards that Western
emerP'in? shift i n governments practice in their relations with African
, , •, 1 , 1 states, and the tendency to give aid with one hand
and to retrieve it from Africa with the other through
t n e VVeSLern unfair trade practices, capital flight and debt struc-
WOrld on the tures, has generated a lot of debate among Africans
DP r t o f a OTOwi n o ^^^"^ ^^^ P^^*" ^^'^^^^ ^^'^ ^^^ served as a rallying point
. r foi" pursuing an alternative and independent African
r r development agenda.'^ Africa has vet to recover from
a decade of rather socially challenging structural
adjustment and economic reform policies. Although
these policies opened up the continent thanks to the adoption of liberal investment
policies, the impact of economic reforms on local industry, infrastructure and state
welfare services was largely negative. From an African perspective, the emergence
of China and India as potential important development partners came at a time
when Africans themselves were engaged in a major soul-searching exercise to find
out what had gone wrong with Africa's development in the past half-century.
China's and India's historical experiences, respectively as former semi-colony and
colony, and their spectacular development experience since the mid-1970s have
raised hopes among African nations that they too can one day break away from
the shackles of poverty, underdevelopment and aid dependency.'^
This shift in attitude was reinforced by the visibility of Chinese and Indian
companies investing heavily in the much-neglected infrastructure sector of many
African countries—from the construction of dams to major transport and tele-
communications projects, which are critical for raising productivity and reducing
poverty.'^ The Chinese and Indians have been able to address the critical infra-
structure gap cheaply, less bureaucratically and in a shorter timeframe. These
strategic investments and increased trade have helped some African countries

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

such as Angola and Sudan register impressive growth rates for the first time in
many decades. The positive growth rates have further been fuelled by China's
and India's demands for African resources to feed the appetite of their growing
economies. Indeed, China has emerged as Africa's second largest trading partner
and is currently the biggest lender and investor for infrastructural development on
the continent.
Chinese and Indian leaders and diplomats fre- When China
quently express the view that Africa is a dynamic con-
tinent on the threshold of a development takeoff with
unlimited business opportunities that would serve
Chinese, Indian and African interests.'"^ Therefore,
when China does make pronouncements about devel- i+ ííVOids
opment cooperation, it avoids the language of aid t r
AA y . • A• A C u language of
and development assistance and instead prefers the o o
rhetoric of solidarity, mutually beneficial economic aiQ an
cooperation, common prosperity and shared devel- the
oping-country status. Granted that there is more to _r
the rhetoric than the eye can see, this is music to the
ears of the majority of African leaders and elites, who ailU. LOIIlIIlOIl
are weary of what they perceive as Western pater-

Equally important is the demonstration effect of China's and India's own

development experiences to African countries. What has been central to the eco-
nomic success of these Asian countries is the role played by the state in guiding
the market and the willingness of the state to intervene and experiment with
heterodox policies to revive the economy, compete in global trtarkets and reduce
poverty in the process of moving in a free-market direction.2' Heavy investment
in infrastructure, education, research and development (as opposed to the defla-
tionary and austerity measures demanded by the Bretton Woods institutions) were
complemented with adjustable policies designed to enhance the competitiveness
of local producers through technological retooling and workers' retraining, then
deregulating the market accordingly.
These factors have helped rekindle interest within Africa in the role of devel-
opmental states and the importance of experimenting with heterodox economic
policies in order to successfully navigate the cold currents of economic globaliza-
tion, as China and India have both done successfully. The two Asian giants have
made great progress in transforming their backward economies and have been
able to reduce absolute poverty dramatically (particularly in the case of China)
in a relatively short period of time, under the guidance of a strong, development-

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 Eantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

oriented activist state.

There is a growing view that African countries can learn a lot from the Chinese
and Indian economic reform programs of the past thirty years without having to
import either the "Beijing Consensus" or the "Delhi Consensus" to Africa in their
entirety. Chinese and Indian aid to Africa, though wrapped in the rhetoric of "no
strings attached," is however not completely unconditional, even though it holds
some appeal based on the view that it supports the
Although the developmental aspirations of African states.
Indian state has ^ T r^ c
CHINA AND INDIA: DIFFERING STRATEGIES FOR
Stepped up its ENGAGING AFRICA
support ror tne While some of the strategies that China and
private sector's india employ to extend their influence in Africa may
p r r .i. If V»QQ appear similar, they are not identical. Naidu points
out that similarities "can be found in their demand
HOL Ueen auie LO ^^^ resource security, trade and investment opportu-
match the deep nities, forging of strategic partnerships, and the spirit
Dockets of the °^ ^^^ Bandung Conference, African-Asian solidarity
/-11 . , , and South-South Cooperation."^^ ßoth countries
Chinese state. u • .u • u - . ^• •u u
emphasize their historical ties with the continent,
underlining their solidarity in the form of an equal
partnership based on mutual respect and equal benefits.
Although India consistently denies any competition with China, it has cast the
latter as a "fair-weather friend" while presenting itself as an "all-weather friend"
to Africa.^^ As India's foreign minister noted in March 2010, "we do not wish to
go and demand certain rights or projects or impose our ideas in Africa. But we do
want to contribute to the achievement of Africa's development objectives as they
have been set by our African partners."^"* The reality is that both countries present
themselves as partners to Africa in the quest for a more equitable global economic
order, including helping the continent develop and helping the majority of its
people overcome poverty.
Chinese investments in Africa are rather complex, but have been dominated
by large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These tend to operate in the extractive
(oil and mining), construction, agriculture and capital equipment sectors. Indian
investments in Africa are largely driven by the private sector. Although the Indian
state has stepped up its support for the private sector's efforts to penetrate the
African market, it has not been able to match the deep pockets of the Chinese
state. Thus Chinese investment has been more aggressive, with SOEs enjoying
both political and financial support to undercut other competitors in the African

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

market, including Indian private sector investors.

China's strategy for promoting investments in Africa includes the establish-
ment of a China-Africa Development Fund (CAD) to support companies wishing
to invest in Africa, the provision of low-interest or interest-free loans through the
Bank of China, the Exim Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank, and the
establishment of bilateral agreements with African countries. Such agreements
usually cover large-scale projects and double-taxation treaties to promote Chinese
direct foreign investments in Africa.•^^ Such investors enjoy state support, which
is enhanced through intense diplomatic initiatives or forums such as FOCAC and
high-level visits by Chinese officials to Africa. Alden provides a good descrip-
tion of Chinese strategies in Africa as including competitive political advantage,
which means cooperating with any state "regardless of its international standing;"
comparative economic advantage based on the use of a "low-cost bidding strategy,
centred on skilled and semi-skilled Chinese labour" and "diplomacy and develop-
ment assistance."^*
India's approach to investments in Africa is also tied to its rhetoric of true
friendship with the continent, but distances itself from the Chinese strategy of
state-backed resource diplomacy (and extraction).^'' It also refers to a renaissance in
India-Africa relations that is underpinned by India's sincere intentions toward and
respect for Africa. While emphasizing its cooperation initiatives aimed at capacity
building and technology transfer to the continent, India uses several strategies to
promote investments and trade in Africa. For instance, by the end of March 2009,
$2.27 billion (60 percent of total EXIM bank credits) went to African countries.
It also announced a duty-free tariff preference program for thirty-four African
countries.^^
The India EXIM Bank has partnered with the Indian government and the
Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) to organize the Conclave on India-Africa
Project Partnership, which has acted as a catalyst in India's economic relations
with Africa.^' The Conclave has held annual meetings involving many African
states since 2005. The meeting held in New Delhi from 15 to 16 March 2010
attracted "380 participants, representing thirty-four African countries to discuss
business transactions and about 150 project investments to the value of approxi-
mately $10 billion."3o
India's relations with Africa include relatively modest but highly valued aid,
economic cooperation and technical assistance programs. This includes the Focus
Africa Programme launched in 2002, through which the EXIM Bank supports
Indian trade missions to Africa and extends lines of credit to Africa's regional
economic blocks such as the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

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 Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The Focus Africa
Programme has also supported the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India
Movement with nine African countries (TEAM 9), launched in 2004, and has
provided training and technical assistance to African countries through the
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program (originally estab-
lished in 1964 to promote South-South cooperation). Such lines of credit support
India-Africa trade. Similar initiatives include the Special Commonwealth African
Assistance Programme (SCAAP) and the Pan-African e-Network Project in part-
nership with the African Union, aimed at building an Africa-wide electronic
network to provide tele-medicine and tele-education
Africa is through wireless connectivity.^'
n^irtirnliïrK^ India has also consolidated its presence in Africa
. . . through the IAFS. Though modest by comparison
attractive as the ^-^^^ ^^^ F O C A C of November 2006, IAFS demon-
latest frontier m strated India's commitment to making its mark in
Q\\ Africa amid competition with China and with devel-
oped countries to secure energy and other raw mate-
rial resources to fuel its growing economy. During the Conclave meeting in Delhi
last year, India seized the opportunity to set the agenda for the next IAFS in 2011,
where it hopes to further extend its gains in Africa. The Indian private sector has
expanded investments in the African agricultural, power, pharmaceutical, infor-
mation and telecommunications sectors. Small- and medium-scale enterprises in
some African countries have also been the focus of the renaissance in India's policy
toward Africa.
The competition between Cbina and India in Africa can also be seen from the
strategies they have adopted in pursuit of their energy security interests. China is
the world's second largest importer of oil (importing about 46 percent of domestic
oil consumption), while India is the world's sixth largest (importing 70 percent of
domestic oil consumption). Energy security is writ large in the strategic interests of
China and India, as both seek to diversify and expand their sources of oil and gas
from the Middle East to Central Asia, Russia, Africa and South America. Africa
is particularly attractive as the latest frontier in global oil, where new oil fields are
being discovered in the context of an investor-friendly climate.
Several commentators have noted that China has been more successful than
India in gaining access to Africa's oil.^^ This is attested to by investments by
Chinese SOEs in Sudan, Algeria, Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia,
Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. India lags behind China in this regard.
China's strategy for oil in Africa is twin-pronged: it has engaged Africa's big
oil producers such as Nigeria, Angola and Sudan by offering them integrated

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

packages of aid and low-interest/interest-free loans, and it has targeted less visible
African oil producers such as Gabon and Equatorial Cuinea for its oil deals. The
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) holds 40 percent of the shares
in the Greater Nile Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) of Sudan and also owns 41
percent of the shares in Sudan's Petrodar oil consortium, along with Sinopec
(China Petrochemical Corporation), which owns 6 percent of the shares. China
also "assisted Sudan with oil infrastructure, including the construction of an oil
pipeline to the Red Sea as well as an oil refinery."^^
Angola is Africa's leading oil exporter to China, accounting for about 13
percent of China's oil imports. China was able to secure a major stake in Angola
when Sinopec gained access to its oil in 2004 through a low-interest loan and aid
package valued at $2 billion and targeted at building, transportation, education
and health infrastructure, the construction of offices and the laying of a fiber-optic
network.^"* Sinopec also outmaneuvered India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
(ONGC) in 2004, when the latter's offer of a $310 billion deal was no match for
a $725 billion infrastructure development deal from China.^^ In 2006, Sinopec
acquired an offshore block valued at $1 billion in Angola. Apart from the oil-for-
infrastructure deals, China offered credit to support infrastructure projects in
Angola.
In Nigeria, the Chinese National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquired
a 45 percent stake in the Akpo offshore oil field in 2006 (the Indian government
considered the oil field a risky investment and declined to approve ONGC's initial
bid), and, in 2006, was granted the right of first refusal to four other oil blocks as
part of an oil-for-development deal involving "$4 billion worth of investment in
infrastructure."^"^ Sinopec was also part of a consortium that was granted'concession
in 2006 over oil block 2 in the Nigeria-Sao Tomé ÍSL Príncipe Joint Development
Zone (JDZ) and commenced exploration in July 2009. Following the 2009 acquisi-
tion of Addax, a Swiss oil company, Sinopec-Addax announced in July 2010 that it
had struck oil in its offshore Udele-3 well of oil block 137 in the Niger Delta.^^
The China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) signed an
oil deal valued at $8 billion with the Lagos state government and the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in July 2010 to build a 300,000 barrel
per day oil refinery and a liquefied petroleum plant at the Lekki Free Trade
Zone (LFTZ) in southeast Lagos state, with CSCEC providing 80 percent of the
financing.^** In clinching this deal, CSCEC outmaneuvered Indian-owned ONGC
and Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL), which had earlier been in talks with the
Lagos state government but failed to reach an agreement. CSCEC also signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with NNPC to build three refineries in
another attempt to reach an infrastructure-for-resources deal after an earlier oil

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 Eantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

for development deal reached with CNOOC under the Obasanjo Administration
in 2007 failed and was cancelled by the Yar'Adua government.^'
Two issues flow from the foregoing. The first is that China's strategy for energy
security has been underpinned by a resource diplomacy in which the state has
backed its SOEs with substantial amounts of cash. This has resulted in some suc-
cesses. Though China remains far behind the United States and some EU coun-
tries in accessing Africa's oil it has outbid its rival, India, in the new scramble for
Africa's oil. India is more dependent on imported oil, but has so far been unable to
match the financial muscle of Chinese state-backed
India's oil *^il diplomacy in Africa. Drawing on instances in
!_„„ Angola, Sudan, Nigeria and most recently Uganda,
where Chinese oil companies out-competed Indian oil
companies, it has also been noted that delays related
promoting to bureaucratic red tape in the context of Indian
its credentials democracy are also partly responsible for India's
as Africa's true aversion to proactive risk-taking and lack of quick
decisionmaking.'"'
This does not, however, mean that China is always
successful in its bids for access to Africa's oil. There
have been cases where African states have refused or blocked Chinese oil bids. In
2009, the Nigerian government rejected CNOOC's offer of interest in twenty-three
oil fields for which leases to Western oil multinationals were due to expire after
news of the offer was leaked to the press. This occurred just as the Angolan state
oil company Sonangol, adept at asserting itself with regard to diversifying foreign
investments in Angola's oil sector, reportedly blocked CNOOC and Sinopec's bid
to acquire Marathon Oil's stake in offshore oil block 32.'"
The second issue is that, in spite of several losses to its Chinese rivals in terms
of winning oil deals in Africa, India has continued to look for niches where it can
maximize its comparative advantage in relation to Chinese and Western competi-
tors while pragmatically cooperating with them. India's oil diplomacy has taken the
form of promoting its credentials as Africa's true friend, and establishing a formal
energy cooperation and trade program through the India-Africa Hydrocarbon
Conference, launched in 2007.
As a leading supplier of India's African oil imports, Nigeria has been a key
target of Indian energy security calculations. The Indian prime minister visited
key African oil producers, including Nigeria, in 2007. After losing to China in
the Akpo deal in 2006, India resorted "to an oil-for-development strategy and the
ONGC Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL) succeeded in getting a $6 billion invest-
ment deal to build a refinery, power plant and railway line in 2006."''2 Through this

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

deal, OMEL was allocated two oil blocks, which were later withdrawn after the
deal fell through and the oil blocks were reallocated by the Yar'Adua presidency.*^
Although promises were later made to return or give India new oil blocks, the situ-
ation so far remains unclear. In spite of its best efforts, "India's involvement in the
Nigerian oil industry has not paid the expected dividends.'"''' Indian oil companies
have also invested in other African countries such as Sudan, Libya, Gabon, Côte
d'Ivoire and the Nigeria-Sào Tomé & Príncipe JDZ.
India has continued to court African oil producers through bilateral and
regional channels and the platforms provided by the India-Africa Hydrocarbon
Conference. In the 2009 Conference, India's strategy as articulated by a leading
official of its Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas encompassed promoting the
country as a major global oil refining hub and offering Indian oil investments and
expertise to Africa for the development of its oil and gas sector and for the benefit
of its peoples.''^
There is growing evidence that India has intensified its efforts and is making
some modest progress regarding gaining entry into Africa's oil fields. In December
2010, ONGC and Sonangol of Angola signed an MOU covering cooperation in
the areas of oil exploration and refining.''^ This was followed by reports that India
had expressed interest in sealing oil refinery and liquefied natural gas construc-
tion deals with Nigeria and Angola in exchange for oil access.''^ Thus, in spite of
earlier reversals in both countries, India's oil diplomacy appears to be making some
headway.
The unfolding scenario suggests that India is lagging behind China in the
race for Africa. This has been the case so far and is likely to remain so for some
time to come as China continues to press the advantage in its resource-backed
diplomacy with Africa. However, India has made a strong showing in Africa in
the information and communication technology, agriculture and power generation
sectors. Examples of this include the acquisition of the African assets of Kuwait's
Zain telecommunications company by the Indian telecommunications company
Bharti Airtel in a deal valued at $10.7 billion (one of the largest made globally
by any Indian company, giving it access to millions of mobile telephone users in
a vast African market), and the billions of dollars worth of Indian investments in
Africa's agricultural sector, including those by private Indian power companies in
South Africa such as Tata Power and Reliance Power, among others."*^ We agree
with the view among some Indian scholars and commentators that India may, in
the medium to long term, gain considerable comparative advantage over China due
to its closer proximity to Africa, its historical ties (including a significant Indian
diaspora that can communicate in local languages in some African countries), the
sharing of English as a common language, the special niches to promote its friend-

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Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

ship with the continent and its excellent educational and training opportunities
and democratic systems."*'
However, this will depend on a radical paradigm shift in India's foreign policy
bureaucracy, a coherent and more creative use of its large diaspora communities
in Africa and the capacity to successfully adapt its "low-cost high efficiency busi-
ness model" to the conditions and priorities of African people.^" This will require
greater effort on the part of the Indian state, ruling elite and private sector. Such
an effort will demand a lot of political will, resources and time, and will also have
to contend with China's proactive policies. Beyond this lies the response of African
countries to the emerging powers, and their ability to transform the new oppor-
tunities represented by the shift to a global axis of power and to engage emerging
and established powers from a coherent and stronger platform.

CONGLUSION
The foregoing analysis shows that China's and India's engagement with Africa
has far-reaching implications both for the world and the continent in particular.
With regard to the latter, the challenge in our view is what lies in store for Africa,
and what options it can pursue in terms of taking advantage of the current moment
to accelerate its drive toward development.
In spite of the evidence of India's oil scramble with China in Africa, and
China having the upper hand, the tendency has been to overlook the pragmatism
that can also be found in India's relations with Africa. This trend cannot be sepa-
rated from the reality that the two countries are regional neighbors in Asia with
common interests requiring cooperation. China and India have close economic
relations, with the former being the latter's biggest trade partner.^' Also, it is noted
that "India aspires to evolve a common energy strategy that could mitigate the
vagaries of the global oil market."^^ This is partly demonstrated by a 2006 initia-
tive in which China and India signed a joint memorandum to bid jointly for oil
projects. The two have cooperated in oil operations in Iran, Colombia and Syria.^^
In Africa, such cooperation can be gleaned from ONGC's (25 percent) partner-
ship with the China National Petroleum Corporation (40 percent), Petronas (30
percent) and Sudapet (5 percent) in Sudan's Greater Nile Petroleum Corporation
(GNPC). India's ONGC-Videsh (13.5 percent) is also in partnership with Sinopec
(28.7 percent), ERHC (22 percent), Addax (now Sinopec, 14.3 percent). Equator
(9 percent), MoMo Deepwater JDZ Limited and Foby Engineering (each with 5
percent), and A & Hartman (2.5 percent) in an oil exploration consortium oper-
ating blocks 2 and 4 in the Nigeria-Sâo Tomé & Príncipe JDZ.^''
China and India "have mostly managed to compartmentalize their differ-
ences," and are both engaged in a softer form of power projection in Africa, leading

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

to a combination of policy actions characterized by swings between competition

and accommodation.^^ But just as they compete and cooperate with each other,
they do so with Western and emerging powers that engage Africa. The hallmark
of this development is the combination of competitive and mutually reinforcing
strategies that emerge on a case-by-case basis, amid concerns that a growing pres-
ence in Africa should be peaceful and consistent witb the global ambitions of
China and India and with their broader relations with
the world's established and emerging powers. Thus, China and India
apart from the fact that the competitive strategies " h a v P mo<stlv
adopted by both countries are not entirely dissimilar, j -^
the subtle differences should not be exaggerated. l l l d l l d g C t l LO
What is relevant in our view is that the competition Compartmentalize
between these Asian powers is underpinned by both their differences"
suspicion and accommodation in relation to the race j i ., i
r ... and are both
for Africa.
On the question of whether the strategies they e n g a g e d m a SOtter
adopt are mutually reinforcing, the answer varies form of pOWer
from one case to the other, depending on the country r>roiprtTOn i n
and the sector of the economy involved. Beyond an Ar •
understanding of the need to accommodate each rxilH^d.
other's interests and to compete and cooperate in the
pursuit of their interests, it is not clear that China and India are working together
on a common strategy for engaging Africa. While China has an Africa policy, India
does not, though it has clear principles on the basis of which it engages Africa.^^
The picture is complicated by the fact that Africa, in spite of the rhetoric, does not
have a single, coherent policy for engaging Asia's emerging powers. Rather, the ini-
tiative in the courtship has been taken up by China and India, with Africa basking
in the attention and benefits it is getting.
We note that the responses, particularly of African governments, have been
positive in the short term, partly as a result of higher returns from commodity
exports fuelled by excessive demands from botb countries. Wbile the examples
of China and India are appealing to African countries, they are not entirely free
of tensions. These include: competition between cheap(er) manufactured goods
produced in China and India and more locally produced African manufactures,
the former stifling the latter; limited local insourcing by Chinese and Indian
companies operating in Africa; poor labor and environmental practices in Chinese-
owned companies; and the large-scale importation of low-skilled Chinese labor to
work on construction sites in Africa. In addition, Chinese political and economic
support for illiberal regimes and the increasing securitization of Africa's oil sector

SPRING/SUMMER 2011 I 105

 Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

contributes to emerging or potential sources of tension with African countries.^''

Thus, there is a need for realism on the part of African governments to correctly
read the trends in the evolving global order and not merely exchange one set of
asymmetrical relations (those with the West) for another (new relations with the
East).
It is still too early to tell whether the two Asian giants' growing interest in
Africa is going to constitute a new dimension of South-South relations. The key
for Africa is to have visionary leaders with a clear and coordinated strategy at the
national and regional levels in order to engage the
Africa does not emerging giants from a stronger and well-informed
it cinalp platform. African governments must formulate and
^ .. debate a coherent and focused African policy toward
poney china and india in order to negotiate with, and relate
for e n g a g i n g Asia's to, both countries.
emerPinP" DOWerS ^^ ^^^ national level, such a policy should empha-
D +V» +V» ^'^^ strategic integration based on appropriate mac-
' roeconomic structural and social policies that favor
initiative m tne a strategic opening to the global market, and clearly
courtship hasbeen connecting national interests to economic and struc-
t i ï l c p n Tm \wr C^\\\T\^ tural change. At the regional level, African countries
J _ J. will need to harmonize industrial, infrastructural,
foreign direct investment, trade and resource extrac-
tion policies so as to direct China and India's atten-
tion toward areas of national and regional interest, using subregional economic
groupings like ECOWAS, the East African Community, the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and the African Union, as well as pan-African
private sector and civil society organizations. Though there may be competing
interests among African countries, the evidence so far suggests that bilateral part-
nership agreements only contribute to fragmenting the continent and weakening
the bargaining power and capacity of individual African countries to pursue their
interests.'^ The question is not so much a choice between Europe and China (or
any other actors interested in African resources and markets). The challenge lies in
pooling efforts and setting a new course to make optimal use of the new scenario
for the majority of African people.
A potential space exists for Africa to turn the strategy gap between Chinese
and Indian strategies of engagement with the continent to its own advantage,
but this requires both a strategic integration at the national level and a regional
approach to engaging China and India. In the absence of visionary African leader-
ship and concerted and well-thought-out African action, the relationship with the

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

emerging Southern powers could turn out to be colonialism by invitation. '^

NOTES

' Fantu Cheru, "The Rise of China and India in Africa: What Should be Africa's Response?" The
Nordic Africa Institute (2010), http://www.nai.uu.se/forum/entries/2010/06/29/the-rise-of-china-and-
ind/inde.x.xml.
2 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) News Update, "India Has a Key Role in Africa's MSME
Development" (CII: 13 March 2010), http://wvvw.cii.in/PressreleasesDetail.aspx?id=2692&gid=&Sec
torID=S000000084&regionid=&conid=&nrid=&.StateID=.
^ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "Economic Development in
Africa Report 2010" (New York and Geneva, UNCTAD: 2010), 30, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
aldcafrica2010_en.pdf.
'' Michael Deibert, "EU Seeks to Subdue a Competitive China," IPS News, 15 May 2008, http://
ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42381.
^ Peter Feuilherade, "China-Africa Trade Set for Record High," SuitelOl, 21 October 2010, http://
www.suitel01.com/content/china-africa-trade-set-for-record-high-in-20I0-a299243.
^ Erica Downs, "The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations," China Security 3, no. 3
(2007), 44.
Shinichi Terada, "Japan Aims to Double African Trade,"/a/;«« Times Online, 30 May 2008, http://
search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20080530al.btml. According to a recent report, while trade between
Japan and Africa doubled between 2001 and 2009, figures for the same period suggest that China-
Africa trade grew by 1,000 percent and India-Africa trade grew by 525 percent. Simon Freemantle
and Jeremy Stevens, "Emerging Economies Outpace Japan in the Battle for Trade with Resource-Rich
Africa," Africa Review, 28 September 2010, http://www.africareview.com/Business%20&.%20Finance/
Emerging%20economies%20outpace%20Japan%20in%20Africa/-/979184/1019890/-/kp5wwy/-/index.
html.
^ Stephanie Hanson, "China, Africa and Oil" (Council on Foreign Relations: 6 June 2008), http://
www.cfr.org/publication/9557/china_africa_and_oil.html.
' Bashir Adigun and Tom Maliti, "New Biz Expansion: Hello Africa, India Calling," Blootnberg, 10
January 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-I0/new-biz-expansion-hello-africa-india-s-
calling.html; Sanusha Naidu, "India's African Relations: In the Shadow of China?" in The Rise of China
and India in Africa, ed. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books in association with Nordic
Africa Institute, 2010), 36.
'" Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, "Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with Africa,"
African Studies Review 50, no. 3 (2007), 76; Linda Jakobson, "China's Diplomacy Towards Africa:
Drivers and Constraints," ¡tttentational Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9, no. 3 (2009), 406.
" Jakobson, 406.
'2 Joseph J. Schatz and Mark Sappenfield, "On China's Heels, India Vies for its Old Edge in Africa,"
Christian Science Monitor, 5 May 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/0505/p01s04-
woaf.btml/%28page%29/2; Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, eds., Tlte Rise of Chitia and India in Africa,
(London: Zed Books in association with Nordic Africa Institute, 2010), 5.
'^ Anand Sbarma, "India and Africa: Partnership in the 21st Century," South African journal of
hnernational Affairs 14, no. 2 (2007), 13-17; Wenping He, "China's Perspective on Contemporary
China-Africa Relations," in Chitia Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continetit Embrace, ed. Chris
Alden, et al. (London: Hurst and Company, 2008), 3-6; Peter Pham, "China's African Strategy and
Its Implications for U.S. Interests," American Foreign Policy Interests 28 (2006), 239-42; Peter Pham,
"India's Expanding Relations with Africa and Their Implications for US Interests," American Foreign
Policy ¡ntetests 29 (2007), 341-43; Naidu (2010a), 34; Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, "Introduction-
Africa in the Twenty-First Century: Strategic and Developmental Linkages," in Tlte Rise of China and
Itidia in Africa, ed. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books in association with Nordic Africa
Institute, 2010), 5.

SPRING/SUMMER 2011 I 107

Eantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

''l He, 143.

'^ "China's African Policy," People's Daily Online, January 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/20060I/12/eng20060112_234894.html.

'6 Cheru (2010).

'*" Paul Kagame, "Why Africa Welcomes the Chinese," Guardian (UK), 2 November 2009, http://
www.guardian.co.ulc/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/aid-trade-rwanda-china-west.

'** Cheru.
'^ "India Inc Has Unlimited Opportunity in Africa," Shashi Tiiaroor, http://tharoor.in/press/
interviews/india-inc-has-unlimited-opportunity-in-africa/; China's State Council, White Paper on
China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, 23 December 2010, http://www.gov.cn/english/offi-
cial/20I0-12/23/content_1771603.htm; "China-Africa Cooperation Overladen with Fruits," China
Daily Online, 3 November 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91421/6802280.html;
Speech by India's External Affairs Minister, Anand Sharma, at the Conclave on India-Africa Project
Partnership: Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) News Update, "India has a Role in Africa's
Human Development," CII, 15 March 2010, http://www.cii.in/PressreleasesDetail.aspx?id=2693&.gid
=&.SectorID=S000000060&.regionid=&conid=&nrid=&.StatelD=.

20 Cheru.
21 Ibid.
22 Naidu (2010a), 34-49; Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, "The Sino-African Relationship:
Towards an Evolving Partnership?" in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China, ed. Kweku
Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (Scottville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).
2^ Surendra Kumar, "Engaging Africa as an All-Weather Friend," Deccan Herald, http://www.deccan-
herald.com/content/41482/engaging-africa-all-weather-friend.html (accessed 21 February 2011).
2'' Sanusha Naidu "India Stepping u p t h e Ante in African Relations," Pambazuka News, 2 5 March
2010, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/63296.
2^ Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), "China in
Africa" (IDE-JETRO), October 2009, http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/
c i a _ l l . h t m l ; Todd Moss and Sarah Rose, "China Exim Bank and Africa: New Lending, New
Challenges" (CGD Notes, Center for Global Development, November 2006), http://www.eldis.org/
vfile/upload/l/document/0708/DOC22802.pdf.

26 Chris Alden, China in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2007), 4 2 .

2'^ Shashi Tharoor, "India N o t Competing with China over Africa," 15 March 2010, http://tharoor.
in/press/shashi-tharoor-india-not-competing-with-china-over-africa/
2^ Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), "Financial C o m m i t m e n t s for Infrastructure in
Africa for 2008," (ICA), September 2009, http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/2010/2008_
Financial_Commitments Eng PDF.pdf.
29 Naidu (2010a), 4 0 .
30 Naidu (2010b).
"" A n a n d Sharma, "India and Africa: Partnership in t h e 21st Century," South African Journal of
International Affairs 14, no. 2 (2007), 13-20; Naidu (2010a), 3 4 - 4 9 .
3^ Sanusha Naidu, "India's African Relations: Playing Catch u p with t h e Dragon" (unpublished
paper, UCLA African Studies Center: April 2007), http://www.international.ucla.edu/africa/grca/pub-
lications/article.asp?parentid=107303; Alex Vines, Lillian Wong, Markus Weimer and Indira Campos,
"Thirst for African Oil, Asian Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola" (A C h a t h a m House Report,
C h a t h a m House, London, 2009), http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14524_r0809_africanoil.pdf;
Cyril Obi, "Scrambling for Oil in West Africa," \nA New Scramble for Africa?, ed. Roger Southall and
H e n n i n g Melber (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2009).

"^"^ Cyril Obi, "African Oil in t h e Energy Security Calculations of China and India," in The Rise of
China and India in Africa, ed. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, (London: Zed Books, 2010), 184.
3" Ibid.
^^ Alex Vines and Indira Campos, "China and India in Angola," in Tlie Rise of China and India in

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 Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies?

Afriea, ed. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books, 2010), 205.
3^ Ian Taylor, "China's Relations with Nigeria," Round Table 96, no. 392 (2007), 636; Obi (2010)
181-92.
^'' "Sinopec Addax Strikes Oil at Nigerian Block", Reuters (Afriea), 12 July 2010, http://af.reuters.com/
article/investingNews/idAFJOE66B00P20100712.
3^ "Beijing Gazumps New Delhi," Afriea-Asia Confidential 3, no. 9 (2010).
-^' "Beijing Gazumps New Delhi;" Gregory Mthembu-Salter, "Elephants, Ants and Superpowers:
Nigeria's Relations with China," SAIIA Chitta in Afriea Projeet Oeeasiotial Paper 42 (September 2009),
13-14.
•*° "ONGC Arm Loses Race for Uganda Oil Bloc," Ordons News, 25 March 2010, http://www.ordons.
com/africa/east-africa/3691.html?lang=en.
"" Peter Forster, "China Seeks a Sixth of Nigeria's Oil Reserves," Tlie Telegraph (UK), 29 September
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/6241570/China-seeks-a-sixth-of-Nigerias-
oil-reserves.html; "China Thwarted Again in Africa as Sonangol Blocks Marathon Deal," Petroleutn
News, 11 September 2009, http://www.petroleumafrica.com/en/newsarticle.php?NewsID=8272&PHP
SESSlD=172d2fc6fab2O9828a9c5729221faO4f.
••2 Obi (2010), 188.
« Ibid.
'^'* Parvathi Vasudevan, "The Changing Nature of Nigeria-India Relations," (London: Chatham
House Programme Paper, 2010), 2.
"•^ Shri Sundareshan, "Inaugural Address," (inaugural address, 2nd India-Africa Hydrocarbons
Conference, New Delhi, 7-9 December 2009).
"•^ "Angola, India Ink Oil Exploration Deal," Afriea the Good News (South Africa), 27 January 2010,
http://www.africagoodnews.com/pan-africa/international-relations/1356-angola-india-ink-oil-explora-
tion-deal.html; "ONGC in Pact with Angola's Sonangol," The Hindu (India), 27 January 2010, http://
www.thehindu.com/business/companies/article95644.ece?service=mobile.
"•^ "India Steps up Securing Economic Foothold in Africa," Global Times (China), 5 February 2010,
http://business.globaltimes.cn/world/2010-02/502417.html.
^^ Such investments are to be found, though not exclusively in the following countries: Ethiopia,
Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal and Madagascar. See Renu Modu, "The Role of India's Private Sector in
the Health and Agricultural Sectors of Africa," in 77!« Rise of China and India in Africa, ed. Fantu Cheru
and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books, 2010), 123-27; John Cherian, "Grabbing Africa," Frotitlitie 11, no. 9
(April-May 2010), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2709/stories/20100507270906100.htm; Manish
Chand, "India-Africa: A New Business Chemistry," India Perspectives 24, no. 3 (July 2010), 20-29.
^' Renu Modu, "The Role of India's Private Sector in the Health and Agricultural Sectors of
Africa," in 77ie Rise of China atid Itidia in Afriea, ed. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books,
2010), 120-31; Balaji Chandramohan, "India Catching up with China in Mrica " Atlatitie Setitittel, 27
September 2010, http://atlanticsentinel.com/2010/09/india-catching-up-with-china-in-africa.
^° Balaji Chandramohan, "India Catching up with China in Africa," y4t/flj;ííc Sentinel, 27 September
2010, http://atlanticsentinel.com/2010/09/india-catching-up-with-china-in-africa/
^' "Fact Box - Top Issues in India, China Ties," Reuters, 10 December 2010, http://in.reuters.com/
article/idINIndia-53479920101210.
^^ P. R. Kumaraswamy, "India's Energy Cooperation with China: The Slippery Side," China Report
43, no. 3 (July 2007), 350.
53 Hongyi Lai, "China's Oil Diplomacy," Third World Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2007), 532-33.
5'' U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Sudan," http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Sudan/Oil.
html; Clara Nwachukwu, "Chinese Firm to Start Crude Exploration in JDZ," Next, 25 June 2009,
http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5430602-146/story.csp.
^5 "Fact Box - Top Issues in India, China Ties," Reuters, 10 December 2010, http://in.reuters.com/
article/idINIndia-53479920101210.
5^ Rajiv Bhatia, "India's Africa Policy: Can We Do Better?" Pambazuka News, 15 July 2010, http://

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Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi

www.pambazuka.org/en/category/af rica_china/65960.
57 Cheru.
5^ Fantu Cheru, "Love at First Sight! Or Confused Priorities? Decoding the Evolving China-Africa
Relations" (speech, UCLA Clobalization Center, June 2007).

110 I JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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